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Abstract:

In Europe and across the world, many countries are turning to deliberative democracy to reform their constitutions, and in many others this question is high on the political agenda. Such transformation also shuffles quite radically the role of the citizenry regarding constitutional changes. Traditionally such changes are the sole responsibility of elected officials in collaboration with experts. With the deliberative turn, many more actors may be involved in the designing of constitutions, from citizens both individually and collectively in the forms of informal associations to various civil society organisations. The main aim of this paper is to analyse potential of deliberative democracy in Slovenian national setting, therefore authors are analysing a) framework of constitution making dynamics and b) most successful deliberative democratic tools and opportunities developed so far on both national and sub-national levels of the Slovenian government. As deliberative democracy is well known political phenomenon, we will start not by yet another theoretical pandemonium, but with less-known Slovenian contribution to the global development of deliberative model.

Keywords: deliberation, democracy, constitution, Slovenia, policy-making

Theory Behind Deliberative Democratic Model: Slovenian Contribution

Deliberation is not a new political phenomenon. Historically, we can trace it back to the Ancient Greece and the model of direct democracy, where the sublimity of the word is placed above all other political instruments and portrayed as a major political tool. Deliberative democracy is concerned with building and engaging with authentic and reasoned debate in order to decide on a course of action. In other words, if it is deliberative, it is inclusive and consequential (Dryzek 2009). All deliberative democratic forms share common features: they are based on some form of

deliberation among samples of citizens; they aim to foster positive and constructive thinking about solutions (they are not simply protest movements); they seek genuine debate about policy content; they seek solutions beyond adversarial politics; and they seek to identify common ground. In addition to the legitimacy crisis of liberal institutions that started in the second half of the previous century (Serzhanova 2018: 31) and which recently led to the crisis of the representative democratic model, tenets of deliberative democracy can be tracked back to the new social movements in the 1960s, which provided a serious critique of political elitism and the technocratic state. As an integral model of (liberal) democracy, deliberative democracy was nevertheless not constituted before the 1990s, when increased interest in participatory forms of democracy was also accelerated by the rise of the new ICTs, especially the Internet (Oblak-Črnič et al. 2011: 91).

Discussion about democratic governance has its roots in early theories about participatory democracy, which can be defined abstractly as a regime in which adult citizens assemble to deliberate and to vote on the most important political matters. Barber (1984: 117) states that participatory democracy becomes possible through policy-making institutions and a high level of education, which binds citizens to pursue the common good. However, Barber (1984: 234) specifies that strong participatory democracy will not develop through civic education and knowledge, but rather will arise when people are given political power and channels of influence. Having attained these, they will perceive that it is necessary to acquire knowledge in order to be able to make political decisions. According to Pateman (1970: 42-43; see also Uziębło 2009), wide participation in the community's decision-making stabilises the community. A decision-making process that allows public participation develops from the very start as a process that perpetuates itself due to the effect of political participation. Participatory political processes have an impact upon the development of the social and political capacities of citizens, and this positively influences the next act of participation. Participation has an integrative effect especially upon those citizens who take part in political activity, and thus makes the acceptance of collective decisions easier.

Deliberative democracy, in its essence, advocates the systematic internalization of the assumptions that Barber (1984) requires to establish a strong democracy. In order to fulfil this requirement, it would first be necessary to ensure greater involvement of those affected by political decisions and (equally importantly) to build-up a different political culture and civic

awareness, enhancing the social inclusiveness and importance of citizen's participation in political decision-making. Contrary to the liberal-democratic model, the main innovation of deliberative model is the establishment of institutions and procedures that will enable those affected by the decisions taken to play a crucial role in the process of political decision-making. The objection of the proponents of the deliberative decision-making model is that the existing political decisions do not (sufficiently) contain the will of all stakeholders affected by the decision. This finding also leads to further criticisms of the legitimate deficiency of both, the decisions taken and the system that enables such deficient decision-making.

Lukšič (2005) joins many critics of liberal democracy who believe that the activities, backgrounds, and interests of political representatives and decision-makers are distant from the lives and expectations of citizens. Although elections act as selective, citizens have little influence on the decisions made on their behalf. In line with the basic belief in the deliberative capacity of the individual, deliberative theory acknowledges the existing representative institutions; but also maintains critical distance by noting that because of the influence of the party interests and the lack of the citizen's opinions, which are being politically marginalized in the political decision-making process, citizen's interests and expectations are systematically excluded or at least inadequately addressed (Lukšič 2005: 239).

Proponents of the liberal democratic model point out that the complexity of modern societies makes it impossible for the public to make political decisions directly. However, deliberative democracy does not deny the need to share work and integrate professional views into decision-making processes. After all, experts are part of the public that would be included in the deliberative decision-making model. But the forms deliberative democracy offers are significantly different in that they provide the desired and possible citizenship operation. However, due to the increased internal legitimacy, the decisions that would be the product of such a decision-making process would also strongly bound legally defined political authorities. Deliberative democratic model, therefore, relies on institutions that: (a) promote democratic deliberation involving a reasonable political dialogue, (b) are sensitive to the plurality of values, and (c) promote political judgment, taking into account different perspectives and views of different stakeholders (Lukšič 2005: 240).

Constitution-Making in Slovenian Political System

The process of forming and enacting the Slovenian Constitution, adopted on 23 December 1991, was inseparably connected to the Slovenian liberation and its democratization. Democratization ran from the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s and created a basis for the transition into a new constitutional arrangement. One of the main objectives of this arrangement was national liberation (Cerar 2001: 10). However, the process of liberation surpassed the accepting of a new constitution. Due to a lack of political consensus on new constitutional arrangements, it was accepted approximately six months after the declaration of independence.

Accepting the new Constitution and the soon following elections of the new state authorities (President of the Republic, National Assembly, and National Council) was the most dramatic phase of Slovenia's transition (keeping in mind the liberation was followed by a ten-day war and a few months of the partial isolation of Slovenia). Therefore, the beginning of Slovenia's current constitutive system stretches back to the time of the democratic movement in the 1980s, when alternative and oppositional forces progressively increased their demands for Slovenia's statehood and introduction of a democratic system. A complete program for a more determinant assertion of Slovenia's statehood was first put forth by the authors of the 'Subscriptions for Slovenian National Program' in the *Nova revija* magazine in 1987. However, the first draft of the constitution was proposed in 1988 by the Society of Slovenian Writers and the Slovenian Sociological Society, where a number of authors composed the so-called 'Writers' Constitution' and published it in the *Critical Science Magazine*.[1] The initiative that was launched at the public presentation of the Writers' Constitution was used by the opposition organizations (societies, associations, unions, etc.) to form the Convention for the Constitution in 1989. The Convention's activities operated under the former republic's constitution and ordered the creation of a working draft of the current constitution. This draft was accepted by the Convention at the beginning of 1990 (the DEMOS Constitution) and published in the *Democracy* magazine under the title

[1.] This later formed material for the Slovenian Constitution, which focused on those theses of the Slovenian Constitution that were summarized advanced and published in the national program one year earlier. They were seen as groundwork for the later draft. Their purpose was to dismiss ideological principles, the former constitution, and provisions on the leading role of the Communist Party and to trigger the process of establishing a free and democratic Slovenia.

'Working Draft of the New Slovenian Constitution'. It presented a 164-article formulation of the proposed new constitution.[2]

By the end of 1990, the extensive work of the political coalition on their primary aim to liberate Slovenia by composing a new constitution had failed. Consequently, DEMOS agreed on an alternative – to hold a plebiscite. This was carried out on 23 December 1990, when 88.2 percent of the voters (a 93.2 percent electoral turnout) voted in favour of an independent Slovenia. The outcome of the plebiscite proves the legitimacy of the Slovenian liberation process. Slovenia finalized its statehood by accepting the 'Basic Constitutional Deed on the Independent Republic of Slovenia' and the Constitutional Law for Realization of the Basic Constitutional Deed on the Independent Republic of Slovenia. At the same time, Slovenia accepted the Declaration of Independence.[3] The former two have a constitutional and juridical nature, whereas the latter is a political act. The Basic Constitutional Deed is *sui generis* a constitutional law, which defines Slovenia as an independent state with all those rights and responsibilities (and their implementation) that were formerly given to the federal organs by the Constitution of Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and by the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia. It further defines Slovenia's international borders, guarantees the protection and exercise of the human rights of all people on Slovenian national territory, and also guarantees legal custody of Italian and Hungarian minorities as determined in the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution.

The Current Slovenian Constitution was ratified in a regular legislative body (the tri-cameral Slovenian Socialist Assembly) following the procedure of constitutional revision (Sokół 2012: 386). The latter was made obligatory by the former constitution (actually by its amendments) for any amendments to it. But the span of action ran from the wording of the new Constitution, via the Basic Constitutional Deed on the Independent Republic of Slovenia to the independence plebiscite. That is why the preamble of the Slovenian Constitution begins: 'Derived from the Basic Constitutional Deed on the Independent Republic of Slovenia', which further begins with: 'Derived from the will of the Slovenian Nation and the citizens of the Republic of Slovenia, expressed in the 23 December 1990 plebiscite on the liberation and independence of the Republic of Slovenia'. The legitimacy of the current Constitution, therefore,

[2] Unfortunately, it did not exceed the mark in its title. The working draft was divided into five sections: 1. Basic principles, 2. Human rights, 3. State arrangement, 4. Self-government, and 5. Constitutional protection.
[3] All three documents were accepted on 25 June 1991.

originates from the results of the public vote (plebiscite) that was actually a substitute for a constitutional referendum (Jambrek 1992: 215). This shows the new Constitution is an expression of public opinion, empirically measured in the social reality. In the period of Slovenia's international recognition, the plebiscite and the subsequent Constitution both had a very strong influence on the conceptualization of the legitimacy of the state's authority.

The new Constitution institutionalized values of a modern constitutional democracy such as the sovereignty of the people, human rights, the right of self-determination, political and property pluralism of enterprising, free elections, and the division of power. Slovenia was thereby part of the actual and normative process of the great political changes seen at the end of the 20th century – the transition of single-party systems and integration of Western civilization's norms into the Constitution. The Slovenian Constitution institutionalized the values of a liberal and independent state. The referendum and the integration of the mentioned values in the Constitution together guarantee their symbolism, legitimacy, and stability (Rupnik et al. 1996: 18). Hence, the Constitution gained the form of a 'social contract', became a symbol of legitimacy and stability, and established itself as an independent value. The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia is in its form a modern constitution focused on classical constitutional material. It fundamentally differs from previous Slovenian (or Yugoslavian) constitutions in 1963 and 1974, which were based on the 'Basic Deed of Self-government'. These not only determined the state's system, but also defined the position and role of workers and citizens in the self-governed communities of bigger or smaller sizes. From there the program of actions also originates. The former Slovenian and Yugoslav constitutions were imbued with 'visionary principles' and the ideal system of self-government. Today's Slovenian Constitution is, on the contrary, a classical and realistic constitution (Pavčnik 1993: 890) that has almost no provisions concerning programs and actions.[4] The new Constitution highlights basic human rights and defines them as the origin of the whole system, whereas the former constitutions simply 'drowned' them in a detailed vision of a self-governed society or state.

The Slovenian Constitution is primarily based on liberal-democratic principles, but also contains elements of political doctrines of pluralism, socialism, and corporatism (Lukšič 1992:

[4.] Some 'program norms' can be found in the chapter about basic economic and social relations (e.g. the provision on the state's duty to provide good working (and employment) conditions, or the one on the state's duty to provide good conditions for the citizens to get suitable apartments. Such provisions form the state's political duty but not also its legal obligation, which could then be lawfully enforced.

305). It is caught in a paradigm of Continental European constitutionality, where it is clear that it followed certain provisions of the Italian and German constitutions. Nevertheless, we can confidently talk of its genuine form and tenor. The new Constitution is not only a collection of legal principles, but also a tool for exhibiting Slovenian culture, proof of the country's cultural development, a mirror of the cultural heritage of the Slovenian nation, and lastly its basis for future hopes. From that point of view, the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia was created in a pluralistic procedure with all the related consequences of agreements and compromises among Slovenian political parties or other political subjects. So it was not only formally ratified in the newly formatted National Assembly. It was formulated on legal and professional grounds, in spite of the many compromises among political elites.

In the process of forming the new Constitution, some of the important open questions were addressed: the constitutional definition of a national basis for a Slovenian state; foreigners' ownership rights; the extent of protection of social and economic rights; the status of national minorities; the social function of property; workers' rights of self-management; rights related to conceiving and giving birth to a child; a single or bi-cameral parliament; the representation of regions; the representation of social, cultural, and economic interests; the authority of the President; the army; the division of power between the state and municipalities; the designation and composition of the Judicial Council; the question of a constitutional referendum or plebiscite on national self-determination and other questions (Cerar 2001: 17). Over time some of these questions were resolved on their own (constitutional referendum, demilitarization), some are still present today, whereas some are even subject to changing the Constitution.

Constitutional Changes and Opportunities for Deliberative Democracy

From a theoretical point of view, there is no clear answer to the advantages of the short-term or long-term validity of constitutions. Some advantages of the latter are social stability and the stability of state regulation by avoiding shocks to state organs (or other organs for that matter) caused by every constitutional amendment. A long-term valid constitution creates an image of reputation, thus implanting a special (legal) consciousness, and a certain psychological state of mind of every citizen. On the other hand, such a constitution can prove its own inability to adapt to reality and so it is more of a relic than a living legal act. The stabilizing effect of the Slovenian

Constitution is expressed through a demanding procedure of its altering, which requires a qualified majority in the legislative body (as opposed to a regular legislative procedure).[5]

The Slovenian Constitution is in no need of great changes, but it could use a few minor ones. Due to time restrictions, it was not completely finalized. At the time of its writing and enacting, some resolutions lacked a wider consensus, whereas others were necessary due to joining the European Union. The Constitution was changed for the first time in 1997, when Article 68 was altered to enable the foreign possession of real estate. It was changed for the second time in 2000, when Article 80 was amended to change the elective system. In 2003, a constitutional law was ratified which changed the so-called 'European' articles and was at first highly politicized and disputed. In the following year (2004), a cluster of changes was accepted. Among them were, for example, Article 14, which determines the equality of rights regardless of invalidism, Article 43, which regards the equality of candidacy for elections among men and women, and an amendment to Article 50, which regards the citizens' right to a pension. In 2006, there were changes to Articles 121, 140, and 143, which all relate to local self-government. Changes to Article 121 comprise: deleting the first paragraph which imposed administrative duties directly on ministries; amending the second paragraph in order to generalize the classification of those subjects eligible to carry out the services of state administration and that these authorizations can be given not only by law but also by sub-legal acts. Article 140 was changed in a way that it now permits the transmission of certain state duties from the state to the municipalities, without the latter's concord (whereby the state also has to provide the necessary means). Lastly, the new Article 143 regards the obligatory establishment or regions (with a law) as wider local communities in order to carry out regional duties prescribed by law. Ratifying the law on regions will require two-third majority of Members of Parliament (henceforward MPs) present. In the process of discussing the bill, there must also be a place for the non-obligatory co-operation of the municipalities.

[5.] To initiate the process, 20 MPs, the Government, or 30,000 voters are needed and relative support of two-thirds of present MPs is required; to accept the changes of the Constitution or its amendment, absolute support of two-thirds of all MPs is required (Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia 2016: Articles 168 and 169). Confirmation of any constitutional change in a referendum is mandatory, only if required by at least 30 MPs. A constitutional amendment is accepted if the constitutional referendum is attended by a majority of voters, and if the majority is also in favor of the proposed amendment. There is no actual implantation of constitutional referendum in Slovenia.

The most significant of all the above changes is no doubt the constitutional arrangement of Slovenia's international associations and co-operation. The new Article 3a enables Slovenia to enter into international contracts in order to join international organizations of a supra-national nature and to transfer some of its sovereignty to them. This can only happen if these organizations are based on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law and if Slovenia joins a defence association of countries based on these same values. The National Assembly can call a referendum before ratifying any such international contract. Legal acts and decisions of organizations, to which Slovenia has transferred some of its sovereignty, are employed in Slovenia in accordance with the legal structure of these organizations. Changing Article 47 made it possible to hand over a Slovenian citizen to another state or an international court (which is otherwise prohibited), if prescribed so by an international treaty. The double-changed Article 68 guarantees an equal right of possession of real estate for both foreign and Slovenian citizens. These changes clarified the relationship between European supranational legislation and the Slovenian legislation and also transparently enabled Slovenia's membership in the European Union and NATO.

In May 2013, the National Assembly adopted several changes in the Constitution. Firstly, Article 148 of the Constitution changed with the insertion of the so-called "Golden Fiscal Rule", which aims to balance the public finances and puts limitations on public borrowing. Then, the organization of a referendum was re-organized as well, with the amendments of Articles 90, 97, and 99 of the Constitution. The latter change limits the right to a referendum, as only 40,000 citizens can henceforth request it, but not also thirty MPs or the National Council as it was the case before May 2013. A referendum is also not possible to be requested on laws which have implications on public finances and the human rights. As a consequence, a referendum cannot be called on taxes, duties, or other laws relating to compulsory charges, as well as on the law to be adopted for the implementation of the state budget; the law on emergency measures to ensure national defence, security, or the aftermath of natural disasters; the laws on ratification of international treaties; and the laws that eliminate any possible unconstitutionality. In November 2016, the Constitution was changed most recently, as a new Article 70a was added in order to make access to drinkable water a fundamental right for all citizens and stop it being commercialized.

Apart from the amendments to the Constitution that have actually entered into force, there have been several proposals that were never adopted. In 1997, 40,000 voters submitted a proposal for the amendment to Article 82, which states that members of the National Assembly (MPs) are representatives of the entire nation and are in no case bound by any instructions. The proposed amendment provided for the MPs to be accountable to their voters who could then as a result call them off in mid-term. In this manner, MPs would be held accountable for their work. Because the proposed change would interfere with the constitutional setup and status of the National Assembly, the amendment was not adopted. In 1999, the proposal for ruling out Article 143, which regulated the topic of communities of wider local self-government, was launched. The abolition of this Article would eliminate the obstacles for the regionalization of Slovenia. The Article was eventually amended in 2006. Further proposals for amendments were submitted in 2001, whereby the first group of proposals in the area of international integration concerned Articles 3, 8, 47, and 68 (the proposed amendments were adopted two years later) and the other group of proposals referred to the institute of referendum (Articles 90, 97, 99, and 170), to the formation and operation of the Government (Articles 112, 114, and 118), to the judiciary (Articles 129, 130, 131, 132, and 134), and to the provisions on regions (Articles 121, 140, and 143, which were amended in 2006). In early 2002, numerous amendments to the Constitution were once again proposed by deputy groups of the National Assembly. Their proposals included the amendment to Article 44 with the provision on the promotion of equal possibilities of women's and men's candidatures at national and local-level elections; the extension of material and procedural immunity of the MPs from criminal and restitutive liability; the amendment to Article 14 on the guarantee of equal rights and freedoms also in case of disability (adopted in 2004); amendment to Article 50, adding the right to pension (adopted in 2004); the amendments to Articles 111, 112, 116, and 117, which regulate the election of the Prime Minister, the appointment(s) of ministers, and the vote of (no) confidence to the Government; the amendment to Article 143, which would enable the granting of suffrage at the age of 16; the de-constitutionalizing of the provisions contained in Article 6 on the state insignia and the amendment to the text of the Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (Kaučič 2007). Yet another amendment to the Constitution was proposed in 2010, aimed at changing three Articles. The amended Article 160 is derived from the rule that the competences of the Constitutional Court are set down in the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia. In the amended

Article 161, powers of the Court regarding its constitutionally legal judgments are determined, in relation to Article 160. In the proposed amendment to Article 162, entities that may initiate procedures before the Constitutional Court and the principle of free choice among submitted initiatives and constitutional appeals are set down. The abovementioned amendments of course concern the regulation of the competences of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia. During that same year, an idea for amending Article 80, which states that the National Assembly is composed of 90 members, was raised. Namely, it was suggested that the number of MPs and members of the National Council should be reduced to a maximum total of 75 representatives (Hren & Šušteršič 2010). In February 2012, several political parties proposed the abolition of the National Council (the SDS, the NSi, and the Virant Alliance) and the abolition of permanent tenure of office of judges (the SDS), but proposals failed to reach any parliamentary procedure (Haček et al. 2017).

Deliberative Democratic Tools and Practices in Slovenia

Online tool "I suggest to the government"

The best example of deliberative democratic practice in Slovenia is the online tool "predlagam.vladi.si" ("I suggest to the government.si"). The tool was created in November 2009 for the purpose of sending various proposals to the Government of the Republic of Slovenia for changing the current regulation, exchange of opinions, and to influence the policy-making processes at the governmental level. The main goal of the online tool is to encourage users to exchange opinions and to involve the Slovenian inhabitants in the policy-making processes at the governmental level. The tool enables the mutual exchange of individual views, views and opinions on public topics, which are determined by the users themselves. Users can freely define and present in more detail the substantive issues that are, in their opinion, not adequately regulated by law, and at the same time users can also submit the proposal for its regulation. All proposals prepared in accordance with the online tool rules are publicly announced. Other users can comment on suggestions or suggest corrections. The final proposal prepared by the author of the original proposal is to be put to the vote. If such a proposal receives more votes for than against, and if at least 3% of active registered users participate in the voting, the proposal is to be sent to the competent body of the Slovenian government, which must prepare an official

response. The administrator and moderator of the online tool predlagam.vladi.si is the Office of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia for Communication.

Citizens can use the predlagam.vladi.si tool to draw attention to the problems and highlight issues, especially those that are not otherwise addressed by the government, and to propose various policy solutions and changes. The most important feature of the online tool is the commitment of ministries and government services to consider and analyse the submitted proposals and prepare an appropriate response. If the influence on political decisions can be achieved through the online tool predlagam.vladi.si, an important question to what extent the success and power of the submitted proposals increases with the approach to the democratic demands of ideal deliberation still remains. The success of the proposal is positively affected by the achievement of consensus in the debate, the equality and involvement of citizens, and the intensive exchange of reasoned claims and criticisms between them. Proposals published on predlagam.vladi.si are successful if the competent authorities define them in a positive answer as included in the policy-making process (Trbižan 2011: 21).

Portal "*Predlagam vladi*" (https://predlagam.vladi.si/) also contains the overview of the most resounding proposals, i.e. proposals that have received the most votes, comments, and views in the most recent period, as well as the overview of all active proposals. On 21 July 2020, there were 85 active proposals debated on the portal, and most resounding were the proposals that (a) all public employment agencies should be abolished, (b) state should end all financing of the Church, (c) prohibition of fertilization with slurry, and (d) renewal of the conditions for the appointment to the position of state minister. Up to 21 July 2020, there have been 9,591 proposals in total that received in total almost 229,787 votes, 64,160 comments, and 3,253 feedbacks from various state ministries. In total, there are 27,025 registered portal users on 21 July 2020, which represents a bit less than 1.6% of all voters. Trbižan (2011: 27) states that average response time from state ministries is 24 days.

For the discussion about the deliberative potentials of citizen participation in the political process through the web portal, it is more relevant to understand what are actually the topics of debates and how the debates itself are structured. Since in the context of their "success," all proposals are divided into three groups: (a) accepted with positive response, (b) accepted as potential solution, or (c) rejected (Oblak-Črnič 2011: 103). A difference in policy areas can be observed between the accepted proposals, the rejected proposals, and the proposals as possible

solutions. Among both rejected and accepted proposals, most are in the field of transport (20%). Equally often, the adopted proposals also deal with taxes, finances, and public administration. In the group of proposals as possible solutions, most proposals are defined in the field of internal affairs (20%). The group of adopted proposals does not have proposals in the fields of agriculture, social affairs, higher education, and science, while the proposals do not address education and general affairs as possible solutions. None of the groups have proposals for the areas of environment and space and justice. The least frequently represented area is culture with 3% of accepted proposals and zero in the other two groups (Trbižan 2011: 27).

Public participation in the normative process

The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia stipulates that laws are adopted by the National Assembly, and the eligible proponents are: any member of parliament, government, state council, or at least 5,000 voters. In the ordinary legislative procedure, which is defined in detail in the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly, three stages are envisaged in the discussion of the law: the first is intended to acquaint with the bill, the second to discuss and vote on articles or parts of the bill at the parent working body and at a session of the National Assembly, and the third to debate and vote on the bill in its entirety and shall be held at a session of the National Assembly. A proposer of the law may, before filing a bill, propose that a hearing be held in the National Assembly on the reasons that require the adoption of the law, as well as on the principles, goals, and main solutions of the proposal law (general debate).

We would like to draw attention to an important component of the legislative process – participation of the public. The public debate has an important information function, as it informs citizens about the planned normative solutions and offers opportunity to propose changes and additions to the proposed normative acts. The legitimacy of the authorities is ensured through public debate, therefore, in order to ensure it, it is necessary to present legal changes to citizens and obtain their views on these changes. Public opinion is thus a key indicator of legitimacy.

Public participation is more specifically provided for in Article 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia (RPG), which stipulates that the proposer of the regulations invites professional and other public to participate in the preparation of the regulations by a general invitation, accompanied by a normative draft. In addition, the

applicant may raise individual issues raised by the invitation to participate, accompanied by a draft regulation, addressed to a specific organization, civil society, or individual experts. The deadline for public response is set by the regulation proposer and amounts to 30 to 60 days from the publication on the website. In addition, the RPG stipulates that the public is not invited to participate in the preparation of proposals regulations in cases where, by the nature of things, this is not possible (i.e. emergency measures). In addition, the RPG provides that the above rules on public participation do not apply if public participation in the preparation of legislation is regulated by law.

With regard to the issue of public participation in the preparation of regulation, it is undoubtedly also worth mentioning the Resolution on Normative Activity (2009). Resolutions are legally non-binding acts by which the parliament assesses the situation, determines the policy, and adopts programs in individual areas, but due to its non-binding nature, the resolution alone cannot create any legal effects. With the Resolution on Normative Activity (2009), the Slovenian National Assembly outlined the main guidelines of legislative policy and basic elements for upgrading the Slovenian legal system, which in essence represent a summary of already known and established constitutional, legal, and nomotechnical principles and rules. The resolution draws attention to a number of shortcomings in the field of regulation, and the wish was that after its adoption, among other things, the professional and other interested public should be more consistently involved in the preparation and adoption of regulations, so in the second point of the 6th chapter, there are also guidelines outlined to help achieve this goal. The participation of the widest possible circle of subjects in the preparation of decisions should ensure greater legitimacy of the decisions taken and reduce the democratic deficit, thus enabling the adoption of quality and effective regulations. The text of the Resolution distinguishes between spontaneous public participation, which arises from the interest of the individual, and organized public deliberation, which arises from the call to target groups and experts, and the fact that certain interest organizations have a specific role in the drafting procedures.

The resolution highlights a number of principles in public involvement (timeliness, openness, accessibility, responsiveness, transparency, and traceability), but also offers minimum recommendations that the state administration should take into account when drafting new regulation or regulatory changes:

- public participation in drafting regulations should generally last from 30 to 60 days (with the exception of draft regulations where cooperation is not possible by the nature of things),
- appropriate material should be prepared, containing a summary of the content with expert bases, key issues, and objectives,
- a report on cooperation should be prepared after the cooperation procedure; presentation of the impact on solutions in the draft regulation.

The call for public participation should be implemented in a way that will ensure the response of target groups and professional publics and information to the general public, and for the sake of continuous cooperation and information, lists of entities whose participation in drafting regulations is required by law and entities dealing with the area. It is clear that the Slovenian government or individual ministries do not consistently adhere to the recommendations of the Resolution. The Centre for Information, Cooperation and Development of NGOs runs a website entitled *Counter of Violations of the Resolution on Normative Activity*,[6] where, since 2009, they monitor how national governments adhere to the provisions of the Resolution, which requires at least 30 days of public debate on each new regulation. For the mandate 2014–2018, for instance, the violations began to be counted on 18 September 2014 and in the period up to 22 May 2017, 772 of the total of 1,312 published draft regulations were recorded with a total lack or too short public participation. During this time, the Ministry of Health, for instance, published 95 draft regulations, violating the provisions of the Resolution as many as 45 times, of which 10 draft regulations were submitted for public discussion without a deadline for comments, 34 draft regulations were submitted for public discussion with a deadline for comments shorter than 30 days, and one draft regulation was not put up for public discussion at all. For the current government, which took office on 13 March 2020, during the first 130 days in office, the government published 124 draft regulations, but only in 40 cases the provisions of the Resolution were adhered, in 14 cases there was no public participation at all, and in 70 cases the deadlines for public debate were under the required minimum of 30 days.

On this issue, the legal profession draws attention to the fact that ministries are too quickly satisfied with only the formal aspect of public participation, without a substantive analysis of the comments from the public debate. Last but not least, with regard to the issue of

[6] Available at https://www.cnvos.si/stevec-krsitev/.

public participation in the drafting of legislation, it is also important to point out the fact that civil society also participates in the drafting of legislation through the activities of individual stakeholders who influence the content of legislation by lobbying in accordance with legal and ethical rules.

Deliberative Democracy in Slovenian Local Government

According to the modern theory of participatory democracy, political participation and deliberation of the citizens are characterised by an aim to acquire information and knowledge about political matters, so that political opinions or decisions can be argued proficiently. Knowledge is not usually the starting point when opinions or decisions are formulated; information about political issues is, by nature, contingent on the situation. The citizens who participate in political deliberations are assumed to possess the ability to select relevant information, which they can use to support their arguments. Among the most basic principles of participatory democracy there is the idea that people learn through an opportunity to participate and by utilising and judging the relevance of different types of information. Political information and knowledge are, therefore, given a certain utility value in political argumentation; administrative information and knowledge of societal matters are presented as having significant descriptive power regarding circumstances (Haček 2020: 90).

We begin the evaluation of the implementation of deliberation in Slovenian local governments[7] with the question in what manner municipalities provide opportunities for citizens to consult with the local government representatives. We analysed in which extend the second stage of citizens' involvement in the political decision-making, i.e. "consultation" is present. We found that all Slovenian municipalities have a published e-mail address (either general, by sections or even by individual civil servants). The methods and tools of consultations vary between municipalities; applications designed as forms where citizens write proposals, opinions, questions, suggestions, and others;[8] we can say that all of the Slovenian municipalities allow

[7] The Research Project 'E-demokracija in e-participacija v slovenskih občinah' (E-democracy and eParticipation in Slovenian municipalities) was performed at the Centre for the Analysis of Administrative-Political Processes and Institutions in the second half of March and in the beginning of April 2013 and included all municipalities at the time (211).

[8] Municipalities have different names for such applications, e.g. '*service of citizens*', '*Kr.povej*', '*Citizens Initiative*', '*Review of citizens*', '*Ask the Mayor*', '*Contact Us*', '*Citizens' questions*', '*Ask us*', '*Questions, suggestions and criticisms of citizens*', '*You question, Mayor answers*', *'E-initiatives,*' and others.

citizens the opportunity to establish a two-way electronic communication. We also analysed the third stage of citizens' involvement in the political decision-making – "active participation" – a partnership between the public authority and citizens, where citizens are actively involved in shaping public policy and decision-making about such policies. Only 38 Slovenian municipalities out of 211 (18 percent) have published public policy related e-surveys on their official websites. In addition, only eight municipalities offered an e-forum to its citizens.

As we also aimed at evaluating local government decision-makers' viewpoints on the involvement of citizens and deliberation,[9] we probed mayors of Slovenian municipalities with several statements and measured their (dis)agreement with the three simple statements (Table 1). The mayors assessed all statements as relatively important (all ratings are above average value). The highest ranked was the statement "Decentralisation of local government is necessary to involve citizens in public affairs" (mean value 4.22), followed by the statement "Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by elected representatives" (mean value 3.63). Based on this rather simplistic questions, we can conclude that Slovenian mayors are in favour of citizens' active and direct involvement in local public policies.

Table 1: *Importance of deliberation in local government (N=106)*

	Mean	**Std. Deviation**
Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions.	3.60	1.110
Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by elected representatives.	3.63	1.058
It is necessary to involve citizens in public affairs.	4.22	0.743

Source: Research project "Styles of local political leadership" (2014). All question were evaluated on the five-point scale from 1 (little importance) to 5 (very important).

The support of democracy and governance ideas can also be analysed by looking at what the mayors believe to be the most effective ways of communicating with citizens. There are many

[9] The research project 'Stili lokalnega političnega vodenja' (Styles of local political leadership) was conducted at the Centre for the Analysis of Administrative-Political Processes and Institutions in spring 2014.

ways of communicating with local people and allowing people to let local politicians know what they think. We asked the mayors which of the listed sources, instruments, and methods of communication[10] are useful and effective for becoming informed of what citizens think. More than half of the mayors assessed citizens' letters via the Internet (55 percent), petitions (62.5 percent), satisfaction surveys (56.3 percent), focus groups (63.6 percent), and referenda (60 percent) as only effective in special circumstances. Mayors viewed personal meetings in the town hall (95.4 percent), public debates and meetings (72.1 percent), and formalised suggestions or complaints (64.3 percent) as the most effective methods. The results show that mayors are still in favour of personal meetings with citizens: on average, they spent 6.3 hours per week in meetings with citizens, as 74.6 percent of the mayors claimed that they communicate with the citizens on a daily basis.

To Conclude

We analysed framework of constitution-making dynamics in Slovenian political system and found out that the stabilizing effect of the Slovenian Constitution is expressed through a demanding procedure of its altering, which requires a qualified majority in the legislative body, resulting in relatively few constitutional amendments since the adoption of the current constitution almost thirty years ago. So far none of the constitutional amendments or unsuccessful proposals went towards enhancing deliberative democratic processes. Nonetheless, Slovenian citizens still have tools and means available to be actively involved in the policy-making processes on both national and sub-national levels of political decision-making, as we effectively demonstrated with analysis of public inclusion into decision-making processes on the national level and in local self-government. Most innovative deliberative tool extensively used is the online tool "predlagam.vladi.si" ("I suggest to the government.si"), where citizens can draw attention to the problems and highlight issues, especially those that are not otherwise addressed by the government and propose various policy solutions and changes. Yet, the most important feature of this online tool remains in the commitment of decision-makers to consider the

[10] The listed methods were as follows: *citizens' letters via the Internet; citizens' letters in the local press; formalised complaints or suggestions; petitions; information on citizens' position gathered by the councillors; information on citizens' position gathered by people working in local administration; information on citizens' position gathered by the local parties; public debates and meetings; satisfaction surveys; neighbourhood panels of forums; forums via the Internet; focus groups; self-organised citizen initiatives; referenda,* and *personal meetings in the town hall.*

submitted proposals and prepare an appropriate response resulting in adoption of new public policies, that might otherwise, without the impacts of deliberation, be neglected and overlooked.

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Did Polish Bishops Support Andrzej Duda in the Presidential Campaign in 2020? Analysis of Institutional Messages of the Polish Episcopal Conference

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Abstract:

The aim of the article is to increase the cognitive value in the area of political communication of Polish bishops during the presidential campaign in Poland in 2020, in particular to answer the question whether the Polish Episcopal Conference supported President Andrzej Duda politically in his candidacy for re-election. The research applied the analysis and synthesis method supplemented with elements of hermeneutics. The Polish Episcopal Conference remained an entity not politically involved at the level of institutional communiqués and did not support any of the candidates applying for the office of President of the Republic of Poland in 2020. The issue for further political and media research remains that of complementary forms of communication of the ecclesial institution and the way of expressing one's own electoral preferences, for example through the Catholic media.

Keywords: Andrzej Duda, bishops, Polish Episcopal Conference, political communication, elections

Introduction

The Catholic Church in Poland plays an important role in public space after 1989, among others by taking a specific position in the area of current politics and ongoing election campaigns. Political scientists point out that the institutional Church can adopt potentially different strategies for political communication. For example, it can encourage society to participate in elections and referendums; it can legitimise the programmes and activities of political entities that respect Christian values and recommend a particular political party or politician to vote for. It can also discredit them because of the views they hold in opposition to the social teaching of the Church,

or because of the undermining of the legal and constitutional and informal position of the Church in the state and society (Kowalczyk 2014: 134). Research to date has shown that the ecclesial institution in Poland plays an important role in the above forms of communication and political participation, using its social position (Borowik 2017). As noted by Grzegorz Piwnicki (2017: 150-151), a compromise regarding the state-church relationship, which was formed in the 1990s, including "Religion in schools, a cross in the Sejm, a concordat, a very restrictive abortion law, generous financing of the Catholic Church by the state," Christian values "entered into key laws plus a statue of John Paul II in every commune", at the end of the second decade of the 21st century it is destroyed by PiS and some Catholic circles allied with it. After 2015, concerns should be raised regarding the relations between the state and the Church, such as: the decisive voice of religious associations in bioethical matters, the method of financing the church by the state, the overlapping of church and state orders, support of the Radical-National Camp by many Catholic clergy (Piwnicki 2017: 151-156).

The analysis undertaken was aimed at verifying the formal political support given by Polish bishops to Andrzej Duda in his application for the office of President of Poland in 2020. The aim of the article is to try to answer the following research questions. Did the Polish bishops give political support to the incumbent president Andrzej Duda in official institutional communications during the 2020 presidential campaign in Poland? Did they politically support the Law and Justice party, whose candidate was Duda, or did the other parties not be involved?

The publication, in the author's intention, is therefore to increase the cognitive value in the area of institutional political communication of Polish Catholic hierarchs during the election campaign in 2020. The temporal scope of the analysis covered the period between February 5, 2020 and July 10, 2020. The starting date is determined by the *Order of the Speaker of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of 5 February 2020 on the Ordinance on the election of the President of the Republic of Poland*, based on which Elżbieta Witek indicated 10 May 2020 as the date of the presidential election (Journal of Laws 2020, 184). As a result of the coronavirus pandemic and the impossibility of holding the election on the above date (Resolution 129/2020), the Speaker of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland set a new election date of 28 June 2020 (Journal of Laws 2020, 988). Due to the fact that none of the candidates for President of the Republic of

Poland obtained the required majority in the first round[1], the second round of the elections held on 10 July 2020 selected their winner, the hitherto incumbent President Andrzej Duda[2]. This is also the final date of the analysis.

Material and methods

The research material consisted of institutional communiqués of the Polish Bishops' Conference (KEP) published on its official website episkopat.pl and on the website of the Catholic Information Agency ekai.pl, as well as other official statements of bishops belonging to the Permanent Council[3] and the Presidium of KEP[4], which referred to the issue of the 2020 presidential elections and the camp of the *Zjednoczona Prawica* in power. The research sample included those messages of hierarchs that simultaneously met two criteria. First of all, they were created between February 5, 2020 and July 10, 2020, i.e. in the period immediately preceding the election. Secondly, the announcements noted the presence of at least one of the following keywords in any grammatical form: "elections", "president", "party", "Duda", "Morawiecki", "Law and Justice" and actually referring to the election.

The research sample included a total of 13 official announcements presented by the KEP or by individual bishops belonging to the Permanent Council of KEP and the Presidium of KEP. The analysis takes into account the position on the presidential election of the following hierarchs: card. Nycz, Archbishop Gądecki, Archbishop Jędraszewski, Bishop Miziński, Archbishop Budzik, Archbishop Skworc, Archbishop Ryś, Archbishop Polak and the press spokesman of the KEP, Fr. Rytel-Andrianik.

[1] Andrzej Duda and Rafał Trzaskowski (43.5% and 30.46% of the votes in the first ballot) were entitled to stand for election again. Cf. PKW (2020a).

[2] Andrzej Duda received 51.03% of votes in the second round. Cf. PKW (2020b).

[3] The Permanent Council of the KEP "may take a position on public matters when the good of the Church or the specific needs of the faithful, according to the opinion, at least presumed, of the members of the Conference" (KEP 2009, Article 23). During the 2020 presidential campaign the Permanent Council of KEP was composed of: Bishop Stanisław Budzik, Bishop Andrzej Czaja, Archbishop Sławoj Leszek Głódź, Archbishop Grzegorz Ryś, Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki, Archbishop Marek Jędraszewski, Archbishop Józef Kupny, Bishop Artur Miziński, Card. Kazimierz Nycz, Archbishop Wojciech Polak, Archbishop Wiktor Skworc, Bishop Piotr Turzyński (KEP 2020b).

[4] The Presidium of the KEP "may take a position on public matters when the good of the Church or the specific needs of the faithful so require, and it is not possible for the Permanent Council to intervene, in accordance with the opinion, at least presumed, of the members of the Conference" (KEP 2009, Article 31). During the 2020 presidential campaign the Presidium of the KEP was composed of: Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki, Archbishop Marek Jędraszewski, Bishop Artur Miziński (KEP 2020c).

It was assumed that Andrzej Duda is a candidate of *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (PiS), and so the analysis included those KEP communiqués which would possibly also refer to the policy of the Mateusz Morawiecki government. The study treated the possible positive assessment given to the PiS camp as approval of Andrzej Duda's actions. A negative assessment of the government's actions would be interpreted as a simultaneous criticism of the president's actions. The analysis also included statements made by bishops belonging to the Permanent Council and the Presidium of the KEP, published on the websites of dioceses in which they hold a pastoral function. The research applied the analysis and synthesis method supplemented with elements of hermeneutics.

The author has formulated the following research hypothesis. During the 2020 presidential campaign in Poland, Polish bishops did not give political support to the incumbent president Andrzej Duda in official institutional communications. The clergy remained formally a non-aligned party and did not politically support the Law and Justice party, whose candidate for the office of President of the Republic of Poland was Duda.

Results

KEP spokesperson, Rev. Paweł Rytel-Andrianik on 9 March 2020 reminded the basic principles of Catholic social teaching concerning the purpose of temples and the participation of Catholics in political life:

> Temples and church rooms are not places where one can be politically agitated, hand out leaflets or hang posters or election banners. The Catholic Church is open to everyone and everyone can find themselves in it, as long as they do not exclude themselves from the community of believers by denying God's Revelation in Scripture and Church Tradition (...). It would not serve anyone to turn the church pulpit into a political pulpit. Such actions would be contrary to the spirit of the Gospel, in which we read the words of Jesus Christ: "Give back to Caesar what belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to God" (BP KEP 2020a).

He repeated the above position of the Polish bishops in the communiqué of 21.06.2020:

> The pulpit cannot serve any purpose other than proclaiming the Word of God, transmitting hope and teaching of the Catholic Church. (...) Catholics, of course, like other citizens, have the right to be actively involved in politics for the common good, but the churches are not the places where action can be taken. For more than two thousand years, Christians have been proclaiming the truth about God's love for every human being, regardless of his or her life situation. The Church does not exclude anyone from its community, but it also sets specific requirements for implementation, as indicated in the Decalogue, the Gospel and the social teaching of the Catholic Church, and confirmed by successive popes.

> If there is a case of electoral agitation in a church or parish building, it must be considered reprehensible and incompatible with the Church's mission, which is to proclaim the Gospel to every person, regardless of political opinion. Temples are not places for politics, but, as Jesus Christ stressed, they are houses of prayer (BP KEP 2020b).

The President of KEP, Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki, in the face of the spreading epidemic of coronavirus, called in his appeal of 3 April 2020 for politicians to stop conducting an election campaign and reminded of the principle of the common good as the main criterion for assessing social life:

> In the social teaching of the Catholic Church, the main criterion for assessing social life is the principle of the common good. (...) In the name of this principle, the Church fully supports the principles of security introduced during the pandemic by the Government in recent weeks and the encouragement to limit all contacts and stay at home. Moreover, the time of the fight against the coronavirus requires the suspension of political struggle. In a difficult situation involving a threat to human life and health, the fundamental concern should be the well-being of man, which the Church has always recalled. Therefore, in accordance with the position of the Council for Social Affairs of the Polish Episcopal Conference, I appeal to all groups and electoral committees to "limit and temporarily suspend all political rivalries" concerning the presidential elections. I encourage agreement over and above the divisions in this matter, which Poles have always been able to do in difficult moments for their homeland (Gądecki 2020a).

In turn, a few days before the second round of the presidential election, on 7 July 2020, the Secretary General of KEP, Bishop Artur Miziński, appealed to the Poles to participate in the decisive phase of the election, arguing that this is responsible for the democratic social order of the country:

> Despite the difficulties related to the pandemic, in the spirit of responsibility for the fate of Poland and out of concern for the common good, I appeal to all those entitled, including those who, for various reasons, could not participate in the first round of the presidential election, to participate in the second round of voting. This will be a sign of our responsibility and maturity in shaping democratic social order in Poland (Miziński 2020).

The above communication of Archbishop Gądecki and Bishop Miziński did not contradict each other, but took into account the current recommendations of the Chief Sanitary Inspector and the recommendations of Minister of Health Łukasz Szumowski.

Bishop Miziński (2020) also made an appeal to politicians and journalists "to exchange views and report on them in a substantive, constructive and honest manner", as well as show "respect for opponents, peace and common sense".

On 28 April 2020, the Permanent Council of the Polish Episcopal Conference issued the word *Peace be to you, Poland! (St. John Paul II, 1983),* in which it addressed the political tension related to the presidential election in the context of the time of the epidemic. In the period immediately preceding the originally planned elections, i.e. 10 May 2020, a conflict between the ruling camp and the opposition party concerning the possibility and possible date of holding them was noted (Radwan 2020). The hierarchs appealed to politicians for their responsibility for the common good that is Poland:

> We wish those responsible for the governments of our country to be able to devise and implement the most appropriate mechanisms to overcome the epidemic soon. We recall that the raison d'être of any authority is the concern for the common good, which includes 'the whole of social conditions in which people can achieve their own perfection more fully and quickly
>
> We therefore appeal to the consciences of those responsible for the common good of our homeland, both the people in power and the opposition, to reach a common position on the presidential elections in this extraordinary situation. We encourage dialogue between the parties to seek solutions which do not arouse legal doubts or suspicion not only of a violation of the constitutional order in force, but also of the principles of free and fair elections adopted in a democratic society. We ask that they - guided by the best will - should seek in their actions the common good, the expression of which is, today, the life, health and social existence of Poles, as well as broad social trust in the electoral procedures of a democratic state, which have been jointly developed over the years. In the difficult situation we are experiencing, we should take care and cultivate a mature democracy, protect the rule of law and build a culture of solidarity, also in the political sphere, despite differences (John XXIII, Mater et Magistra, 65) KEP Permanent Council 2020).

The bishops recalled the "legitimate autonomy of the democratic order", referring to point 47 of the encyclical *Centesimus annus*:

> The Church has no mandate to participate in purely political disputes about the form or timing of elections, let alone to advocate this or that solution. The Church's mission in such a situation, however, is always, full of kindness, to remind people of the particular moral and political responsibility that lies with the political players.

The above mentioned word of the Permanent Council of the ECC of 28 April 2020 was quoted by Archbishop Gądecki in his homily delivered at Jasna Góra on 3 May 2020, by performing the *Act of Commitment of the Homeland* (Gądecki 2020b).

On the eve of the second round of the presidential election, 7.07.2020, the Deputy President of KEP, Archbishop Marek Jędraszewski, appealed to the faithful of the Archdiocese of Krakow to take part in the decisive phase of the election as many people as possible, and that the Krakow faithful, "in accordance with a properly formed conscience, should support this candidate for the office of President of the Republic of Poland, whose political programme is close to the social teachings of the Church due to the defence of the fundamental value of life and the traditionally understood institution of marriage and family, as well as concern for guaranteeing parents the right to raise their children" (Jędraszewski 2020).

Formally, the Deputy Chairman of the KEP did not indicate by name the person for whom the Catholic should vote. However, in the opinion of political commentators, including the editorial staff of *Więź*, the above statement of the hierarchy should be treated as a form of support for Andrzej Duda, taking into account that "*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* has made the world-view dispute (and attacks on LGBT people) a part of this year's presidential campaign" (Więź 2020b). The editorial staff of *Więź* noticed the convergence of the voice of Archbishop Jędraszewski's and the views of *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*:

> On the 18th of June, on the 71st anniversary of Lech Kaczyński's birthday, during a Mass at the Wawel Castle, attended by, among others, the President of *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* Jarosław Kaczyński, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and the Speaker of the Sejm, Elżbieta Witek [Archbishop Jędraszewski] said that 'today, attempts are being made to take away our Polishness through a new, atheistic ideology which wants to build everything on the idol of sex. Homage is to be given to this idol by four-year-old children who have been properly instructed in kindergartens and taught masturbation there" (Więź 2020b).

Apart from the above position of the Metropolitan of Krakow, no statements by Polish hierarchs have been recorded which would refer to the views or profiles of people who are candidates for the highest office in the country. In his statement to Radio Lublin on 28 June 2020, Archbishop Stanisław Budzik encouraged the faithful to take part in the elections:

> No one is a lonely island. We are responsible for what is happening in our homeland,' he says in an interview with Radio Lublin - We, as representatives of the Church, often remind the faithful that it is the duty of every Catholic to consider in conscience who he wants to vote for and what values the candidates present. (...)

> Therefore, we encourage everyone and we are glad that we have the opportunity to influence the shape of our country (Radio Lublin 2020).

In an interview with the President of the Catholic Information Agency, Marcin Przeciszewski, Archbishop Grzegorz Ryś confirmed his position. He confirmed the position of Archbishop Gądecki concerning the indication of a new date for the presidential election in view of the impossibility of holding it on 10 May 2020:

> What Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki has already said is actually all the Church can say on this subject. I can therefore reiterate, in favour of the President of our Episcopal Conference, that elections should be organised when the health and lives of citizens are not at risk and when they are accompanied by a guarantee of democratic conduct. This is the level of the common good and the resulting moral assessments. The dispute over whether it is to be in May or June, this year or two years from now, in one form or another, is already a 'real' policy dispute, and any statement we make would be interpreted in its terms (KAI 2020).

Card. Kazimierz Nycz assessed the specificity of the presidential campaign in 2020 in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. In the opinion of the Warsaw metropolitan, “politicians should take care of three things: the safety of people, the common good of Poland, so that the decisions of politicians do not contribute to its weakening, and the fundamental principles of a democratic state, starting with the Constitution, do not suffer” (Więź 2020a). The decision to go to the ballot box or to stay at home was left to the consciences of the believers.

The Primate of Poland, Archbishop Wojciech Polak, in an interview with Beata Lubecka from *Radio Zet*, on 6 April 2020, did not want to resolve political issues related to the planned elections on 10 May 2020, but only exposed the primacy of concern for the life and health of citizens:

> "I believe that if there is a risk to life and health, we should not put either ourselves or others at risk," stressed the primate of Poland. Asked whether, however, if the elections on 10 May are held, he will take part in them, so that the Polish President answered: "I do not know; I will not put my life and health at risk: This is not about me personally, only about my life and health, but also about ensuring that others do not risk themselves, he added (PAP 2020).

During his annual pilgrimage to the sanctuary in Piekary Śląskie on 1 June 2020, Archbishop Wiktor Skworc pointed out that the situation of the pandemic should not dispense Catholics with the civic duty to participate in elections:

> In his speech, he pointed out that the situation of a pandemic threat to the health and life of people is being imposed by the constitutional necessity of holding presidential elections, “which no one is allowed to torpedo”. "The mission of the Church is to encourage the preservation of social peace, participation in elections and a sober assessment of the moral qualifications of a candidate for the most important office of our country", said Archbishop Skworc (Silesia24 2020).

The above mentioned statements of the official representatives of KEP prove that in institutional communiqués the Polish Episcopal Conference did not give political support to any of the candidates for the office of President of the Republic of Poland in 2020. The only exception to this was the statement of Archbishop Jędraszewski of 18 June 2020.

It is also worth noting that the statements of Polish bishops in the national Catholic press did not confirm their political commitment to any of the candidates. The analysis of the weeklies (*Gość Niedzielny*, *Niedziela*, *Idziemy*, *Przewodnik Katolicki*) during the prescribed research period proved the presence of the statements of only Archbishop Gądecki on the pages of *Gość Niedzielny*, which, however, did not go beyond the framework of the Church's Magisterium in the area of political communication. During the presidential campaign and in connection with the ongoing political dispute over the reform of the justice system, the above periodical recalled the content of the letter from the President of KEP to the President of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Jerzy Duszyński, in connection with the 'Forum for the Rule of Law', in which Archbishop Gądecki called on the politicians of various parties to the political dispute to adopt an attitude of dialogue for the construction of the common good (Łoziński 2020). In an interview entitled *A Time of Trial of Faith, Love and Solidarity*, given to the *Gość Niedzielny*, the Poznań Metropolitan noted that the criteria to be met by the President, as set out by the Permanent Council of the Bishops', “are not intended to identify a particular candidate, but rather to help each voter to make a personal choice. It is not enough for someone to belong to a grouping that I support, or to display qualities or a way of being that impresses me. The key to good choices is values” (Gądecki 2020c). The Hierarch also stressed that the Church's task is not to get involved in the current political struggle, but to help people come to salvation. It is in this key that the political distancing of the ecclesial institution, as declared by Archbishop Gądecki, should be seen. The weekly also recalled the Church's teaching on the criteria that should guide a Catholic in elections (Burgoński 2020).

Discussion

The Polish Episcopal Conference in its declaratory communiqués remained essentially an unaligned political entity during the 2020 presidential campaign. No direct content indicating that Andrzej Duda received the support of Polish bishops was noted. The clergy remained formally distanced from political competition throughout the presidential campaign. The analysis proved the veracity of the research hypothesis.

One of the significant reasons for this attitude are the negative consequences of the alliance of the throne and altar for a church institution, which was noted in the early 1990s, when KEP was an active political actor during the period of political transition that was taking place, and in just four years, the results of public opinion polls showed a rapid drop in positive ratings of the Church's activities from around 90% at the end of 1989 to 38% in 1993. In the longer term, when the bishops adopted a more distanced attitude towards social, political and economic issues, they regained a fairly high degree of public trust (Leśniczak 2020b). Most likely, the clergy remembered the above historical episode and their formal political distance can be e.g. justified by understanding the consequences of crossing the boundaries of the Church's Magisterium in the field of Catholic social teaching.

A survey conducted in February 2020 on the social trust of Poles in various institutions and organisations revealed a lower percentage of respondents trusting the Roman Catholic Church: in comparison with 2018, a decrease from 70% to 64% was recorded (Omyła-Rudzka 2020: 10). On the other hand, the public opinion polls from November 2019 concerning the place of the Church in the public space during the election campaign prove the growing conviction of citizens about the political involvement of an ecclesial institution: according to CBOS surveys in November 2011, 34% of respondents believed that "before the last parliamentary elections, the Catholic Church in Poland was involved on the side of some political parties", in turn, in November 2019, the above percentage was 38%. As many as 95% among the respondents who are convinced that the Church is involved in the election campaign, believe that before the parliamentary elections in 2019 the Catholic Church was politically involved on the side of the *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* party (compared to 89% of respondents participating in the CBOS survey in November 2019). It is worth noting, however, that the above assessment is related to the declared political views of respondents: the political involvement of the Church before the elections in 2019 was noticed by a majority of respondents with a left-wing orientation (66%)

and not participating in religious practices (57%) (Roguska 2019: 4-6). The above interference of the ecclesial institution was rarely noticed by people with right-wing orientation (27%) and people who take part in religious practices several times a week (16%). Beata Roguska (2019: 7) correctly sums up the results of the above research:

> The more general the level of ratings for the political commitment of priests and the Church, the greater the role of political orientation in perceiving the attitude of the Church before elections. It is crucial for the perception of the Church's activity as an institution. Accusations made by left-wing supporters against the Church concerning her electoral commitment cannot, however, be explained only by prejudices and stereotypes. It seems that people who are ideologically distant from the right are more sensitive to any signals coming from the Church and priests that might testify to their involvement in the electoral campaign.

The results of this analysis may prove that the attitude of KEP has expressed the awareness of Polish bishops towards the possible consequences of their involvement in the political discourse of the polarised Polish society of the second decade of the 21st century.

The political and media research so far shows that after 2000, the Polish Catholic media clearly supported *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* party and the right-wing candidates for the office of president (Lech Kaczyński, Jarosław Kaczyński, Andrzej Duda), even if in institutional communiqués the hierarchs held positions consistent with Catholic social science (Topidi 2019; Dośpiał-Borysiak 2020; Leśniczak 2018; Leśniczak 2020a). The media, which are owned by Church institutions and in which the formal control over the broadcast content is exercised by a Church assistant, should be treated as the complementary voice of bishops. In the overall assessment of the political involvement of KEP in the presidential campaign of 2020, we cannot, therefore, overlook the content broadcast by the Catholic media, which is a complementary, although less formal, part of the political communication of Polish hierarchs.

The perception of the political communication of the Church as an institution by public opinion is carried out through the prism of parish communities, the degree of political involvement of pastors, but also the laity, even representatives of Catholic movements and associations, whose informal message, often at the local level, is sometimes perceived as the "voice of bishops".

An accurate summary of the interpretation of the results of the analysis is the opinion of the esteemed Polish sociologist, Janusz Mariański (2017: 86, 88):

The experience of the post-communist period shows that churches fighting for power and social (and especially political) position destroy their moral credibility. It seems that finding the right position and role in a pluralistic society is still an untold lesson for the Catholic Church in Poland. (...) According to some sociologists, we are dealing in Polish society with clear manifestations of the politicisation of religion, and even with the widespread involvement of the clergy and church structures in political life. The Church, for her part, stresses that her mission is primarily religious, not political, and that she is joining the social order because of the implications that her religious mission has for worldly life.

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Money for Nothing? Financing the 2016 and 2020 U.S. Presidential Nomination Campaigns

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Abstract:

The aim of the paper is to analyze the relationship between campaign money and winning the 2016 and 2020 presidential nominations in the United States. While in the last two decades of the twentieth century candidates who raised most money almost always became major party nominees, the record is mixed for presidential cycles 2004-2012. By comparing various dimensions of campaign finance, including activities of candidates' campaign committees and outside groups, the Author demonstrates that while successful fundraising, resulting in dozens of millions of dollars at the disposal of candidates, seems necessary to run a competitive campaign, raising the most money is no longer pre-requisite for becoming major party presidential nominee.

Keywords: U.S. presidential nominations, campaign finance, money and elections, independent expenditures

Introduction

The legendary American party boss, Mark Hanna, used to say that "there are two things that are important in politics. The first is money and I can't remember what the second one is" (Witcover 1997: 74). Many politicians and office hopefuls seem to agree with that statement, considering ever-increasing amounts of money in American elections. The spending orgy culminates every four years, when Americans elect their president. In the period 2000-2012, expenditures in the presidential election campaigns, including nomination period and general elections, by the

candidates committees of two major parties alone was $4,74 billion[1] (FEC 2016a), and it is generally expected that it will only grow with each electoral cycle.

In this paper, I will focus on the role of money in the Democratic and Republican parties presidential nomination races of 2016 and 2020. Since it is a crucial ingredient of political campaigns in America, it is even more important in the race for presidential nomination. Party reforms in the 1970s, which shifted power over the nomination from party leaders and officials to rank-and-file party supporters, intended to make the whole process more participatory and democratic. It thus required that party organizational structures, at the national and state levels, would restrain from favoring a particular candidate. Without any help from party, the candidates must built their own campaign machines. But more importantly, since the nomination hopefuls are all carrying same party label, "this lowers the range of policy differentiation across candidates for voters to assess (...) and removes major decision cues" (Redlawsk et al. 2011: 142). As a result, "candidates would seek some early circumstance to break loose from pack in public recognition and support" (Witcover 1997: 187). Thus in order to distinguish themselves from their nomination rivals, candidates would seek to disseminate their messages, promote their personalities and emphasize their experience and achievements to gain the voter appeal. And whatever strategy - media, new media or grassroots campaign, or the mixture of all - they choose to execute, it would require considerable amounts of financial resources. In four presidential cycles, from 2000 to 2012, nomination hopefuls' campaign committees spent astonishing $2,765 billion (FEC 2016a). The 2000 cycle was the last one when one of major party eventual nominee (Al Gore) was using public funding system to finance his nomination bid. Ever since, the eventual nomination winners declined to use public funds, as it obliged them to spent within the legal limits. Once the campaign advisers developed ways to raise massive amounts from individual donors, presidential candidates stopped to rely on public money, as they have become to be able to raise much more than the government offered, at the same time being not restrained by spending limits.

Research goals

That better funded candidates usually win is not only a conventional wisdom. William G. Mayer (1996, 2003) found that between 1980 and 2000, the candidates - excluding incumbent presidents

[1] All values throughout the paper are in nominal dollars.

running for reelection - whose committees raised most money at the end of the pre-election year had become their party nominees each cycle with exception of John Connally in 1980, when Republican nomination was won by Ronald Reagan.[2] Wayne Steger (2000) corrected the money variable, specifying that amount of money raised as of January 31 of election year would better predict the winning nominee.[3] However, confronting Steger's finding with subsequent electoral cycles, from 2000 to 2012 some of the early contests were held in January, making his operationalization of the money variable less useful in the longer time frame. Meanwhile, a variable of cash reserves was introduced in the forecasting models, operationalized as either money available on hand (Steger 2000) or "calculated as the percentage of unspent monetary cash reserves available to all campaigns at the end of reporting period" (Adkins & Dowdle 2005: 652), that is each quarter (Adkins & Dowdle 2005) or end of December of the year preceding presidential cycle (Steger 2007). While the argument that cash reserves might be more important than money raised – "funds allocated by the campaign in the past have already influenced the voter perception of the candidate. Cash reserves, however, represent unrealized potential for the campaign to affect the candidate's performance in the future" (Adkins & Dowdle 2005: 651) - seems valid, the money variable failed to explain the results of the 2004 and 2008 presidential nominations. Had they worked, the Republican nominee of 2008 would have been Mitt Romney (or Rudy Guliani, if considering cash reserves), not John McCain, and Democratic primaries won by Howard Dean in 2004 and Hillary Clinton in 2008, instead of John Kerry and Barack Obama, respectively. Yet it successfully explained the winner of 2012 Republican Party nomination, as Mitt Romney again had the biggest chest in both money raised and cash reserves, allowing him to become Republican nominee.

The aim of the paper is to examine to what avail have money been important to presidential hopefuls in the 2016 and 2020 nomination campaign, and whether did it help them to become party nominee. Did the money variable fit the Mayer model of 1980-2000, as well as 2012? Or was money not that important, as in 2004 and 2008?

It is worth noticing that eventual winners of the 2016 and 2020 major party nomination races – Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden – were (1) established candidates with

[2] To be sure, Mayer also included second variable, candidate standings in the last national Gallup poll before Iowa caucus. The poll variable analysis will be excluded from this analysis.

[3] While this is correct for the period 1980-1996, it is unclear why would Steger move date by a full month, considering that, for instance, 1980 Republican Iowa caucus took place on January 21, when the voting process had already started and might have affected candidate's fundraising.

broad political connections (Clinton, Biden), which is essential in amassing early money (Goff 2004), (2) were leading the public opinion polls throughout much of the primary campaign before the voting started (Clinton, Trump, Biden), crucial in keeping presidential campaign afloat (Damore 1997), or (3) were personally rich enough to self-fund their presidential bid (Trump). I would therefore hypothesize that H_1 *Hillary Clinton's, Donald Trump's, and Joe Biden's campaign committees' raised the most money at the end of December of pre-election year*. Subsequently, H_2 *the money model of major party presidential nominations would demonstrate its both explaining and predictive validity for the 2016 and 2020 major party presidential nominations.*

In order to address these questions and test the hypotheses, I will compare candidates' committees raising and spending data, available on the Federal Election Commission (FEC) website, in the periods pointed by Mayer (2003). The paper will also investigate the activities of the outside money, mainly the SuperPACs. These entities emerged as a consequences of the Supreme Court ruling in *Citizens United v. FEC*, and have become an financial arm of political candidates, particularly in the presidential nomination races (Turek 2016). Thus the SuperPAC data shall be included in any analysis related to campaign finance.

2016: General Overview

The 2016 presidential cycle was extraordinary in many respects, including financial activities of the candidates and their campaign committees. Combining two major political parties, there was a record of twenty-two nomination aspirants, 5 in the Democratic Party race and 17 running for the GOP nomination. The extensive pool of candidates was clearly determined by the context of the race - an open election, which always attracts more than one candidate for nomination in both parties. In turn, it may better motivate larger pools of donors to open their pockets than in an incumbent election. Yet remarkably, the 2016 nomination cycle was not the most expensive primary period to date. As Figure 1 clearly indicates, the 2008 primary season stood as a record of financial activities until the 2020 cycle. It can be accounted for the number of competitive candidates in the Democratic Party nomination campaigns. In both 2016 and 2008 we had two major candidates - Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders, and Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, respectively, each raising more than $200 million (Green & Kingsbury 2011: 93; Green 2019: 139). Yet in the case of 2008 nomination, only two candidates raised and therefore also spent less

than Martin O'Malley, who came third in the 2016 Democratic Party race (Green & Kingsbury 2011: 93).

When it comes to the Republican contests, in nominal dollars GOP nomination hopefuls of 2016 raised slightly more than in 2008, while spending somewhat less than eight years before. But after adjusting for inflation, there was actually more money at candidates disposition than in 2016. Interestingly, in 2016 there were 17 candidates (11 in 2008), out of which eight raised and spent more than 10 million (Green 2019: 139), comparing with six reaching that amount in 2008 (Green & Kingsbury 2011: 93). Partial explanation might be the extensive use of the SuperPACs, entities present in American political campaigns since 2010, which might solicit and spend unlimited amounts of money on behalf of the candidates as long as they do not coordinate strategy and message with them. In 2016, the Republican candidate's principal committees spent $377,1 million in the nomination period (FEC 2016b), while SuperPAC spending was only $10 million lower (Malbin & Glavin 2018: 29). While it is hardly possible all the money would go directly to the candidates' organizations had SuperPACs been non-existent, certainly part of it would be at the disposal of campaign committees.

Figure 1: Principal Campaign Committees Totals, 2000-2020[4]



Source: compiled by the Author from Federal Election Commission (FEC) website.

[4]All data presented in figures and tables are in millions of nominal dollars.

Money in 2016 Presidential Nominations

Both major party presidential nominees of 2016 would be expected to be money primary winners. Hillary Clinton had a long history of public service, becoming an instant frontrunner and poll leader after announcing her presidential bid. In addition to 100% name identification, long affiliation with the Democratic Party and experience of running campaigns on state and national level, Clinton had long been thought of "having the best political operation maybe in the history of the Democratic Party" (The Institute of Politics 2009: 34). All the above shall translate into coffers full of campaign cash.

The opposite, at least on the political experience and party support dimension, might be said of Donald Trump, who had never held a public office before running for a Republican nomination. Yet he had also had a household name, and proceeded with building his campaign image on being a successful businessman. At the time of his candidacy announcement, Trump was also personally richest – or at least was trying to persuade the world about that – candidate in a field. Therefore, the New York-based real estate magnate and celebrity, Trump was expected to self-fund his campaign effort, following the paths of Ross Perot and Steve Forbes, presidential hopefuls in last decade of the twentieth century. On the surface, the latter instance might have served as model for Trump, even though Forbes was neither leader in fundraising nor spending in his 1996 run. However, as of December 1995, he collected $18 million in total, second to only Bob Dole, eventual Republican nominee (FEC 1996). Yet Forbes was not even close to Trump in terms of public support, as the future nominee and then president was already leading polls as early as in July 20, 2015. With exception of a brief period in November of 2015 (RealClearPolitics 2016), Trump was a frontrunner until collecting a required number of delegates to become a presumptive Republican nominee. In addition, due to his celebrity status Trump was widely recognized, and those two factors combined contributed to high volume of media exposure. All the above have traditionally been a key to successful fundraising campaign (Damore 1997; Goff 2004), and personal wealth would also position Donald Trump well in the money primary.

As data presented in figures 2 and 3 indicates, however, money can only partially explain the 2016 major party presidential nomination results. While Hillary Clinton fundraising summaries made her a clear winner of the money primary, at least as of end of December 2015,

there was a different scenario for Donald Trump candidacy. Let me elaborate on both campaigns dynamics for a more thorough understanding of those two nomination races.

Despite his wealth, polling support and media exposure, Donald Trump was not the best positioned contender from the campaign finance point of view. Comparing six best-funded candidates in the Republican race - that of Ted Cruz, Ben Carson, Marco Rubio, Jeb Bush, John Kasich and the eventual nominee himself - the FEC data demonstrates that Trump started topping the field in both raising and spending for a single reporting period in March 2016 (FEC 2016c), a month at the end of which he had only two opponents effectively competing for the nomination (Turek 2017: 182). Considering models explaining success in major party presidential nomination, the low standing of Donald Trump in the money primary might be surprising. What is also worth emphasizing is the fact that in terms of cumulative fundraising, Trump committee raised the top among Republican Party nomination candidates as late as at the end of July 2016, long after the GOP race had been concluded.

Figure 2: Candidates' Receipts in the Primary Season by Reporting Periods, 2016 Democratic Party Nomination Campaign



Source: FEC (2016a).

Figure 3: Candidates' Cumulative Receipts in the Primary Season, 2016 Republican Party Nomination Campaign



Source: FEC (2016a).

By defeating well-financed field of candidates, Trump managed to raise serious doubt about one of the long-lasting views of presidential nomination campaigns: that in order to be successful candidate for nomination, an individual shall be a top financial contender. Figure 3 clearly indicates that for the most part of the nomination race, Trump was very much behind his main rivals in terms of financial resources. *The money primary* is described by Goff (2004: 1) as "a critical period in defining the field of viable candidates that emerges before the primary and caucus process begins", whereas Adkins and Dowdle (2002: 257) understand is as "the competition of candidates for financial resources contributed by the partisan elites before the primaries begin". According to them, this race concludes with the finish of the exhibition season and start of the voting period in the nomination year, which constitutes the "operational year of the money primary" (Adkins & Dowdle 2002: 264).

Trump also was not a top contender in terms of cash reserves (FEC 2016a). And considering he was neither beneficiary of SuperPAC spending, which in instances of several candidates outspent their campaign committees, as demonstrated in Table 1, it creates some kind of a puzzle in terms of money being essential for electoral success. It had been observed in the past that while "money cannot *buy* the nomination, (...) without the means to compete, no candidate, however meritorious, has a realistic chance of winning the nomination" (Steger 2000: 747) and that "candidates who are unable to raise significant resources, will be quickly *winnowed*

out either before or during the early primaries and caucuses" (Adkins & Dowdle 2000: 256). Robert Farmer, who was involved in campaigns of Michael Dukakis and Bill Clinton, went even further, claiming that "people don't lose campaigns. The run out of money and can't get their planes in the air. That's the reality" (Brown, Powell & Wilcox 2003: 1). So how did Donald Trump actually won?

Table 1: Candidates' committees and SuperPAC spending in 2016 Republican Nomination Campaign, in million of nominal dollars

	Campaign committee	**SuperPAC**
Donald Trump	64,6	2,0
Ted Cruz	92,9	64,5
Ben Carson	64,4	12,5
Marco Rubio	47,5	59,8
Jeb Bush	35,4	118,2
John Kasich	19,5	25,8
Carly Fiorina	12,1	14,3
Scott Walker	8,8	24,1
Chris Christie	8,7	20,2

Source: Green (2019: 139, 149).

The answer might be the allocation of resources. When Wayne Steger claimed that the nomination cannot be bought, he quickly added that without it candidates "cannot gain the exposure needed to attract supporters" (Steger 2000: 747). In one of his papers he went beyond finances, arguing that "only candidates who achieve sufficient recognition, resources and support are able to compete in the primaries" (Steger 2008: 194). While Trump built a considerable voter support even if his opponents had more the resources, in terms of recognition he was unbeatable. Data on presidential campaigns expenditures consistently shows that candidates spend heavily on salaries, travel and media, mainly air time and ad production. For nomination hopefuls who are not known by the voters, getting on television is the only way to gain awareness and present their cause. As Center for Responsive Politics data on spending in the 2016 Republican nomination contest depicts, of five of Trump's biggest opponents, only Jeb Bush media spending was not his biggest overall campaign spending share. At the same time, Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, John Kasich and Ben Carson media spending constituted 31,3%, on average of their total campaign committee disbursements (Center for Responsive Politics 2016). But Donald Trump, having a 100% name identification among American citizens, did not have to worry about this. More importantly, he received a lot of media exposure he did not spend a dollar on. Scholars and campaign

practitioners distinguish between *paid media* and *free media*. The former is the air time candidate has to pay to see their ads running on selected TV and radio stations. On the opposite site is the *free media* - the coverage candidate receives without paying for. It usually occurs when candidate does something spectacular, in either positive or negative way, that the media themselves find it interesting, worth covering and carry candidate name without candidates paying for air time.

Examining campaign coverage in eight television and press outlets during the time of *invisible primary,* Thomas Patterson found that Trump received the highest ad-equivalent value exposure among the GOP contenders (Patterson 2016b: 6), even though he spent on media much less than his rivals. In fact, "Trump did not start running media ads until January 2016" (Hershey 2017: 119). Yet his "controversial demeanor, expressive even if insulting comments on his rivals and even whole social groups, along with emotional statements published in social media" (Turek 2017: 250) demonstrated Trump mastery in getting attention which allowed him to "become his own media outlet" (Hershey 2017: 116). As Trump became content-creating machine, it made editors eager to run some juicy comment or exchange, apparently hoping to increase TV ratings and translate it into advertising income. Its growth even spurred Les Moonves, then-CEO of CBS Corporation, to comment that "Trump's presidential run may not be good for America, but it's damn good for CBS" (Weprin 2016). To illustrate Trump's media coverage advantage over his opponents, the New York Times reported on the media exposure of Trump and other major candidates for Republican nomination, as calculated by the company MediaQuant. The results, depicted in Table 2, show that spending only $10 million by campaign committee and outside groups from the day of announcing candidacy throughout February 2016, Trump received free media coverage of almost $1.9 billion (Confessore & Yourish 2016), which could not be matched.

Table 2: Paid and Free Media Values of the Six Contenders of 2016 Republican Party Nomination Campaign, as of end of February 2016

Candidate	**Media Exposure**	
	Paid media	Free media
Jeb Bush	82	214
Ben Carson	5	112
Ted Cruz	22	313
John Kasich	14	38
Marco Rubio	55	204
Donald Trump	10	1898

Source: Confessore & Yourish (2016).

All in all, in the 2016 Republican nomination race Donald Trump demonstrated that vast financial resources are not necessary to become major party presidential nominee. If a candidate is able to get media attention and turn it into support in both polls and voting booths, money is not that necessary as it was thought, at least was not in the 2016 cycle. One more important financial aspect of the Trump candidacy was that the candidate himself was the major source of campaign contributions. Of $64.6 million the Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., his principal campaign committee raised through May 31, 2016, about 71% came from the candidate either as direct contributions ($395,508) or loans ($45.7 million) (FEC 2016c). He thus became the first modern-time major party presidential nominee to keep a nomination campaign afloat almost out his own pocket.

On the opposite, the campaign for 2016 Democratic Party nomination seems to be more conventional in terms of explaining the results through money variable. Although its financial aspects were not as nuanced as in the GOP case, it does not mean it was uninteresting. As of September 30, 2015, Hillary Clinton principal campaign committee raised more than other four Democratic contenders combined (FEC 2016a). Moreover, Clinton-aligned SuperPAC, Priorities USA Action, also had the highest amount of money at its disposal of all outside groups, willing to spend in Democratic race (Green 2019: 149). Thus from the organizational perspective, Clinton should have an open way to clinch the nomination quickly. It was also predicted by her campaign advisers, who were trying to create so called *aura of inevitability* - perception that the candidate will be the nominee, and neither internal circumstances nor other candidates can stop it. Scholars often theorize about two paradigms of presidential nomination campaign: *organization-driven* and *campaign-driven*. On campaign finance perspective, the latter "ties its success to performance in campaign itself, often in the form of momentum; and an *organization-driven* model (...) ties the fundraising to the quality of candidates' political bases and fundraising efforts" (Hinckley & Green 1996: 693). In other words, in the latter model campaigns raise more money due to its organizational advantage during the exhibition season, before voters go the polls. In *campaign-driven* model, candidates fundraising prosperity depends on how well they do in the subsequent caucuses and primaries. Out of about $467 million raised by the two major candidates until end of May 2016[5], 48,5% was collected before voters went into polls, and 51,5% after

[5]Although Clinton secured her nomination on June 7, I am using money raised until May 31, as those donating to both candidates from June 1 on, possibly contributed having general election support already in their minds.

February 1. On individual level, Clinton raised 54,7% during the exhibition season and 45,2% from February through May.

Bernie Sanders fundraising, on the other hand, was more campaign-driven (57,9%) than organization-driven (42%). At the end of June 2015, Clinton reported raising more than three times as much as Sanders (FEC 2016a). But once the Vermont senator started introducing himself to the national electorate, he was getting attention in the media and his polling numbers were slowly growing. As presented in figure 2, Sanders managed to start a long march to reducing his fundraising distance to Clinton in each financial reporting period. In the third and fourth quarter of 2015, he raised 87% and 88% his rival. But from January through April 2016, Sanders collected much more than Clinton. If the former secretary of state figures are a reference point at 100, Sanders raised 143 in January, 147 in February, 171 in March, and 107 in April. In April, he also exceeded Clinton's total fundraising.

Meanwhile her SuperPAC, with constant cash balance of over $100 million, was somehow useless because of the electoral context. During the nomination period, it spent only $5,63 million in Clinton-supporting independent expenditures, without a single attack on Sanders (FEC 2016d). It was due to the fact that “Sanders made reforming of the campaign finance system one of the central points of his campaign. Accordingly, he did not endorse any of the SuperPACs, willing to support his candidacy. One might think that by doing so Sanders was unilaterally disarmed, as he deprived himself of using money if attacked by Clinton SuperPAC or her campaign. (...) Apparently, its management ceased spending more and against Sanders probably fearing that it would support his rhetoric against unlimited and outside money, painting Clinton as the candidate of interest groups and big money, not always supporting traditional Democratic causes” (Laidler & Turek 2016: 321-322).

As an outsider candidate, Sanders also demonstrated the significance of a small donor, which was essential in gaining both the Democratic nomination and then presidency by Barack Obama. Campaign finance literature traditionally distinguishes between significant donors and small donors. The former are those contributing $200 and more, while small donors are those who donate less. Throughout the campaign, Sanders was repeating that his campaign was not based on big money, as in case of Clinton, and as his standard stump speech never failed to mention that average contribution to his committee was $27. As the data in Table 3 shows, Sanders candidacy was based indeed on contributions less than $200 dollars. It constituted almost

half of donations, whereas those donating $1000 and more, accounted for only 17% of receipts of Bernie 2016 committee.

Table 3: Distribution of Individual Contributions to 2016 Democratic Nomination Campaign

Candidate	<$200	$201-999	$1000-2699	$2700
Hillary Clinton	33,0	29,9	16,3	20,8
Bernie Sanders	44,1	38,1	13,9	3,1

Source: Green (2019: 144).

Unfortunately for Sanders, in neither reporting period the senator had an advantage in cash-on-hand reserves. Thus even if he was competitive candidate, he was unable to translate his financial assets and energy of his supporters, enthusiastic about Sanders candidacy, to beat Clinton. However, the explanation of Sanders' failure might not lie solely in the campaign finance, but more in shortcomings of his candidacy. Firstly, "his time in the U.S. Senate was not particularly distinguished" (Hetherington 2017: 66). More importantly from the perspective of his Democratic presidential run, he was actually not a member of the party (Turek 2018: 96), remaining independent. While he identified himself as a Democrat upon registering his presidential candidacy in 2016, he became a member of the party as late as in March 2019. It occurred as fulfillment of the Democratic National Committee condition, which before the start of 2020 presidential cycle "sought to clarify its membership requirements (...) by requiring every presidential candidate to sign the loyalty pledge" (Seitz-Weld 2019). Partisan independency was the reason that Sanders "was not very popular among congressional peers" (Hetherington 2017: 66) and clearly affected his ability to collect party endorsements during his first presidential run. As of May 31, 2016, Sanders' candidacy was supported by only 8 U.S. House of Representatives members and one senator, as Clinton was endorsed by 167 representatives, 21 senator and 15 state governors (Bycoffee 2015), demonstrating he was disconnected from the party's highest power echelons. Finally, Sanders never connected with Democratic most important voting groups, African Americans. As during the 2016 presidential cycle 87% members of that group identified themselves as Democrats (Pew Research Center 2016: 8), it constituted 27% of primary voters in the party nomination race (Mayer 2017: 44). Considering Sanders won only one in five voters in this segment of the electorate (Mayer 2017: 44), it was not only financial advantage that led to Hillary Clinton nomination.

But does that mean that almost $220 million, spent by Sanders campaign by May 31, 2016 (FEC 2016a), was all for nothing? Not at all. Winning primaries in ten states, and caucuses in another twelve, and amassing 13,2 million voters (Mayer 2017: 13) allowed Sanders supporters to become powerful coalition within the Democratic Party. Thus Sanders was not only able to shape the party platform before the 2016 general election (Turek 2018: 98), but also managed to push one of the most significant procedural change in the Democratic Party nomination rules in decades, limiting the role of automatic delegates, or superdelegates, at the national party convention (Democratic Party of the United States 2019). The financial network built during his 2016 candidacy also allowed Sanders to gain national recognition and play a role of a fierce critic of Donald Trump administration. On the electoral level, Sanders endorsed, with mixed results, several individuals who shared his progressive position on policy issues and were running for federal and statewide offices. While few believed he would seek presidency again, Sanders' capital from the previous campaigns, if applied again the presidential race, could have instantly put him in the top tier of candidates.

Financing in the 2020 Democratic Presidential Nomination Campaign

Dynamics of any political campaign is always determined by, among others, the electoral context, the number of candidates and their skills on the campaign trail. Who is running, particularly in the multicandidate field of the presidential hopefuls, also affects race's financial aspects. In case of 2020 Democratic campaign, there were three candidates who might have been equally expected to lead the money primary at the crucial date, end of December 2019.

When in February 2019 senator Bernie Sanders announced his second presidential bid, it was wondered whether he would recreate his impressive campaign organization in a multicandidate race. As again he was the only candidate whose policy proposals would situate him on the left of ideological spectrum of Democratic Party, Sanders was well positioned to persuade contributors, particularly small donors sympathizing with this fraction, to fill his coffers. Interestingly, being the top financial contender would also be anticipated from Joe Biden, the 2020 Democratic nominee. For this veteran politician, former six-term senator and vice president, it was third presidential nomination bid. He was rumored to run in the previous cycle, but in 2016 Biden abandoned the idea due to personal reasons. But once he entered the 2020 race on April 25, 2019, he became an instant frontrunner. Not only did he hold poll command through

the whole period of exhibition season, as indicated in Figure 4. Before the voting started, Joe Biden also received the highest number of endorsements from local, state, and national party leaders (FiveThirtyEight.com 2020). As Marty Cohen and colleagues demonstrated (Cohen et al. 2008), endorsements in presidential nomination process are crucial in invisible primary period, as they help candidate built campaign organization, generate early voter support and raise money. Finally, the speculations that Michael Bloomberg might launch presidential campaign started when he "re-registered as a Democrat in 2018, having left the party in 2001 to register as a Republican" (Morin 2019). Thus when Bloomberg indeed announced his candidacy in November 2019, it was actually a matter of time when the billionaire, the ninth richest man in the world according to Forbes 2019 list, would become a leader of the money race.

If not for Bloomberg, who in the end had virtually no influence on the nomination results, the validity of the Mayer model for the 2020 Democratic Party nomination would depend on whether it was Bernie Sanders or Joe Biden to raise most money. Had the small donor model been more significant in allocating financial resources, as it was in the 2008 campaign of Barack Obama, Sanders would have prevailed. But had the party model (Cohen et al. 2008) dominated, Biden would be destined to raise the most. The issue was whether money influence would follow 2016 Democratic or Republican nomination path.

When Sanders campaign revealed their financial reports, the senator was clearly satisfied. As indicated in Figure 5, Sanders was a fundraising leader - with the exception of self-funded candidacies of billionaires Michael Bloomberg and Tom Steyer, both of whom never received voter appeal - throughout the whole campaign. Particularly important for the campaign setting, however, was the reporting period after the second quarter of 2019. The conventional wisdom is that field of candidates for party nomination is usually shaped until end of June of pre-election year. This was the case in the 2020, as the top vote getters entered the race between February and April of 2019.

Figure 4: 2020 Democratic Party Nomination Polls Standing, May 1, 2019-January 31, 2020



Source: RealClearPolitics.com (2020).

Figure 5: Candidates' Cumulative Receipts in the Primary Season, 2020 Democratic Party Nomination Campaign



Source: compiled by the Author from Federal Election Commission (FEC) website.

At the end of June 2019, Sanders campaign raised $46 million, trailing senator Elizabeth Warren ($35 million), South Bend mayor and novice on national political stage Pete Buttigieg ($32 million), senator Kamala Harris ($25 million), but most importantly, Joe Biden ($22 million) (FEC 2019). Within Sanders campaign circles, it was thought that the fundraising difference would translate into building support for the senator and slip for Biden closer to the voting phase of the primary season. This scenario briefly materialized following first three contests, when Sanders took the polling lead after winning New Hampshire primary and Nevada caucus whereas lost Iowa caucus by just 0,1% of votes.

Figure 6: 2020 Democratic Party Nomination Polls Standing, February 1-April 8, 2020



Source: RealClearPolitics.com (2020).

But the conclusion of the 2020 Democratic nomination race again demonstrated the limits of money in presidential election politics. While the results of the initial contests were successful for Sanders and his financial advantage was also substantial, he was never able to amass national support of more than 30% of the Democratic electorate, as long as the nomination race was still multicandidate. In February, after a setback in appeal in early voting states, many started writing Joe Biden political obituaries, he showed that in nomination politics building a strong coalition

can be more important than other resources. Presenting the phenomenon of winnowing, Steven Brams (2008: 13) argued that in a nomination race "first-priority goal is not be eliminated. In a multicandidate race, this goal often translates into not being defeated by an opponent or opponents who appeal to the same segment of party electorate". Thus from the perspective of Biden success, it was important that following the initial contests, his failing position did not substantially strengthen the other moderates in the race, Pete Buttigieg and Amy Klobuchar. At the same time, as long as Elizabeth Warren, Sander's closest on ideological level, was actively campaigning, the Vermont senator was unable to gain advantage over the rest of the field that would make his candidacy unstoppable.

Did Biden need a lot of money to turn the race around? Not necessarily. In February and March, when the race was effectively decided, Biden campaign spent $45,5 million, less than Sanders committee in February alone. In addition, outside money were almost non-existent in the Democratic race. As of March 31, 2020, only about $12,5 million was spent on behalf of Biden (FEC 2020a), which main SuperPAC, Unite the Country ceased from attacking senator Sanders. Major source of Biden win was, tough, not money, but support of party officials, moderate voters and those who were afraid that Sanders nomination might pave the way to reelection of Donald Trump. Once former vice president decidedly won South Carolina primary, Pete Buttigieg and Amy Klobuchar, with only minor chances for the nomination clinch, ended their campaigns immediately endorsing Biden. Becoming the only moderate in the race allowed him to consolidate broad coalition behind him, leading to win in 16 contents (out of 22) on March 3 and week later. In the meantime, Elizabeth Warren and Michael Bloomberg left the race, which, along limited opportunities for ground campaigning and organizing rallies due to COVID-19, made Biden unstoppable. Despite spending considerably more than Biden - $203 million versus $108 million at the end of March 2020 (FEC 2020b) - Bernie Sanders suspended his campaign on April 8, effectively handing Democratic nomination to Biden.

Billionaire Candidates in the 2020 Presidential Nomination Campaign

The financial story of the 2020 Democratic nomination could not be fully told without mentioning activities of self-funded candidates, Michael Bloomberg and Tom Steyer. Although both were coined as billionaire candidates, they were involved in Democratic Party politics

before. Between 2002 and 2013 Bloomberg was a mayor of New York, the office he won as Republican, but turned Independent in 2007. Yet from 2010 on, he contributed about $162 million to outside groups, who helped elect Democratic candidates in independent expenditures (Center for Responsive Politics 2020). Former hedge fund manager Tom Steyer donated ever more, $284 million, between 2014 and 2020 (Center for Responsive Politics 2020a). Considering that at 63 he is relatively young comparing to recent American electioneering standards, it is conceivable that he will be seen again on the presidential campaign trail. Both Steyer and Bloomberg entered the 2020 Democratic race relatively late, in July and November, respectively. Yet once they did, they were immediate spending leaders. While Steyer spent $47 million in the third quarter (FEC 2020d), more than double than Bernie Sanders, the billionaires smashed the rest of the field in the final quarter of 2019, with Bloomberg assigning $188 million and Steyer $153 million. Altogether, at the end of the month their campaigns concluded, Steyer spent $344 million as of February 29 (FEC 2020d; 2020e). Bloomberg became first candidate to exceed a billion dollars in presidential nomination campaign expenditures, spending $1,051 billion as of March 31 (FEC 2020a). Both candidates were involved in massive media buying, as it accounted for 76% (Steyer) and 68% (Bloomberg) of overall campaign spending (Center for Responsive Politics 2020b; 2020c). Was it worth it? Well, if Steyer will play vital role in Democratic Party politics in the future, he will surely point to the 2020 race as a step toward building name identification, base support and networking among campaign professional and advisers. But from the vote and delegate-getting perspectives, gains of both candidates were rather unimpressive. Steyer came distant seven, six and five in first three contests, receiving 11,7% votes in South Carolina, after which he suspended his campaign without a single pledged delegate gain. When it comes to Bloomberg, his campaign activities seem to be more influential even if short-lived. As seen at Figure 6, he started polling at about 10% on February 5, to overtake Elizabeth Warren a week later. While he gained little or none support in first fours contests, Bloomberg received handful of votes on Super Tuesday on February 3, winning American Samoa caucus, and even was awarded 44 convention delegates. It certainly did not satisfy the candidate, as he dropped from the race the very next day.

What is also worth mentioning is the fact that these candidates financed their campaign activities from their owned pockets. As of March 31, Steyer received only $3,7 million in

contributions from individuals (FEC 2020d), while Bloomberg even less, $916 thousands to be exact (FEC 2020e). In both cases, however, this money was all for nothing, at least as of 2020 Democratic presidential nomination process.

Conclusion

Is money important in contemporary presidential nomination politics? It is. The candidates need resources to pay salaries to their campaign advisers and workers, for media and ground advertising, for travel and various administrative expenses. Without a considerable war chest it is not possible to effectively operate in a very competitive multicandidate field for several months of a primary campaign. But is money the most important factor explaining the final results of presidential nominations? Not necessarily. While it seemed to be a crucial factor between 1980 and 2000, when candidates who raised the most at the end of pre-election year won in almost all instances, from the 2004 cycle on it happened only twice. At the same time, Mitt Romney in 2012 and Hillary Clinton in 2016 had the support of partisan establishment and were leading public opinion polls throughout the whole (Clinton) or predominating period (Romney) of the nomination process. While in 2020 Joe Biden was overwhelmed financially by several candidates, not mentioning Michael Bloomberg and Tom Steyer, his decisive resource seemed to be diversity of party endorsements and support from various groups. They did not abandon him when his candidacy was down after poor showings in initial nomination contests. This bond, in the making through the years of partisan activity of the former vice president, was something that money of Bloombergs, Steyers, and even Bernie Sanders could not buy.

From the outset, explaining 2016 successful nomination of Donald Trump seems to be the hardest task, as he did have neither campaign money nor party establishment support. His biggest asset, however, was the skill of dominating communication channels in traditional, social and digital media. Trump received highest media exposure without having to pay for the air time, winning the attention of Republican primary voters. Equally important was the fact that despite stable and solid polls standings, his candidacy was underestimated by nomination opponents. As longtime Republican campaign operative Stuart Stevens observed, “Donald Trump consistently benefited from the inability to imagine him winning. That belief shaped the Republican primary. (...) So the real race was to beat every candidate whose last name wasn't Trump, and then the last

stage, just beating Trump, would be an easy layup" (Stevens 2020: 149). In other words, "the field of nomination hopefuls almost ignored Trump - neither attacking him personally nor questioning his policy proposals. When after the initial contests it turned out Trump was able to translate polling numbers into votes, it was too late" (Turek 2017: 177). All the better funded campaigns of Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio or Ben Carson could not stop the tide.

Thus, while a few dozens of millions of dollars is still required for a nomination success, raising and spending more than the rest of field is not a precondition to win. As the two recent electoral cycles clearly demonstrated, nomination hopefuls might consider spending less time courting donors and more building coalitions. In the long term, it shall pay bigger dividends than spending hundreds of millions or even billion dollars, on a campaign effort.

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Electoral Defeat and Party Change: When do Parties Adapt?

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Abstract:

Electoral defeat has sometimes been called the mother of party change, but is this reputation warranted? In this paper we investigate whether party characteristics such as government status, party systemic origins, or ideological family affect how parties respond to defeat. Examining 73 parties in 28 countries, considering party efforts to change their leadership, their programs and their organizations, we conclude that only systemic origin (post-communist vs. West European countries) is a relevant factor affecting depth of party change. Parties take some corrective actions after electoral defeat, however, they are not likely to be a wholesale reforms. Thus, it would be more accurate to describe electoral defeat as a midwife of a party change, not as its mother.

Keywords: electoral defeat, political parties, party change, Europe

Introduction

Existence of any political party involves taking part in electoral competition, either as an individual player or as a member of a coalition. Difficulties are inevitable, particularly in rivalry democratic systems. Without understanding defeat and its influence on ensuing performance in political career, knowledge about the mechanism of winning would be incomplete (Bolleyer

2013: 2; Anderson et al. 2005: 1-2). The way political party deals with defeat affects its further existence and sometimes is even a matter of survival, hence commonly recognised belief about defeat as a 'mother of party change' (Janda 1990: 5; Deschouwer 1992: 9) seems reasonable. The collection of studies by Lawson and Poguntke (2004) discloses that challenges parties face, which translate into a decline in support, induce party transformation. Also, according to Harmel and Janda (1994) electoral defeat is a common trigger for party change. But the question remains why for some parties it is truer than for others, why some parties change more than others, what party characteristics is responsible for the difference?

Before the above issues will be addressed, the key category needs to be explained. We operationalized electoral defeat based on the three criteria: level of electoral support, quantity of parliamentary representation (number of seats got), party status in terms of its relation toward government (party in government versus opposition party). In these terms, an electoral defeat occurs:

1) Regarding a party in government: when as a result of an election the party is no longer the governing or co-governing party, irrespective of the quantity of attained seats or electoral support,
2) With an opposition party: lower electoral support or decrease in parliamentary representation. In those cases, not becoming a member of a governing coalition will not be considered as a defeat, provided that the party receives higher or the same number of votes (in a majority voting system) or percentage share of votes (in a proportional voting system).

Theoretical framework and hypotheses

Explaining party change after electoral defeat is a complex task which requires analysis of factors internal and external to the party (Harmel & Janda 1994; Harmel 2002: 127-128; Gauja 2017: 7-9). Theoretically then, electoral defeat is a rich source of hypotheses, but surprisingly the topic has been approached not as autonomous, but as a secondary object of the analysis (Norris & Lovenduski 2004; Langston 2003; Fell 2009; Pacześniak & Bachryj-Krzywaźnia 2019; Louault & Pellen 2019).

Alteration within party organisation has been researched mostly within three theoretical approaches: the 'life-cycle approach', the 'system-level trends approach' and the 'discrete change approach', which deal with different changes in terms of depth and time-perspective (Panebianco 1998: 181-236; Harmel 2002; Gherghina & von dem Berge 2018: 211). But there is also a body

of research which does not invoke any theoretical paradigm, and yet it can be singled out under an umbrella term "electoral incentive approach". What they have in common is that they are anchored in the same line of reasoning, which assumes that a desire to improve electoral performance is one of the primary motivators for a party to change, which turns into a widespread question, whether political parties change after political defeat (Gauja 2017: 50). The problem is that these studies vary in terms of dimensions of change (Moskovic 2011; Van Der Velden et al. 2017), size of the sample of analysis, including single case studies (Ágh 2000; Fraser 2007), presence of cross-national perspective (Cyr 2016, Bosco & Morlino 2006) and other than defeat alone factors taken into account like party inner-actors, leaders and factions (Harmel et al. 1995), they discursive practices (Gauja 2017: 13-15), the party's office aspiration level (Schumacher et al. 2015) or balance of power within a party (Schumacher et al. 2013). Some researchers analysing the consequences of electoral defeats for political parties emphasize a kind of inertia of the defeated, manifesting in resistance to implementing changes and inability of drawing conclusions collectively (Budge 1994; Norris & Lovenduski 2004).

The above studies make reasonable to adopt a position that electoral performance, and electoral defeat in particular, is one of the most important factors influencing party alteration. However, the question remains whether and on what conditions and circumstances it leads to a complete party makeover, or just superficial emendation, or something in between. In this context the above-cited idea of defeat as a 'mother of party change' seems to be very categorical and too general statement. In this very paper we intend to verify validity of the claim and to overcome shortcomings of the above-cited research. Therefore, we have included in the analysis most of EU countries plus United Kingdom, Norway and Switzerland, and defined party change in a multidimensional way. We also introduced additional variables, that may affect party change after electoral defeat, such as 1) the political status of the party prior to losing elections, 2) the systemic origin of the party, and 3) the party's ideological profile.

Originating from the observation that electoral decline can affect political parties in several ways, we ask why for some parties does a defeat end with a complete downfall, while for others it provides a boost to regroup and solidify their positions in the party system. What party characteristics causes the difference?

The scope and depth of a party change depends on its catalogue of political goals, as suggested by Harmel and Janda's (1994). Since we have declared that the core idea of our approach is that the main motivator for change is a party's desire to improve electoral

performance, we focus on the first two-party goals on their list: winning votes/election and gaining executive office (Harmel & Janda 1994: 272-273). Electoral defeat definitely affects the party's electoral vote share and ability to exercise power, but the study on how it affects party change are often inconsistent with one another. Some research suggests that parties do not adjust in response to election results (Adams et al. 2004), others prove the opposite (Somer-Topcu 2009; Van Der Velden et al. 2017). Schumacher et al. claim that 'government parties, on average, change their platform more than opposition parties' (2015: 1051). These findings are therefore contrary to the previous literature, arguing that opposition parties are more likely to change (Bendor 2010). Schumacher et al. have proved that dependency between electoral loss and changes in party platform is mediated by another variable: level of office aspiration. However, for our research, these findings are of limited use, as it considers a party change in a perspective of expected electoral results. This very research, on the other hand, approaches to a party change as motivated directly by experience of defeat instead of foreseen electoral gain, the change which occurs in response to an actual electoral outcome

In our analysis we included: 1) parties which gave up power after election and moved to opposition (ruling or co-ruling prior to election); 2) parties which had already been in opposition and in result of election experienced further decline in vote share or parliamentary representation. For both types, electoral defeat implies decline is electoral support and parliamentary seats. However, parties in government additionally lose the ability to form government and shape state policy. Therefore, we assume that changes, implemented after experiencing electoral failure, varies in opposition parties compared to those which have just lost their place in a governing coalition. We assume that for the latter the sense of loss is more acute, which renders defeat stronger stimulus for change. Therefore, our first hypothesis stipulates that:

H1: Electoral defeat induces deeper changes in parties which give up power than in parties which remain in opposition.

Many studies show that political parties in Western Europe differ from parties in Central and Eastern Europe (Kopecký 1995; Lewis 1996; van Biezen 2003). The latter have a relatively short period of existence on the political scene, and, except of the group of parties originating from the previous regime, were created in a top-down manner in the parliament, which remained the main space for their formation and activity. Being rather elitist than mass parties with underdeveloped organisational structure, and leaders and communication efforts as the primary element determining their election result, they are also characterised by poor rooting in society.

In terms of Harmel and Svåsand's (1993) party development stage, parties from CEE countries are relatively young and thus less-institutionalised, compared to parties from western democracies. Having less petrified and inert structure, their organisations are more flexible and prone to implement major changes after a negative electoral shock. This tendency may be also intensified by post-authoritarian 'genetic imprint', which in case of parties from non-CEE post-authoritarian regimes, makes them more efficient in adopting changes aimed at improving electoral performance (Lisi 2010). Thus, it can be concluded that parties in Central and Eastern Europe because of their younger age, higher volatility of party systems, weaker party rooting in the social system and less well-grounded relations between parties, should be more prone to change after electoral defeat. Hence, our second hypothesis is:

H2: The changes in parties from the post-communist countries are deeper after the defeat than in parties from the countries of the Western Europe.

Despite vigorous debate among scholars about increasing concurrence between parties in terms of ideological stance (Bobbio 1994), ideological divisions are still lively and are constantly the most vital and universal method of classifying political parties. According to Elay (2002) left-wing political tradition is a critical review of changes in society, economy and politics, an attempt to reform these spheres, and advance democracy against tradition and hierarchy. Similar critical imprint marks left-libertarian parties as well (Kitschelt 1988, 1993; Redding & Viterna 1999). Therefore, it seems reasonable to claim that the change is somewhat inscribed in nature of parties, which falls into a broad understanding of the left. Left-wing parties are and have always been open to cooperation with various types of organisations promoting the rights of the excluded or the weaker. We believe thus the dependency between the party's readiness to implement changes and its ideological profile is worthy to be tested, therefore our third hypothesis is:

H3: The changes after defeat within the left and centre-left parties (social democratic, radical left, green and liberal) are deeper than within the right and centre-right parties (Christian democrats, conservative, nationalist).

Research design

Data and methods

The sample of analysis includes 28 European countries and consists of 73 political parties, which experienced electoral defeat between 2011 and 2017. The parties selected for analysis have lost electoral support measured by the share or number of casted votes compared to the previous election. This was translated into a reduction in the number of seats in the parliament. An

additional condition for including the party in the analysed cases was the status of the opposition party after losing the election. The comparative analysis is based on the dataset collected at the turn of 2018 and 2019 by 30 political scientists with expertise on particular national political scene and parties from each country. The data collectors filled out a questionnaire composed of 15 closed and open-ended questions. The first part was devoted to leadership after the electoral defeat. The second part concerned the causes of the defeat and their assessment. Third and fourth parts were focused respectively on changes in membership and internal organization. And in the final, fifth part of the survey we asked about programme changes in the political parties. We attach the list of the experts participating in the survey in the appendix.

Setting the starting point of analyse in 2011 we applied the criterion of cognitive accessibility, assuming that some facts and nuances about more temporally distant elections, may not be easy for an expert to recall and analyse. As for the ending point in 2017, we relayed on the common observation that changes within a party takes time. Therefore, we assumed that we need at least a year for them to actually occur and be become observable.

The hypotheses assume that the depth of changes taking place in political parties after electoral defeat is influenced by the political status of the party prior to losing elections, the systemic-origin of the party, and the party's ideological profile. Our sample comprises 73 parties which includes: 39 opposition parties and 34 (co)ruling parties. 23 parties are from post-communist countries and 50 parties from non-post-communist countries (West Europeans ones). Regarding parties' ideological profile, 21 were identified as social democratic, 20 Christian democratic, 9 liberals, 8 greens, 7 nationalistic, 6 radical left, and 2 conservatives.

Variables

The independent variables in the presented research are: (1) the political status of the party prior to losing elections, (2) the systemic origin of the party, and (3) the party's ideological profile. As regards the first variable, we considered all the parties in government which formed a single-party cabinet or were members of a governing coalition (either as a senior or junior partner). Parties supporting government (e.g. by parliamentary voting), but without formal status of coalition partner or cabinet representation, we exclude from this category. In a category of opposition party, we included those holding seats in parliament prior to election but not taking part in government nor governing coalition. For a second variable, amongst 28 countries included in the study, 10 of them are Central and Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic,

Slovakia, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Croatia, and three Baltic states). Whereas to determine the third variable, i.e. the ideological profile, parties were assigned to particular ideological group based on self-identification, expressed in their charters, political manifestos or presented on official website. When this criterion turned out to be confusing, an additional one was applied. In such cases we attributed ideological profile to the party because of their membership in transnational party organizations (as the international party organizations, and the Europarties called formally the political parties at European level).

The dependant variable in our research is the depth of party's change after electoral defeat. Such change may occur in various areas of party functioning therefore we constructed an index which covers five different dimensions of potential change: (1) change of leadership; (2) party decomposition; (3) change of power balance in the party; (4) programme changes; (5) structural changes. In all these dimensions each expert's statement was scored either 0, 1 or 2 points, according to schema presented below (Table 1).

Table 1: Range and indicators of change in political parties

Dimension of change	Indicator of change	Score	Indicator of change	Score	Indicator of change	Score
Change of leadership	no change	0	change of leader resulting from the party's electoral calendar	1	accelerated leader exchange or resignation of the leader	2
Party decomposition	no secession of activists	0	activists leave the party but do not form a new one	1	activists leave and form a new party	2
Change of power balance in the party	no change	0	marginal	1	significant	2
Programme changes	no programme changes or other distribution of emphasis on programme issues or development of a programme strategy for the future by the party	0	the emergence of the new issues or disappearance of certain issues	1	party move to the left-right axis	2
Structural changes	no creation of new bodies	0	establishment of new bodies which did not have a visible impact on the party	1	establishment of bodies that have actually taken up the programme/communication/strategic work	2

Source: own elaboration.

In the leadership dimension '0' point is assigned in case when there is no change of the party leader. In case of the second dimension – party decomposition – the same score means that secession of activists did not happen. Respectively, in other dimensions, '0' stands for lack of change in the party's power balance as well as in the programme and organizational structure. A change in leadership is ranked '1' if the leaders leaving is not an immediate result of the defeat but occurs due to scheduled party election. In terms of party decomposition such score signifies that although some activists left, they did not create a new grouping and respectively a change of power balance was marginal. In the last two dimensions score '1' shows respectively minor alterations in party agenda and creation of new bodies in the party structure, though they could not deliver visible impact on the party functioning. Modifications such as sped up change of leadership, activists' secession including establishment of a new party, significant shift on the left-right axis and in the balance of power in the party or structural makeover exerted actual impact on the party functioning, were scored as 2.

Accordingly, depth of the party change can range from 0 to 10. However, in a case of several parties there was a lack of data for one or two dimensions. Because of this we converted total change score for each party to avoid spurious result stemming from the simple fact that in some case total change score would be respectively overrated or underrated by a different number of elements in the sum. Therefore, the sum of change value in particular dimensions was divided by the number of data for each party. Total party change index for each party varies from 0 to 2. It should be noted though that the index reflects overall changes in a party. It means that sometimes party may experience a change in some above dimensions, whereas in other it can be scored either 1 or 2. What the index presents is the average of these changes for each party.

Results of analysis

As it turns out, sometimes after electoral defeat political parties introduce many changes at once, and sometimes are reluctant to make any of them. Analysing the behaviour of political parties following the election defeat, several regularities arose. Furthermore, alterations within parties are of different extent in particular analysed dimensions. None of the analysed parties scored maximum value of the index. In 9 cases no transformation followed party electoral defeat. The average index value within the whole set reached 0,78, being less than half of the maximum, which may be interpreted by the fact that parties are reluctant to introduce far-reaching changes. However, taking into account average value of change in respective dimensions, a more nuanced picture emerges. Table 2 consist data about post-defeat changes observed in all 73 parties.

Table 2: Index of change within 73 European political parties (in details)

	Code	Acronym	Change of leadership	Party's decomposition	Change of power balance in the party	Programme changes	Structural changes	Index of change
1	AT	GRÜNE	2	1	1	no data	0	1,00
2	AT	SPÖ	2	1	2	no data	1	1,50
3	BE	VB	2	1	0	0	1	0,80
4	BE	PS	2	0	0	1	1	0,80
5	BE	Sp.a	1	0	2	2	0	1,00
6	BE	Ecolo	2	0	0	0	2	0,80
7	BG	DPS	0	0	0	no data	0	0,00
8	BG	BSP	0	0	2	2	2	1,20
9	BG	ATAKA	0	0	0	0	0	0,00
10	CH	CVP/PDC	2	0	0	2	0	0,80
11	CH	GPS/PES	0	0	0	no data	0	0,00
12	CH	BDP/PBD	0	0	0	no data	0	0,00
13	CH	GLB/ PVL	2	0	1	2	2	1,40
14	CZ	ČSSD	2	1	0	0	0	0,60
15	CZ	KSČM	0	0	0	0	0	0,00
16	CZ	KDU-ČSL	0	0	0	0	0	0,00
17	CZ	TOP 09	1	0	2	0	0	0,60
18	CY	AKEL	0	0	0	0	2	0,40
19	CY	EDEK	0	0	0	0	no data	0,00
20	CY	DISY	0	0	1	0	2	0,60
21	DE	FDP	2	0	0	0	2	0,80
22	DE	Die Linke	0	0	0	no data	1	0,25
23	DE	Die Grüne	1	0	0	2	0	0,60
24	DK	SF	0	0	2	2	0	0,80
25	EE	EER	2	0	0	1	1	0,80
26	EE	ERL	2	1	2	2	2	1,80
27	EL	PASOK	0	1	1	2	0	0,80
28	EL	DIMAR	2	1	1	2	no data	1,50
29	EL	ND	0	1	1	2	2	1,20
30	EL	To Potami	0	1	0	2	0	0,60
31	ES	Ciudadanos	0	0	0	2	0	0,40
32	ES	PSOE	0	no data	0	2	0	0,50
33	FI	SDP	0	0	0	no data	no data	0,00
34	FI	Vas.	1	0	1	1	1	0,80
35	FI	KD	1	0	0	no data	0	1,25
36	FR	PS	0	2	2	2	0	1,20

37	FR	LR	2	2	2	2	1	1,80
38	FR	EE-Les Verts	0	0	0	0	0	0,00
39	HR	SDP	2	0	2	2	0	1,20
40	HR	HL	1	0	2	2	0	1,00
41	HU	LMP	2	0	2	2	0	1,20
42	IE	Lab	2	0	2	0	1	1,00
43	IE	Green	2	0	0	2	1	1,00
44	IE	Fianna Fail	2	0	0	2	2	1,20
45	IT	Forza Italia (2013)/The people of freedom	0	2	0	0	0	0,40
46	IT	LN	1	0	0	1	2	0,80
47	IT	UDC	0	0	0	1	2	0,60
48	LT	DP	2	1	1	0	1	1,00
49	LT	TT	2	2	2	0	1	1,40
50	LV	SSP	0	0	no data	0	2	0,50
51	LV	ZZS	0	0	2	0	1	0,60
52	MT	PN	0	0	2	0	1	0,60
53	NL	PvdA	1	0	1	2	2	1,20
54	NL	SP	2	0	0	0	0	0,40
55	NO	Ap	0	0	0	2	0	0,40
56	NO	KrF	0	0	1	2	2	1,00
57	PL	PO	1	0	2	0	1	0,80
58	PL	PSL	2	0	2	0	1	1,00
59	PL	SLD	2	2	2	2	1	1,80
60	PL	PiS	0	2	2	2	0	1,20
61	PT	PSD	0	0	0	no data	1	0,25
62	PT	CDS/PP	1	0	0	0	0	0,20
63	RO	PNL	2	0	2	0	0	0,80
64	SE	M	2	0	0	0	2	0,80
65	SE	C	2	0	0	no data	2	1,00
66	SE	FP	0	0	0	0	1	0,20
67	SE	KD	2	0	0	0	0	0,40
68	SK	KDH	2	0	2	no data	1	1,25
69	SK	SDKÚ-DS	2	0	2	no data	1	1,25
70	UK	Lib Dem	2	0	0	1	0	0,60
71	UK	SNP	1	no data	no data	0	0	0,33
72	UK	UKIP	1	0	2	0	2	1,00
73	UK	Labour	2	0	2	2	2	1,60
Average			1,04	0,31	0,82	0,94	0,80	0,78

Source: own elaboration.

It turned out that changing leader is the most common reaction after lost election. The average index value amounts to 1,04. In less than half of the cases (30 among 73 parties) the leader remained on position. In the rest of cases, parties decided to exchange their leader immediately after a defeat in sped up mode (31 cases), or due to scheduled party election (12 cases).

The second most prevailing change after electoral defeat were agenda shifts. The average index value for this dimension reached 0,94. Though 29 parties did not make any programme changes after losing election, other 26 made substantial and decisive changes, deep enough to move the party on the left-right axis in the party system. Only in small number of parties (5 cases), platform changes were rather shallow, limited to introducing certain new issues or withdrawing from others, which, according to experts collecting data, did not imply shift on left-right axis.

In the third dimension, change of power balance in the party, most of them did not record or introduce any changes (37 cases), only political parties implemented lesser adjustments, 24 parties experienced more substantial changes. The average index value for this dimension reached 0,82.

In terms of structural changes, also the majority (32 political parties) have made no correction. In the case of 20 parties while new bodies appeared but did not have a visible impact on the party. Then, 18 political parties established new bodies that have actually taken over the responsibility for the program, communication, or strategic work within the party. Here index value equals 0,80. A closer look at table 2 suggest that the least probable consequence of electoral failure is decomposition of the party, which reflected by low index value 0,32. In only 6 of analysed cases some members left the party and created a new political entity. In 10 other cases, some activist left their current organization. Other parties did not experience any of such an occurrence. However, it should be clear that the result does not report this aspect of party change accurately, which is a consequence of method of cases selection. Firstly, the study takes into account only those parties which survived electoral defeat and did not perish in the aftermath from a political scene as an independent political brand. Secondly, because a decrease in electoral support, which in the study is one criterion of identifying defeat, was concluded by reference to electoral result prior to the one marked as defeat, only those parties could be included, which had taken part in at least two consecutive elections. Therefore, the research does not include parties debuting in electoral competition. In other words, average index value to this aspect of party

change, does not imply that party decomposition is the least likely consequence of electoral defeat. At the most perhaps amongst the well institutionalized parties, present on political scene for an extended period, this is the least probable that could follow electoral defeat.

The above numbers prove that parties experiencing electoral defeat most willingly change in those aspects which are the most easily to be noticed by external observers, transformations involving party structures occur less likely. New face of party leadership, changes in party platform, are the most easily perceptible and communicable facets of organizational change. This may explain why parties under scrutiny were more inclined to adopt such a way to account for defeat. However, we are aware that such a result could be, to some extent, a consequence of applied method of data collection. Though political scientists, compared to a common observer, present more thorough and sophisticated analytical attitude, they look at the party from outside.

They are not insiders - activists, MP's, board members. It is possible then, that despite their efforts and meticulousness, in case of some parties they could not report on party internal changes fully adequately, like in case of change of power balance and structural changes.

The crucial data, in terms of research objectives were presented in table 3. The table comprises information on index values change, relevant to the previously formulated hypotheses.

Table 3: Hypothesis verification

	Variable	Number of parties	Index of change	Change of leadership	Party's decomposition	Change of power balance	Programme changes	Structural changes
H1	Opposition	39	0,80	1,00	0,27	0,92	1,09	0,79
	Government	34	0,75	1,03	0,35	0,71	0,78	0,81
H2	West European countries	50	0,73	0,94	0,27	0,55	1,05	0,87
	Post-communist countries	23	0,87	1,17	0,39	1,41	0,75	0,65
H3	Left & centre-left	35	0,77	0,97	0,30	0,82	1,23	0,63
	Right & centre-right	29	0,80	0,97	0,38	1,00	0,58	0,90

In case of third hypothesis liberal parties have been excluded because in various countries they can be positioned differently on left-right continuum, usually as centre parties, sometimes centre-right, in case of social-liberal also as centre-left.

Source: own elaboration.

Results obtained for hypothesis 1 have not confirmed predicted dependency. It turned out that the opposite is true, opposition parties are more likely to change (index value 0,80) after electoral defeat compared to governing parties (index value 0,75). In should be noted though that index value in both cases is very similar, which suggests that the analysed variable is not relevant in determining post-defeat party change. Governing parties are slightly more likely to change their leader and implement structural changes and experience decomposition, whereas in other two dimensions are more likely to introduce change.

The collected data have confirmed second hypothesis. Numbers prove that parties from post-communist countries are more flexible, changes they carry through are distinctly more substantial than those observed in West European parties. We should note though it that this is not true for all five dimensions. A regards programme changes, parties from post-communist countries are more restrained compared to West European equivalents. This is true also for organizational changes.

We have not confirmed the third hypothesis. Left and centre-left parties, with index value 0,77, turn out to be less eager to implement post-defeat changes than right and centre-right parties, which score 0,80 on change index. But like in case of the first hypothesis, in both party subsets index values is very similar, which suggest that position parties occupy on a left-right continuum, does not affect their inclination for post-defeat change. Though considering structural changes alone, left and centre-left parties are slightly more restrained, at the same time they are much more flexible, compared to right and centre-right parties, as regards programme changes.

Concluding remarks and Discussion

An electoral defeat is a kind of a test for every political party. How effectively a political party deals with a defeat is a measure of its success in the next election. After analysing the behaviour of 73 political parties after their electoral defeats, we can make a general conclusion, that in the most cases political parties are taking some corrective action. However, parties are most likely to implement changes voters can easily notice. Structural changes, definitely more engaging, demanding and less spectacular in terms of party image, are less common. Leaving the party and starting a new one, is the last option.

Only one of three stipulated hypotheses has been confirmed. Amongst three variables analysed in the study, only systemic origin of the party turned out to be a relevant factor in

affecting scale of party change. The other two: political status of the party and party's ideological orientation, do not affect post-electoral defeat party transformation in the way the hypotheses predicted. However, more detailed analysis, which take into account given dimensions separately, brings a more complex picture. First, party transformation cannot be reduced to one aspect only and should not be considered as an indivisible, single phenomenon. The fact that in case of two hypotheses overall index change was approximate in value, whereas single-dimensional differences were more sharply outlined, suggests that a study of a party change requires more refined and subtle tools and methods. Second, we are also aware some change happens anyway, even for victorious parties. It means that a broader comparison could also bring interesting conclusions, like to compare the reactions of parties that have failed during elections with parties that have no defeat in their account, because after winning elections or maintaining the electoral status quo changes may also occur. But we investigated the parties that suffered electoral failures, so as not to obscure the relationship between defeat and changes in the parties.

To summarize, though electoral defeat in most cases induces party transformation, in the light of above findings the change itself, and the mechanisms behind it, are not as obvious and overwhelming as one may expect. Catchy idea of defeat as a mother of party change seems to overrate the role electoral failure play in giving birth to the new in party life. Until further research refines the findings the less spectacular role of a midwife seems to be more suitable.

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Regime Preferences in Communist Czechoslovakia and the Narrative on the Slovak National Uprising

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Abstract:

Most of the participants in the Slovak National Uprising (SNP) were fighting for the ideals of democracy and freedom, for the defeat of fascism and Nazism and for the new Czechoslovak Republic with equal status for the Slovak people within it. They could not have foreseen that communist totalitarianism would be established after the war, one that would try to use the Uprising as a precursor for the socialist revolution (Fremal 2010: 359). The Communist Party, with the support of historians, utilised the legacy of the SNP to justify its political actions. Czechoslovak identity was also constructed through the image of the SNP, whose annual celebrations provided the communists with the opportunity to interpret the legacy of the SNP in various forms. This work deals with the way the communists interpreted the SNP in order to convince the public that this was a people's Uprising intended to lead to social equality and the eventual acceptance of communism in Czechoslovakia in the years 1947,1948 and 1954.

Keywords: Slovak National Uprising, communism, propaganda, historical memory, national identity

Introduction

The Slovak National Uprising (SNP, or Uprising) played an essential role in Slovak history. For this reason, its celebration was also important as a symbolic confirmation of Slovak statehood (Naxera & Krčál 2016: 84). Public memorial celebrations represent a part of political culture, an instrument for strengthening power, which serves to reproduce fundamental societal values (Michela & Kšiňan 2012: 8). The importance of a suitable and desirable perception of an event, such as the SNP, plays an essential role in national mythology. It forms specific cultural ideas and thus strengthens the existing political order. Instrumental handling of history and the use of

variously interpreted historical events is typical of all kinds of regimes and political actors (Naxera & Krčál 2020: 7). It only makes sense that the Uprising became a significant event, which the Communist Party tried to use to promote their own political goals.

Author analyses the narrative of the Slovak National Uprising in two Czech communist daily newspapers *Rudé Právo* [Red Truth] and *Práce* [Work]. During this research, the author relied on contemporaneous documents obtained from the archives of the National Library of the Czech Republic in Prague. Thematically, this study builds on the work of Elena Mannová (2008): '*Slovak National Uprising and political memory*,' Adam Hudek (2010) '*The most political science. Slovak historiography between years 1948 – 1968*' and Miroslav Michela & Michal Kšiňan (2012): '*Slovak National Uprising*.' But it falls within a set of works on the SNP which also include those of Jan Rychlík (2015), Matej Berlanský (2017), Vilém Prečan, Vladimír Naxera & Peter Krčál (2016), Karol Fremal (2010) and others. This research is a fractional one and requires completion with the analyses of the next periods of the communist's governance.

Changes in the myth

If we agree on Barthes' (1991: 128) claim that the very principle of myth is transforming history into nature, we must look for this transformation in the everyday narrative. Narrative, in Goffman's understanding, refers to the structured meanings within a story, which have a sense of sequence and causality and are strongly influenced by ideologies (Longhurst et al. 2008: 34). Studying the narrative in the ideological press is, therefore, a way of describing the exact process of change from narrative to myth.

The years chosen for research were ones where several significant events took place. The first was the implementation of the communist worldview into Czechoslovak science, where history was intended to become a pseudoscience serving the interests of the ruling Communists (Hudek 2010:10) following the votes in Czechoslovakia in 1946 and subsequent communists takeover in 1948. The second was the trial and subsequent execution of the Uprising heroes. Participants in the Uprising, communists, Laco Novomestký and Hustáv Husák, were arrested in 1951. Rudolf Slánsky, the SNP's hero, promoted by the communists, was executed in 1952. The death of the president Klement Gottwald (1953) and subsequent weakening of his personality cult meant a change in the communist interpretation of the SNP's heroes. Elena Mann (2008: 216-219) sees two milestones in the SNP's interpretation in the 1940s and 1950s. The period of the

first myth lasts until 1948 (communist takeover in February 1948). The heterogeneity of the organisers resulted in a contrasting version of its meaning. The period of the first myth was formed on the idea of the unity of the anti-Nazi resistance what contributed to the national identity construction. Because some participants in the Uprising were persecuted, they were removed from the public image of the SNP. The second stage after 1948 started a new myth in which the '*theological concept of the road to a happy socialist future*' was promoted, at the beginning of which stood the SNP and the liberation of the ČSR (Czechoslovak Republic) by the Soviet army. Adam Hudek (2010: 148) places this change in the year 1952, in which the communist idea of the history of Slovakia was '*comprehensively sketched*' for the first time. The 10th celebration of the Uprising in 1954 was pompous, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party guided the entire preparation (Mann 2008: 2019). Hudek (2010: 153) claims that communist ideology marked the SNP and the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet army as the beginning of a national and democratic revolution. The years 1947, 1948 and 1954 will thus reveal the most significant changes in the narrative, when the interpretation of this event was significantly formed, from the pluralist concept to the unified, communist-controlled story of the path to a happy socialist future.

Choice of Methods and the analysed units

The reason for this work is to complete the research on SNP with the content analysis of the daily press in communists Czechoslovakia. One of the primary tasks that the representatives of communist parties had to resolve in the interest of promoting communist ideology was taking control of public opinion, which meant controlling media production. In the interests of spreading the new social model, all types of media, including print, were therefore now given the task of spreading propaganda. They were to become institutions of education, persuasion, and enlightenment (Bednařík et al. 2019: 221-251).

The goal of this scientific research is to describe the narrative on the SNP in the articles published in the years 1947, 1948 and 1954. The author uses the comparative-historical method, considering the record of the SNP in 2 dailies. The daily newspaper *Práce* was published by the Central Union Committee and individual trade unions of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement by the Práce Publishing House since 1945. The Communist Party published *Rudé právo* from 1920, and for many years it was the leading political daily of the KSČ. As the coding

unit the author chose a single text. A text is editorial content, photographs, announcements, notes, and other formats present in newspapers which are directly relevant to the issue of the SNP, together 187 units. The comparative unit was a period of three days: one day before, the day of and one day after the celebrations of the anniversaries of the SNP in Czechoslovakia in 1947, 1948 and 1954.

The research question is: How did the narrative on the Uprising during the monitored period change?. This question leads to the aim of the paper: to identify the narrative changes in the published articles of the chosen period. The author answers these questions through comparison in three comparative categories identified in the pre-research: historical misinterpretation, political strategy, and the SNP's heroes. The sub-question: Which topics resonated in the presentation of the SNP in individual years?

The period of the first myth

1947: Political strategy

The event that significantly influenced the newspaper narrative on SNP in 1947 was the Košice Manifesto, approved at the first meeting of the Czechoslovak government on 5 April 1945 in Košice. The Košice Manifesto declared the status of Czechs and Slovaks in the joint republic as having equal rights and value according to the principle of equal with equal and described the Soviet Union as the most important foreign ally (Vlček et al. 1945). In the 1946 elections the winners were: The Democratic Party in Slovakia and the Communist party in Czech lands. The election results forced Slovak communists to change their minds about the Slovaks' equal status in the state. The Slovak Communists modified their position from equal to equal and as supporters of Prague centralism hoping that a strong Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) would ensure their status in Slovakia (Kováč 2010: 242). KSS must defeat the opposition represented by Democratic Party before usurping the power from Democrats. The political strategy of 1947 consisted of few steps: warn against the enemy, establish enemy, defame the enemy.

Warn against the enemy

The Chairman of the Slovak Trade Union Committee František Zupka claimed that '*the primary goal of the Uprising was the establishment of a new Czechoslovak Republic without the German and Hungarian fifth column and the exploiters, without national, economic and social*

oppression, crises, unemployment and poverty' (Zupka 1947). Laco Novomestský leading the department of education and enlightenment argued that '*Czechoslovak unity would be best served by foregoing attempts to return to the understanding of Czechoslovak nationality from the pre-Munich republic*' (Novomestský 1947). In this sense Uprising was a kind of vindication for the betrayal of the Czechs that was the creation of the Hitlerian Slovak State in 1939. Laco Jašík, Deputy General Secretary of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement in Slovakia, argued that '*the Slovak nation had never betrayed the Czechs. The betrayal was made by irresponsible individuals for whom thousands of the best Slovak men had laid down their lives*' (Rudé právo 1947e). Deputy Chairman of the Slovak National Council (SNR) Karol Šmidke pointed at '*Slovak circles which are insubordinately hindering strong recovery and economic reconstruction*' (Rudé právo 1947c). The SNP fighters were represented by Colonel Milan Polák, saying that '*the Slovak uprising was an explosion of the will of the majority of the nation, in an attempt to achieve a reckoning with the Germans*', but adds that '*the purge had not been fully completed'*. Also, the mayor of the Czech Sokol Community[1] agreed with the statement (Práce 1947). In *Rudé právo,* an anonymous reader expressed '*the necessity of building from the outcome of the Uprising and bringing a complete victory for the ideas and spirit of Slovak heroes and Czechoslovak patriots*' (Rudé právo 1947b). Complete victory means revealing enemies.

Establishing and defying the enemy

In the print press of 1947, one can already see signs of preparations for the communist's takeover by establishing and defying enemies. General Secretary of the KSS Štefan Baštovanský returned to the process with Jozef Tiso. He associated Democratic Party with his person saying, that '*the political rehabilitation of many proponents of the fascist regime and allowing their re-entry into public life are early signs of a future, miles distant from the principles of our revolution and (mean) abandoning the ideals of Uprising*.' The argument was an open attempt of the KSS to ignite division within the election winner Democratic Party, whose Catholic wing had not agreed with the execution of Tiso. He also enumerated the areas in which part of the opposition failed: the rejection of the nationalisation of the economy, intentional delays in land reform, insufficient goodwill in the organisation of supply and delivery shortcomings. Baštovanský (1947: 3) pointed the finger '*on one part of the National Front who has chosen to take the path of destructive*

[1] Sokol is a Czech sports association that has been banned during the Word War II

politics and apparently failed to be bound by the blood-signed postulates of the liberating struggle.' The distribution of supplies was the responsibility of the Commissioner of Supply for the Democratic Party, Kornel Fila. Martin Kvetka was Commissioner for Agriculture and Land Reform. Both were eventually replaced in November 1947 at a state meeting of the National Front (Kováč 2012: 245). A summary of the communist strategy in fulfilling the legacy of the SNP is the speech by Prime Minister Klement Gottwald. According to him, the Uprising led to the creation of '*a united Czechoslovak Republic as a state of two equal nations, a genuinely democratic expression of popular will in the state, for the social development and prosperity of Slovakia and cooperation with the other Slavic nations*' (meant Soviet). And he did not forget to draw attention to the actions of the supporters of Vojtech Tuka and Josef Tiso, who '*are impeding the further development of Slovakia,*' which leads to the next task to free Slovakia from '*anti-state elements*' (Gottwald 1947). According to the General Secretary of the Communist Party Rudolf Slánský, SNP was '*characterised by its Slavic spirit, the spirit of warm friendship with the Soviet Union.*' He also called for the removal of opponents of Czechoslovakism, critics of national committees and opponents of nationalisation (Slánský 1947).

1947: Historical misinterpretation – communist's leading role and Soviet contribution

The communist's intention to take over the power from Slovak Democrats needed to be implemented in the historical interpretation of Uprising. The development of the historical depiction in the context of Uprising starts at lunch (it is not said where) where Klement Gottwald informs those present (it is not said who) that '*Moscow had precise information about the preparations and progress of the Uprising*.' He also adds that *'the Soviet government and army took measures to provide help.*' And he further emphasises that '*this help cost the Russian people 80,000 deaths*.' This article also displays agitation for Stalin, saying '*he personally ordered the Dukla offensive*' (Rudé právo 1947a). It can be assumed that this lunch was part of the ceremonial awarding of honorary citizenship to Stalin and Roosevelt because there is a short note about the event above the article. The affirmation is a typical example not so much of twisting the history, but rather of its concealment. The contributions of the USSR to the liberation of Czechoslovakia are, of course, undeniable. Still, in this historical context, all mention of the resistance movement and official government recognition in London are purposefully left out. This propaganda version of history also leaves out the involvement of Soviet Russia in the too

early commencement of the SNP and in essence its failure when the Russians supported the resistance fighters in their fight against the Germans. Quite the contrary, the plans of the Uprising were most endangered by the uncoordinated groups of resistance fighters (supported by the USSR), who were destroying transport infrastructure and most importantly blocking railway tunnels, significantly reducing the future effectiveness of the Slovak Army (Rychlík 2015: 260). Major Mikuláš Langer remembered the role of the Red Army, but also the allies. The evidence is in the note by Foreign Minister Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, addressed to the Czechoslovak government on 22 September 1944, where he says '*the Soviet government has seen the contributions of the Slovak people against Hitler's usurpers and taken measures to provide help to Slovak partisans and soldiers*' (Langer 1947). Deputy Chairman of the SNR, Karol Šmidke declared, that '*the Slovak Communist Party was the only central and single-minded national political organisation in the country to fight for the liberation of Slovakia*' (Šmidke 1947). In the first studied period of the daily newspapers, the contribution of the exile government falls into the background being replaced with the Communists and Soviet Army.

1947: Heroes in the Uprising

The heroes of SNP did not play an essential role in the political strategy these days. The authors or heroes of the articles were still direct participants in the Uprising. Only one worthwhile mention indicates upcoming heroes fabrication in 1948 - designation of Jan Šverma as a Slavic politician who was able to '*bridge the gap between those Slovaks who wanted to preserve Slovak independence and those who represented the opposite position*' (Rudé právo 1947d).

1948: Political strategy

The most important historical event was the so-called Victorious February 1948, which resulted in a "takeover of power" in the Czechoslovak state by the communists. After the takeover, the official story of the SNP was modified, with key actors pointedly erased from the narrative, as were politics of the Democratic Party: Ján Ursíny (prisoned), Jozef Lettrich and Matej Josko (both emigrated after the turnover), partisan commanders Jozef Trojan (1949 arrested, 1953 executed), Viliam Žingor (1949 arrested, 1950 executed) as well as many others (Valko 2014: 311-312). The SNP become above all a "communist uprising" (Kšiňan 2012: 22-23). In this period, the political strategy concerning the SNP is more unified than in 1947, even though the

political rules for SNP celebrations were only published in 1949 (Mannová 2008: 218). Newspapers show a trend of reducing the importance of the battles themselves while emphasising the ideological construction of the communists as the primary organisers of the events and cover the abandoned idea of equal to equal marred by centralisation. Centralisation was presented as the state bonding, merging for the strengthening the nation and the real wish of Slovakian. The second strategical point was the justification of the imprisonment and trials with the SNP's heroes or communist opposition for their anti-state activities.

Spirit of merging

In the first place communists' set on the examples of institutional merging. The Slovak National Council issued its Ceremonial Declaration in which they promised '*to act as safeguards of progressive and popular traditions*' and declared that '*The People's Democratic Czechoslovak Republic is the only home of the Slovak nation*' (Práce 1948b). To remove all doubts that the KSS was on the same side, Štefan Baštovanský (1948: 1) added that the '*idea of Czechoslovak statehood has been blessed with the common blood that had been spilt*.' Ludvík Svoboda, the Minister of National Defence and participant in the Uprising stated that '*the political programme of the Uprising was executed to its fullest degree when the principle of the equality of the Czech and Slovak nations was realised in a single country*' (Rudé právo 1948a). Celebrations of the Uprising took place together with the merging of a resistance group in Slovak Košice, '*for the purpose of more fruitful cooperation and the strengthening of the February victory of the labouring class and working people*' (Práce 1948a). In Prague, the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Union of Youth (SČM) accepted the recommendation to connect with Slovak Union of Youth (SSM), following the outstanding example of the Soviet Pioneer movement (Rudé právo 1948d).

Anti-state elements

It is further possible to notice the continuation of the trend of searching for public enemies, again to legitimise the February takeover while "explaining" the need to remove the inconvenient elements: pharisees, traitors to the people, capitalist exploiters, etc. This line also includes a justification of the execution of Tiso, which in 1947 was part of the struggle between the Slovak Communists and the Democratic Party associated with Slovak Catholics (Kováč 2012: 243).

Karel Šmidke continues with the enemy-searching he began in 1947, by criticising the creation of a '*civic bloc made of former bourgeois parties from the times of the First Czechoslovak Republic*.' These factions were '*overlooking the deeply social character of the Uprising in an attempt to destroy the revolutionary nature of the Slovak nationalist movement*' (Šmidke 1948). Štefan Baštovanský had no qualms in calling out these enemies whose interests went against those of the people, saying these '*Lettrich-Ursíny reactionary capitalist elements were only mooching off the national Uprising*' (Baštovanský 1948). Klement Gottwald brought this entire line-up of national enemies to close with the words: '*the legacy of the SNP commands that we stand guard and mercilessly crush every attempt at the anti-state and anti-national reaction to break up the unity of the state*' (Rudé právo 1948a). The reformed Slovak National Council (SNR) undertook '*never to become an instrument against the people's interests, but instead to protect and execute the ideals of centuries of struggle, the ideals of democracy, progress and fated brotherhood of Czechs and Slovaks, the principles which had just been set out in Košice*' (Rudé právo 1948b). However, politicians agreed on one thing. They awarded all credit for the liberation of the republic to the Soviets.

Two above mentioned political objectives were followed by misinterpretation in order to highlight the role of communists and the USSR in the Uprising narrative.

1948: Historical misinterpretation on heroes

The role of the advocate of new heroes was played by Slovak editor and later also historian Juraj Fabián who opened the door for new heroes. He emphasised the role of Klement Gottwald, '*who organised help for the Slovak rebels from the USSR,*' and Rudolf Slánský, who utilised '*his rich political and military experience in managing the resistance movement in the main partisan headquarters.*' And he is also not remiss in recollecting Jan Šverma and his historic speech in the SNR, where he emphasised '*the state of affairs in the republic at the time, as enshrined in the Constitution*'[2] (Fabián 1948a). In a different article, Juraj Fabián describes the press and radio of the SNP and names the illegally published communist press. Among others the cultural and political daily review New Word, whose publisher and the main editor was Chairman of the Board of Commissioners Gustav Husák (Fabián 1948b). The article of the journalist, Václav Slavík, together with photographs of Klement Gottwald and Jan Šverma at Moscow airport,

[2] Meaning equal with equal

confirms this arrangement. The text conveys the feelings of Klement Gottwald: '*As he looks into the camera lens, says goodbye to his foremost colleagues who he is sending to the uprising headquarters as political representatives of the KSČ.*' The author further explains the role of Rudolf Slánský, Jan Šverma and the commander of the Czech army (not named). He '*suggested joining the military with the partisans and supported further organised resistance*' (Slavík 1948). The second line of the historical depiction led by the Chairman of the Board of Commissioners Gustáv Husák not only highlights the work of communists but completely rejects the role of the foreign resistance in the SNP. He stated that '*the Czechoslovak émigré army in London failed to help the heroic battle of the Slovak people either politically or militarily*' and he carries on, saying that '*its intrigues only served to impede the domestic and foreign resistance during this most heroic of periods*' (Rudé právo 1948c).

The result of this period narrative was the myth when the Uprising was organised by the Czechoslovak communists (mostly Gottwald, Slánský, Šverma, Husák) and led by Soviets.

The period of the second myth

The early fifties witnessed a struggle for the competence between Czech and Slovak communists within ČSR. The leadership in Prague considered Slovakia to be an area where the revolutionary consciousness of the working class is not sufficient. Every attempt at autonomy was considered a manifestation of Slovak bourgeois nationalism and punished (Rychlík 2015: 394). Communist Gustáv Husák (imprisoned) and Karol Šmidke (relieved of political positions) also became its victims in 1951. The close co-worker of the Klement Gottwald and the SNP's hero Rudolf Slánský was, after a fabricated trial, executed in 1952. Czechoslovakia also experienced the economic difficulties associated with central planning.

Furthermore, in 1953, a currency reform was carried out. The reform angered workers who lost their savings (Kováč 2012: 265). From an international viewpoint, the critical event was the Cold War, plans for the establishment of the Warsaw Pact (ČSR entered on 14 May 1955) and the negotiations of the European Defence Community (EDC) being discussed in that time at the French parliament, despite it not being ratified.

1954: Political strategy

The Uprising celebration in 1954 was organised under the control of communists. On the front pages of both, the event is described almost artistically, colourfully, with emphasis on the public reaction and atmosphere: flags are flying in the wind, music is playing, the crowd breaks into enthusiastic cheers, the president's speech is interrupted by passionate cries of '*Long live the Soviet Union!, Long live peace!... tens of thousands of people on Stalin's square express their gratitude and love to their Soviet brothers*' (Rudé právo 1954b).

In 1954 the ČSR was under the control of Soviet Union. Communists agenda in press promotes the alliance with Russia sealed by blood and conceals the situation in Slovakia by highlighting higher living standards in the country. The old heroes were replaced by hard-working national heroes coming from the nation.

The brotherhood sealed with blood

The political line of the alliance sealed with blood includes the speech of President Zápotocký, who reminisced about the '*breathless interest and sympathy with which the Slovak people witnessed the struggles of the Soviet people.*' Ignoring the fact that no joint Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had existed at the time of Uprising he stated that '*people did not trust the reactionary Hlinka or Hitler circles. They trusted the Soviet Union, believed in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which had stood at the forefront of every battle.*' He pointed to the émigrés as traitors, who '*as paid mercenaries of American imperialism, were betraying the Slovak people. Every sincere citizen of our republic must condemn imperialist war carried out with the participation of the West German mercenary army*' (Zápotocký 1954: 1,3). This statement intentionally connected the negative connotations of the word German with the imperialist enemy, to point out that the enemies standing against the USSR were essentially following the footsteps of fascists. Especially moving is the story of a mother (and member of the Unified Agricultural Cooperative - JRD), who lost her son in the war. But thanks to the liberation by Soviet army '*she gained thousands of new sons*.' As in many other texts, this story follows the narrative of the changes that happened in a village after liberation. '*The blood of her son Ondra was not spilt uselessly*' (Kišová 1954). This friendship sealed with blood was also appropriately valued by the Slovak National Council (SNR), who expressed '*gratitude for the terrible* (Soviet) *sacrifices that we had to thank for our freedom and the ability to build socialism in a prosperous*

Slovakia.' The SNR further promised '*to protect brotherhood like our own eye, to ensure world peace and happiness of the entire human race*' (Rudé právo 1954a). The protection of brotherhood also means facing common enemies.

Imperial enemies

The Slovak Trade Union Committee Chair, František Zupka, states that '*the peace policies of the USSR have been whipping the imperialists into a rage'* (Zupka 1954: 1,5). The Prime Minister Viliam Široký described '*the impending danger from imperialist circles in the United States, who had resumed a policy of violence, provocation and aggression, German militarism, and Nazism.*' None of them had any doubts that the issue at hand was the destruction of the Czechoslovak Republic (ČSR) and the subjugation of its peoples (Široký 1954: 3-4). However, the propaganda was not restricted to defending it_against threats and also included positive examples. One of them is Ladislav. The man who leaves his hometown to go to America '*and returns with greying hair to find the landscape has been transformed.*' In a letter from an American friend, he hears that America is fraught by unemployment and that life is hard. The author ends the story by stating that 30 years ago, '*Ladislav thought he was heading to the promised land, only to discover a real one back at home*' (Paľo 1954).

The legacy of the SNP leads to the socialist competition

Political strategy grew into an economic agenda, where the legacy of the SNP is now associated with socialist competition and the overall economic and cultural growth of Slovakia. Individual examples are highlighted, such as how the previously small Baťa settlement had '*grown into the modern socialist town Partizánske, proudly carrying the name of the resistance fighters to the occupation*' (Vranovský 1954a). Viliam Široký also devoted his speech to economic growth, evaluating the role of the Uprising as a '*mass revolutionary people's movement, leading to the unparalleled economic and cultural development of Slovakia*. *The progress that the Slovak people with the help of their Czech brothers had been carrying out for ten years*' (Práce 1954b). First Secretary of the Central Union Committee Josef Tesla proclaims that '*fulfilling the legacy of the SNP means dutifully carrying out the tasks set out by the KSČ.*' The primary means of their fulfilment is socialist competition (Práce 1954c). And the development of Slovakia closed Pavel Vranovský '*ecstatic about the surprise which the reader must feel seeing tractors under the Tatra*

Mountains' (Vranovský 1954b). This prosaic statement is accompanied by the map of the industrial buildings constructed during the Five-Year Plan, with the text interspersed with the verses of the poet Ján Kostra.

1954: Heroes in Uprising

The heroes in 1954 were the people from the nation, the fighters for their homeland carried out great deeds and continue to do so in their honest work. An example is a story about Bolek, whose combination harvester broke down. In frustration, he remembered another situation he experienced. At this time, as a young military chauffeur of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps in the USSR, he was driving his car through the Carpathian woods at night when someone shot through his tyre. Bolek did not hesitate and replaced the tyre under enemy fire. And so Bolek repairs the axle on his combination harvester on his own. After winning the competition, he is awarded a new Russian combination harvester (Vondra 1954: 3). The significant role in narrative was played by the miners because the ČSR experienced lack of the coal: '*The anniversary will also celebrate the Slovak miner's foreman by mining 30% coal over the approved plan*.' In his letter to trade union heads, he writes how he needs more workers, that the pay is good and how he is building a house at home and looking to buy a motorbike to fulfil his childhood dream (Práce 1954a). The storyline of the ordinary heroes – soldiers – loyal workers is exemplified by a tale of a_Slovak shepherd from the Low Tatras, who is having a conversation with students from Prague. He reminds them that there are '*no more loyal friends in the world than the Soviet people.*' He remembers the resistance fighter Nikolaj, who threw himself in front of a German shot which was about to hit the shepherd, sacrificing his life. At the end of the narrative, he openly admits he is '*envious of the youth living in Prague,*' but that '*the only way to repay Nikolaj for his love and sacrifice is to surpass the quotas of sheared wool*' (Šimonek 1954: 7).

1954 Historical misinterpretation

In 1954 there is no doubt that the KSČ was led by the SNP together with the USSR partisans. The historian from the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (SAV) reaffirmed that '*the Czech and Slovak peoples had shaken off the hated yoke with the help of the Soviet people. After years of violent separation, they could finally permanently unite*' (Tibenský 1954: 2). The true story of the liberation brought the narrative of Piotr Alexejevič Veličko. The

former commander of the Slovak Partisan Brigade appreciates the exceptional assistance of the Slovak people '*who made it possible to bring together in the mountains a brigade of 3,000 men ready to go to their deaths*' waiting when the brigade marched out, fully armed with Soviet weapons (Veličko 1954: 3).

Conclusion

Despite all the propaganda surrounding the SNP during the communist period, the SNP was only declared a state holiday by the Slovak National Council as late as 1992 (Popelková 2014: 34) and to this day there is no consensus among historians as to the history of events associated with the Uprising.

The research besides the acknowledgement of already well-known facts brings the narrative on Czechoslovakism, which researchers do not devote much attention. In 1947 the Communists convinced Slovaks that the legacy of the SNP is primarily a unified Czechoslovak nation and not two of its components, the Slovak and Czech, as was set in the Košice Manifesto. In 1948 the Slovak fighters disappeared and were replaced by communists' heroes. In 1954 the press responded to Slovak dissatisfaction with the power arrangement (centralised in Prague) with the narrative of idyllic expansion of the country achieved thanks to the help of Czech brothers. To confirm the unity of the Czechoslovak nation, the Communists forcefully inserted into the otherwise Slovak national story firstly a strong Czech communist involvement, later the famous Soviet victory. The Slovak story was thus suppressed, and the Slovak public was systematically led to the obligation to feel gratitude to the Czech and Soviet brothers. Based on the analysis, the author agrees with the opinion of Jan Rychlík (2018: 169) that the separation of Czechoslovakia came as a result of the lack of a solid Czechoslovak identity. At the end it should be expressed, that misusing the Uprising's legacy by communists to convince Slovak to the idea of common centralised state, together with the frequent changes of the narrative had played a significant role in the widening of the gap between both nations.

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