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The Application of S.H. Schwartz Universal Theory of Human Values in a Sociological Research

Abstract: The article deals with the application of Schwartz theory of human values in a sociological research. The Schwartz theory of human values is a psychological theory of motivation in human behaviour and acting. The article is a critical introduction to a research of human values comparing research approaches of M. Rokeach, G. Hofstede, R. Inglehart and S.H. Schwartz. The “youngest” one — Schwartz’s has an aspiration to be universal. This theory has a common ground with a number of sociological theories. Basically, it is possible to apply this theory in empirical investigation of spectrum of nowadays sociological themes, topics and theories. The article is an attempt to step toward empirical investigations of values in sociology.

Key words: value, value measurement, education, university education.

Introduction (definition of value)

It is always good to start with a definition of a problem. In this article we will deal with a problem of the value and value measurement. The definition of the value is unified within all sciences, so it is not important to define value precisely in the framework of humanities and social sciences.

Most generally we understand the value as a goal, entity, state or thing that people want to reach, or to gain for themselves as they consider it significant for them. It does not matter whether they can or cannot express this significance. The first definition of the value is vague because it does not define the object of the interest and it does not define a person’s motivation. Apparently, this lack of

precision comes from impossibility to define or describe the value as an object. Valuable is everything that has an ascribed meaning from an individuality, and the “measure” of the meaning is also individual. The individuality is everything that defines the object as valuable. Another dilemma comes from the first sentence of this paragraph. It is a static-dynamic dilemma. Is the value what we achieve, or is the value what we gain?

We used to say about democracy that there is constant need for its legitimization and confirmation. It is a neverending process of a democracy living. If the democracy is a value, it is definitely an instrumental value as it was defined by Rokeach (M. Rokeach, 1973). On the other hand, I consider “a good life” a nowadays value. “A good life” means a relative security in which a person lives every day. To live a “good life” does not mean to think about the ways of how to handle everyday reality. In other words, we can say that a comfortable life is a life when we are not forced to think about tomorrow, but we live for the present moment. Good life defined as *a comfortable life* by Rokeach is one of the terminal values (M. Rokeach, 1973).

The concept of value (Lat. *pretium*) expresses the price of a thing. The word came to social sciences from economy, more precisely from the political economy (W.K. Frankena, 2006, p. 636). The first sociological definition of value is the one used by W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki in the methodological part of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (J.L. Spates, 1983, p. 29). They wrote: “By a social value we understand any datum having an empirical content accessible to the members of social group and a meaning with regard to which it is or may be an object of activity” (W.I. Thomas, F. Znaniecki, 1921, p. 21).

In Slovak language the word value has four meanings. The first meaning is a price, the second is something important or significant, the third is something useful or advantageous, and the fourth is something valuable or some possession (J. Kačala, M. Pisárčiková, M. Považaj, 2003). Value is anything that is worth of something.

Economy speaks about values *in exchange* and values *in use*. Values *in exchange* are prices for services or goods. Values *in use* are internal values (inscribed to thing by individuality) of usability of the product or service (D. Rutherford, 2002, p. 609, the same as D. Šibl, 2002, p. 321). In economy the value of the object is “derived” from the price and/or its usability. For the economy it has object’s values and people’s preferences (E.F. Morgatta, R.J.V. Montgomery, 2000, p. 321). This definition speaks about inscription of the value to an object individually. On the other hand, the important thing is the agreement of the value of the object inside of a social group, community or society. The price of the product is the result of an *offer* and *demand*, the agreement about the value of the object. The first notion of value which comes from this paragraph is the ability to share the value in a society. The value is one of the components of the culture and its articulation is widely known.

First of all, the term value is used as an abstract noun with the meaning ‘good, desirable’, worth for), and in its second meaning it designates every right ob-

ject, commitment, custom, beauty, truth or holiness. Secondly, value can be a concrete noun which refers to something that is valuable, something that “has a value.” The internal value of an object is not an object itself, but the object is the holder of the value. Thirdly, the term value is used as a verb in the meaning of “evaluate” or “assess.” Evaluation is now linked to the process of evaluation and not with the act of evaluation which has a result (W.K. Frankena, 2006, pp. 637—638). The meaning of a term value is possible to define through an individual person. Individuality is a measuring instrument of a value of an object. Value and evaluation starts always in the context of an individual person. Value is an example of an anthropocentric term. Objects which emerge in a world can become, or already are valuable. The object exists in the world, but just the introduction of man can give it some meaning. In other words: The object becomes a value only in a discourse which is held by a man. If we say that animals behave according to their instincts and if we define a man as a social creature (*homo socialis*) or a cultural creature (*homo culturalis*), we can say that he/she behaves according to culture and rules. The second note from this chapter says that values are the products of culture of man and they depend on man (value is created within the culture and for the culture).

Every value comes from the culture — its appearance and also its dynamics are images of the culture. At the same time people apply values to their activities, or they live by them in their everyday's reality. Values are maintained in culture. Values are both — individual and cultural, they depend just on a perspective. The values can change by the influence of an individuality, social group, society or social institution. Changes of the values always start in the elementary social reality. “The term *value* always refers to behaviour” (C. Kluckhohn, 1951, p. 393). Value is always dynamic in relation to man, and structural in relation to culture. “Values (e.g., achievement, justice, freedom, social order, tradition) are always on the list of socially approved goals for motivation of behaviour, as for the expression and legitimate argumentation of selected opportunities for behaviour” (S.H. Schwartz, 1999, p. 26). It is also truth that people who appreciate values as a goal are not necessarily acting in the way which ensures them in achieving them. We consider university education a value in our society, but not everyone who graduates from a high school continues to study at a university.

S.H. Schwartz and W. Bilsky recognized five fundamental features which emerge in scientific articles about values. We can consider these features as characteristics of values, or an elementary definition of value (S.H. Schwartz, W. Bilsky, 1987, p. 551; P.B. Smith, S.H. Schwartz, 1997, p. 80; S.H. Schwartz, n.d., p. 262):

1. Values are beliefs. But they are beliefs tied inextricably to emotion, not to cold objective ideas.
2. Values are motivational constructs. They refer to the desirable goals that people strive to attain.
3. Values transcend specific actions and situations. They are abstract goals. The abstract nature of values distinguishes them from concepts like norms and attitudes, which usually refer to specific actions, objects or situations.

4. Values guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people and events. In that case values serve as standards or criteria.
5. Values are ordered by the importance relative to one another. People's values form ordered by system of value priorities that characterize them as individuals. This hierarchical feature of values distinguishes them from norms and attitudes.
6. Relatively important complex of values control the human action "motivational influence of value depends on its relative importance for an individual in the relation to behaviour in question" (J. Ilgová, A. Ritomský, 2009, p. 77).

We can consider these definitions as elementary or fundamental. It is necessary to specify the definition and look at values with the relation to needs which is very close in concept. Needs as well as values regulate human actions.

Values and needs

"Although values have this affective dimension, they are not identical with particular segmental 'needs' of the organism; specific psychological deprivations and gratifications may be relevant to many values, but do not themselves constitute value-phenomenon... To put it in another way, values can only become actualized in the context of the 'need', but it cannot be identified with the need. [...] Since a value is a complex proposition involving cognition, approval, selection and affect, then the relationship between a value system and a need or goal system is necessarily complex. Values both rise from needs as well as create them. A value partially serves several needs, partially inhibits others, half meet and half block the others" (C. Kluckhohn, 1951, pp. 427—428).

The relation between needs and values is possible to be seen in two different meanings. We can identify values in the society and in the culture, but needs belong to a biological discourse. For example food and eating are needs but also values. On the one hand, we can live without food as a biological creatures, in the case that deprivation of food goes to the edge of a man's behaviour in the interaction with others. The value of food is in its aesthetics, taste, in the table manners and in the all cultural aspects connected with food. Norbert Elias's book *The Civilizing Process* hypothesizes that the society in its evolution process gets civilized (N. Elias, 2006). It is clear that the relation between value and need does come from their existence in a human life. A changeover from biological creature to cultural creature is a change from need to value.

A value and a need have a common "denominator" and it is the motivation. For Maslow (A.H. Maslow, 1954, p. 35) the engine of need is motivation — psychical motivation. In this case we can grasp the psychical motivation as a basic living energy for living creature because in the case of hungry man it turns on "the receptors and effectors, the intelligence, memory, habits, all may now be defined simply as hunger-gratifying tools" (A.H. Maslow, 1954, p. 37). Maslow defined the

culture in relation to needs as an external phenomenon. Values and needs motivate a man to act, but according to the level the stimulus comes from whether there are different grounds and clear boundaries is impossible to say: "Human behaviour has multidimensional determinants" (A.H. Maslow, 1954, p. 55). The relation between a need and a value is rather complementary.

Values and their measurement

I will not introduce all theories of values in this chapter. To make a historic excursion may be more interesting, but also significant for theoretical grasp of value research. It is necessary to show and describe the process which has been taking place in the value research during the past years. This process brings new knowledge in theory of values and their place in human acting and behaviour. One of the first methodological articles about values was written and published by Dodd in 1951. This author and his concept of values is significantly different from contemporary authors like Schwartz. Dodd defined a value as a "desideratum, i.e. anything desired or chosen by someone, at some time" (S.C. Dodd, 1951, p. 646). By evaluation Dodd means acts which show the intensity of desire of the value. The value is defined as an object, a dynamic component of the value as the process of valuing things and objects. Valuing the things and objects is the process of defining the thing as desirable. Dodd does not see two grounds of the same values as the other authors do. The first ground is cultural, the second individual. What have the contemporary theories of values in common is the separation into these two grounds of values.

Geert Hofstede recognizes two types of values: values desirable and values desired. First type describes values which society and culture defines as desired, the second type speaks of values which are important for a particular person (G. Hofstede, 1991). Schwartz and Bilsky understand values differently. They come out from functionalist approach of Kluckhohn which stresses the consequences of achieving an aim. The value of an object is not in the object itself, but it is in the opportunities of its use (S.H. Schwartz, W. Bilsky, 1987; S.H. Schwartz, W. Bilsky, 1990). "The primary contextual aspect of value is a type of an aim or a motivational interest, which it expresses" (B. Řeháková, 2006, p. 108). Schwartz and Bilsky defined a limited number of motivational interests. Individual values and motivational interests are in Schwartz theory the same things. Cultural values are different from individual values and there are seven of them (S.H. Schwartz, 1999).

Every methodological adjustment of the value research is dependent on the theory. Today we can identify four most frequent approaches of the value study. Řeháková, Ilgová and Ritomský agree on four approaches to the value studies — Hofstede, Rokeach, Ingelhart and Schwartz (B. Řeháková, 2006, p. 107; J. Ilgová, A. Ritomský, 2009, p. 74).

Hofstede and measurement of values

For Geert Hofstede values are the basic structural components of the culture. The core of culture is made of values which are bi-polar (good — bad, dirty — clean, ugly — beautiful, etc.). Other components of culture are symbols, heroes and rituals. It is possible to sum up rituals, heroes and symbols to the concept of practice (see Figure 1). To interpret the relations between the components of the culture it is necessary to take it as if values were the foundation for every other component. Hofstede established a research in the IBM company in 50 countries with one objective — to find out which are the basic values. On this basis he defined five areas of differences in certain countries: (1) power distance (from small to large); (2) individualism vs. collectivism; (3) masculinity vs. femininity; (4) uncertainty avoidance index (from small to large); (5) long-term orientation vs. short-term orientation (G. Hofstede, G.J. Hofstede, 2004).




Figure 1. Diagram of the components of culture (G. Hofstede, G.J. Hofstede, 2004)
1 — values, 2 — rituals, 3 — heroes, 4 — symbols, 5 — practices

Every dimension has its own index. To be concrete: power distance index (PDI); individualism index (IDV); masculinity index (MAS); uncertainty avoidance index (UAI); (in the fifth dimension the index has not been defined yet). Every index has two distinctive component: 1. General norms and rules, family, school, work; 2. Politics and ideas. Every component is bi-polar (e.g. small power distance — large power distance; collectivism — individualism; feminine — masculine; weak uncertainty avoidance — strong uncertainty avoidance) in

which both polls are characterized by 11—15 indicators. We can use the example from the second component — MAS index: poverty helps, slow is beautiful, preservation and environment should be the highest priority vs. helping the strong, big and fast is beautiful, preservation of economic growth should be the highest priority.

The research of G. Hofstede focuses on the culture and the cultural differences in the world. As Schwartz pointed out — the research of G. Hofstede is a good tool for distinguishing the cultures, but it is useless for comparing the individuals (S.H. Schwartz, n.d.).

Rokeach and values

The approach of Rokeach is the oldest one from the group in question, but it is not still the first that brought the separation of values into two different groups. Golighly divided values into two groups. The first group he called basic and the second operational (C. Golighly, 1948). Lewis spoke about inner, outer, basic and remedial values (C.I. Lewis, 1946). Rokeach divided values into terminal and instrumental. Then he distinguished 18 terminal and 18 instrumental values, terminal values are those which describe terminal state of existence, and instrumental are those which define the meaning of life, or the way of behaviour and they are tools for achieving the goals (J. Ilgová, A. Ritomský, 2009, p. 74). The Rokeach's value research tool is called RVS — Rokeach Value Survey. The terminal values for Rokeach are: True Friendship, Mature Life, Self-Respect, Happiness, Inner Harmony, Equality, Freedom, Pleasure, Social Recognition, Wisdom, Salvation, Family Security, National Security, Sense of Accomplishment, World of Beauty, World of Peace, Comfortable Life, Exciting Life. Instrumental values are the following: Cheerfulness, Ambition, Love, Cleanliness, Self-Control, Capability, Courage, Politeness, Honesty, Imagination, Independence, Intellect, Broad-Mindedness, Logic, Obedience, Helpfulness, Responsibility, Forgiveness. The same as in the Inglehart research, in Rokeach research the respondents are obliged to arrange values from most important to the least important (ranking). Rokeach does not connect values with ethics or morality. We can use as an example the value of wisdom and the value of broad-mindedness because their disruption does not necessary mean immorality (M. Rokeach, J.F. Regan, 1980, p. 578). With the application of this theory we can get a picture of individuals as well as the picture of the whole societies. The Rokeach research is problematic from the methodological point of view. Respondents are unable to distinguish between terminal and instrumental values (R.L. Heath, D.S. Fogel, 1978). Terminal values are sometimes used as an instrument and an instrument can become terminal (S.H. Schwartz, W. Bilsky, 1990). Last but not least, the Rokeach research (RVS) was written in English language and it also means its impossibility of literal translation to other languages. The terminal values are often named by nouns. The instruments as an adjectives. Not every language names the terminal values by

nouns and instrumental by adjectives. For example Chinese language does not use these parts of speeches in this context (S.H. Schwartz, W. Bilsky, 1990).

Inglehart and values

In 1977 Inglehart published a book called *The Silent Revolution* (R. Inglehart, 1977). It is clear from the data which he uses that societies of researched countries had changed during one generation from materialistic to postmaterialistic. Inglehart defined 4-item, later 12-item set formed for values measurement. Values, as Inglehart defined them, do not reflect earlier research of Rokeach (M. Rokeach, 1967, 1976). Inglehart does not recognize terminal and instrumental values. For Inglehart it was more important to divide values into materialistic and postmaterialistic because this division better reflects the differences between generations. Materialistic values are defined as values of security, economic stability and certainty. As postmaterialistic values Inglehart defined values of self-control, self-actualization, freedom and pleasant living place. Inglehart does not create the theory of values, or the methodology of values research, but he wants to show how the societies in Europe had changed their value orientation after WW II.¹ His research is much simpler than Rokeach's or Schwartz's. There are just two samples of four proclamations and respondents have to rank values from the most important to the least important. Inglehart sees his own approach as a searching for the importance of values on the scale of "values of common living — values of self-expression" (R. Inglehart, Ch. Welzel, 2005, p. 137).² Ilgová and Ritomský defined the polls at Inglehart scale: "in the poll of postmaterialism are values of intellectual openness, self-expression, tolerance, refusing of forced social control, but on the poll of materialism there are the values of security, stable social environment, traditions, economical growth at any price" (J. Ilgová, A. Ritomský, 2009, p. 76; see also: L. Rabušic, 2000). The author in his latest works (R. Inglehart, Ch. Welzel, 2005) searches for a deeper explanation of changes from materialistic to postmaterialistic society. The explanation of this serious change from materialistic to postmaterialistic values preferation can be defined: The values of societies had changed because of the socio-economic changes in the societies. After economic changes also the cultural changes came. One of the changes (like changes in gender social roles, changes in attitudes towards authority, changes in sexual behaviour, wider political participation, etc.) is the change in political cleavages. Political cleavages meant also the change of domain from the accent on class conflicts to stress on quality of life

¹ It is necessary to note that Inglehart is a political scientist and not a psychologist like Rokeach, Schwartz and G. Hofstede.

² The same key the author found in the approaches of G. Hofstede and Schwartz. The research of G. Hofstede functions see at the scale individualism-collectivism and Schwartz at the scale autonomy-integration (R. Inglehart, Ch. Welzel, 2005, p. 137). This distribution is supported by theories of Durkheim and Tönnies. The author with this step comes to traditional dilemma of social sciences: Is there a strong individual or a collective?

and cultural politics (R. Inglehart, Ch. Welzel, 2005). We can find the same opinion also in Kate Nash's *Contemporary Political Sociology* in which she stresses today's emphasis on cultural politics (K. Nash, 2010, pp. 30—41). We can agree with Inglehart in the emphasis on social and cultural changes, but the methodology of the research can be problematic and Inglehart also has his critics. Schwartz criticizes the questions in research, since it is impossible to use them internationally and universally (S.H. Schwartz, n.d.).

Schwartz and values

The latest and newest research of value is the approach of Shalom H. Schwartz. The author established the foundations of his approach in 1987 in the study *Toward a Universal Psychological Structure of Human Values* together with Wolfgang Bilsky. Schwartz and Bilsky used the methods of Guttman-Lingoes Space Analysis for the Pearson correlation coefficients for value from the Rokeach Value Survey (RVS). Together with the factor analysis they defined the proximity of values and determine eight value domains: prosocial, restrictive conformity, enjoyment, achievement, self-direction, maturity, security and social power. Their conviction was that values are representation of three universal requirements: biological needs, interaction requirement for interpersonal coordination and social requirements for living and prosperity of a group (S.H. Schwartz, W. Bilsky, 1987). Motivational domains are defined on two important levels — intervals (motivational domains are arranged by simple key, both domains are on one hand very close to each other, and on the other of the circle they are opposite to each other — Schwartz and Bilsky also determined the hypothesis about the relation between motivational domains (see S.H. Schwartz, W. Bilsky, 1997). The first interval is the interest which determines the reaching of the aim — the value. The scale is here determined from an individual interest to a mixed interest and a collective interest. The second interval is set by importance of value as a control principle in life from very important to unimportant.

In 1992 Schwartz adjusted his theory and extended the number of motivational domains to eleven (S.H. Schwartz, 1992): self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, spirituality, benevolence, universalism. Spirituality was later excluded from this research. Each motivational domain is strictly theoretically and empirically supported by research (S.H. Schwartz, 1992, pp. 5—13).

A brief look at the motivational domains (see Figure 2) can easily show us which motivational domain represents which value. Mainly individual interest is represented by values of power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation and self-direction. Mostly collective interest is represented by values of benevolence, tradition, conformism. Universalism and security are typical for both interests. All ten motivational domains are possible to subsume to the complexes of higher type, and this merger shows the relations between domains. Openness to

change contains the motivational domains of stimulation and self-direction. Self-transcendence contains motivational domains of universalism and benevolence. Conservation contains motivational domains of conformity, tradition and security. Self-enhancement contains motivational domains of power and achievement. Self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence: This dimension defines values of power and achievement in opposition to universalism and benevolence. While power and achievement speak about an individual interest, and universalism and benevolence speak about good and concern for the others. Openness to change vs. conservation is the second dimension. Here we can find values of self-direction and stimulation which are in opposite to conformity, tradition and security. First mentioned accent of autonomous action, thinking, feeling and new experiences, and on the other hand, the later mentioned accent of self-constrain, discipline and aversion to change. Hedonism contains the openness to change as self-enhancement (S.H. Schwartz, n.d.).




Figure 2. Motivational domains (S.H. Schwartz, 1992 and later)

Motivational domains are possible to consider as values of an individual. Schwartz confirmed the validity of this structure of values in 67 countries in the world, so we can consider it universal (S.H. Schwartz, n.d.). It is possible to say that every human act and behaviour is oriented towards values. Each time a human behaves according to one of the value (motivational domain) defined by Schwartz.

After creating a circle structure of motivational domains Schwartz had researched the values with rating-expression method of each individual value. The Schwartz value research is known as Schwartz Value Survey — SVS. Respondents

have to express their conviction of 56 values³ with the consideration of their role as a guiding principle in their lives, the scale was also defined: +7 (extremely important) to -1 (“it is the opposite to my values”). Twenty-one values were taken from Rokeach Value Survey (RVS), other 35 were defined by Schwartz as important for individual. “Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) was relatively time-consuming and it also required high level of abstract thinking. This was the unbearable problem for people with lower level of education” (B. Řeháková, 2006, p. 113). In 2001 Schwartz re-worked his questionnaire and came up with the values portrait research (Portrait Values Questionnaire — PVQ).

PVQ contains 29-values portraits of imaginary person. Schwartz prepared for ESS (European Social Survey) a shorter questionnaire with 21-value portraits, and also made one which contains 40-value portraits. Each respondent obtains a questionnaire and he/she should express his attitude on 6-grade scale about the similarity to him/her (he/she is very similar to me — is not similar to me at all). It is necessary that the respondent compares the portrait with him/her and not him/her with the portrait, as “it can happen that there will be too much attention to this person, and that can eventuate to reflection on his/her own characteristics which are irrelevant for the research. The respondent can also marginalize or overestimate the affinity of some values because he/she will find some other characteristics in the portrait” (B. Řeháková, 2006, p. 114). PVQ has two alternative models — one for men and one for women.

Until now we have analysed values as an individual choice of each individual who controls his/her behaviour and acting in the effort to achieve the aim. As we said earlier, values have two dimensions — individual and cultural. Schwartz also paid attention to the second dimension of values and ask himself how can he estimate the value of an *object* in the culture. In other words — how can we measure the value of an object in the culture? To ask this question is very important because “individual value priorities are products of a shared culture, but also of specific individual experience” (S.H. Schwartz, 1999, p. 25).

Schwartz constructed a model which allows us to measure an *object* shared and valued in the culture. He derived cultural values from 10-component circle of individual values and also used the circle structure for a model of cultural values. He came to a belief that values can be defined by opposition. In the 10-component circle structure there are in opposition autonomy and conservatism, self-transcendence and self-enhancement. In a new matrix there are in opposition (intellectual and affective) autonomy and conservatism, hierarchy and egalitarianism, and mastery and harmony. We can count it down and we get 7-component matrix. If we “attach” a cultural object to this matrix, we can find out why it is important in the culture.

The author chose for his experimental determination of cultural character of values the value of work. In the sample of research there is also Slovakia, and

³ There we researched values, because in the final questionnaire there was one let out and two were added (B. Řeháková, 2006, p. 113).

Schwartz confirmed the validity of 7-component matrix the same as the universality of structure of cultural values (S.H. Schwartz, 1999). Schwartz was successful in establishing the model which is the base of measurement and research of cultural values.




Figure 3. The matrix of cultural values

It is necessary to add that questions for researching the value of work contain three dimensions of the aims/ends/goals of work: (1) work centrality (in the relation to free time, community, family and religion); (2) societal norms of work (Every person in our society should be entitled to interesting and meaningful work vs. A worker should value the work he or she does even if it is boring, dirty and unskilled) and (3) importance of work⁴ (possible goals — power, intrinsic, extrinsic and social). This is the path of how to find out what is the meaning of work, and how important is the work for achieving concrete goals. These three dimensions are integrated in the matrix with 7 components according to their cultural meaning.

Schwartz with Ros and Surkiss (M. Ros, S.H. Schwartz, S. Surkiss, 1999) tried to find out which values are directly linked to value of work — which looks like the correlation between the values of SVS questionnaire and the value of work. For this research they came out with two models. The first one was called *Basic individual values and work values*, the second one *The meaning of work as a vehicle*

⁴ Intrinsic values of work are: personal growth, autonomy, creativity and interest. Extrinsic values of work are income and security. Social values of work are: contact with other people and society welfare. Values of power are: prestige, authority and influence.

for a goal attainment. The first model contained the questions which should be answered by respondent by expressing his/her attitude on the scale. The first one is SVS questionnaire (with 37 values) and after the respondent will answer 10 proclamations which are determined from the basic goals of work — intrinsic, extrinsic, social and prestige. Investigation is the rate of correlation among the goals of work. The second model investigates “the structure of the value system to explore the meaning and the importance of work” (M. Ros, S.H. Schwartz, S. Surkiss, 1999, p. 62). SVS contains 56 values and the value of work was also added to the questionnaire. Subsequently, the proximity and location of the value of work in the relation to other values in the matrix of 10 motivational value domains was derived.

Application of value measurement: Education

In this part I will provide a proposal for examining the value of education. The basic assumption is that education and training is a socially structured path to achieve goals, which are defined in four spheres of orientation. To put it more clearly: We consider education cultural values recognized in society and culture, the effort for their achieving is interconnected with goals summarized in the four categories. For the determination of hypothesis we work on the assumption of cultural values’ model defined by Schwartz (Figure 3). We defined four higher types of values:

1. Power.
2. Intrinsic values of education.
3. Extrinsic values of education.
4. Social values of education.

To each type of higher value we can assign specific cultural values:

1. **Power** speaks about prestige, authority and social influence, but also about gaining the wealth. We work on the assumption that education is socially structured path to successful life. The successfulness of life is in this case a synonym for wealth, prestige and influence. Power, prestige, wealth and social influence need to be seen as a individually constructed continuum and not just as a point which defines the state of wealth or prestige. It is not necessary to have too much, but to have relatively enough. Goldthorpe (J. Goldthorpe, 1996) speaks about two classes of mobility strategies in gaining “power.” The strategy from “downside” is used by lower classes which have a disadvantage position in the society measured by wealth, social influence and prestige. According to this strategy individuals behave and act according to the guarantee of the preservation of their class position. In that case they want to improve their class position they, take the risk of child’s failure and also believe in the future achievement of their children. Higher classes usually use the strategy “from above.” These higher classes mobilize all resources for higher education of their children. Children from these classes have

better starting position and the risk of failure is not so high as in the case of lower classes.

Relatively low cost of university studies in the Slovak Republic leads us to the next hypothesis. If the university is in the place of the child permanent residence, we presuppose that lower classes (measured by the socio-economic status of family) from university cities do invest in university education of their children. The risk which they have to bear is not extremely high. I suppose that three factors intervene in this situation. First factor: a child can have a part-time job and be a full-time student at the university. The second factor are non-jeopardize economical investments in the university studies of the child. Last but not least, the third factor is a high chance to be accepted for studies at any type of university, from any type of secondary school (with small number of exceptions). Lower classes combine the educational strategies for their children. They try to get rid of potential risks. This low-risk educational strategy is simple. It is absolutely necessary to graduate at secondary school which is practical (e.g. car mechanic). Then apply for university studies at the program, which has the highest numbers of graduates in comparison to number of students, “[...] education is changing from a goal to a simple tool for an individual and a society” (J. Keller, L. Tvrdý, 2008, p. 65).

The first type of educational goals — power, looks like an important cultural value. If we look at the strategies of education from the position of vertical social mobility, their explanation is defensible. The same can be applied to explain the educational strategies with the rational choice of theory from Goldthorpe. It is also possible to explain them with the theory of cultural transfer of Pierre Bourdieu. To reach the power, wealth, prestige and social influence (cultural and economic capital) which is a desire for lower but also for higher classes in the society. On the level of individual action and behaviour, it is possible to talk about two types of approaches. The first is typical for higher classes, which applies strategies for preservation of cultural, social and economic capital. They want to reproduce their proportion on power, prestige, wealth and social influence in the society (Bourdieu and Passeron speak about a situation when cultural reproduction of relations is enabled by social reproduction of power relations). The second type is characteristic for lower classes which have the ambition to gain some advantages for themselves. However, they do not acquire huge amount of capital. It is universally common that which is “good to have,” and they are looking to get it (P. Bourdieu, J.C. Passeron, 1977; P. Bourdieu, 1998) The value of power refers to the values of *hierarchy* and *mastery*.

2. Intrinsic values of education are autonomy, personal growth, interest in creativity and knowledge, discovering and science. We presuppose that the education is also a path to the development of the personality of man and the development of critical thinking. Schools and other educational institutions are the bearers of knowledge and tools for the development of critical thinking of individuals. Nowadays educational institutions and organizations are often criticized for orientation toward markets (e.g. J. Keller, L. Tvrdý, 2008; K.P. Liessmann, 2008), or for their “practical applicability of knowledge” (M. Petrusek, 2006, p. 411). Education is still socially recognized as a path to wisdom and knowledge and searching for

the meaning of life. The intrinsic value of education is also a pleasure and non-stereotype in life. These values refer to *intellectual* and *affective autonomy*, which stands in for values of independence, self-preference and pleasure of life.

3. **Extrinsic values of education** are security, certainty and keeping the traditions. The effort to avoid the existential problems. In this case the value of education refers to values of *conservatism* and *hierarchy*. We consider that “the school has changed and become an insurance company, the education does not guarantee the rising vertical social mobility any more as it did in the past” (J. Keller, L. Tvrdý, 2008, p. 24). Keller and Tvrdý describe three forms of understanding of today’s meaning of education (higher education). The first one is understanding the education as a temple — the education for elite. The second is understanding the education as an elevator of individuals to higher classes of the society. Thanks to education individuals were able to get into the higher class in comparison with the class in which he/she was born. The third is understanding the education as an insurance. The economy has changed in many countries and the university education does not guarantee keeping a job, getting a better job or moving to higher class any more. On the other hand, education is also the preservation of class status of the family, or following the wishes and orders of a significant person. Education is an embodied value of tradition and dominance.

4. **Social values of education** are those which contribute to in society welfare, to the equality among people and helpfulness among people, the growth of society and maintaining the contact among people. The social values of education refer to values of *harmony* and *egalitarianism*. It is necessary to divide social values into two types. The first will be the values (goals) of students to develop new contacts and friendships with the others — the effort to get a social capital. The second type will be the contribution to the common good of society, equality among people, helpfulness and the development of the whole society. The hypothesis is the following: Education is gathering of cultural capital of the family and this effort also leads to gathering the knowledge and the development of science.

As the reader probably noticed one value is defined in two value domains of higher type. It is the value of hierarchy, which belongs in our paper to extrinsic values of education and also to value of power. The reason for this is the overlapping nature of this value in individual and cultural state of education. The delimitation of the hierarchy in the extrinsic values of education refers to the status of the society (security, certainty in life) and we can see very similar reference in the value of power. The value of power refers in the hierarchy to prestige, social influence and economical status.

Conclusions

The aim of this study was to present the most commonly used research approaches and the application of general value research into the values of education

research. We define values as beliefs, which are hierarchical and motivational for all human actions and behaviours. They drive human actions and behaviours. Our application of value research for education value may lead to the research of specific kind of value, which is the value of education. Education in its nowadays form is the result of the process of institutionalization several-centuries long. Education is becoming more and more preferred strategy for on the one hand personal growth and on the other hand for socially recognized social status which can bring a man or a woman the prestige, wealth or power. It also leads to the growth of man or woman what we call a social capital and it also fills up the expectations which are put on human achievements.

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