

Horst Ruthrof

Murdoch University

English and Philology

Perth, Western Australia 6150

 <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5018-5918>

Er(r)go. Teoria–Literatura–Kultura
Er(r)go. Theory–Literature–Culture
Nr / No. 48 (1/2024)
humanistyka/humanistyka/humanistyka II
humanities/humanities/humanities II
ISSN 2544-3186
<https://doi.org/10.31261/errgo.16019>



1790: The End of Truth in the Interpretation of Complex Contexts

Abstract: The paper argues that the standard pro- and anti-Kantian reception of the *Critique of Judgment* has largely misconstrued the relationship between Part I and Part II of the book by failing to recognize that the former is primarily providing a series of stepping-stones laying the groundwork for the elaboration of reflective-teleological reasoning in Part II. Instead of its dominant reading as foremost relevant to the study of biological nature, the paper distils from the reflective-teleological judgment a universal principle by which we typically interpret *any* complex set of particulars. As such, the reflective-teleological judgment of 1790 is shown to have done away with interpretive *truth*, replaced by Kant with the more modest claim of *intelligibility*.

Keywords: as-if causality, indeterminacy, projection, truth-claims, intelligibility

Introduction

Over the last 230 years, many a reader of Kant's *Critique of Judgment* must have wondered why in a book dealing with judgments the word 'truth' is mentioned only marginally. And where it is touched on it is hardly of consequence for the *Critique's* central concern.¹ Still, in the conceptual architectonics of the two earlier *Critiques* reasoning with concepts occupied centre stage in Kant's analyses. Thus, *formal* reason was separated from *pure* reasoning by virtue of their different genesis, the former operating with *stipulated* or *constructed* concepts, the latter derived from appearances via *abstractive* distillation. In this way, formal strings, such as $x = y^3$, can be neatly distinguished from such *pure* or *purified* concepts as *time*, *space*, or $E = mc^2$. Likewise, such empirical concepts as *gold* are uniquely characterized by the double wobbliness of their conceptual boundaries never being fully determinable and their semantic analysis never being complete² (*CPR*

1. Horst Ruthrof, *The Roots of Hermeneutics in Kant's Reflective-Teleological Judgment* (New York: Springer, 2023).

2. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965). All references to this edition are cited as *CPR*.

A728/B756). In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant sums up moral concepts as entirely different constructs as components of a modest metaphysics which cannot be derived from, but can only be imposed on, reality by social agreement under the principle of the *categorical imperative*, to “organize *empirical* presentations of sense according to an *a priori* principle.”³ Which leaves his treatment in the third *Critique* of merely aesthetic judgments based on feelings to be dismissed as non-cognitive and, beyond them, his all-important, *reflective-teleological* judgments, based on the principle of an *as-if causality* which we tend to apply to the cognition of works of art and other complexities. It is here that the Kant reception since the end of the eighteenth century has failed to recognize Kant’s revolutionary invention of a form of reasoning which we cannot but apply whenever we are confronted by opaque contexts demanding interpretation.

The standard reception of the *Critique of Judgment* suffers from having drawn too strong a distinction between the two parts of the book. Instead, it makes a lot more sense to view the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” of Part I as a set of necessary stepping-stones for the “Critique of Teleological Judgment” in Part II. Kant himself concedes that his treatment of “the power of judgment” in Part I does not have “all the lucidity that is rightly demanded.” Which, however, he believes he has “in fact attained in the second part of this work”⁴ (*CJ* Preface to the First Edition). As the paper will argue, what has gone wrong in the assessment of the *Critique* as a coherent whole is a misreading of Kant’s notion of *nature*, conceived as the “the sum of objects of the senses” and the “totality of appearances,” which include human culture as its highest form of development (*CJ* §61; *CPR* A114; *CJ* §83). In this sense, Kant’s separation of the aesthetic judgment based on mere feelings, together with the relegation of embellishments to what is inessential and the sublime as overtaxing our capacity to judge, from cognitive judgments establishes Part I of the *Critique* as a necessary clearing of the ground on which he was able to construct his last critical, and perhaps most important, concept, the *reflective-teleological* judgment.

The revolutionary characteristic of this innovative form of reasoning is that it does away with truth-claims in favour of the reduced assertability of *intelligibility*. Accordingly, we can make a case for Kant’s *interpretive* reason, that is, *reflective-teleological* judgment formation, functioning as a critique of *determining* reason as it appears in the employment of *formal*, *pure*, and *empirical* judgments both in deductive and inductive contexts. Neither formal, nor pure, nor even empirical

3. Immanuel Kant, *Opus Postumum*, trans. Eckart Förster and Michael Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 139.

4. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. James Creed Meredith, revised by Nicholas Walker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). All references to this edition are cited as *CJ*.

concepts are regarded here as sufficient for the kinds of judgments we routinely perform in the interpretation of culture, history, economics, politics, and above all in personal, human interaction. Rather, the paper contends, we cannot but negotiate such complexities by way of the kind of reasoning which Kant identified as *reflective-teleological*. Contrary to judgments making truth-claims, their *interpretive-projective* statements are *heuristic, open-ended, and indeterministic* in the service of *intelligibility* rather than of truth.⁵ What Kant foregrounds in such cases is thinking in terms of *parts and wholes, systematicity, means-ends relations*, and *understanding* as a *social process*. Methodologically, the paper is committed to a phenomenological, intentional act description as eidetic, inter-subjective generalization. Which means revisiting Kant through Husserlian eyes.

The Critique of Truth in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*

Looking at Kant's conceptual architecture as it is presented in the three *Critiques*, we cannot but notice a peculiar, chiasmic relationship in his critical concepts between their subject-predicate relations and the speech community in which they operate. Leaving aside Kant's *transcendental reasoning* as one of his major *methodological* tools, in *formal* reasoning, as in $x = y^3$, the subject-predicate relation is deductively secured, while the input by the community is limited to the right to reject its "dictatorial authority" and to vetoing participation. This, on the grounds that reasoning must always rest on "the agreement of free citizens" (CPR A738f./B766). In *pure* reasoning, as in the *abstraction* of the *a priori* generality of *time* and *space* from the temporality and spatiality of experiences, the subject-predicate relation is fully determined, while the community is involved as the necessary medium in which such concepts are instantiated. In the remainder of Kant's critical concepts, the subject-predicate gradually weakens, whereas the role of the community significantly increases. In all *empirical* forms of reasoning, both the boundaries and the analysis of concepts change under the auspices of the community over time, resulting in gradual *semantic drift*. This relation shifts even further towards the input of the community in *moral* reasoning, where what is predicated as acceptable and unacceptable is fully determined by community agreement. A similar dependency relationship exists in Kant's *non-cognitive, merely aesthetic* judgments which are circumscribed by *taste* and merely individual likes or dislikes and where truth-claims are no longer applicable. Finally, in cognitive, *reflective-teleological* judgments, appropriate for the interpretation of all complex and opaque empirical contexts, the subject-predicate relations are characterized

5. Horst Ruthrof, *The Roots of Hermeneutics, passim*.

by meaning negotiation within the cultural community, such that truth-claims give way to interpretive assertions in the service of *intelligibility*.

The decisive step Kant takes in *interpretive* reasoning in the third *Critique* beyond its precursors is that the former lacks not only the “genuinely universal validity” of deduction (CPR A196/B241), but even the merely “comparative universality” which can be “obtained through induction” (CPR A25/B40). And while in induction Kant had already discovered a “fictitious” ingredient (CPR A196/B241), in the *Critique of Judgment* he takes an important additional step, which is to argue for the necessity of an *artistic* component in the act of the interpretation of complex contexts. As *reflective* projection, this procedure becomes the central thrust of the third *Critique*, combining as it does Part I and Part II, progressing from an analysis of the limitations of merely aesthetic responses based on feelings and such limiting cases as ornaments and the sublime to genuine, *cognitive* judging in art appreciation and the complexities of nature, including human culture. As such, the *reflective-teleological* judgment is regarded in this paper as Kant’s most advanced, as well as most useful, critical concept, a reading which declares the *Critique of Judgment* the final crowing of Kant’s critical business.

The components of the reflective-teleological judgment

What makes *reflective-teleological* judgment the pinnacle of Kant’s conceptual architecture is that it marks the revolutionary moment in the history of philosophy when deterministic truth-claims are weakened to the assertability of *intelligibility* as more appropriate to acts of *interpretation*. Kant’s interpretive-projective approach is his answer to the problematic of rendering perplexing contexts of phenomena meaningful. What then does this procedure consist in and in what way is it tailor-made for the interpretation of human complexities? In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant conceives of interpretation as a compelling human response to “a need of the understanding” (CJ Intro V), a response that kicks in whenever our sense making routines prove inadequate to the task, that is, whenever the opacity of sets of “objects exceeds the capacity of the understanding” (CJ §76). The important consequence of this situation in Kant’s view is that when we fail to find such contexts meaningful in themselves, humans have the capacity to invent a solution which *declares* them so via reflective-projective reasoning. Here, our reason returns to itself in order to provide a “principle” which is lacking in the appearances before us (CJ Preface). He calls this a “subjective” principle, whereby Kant’s subjectivity, however, has nothing to do with anything *personal* or *private*. For whenever Kant wishes to refer to the latter, he identifies the merely private as such, as he does in §40 of the third *Critique*, where he singles out *subjektive*

Privatbedingungen. On this point, Gadamer has committed a major interpretive sin by advertently confusing Kant's species subjectivity with *subjectivism*.⁶

As to contextual opacity, the bridge that Kant builds between our overtaxed understanding and our "never-passive reason" is the *reflective-teleological* judgment (CJ §40), the conceptual climax of the third *Critique*. The source for this form of reasoning is identified as *Kunstverstand*, that is, the way we cognitively process works of art (CJ §85). For it is "in products of art" that "we can become aware of the causality of reason with respect to objects" (CJ FI IX). So, Kant declared the kind of *purposiveness* which we can discover in art a general principle for the transformation of opaque aggregates of particulars into meaningful wholes. How does this transformation work? As the term tells us, it consists of two constituents, *reflection* responsible for searching and sorting and *teleological* projection for a synthesizing interpretation. Reflection is to view puzzling aggregates of phenomena under an interpretive hunch, such that their individual specificity gives way to a unity. The non-Aristotelian *teleological* component can then be conceived as *indeterministic, heuristic subsumption*. Viewed as a mechanism, reflective-teleological reasoning is the combination of a bottom-up search and an always provisional top-down solution, the former raising a complex question, the latter providing a tentative answer.⁷

Systematizing means and ends as wholes

When we wish to make sense of baffling phenomena, one way recommended by Kant is their *logical* unification under a "higher guidance" (CJ §81), such as a "teleological system" or "organizing whole" (CJ §82). Only on such a premise "is it possible to order experience in a systematic fashion" (CJ FI IV). In this way, we "presuppose an idea of whole, according to a certain principle, and prior to the determination of the parts." As a result, "the whole becomes a system" (CJ FI XII). Without this *presupposition* "no empirical unity of these experiences could be established" (CJ FI II). Another way Kant argues for systemic interpretation is via a propensity of human cognition, when he writes that it is "the power of judgment" itself that likewise "presupposes a system" (CJ FI Vn4). This second argument rests on the *anthropic thesis* that humans are interconnected of necessity as part of nature. Not only are we bound to cognize "*experience* as an empirical system" (CJ FI XI; my emphasis), nature itself "as the sum of all objects of experience, comprises a system," including ourselves. Kant views this "thoroughgoing"

6. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Crossroad, 1985), 418; cf., however, Ruthrof, *The Roots of Hermeneutics*, 21ff.

7. Ruthrof, *The Roots of Hermeneutics*, 68ff.

interconnection as a transcendental law “which the understanding itself furnishes *a priori*” (CJ FI IV).

The kind of systematicity accomplished in this way by itself, however, remains an empty logic of relations in need of specification. Here, Kant introduces the principle of the interdependence of parts and wholes as means and ends, whereby “the concept of ends” as “purposiveness” is regarded as “a concept of reason” in the sense that it “attributes to reason the ground of the possible existence of an object” (CJ FI IX). At the same time, “where ends are thought as the sources of the possibility of certain things, means have also to be supposed” (CJ §78). From this basis Kant asks, what do aggregates of empirical particulars look like from the perspective of a “system of ends” (CJ §67), and “how does a whole become an end?” Kant’s precision answer is, “if it is *regarded* as the ground of a causality” (CJ FI IX; my emphasis). After all, ends are not “given to us by the object” (CJ §75). Nor is their existence provable; rather, they are “read into” the object of inquiry (CJ §61). Ends are always “posited” (CJ FI V). And yet, although ends are not given in objective reality (CJ §75), and are no more than a mere “idea” (CJ §71), they are indispensable for cognition (CJ §68). And since interpretation is required for the cognition of opaque contexts, it can be called a construction via “reason” within an ever-changing “system of ends” (CJ §82). As such, the imposition of *purposiveness* is always the exercise of a “heuristic principle” (CJ §78). When it is applied in interpretation, it appears in two forms, *extrinsically* where it serves “the advantageousness of a thing for other things” (CJ §63) and/or “where one thing in nature subserves another as means to an end” (CJ §82); it functions *intrinsically* as the contribution a part is making to a whole. In this sense, all interpretation is a positing by the “creative understanding (*schaffender Verstand*)” of “a causality according to ends” (CJ §82). Finally, Kant characterizes the parts that we view as making up a whole as presupposed by the whole as an end. The “synthetic unity” of wholes introduced in the first *Critique* is specified in the *Critique of Judgment* in the sense that when we posit a “whole” which, by transcendental necessity, “contains the source of the possibility of the nexus of the parts” (CPR A326/B383; CJ §77). For even to speak of a *part* “emphatically presupposes the idea of a whole” (CJ §77). So, if we wish to interpret a text purposefully, we cannot but “presuppose an idea of whole, according to a certain principle, and prior to the determination of the parts.” And “it is only in this way that the whole becomes a system” (CJ FI XII). All of which demonstrates that Gadamer was quite wrong when he attributed the analysis of part-whole relations primarily to the Romantics.⁸ What the Romantics failed to retain of Kant’s insights is the methodological advance he had made in identifying the limits of interpretation logically dictated

8. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 167; see, however, Ruthrof, *The Roots of Hermeneutics*, 5f.

by its *heuristic* and *indeterministic* character (CJ §§21f.; 62; 67; FI V, VI). What is likewise revolutionary here is Kant's finding that all interpretation employs the causality of *as-if*.

Kant's as-if causality as a nexus of architectonic thinking

Towards the end of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the notion of "architectonic" was defined as "the art of constructing systems," as distinct from thinking as "a mere rhapsody." Instead, reasoning ought to provide a "unity of the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea" (CPR A832/B860). This line of reflection is resumed in the *Critique of Judgment*, where Kant differentiates amongst various forms of causality, empirical, objective, mechanistic, and intentional. He calls a causality *empirical* if it "never strays from the sensible world" (CJ §71), *objective* if it is used for the collection of "many particular experiences" under an umbrella of means and ends (CJ Intro VIII), merely *mechanistic* if it refers to "the connection of the manifold without any concept underlying the specific character of this connection" (FI VII), and *intentional* if it relies on the *assumption of a design will* (CJ §75). The latter form of causality is viewed by Kant as an *as-if causality* in contexts where it serves the interpretation of complex constellations of parts (CJ Intro IV; §61). He also refers to this kind of causal nexus as a "causality of architectonic thinking" (CJ §71). Here we realize once more how closely Kant's reflective-teleological reasoning is related to the *arts*.

To interpret, then, is to "have recourse to a subjective principle, namely art, or causality according to ideas, in order to introduce it, on an analogy, as the basis of nature – an expedient that in fact proves successful in many cases" (CJ §72). However, proceeding interpretively on the analogy of the "causality of ideas" as in art does not mean that anything goes. To start off with we must adhere to empirical evidence, avoiding readings that are "*willkürlich*" (arbitrary), "*vermessen*" (presumptuous), "*unerweislich*" (lacking evidence), and "*schwärmerisch*" (ecstatic)⁹ (CJ §§68; 78). Still, because of "the contingency which we find in everything we imagine to be possible only as an end," we are inclined to view relations amongst parts of a whole in an artistic manner as unified by a merely *imaginable* "causality" (CJ §80). As a result, opaque contexts are rendered "explicable and intelligible" for us on the grounds of the "assumption on our part of a fundamental causality according to ends," that is, Kant's *as-if causality* (CJ §10). Elsewhere, Kant refers to such a "causality according to ends" as a "creative understanding," irrespective of intentional design (CJ §82).

9. Graham Bird, "Introduction" to "The Critique of the Power of Judgment," in *A Companion to Kant*, ed. Graham Bird (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 399–407, 405.

Thus, human understanding reveals itself not simply as a neutral mechanism of cognition, but as a set of creative acts driven by a need to understand, intellectual interest, and a dislike of ignorance (CJ §42). At the heart of Kant's as-if causality, then, is a reasoning response to reduce phenomenal chaos to systemic analysis based on the difference between the empirical causality of ordinary apprehension and the *as-if causality* linking the reflection on particulars as parts with of a stipulated whole. As a multi-faceted process, Kant's creative as-if causality is termed a "special kind of causality" in that it is repeatedly distinguished from the causality of a mere objective or "blind mechanism"¹⁰ (CJ §61). And since the proto-hermeneutic stipulation of a whole always "precedes the possibility of the parts," it is rightly "called an end, if it is regarded as the ground of a causality" (CJ FI IX). This merely cognitive picture is further complicated by Kant when he adds the principle of the broadened horizon involving the *sensus communis* (*Gemeinsinn*) in our reflective-teleological judgment (CJ §40).

The hermeneutic circularity of interpretation

In interpretation, each new cognitive emphasis affects all its parts. By viewing particulars and wholes "now as effect, now as cause" our as-if causality cannot but produce a certain hermeneutic circularity, called the *hermeneutic circle* by Friedrich Ast in 1808. But it was Kant's *heuristic* concept of interpretation which first turned the target of investigation into a self-generating object as "cause and effect of itself" (CJ §64). Interpretation in the reflective-teleological sense occupies the opposite end in Kant's system of critical concepts if compared to formal reasoning, a contrast that is mirrored in the relation between the certitude of determinant judgments of the latter with the indeterminacy of the former. The proto-hermeneutical circularity of interpretive-projective reasoning manifests itself in the *Critique of Judgment* in at least six ways: (1) as *reciprocity* amongst particulars (CJ §65), (2) as a consequence of every part "being reciprocally *purpose and means*" (CJ §66), (3) as circularity arising from *positing ends* "as the sources of the possibility of certain things" (CJ §78), (4) in that "every part is thought as owing its presence to the *agency* of all remaining parts and also as *existing for the sake* of the others and of the whole" (CJ §65), (5) in the guidance of our constructions by empirical "contingency," such that when "ends are thought as the sources of the possibility of certain things, *means* have also to be *supposed*" (CJ §§80; 78), and (6) in the fact that as soon as we posit our interpretation as preceding "the possibility of the parts," it is "a mere idea and is called an 'end', if it is regarded as the ground of a causality" (CJ FI IX). Such is the circularity of Kant's reflective-teleological,

10. Ruthrof, *The Roots of Hermeneutics*, 72f.

interpretive recursivity, a perspective which was to be influentially resumed and elaborated by Martin Heidegger in *Being and Time*.¹¹

Indeterminacy

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant distinguishes our “knowledge of the discursive type,” which typically employs *erörternde Begriffe* (discursive concepts) of *exposition*, from knowledge based on the determining concepts of *explanation*. What matters in this distinction is that “real explanation would be that which makes clear not only the concept but also its objective reality” by containing “a clear property by which the defined object can always be known with certainty and which makes the explained concept serviceable in application” (CPR A242n). In the *Critique of Judgment*, this distinction is succinctly sharpened by the formula “explanation means derivation” (CJ §78). Which is to say that *Erklärung* is always *derived* from “given laws,” whereas *Erörterung* merely “elucidates” and as such belongs to the language of interpretation (CJ §77). While the former entails a high degree of certitude, the latter cannot but admit to a certain degree of *indeterminacy*.

In the first *Critique*, Kant had already introduced the concept of *indeterminacy* as an inevitable feature of interpretation, such when the merely “regulative principle” presupposes a “systematic unity,” it can do so only “in an indeterminate manner” (CPR A693/B721). Yet it is in the *Critique of Judgment* that indeterminacy comes forcefully to the fore. Already in the Introduction, indeterminacy robs the “heterogeneity” and “multiplicity” of “the empirical field” of determination (CJ Intro VI). Likewise, whenever we invoke the reflective-teleological judgment “artistically” for “a purposive and systematic ordering” we are relying on a “universal but nonetheless indeterminate principle” (CJ FI V). Much the same applies to “the free play of our cognitive faculties,” which of necessity imposes indeterminate purposiveness on complex contexts. We can also add here the kind of indeterminacy that flows from Kant’s *schematization*, which always involves diverse levels of abstraction (CPR A137ff./B176ff.; CJ FI V). In short, in the use of reflective-teleological judgment, “our reason must always remain an open question”¹² (CJ §78). But perhaps the most persuasive source of hermeneutic indeterminacy is that in our judgments of complex contexts we cannot but “presuppose” the “indeterminate norm of a communal sense” (*unbestimmte Norm eines Gemeinns*) (CJ §22).

11. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London and New York: Harper, 2008), 195.

12. Ruthrof, *The Roots of Hermeneutics*, 85.

When we look at the reflective-teleological judgment from the perspective of its subject-predicate relations, we cannot but notice that it “combines the lowest degree of determinacy with the highest degree of community interaction under Kant’s rule of the broadened horizon.”¹³ Although such judgments are indeterminate, they are indispensable in the interpretation of all complex and opaque scenarios. This is why the weakening of any truth-claims in reflective-teleological reasoning to the assertion of *assertable intelligibility* is by no means a defect. Rather, Kant’s final critical concept enriches his conceptual architectonic by adding *indeterminacy* to problem solving whenever “it admits of solution in an endless variety of ways” (CJ §62), in the service not so much of truth but *understanding* (*Begreifen*) as intelligibility (cf. CPR B367; CJ §61; Preface; Intro V).

The absence of truth in reflective-teleological reasoning

Throughout the three *Critiques*, Kant is reluctant to let go of the time-honoured convention of truth-claims. In the end, indeterminacy proves to be an inexorable concession demanded by reason. Kant’s struggle with truth is neatly encapsulated in §73 of the *Critique of Judgment*, where he feels compelled to abandon truth-claims in the reflective-teleological interpretation of the complexity of *nature*. He singles out three prominent philosophical positions on the question of the *purposiveness* of nature: *idealism*, *realism*, and *theism*. First, Kant dismisses any truth claims made by idealism representing nature *as if* it were art. Second, he rejects the position arguing its idealism as “final causes.” Here, Kant distinguishes the arguments of Epicurus from those of Spinoza. The former are said to fail because they merely substitute “blind chance” for “intentionality” which, says Kant, explains nothing. Likewise, Spinoza’s theory of “subsistence” as “unconditional necessity” of “all purposiveness” is rejected on the grounds that its “ontological unity” presumes to be produced by a “cause possessed of intelligence.” As such, Spinoza’s idealism of purposive “inherence” cannot provide an explanation of contingency (*Zweckverknüpfung*) without the unargued for stipulation of an “*Urwesen*” which, once more, is rebuffed as a case of “blind necessity.”

Next, Kant dismisses any *realism* of natural ends because it is bound to assume “causes operating intentionally” by themselves, a causality of *Ursachen*. Yet, so Kant, the very possibility of “living matter” is a self-contradiction resulting from viciously circular reasoning. After all, matter is defined as lifelessness (*Leblosigkeit*), that is *inertia*. To this day, the natural sciences are struggling to bridge this gap. Lastly, Kant takes on *theism* as yet another way of trying to provide a rational explanation of the purposiveness of nature out of the purposive unity (*Zweckseinheit*) of matter. But here, the stipulation of a “supreme intelligence as the cause of the world” is

13. Ruthrof, *The Roots of Hermeneutics*, 53.

barred, he writes, by the “limit of our cognitive faculties” (*Schranken unserer Erkenntnisvermögen*). As a result, all such *determining* judgments about complex contexts have to be weakened to the more modest claim of *reflective-projective* reasoning in the service of *intelligibility* rather than *truth*.

None of the other references to *truth* in the third *Critique* are relevant to Kant’s *reflective-teleological* judgment. In §28, truth is restricted to our recognition of experiencing “delight” (*Wohlgefallen*); in §40, Kant speaks of a “sense of truth” amongst other senses; in §47, he refers sarcastically to “new truths” offered by impostors (*Gaukler*); §51 distinguishes between “sensuous truth” and “sensuous semblance”; while §60 identifies “truth” as an “indispensable condition of fine art.” None of these cases addresses the core issue of truth in interpretive reasoning about complex and opaque contexts. However, in his General Remark on Teleology, allows for yet another approach to the judgment of nature, namely via *moral reasoning*.¹⁴ Here, the stipulation of a supreme intelligence as creator of the universe is discussed as a necessary consequence of *moral* thinking culminating in the demand for a *summum bonum* which, however, cannot be justified on the grounds of human reasoning. For here, “philosophy in its theoretical capacity must of its own accord resign all its claims in the face of an impartial critique.” And so, moral reasoning, as a metaphysical procedure, cannot argue for truth in this respect, but only provide “conviction” (*CJ* General Remark on Teleology).

Justifications for the Generalization of Reflective-Teleological Reasoning as a Universal Interpretive Principle

Whereas many Kant specialists have engaged with Part II of the *Critique of Judgment* on the assumption that it is meant to deal primarily with nature in a narrow sense,¹⁵ there are good reasons for taking a broader view, according to which we can abstract a general interpretive principle informing Kant’s

14. Cf., for instance, Juliet Floyd, “Heautonomy: Kant on Reflective Judgment and Systematicity,” in *Kants Ästhetik, Kant’s Aesthetics, L’esthétique de Kant*, ed. Herman Parret (Berlin–New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 192–218; and Paul Guyer, *Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom: Selected Essays by Paul Guyer* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); as well as his “Reason and Reflective Judgment: Kant on the Significance of Systematicity,” *Noûs* 24, 1 (1990), 17–43.

15. Cf. Clark Zumbach, *The Transcendent Science: Kant’s Conception of Biological Methodology* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1984); Peter McLaughlin, *Kant’s Critique of Teleology in Biological Explanation: Antimony and Explanation* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990); Daniel Warren, *Reality and Impenetrability in Kant’s Philosophy of Nature* (New York: Routledge, 2001); and Rachel Zuckert, *Kant on Beauty and Biology: An Interpretation of the Critique of Judgment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

reflective-teleological judgment. The most persuasive reasons in this respect are entailed in his numerous definitions of nature as “the sum of objects of the senses” (CJ §61), or “the complex of all sensible objects” (CJ Intro II), Kant’s “*Weltwesen*” (CJ Preface) accessible to us via “empirical,” that is, “contingent” concepts (CJ Intro II). Kant’s broad concept of nature thus covers “the complex of objects of all possible experience, taken as no more than mere phenomena” (CJ Intro II), that is, “appearances,” which include culture as “the ultimate end which we have cause to attribute to nature in respect of the human race” (CJ §83). Thus, ‘nature’ refers to appearances as “the sum of phenomena” (CJ Preface); “the sum of objects of outer sense” (CJ §70); “the whole of nature, namely the world” (CJ §78); “things capable of being objects of experience”; “the world as the sum of all objects of experience” (CJ §79); the “totality of appearances” and “aggregate of appearances” (CPR A114); as well as the “order and regularity in the appearances” (CPR A125). The distillation of Kant’s *projective, heuristic, as-if* and *indeterministic* character of interpretation from reflective teleology, then, appears justified in terms of the deliberate comprehensiveness by which *nature* is described in the *Critique of Judgment*.

The definitional justification of distilling a general, procedural mechanism from Kant’s *reflective-teleological* procedure is further strengthened by its *epistemological* intent as displaying the “peculiarity of *our* (human) understanding” (CJ §77). An important feature here is that whenever we are baffled by complex contingencies, interpretation is invoked to find “an intelligible order.” Which applies to anything that is “infinitely multiform and ill-adapted to our power of apprehension” (CP Intro V). As such, Kant’s final critical concept of reflective-teleological judgment has the distinction of uniquely dealing with the most complex contexts of human interaction in history, politics, culture, the arts, and personal relations. On the scales of the ubiquity and usefulness of judgments, then, Kant’s interpretive-projective procedure must rank very highly amongst his earlier critical concepts. The abstraction of a general principle governing all interpretation of complex contexts then appears justified also on the grounds of reflective-teleological reasoning offering a genuine advance over previously available tools.

In terms of its genesis, perhaps the obvious usefulness of Kant’s primary interpretive tool is not so surprising if we recall that it is derived from art and other cognitive judgments. In the *Critique of Judgment*, interpretation is consistently associated with an artistic manner of investigation (CJ Intro IV; VIII; FI II; V; §§65; 71; 72; 74; 90). And whenever we employ the reflective-teleological dialectic we do so for “a purposive and systematic ordering.” In doing so, our “reflective power of judgment” interprets “not schematically, but technically; not merely mechanically” but rather “artistically” (CJ FI V). As such, Kant’s *artistic* use of reflective-teleological reasoning forges “a causal connection according to a rational

concept, that of end, which, if regarded as a series, would involve regressive as well as progressive dependency.” And it is “in art” that “we readily find examples of a nexus of this kind” (CJ §65). Furthermore, the discovery in interpretation of a “self-propagating formative power” (*sich fortpflanzende bildende Kraft*) is as much in the interpreter’s mind as it may have been the actual cause of the artistic product itself (CJ §65). Here, Kant’s critique of authorial primacy proves relevant, according to which even Plato, “this illustrious philosopher,” can be interpreted better “than he has understood himself.” This is so because he may not have “sufficiently determined his concept” or if “he has sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own intention”¹⁶ (CPR A314/B370).

Also, part and parcel of this new way of approaching perplexing aggregates of particulars is Kant’s second “maxim” of the *Critique of Judgment*, according to which he urges us to advance from “*Selbstdenken*,” that is, “to think for oneself” to communally informed judgments, known as his expanded horizon (CJ §40). Lastly, Kant’s consistent emphasis on freeing reason from authority via the Horatian slogan “dare to know” (*sapere aude*) and his motto of the Enlightenment, that “everything must submit to Kritik,” in the first footnote of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, all buttress reflective-teleological judgments as general, legitimate tools of inquiry. As such, and given its broad range of applicability, it makes sense to regard Kant’s reflective-teleological judgment as the pinnacle of his *Critiques*. Which is not, however, the way it was received in the following two centuries.

The 19th Century Relapse into Induction

Since induction is a form of reasoning by which we proceed from empirical premises to empirical truth-claims, it cannot do the job of Kant’s proto-hermeneutic procedure which advances only the weaker claim of rendering opaque contexts *intelligible*. However, the leading authorities on interpretation theory in the 19th century, Friedrich Ast, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and Wilhelm Dilthey were unable in their writings to build on Kant’s revolutionary innovation of letting go of truth-claims in complex judgments. Although all three thinkers adopted Kant’s fundamental insight into the reciprocity of relations between particulars and wholes in interpretation (CJ FI XII; Intro V; §§65; 67; 68; 77), they failed to sever the verification cord between what is empirically observed and what is interpretively projected. Instead, they consolidated hermeneutic inquiry as *inductive reconstruction*.

16. Otto-Friedrich Bollnow, “What Does It Mean to Understand a Writer Better than He Did Himself?” *Philosophy Today* 23, 1 (1979), 16–28.

In his *Grundlinien der Grammatik, Hermeneutik, und Kritik* (1808), Friedrich Ast appears to follow Kant in conceiving interpretation as combining particulars with a reconstructed whole. Yet, instead of viewing reconstruction as a historically situated, rational imposition, as it is in Kant, Ast's interpretation introduced a radically different accent: the act of interpretation is now guided by the notion of a reified *Geist* (spirit). Ast takes the directionality of interpretive claims from the higher authority of an early 19th century conception of spirit as "undivided being" on the assumption that "the more I progress in my conception of the particular," the easier it will be to "recognize the spirit [as] the idea of the whole."¹⁷ Thus, Ast's famous formulation of the *hermeneutic circle* reveals an inductive methodology that has been idealistically transformed into a strange form of deduction in which *Geist* functions as a unifying force by which particulars become meaningful as a whole. Ast's interpretive truth-claims anchored in a dubious notion of *Geist* draws a sharp line between Kant's proto-hermeneutics and the beginning of modern hermeneutics as incommensurate methodologies.

Schleiermacher's inductive hermeneutics of the sense differs decisively from Ast's position in that any "hermeneutics of the spirit" is "beyond the scope of hermeneutics altogether." Instead, Schleiermacher opts for a method with a double focus on empirical, comparative analysis and "divinatory" interpretation.¹⁸ Its task is seen as understanding an "utterance at first as well and then better than [did] its author"¹⁹ (cf. Kant *CPR* A314/BB377). After all, an author "has even here no other data than we do." Again, like Kant, Schleiermacher recognizes that interpretation "is always *provisional*."²⁰ As "understanding," interpretation is viewed as an "art," driven as it is by a "hermeneutic *Kunstgefühl*." Unfortunately, like Ast, Schleiermacher's hermeneutics lets go of *reflective-teleological* reasoning by viewing interpretation as a form of *induction*. On the one hand, Schleiermacher continues to be committed to Kant's "general *image-schematism*," which is not easily reconciled with an inductive approach, on the other hand, yet, as we read in his *Dialectic* of 1811, "there is everywhere as much approximation to knowledge that is really known as the procedure of the process of *induction*."²¹ By referring to his method as *inductive* rather than *reflective-teleological*, Schleiermacher's hermeneutics displays a tension between interpretation conceived as provisional

17. Friedrich Ast, *Grundlinien der Grammatik, Hermeneutik und Kritik* (Landshut: Thomann, 1808), 177ff.

18. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts*, ed. Heinz Kimmerle, trans. James Duke and Jack Forstman (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1977), 212.

19. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings*, trans. and ed. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 23.

20. Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts*, 198.

21. Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics and Criticism*, 240; 278ff.

approximation and the certitude of making truth-claims. The latter has recently been confirmed, for example, by Schleiermacher's influential but now discredited assertion that Plato's criticism of written philosophy is apocryphal.²²

At the heart of Wilhelm Dilthey's hermeneutics we find the notion of *Verstehen*, conceived as a grasping of "the interconnectedness of lived experience in the human-historical world." As such, "understanding returns from the sensorily given in human history to that which never appears to the senses but nevertheless works itself out and expresses itself externally." Interpreting is to discover the "the nexus of lived experience" revealed in human "expression," by which "humanity is present for us as an object of the human sciences."²³ The central methodological tool for this goal is the *inductive reconstruction* of the "the totality of the psychic life" recreated as a "triumph of re-experiencing." The manifestations of what makes us humans, such as pictures, statues, plays, philosophical systems, religious writings, and legal books, Dilthey inquiry calls for a method of "inductive inference" providing "higher forms of understanding" on the basis of "gathering" of "what is given in a work or a life." As a result, we are able to comprehend "the overall connectedness or unity of a work or person – a life-relationship" by generalizing to a "knowledge of life" via "a procedure equivalent to induction." Thus, the method of induction covers both the analysis of details and the "synthetic reconstruction of the whole, again on the basis of induction, and with constant awareness of general truths."²⁴

To be fair to Dilthey, he was aware of the fundamental tension between his humanistic goals and his quasi-scientific methodology, as is revealed in his concept of "indeterminate intuition," the "process of determining determinate-indeterminate particulars," and his phrasing of "the connectedness of life from the determinate-indeterminate meaning of its parts."²⁵ However, Dilthey was unable to reconcile such insights with the very notion of induction. It required Husserl's invention of the eidetic procedure to furnish the tools for liberating Dilthey's hermeneutic psychologism from its inductive limitations. In spite of the progress he had made in the identification of the characteristics of the humanities, Dilthey's commitment to *induction* proved to have four disadvantages. First, it forgets Kant's critique of its limitations; second, given its target of clarifying the complexities of historical human existence, it makes truth-claims beyond its reach; third, induction had long been successfully employed in the natural sciences from

22. Thomas Alexander Szlezák, *Reading Plato*, trans. Graham Zanker (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 29.

23. Wilhelm Dilthey, *The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences*, ed. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi., v. 3 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 23, 105, 108f.

24. Dilthey, *The Formation of the Historical World*, 235, 233f., 156, 180.

25. Dilthey, *The Formation of the Historical World*, 193, 241, 253.

which he wanted to distinguish the humanities; and fourth, it weakened the very point of Dilthey's search for what renders human understanding unique.

More Recent Failures in Doing Justice
to the *Critique of Judgment*

In Part II of the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant had clarified that there can be no such thing as a *last sentence* in interpretation. And yet, in the second half of the 20th century, Paul Ricoeur still publishes as anachronistic a statement as “neither in literary criticism, nor in the social sciences, is there such a last word. Or, if there is any, we call that violence.”²⁶ Yet truth, in the interpretation of complex contexts, was eliminated by Kant in 1790. We also recall that “violence” and “oppression” are singled out towards the end of the third *Critique* as the main obstacles to the modest metaphysics of a universally agreed upon form of morality (*CJ* §83). Ricoeur's hermeneutic is oblivious to any of these Kantian innovations. More astonishing is it that this lack of acknowledgement of the contribution made to interpretation theory by the *Critique of Judgment* is still shared by a broad spectrum of theorists, including Jacques Derrida, Gianni Vattimo, Jean-Luc Nancy, and John Caputo.

Thus, Jacques Derrida's response to Kant's last *Critique* remains trapped in the net of its standard readings focusing on the analysis of non-cognitive aesthetic judgments of mere likes and dislikes, instead on the interpretive advancement made by the *reflective-teleological* judgment. At one point in *The Truth in Painting* (1987) Derrida comes close to addressing Kant's innovation when he asks, “what is artistic in reflection, and what in projection?” In lieu of an answer, Derrida anchors his position in “the distinction between reflective and determinant judgment, a distinction that is both familiar and obscure,” which “watches over all the internal divisions of the book.”²⁷ The decisive omission here is Kant's *reflective-teleological* innovation. Beyond noticing the traditional reading of the relation between determining and reflecting reason, “Derrida fails to see the all-important, artistically inspired second half of this form of judgment, its indeterminate, and therefore always provisional, interpretive projection.”²⁸ Had Derrida paid serious attention to Part II of the *Critique*, he could have made a much more insightful, even if deconstructive, contribution to the critical literature.

26. Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*, trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 215.

27. Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and I. McLeod (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 50.

28. Ruthrof, *The Roots of Hermeneutics*, 303.

Likewise chastising large-scale, interpretive truth-claims, Gianni Vattimo wants to install in hermeneutics a postmodern, “non-metaphysical conception of truth” as an “aesthetic and rhetorical experience.” In such a “nihilistic,” post-metaphysical conception, truth would not emulate the “positivistic model of scientific knowledge” and “the conformity of a proposition to how things are,” but rather follow Nietzsche and Heidegger in the pursuit of a “nihilistic ontology.”²⁹ Ironically, his position on interpretive truth as an opening rather than closure is much closer to Kant’s abandonment of truth in the critical concept of reflective-teleological judgment than Vattimo appears to be aware of, as revealed in his Kantian observation that “the recognition of truth as interpretation” means “that it is provisional.”³⁰ After all, the reflective-teleological judgment does its work “artistically, according to the universal but nonetheless *indeterminate* principle of a purposive and systematic ordering” (CJ FI V). Not unlike Ricoeur, Vattimo understands the entire metaphysical tradition as a “quest for assurance,” force, and “the violence bound up with the imposition of presence.”³¹ Once more, we must exempt Kant from this charge, for whom interpretive, reflective-teleological projections, though metaphysical in a minimal sense, are stripped of certitude and truth-claims in favour of no more than elucidation and the assertion of *intelligibility* (CJ §§78, 61, 76, Preface, Intro V).

In his chapter “The Kantian Pleasure System” of *A Finite Thinking* (2003), Jean-Luc Nancy engages directly with Kant’s third *Critique*, even if he does so from a not so promising perspective. The central thesis here is that the *Critique of Judgment* reveals to us that pleasure in Kant “is repressed” even it exhibits itself as an “active principle,” if not as “the sole really active and motivating principle” at the core of his critical enterprise.³² Which is to reiterate a critical gesture familiar to us from the writings of Hamann, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Derrida. Yet it is not the case, as Nancy alleges, that Kant *represses* pleasure; it simply is not his key topic. Rather, he relegates the merely aesthetic response of likes and dislikes to the domain on non-cognitive judgments, a necessary move in preparation for his exploration of the limits of human cognition in the interpretation of complex phenomena, the core task of the *Critique*. As Kant tells his readers in the Preface to the First Edition in 1790, “our cognitive faculties” are the *Critique’s* “sole concern, to the exclusion of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure.” What matters

29. Gianni Vattimo, *Beyond Interpretation: The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy*, trans. David Webb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 28f.

30. Vattimo, *Beyond Interpretation*, 6.

31. Gianni Vattimo, *The Adventure of Difference: Philosophy after Nietzsche and Heidegger*, trans. Cyprian Blamires and Thomas Harrison (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), 84.

32. Jean-Luc Nancy, “The Kantian Pleasure System,” in *A Finite Thinking*, ed. Simon Sparks (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 199–210, 209.

is that in their most complex application, our cognitive faculties employ Kant's *reflective-teleological* judgment, an intricate, critical procedure for the elucidation of which Part I of *Critique of Judgment* functions as prolegomenon. And this is why judgments based on feelings alone cannot be "raised to the level of concepts in order to contribute to the knowledge of objects" (CJ FI XI). Nancy's dismissive intervention, according to which "Kantian reason relinquishes or is deprived of delight," comes at too high a price.³³ What is achieved here is not only a wilful distortion of what the third *Critique* is all about, but also the destruction of the intricate interrelation between the two parts of the book, adding to the scandalous denial in modern hermeneutics of the momentous contribution the *reflective-teleological* has made to interpretation theory by substituting claims to *intelligibility* for untenable claims to truth.

Authorial privilege having been eliminated in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, with reference to Plato, and truth-claims being replaced by the weaker assertion of *intelligibility* in the interpretation of opaque contexts in the *Critique of Judgment*, one might have expected that postmodernity had learned that it is a little late to still rile against the hermeneutics of truth. Not so the postmodern John Caputo in *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project* (1987) and a little later in *More Radical Hermeneutics: On Not Knowing Who We Are* (2000) when he "douses the flames of essentialism," advocating instead an "anti-essentialist open-endedness," the "irreducibility to truth" and a "relentless critique of objectivist conceptions of truth" in interpretation. In Caputo's *prankster hermeneutics*, the "metaphysicians and transcendentalists" have received "more contempt than contemplation" and so look very much like the strawmen of postmodernity. Had Caputo read Part II of the *Critique of Judgment* he could not have missed that Kant's conception of interpretation had long ago forsaken "settling on a thesis," or insisting on interpretive "truth."³⁴

We could say, then, with and beyond Kant, that *interpretation*, like works of art themselves and like self-organizing biological beings, have a "self-propagating formative power" which transcends their original design, renewing themselves with each new elucidation. Which, however, does not require the reinvention of truth as Heideggerian *disclosure*. Instead, Kant's more sober substitution of continuing, interpretive, *indeterministic intelligibility* for truth, though largely unacknowledged in the literature, remains the decisive philosophical advance made in 1790.

33. Nancy, "The Kantian Pleasure System," 210.

34. John Caputo, *More Radical Hermeneutics: On Not Knowing Who We Are* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 12, 96; cf. Ruthrof, *The Roots of Hermeneutics*, 361.

Bibliography

- Ast, Friedrich. *Grundlinien der Grammatik, Hermeneutik und Kritik*. Landshut: Thoman, 1808.
- Bird, Graham. "Introduction" to "The Critique of the Power of Judgment." In *A Companion to Kant*, edited by Graham Bird, 399–407. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.
- Bollnow, Otto-Friedrich. "What Does It Mean to Understand a Writer Better than He Did Himself?" *Philosophy Today* 23, 1 (1979), 16–28.
- Caputo, John. *More Radical Hermeneutics: On Not Knowing Who We Are*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000.
- Caputo, John. *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987.
- Derrida, Jacques. *The Truth in Painting*. Translated by Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
- Dilthey, Wilhelm. *The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences*, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi, v. 3. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
- Floyd, Juliet. "Heautonomy: Kant on Reflective Judgment and Systematicity." In *Kants Ästhetik, Kant's Aesthetics, L'esthétique de Kant*, edited by H. Parret, 192–218. Berlin–New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Truth and Method*. New York: Crossroad, 1985.
- Guyer, Paul. *Kant's System of Nature and Freedom: Selected Essays by Paul Guyer*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Guyer, Paul. "Reason and Reflective Judgment: Kant on the Significance of Systematicity." *Noûs* 24, 1 (1990), 17–43.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. London and New York: Harper, 2008.
- Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Judgment*. Translated by James C. Meredith and Nicholas Walker. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. (CJ)
- Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Norman K. Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965. (CPR)
- Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum*. Translated by Eckart Förster and Michael Rosen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- McLaughlin, Peter. *Kant's Critique of Teleology in Biological Explanation: Antimony and Explanation*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990.
- Nancy, Jean-Luc. "The Kantian Pleasure System." In *A Finite Thinking*, edited by Simon Sparks, 199–210. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.
- Ricoeur, Paul. *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*. Translated by John B. Thompson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

- Ruthrof, Horst. *The Roots of Hermeneutics in Kant's Reflective-Teleological Judgment*. New York: Springer, 2023.
- Schleiermacher, Friedrich. *Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts*, edited by Heinz Kimmerle. Translated by James Duke and Jack Forstman. Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1977.
- Schleiermacher, Friedrich. *Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings*. Translated and edited by Andrew Bowie. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Szlezák, Thomas Alexander. *Reading Plato*. Translated by Graham Zanker. London and New York: Routledge, 1999.
- Vattimo, Gianni. *Beyond Interpretation: The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy*. Translated by David Webb. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997.
- Vattimo, Gianni. *The Adventure of Difference: Philosophy after Nietzsche and Heidegger*. Translated by Cyprian Blamires and Thomas Harrison. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993.
- Warren, Daniel. *Reality and Impenetrability in Kant's Philosophy of Nature*. New York: Routledge, 2001.
- Zuckert, Rachel. *Kant on Beauty and Biology: An Interpretation of the Critique of Judgment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Zumbach, Clark. *The Transcendent Science: Kant's Conception of Biological Methodology*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984.