

**The Private Side of a New Security Identity
in French Cities**

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Abstract:

Focusing on the joint analysis of security trends and the organization of the private security market in France, this article addresses the new relationships between different security players and modern citizenship and society within the framework of metropolization. Despite the construction of an extended sovereign power, especially after the Second World War, the governments started to cooperate in the 1990s with other partners and to vary the levels of decision making in terms of security policies. Experts from private security companies or local councillors are new operators in the so-called “security co-production”. An analysis at the metropolis scale seems important in order to understand the issues related to security for two reasons: firstly, because of the particular pressure connected to the recent terrorist attacks than can affect the “identity” of the city; secondly, because “incivility” – constructed as a major political problem since the 1990s – is linked to social structures of local territories within a wider one, with differentiated means for the people who live in the metropolitan center of social framework. The social representations of order and social control are still based on the relationships between private property, transports and public (access) spaces. The new security identity of cities depends on the relationships between local policies and the socio-economic reality of citizens, including private security guards, whose life conditions are an expression of the paradoxes of modern life.

Key words:

private security, professionalization, metropolis, social control

Introduction

“Law and order issues in metropolitan areas have become a worrying phenomenon, and can have serious repercussions on social cohesion and balanced development. Paradoxically, the

assets and demographic features of metropolitan areas make them particularly vulnerable to certain types of risk. On the one hand, the way they operate as a system can be weakened by any attack related—however marginally—to law and order issues on one of their vital components. On the other, metropolitan features encourage flows of people and goods that are conducive to illegal activities linked to national or international criminal networks. They can facilitate the establishment of activist groups by offering anonymity, logistical support and a recruitment base. The nerve centers of metropolitan areas are a particular target for new forms of terrorism. These trends are worrying in the current international political situation.”¹

More than one decade ago, the European Economic and Social Committee identified few major security issues in metropolitan areas, pointing out the relation between their distinctive features and the risks involved. Since 2015, along with other European countries², France has been hit by major deadly Islamist terror attacks, especially the ones in Paris on November 13, 2015 (130 dead and 413 injured), and Nice on July 14, 2016 (86 dead and 458 wounded). The latest large-scale attack dated back to two decades ago. In common representations, the identities of major French cities now seem associated with the terrorist risk, which can have significant negative consequences on socio-economic and symbolic levels. These tragic events create an exceptional political situation: the state of emergency, declared on the night of 13 to 14 November 2015, has been extended several times and remains in force at the time of writing. However, it should be noted that the previous state of emergency was not related to Islamist attacks, but lasted nearly two months (from November 21, 2005 to January 6, 2006) when riots broke out in the suburbs of some major French towns. These outbursts were a response to the death of two teenagers, the cause of which was attributed to police officers who, after being questioned, were finally released.³ This episode has been an opportunity to see the discrepancies between different urban groups.

These two types of situations are at the heart of the current issues with French security policies. This also follows three decades of construction of “security” as an issue at the forefront of the political and media agendas (Bonelli 2008; Mucchielli 2014). In a paper published in 2001, the political specialist and criminologist Sebastian Roché championed “security

¹ Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘European Metropolitan Areas: socio-economic implications for Europe's future’ (2004/C 302/20).

² For example, Brussels bombings on March 22, 2016 or the Manchester bombing on May 22, 2017.

³ The lawyers of the victims’ families announced their intention to appeal to the Supreme Court.

metropolitanization”, according to the rise of communities in public decision making and commodification of the security sector. Indeed, at the local political level, mayors saw an increase in legitimacy in the management of safety in the mid-1990s. It resulted in forms of partnerships with uncertain effects in the consequences of co-production and complex reasons, including the conflicts between managers and ground logics (Ferret & Mouhanna 2005). Sebastian Roché, however, remained pessimistic about seeing the “head of an urban area” (“chef d’agglomération”) become the “true coordinator of local actions of security”, particularly because of the weight of political and police corporations and the risk of inequalities between municipalities. Fifteen years later, even though the mayor had since then become in charge of prevention policy (2007), the facts proved him right. But his words, like many political analysts working on private security, suffer from a too functionalist-centric approach, even if a recent collective analysis made the effort to confront elements of public policy and empirical sociology (Bonnet, De Maillard, & Roché 2015).

The economic interests of metropolitan centers and the practices of many players also explain why cities do not produce a continuous and consistent security, in a modern form of social control mechanisms of integration comparable to that of the “Community”. For example, the ‘metropolitan network’ (‘toile métropolitaine’) (Halbert 2010) is characterized by a “movement of dissociation of housing, jobs and places of consumption, leisure, training” (Morel 2014). This situation produces safety constraints and partially influences the work of professionals.

The reflection in this article is at the intersection of political sociology and the sociology of work. It deals with certain forms of contemporary security issues in cities. It aims to understand what the new safety devices reveal about the identity of cities today, and to grasp the new issues for their inhabitants. This reflection extends the results of a research that was focused on the construction of private security sector and the journey and experiences of individuals working in this sector of activity. These works show in particular how private security is based on flexibility and social insecurity for individuals, and what are the additional social functions of private security agents (Bauvet 2015).

As a first step, I will present the evolution of security production in France, and more specifically the advent of private security in a country where security often appears as part of the ‘regalian’ duties (Bonnet, De Maillard, & Roché 2015). Secondly, I will define specific security

social issues for metropolies as institutional and political structures (Pyka 2011), which will allow to question joint developments in citizenship and metropolitan identity through the prism of the new security relationships.

Evolution of the design and production of security in France

I will begin by sketching a general historical framework of the evolution of security production in France. It is possible to identify several key processes. They correspond to three general models of protection development, which are not strictly linked in their chronology.

Originally, on the one hand, when cities were not as politically important as they are today, the protection model was feudal and seigniorial. It was based on private ownership military means (regular and mercenary troops). Urban security, on the other hand, was provided both by a kind of “City police” and a set of small trades of surveillance without coercive powers. Overall, security missions were shared between public and private sectors (Robert 1999), depending on the nature of the controlled object (urban security or tax collection).

Since the modern period, the sociologists and historians have shown a process of state-building through the monopolization of legitimate violence. This well-known process has been theorized by Max Weber (1959) and shown by Norbert Elias (1969) to be valid in the French case until the end of the Modern period: the Lords related to Kingdom-State did not have personal armies but were dependent on the King's soldiers. Some troops were sometimes bigger than the city police. However, it is only after the Second World War that the state police truly started dominating daily security (Le Goff 2005), namely with the nationalization of many municipal police forces. The latter would find some strength from the 1980s, in parallel to an improvement in the training of the national police.

The last identifiable model is that of the co-production of security (Ocqueteau 1997). It is inherited from the theories of security experts, especially in the United States, where the aim of co-production security is supposed to be at the crossroads between public authorities, private security and citizens. In France, since the mid-1990s, the state has retained the most important security missions but created other entities (communities, institutions and businesses) for day-to-day security missions. It should be noted that since the 1980s, in parallel, insurance companies have also insisted that their corporate customers invest more in security (Lemaître 1995). Thus, while there were 235,000 members of the public security forces in France by 2015—about

140,000 police officers and 95,000 gendarmes⁴ (IGF & IGA 2017), the staff of private security agents amounted to about 160,000 people, with a near-constant increase in volume since the beginning of the 1980s (OMPS 2016). In comparison, according to the Ministry of the Interior, municipal police officers are only about 21,000⁵, assisted by 7,000 monitoring street police officers ('agent de surveillance de la voie publique').

Since France has entered a process of decentralization (that started in the 1980s), the model of 'co-production' of French security has changed.

Firstly, the 1983 Act regulating the activities of private security was a great first step, but an ambiguous one: it marked both the 'recognition' of the sector, but also its 'probation' (because many small businesses had been created since the 1970s, without regulation, giving rise to multiple abusive and unlawful situations, especially to the detriment of the employees).

Then, the 1995 law orientation and programming for safety, and two years later, the Villepinte Symposium (Ministère de l'Intérieur 1997) marked a fully assumed political and legal inflection to a logic of "co-production". It is notable that the use of private security expertise is increasing, particularly at the local level, through local security contracts ('Contrats Locaux de Sécurité' – CLS): this type of contract between various public and private operators determines a security policy in a particular territory. In addition, the signature of a CLS is subject to a "local safety diagnosis", which involves private upstream expertise (Bonelli 2008).

From 2001, and the so-called 'daily security law' (Loi de Sécurité Quotidienne – LSQ), links with companies monitoring and controlling the 'production of security' were reinforced, including their integration into the Vigipirate plan (the French national security alert system) and granting some additional rights for private security officers.

Finally, the 2010s marked the beginning of the "privatization of the regulation of private security" (Ocqueteau & Warfman 2011: 122), through the creation of a public administrative institution responsible for accreditation and control: the Council of Private Security Professions ('Conseil national des activités privées de sécurité' – CNAPS). This joint administration, which still gives the majority of seats to representatives of the State, is funded through a tax paid by security companies. At the same time, new professional unions are emerging (for example,

⁴ This corps is a branch of the military, operating in rural and semi-rural areas.

⁵ <https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/datasets/police-municipale-effectifs-par-commune/>. The most important numbers are in Marseille (402), Nice (378), Lyon (330), Toulouse (233) and Cannes (197).

Syndicat du conseil en sûreté in 2010, or Fédération française des acteurs de formation en sécurité in 2012).

On a local level, the development of the scope of intervention of mayors, through local security contracts, has given new orientations in programs of security policies based on a politically neutralized production and a presence of a ‘strategist’ (Le Goff 2002). It also revived the pragmatic ‘neutralizing’ effects of presentation of the field of expertise. Tanguy Le Goff shows that mayors who have an original role of “guarantor of the peace [...] seize insecurity to strengthen their hold on their constituencies by their policies and their speech” (Le Goff 2005: 416). Mayors are gradually recognized as partners of the state in its struggle against insecurity in all aspects of crime prevention, and gradually rely not only on municipal police, but also on new professionals responsible for surveillance of public space missions: local social mediation agents, urban mediators or even night correspondents.

The CLS policy was based on ‘citizenship’ (the access to which would be promoted through instances of socialization, such as family, school and society), and ‘proximity’, to “guide the police based on the—too long neglected—concerns of the people, so as to better coordinate social and criminal dimensions and not to cancel one another” (Roché 2005: 9). The next actions being based on social prevention, operations are clearly developing within a paradigm of situational prevention: stemming from American Criminology of the 1970s-1980s, this approach aims to organize space and security devices with the idea that the offender is a rational actor who acts opportunistically (Benbouzid 2010; Bonnet 2012). This approach would be used in managing local public space of French big cities from the middle of the 1990s on.

The book *Peur sur les villes* (‘Fear in the Cities’) co-written by Jérôme Ferret and Christian Mouhanna (2005) juxtaposes the analyses of different local safety devices in an attempt to answer the question of the advent of a ‘punitive populism’, defined initially as a psychological phenomenon, as a discourse deriving from ‘common sense’, a-ideological, marked by the figure of the victim, and at the root of a crisis of traditional mediations. It is aligned with the transformation of the state. The authors analyze the ‘safe interventionism of mayors’ as one of the reasons of a “competitive co-production of local public order”. They show converging procedures that form local actors despite a “real or perceived insecurity [that] is not of the same nature from one site to the other”. They stress that cooperation as an aspect of ‘security’ is not the new dominating topic (Ferret & Mouhanna 2005). The authors do not extend this observation

to homogenization in other instances of security production. However the private security market, the management of employment and the organization of work appear also as a source of reflection on the homogenization of modes of security regulations in the broad sense.

As part of a large ‘contractualization movement’, the register of the ‘council and engineering’ is thus at the heart of the positioning of private security market expertise (Sina 2005), spreading social prevention supported by educational associations, mediator businesses, etc. There is a double cost: ‘diagnostic’ (in the case of CLS especially) and evaluative, supported by an inflation of public policy assessment mechanisms leading to their commoditization (Barbier 2010). It is quite logical that security experts, shaped the empirical results of the use of devices designed to combat crime and insecurity, used local data to show the viability of the new security ‘solutions’, as it can be observed in some events with different partners of private security: for example, trade shows are an opportunity to see local actors articulate ‘requests’ at a national level and ‘local problems’, the first of which is the ‘sense of insecurity’ of communities. Thus one speaks as much of ‘urban shortcomings’ (which involve questions of cleanliness or lighting) as of ‘social solutions’ to reinforce citizen protection.⁶

This legitimization by the local level, which gives the opportunity to security experts to mobilize their ‘de facto skills’ and get economic remuneration, is never without risk since the local political power itself can be subjected to citizen criticism of the management of safety devices, coming sometimes from local elected officials, in a reference to the responsibilities of the State and its sovereign missions.

Regarding labor, private security experts frequently emphasize the ‘moralization’ and ‘sanitation’ of the sector (Bauvet 2015), and since 2000 have tried to legitimize their position of security ‘co-producer’. A series of measures of workers’ ‘professionalizing’ have been implemented:

- 2006: implementation of a grid ‘business leader’, i.e. the definition of 17 specific “professions” within the private security;
- 2009-2010: diploma became mandatory for recruitment, a professional certificate (‘Certificat de Qualification Professionnelle’ – CQP) as professional ‘prevention and security officer’. Each agent must also be in possession of a professional card;

⁶ Richard Olszewski, councilor and supervisor of video surveillance department in Lille, Public statement at Expoprotection, security trade show, Villepinte, November 5, 2008.

– 2013: the duration of the CQP training went from 70 to 140 hours (many professionals judging the initial training too short and evaluation procedures as too easy).

This legal-political structuring of private security in France can give an impression of rationalized new forms of safety production, contrasting with some elements of its implementation. Before further analysis of this contradiction, I will present some general data about the policing performed by the private sector.

The reports of the professional branch of private security⁷ establish that private security officers are employed by more than 10,000 companies, of which two-thirds are in fact self-employed individuals. There is a great contrast between the multinational companies that dominate the market and many small businesses struggling to survive, mainly because the market is highly competitive, with public contracts representing around 25% of the overall turnover. The latter henceforth overtakes 6 billion euros, with an increase of 22% in ten years. It is notable that private security companies are known for illegal employment and labour practices (Hassid 2010), especially in undeclared work.⁸

With reference to the workers, more than a third are between 26 and 39 years old, with 9.5% aged less than 26 and 9.5% aged 55 and older. There are 86% of men and 14% of women, and the rate of the latter increases with the hierarchical rank, except in director positions, especially in large companies. The employment conditions of workers appear precarious. In 2012, the average salary was 1,489 euros, which is less than the services workers administrative category and barely higher than cleaning professions (1,367 euros) or jobs in the fast food industry (1,391 euros).⁹ Since the beginning of the 2010s, fixed-term contracts represent the majority of new contracts: they amounted to 69% in 2014 and 74% in 2015. These rates must not hide the disparities among agents: if part of the agents are in a stable situation (20% of the agents have 11 years' seniority and more), the majority worked very temporarily, and are partially ignored by official statistics. These, at least, reported an annual turnover rate that has varied between 40% and 100% since 1998 (Bauvet 2015). Similarly, the daily geographic constraints of

⁷ Unless noted otherwise, statistics for this paragraph are taken from the last report of the professional branch of private security (OMPS 2016).

⁸ Research interview with a health and safety inspector, Paris region, March 2011.

⁹<http://dares.travail-emploi.gouv.fr/dares-etudes-et-statistiques/etudes-et-syntheses/dares-analyses-dares-indicateurs-dares-resultats/article/les-salaires-par-secteur-et-par-branche-professionnelle-en-2012>.

private security agents' work appear to be characteristic of metropolitan life and patterns of inherent inequality.¹⁰

These dimensions of employment are indicative of the economic logic at work in cities: although these are territories characterized by capital accumulation, they also create significant inequalities among the population, and precarious conditions for some workers. Private employment in urban security does not escape this logic. In the third part, I will further analyze this issue, to show that the metropolitan identity and its security challenges influence the form of labor and employment in private security itself.

Metropolitan security and society

Generally speaking, cities now appear as the attractive place for the majority of the French population, and inevitably contribute to their experience and identity. Urban planning is historically marked by attention to safety. Some scholars argue that this is part of the 'visibility' culture linked to urban development, through policing jobs but also equipments, such as for example lighting (Marchal & Stébé 2011). The development of cities has led the recent approach to cross economic and security issues, as evidenced by the development of *surveillance studies* (Bardet & Purenne 2010), which take into account essential aspects of social control, including the collection of personal information on the population and the control of their mobility.

As regards security in the classical sense of the term, the cities are today affected by two major issues:

– First of all, 'incivility' (Roché 2002) has gradually taken an essential role on the political and media agenda since the 1980s. Expanding the definition of 'delinquency', this poorly defined term refers to a set of actions and behaviors (rudeness, small damage to public facilities and communal areas of buildings, occupation of public space, etc.). These would feed a sense of insecurity through the degradation of the environment in the broad sense (both material and social). Stereotypically, some media or politicians sometimes associate incivility to the figure of a young man with an immigrant background and living in the popular suburbs.

¹⁰ In INSEE surveys, security officers mostly live in a different Department than their employer's compared with the employed population (approximately 20 points difference). Furthermore, the gap between the Île-de-France (the Paris region) and the rest of the country is important: in 2011, more than 65% of private security officers living in Île-de-France worked in a different Department than their employer's in France, while the rate is only 40% for metropolitan France. This phenomenon affects the employed population or employees in comparable proportions (Bauvet 2015).

– Islamist terrorism has been present since the mid-1990s, but became increasingly important in the collective representations only later: first with the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States and the Madrid (March 11, 2004) and London (July 7, 2005) bombings and more particularly in France since the 2015-2016 attacks.

During this period, in parallel with their legitimization in the political field, private security experts have brought these issues to the risk for businesses. One expert recalls that “a company is a creator of wealth, and therefore this wealth becomes a target, because this wealth interests everyone – it goes from the mafia to terrorist organizations, because we should not separate the two of them, often there are connections between them – and that, of course, wealth is a target for these organizations, by the profit they can get.”¹¹ This expert links terrorism and mafia, and as the mafia is also based on petty crime, he hints at possible links between terrorism and crime. It presents a cross security risk for legal persons (companies) and, therefore, a risk to major cities. In practice, large companies, as major players in metropolitan centers, have largely reinforced their security for a decade by appealing to private security companies.

Besides the closed corporations, private security unfolds based on the issues of mobility and flows in different mixed spaces, and is part of the metropolitan security culture:

– Video surveillance is increasingly used on the public highway. From the early 2000s, many municipalities equipped themselves with cameras. For example, large metropolises have significantly invested in such devices. They are sometimes criticized for their potential intrusive and discriminatory effects, but may also be supported on behalf of their technical neutrality, especially when the implantation of these devices are validated by expertise committees from engineering, as is the case in Lyon (Benbouzid 2010). Indeed, the new expression ‘vidéoprotection’ (video protection) describing the features of video surveillance, promoted by mayors and private security experts, seems to justify the privatization in the name of public safety.

– In the new business districts located in disadvantaged areas (for example, the business center of Plaine Saint-Denis, in the Seine-Saint-Denis department), decision makers use security architecture and social mediation agents to ensure the tranquility of workers commuting from

¹¹ Régis Poincelet, Security Director at GDF Suez and Vice President of the *Club des directeurs de sécurité des entreprises (CDSE)* (Enterprise Security Directors Club), Public statement at Expoprotection, security trade show, Villepinte, November 8, 2008. CDSE is one of the most important security specialists associations, with 114 companies, mostly French (Sécurité & Stratégie 2017).

other areas in the Paris region. As in other types of spaces (for example, public transport), public policy makers or private companies in charge of public service missions, resorted to new companies to ensure local peace (Bonnet, De Maillard, & Roché 2015). It should be noted that these new jobs are often precarious.

– In stores and malls (which are part of what the literature defines as ‘mass private properties’), beside more and more surveillance cameras, private security agents provide security of public spaces on regular basis. They also ensure ‘good conduct’ of the local population (in major malls located in the suburban towns), so as to reassure the customers. This role is particularly interesting to explore the new metropolitan identity at the junction between the socio-political issues and the question of work implementation.

The new security identity of cities is based on similarities between the new security forces and more general characteristics of metropolitan features and population. While recruiting the public force, the process is based on a national logic recruitment (only French citizens may pretend to join police, and the competitive recruitment is done at national level), into private security it is linked with the socio-economic rules of the metropolis, at least for two reasons:

– Proximity between economic players: cities attract businesses to increase their economic and/or symbolic capital, and seek partners and providers to join forces. Businesses try to reconcile security and marketing, and want a customized security service. To that purpose, they can turn to private security companies which are essentially multinational companies (for example, Securitas or G4S) or many companies settled at a metropolitan or local level. This logic is felt regarding the distribution of agents or the establishment of company head offices: 35% of companies and 44.5% of employees were concentrated in the Île-de-France region in 2015, for a rate of 589 employees per 100,000 inhabitants (OMPS 2016). In work activity, looking for a match between these constraints is observable. For example, even Parisian uptown luxury store may greet customers originally from the working-class but economically successful. According to some private security agents, this entails adapting part of the host device, and first of all the sociological characteristics of security agents themselves.¹² More generally speaking, the sociology of work helps to show that sales and security recruitment is crucial in this adaptation. The “good profile” is one that fits the ‘profitable visitor’, i.e. who makes purchases, and some

¹² Research interview with a private security officer, Paris, December 2014.

abuse or negative behavior towards staff (regardless of the social origin of the client) are ‘absorbed’ by employees, not only sales-persons, but also private security officers.

– Proximity between populations: the “metropolitan” population does not correspond to a ‘national’ population according to the Ministry of the Interior (2014), foreigners represented 4.67% of the total population in 2014, but there are strong differences between departments: the population of the Paris region has a lot more foreigners, with inner Paris (13.29%) or Seine-Saint-Denis (18,36%), a disadvantaged department located North of the capital, with a population essentially from former French colonies, in particular from Africa, but also 40% European Union (EU) citizens.¹³ The mobility of EU citizen has been on the rise in recent years, in line with a metropolitanization process attracting foreign labor. Thus, the presence of many foreign security officers, especially immigrants of African origin, testifies to the post-colonial reality of globalization, and their mobility (place of residence and place of work) is spread across the metropolitan territory.

Two ideal-types among private security officers can be distinguished:

– On the one hand, a minority trained for careers in public safety (and more particularly former military personnel) may seek a job with a professional ‘resemblance’. Some of them call to mind the earlier generations, nostalgic for the colonial order and/or aspiring to the exercise of authority (Ocqueteau & Warfman 2011). This minority may be supplemented by people seeking or aspiring to careers in public safety who couldn't integrate these professional bodies or are still preparing for the competition exams.

– On the other hand, a majority of individuals followed very different academic and/or professional courses and joined the sector “by default” or “by chance”. These are the successors of workers changing their profession, students or pensioners who needed an extra income in the 1970s. Some workers are referred by Job Centre (initially directly to employers, and then through mandatory training at the end of the 2000s), others get a position through their friend or family networks. This is particularly true for African workers, for whom private security is an example of ‘ethnic’ hiring (such as cleaning services, some fields of the building trade, etc.), and a large number of small agencies are working from a network of informal recruitment (Gandaho

¹³ This data is based on the Census of legal residents, suggesting that the actual foreign population is slightly more numerous. It may also be noted that immigrants (people born outside France, regardless of past and current nationality) represented 8.7% of the population in 2012. 38% of them live in the urban area of Paris, where 17% of the non-immigrants live (<https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2121524>).

2010). Private security is among the professional categories with more immigrants: they hold 21.9% of those jobs (Jolly, Lane, & Breem 2012), alongside “racialized” French people.

It is not to imply that private security agents are incompetent; not only because security does not “naturally” belong to the public forces, but also because their involvement in employment is based on a strong sense of responsibility. It brings them to face the conditions of employment and precarious work in a dynamic of social relations including the use of interpersonal skills (Bauvet 2017). However, the observation of practices of principals (clients of private security companies) and the testimonies of agents regarding their relationships at work (namely their interactions with clients) show an attenuation of this security responsibility in representations of their functions. In reality, there is a preference to minimum of staff employment (that is, contractors who employ private security guards often stick to the minimum requirement of insurance companies). Conversely, they frequently expect security agents to perform tasks usually done by other workers (cleaning, storage, sales support, switchboard, customer intelligence). In the same way, store customers can easily turn to the private security agent for requests that have no connection with security. This complex process is testament to the transformation of cities' identities, marked by commoditization, with three criteria: the extension of a new market (private security), the search for productivity gains (new private security jobs absorb part of other jobs), and competition and/or the weakening of traditional groups of social control. These elements appear as concrete forms of what some authors refer to as cultural impact of the “market society” (Roustang 2009).

Conclusion

The current role of private security in France, as in many countries, can reflect the transformations of Nation-States and highlights the importance of metropolises in developments related to globalization. After becoming the principal place of concentration of political power, the city was logically put under the protection of police security to ensure “conservation of goods and people”. However, metropolitan development, especially in terms of economic issues, must take into account three essential dimensions of “control”: selecting individuals and goods in order to ensure a return of economic devices, the fluidity of their passages and their displacement, and mutual transparency of devices and individuals increasingly identified through their consumer identity (Gros 2012). Implantation of a private metropolitan-wide security might

seem to go in the direction of the event of a transfer of political community legitimacy in civil society. However, the current limits are reflected by the remaining obstacles in civic life. Indeed, the decision-making process is conditioned by traditional political mechanisms, and instances of participatory democracy reproducing the problems existing at the national level: weight in decision-making, lack of social representativeness of participants, lack of stimulation of participation (Lefebvre 2012). When social and political innovations come directly from civil society, it is difficult for them to enter the legitimate public landscape at the level of the metropolis, and networks remain essentially militant (culture of closeness, solidarity, etc.).

Private stakeholders at the metropolitan level security encounter similar difficulties: as things stand, regulation leaves a lot of power to principals, often at the expense of the conditions for security missions' realization; private security agents are presented as figures of future security, but actually they remain an atomized segment and can't find professional representation to rise to the challenges of their profession. They do not find the practical conditions of their legitimacy within the division of social work. They are sometimes viewed as illegitimate in society in general (partly due to their ethno-national origin) and are kept at distance from their own functions. The new security identity of cities is marked by socio-economic differentiation of players who are increasingly under security and commercial pressure. Accordingly, the new forms of policing need to provide for a more integrative dynamics from a social point of view.

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