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Is Our Perception Word-stained? An Analysis of *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* 1.3. and 1.10*

Abstract: The aim of the article is to analyse Prabhācandra’s treatise in Sanskrit entitled *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* [PKM] 1.3. and 1.10, one of the main Jain philosophical texts (11th c. CE), in order to investigate the author’s view on the relation between sensory and verbal cognition. Prabhācandra refers to the thought of Bhartṛhari (5th c. CE), pioneer of the Indian philosophy of language, who formulated his original vision of the role of language in cognitive processes, as well as to the proponents of the monistic standpoint, who are considered to be his followers. The translation and interpretation of PKM’s passages are crucial to find an answer to the following questions: Is language for Prabhācandra necessary to make cognition complete? or: Are there any intersecting spheres of these two kinds of cognitions?

Keywords: Prabhācandra, Bhartṛhari, *śabda*, *pratyakṣa*, *adhyakṣa*, *locanāvijñāna*, *vāg-rūpatā*

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Introduction

Verbal cognition, that is, apprehending a given fragment of reality directly or indirectly through the medium of language, and its relation to the non-verbal act of perceiving an object, seem to have been important issues to the classical and medieval Indian philosophers. The Jain thinkers are not an exception. I would like to bring their observations closer in the following article, confining myself to the output of Prabhācandra (1040 CE¹), which is — in my view — one of the crowning achievements of the Jain epistemological thought, gathering and deepening ideas of the classical period (5th—10th c. CE). Hence, although Prabhācandra's lifespan goes somewhat beyond this time frame, I have found it advisable to consider his standpoint as an inherent corollary of previous intellectual investigations. His work *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* (The Lotus-like Sun [revealing] Cognizable Objects²) [PKM], a significant textual basis for this article, is recognised as a commentary to the full-fledged and concise treatise *Parīkṣāmukha* (The Prologue to the [Epistemological] Investigation) [PĀ] authored by Māṇikyanandin (940 CE³), one of the main proponents of the Indian epistemological thought, “authoritative by the Jaina tradition.”⁴ Anantavīrya (11th/13th c. CE⁵), the author of *Parīkṣāmukha-laghu-vṛtti* (The Compendious Commentary to [the Treatise] *Parīkṣāmukha*) [PĀLV], another commentator on Māṇikyanandin's text, alludes to the author of PKM, appealing to “the rising of an illustrious moon of Prabhēndu's [Prabhācandra's] work” (*prabhēndu-vacanōdāra-candrikā-prasara*).⁶ Prabhācandra himself ascertains that:

¹ Dated on the basis of P. BALCEROWICZ, K.H. POTTER: “Jain Philosophy,” part 2. In: *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. 14. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 2013, p. 52.

² After P. BALCEROWICZ: “*Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* on Māṇikyanandin's *Parīkṣāmukha*.” In: *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies...*, p. 85.

³ Dated on the basis of D. MALVANIA, J. SONI: “Jain Philosophy,” part 1. In: *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. 10. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publ. Jain Philosophy, 2007, p. 233.

⁴ J. SONI: “Basic Jaina Epistemology.” *Philosophy East and West* 2000, No. 3 (50), p. 367.

⁵ Dated on the basis of P. BALCEROWICZ, K.H. POTTER: “Jain Philosophy...,” p. 245.

⁶ The opening lines of PĀLV, pratīka v. 3, p. 3.

śāstram karomi varam alpatarāvabodho
māṅikyanandi-pada-paṅkaja-sat-prasādāt.

[Endowed with] a little knowledge I write the valuable treatise,
Thanks to perspicuity belonging to the lotus feet of Māṅikyanandin
(PKM, p. 1).

Apart from PKM, Prabhācandra brings up the question of language in the epistemological context in *Nyāya-kumuda-candra* (The Lotus Moon of Logic) [NKC], a commentary to *Laghīyas-traya* (Three Very Accessible [Chapters]) [LT] authored by Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa (8th c. CE)⁷. He focuses, among others, on the following issues: the non-existence (*asambhava*) of a word (*śabda*) in the case of *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* (‘construction-free awareness’);⁸ the question of whether or not the organ of hearing (*śrotra*) gives a knowledge of distance (*prāpya-kāritva*);⁹ the arguments propounded by the adherents of *śabdādvaita-vāda*¹⁰ — a reflection on these arguments will appear in further analysis of PKM’s passages — and their concept of perception inherently permeated by a word (*śabdānuvidham*); the discussion between proponents of treating a word as a quality (*guṇa*) and proponents of treating a word as a substance (*dravya*), leading Prabhācandra to reject the former (*śabdasya guṇatva*);¹¹ a form (features and specificity) of *śruti-jñāna* (*śrutasya svarūpa*);¹² the theory of a word as expressing the meaning (*artha-vācakatva*);¹³ the notion of *pramāṇa*, that is, a means of cognition, in the context of *śabda* (a word)¹⁴ and *śruti* (lit. that which has been heard);¹⁵ the refutation of an eternal relationship (*ni-tya-sambandha*) between a word and its meaning (*artha*);¹⁶ the theory of “exclusion by the other” (*anyāpoha*);¹⁷ the problem of universals (*sāmānya*) and particulars (*viśeṣa*) from a purely linguistic point of view;¹⁸ the issue of the word’s eternity (*śabda-nityatva*);¹⁹ the theory of *sphoṭa* (“the eternal and imperceptible element of sounds and words

⁷ Dated on the basis of P. BALCEROWICZ, K.H. POTTER: “Jain Philosophy...,” p. 264.

⁸ NKC, pp. 46—51, 525.

⁹ NKC, pp. 83—86.

¹⁰ NKC, pp. 139—146.

¹¹ NKC, pp. 240—250.

¹² NKC, pp. 404, 530—536.

¹³ NKC, pp. 536—543.

¹⁴ NKC, pp. 536—543.

¹⁵ NKC, pp. 530—536, 599.

¹⁶ NKC, pp. 543—551.

¹⁷ NKC, pp. 551—565.

¹⁸ NKC, pp. 566—573.

¹⁹ NKC, pp. 697—720.

and the real vehicle of the idea which bursts or flashes on the mind when a sound is uttered”);²⁰ and the verbal point of view (*śabda-naya*) as one of the seven viewpoints accepted by the Jains.²¹ NKC contains more comprehensive studies on language than PKM, although some passages — for instance these considering *vāg-rūpatā* — are quite similar in the line of reasoning.

While analysing the epistemological problems related to language from the Jain perspective, one needs to remember that from this particular standpoint, a description of reality or its verbal projection is always partial and incomplete. This very idea, known as the idea of indescribability, was undertaken by Sagarmal Jain in his pioneering work on the Jain philosophy of language. He states:

In my opinion, the Jaina tradition has accepted many forms of indescribability. Firstly, the affirmation of “is and is-not” simultaneously is not possible, hence the thing is indescribable. Secondly, there may be infinite viewpoints, and as such with all the viewpoints simultaneously a thing cannot be asserted, and accordingly the thing is inexpressible or indescribable. Thirdly, the thing is possessed of multiple specific qualities and in language, there is no word to describe all the specific qualities, hence the thing is indescribable. Fourthly, the universal-word cannot express a particular thing in its entirety, with all its peculiarities. Thus, in the Jaina philosophy though the reality is indescribable in its entirety and absolute sense, but at the same time, it is partially as well relatively describable²².

²⁰ NKC, pp. 745—756. The translation of the term *sphoṭa* after M. MONIER-WILLIAMS: *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 2005, p. 1270.

²¹ NKC, pp. 793—794. Umāsvāmi/Umāsvāti (5th c. CE), in his treatise *Tattvārtha-sūtra* (TS, The Treatise on Reals), enumerates the following viewpoints: the universal-particular (non-distinguished, conventional, comprehensive) point of view (*naigama-naya*), the collective (general, generic) point of view (*samgraha-naya*), the commonsensical (practical) point of view (*vyavahāra-naya*), the immediate point of view (*rjusūtra-naya*), the linguistic point of view (*śabda-naya*), the etymological point of view (*samabhirūḍha-naya*), and the constructionist (factual) point of view (*evam-bhūta-naya*) (TS 1.33). Translation of terms after: P. BALCEROWICZ: “Some Remarks on the Naya Method.” In: *Essays in Jaina Philosophy and Religion*. Ed. P. BALCEROWICZ. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 2003, p. 48; Y.J. PADMARAJIAH, *A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1963, pp. 314—324; M. BARBATO: *Jain Approaches to Plurality: Identity as Dialogue*. Leiden, Boston, Brill, 2017, p. 98; D. MALVANIA, J. SONI: “Jain Philosophy...”

²² S. JAIN: “Jaina Philosophy of Language,” *Parshwanath Vidyapeeth Series* No. 145. Varanasi, Vardhamana Mudranalaya, Jawahar Nagar, 2006, pp. 111—112.

The scholar notices that the Jain authors were distinctively consistent in presenting the limited potential of a word in describing a thing, and this assumption should be treated as prominent in case of any research on the role of language in verbal representations of reality in the Jaina philosophy.

The intellectual task undertaken by Prabhācandra — an attempt to investigate whether some elements of the cognitive apparatus are connected with words — is important as an influential contribution to the reflection on the verbal core of cognition in the Indian philosophy. As an interesting philosophical proposal, it reveals above all the uniqueness of the Jaina approach, especially given the fact that PKM is a commentary to one of the most important texts reflecting the medieval Jain thought. Prabhācandra strongly underlines the importance of language but also stresses its fairly ambiguous role. On the one hand, the questions he raises deepen Mānikyanandin's theses; on the other hand, they reveal a similar need for grasping the perception—language relation as in the case of 20th-century Western philosophers, for instance Maurice Merleau-Ponty²³ and Ludwig Wittgenstein,²⁴ unveiling a universal nature of philosophical investigations.

Bhartrhari as a Waypoint

In this article, the basic considerations and conclusions of Bhartrhari, the 5th-century philosopher and grammarian, the author of the pioneering work *Vākya-padīya* ([The Treatise] on a Sentence and a Word) [VP], are crucial as a waypoint in shaping Prabhācandra's view. Jan Houben recognises some “contact points” between the Bhartrharian thought and representative pieces of the Jaina philosophy, saying:

²³ M. MERLEAU-PONTY: *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1979; J. SALLIS: *Merleau-Ponty: Perception, Structure, Language: A Collection of Essays*. Ed. J. SALLIS. New Jersey, Humanities Press, 1980.

²⁴ Cf. J. GOOD: *Wittgenstein and the Theory of Perception*. London, A&C Black, 2006.

Bhartṛhari is aware of Jaina philosophers and refers to them explicitly in at least one place in the *Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā*. Other passages in the *Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā* and *Vākya-padiya* are remarkably well compatible with Jaina ideas. They may have been intended as references to their views, although their name is not explicitly mentioned.²⁵

Houben suggests that VP's author probably knew some Sanskrit Jain works, such as the 5th-century Umāsvāti's treatise *Tattvārthasūtra* (The Treatise on Reals) [TS].²⁶ The most important thing — from the point of view of the present article — is to mention after Houben the passage from *Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā* (The Illustration of *Mahābhāṣya*) [MBhD]²⁷ containing reflections on various viewpoints concerning the concept of “a permanent *śabda*” (MBhD 1: 16, 28—29). He names both Bhartṛhari's as well as the Jain approach “perspectivistic,” and he is decisively in favour of the mutual and bilateral influence between them.²⁸

Bhartṛhari tries to find the answer to the question which can be formulated as follows: What kind of mental processes occur in the human mind when a person formulates their own speech or receives an utterance from another person? It is worth emphasising that his point of view is radical and distinct, for in his opinion, the whole world — originating from the revealed sound, called *śabda-brahman* (‘the sacred word’) — is permeated by the word and moldable only with the help of it. This very vision unites many different philosophical aspects, essential for the development of Indian thought; thus, in consequence, Indian thinkers were supposed to refer to it in some way — either to accept this vision or to reject it — and explain their attitude accordingly. In Bhartṛhari's view, the word constitutes the rudimentary component of reality, and this perspective allows one to create different epistemological, ontological, or theological interpretations. Malay Gangopadhyaya highlights the fact that according to the VP interpretation, the following relations are important: between a perceiver and a [thing] to be perceived (*grāhaka-grāhya*), between consciousness and a person endowed with it (*sañjñā-sañjñin*), and

²⁵ J. HOUBEN: “Bhartṛhari's Familiarity with Jainism.” *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 1994, No. ¼ (75), p. 2, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41694403> [accessed: 13.03.2016].

²⁶ Ibidem, p. 2.

²⁷ Ibidem, pp. 3—4. *Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā* is a commentary to *Mahābhāṣya* (The Great Commentary), the treatise on Sanskrit grammar written by Patañjali (2nd c. CE).

²⁸ Ibidem, p. 19.

between a speaking person and a [thing] to be expressed (*vācaka-vācya*).²⁹

For the author of VP, *śabda* is the unique entity in a peculiar constellation of cognitive events. To describe its operational mode, Bhartrhari often uses the metaphor of light (*jyotiḥ, tejas*). Here are some examples of his thought:

araṇi-stha yathā jyotiṃ prakāśāntara-kāraṇam
tadvac chabdo 'pi buddhi-sthaḥ śṛtīnām kāraṇam pṛthak (VP 46).³⁰

Just as the light, [which is] initiated by the piece of wood, is the cause of further light,
thus the word obtainable in mind is the cause of speech sounds.

This means that in the cognitive perspective, *śabda* has its source in the mind, activating further processes and granting its own nature. Just like light is capable of engendering a new portion of light, *śabda* is capable of engendering sounds of uttered words. The metaphor of light was used by the author of VP for a purpose — it is based on the fact that light has two abilities: the ability to spotlight objects and the ability to activate its own internal power in order to make others see these objects. *Śabda* itself has also two abilities. Bhartrhari puts it as follows:

grāhyatvaṃ grāhakatvam ca dve śaktī tejaso yathā
tathaiva sarva-śabdānām ete pṛthag avasthite (VP 55).³¹

Just as the light has two abilities, i.e. [an ability] to be perceived and [an ability] to cause perception,
all words are endowed with these two distinct [abilities].

The author of VP sets the word completely within perceptual acts. Houben puts emphasis on the fact that the philosopher “leaves little room for a ‘pure perception’ free from language: in some profound way, perception is unavoidably shaped by language.”³² For

²⁹ M. GANGOPADHYAYA: “Ancient Indian Grammar: A Concise Analysis.” *Sri Garib Das Oriental Series* No. 355. Delhi, Sri Satguru Publications. A Division of Indian Books Centre, 2013, pp. 55—56.

³⁰ Text after VP, p. 31. My translation of VP (in all cases) is a modified translation by Korada Subrahmanyam.

³¹ VP, p. 37.

³² J. HOUBEN: “Language and Thought in the Sanskrit Tradition.” In: *History of the Language Sciences/ Geschichte Der Sprachwissenschaften/ Histoire des sciences du langage. 1. Teilband*. Ed. S. AUROUX, E.F.K. KOERNER, H.-J. NIEDEREHE, K. VERSTEEGH. Berlin, New York, Walter de Gruyter, 2000, p. 150.

Prabhācandra, as it will become clear in further parts of the article, this point of view is unacceptable.

The fact that the author of PKM refers to Bhartṛhari indicates the importance of the grammarian's intellectual inheritance and its impact upon the Indian philosophy, as well as the availability of VP's fragments. References to the Bhartṛharian thought are to be seen also in other Jain scriptures, for example in *Naya-cakra* (The Wheel of Methods) authored by Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa (6th c. CE) or *Yoga-dṛṣṭi-samuccaya* (A Collection of Views on Yoga) by Haribhadra-sūri (8th c. CE)³³. It is also an attempt to deal with the well-founded set of conceptions by stressing bluntly its faultiness. Prabhācandra does not build his own theories in a vacuum but refers to the pioneer philosophical reflection on language, displaying his own knowledge of philosophical tradition and its influence on later generations.

Perception and Language according to Prabhācandra

Although the Jain thinkers concentrate on the relationship between sensory cognition and verbal one, their point of view is not homogenous or fossilised. Akalaṅka, for instance, underlines a causal succession and a reciprocal dependence between experience and verbal cognition, the last understood as the scriptural knowledge constituted on the basis of data taken from perceived reality (for example, RVār 1.9, 1.30).³⁴ Others, like Prabhācandra, ask themselves the question: At which level of the comprehension of an object — its presence and nature — does language participate? If there were a strict relation, valid sensory perception — understood not only as *pratyakṣa*, but also as *adhyakṣa* ('eye-witness') and *locanāvijñāna* ('the act of ocular discerning') — would be subordinated to language. For the Jains, perception, which is "clear" (*viśada*) and which illuminates (*pratibhāsana*) an object "without the mediation of other apprehension" (*pratīty-antarāvyavadhānena*) or "through something that is

³³ Dated on the basis of D. MALVANIA, J. SONI: "Jain Philosophy...", pp. 201, 421.

³⁴ *Tattvārtha-sūtra-rāja-vārttika* (RVār, Royal Annotation of *Tattvārtha-sūtra*), authored by Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa (8th c. CE), is a commentary to Umāsvāmi/Umāsvāti's *Tattvārtha-sūtra* (TS, The Treatise on Reals).

endowed with a distinctive property” (*viśeṣavattayā*) (PĀ 2.3—4), is one of *pramāṇas*, that is, instruments leading to the true knowledge, next to memory (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), reduction to absurdity (*tarka*), inference (*anumāna*), and scripture (*agama*) (cf. PĀ 3.2). The last five are indirect cognitions (*parokṣa*), and they are caused by perception (*pratyakṣādi-nimittam*) (PĀ 2.1—2, 3.1—2).³⁵ The Jain philosophers claim that reality can be cognised only partially, and this assumption is the basis for their theory of the multiplicity of reality (*anekānta-vāda*) connected with various attempts to find a satisfactory model of its description, among others, with the theory of modal description (*syād-vāda*), which describes reality with the help of seemingly contradictory sentences revealing only fragments or aspects of the world. A word in the Jain perspective, as a tool for this description, is material (cf. RVār 5) and, as Jain emphasises, is “the sound-symbol” that has to be “meaning oriented.”³⁶

In the following section, I focus on PKM 1.3. and — to a lesser extent — on PKM 1.10,³⁷ as these passages are solely devoted to the perception-language relation. Prabhācandra provides the reader of his text with some insight into the complexity of related issues. He takes into consideration questions such as: Is the word some kind of an object’s image in the mind? or: Does the operation of perception have an impact on the language used at a certain level?

In the course of the analysis, I will show that language, understood by the Jain thinkers in their specific way, has its own intrinsic and compelling boundaries. This view is opposed to VP’s assumptions, according to which language seems to be deprived of limitations. Many Jain philosophers write about verbal cognition — most frequently in the form of an enumeration of miscellaneous cognitions. Prabhācandra’s perspective, inscribed in the commentary to PĀ, is unique and worth considering due to its multidimensionality.

Prabhācandra analyses the mechanism by which the word attends sensory cognition. This analysis is valuable for me insofar as it helps understand in what way the issue of perception, treated by the Jains as important *pramāṇa*, is associated by them with some kind of medium vivifying verbal structures of the mind. It is also clear — while

³⁵ Translation of terms after D. MALVANIA, J. SONI: “Jain Philosophy...,” p. 535. The issue whether and to what extent indirect cognitions have a linguistic component is the subject of my PhD thesis.

³⁶ S. JAIN: “Jaina Philosophy of Language...,” s. 37.

³⁷ All translations have been prepared with the significant help from Prof. Piotr Balcerowicz, Chair of South Asian Studies, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw.

comparing VP's and PKM's passages — that he holds a radically different view from Bhartr̥hari. However, it should be mentioned that the process of understanding the content of Prabhācandra's arguments is onerous as it is complicated by difficult language of their presentation.

The author of PKM explains why cognition cannot be permeated by the word, naming all these philosophers who have a different opinion, namely, the followers of Bhartr̥hari, the “proclaimers of untruth” (*atattva-jñāḥ*). He takes into consideration several possibilities of such a hypothetical situation (that is, cognition permeated by the word), using Jayaraśi Bhaṭṭa's (7th c. CE)³⁸ method of itemising all possible alternatives in order to refute them successively. He asks questions about the kind of cognition able to reflect the conjectured fact that consciousness is permeated by words. After enumerating two kinds of perception — sensory perception and self-perception — and after adding inference to this particular list of *pramāṇas*, he points out that none of them has the word, the carrier of meanings, within its scope. Senses, in his view, are not combined with the word because they are connected with colour and other impressions. On the other hand, self-perception is perception of one's own self, deprived of the need to associate itself with the word, even if it is meaningful. Prabhācandra states:

te 'py atattva-jñāḥ śabdānuviddhatvasya jñāneṣv apratibhāsanāt. tad dhi pratyakṣeṇa pratīyate, anumānena vā? pratyakṣeṇa cet kim aindriyeṇa, svasamvedanena vā? na tāvad aindriyeṇa indriyāṇām rūpādi-niyatatvena jñānāviśayatvāt. nāpi svasamvedanena asya śabdāgocaratvāt (PKM 1.3).³⁹

They (the followers of Bhartr̥hari) are [particularly] the proclaimers of untruth, because the fact, that [consciousness] is permeated by words, is not reflected in cognitive acts. [If this was true], would it be cognised with the help of perception or inference? If with the help of perception, [would it be cognised with the help of] sensory [perception] or [with the help of] self-perception? Neither [with the help of] sensory one, because senses do not have cognitive acts for their object, as they are strictly connected with a colour etc., nor [with the help of] autoperception, because it is of such a kind that it does not have a word for its purview.

³⁸ G.P. BHATT: *The Basic Ways of Knowing: An In-depth Study of Kumārila's Contribution to Indian Epistemology*. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1989, p. 145.

³⁹ PKM, pp. 39—40.

Prabhācandra quotes the statement of an opponent, who combines an object and a word — placing them in one conjoint act — and according to whom cognition of an object is intermingled with cognition of a word. He uses the Bhartr̥harian point of view as the basis for his own reflection on the subject. For Prabhācandra, it is very important to consider what comprehension of a word while perceiving an object would mean. In the course of the analysis, he asks whether it is a sameness of a place where apprehensions of an object and a word happen, or whether it is a sameness of nature. The conclusion is that we perceive visual aspects of an object, such as colour and others, and we collect auditory impressions with the help of an ear, so the places of these twofold apprehensions are different and so are their natures. The confrontation of the two standpoints is as follows:

athārthasya tad-anuviddhatvāt tad-anubhave jñāne tad apy anubhūyate ity ucyate. nanu kim idaṃ śabdānuviddhatvaṃ nāmarthasyābhinna-deśe pratibhāsaḥ tādātmyaṃ vā? tatrādy-avikalpo 'samīcinaḥ tad-rahitasyaivārthasyādhyakṣe pratibhāsanāt. na hi tatra yathā puro'vasthito nīlādīḥ pratibhāsate tathā tad-deśe śabdo'pi-śrotr-śrotra-pradeśe tat-pratibhāsāt. na cānya-deśatayōpalabhyamāno 'py anya-deśo'sau yuktaḥ, atiprasaṅgāt. nāpi tādātmyam vibhinnēndriya-janita-jñāna-grāhyatvāt (PKM 1.3).⁴⁰

[Opponent realises that:] It is said that because an object is strictly permeated by it (a word), it (the word) is also comprehended in cognition which is perception of this [object]. [Prabhācandra:] Well, but then does this permeability by the word [succeed when there is] a manifestation of the name's meaning in the same place where [an appearance of the object happens], or is it identity of nature? The first contradistinction between [these] two is not fair, because the object manifests itself in perception [as] free from it (the word). For [it is] not like that in [the case of] this perception, that when something in the indigo [colour] appears in front of [perceiver's eyes], in the same place a sound [appears] as well, because its appearance is in the place of contact with an ear of a listener. And it is not correct, that this [sound], being in one place, is captured as being in the other place, because it would lead to the excessive implications. [This connection between the thing and the word] does not [manifest itself also] through identity of nature, because apprehension happens in cognition originated from separate senses.

⁴⁰ PKM, p. 40.

Each sense has its own respective sense data that it is able to grasp — for this reason, senses are separated, otherwise cognition of different impressions would be dependent only on one sense. Therefore, language is also restricted to its own channel. In auditory perception, it is a word deprived of a colour that plays the main role; in visual one — a colour deprived of a word. Prabhācandra proves that even the statement “it is the [particular] colour,” which seems to combine verbality with experience of colours, does not mean anything to an eye. It can only give an illusion of solving the problem. While illuminating this issue, the author of PKM takes into consideration the category of *vāg-rūpatā* (lit. figurality of speech, character of speech, nature of speech, or form of speech), which is to be understood as an articulated sound and a figural, perceptive character of speech. He elaborates on this very subject in the following way:

yayor vibhinnēndriya-janita-jñāna-grāhyatvaṃ na tayor aikyaṃ yathā rūpa-rasayoḥ, tathātvaṃ ca nīlādi-rūpa-śabdāyora iti. śabdākara-rahitaṃ hi nīlādi-rūpaṃ locana-jñāne pratibhāti, tad-rahitaṃ tu śabdaḥ śrotra-jñāne iti kathaṃ tayor aikyaṃ? rūpaṃ idam ity abhidhāna-viśeṣaṇa-rūpa-pratītes tayor aikyaṃ. ity asat rūpaṃ idam iti jñānena hi vāg-rūpatā pratipannāḥ padārthāḥ pratipadyante, bhinna-vāg-rūpatā viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭā vā (PKM 1.3)?⁴¹

These two [sense data], which are grasped in cognitions originating from separate senses, are not the same, like [in the case of the situation where] there is [no identity of] a colour and a taste. The same situation [applies] for instance to a sound and the indigo etc. colour. Since a colour, such as indigo etc., deprived of a sonic form, manifests itself in perception but a sound deprived of it (a colour) manifests itself in auditory cognition — how can they be identical? [Someone may say that:] their identity (of a colour and a sound) arises from cognition of a colour, characterised by phrasing [it] in the speech act, like [in] the [following statement:] “this is a colour.” That is not true, since [the following doubt arises: What] is recognised through the cognition: “this is a colour”: things that are recognisable through [their] verbal character or [things] that are characterised by the verbal character, [which is] different [from them (things)]?

Prabhācandra explains why these two alternatives are not possible. He points out that the centre of the operation of visual perception and the centre of the manifestation of a speech form are not

⁴¹ PKM, p. 40.

the same. The specificity of the manifestation of the speech form with reference to the operation of the visual perception is not an exception because a similar situation applies to the other non-ocular sense data, like taste etc. The philosopher emphasises the fact that visual perception operates within a strictly limited scope, where impressions other than pure colour or pure form (*rūpa*) are not capable of being grasped, and that it is insensitive to the verbal aspect (an object marked by verblity). Prabhācandra argues:

prathama-pakṣo 'yuktaḥ na hi locana-vijñānaṃ vāg-rūpatayāṃ pravartate tasyās tad-aviśayatvāt rasādivat, anyathēndriyāntara-parikalpanā vaiyarthyaṃ tasyaivāśeṣārtha-grāhakatva-prasaṅgāt. dvitīya-pakṣe 'pi abhidhāne 'pravartamānaṃ śuddha-rūpa-mātra-viśayaṃ locana-vijñānaṃ katham tad-viśīṣṭatayā svaviśayam uddyotayet (PKM 1.3)?⁴²

The first standpoint is not correct, because the act of the visual perception does not function [in the place] where a form of speech is, because it (the state of being formed of speech — note M.G.) does not fall within its scope, like a taste etc. Otherwise the idea that there are some other senses, would be aimless, because it would lead to an unwanted consequence that this [one sense]⁴³ is indeed [capable of] apprehending all things without distinction. According to the second standpoint perception, whose content is merely a pure colour (not mixed with the other sense data — note M.G.), is not targeted at speech; therefore, how is it possible [for perception] to show its own object as marked by the [feature of the verbal character which is different from it] (the colour — note M.G.)?

The author of PKM is fully convinced that there are different cognitions, whose scopes are not to be crossed. He introduces the category of consciousness (*buddhi*), understood as a naturally non-verbal consequence of perception, which means that it is not able to activate the meaning of words. Since the object characterised by the verbal character (*viśeṣana*) is revealed in cognition other than visual perception (*locana-vijñāna*), consciousness does not possess a special property, such as the verbal character. When we consider two situations: one including the given element and the other one deprived of it, then we have to reach a conclusion that these two situations are not congruent. Prabhācandra proves his point in the following way:

⁴² PKM, p. 40.

⁴³ Or one visual knowledge.

na hy agrhīta-viśeṣaṇā viśeṣye buddhiḥ daṇḍāgrahaṇe daṇḍivat.
na ca jñānāntare tasya pratibhāsād viśeṣaṇatvam. tathā sati
anayor bheda-siddhiḥ syād ity uktam.⁴⁴

Since consciousness, which is characterised by the lack of the verbal character, cannot [be directed] towards the named object, like the word “carrying a stick” (*daṇḍin*) cannot pertain to a situation void of grasping a stick (*daṇḍa*). And there is no verbal character, because this [particular] object (the named object — note M.G.) is manifested in different cognition. It has been said that as this is clearly the case, the difference between them should be achieved.

Prabhācandra again refers to the opinion of the adversary who considers memory (*smaraṇa*) to be a vehicle transferring data concerning objects connected with verbality to the moment of grasping things devoid of it. But the author of PKM tries to prove that evoking memory is a cumbersome argument, because an evidence of such a situation is a consequence of the *petitio principii* — the past event should be verified in order to assess whether the given thing was simultaneously perceived and connected with speech, and that pattern should be repeated *ad infinitum*:

abhidhānānuṣaktārtha-smaraṇāt tathā-vidhārtha-darśana-siddhiḥ. ity apy asāram. anyonyāśrayānuṣaṅgāt tathā-vidhārtha-darśana-siddhau vacana-parikarītārtha-smaraṇa-siddhiḥ, tataś ca tathā-vidhārtha-darśana-siddhir iti (PKM 1.3).⁴⁵

[Opponent:] An evidence of perception of these kinds of things (the things that are visible and connected with speech — note M.G.) is on the basis of remembering things to which speech is stuck.

[Prabhācandra:] It is also not correct. It is true that one can remember the thing connected with speech, when there is a proof for perception of such a thing, and [it happens] as a consequence of succumbing to the vicious circle. And hence there is the proof of perception of these kinds of things.

For Prabhācandra the nature of the perception—language interface is highly problematic, because to analyse the complexity of the issue, all possible options are to be taken into consideration, and this procedure is difficult in itself. The philosopher specifies three successive alternatives: the image of the object in cognition of the object

⁴⁴ PKM, p. 40.

⁴⁵ PKM, pp. 40—41.

(*artha-jñāne tat-pratibhāsaḥ*), the experience of the object [in its totality] in regard to the place (the part) of the object (*artha-deśe tad-vedanaṃ*), or the image of the object at the moment of apprehending the object (*tat-kāle tat-pratibhāsaḥ*). None of them can — from his point of view — be treated as firm enough. Focusing on each possibility individually, he proves that the scope of perception and the sphere of verbality are not to be linked either at the level of human cognitive processes, or at the level of external stimuli. He also emphasises the lack of the name's image in perception, whose time of appearance is equal to that of the given thing. This standpoint implies further questions, such as: What kind of cognition is connected with understanding a word? or What is the image of a name in the human mind? — which should be analysed in a separate study.

The Jain philosopher continues:

kā cēyam arthasyābhidhānānuṣaktatā nāma-artha-jñāne tat-pratibhāsaḥ, artha-deśe tad-vedanaṃ vā, tat-kāle tat-pratibhāso vā? na tāvad ādyo vikalpaḥ locanādhyakṣe śabdasyāpratibhāsanāt. nāpi dvitīyaḥ śabdasya śrotra-pradeśe nirasta-śabda-sannidhīnām ca rūpādīnām svapradeśe svavijñānenānubhavāt. nāpi tṛtīyaḥ tulya-kālasyaapy abhidhānasya locana-jñāne pratibhāsābhāvāt, bhinna-jñāna-vedyatve ca bheda-prasaṅga ity uktam. katham caīvaṃ vādino bālakāder artha-darśana-siddhiḥ, tatrābhidhānāpratīteḥ, aśvaṃ vikalpayato go-darśanaṃ vā? na hi tadā go-śabdōllekhas taj-jñānasyānubhūyate yugapad vṛttidvayānūtpatter iti (PKM 1.3).⁴⁶

And is this [achievement] (that an object is stained by a word — note M.G.) — being a state of a connection between speech and an object[, something like name] — [some kind of] the image of the object in cognition of the object, the experience of the object [in its totality] in regard to the place (the part) of the object, or the image of the object at the moment of apprehending the object? The first alternative is not possible, because the word does not manifest itself in perception. Nor the second one, because a sound [manifests itself] within an ear and shapes and other [stimulants], which are not connected with [any] word, are experienced by their own [respective] organ of discerning, [through the act of their discriminating] in their own place. Nor the third one, because it has been said, that simultaneous speech does not appear in perception, and it is an unwanted consequence of the fact that things are multiplicitous when they are cognisable by diversified cognitions. And how for speaking exactly that way is

⁴⁶ PKM, p. 41.

object apprehension achieved in the case of a young child etc., deprived in this instance of the ability to understand speech, or how can they perceive a cow imagining themselves a horse? Since at that moment uttering the word “cow” is not experienced within their cognition, because a simultaneous pair of occurrences is not possible.

Prabhācandra comes to rethink the Bhartṛhariian four-stage theory of speech: *vaikharī vāc*, *madhyamā vāc*, *paśyantī*, and *parā*. The author of PKM reverses the order of analysis — first of all, he refutes these four phases, and then he presents the original quotes from VP. Refutation of the interplay between perception and each of these stages is done to expose the impossibility of joining perceptuality and verbality in one cognitive act. The speech *vaikharī* is strictly connected with receiving a word with the help of an ear and it is not connected with perception. It has been defined by William Haney as: “the most fully expressed temporal sequence of language” that “consists of a gap between sound and meaning.”⁴⁷ The speech *madhyamā* — as Coward and Raja observe — is associated “with mind or intellect (*buddhi*),” and, they add, “all the parts of speech that are linguistically relevant to the sentence are present here in a latent form.”⁴⁸ As to the third kind, the speech *paśyantī*, the authors point out that “at this level there is no distinction between the word and the meaning, and there is no temporal sequence.”⁴⁹ And finally, the speech *parā* is understood as “the supreme word.”⁵⁰ There is no cooperation with perception at any level.

katham vā vāg-rūpatāvabodhasya śāśvatī yato ‘vāg-rūpatā
ced utkrāmet’⁵¹ ityādy avatiṣṭheta locanādhyakṣe tat-

⁴⁷ W.S. HANEY: “Unity in Vedic Aesthetics: The Self-Interacting Dynamics of the Knower, the Known, and the Process of Knowing.” In: *Ingardeniana III: Roman Ingarden’s Aesthetics in a New Key and the Independent Approaches of Others: The Performing Arts, the Fine Arts, and Literature*. Ed. A.-T. TYMIENIECKA. New York, Springer Science & Business Media, 2012, p. 296.

⁴⁸ H.G. COWARD, K.K. RAJA: “Introduction to the Philosophy of Grammarians.” *The Philosophy of the Grammarians*. Vol 5. Ed. H.G. COWARD, K.K. RAJA. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1990, p. 60.

⁴⁹ Ibidem, p. 61.

⁵⁰ K.K. RAJA: “Bhartṛhari’s Philosophy of Language, Sphoṭavāda and Śabdabrahmavāda: Are They Interrelated?” In: *India & Beyond*. Ed. D. MELJ, D. London, Routledge, 2013, p. 407.

⁵¹ VP 1.124: vāg-rūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāśvatī/ na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī. “If eternal form of speech passes, the light of consciousness does not shine, because it [is] (*vāg-rūpatā*) [that is] reflective.”

samsparsābhāvāt? na khalu śrotra-grāhyām vaikharīm vācam tat samspr̥ṣati tasyās tad-aviṣayatvāt. antar-jalpa-rūpām madhyamām vā, tām antareṇāpi śuddha-samvidobhāvāt. samhrtāśeṣa-varṇādi-vibhāgānu (tu) paśyantī, sūkṣmā cāntar-jyotī-rūpā vāg eva na bhavati. anayor arthātma-darśana-lakṣaṇatvāt vācas tu varṇa-padādy-anukrama-lakṣaṇatvāt. tato 'yuktaṃ etat tal-lakṣaṇa-praṇayanam (PKM 1.3).⁵²

Or how can the following thing be ascertained: consciousness that has eternal verbal character, because [— as Bhartṛhari says —] “if the eternal form of speech passes, [the light of consciousness does not shine],” as there is no connection with the [verbal character] in perception? This [perception] is not in contact with the verbal character at the level of *vaikharī vāc* at all, grasped by an ear, because it is not its subject. Also it [does not touch] the [level of] *madhyamā [vāc]*, receiving a form of the internal monologue, because clear consciousness takes place also without this [kind of speech]. But *paśyantī* is of such [a kind], that it is divided into all sounds gathered together etc., and it precisely does not become the subtle speech [endowed with] the essence of the internal light, because [the last] two of them are those that [have] the apprehension of the object's nature as [their] determination but the speech (*vaikharī* — note M.G.) represents the sequence of sounds and words. Hence, the construction of this definition of speech is incoherent.

While according to Bhartṛhari, language is the overriding reality, it plays a different role in the work of Prabhācandra, because it takes a distinct place in cognitive structures. The author of PKM attempts to read VP with a particular attitude towards it and with elaborated concrete assumptions. His standpoint is free from situating *śabda-brahman* (‘the revealed sound’) in the centre of reality and in the middle of perceptive acts. In order to clarify the problem, he quotes Bhartṛhari's words precisely, after analysing them in the first place:

sthāneṣu vivṛte vāyau kṛta-varṇa-parigrahā
vaikharī vāk prayokṭṛnām praṇa-vṛtti-nibandhanā || 1 ||.⁵³

[The speech *vaikharī*], which is characterised by grasping articulated sounds, is present in articulation organs. The speech *vaikharī* has its own fundament in the presence of breath of those who articulate sounds.

⁵² PKM, p. 41.

⁵³ PKM, p. 42.

prāṇa-vṛttim atikramya madhyamā vāg pravartate
avibhāgā 'nu (gā tu) paśyantī sarvataḥ saṃhṛta-kramā ||2||

The speech *madhyamā* (internal reading of an articulation — note M.G.) operates [while] having exceeded the presence of breath, but *paśyantī* [is] deprived of parts, and in each way it is [of such a kind that] its sequence of [uttered *varṇas*] has become contracted.

svarūpa-jyotir evāntaḥ sūkṣmā vāg anapāyinī
tayā vyāptaṃ jagat sarvaṃ tataḥ śabdātmakaṃ jagat ||3|| ityādi.

The speech, which is nothing but the light of its own nature, internally subtle, not perishable — the whole world [is] permeated by it; hence, the world [is endowed with] the speech nature.

Prabhācandra proves that to consider consciousness acts as permeated by words, *liṅga* ('the invariable mark which proves the existence of anything in an object') should be found, such as permeability. He refers to the idea of the monists believing that all cognitive acts are conceptual because they possess *śabdānuviddhatva* ('permeability by a word'). He points out that things have different names but their existence is verified only by perception. The author of PKM uses the term *tan-mayatva* ('the state of being made of that'), where *tad* refers to *śabda*, apart from *anuviddhatva*, which connotes strict and downright ontic dependence. Prabhācandra says:

anumānāt teṣāṃ tad-anuviddhatva-pratītir ity api manorathamātram, tad-avinābhāvi-liṅgābhāvāt. tat-sambhava vādhyakṣādibādhitā-pakṣa-nirdeśānantaraṃ prayuktatvena kālātyayāpadiṣṭatvāc ca. atha jagataḥ śabda-mayatvāt tad-udara-vartināṃ pratyayānāṃ tan-mayatvāt tad-anuviddhatvaṃ siddham evēty abhidhīyate. tad api anupapannam eva tat-tan-mayatvasyādhyakṣādibādhitatvāt, pada-vākyādito'nyasya giri-taru-pura-latādes tad-ākāra-parānmukheṇaiva savikalpakādhyakṣeṇāntyantaṃ viśadatayōpalambhāt. 'ye yad-ākāra-parānmukhās te paramārthato 'tan-mayāḥ yathā jalākāra-vikalāḥ sthā-sakośa-kuśūlādayas tattvato na tanmayāḥ, paramārthatas tad-ākāra parānmukhās ca pada-vākyādito vyatiriktā giri-taru-pura-latādayaḥ padārthāḥ ity anumānato 'sya tad-vaidhurya-siddheś ca (PKM 1.3).⁵⁴

[Prabhācandra:] The idea that these (consciousness acts) are permeated by it (a word), as implied by inference, is merely a wish,

⁵⁴ PKM, p. 43.

because there is no *liṅga* which would be inseparably connected with them (words). And if there was such [*liṅga*] (*anuviddhatva* ‘permeability’ — note M.G.), the immediate indication of *pakṣa*⁵⁵ (*teṣām [pratyayānām]* ‘consciousness acts’), rejected by perception etc. [would happen], because [the ideas] are beyond time and [the word] passes in a course of it.

[Opponent:] Because the world is made of the word [and] because consciousness acts, which are within it, are made of them (words), this is just said to be the well-known [fact] that these [consciousness acts] are permeated by words.

[Prabhācandra:] It is in no way possible, because the fact that they (consciousness acts) are made of them (words) has been just refuted by perception etc., as [things], like a mountain, a tree, a town, a garland etc., other than words and sentences, are completely [perceived] by the differentiated perception being of such [a kind] that the form of the [given things] is located in front of [a perceiver], because [they] are ascertained as evident. Those of them which [have] the form of these [given things] situated in front of [a perceiver], these are made exactly of these [things], as entities [such us] ground, along with a shell, a granary etc., which are deprived of the form of water, they are not made of it (water — note M.G.), and objects such as a mountain, a tree, a town, and a garland etc. [are] different from a word and a sentence and [they are this kind of entities] which in reality present their form in front of [a perceiver] — and due to inference, the object (or the world) is proved as free from it (a word).

Prabhācandra refutes any interplay between consciousness acts directed towards an object and consciousness acts directed towards a word. The last passage rejects the possibility of inferring the idea that they are permeated by a word, containing the examples of things that can be grasped directly by perception. But there is also one more passage where the author of PKM analyses the question of the lack of language in the domain of consciousness, referring to PĀ 1.10:

śabdānuccāraṇe’pi svasyānubhavanam arthavat.⁵⁶

[There is] apprehension of itself (consciousness) without uttering the word, like in the case of the thing.

⁵⁵ The term *pakṣa* means ‘the logical subject.’

⁵⁶ PKM, p. 128.

The author of PKM, commenting on this stanza, acknowledges that when a person cognises an object, the image of it appears in their mind, and that it happens directly after the act of perception — without the help of verbal processes. In consequence, the basic assumption is that the image of the cognitive object is not equal to any word. What is more, this rule can be applied not only to the case of perceiving material objects, but also to the sphere of human internal emotional world. The philosopher strictly separates the images of the object's or subject's nature in the mind from evoking a word. He asserts:

yathaiva hi ghaṭa-svarūpa-pratibhāso ghaṭa-śabdōccāraṇam antareṇāpi pratibhāsate tathā pratibhāsamānatvāc ca na śābdas tathā pramātrādīnām svarūpasya pratibhāso 'pi tac-chabdōccāraṇam vināpi pratibhāsate. tasmāc ca na śābdaḥ. tac-chabdōccāraṇam punaḥ pratibhāta-pramātrādi-svarūpa-pradarśana-param nānālambanam arthavat, anyathā 'sukhy aham' ityādi pratibhāsasyāpy anālambanatva-prasaṅgaḥ (PKM 1.10).⁵⁷

For just as the image of the pot's nature appears [in consciousness] even without uttering the word “pot” and [this way of appearing does] not have the verbal character, because [it] appears [in consciousness] in this [particular] way, in a similar way the image of the cogniser's nature etc. manifests itself without uttering a word by which it is [determined] and that is why [this appearance also] does not [have] the verbal character. And again the articulation of this word, followed by revealing the nature of the manifested cogniser etc., [is] not independent, as in the case of an object; otherwise [the statement]: “I am happy” etc. would have an unwanted consequence [consisting in the fact] that even the occurrence [of self-consciousness in the mind] would not have the real base.

To resume, language for Prabhācandra is not necessary to make cognition complete. The philosopher postulates the decoupling of perception (self-perception) and verbal cognition, because their natures are different, as well as their scopes and centres of sensory data apprehension (visual aspect versus auditory impressions) — each sense has its respective sense data. Sometimes the belief that they are unified may appear, but it is only an illusion, as in the case of the expressed statement containing the word denoting a concept related to sight (such as: “it is a colour”). Considering cognitive (or consciousness) acts as permeated by words would result in the necessity of es-

⁵⁷ PKM, pp. 128—129.

tablishing such an entity as permeability. None object of perception, either material or emotional, is the word. One thing may be endowed with different names but its existence is verified only by perception or by inference based on the sequence of acts of perception.

The analysis of Prabhācandra's presuppositions implies further issues that should be considered in a separate study: What is the purpose of linguistic cognition? Is it a description of a thing, a statement of its existence, or an indication of it? Does the statement: "it is x" say anything about the essence of the thing or its inscription in cognitive structures? What happens if the word is polysemantic?

Prabhācandra undermines Bhartṛhari's perspective referring to his three main concepts: the concept of *śabda-brahman*, the concept of speech levels, and the concept of *vāg-rūpatā*, omitting other issues, for example the theory of universals. The differences of opinions between these two philosophers were a direct consequence of the differences in the basic assumptions of their systems. According to Bhartṛhari, "all disciplines in the world are reliant on grammar" (*tathaiṅva loke vidyānām eṣā vidyā parāyaṇam*), because "all thing-classes are reliant on *śabda*-classes" (*artha-jātaḥ sarvāḥ śabdākṛti-nibandhanah*).⁵⁸ By referring to grammar, a human being can attain the *śabda-brahman* (*vyākaraṇam āgamyā param brahmādhigamyate*).⁵⁹ The philosopher draws attention to the fact that: "no idea is possible except [that one] which is accompanied by a word" (*na so'sti pratyaya yaś-śabdānugamād rte*), "the whole cognition shines thanks to a word as permeated by it" (*anuviddham iva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate*),⁶⁰ and "speech ties up all knowledge of crafts and practical art" (*sā sarva-vidyā śilpānām kalānām cōpabadhanī*).⁶¹ The consciousness (*samjñā, caitanyam*) — says the author of VP — located within and outside (*bahir antaś ca*) living beings (*samsāriṇām*), is not transgressed (*anatikrāntam*) merely by it (a word — note M.G.) (*tan-mātram*).⁶² The thing becomes ascertained (*rūḍhatām eti ... artho*) by an aggregate of sounds (*śrutyā*), distinguished as merely the self (*svamātrā*) or the other (*paramātrā*).⁶³ On the other hand, Prabhācandra's view on this subject is well-grounded in the Jain tradition. He takes the thought of the 5th-century thinker only to strengthen his own standpoint by opposing the VP's theses.

⁵⁸ VP 15, p. 11.

⁵⁹ VP 22, p. 14.

⁶⁰ VP 123, p. 80.

⁶¹ VP 125, p. 81.

⁶² VP 126, p. 81.

⁶³ VP 129, p. 83.

For comparison, if we look at the Buddhist polemic with Bharṭhari, we get a much more complex picture. Diñnāga (5th/6th c. CE), for instance, builds his system, especially the theory of *apoha* ('exclusion'), partially accommodating Bharṭhari's assumptions, and partially polemising with them.⁶⁴ Dharmakīrti (7th c. CE), another Buddhist thinker, as Radhika Herzberger states, "stood for Bharṭhari against Diñnāga."⁶⁵ Herzberger writes about "tool or techniques" which have "an impact"⁶⁶ on these two philosophers at various levels. Apart from them, there was Helārāja (10th c. CE), a commentator of VP, who rejected the Bharṭharian crystal model of language.⁶⁷ In the Buddhist attitude to VP's thought, an intellectual tension and openness can be observed.

Prabhācandra's vision, in contrast, is unequivocal and legible when he asserts that Bharṭhari's solution is unacceptable, which means that according to him, perception itself cannot be word-stained. He emphasises limitations of language, which is not able to cross its own specific channel or to present the totality of reality. These limitations are inscribed in the Jain perspective of relativity imposing partial presentation of the world's image.

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⁶⁵ R. HERZBERGER: *Bharṭhari and the Buddhists. An Essay in the Development of Fifth and Sixth Century Indian Thought*. Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986, p. xviii.

⁶⁶ Ibidem, pp. 15—16.

⁶⁷ Ibidem, p. 15.

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