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CONTENTS

Pre-mayoral Career and Incumbency of Local Leaders in Post-Communist Countries: Evidence from Lithuania and Slovenia

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Abstract:

Political careers emerge when individuals develop patterns of mobility between offices in the political realm. These patterns provide useful clues about the expected activity of an individual leader. Patterns of political tenure can be revealing because individuals who aspire to long-term service seem more committed to the autonomy of their institutions, as well as more active and effective within them. The mayoral career is created in a continuous process of mayoral position implementation where a unique combination of ambition and opportunity intertwine. A political career is therefore necessarily associated with time and defined by two key points: the starting point and the termination point of mayoral function. Between them, the mayoral career takes place. The article focuses on the career development and mayoral incumbency in post-communist countries such as Lithuania and Slovenia. Authors particularly focus on the direct mayoral elections conducted in Lithuania for the first time in 2015 and introduced in Slovenia already in 1994. Career of local leaders was analysed in terms of pre-mayoral career, where authors discovered that the largest share of mayors were municipal council members. Both countries had a relatively high proportion of political newcomers. In Lithuania, the first direct elections finally also enabled the elections of non-partisan candidates, a trend seen in Slovenia since 1994.

Key words:

Introduction

An important question when speaking about political careers in the political science framework is: 'Why do some people become and stay politicians while others do not'? To gain

insights into this question, Verhelst, Reynaert and Steyvers (2013: 27) claim that one must scrutinise the processes by which certain individuals enter, move within and remain in office. Per Marvick (1972), political careers emerge when these individuals develop patterns of mobility between offices in the political realm. Other studies (Barber 1965; Ehrenhalt 1991) suggest that dominant political career patterns provide useful clues about the expected activity of an individual leader. Patterns of political tenure can be revealing, because individuals who aspire to long-term service seem more committed to the autonomy of their institutions, as well as more active and effective within them (Barber 1965; Ehrenhalt 1991; Scarrow 1997).

In our study, the political realm is set at a local level, where the local leader (i.e. mayor) is at the top of the career system. This article focuses on the particular part of career development, i.e. pre-mayoral career, and incumbency of mayors in post-communist countries. Per Haughton (2005), post-communist countries are characterized by the domination of politics and a normative-institutional framework. The political system in these countries often unilaterally penetrates the remaining subsystems, which degrades their complexity and lowers their ability to self-regulate and adapt to the changing environment. All interactions between subsystems are coordinated through a central political system; hence, direct inter-connections between subsystems are often difficult. The relational hierarchy between functional subsystems provides a high degree of integration of the entire system and high predictability of an event within the system. Political leadership (especially for local authorities who are closest to the citizens) remains quite uncharted territory in post-communist countries;[1] however, rare partial studies point to interesting patterns of leadership. For the use of the following comparative analysis, we selected two post-communist countries, i.e. Lithuania and Slovenia. Despite the fact that Lithuania has almost three times bigger territory than Slovenia (in square kilometres), both countries are a similar size according to the population criterion. From historical and political point of view, both countries are republics, established in early 1990s after the transition from previous communist regimes. Furthermore, after independence, both countries set up the same goal to enter European Union; they joined the Union together in 2004. Even though Lithuania

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[1] For example, the extensive international study 'The European Mayor: Political Leaders and the Changing Context of Local Democracy' was carried out in 2003 and 2004 by the European Association EUROLOC and the European Urban Research Association (EURA), mainly due to the numerous reforms and changes in the European systems of local authorities. The study, which included over 2,700 mayors from 17 European countries, included only 3 post-communist countries: Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. Complete study results have been published in a book *The European Mayor: Political Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy* (Bäck et al. 2006).

and Slovenia developed political systems and internal structure of authorities separately, following their own path dependency, as well as political and administrative culture, both opted for a single level of local government with many similarities, which are thoroughly explained in the following chapter. Therefore, Lithuania and Slovenia represent natural choice for a comparative study.

The main aims of this article are to analyse the pre-mayoral career of local leaders and incumbency in connection with the introduction of direct mayoral elections and to uncover similarities in local political leaders from the selected post-communist countries. The article, which is written in head-to-head comparative approach, starts with an overview of the context of the local government systems in Lithuania and Slovenia, where several similarities have been highlighted. The direct mayoral elections conducted in Lithuania for the first time in 2015 are the focus; while in Slovenia, the legislature introduced direct mayoral elections immediately upon the establishment of a new system of local government in 1994. The importance of direct mayoral elections and their correlation to mayoral career paths was noted in a study by Wollmann (2014) who analysed changes that occurred after the introduction of direct mayoral elections in Germany. He noticed the evolution professionalization of mayors. Per Wollmann (2014: 334), 'the professionalization of mayors is encouraged by local voters who tend to elect mayoral candidates whom they consider prepared and trained for doing a good job as mayor'. Based on these findings, we assumed that, in Lithuania, the change of the normative framework for mayoral elections which empowers voters, also changed mayoral career and established trends regarding the incumbency of local leaders. According to described consideration, our research follows main hypothesis: "Directly elected mayors will lead to shorter mayoral incumbency". This paper aims to evaluate how direct elections of mayors changed the composition of Lithuanian mayors in terms of their political careers and to determine whether these changes were similar to those experienced by Slovenian mayors who participated in local elections in 2014 for the sixth time. We analysed similarities between the development of the career of local leaders from two viewpoints: pre-mayoral career and mayoral incumbency. To our knowledge, this is the first and only comparative study on both trends of local political leaders in Lithuania and Slovenia.

The context of local government in Lithuania and Slovenia

To establish a clear picture, we start our analysis of the political careers of Lithuanian and Slovenian mayors with a brief description of the local government systems and roles of mayors in the analysed countries.[2]

Both Lithuania and Slovenia are unitary states and each have only one level of local self-government, which is based on the principle of subsidiarity guaranteed in both countries by their constitutions. Lithuania is divided into 60 municipalities, while Slovenia is divided into 212 municipalities.[3] By territory (65,300 km^2) and number of inhabitants, the municipalities in Lithuania are quite large, with the average population being 48,400. The smallest municipality is Neringa, with 2,900 inhabitants, and the biggest is the capital city of Vilnius (540,000). Vilnius does not enjoy the special legal status of the capital city despite the rather unique position it holds in providing services to nearly one-fifth of the country's population. In contrast, the average size of the Slovenian municipalities is 9,500 inhabitants, and the average scope of the territory is 95 km^2. The smallest Slovenian municipality is Hodoš, with 340 inhabitants, and the largest is Ljubljana (290,000), which is the capital of Slovenia. It does have special legal status. Regardless of size, in both countries, every municipality must perform the same functions and services.

The representative body of local government for both countries is the municipal council. In Lithuania, the municipal councils range in size from 15 to 51 members, while in Slovenia the range is from 7 to 45 members, depending on the population. The rights to both vote and be elected to the council are granted to permanent residents of the municipality based on universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot. After the restoration of Lithuania's independence in 1990, local elections were held eight times: in 1990, 1995, 1997, 2000 and, since 2003, every four years, with the most recent occurring in March 2015. After Slovenia gained independence in 1990, both the comprehensive reform and new establishment of local self-government were performed in 1994. Since that time, local elections have been held every four years, usually in the fall.

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[2] For more details for Lithuania, see Šaparnienė & Lazauskienė (2012). For more details for Slovenia, see Kukovič (2015).

[3] Out of 212 municipalities, 11 municipalities are named 'city municipalities', which affords them with special status and thus urban administrative centers, and 201 municipalities are ordinary (rural) municipalities.

The political head of the municipality in Lithuania is the mayor. There are many parties in local politics, and the mayor's party seldom holds an absolute majority on the council. Hence, most mayors in Lithuania govern with the support of a coalition of several parties, usually two to four. Based on the recommendation of the mayor, the council elects the deputy mayor for the council's term of office. Mayors and deputy mayors should be citizens of the Republic of Lithuania. The candidacy age for a councillor or a mayor is 20 years old, which is higher than the age of entitlement to vote (18). The positions of mayor and deputy mayor are considered full-time jobs. Another important position in Lithuanian municipalities is the director of administration. He/she acts as an individual institution, with responsibility for the implementation of national and local legislation as well as acting as the head of the municipal administration. The director of administration is appointed and dismissed by the council upon the mayor's proposal. Thus, in most cases, this post is filled with someone from the ruling coalition. The municipal council may also establish the position of the deputy director (Republic of Lithuania, Law on Local Self-Government 1994).

In accordance with the organization of a municipality's work and the distribution of competences between the three main bodies of the municipality,[4] concerning the municipality's tasks, the role of mayor in Slovenia is simultaneously executive and coordinative. One of the mayors' more prominent competencies is the political and legal representation of the municipality and the municipal council. The mayor summons and presides over sessions of the municipal council, yet he/she has no right to vote. As an executive body, the mayor primarily executes the decisions made by the municipal council and has the right of legislative initiative because he/she proposes the draft budget, municipal decrees and other legal acts for adoption by the municipal council. The mayor is the 'master' of the municipality as he/she looks after the municipality's assets, replenishes them and provides for an increase in their value on a daily basis, namely by signing various contracts, overseeing public tenders, conducting the rational and economical implementation of the budget and through strict consideration of the principles of good management (Kukovič & Haček 2013: 91). His/her tasks also include the summoning of the assemblies of citizens and the adoption of emergency measures when the lives and/or property of citizens are endangered (Prašnikar 2000: 46; Brezovšek & Kukovič 2012). The most

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[4] Per The Local Self-Government Act (Article 28), there are three main bodies in every municipality: municipal council, mayor and supervisory board.

important competences of the mayor are the proper running and management of the municipal administration. The mayor also appoints the director of the municipal administration (as well as dismisses him/her) (Haček 2006: 166) and the deputy mayor(s).[5] The mayor is sovereign and practically untouchable throughout his/her entire term of office. Through the administration, of which he/she is the head, the mayor can pursue an extremely independent policy, regardless of the policy pursued by the legislative body. The mayor of the municipality plays a central role in the Slovenian local self-government system and, because the mayor is a one-person governing body, the citizens find that he/she is the most recognizable person in the municipality (Kukovič & Haček 2013).

Direct election of mayors

In Lithuania, a big shift towards democracy was made with the introduction of direct mayoral elections. The direct election of mayors had been the subject of a lively debate in the Lithuanian Parliament for more than twenty years, i.e. since independence (Mažylis & Leščauskaitė 2015: 33–56). The main discussion centred on the role that should be played by an elected mayor. Should the mayor be the chairperson of a council or the head of the executive body? And, if the latter, what would the consequences be for the director of administration whose term of office is either conterminous with that of the mayor or lasts until the next election (Astrauskas 2013)? During the pre-electoral campaigns before each parliament election, most of the candidates indicated a favourable attitude toward this subject, but most of them reverted their position immediately after the elections as the first ever policy change was introduced only in 2014. With the Law on Local Government amendment introduced in June 2014, a directly elected mayor would receive slightly increased power as the head of the municipality council; however, the local executive institution remained in the hands of the director of municipal administration.

Per the Law on Elections to Municipal Councils, a mayor in Lithuania is to be elected via direct elections for a four-year term through secret ballots cast by voters who have permanent residence in the municipality. A person may either declare himself/herself to be a candidate for mayor or may be declared so by a party or election committee. A person who declares

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[5] Deputy mayors can be appointed as municipal councillors. A municipal councillor is a symbolic position rather than a professional one, while mayors and deputy mayors can decide whether or not they want to perform their positions as full-time jobs.

himself/herself must be supported in a relevant municipality by not less than 20% of its voters, but not less than 100 voters of that municipality.[6] The right to be elected as mayor is granted to any permanent resident of a particular municipality who is on the polling day at least 20 years old and who is a citizen of the Republic of Lithuania.[7] Mayoral elections use a double-round, absolute-majority vote system; the candidate who gets a majority of all the votes cast is elected. If no candidate receives an absolute majority, a second round is held for the two candidates who received the most votes in the first round.

The first direct mayoral elections in Lithuania were held on the 1st of March 2015. The councils were elected at the same time. The voter turnout was expected to be higher than usual; however, it was similar to previous local elections. In 2011, the voter turnout was 44%; in 2015 it was 47% (first round) and 39% (second round). Nineteen mayors were elected in the first round and, for the first time, five non-partisan mayors were elected (8%).[8] This was a new phenomenon in Lithuania. The ruling Lithuanian Social Democratic Party won 16 mayoral posts. The second party, in terms of the number of mayors, was the opposition Homeland Union–Lithuanian Christian Democrats (conservatives), who had victories in 11 municipalities. The conservatives were closely followed by the opposition Liberal Movement (ten mayors). The changes to the electoral system, i.e. direct mayoral elections, significantly changed the 'profile' of the municipalities. Twenty-five new mayors were elected (42%), whereas 35 were re-elected. In the 2011 election, there were 17 newly elected mayors (28%).

Slovenia's direct mayoral elections were introduced (without any opposition) in 1994 in a package with the local government re-introduction reform. Per the Local Self-Government Act,[9] the mayor is an individual body – a political official elected through a direct election for a term of four years via secret ballots cast by voters who have permanent residence in the municipality. The rights to both vote for and to be elected as mayor are granted to every citizen who has the right to vote for the municipal council. The candidacy procedure is simple because political parties and groups of voters can propose candidates. Elections for mayor use a double-round, absolute-majority vote system; the candidate who gets a majority of all the votes is elected. If none of the candidates receives an absolute majority of the votes, a second round is held for the

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[6] Republic of Lithuania Law on Elections to Municipal Councils, Article 34.
[7] Republic of Lithuania Law on Elections to Municipal Councils, Article 2.
[8] Four of them are mayors of major cities: Kaunas (the second largest city, 300,000 inhabitants), Šiauliai (the fourth largest city, 160,000), Panevėžys (the fifth largest city, 100,000) and Alytus (the sixth largest city, 57,000).
[9] The Local Self-Government Act, Article 42.

two candidates who received the most votes in the first round. The second round should be held no later than 21 days following the day of the first round (Brezovšek & Kukovič 2012; Kukovič & Haček 2013).

Due to differences in Slovenian and Lithuanian local electoral systems, the statistics are slightly different. Voter turnout at Slovenian local elections has been steadily decreasing since 2002;[10] at the latest local elections in the fall of 2014, it was 45% in the first round and almost 44% in the second round. Empirical data concerning local elections since 1994 strongly confirm that non-partisan candidates were convincing winners of the last three mayoral elections, having the highest share of municipalities where at least one candidate for mayor ran as a nonpartisan. The number of elected mayors formally running as non-partisans has been rising sharply since 1998, and most municipalities have had a mayor who was not put forward by a political party during that time as well; 43 non-partisan mayors were elected at local elections in 1998 (out of 192 municipalities), 59 in 2002 (out of 193 municipalities), 66 in 2006 (out of 210 municipalities), 70 in 2010 (out of 210 municipalities) and 115 at the local elections in 2014 (out of 212 municipalities). At the last local elections in 2014, non-partisan mayoral candidates ran in 75% of all municipalities (159 out of 212) and were successful in 72% of those (115 out of 159 municipalities). This was by far the highest success rate for non-partisans (or any political party) at any local election in the two-decade history of Slovenian local democracy (Kukovič et al. 2015: 700). When the five mayoral elections from 1998 to 2014 were compared, the percentage of re-elected mayors in Slovenia increased.[11] Additionally, there was less space for new faces within every local election.

Mayoral political career

Prinz (1993: 12) explains that the mayoral career is created in a continuous process of mayoral position implementation, where a unique combination of ambition and opportunity intertwine. A political "career path"[12] is therefore necessarily associated with time and defined

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[10] Voter turnouts at local elections in Slovenija were 61% in the first round and 50% in the second round in 1994; 58% and almost 52% in 1998; 72% and 67% in 2002; 58% and 53% in 2006 and 51% and 49% in 2010 (Kukovič et al. 2015: 699-700).

[11] At local elections in 2014, 177 out of 211 mayors decided to re-run for the mayoral office. Electoral success was high: 84%, with 149 mayors re-elected.

[12] Authors would like to explain that we realize that mayoral "career paths" are dependent not only from pre-mayoral political career, but also from many different variables such as gender, age, educational background, family roots and political activity of the family members, social origins of the mayors etc. However, we intentionally chose pre-mayoral career, since we argue that the most important factor for political career is the last position before the present one.

by two key points: the *starting point* and the *termination point* of mayoral function. Between them, the mayoral career takes place. However, these two points do not constitute the absolute beginning and end of a political career; rather, they are open to other directions because, before the starting point, there was some form of pre-mayoral career, and, after the termination point, there has usually also been some form of post-mayoral political career (Kjær 2006: 76). Hibbing (1993) says that an effective description of the mayoral career focuses on two different types: the *internal* and the *external* careers. An internal political career exists within local authorities, including the municipal council and the mayor. An external political career can include, for example, a seat in the parliament or another position in the government. As shown in Table 1, there are at least six different aspects of the mayoral career.

Table 1. Different aspects of the political career of a mayor

	Internal career	**External career**
Beginning of mayoral career	Number of years at the council	Pre-mayoral political career
Occupying mayoral office	Seniority	*cumul des mandats*
Termination of mayoral career	Returning to the council	Post-mayoral political career

Source: Kjær (2006: 77).

Our analysis[13] highlights the internal career (number of years on the council), external pre-mayoral political career and incumbency.

Pre-mayoral career: last position determines the present one

If we follow Kjær (2006: 76) and consider that a pre-mayoral career influences mayoral leadership, we must analyse one's mayoral career prior to him/her becoming a political leader. In the first section, we were interested in individuals' pre-mayoral career before they were elected as mayors. We particularly focused on the *internal political career* of mayors, i.e. number of years at the council before first election to the mayoral office, and *external political career*, i.e.

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[13] Data on Lithuania were taken from research project No. MIP-031/2015 "Mayors in Lithuania: Political Leadership in Local Government" (Kaunas: Vytautas Magnus University, Social Research Center), which was founded by the Research Council of Lithuania. Data on Slovenia were based on research conducted among Slovenian mayors in spring 2014. The response rate was 106 out of 212 mayors (50% of the population). For more information on the research project 'Styles of local political leadership', see Kukovič (2015).

holding some other publicly elected office in which they learned the skills of political manoeuvring.

Our analysis of internal political careers showed that most of the mayors followed the path to their career through the position of council member. Most Lithuanian mayors (45 out of 60, i.e. 75%) who were directly elected in 2015 were council members before assuming the mayor's office for the first time; only 15 out of 60 mayors (25%) had no prior experience in this position. The average period of time spent serving as a council member prior to becoming a mayor was 5.4 years (SD = 5.7).[14] Deeper analysis of Lithuanian mayors showed that mayors were usually local party leaders and branch chairpersons; however, sometimes they were politicians who had reached vertically higher positions in the party hierarchy.[15] The analysis also revealed that, in some cases, these individuals even changed their political orientation and their party to become mayors.[16] In addition to political experience as municipal council members, the Lithuanian mayors had diverse amounts of internal (political) experience, i.e. they either spent some time in other political positions,[17] had served as elders in the municipal administration[18] or worked as a department head in a municipality; several mayors had worked in municipal companies or institutions etc.

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[14] The mayor of the Ignalina municipality is an interesting case: He waited 24 years for his 'turn'. This case is extraordinary rather than typical. Henrikas Šiaudinis was appointed as the mayor due to favourable circumstances that arose when his predecessor, who had led the municipality since 1990, was elected to the European Parliament in 2014. The council then elected Šiaudinis as the mayor and, in the direct elections the following year, he was elected by the citizens as well. Šiaudinis had been elected to the council in 1990 and, starting from 1995, had been the deputy mayor (both he and the mayor belong to the same party). Thus, the 'eternal' deputy replaced the 'eternal' mayor.

[15] For example, the assistant of Rolandas Paksas (party chairperson).

[16] For example, the mayor of Raseiniai–from the Order and Justice to Labour Party, the mayor of Kalvarija–from the Homeland Union to Order and Justice, the mayor of Šilutė–from the Order and Justice to the Social Democratic Party etc.

[17] Three mayors that were newly elected in 2015 had held the office of mayor a few years prior (for 13 and 9 years, respectively), two had held the office of the deputy mayor (for 4 years each), one worked as the Director of Municipal Administration (for 4 years) and one served as the Deputy Director of Municipal Administration (for 4 years).

[18] An *elder* is not a political position; however, an elder's duties are 'close' to citizens. Three new mayors had served as elders for 2, 4 and 11 years, respectively.

Table 2. Pre-mayoral career: Comparison between Lithuanian and Slovenian mayors

		Lithuania	**Slovenia**
INTERNAL POLITICAL CAREER	Local council members (in %)	75	52
	Number of years at the council	5.4 years	3.5 years
EXTERNAL POLITICAL CAREER	Members of the national parliament (in %)	5	7
NEWCOMMERS (in %)		35	48

Source: own elaboration.

As shown in Table 2, compared to their Lithuanian colleagues, the share of Slovenian mayors who served as municipal councillors before becoming mayors was somewhat lower. The survey showed that a little more than half of the Slovenian mayors (52%) had already been municipal councillors before being elected to the mayoral office; a notable proportion of those mayors had previously been deputy mayors (19%) or members of supervisory boards (8%).[19] Based on participant responses, we found that Slovenian mayors, on average, were (before being firstly elected to the mayoral office) municipal councillors for 3.5 years, which was also less than that of Lithuanian mayors (Kukovič 2015).

Having an external political career means that mayors had held some other publicly elected office beyond the municipality before they were elected as mayor. Out of 60 mayors in Lithuania, only three (i.e. 5%) were members of parliament prior to the 2015 mayoral elections,[20] and one had worked as a vice-minister; others were either assistants to members of the parliament or ministry advisers. Conversely, some new Lithuanian mayors from the 2015 elections were relatively unknown but managed to win; they had not held any political positions but belonged to one of the main political parties (the Homeland Union–Lithuanian Christian

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[19] Although the latter is an expert and not a political position, he/she could still become acquainted with the local community and acquire local government experience.

[20] One of them was a parliament member from 2008–2012 who later worked in business. The other two gave up their parliament member mandates for the position of mayor (Varėna and Vilnius municipalities). The mayor of Vilnius had been a member of parliament for three years; before that, he had held the position of Minister of Justice (for four years).

Democrats); one mayor had served as the deputy director of municipal administration; some mayors came from police structures.[21]

Likewise, in Slovenia, a rare transition from the national level was evident, since only a small proportion of the mayors had any experience in national politics before entering a mayoral office. Only 7% of Slovenian mayors had gained political experience as MPs in national parliament before being elected to the mayoral office, and only 1% of mayors had been members of the National Council. Nevertheless, one should not overlook that a significant proportion (48%) of mayors were still *newcomers,* i.e. individuals that had never occupied a public office and were elected to the mayoral office without any local political experience. The gathered data (Kukovič 2015) showed that the largest share of Slovenian mayors (before they were elected to public office) occupied leading positions in private and public enterprises (41%). In second place, we found special professions, such as health professionals, teachers and the liberal professions (26%), followed by technical professions (19%).

The re-election of mayors and mayoral incumbency

The following section focuses on both the period of mayoral office occupancy (i.e. incumbency phenomenon) and the re-election of mayors. Many scholars (McKelvey & Reizman 1992; King & Zeng 2000; Leoni et al. 2004; Kukovič & Haček 2013) have stated that incumbent politicians may be successful in re-election because of comparative advantages, such as access to campaign channels, media exposure, personal recognition, previous achievements etc. According Sloboda (2014), incumbents are, on average, seven times more successful than non-incumbents for two primary reasons. First, incumbents often serve citizens better. Through the instrument of elections, they receive incentives to promote the interests of 'their' voters. An incumbent's connection with a constituency is critical to voters, because many of them demand that their

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[21]The mayor of one of the largest municipalities (Alytus City), Vytautas Grigaravičius, had spent no less than seven years as the Police Commissioner General of Lithuania and had occupied various positions in the police system. When he was 58, he was elected as a nonpartisan candidate with support from the public electoral committee. There was a very similar case in the municipality of Anykščiai: the winner there was Kęstutis Tubis, who had been nominated by the Liberal Movement. He had no political experience in local self-government but had worked in a managerial position in the police commissariats of various cities, and he spent four years (2004–2008) working as the Deputy Police Commissioner General of Lithuania. In 2008, he ended his office in the system of the interior (Lithuania's laws foresee the possibility for police officers to retire after 20 years of work; some of them look for another job). Tubis became the mayor when he was 54 years old.

representatives act in a responsible manner.[22] Incumbents are a more desirable species in terms of the quality of democracy, because they tend to be more open to the demands and desires of their voters, especially compared to short-lived, single-term politicians. The second argument states that more experienced politicians with a longer political career are more efficient and can therefore better represent the interests of their constituencies. A career politician assists his/her constituency in becoming more institutionalised and professional, as well as in having a stable membership, internal structure and clear rules (Polsby 1968). In this way, career politicians, whose objective is to achieve a longer political tenure, devote more of their time to both public policy making and implementation (Botero 2008: 6; Kukovič & Haček 2013).

In Lithuania, 72% of mayors were re-elected at local elections in 2011, and 58% were re-elected in 2015, when direct mayoral elections were implemented for the first time. Interestingly, the share of re-elected mayors has dropped just as citizens gained a replacement tool for the mayors in office. In Slovenia, the picture is somewhat different. Statistical data show that, at every mayoral election from 1998 onwards, between 80% and 90% of incumbent mayors have decided to run for office again, which indicates that mayors are highly motivated to stay on in their positions and to build their political careers in this way. In Slovenia, the atmosphere is strongly in favour of mayoral re-election; when five mayoral elections from 1998 to 2014 were compared, the percentage of re-elected mayors steadily increased (Kukovič et al. 2015). The electoral success rate[23] of re-elected mayors has increased with every subsequent mayoral election (from 77% in 1998 to 84% in 2014).[24]

Next, we will discuss the incumbency of Lithuanian and Slovenian mayors. Our analysis of Lithuanian mayors showed that 23–26% of incumbents were in office for one term, i.e. four years. On average, Lithuanian mayors have remained in office for five years (mean = 5.07, SD = 5.73) before the introduction of direct mayoral elections in 2015.[25] Based on empirical

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[22] Voters can inform their representatives of considerations and demands individually as well, or they can use various forms of petitions or exert pressure on them via their parties' leadership. However, casting a vote at elections remains a powerful tool in the hands of a voter; receptive representatives can be rewarded, and inefficient ones can be punished (Botero 2008: 5).

[23] Electoral success is computed as a quotient of the number of municipalities in which incumbent mayors have been re-elected and the overall number of proposed candidacies of incumbent mayors in all municipalities.

[24] The electoral success of incumbent mayors was 77% in 1998; 79% in 2002; 82% in 2006; 83% in 2010 and 84% in 2014. Note also that the number of municipalities analysed during that period increased from 192 in 1998 to the current number of 212 in 2014.

[25]Incumbent politicians who occupied mayoral positions for the longest periods of time before re-election in 2015 were the mayors of Pasvalys (22 years, intermittently, since 1990), Druskininkai (16 years), Rietavas (15 years) and Šakiai (15 years). These mayors are members of different parties (Homeland Union, Lithuanian Social Democrats,

data, we can state that Slovenian mayors perceive the mayorship as a long-term position, with the average period in office at 8.62 years, which is slightly more than two terms in office.[26] Additionally, the following statistics indicate that the atmosphere in Slovenia is indeed quite favourable for the re-election of mayors: first, in 97 Slovenian municipalities, the incumbent mayors are now at least in their third consecutive term of office; second, 11 municipalities have had the same mayors since 1994 (hence, they are currently serving their sixth term); third, in four municipalities, former mayors were again elected after an interval of at least one term; and fourth, of the current 212 municipalities, there are no municipalities in which every election so far has seen a victory by a different candidate mayor. This means that, in all 212 municipalities, at least one mayor has repeated his/her term of office.[27]

Long-time mayors often adjust their political behaviour to satisfy their electoral base and thus further their careers (Kukovič & Haček 2013). However, the opposite view also exists – inexperienced mayors contribute fresh ideas and new energy. Putnam (1976: 66) emphasizes that, the more inexperienced the local leader, the lower the level of professionalism and efficiency but also the greater the degree of innovation and flexibility in local politics. From this perspective, it is therefore difficult to find a balance between 'new blood' – someone with fresh ideas and new approaches – and someone with valuable experience and continuity. Regardless of the high share of Lithuanian and Slovenia re-elected mayors at the latest local elections, a relatively high proportion of political *newcomers*, i.e. mayors, who had no political experience before their first election to the office of mayor, is evident. In Lithuania, 35% mayors lacked prior experience in local government before their first election; in Slovenia, the proportion of mayors who lacked political experience prior to their first election was even higher (48%).

Per Kjær (2006), the average length of a time a mayoral position was held among European mayors was seven years. As previously discussed, Lithuanian mayors held a mayoral position on average for five years, which is more than one term of office; among Slovenian mayors, average incumbency was even longer (8.62 years), i.e. more than two consecutive terms of office. If we compare Slovenian mayors with other mayors from European countries, directly

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Liberal and Centre Union and the Peasant and Greens party, respectively). It is impossible to claim that one particular party has the largest number of incumbent mayors. Two mayors have served two terms in office, i.e. eight years. Six mayors have served as mayors before 2015, but for a very short period of time, i.e. incomplete term, between six months and three years.

[26] Among the respondents, the shortest mayorship was two years, and the longest was twenty years. The vast majority (98%) also responded that they had occupied a mayoral office without any interruption.

[27] The youngest municipality, Ankaran, held its first local elections in October 2014.

elected Slovenian mayors have occupied the mayoral office for a longer period (Slovenia is above the European average), while Lithuanian mayors are under the European average, even though they were directly elected at the most recent local elections (before that they were elected indirectly, i.e. among council members).

Concluding remarks

We chose to emphasise the pre-mayoral career and incumbency of mayors in two former communist countries—Lithuania and Slovenia—which have opted for a similar system of a single-tier, local government, with Slovenia doing so two and half decades ago. We particularly analysed direct mayoral elections, which have been carried out regularly in Slovenia since 1994 and in Lithuania only since 2015. The career of local leaders were first analysed in terms of pre-mayoral career, where we discovered that the largest share of mayors (52% in Slovenia and 75% in Lithuania), prior to their election, were members of municipal councils. The average period for performing as a municipal councillor was 3.5 years in Slovenia and 5.4 years in Lithuania. Our analysis also revealed that, in both countries, only minor transitions from the national level could be observed because small shares of the mayors studied had any prior experience in national politics. It is also interesting to note that both countries had a relatively high proportion of newcomers to the world of politics (Lithuania 35%, Slovenia 48%).

We proceeded from the assumption that the change in the electoral system from indirect to direct mayoral elections impacted the composition of mayoral political careers. A full data analysis confirmed our assumption on two levels.

First, in the analysis of mayoral re-election and related incumbency, we found that the direct mayoral elections in Lithuania reduced the proportion of re-elected mayors; in 2011, the share of re-elected mayors was 72%, while in 2015 the figure fell to 58%. Unlike in Lithuania, in Slovenia the share of re-elected mayors is slowly growing. Indeed, we found that the Slovenian mayors and voters were favourable towards mayoral re-running, which enables long mayoral political careers. Per the analysed data, the average incumbency of a Slovenian mayor is 8.62 years, which is more than two consecutive terms. Based on the analysis, we can confirm the initial hypothesis "Directly elected mayors will lead to shorter mayoral incumbency" only for the Lithuanian, but not also for the Slovenian case.

Second, in Lithuania, the first direct elections in 2015 also enabled the elections of non-partisan candidates, a trend seen in Slovenia since 1994. In Slovenia, the power of non-partisan mayors particularly increased at the latest local elections in 2014, when 115 non-partisan and only 97 partisan mayors were elected. This trend can be linked to the phenomenon of rising distrust towards political parties, which is a particularly common trend in post-communist countries. This is presumably because of the traditions stemming from the previous socialist system (Haughton 2005). Eurobarometer (2004; 2016) data show that, in both Slovenia and Lithuania, trust towards political parties is extremely low. When both countries entered the EU in 2004, 74% of Lithuanians and 77% of Slovenians (Eurobarometer 2004) expressed distrust towards political parties; this changed for the worse in the latest Eurobarometer (2016) survey, when 87% of Lithuanians and 89% of Slovenians expressed distrust towards political parties.

The differences between both cases can be partly explained with the differences in the electoral system used for the mayoral elections and influences in the recent history of the direct voting on the local level. Furthermore, the reasons could also lie in the differences of administrative and political traditions between the countries.[28] Another question to observe is whether Lithuanian voters will continue to use the mechanism of direct mayoral elections and thus, at least in the local government, avoid voting for distrusted political parties, induct more newcomers into the political arena and adorn their local political elite with longer incumbency, thereby following the trends set by the Slovenian local leadership realm, remains to be seen.

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Media in Shaping Knowledge about the Secular State

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Abstract:

This article undertakes the issue of the sources from which we obtain our knowledge and shape our opinions on the topic of the secular state. Based on a questionnaire survey on a representative group of Poles, I point to the constitutive role of the media in this process. However, I specify that the preferred sources of information are first of all television and then the Internet. Next, I translate the results of the quantitative analysis onto Neuberger's (1999) approach to the Church-state relationship. As a result, I point out that the opinions of the respondents are located in the endorsed Church space. At the same time, I argue that in this type of approach to Church-state relations, respondents more often perceive the pressure of the Catholic Church in relation to state authority than vice versa.

Introduction

This article deals with media issues as a source of shaping Poles' knowledge about the secular state. The context of the analysis that I refer to proves the importance of the topic. After the political system change from communist to a democracy, Casanova (1994) predicted that in the coming decades, Poland would remain a country in which Catholicism played the role of a public religion. His intuition remains valid in this second decade. Poland is distinguished by a strong relationship between religion and her identity, with a high 64% indicator of religiousness from among the other Catholic countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Pew Research Centre 2017). Constitutive to the public sphere media take into account the perspective of our dominating Catholicism (Guzek 2017). Today, however, we are undergoing secularization that promises a scenario of the privatization of religion (Borowik 2010). This emerging secular space

lacks an analysis of media, religion, and politics that concerns our understanding of the *secular state*. This intuition leads me to question the place of the media in shaping our knowledge and opinions about this concept. Therefore, in this article, I analyze what share the media play in our understanding of the concept of a *secular state*.

The task I undertook turned out to be important for several reasons. First, broad comparative studies from both Western and non-Western countries point to progressing secularization (Künkler, Madeley, & Shankar 2018; Norris & Inglehart 2004). Religion transforms rather than disappears (Davie 2007; Woodhead & Catto 2012). In CEE countries and the former Soviet Union, this tendency is evident in a specific way. The dominant religion is related to nationality. A good citizen is a devotee of a particular religion. For example, in Russia, a citizen is identified with the Orthodox Church, however, this does not show an increase in religious practices (Pew Research Centre 2017).

Second, our current study of religious phenomena necessarily takes into account the perspective of the media. We are talking about the so-called religion and media turn (Engelke 2010). This means that religion articulated by religious and secular actors "cannot be grasped without understanding the media and how it influences society and culture" (Lövheim 2014: 553). The reason is fundamentally due to the fact that it is mainly the media that distribute a number of religious representations in the public sphere. These only represent the public side of religious rituals and sacred events (Dayan & Katz 1994; Guzek, Szostok, & Głuszek-Szafraniec 2015). They also point to the functioning of secular contents in the background of religion in social awareness, which Knott, Poole, and Taira (2013) describe as the *secular sacred*.

Third, we noticed that in current studies (Herbert 2011; 2015), the level of religious visibility in Poland is not connected with threads in the sphere of the secular and sacred and the mentioned *secular sacred* concept. Referring to the issues in this article, I am thinking about the lack of analysis on the representation of the *secular state* in media coverage, as well as the place of the media among the sources of this content in the minds of recipients. In this article, I omit the analysis of the media content, however, I focus on the recipients of the media, and more specifically the sources of their knowledge and opinions about the *secular state*.

Conceptualizing the Secular State

The concept of a *secular state* is discussed in every geographical region. Such concept translates into a variety of understandings and attribution of separate connotations (neutral, negative, positive). The context in Poland, in which I undertake my analysis, includes some

ambiguity. On the one hand, in our social awareness, the state of affairs before our system changes took place included a program of atheism inscribed on its banner and our opposition partnering with the Church against the authorities (Hervieu-Legér 2000). On the other hand, our social experiences after the system changes refer to attempts to negotiate the dominant position of the Church in the public sphere (Grzymała-Busse 2015; Kowalczyk 2012).

We find the simplest understanding of the *secular state* in the dual pattern of religious state and the *pure separation* or so-called *religious state à rebours* (Małajny 2013). However, this division proves to be impossible to practically implement. In turn, various other social contexts provide specific mixed types and kinds of separation. Led by the need for a clear division, which is verifiable in social practice, for the purposes of this article, I apply a popular distinction made by Benyamin Neuberger (1999). It contains six types of nations, depending on the nature of the relationship between public authority and institutional religions: *secular-absolutist*, *theocracy*, *separation of Church and state*, *recognized communities*, *established Church* and *endorsed Church.*

The taxonomy presented is spread over a continuum which boundaries are set by two extremes: *a secular-absolutist state* and a *theocracy*. The first type, characteristic of the former Soviet Union and its satellites, assumes an oppressive attitude towards religious practices and the functioning of institutional religions in the public sphere. Its opposite is a *theocracy*, which, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, means the interweaving of religious laws and state legislation. The remaining types are characterized by a gentler approach towards the Church-state relationship. In the case of the *separation of Church and state*, the secular nature of the state and its lack of interest or influence on the life of its Churches are emphasized. Depending on the version, we can talk about two such variants. The milder *open separation* present in the United States allows the presence of religious rituals in the public life, but the state does not favor any religious group. *Hostile separation*, implemented in the case of France's *laïcité*, generally excludes the presence of religious symbols and rituals in the public sphere.

Recognized communities, the established Church, and the endorsed Church, are the three types that assume the public role of religion. *Recognized communities* emerged as a consequence of the 1517 Reformation and related religious divisions in Germany. They were the foundations for the recognition of religious communities that meet certain legal conditions and were granted certain prerogatives in the public sphere. Each of the recognized groups, however, obtains the same rights and obligations. The *established Church*, which in modern history appeared along

with the Act of Supremacy of the English Parliament in 1534, points to a specific Church as official, including a constitutional position (cf. Bradney 2011).

This type is historically justified, as in the case of the Church of England and the Church of Scotland. The last of the types, the *endorsed Church*, is characterized by a certain complexity. Within this framework, none of the religions present has an established status, since all religions have equal rights and obligations. However, one of the Churches is in a privileged position from the symbolic perspective. This is exactly the situation identified by the following article in the Constitution of Poland:

> The relations between the Republic of Poland and the Roman Catholic Church shall be determined by international treaty concluded with the Holy See, and by statute (The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 1997. art 25, § 4).

The ambiguity of the Polish context which I mentioned is clearly revealed in the type of *endorsed Church* presented. From an analytical perspective, it will be interesting to check whether this type of a model of Church-state relations functions in the minds of the respondents studied and what their basic sources of knowledge about it are. In my analysis, however, I am not only limited to the conceptualization of the *endorsed Church*. I assume that the data obtained from the respondents on the secular state will be considered in relation to Neuberger's six basic variants.

Methodology

The nature of this study means that the basic purpose of the article is to establish sources of knowledge and opinions on the idea of a secular state as represented by the Polish population. My goal is first of all to determine the state of three cognitive areas. The first indicates which of the means of communication is the basis for understanding the secular state among the respondents. The second concerns how respondents understand the implementation of the postulate of secularism in their nation in the current social context. Next, I will be concerned with views on the influence of the Catholic Church in Poland, which dominates the state. The last issue also refers to the analogous influence of the state on the Catholic Church.

The main research problem is not directly confirmed in previous quantitative studies (CBOS 1994; CBOS 2013; CBOS 2015b; CBOS 2015a). When formulating research questions and hypotheses, I could not use previous regularities and trends in literature. I therefore assumed that the study would have an exploratory character. I based this problem on three research

questions and the corresponding hypotheses presented below. Targeting television and the press present in hypothesis H3, from the available arrangements, I derived the main sources of religious representation from among media recipients (McCloskey 2010).

Q1: Are the media an important source of knowledge on the idea of a secular state?
H1: The media play a fundamental role in providing knowledge about the secular state.

Q2: Which media provide basic knowledge about the idea of a secular state?
H2: Television and printed press play a fundamental role in providing knowledge about the idea of a secular state.

Q3: How do people identify the implementation of the idea of a secular state?
H3: The secular state is understood through the prism of breaking the concordat.

The data which I analyse in this study comes from a survey conducted from April 19 to May 19, 2017 on a sample of 1000 adult Poles (569 women and 431 men). The research was carried out using the Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI) method. They were made by trained and supervised tele-interviewers with the help of the CATI SUPPORT 4.0 computer program. The study sample was selected based on the pre-set gender quota, age and place of residence that reflected the structure of adult Polish residents. Accepted numbers were applied to sex (women: N=569; men: N=431), age (18–24: N=61; 25–34: N=91; 35–44: N=125; 45–54: N=182; 55–64: N=256; ≥ 65: N=285) and place of residence (village: N=356; city: N=644).

The questionnaire was prepared for the needs of a broader study within the project *Media towards the idea of a secular state*. It consisted of 44 single and multiple choice questions that concerned the issue of a secular state, the Church-state relationship, the religiousness of respondents and the sources of obtaining information on the topics discussed. Issues related to the religiosity of Poles were formulated in such a way that they remain consistent with the tools from previous religious studies carried out by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS), the Institute of Sociology of the University of Warsaw (IS UW) and the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences (ISiF PAN). Due to the subject matter of the text, I have narrowed down the selection of the data presented here.

The questionnaire used two groups of questions. The first referred to opinions about the secular state, the Church-state relationship, the religiousness of respondents and their sources of knowledge about the secular state. The second group concerned the state of knowledge related to the secular state and the practice of Church-state relations. Depending on the type of issue, respondents provided answers based on the selection of specific facts and, based on the Likert

scale, gave five positive responses: "strongly agree," "agree," "disagree," "strongly disagree," or "hard to say;" and based on their answer from the three-item list, they responded either "yes," "no" or "difficult to say."

Results

The table below presents the percentage shares of preferred sources of information about the secular state according to place of residence. Worth noting are the three basic sources of this information, where TV takes first place (63%). This media receives the highest score among residents living in cities of up to 20,000 people (67%) and in rural locations (66%). In the case of the inhabitants of the largest cities, the role of television as the basic source of information on the secular state is slightly lower (56%). The next source of information is the Internet (55%), which clearly dominates among residents of the largest cities (68%) and is least used among rural residents (48%). The third source of acquiring knowledge about the secular state is the press (44%) but it does not differ much from the next source, which is talking with other people (42%). The presented results clearly show that the media are the basic source of information about the secular state. At the same time, there is a discrepancy in the choice of media among the inhabitants of the largest cities and village residents.

Table 1. The sources of information on the topic of a secular state according to place of residence

Source of information about the secular state	Place of Residence					
	Village	**Cities up to 20,000 residents**	**Cities from 20 to 100 thousand residents**	**Cities from 100 to 500 thousand residents**	**Cities over 500,000 residents**	**Total**
Television	65.7%	66.9%	60.6%	64.0%	56.3%	63.2%
Internet	48.2%	51.6%	54.4%	60.5%	67.6%	54.8%
Press	41.5%	42.1%	43.4%	45.1%	51.4%	44.1%
Talks with other people	38.7%	32.5%	42.4%	46.3%	55.7%	42.3%
Radio	40.6%	43.8%	36.7%	34.5%	44.0%	40.0%
Social Media	32.2%	35.3%	29.7%	31.0%	33.5%	32.3%
Church – sermons and parish announcements	33.9%	25.7%	24.8%	20.7%	20.2%	26.8%
Other	4.4%	3.7%	1.8%	5.0%	7.1%	4.4%
None	2.6%	1.7%	6.8%	2.3%	4.4%	3.4%
Difficult to say	3.2%	.8%	3.7%	2.9%	3.4%	2.9%

Multi-choice questions, percentages do not add up to 100
Source: own elaboration.

As we can see from Table 2, obtaining information about a secular state is related to the age of the respondents. There is a huge disproportion among the youngest in their dominant declarations that the sources of their knowledge about the secular state are the Internet (77%) and social media (39.9%). The proportions change in the case of the 35–44 year old group, where the primary source of knowledge on the subject turns out to be television (67%) and then the Internet (59%). In the case of the oldest respondents, the dominating source is still television (67%) and the press (42.2%). The results obtained indicate two regularities. First of all, depending on the age group, television or the Internet shape opinions about the secular state. Second, the discourse of Churches is an insignificant source of knowledge about the secular state (26.8% in total), with a slight increase in the 35–54 year old group (31.8%).

Table 2. Sources of information about a secular state according to age

Sources of information about the secular state	Age			
	18–34 year olds	**35–54 year olds**	**over 55 years of age**	**Total**
Television	59.4%	62.1%	67.0%	63.2%
Internet	77.3%	59.1%	34.6%	54.8%
Press	43.5%	46.7%	42.2%	44.1%
Talks with other people	47.4%	44.6%	36.5%	42.3%
Radio	40.1%	46.6%	34.0%	40.0%
Social Media	39.9%	37.2%	22.3%	32.3%
Church – sermons and parish announcements	22.7%	31.8%	25.2%	26.8%
Other	5.2%	2.1%	5.8%	4.4%
None	1.7%	4.8%	3.4%	3.4%
Difficult to say	1.6%	3.5%	3.2%	2.9%

Multi-choice questions, percentages do not add up to 100
Source: own elaboration.

An interesting issue is the combination of the main source of information about the secular state presented in Table 3 with the attitudes of respondents towards religious faith. There are two things worth mentioning when analyzing the following table. People who declare themselves to be non-believers primarily acquire information about a secular state from the Internet, and then from the press. Believers, on the other hand, first gain knowledge about the secular state from television and then from the Internet.

Table 3. The main source of information about the secular state in relation to religious faith

Main source of information about the secular state	Attitude towards religious faith					
	Decided non-believer	Rather non-believer	Believer	Deeply Religious	No answer	Total
Talks with other people	11.1%	10.0%	5.4%	8.1%	6.1%	6.5%
Press	20.4%	16.7%	6.7%	7.1%	6.2%	8.3%
Internet	46.5%	39.9%	26.5%	23.0%	25.7%	28.3%
Social Media	6.2%	3.7%	4.5%	3.7%	.0%	4.3%
Radio	.0%	8.5%	3.9%	6.8%	16.6%	4.6%
Church – sermons and parish announcements	1.0%	.0%	5.1%	9.7%	.0%	4.9%
Television	5.2%	15.1%	36.2%	26.5%	21.7%	30.9%
Other	1.9%	.0%	2.9%	1.6%	18.4%	2.9%
Difficult to say	7.7%	6.0%	8.9%	13.5%	5.3%	9.3%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

Source: own elaboration.

The next issue that needs consideration concerns the very understanding of the concept of secular state. Among Neuberger's variants (1999), there are several options for implementing secularism in practice. In attempting to reach their imaginations, the respondents were asked to identify the postulates of the secular state from among several proposals. The results presented in Table 4 show that there is currently a homogeneous group of actions to be fulfilled for the implementation of the idea of a secular state: withdrawal of religion from schools (35.8%), liquidation of the Church fund (35.1%), the removal of religious symbols from public space (34.2%) and legalizing abortion (32.9%). However, data from Table 5 indicate that age does not significantly differentiate these respondents.

Table 4. Indications of the implementation of the secular state according to place of residence

Expression of the implementation of the secular state	Place of Residence					
	Village	Cities up to 20,000 residents	Cities from 20 to 100 thousand residents	Cities from 100 to 500 thousand residents	Cities over 500,000 residents	Total
Withdrawal of religion from schools	26.8%	30.0%	39.3%	48.8%	44.9%	35.8%
Liquidation of the Church fund	30.3%	32.9%	33.7%	39.6%	44.9%	35.1%
Removal of religious symbols from public space	25.2%	33.8%	37.5%	36.2%	48.9%	34.2%
Legalizing abortion	28.2%	34.9%	31.9%	33.8%	41.6%	32.9%
Breaking the concordat	21.5%	23.3%	28.5%	24.8%	37.1%	26.0%
Difficult to say	27.3%	26.0%	18.7%	16.5%	11.8%	21.4%
None	22.0%	17.0%	18.4%	17.1%	11.6%	18.2%

Multi-choice questions, percentages do not add up to 100
Source: own elaboration.

Table 5. The appearance of the implementation of the secular state by age

Expression of the implementation of the secular state?	Age			
	18–34 years	35–54 years	over 55	Total
Withdrawal of religion from schools	33.9%	36.3%	36.7%	35.8%
Liquidation of the Church fund	39.0%	36.0%	31.5%	35.1%
Removal of religious symbols from public space	34.9%	37.0%	31.0%	34.2%
Legalizing abortion	31.7%	33.5%	33.4%	32.9%
Breaking the concordat	28.3%	26.7%	23.7%	26.0%
Difficult to say	19.2%	23.4%	21.3%	21.4%
None	15.7%	18.9%	19.2%	18.2%

Multi-choice questions, percentages do not add up to 100
Source: own elaboration.

The character of the Church-state relationship that influences the type of state was the subject of the respondents' reflections based on the interference of the state in the affairs of the Catholic Church and the interference of this Church in the affairs of the state and its law-making processes. According to Table 6, up to 65.3% of respondents share the opinion that after 1989, the Catholic Church repeatedly interfered in state policy and legislative issues. On the other hand, 21.7% denied this view. In the opposite situation, describing the interference of the state in

the life of the Church (Table 7), a significant group of respondents (39.5%) denied the repeated influence of the state on the Church, while 31.1% confirmed it.

Worth noting among respondents is the principle of the growth of beliefs concerning the influence of the Catholic Church on the state along with the increase in the number of inhabitants and their place of residence (Table 6 indicates an increase from 32.8% in rural areas to 46.8% in cities of over 500,000). However, this is not accompanied by a reverse tendency in the case of the state's influence on the Catholic Church (Table 7).

Table 6. Interference of the Catholic Church in politics and creating laws from the perspective of the place of residence

After 1989 in Poland, did the Catholic Church often interfere in politics and issues for creating legislation?	Place of Residence					
	Village	Cities up to 20,000 residents	Cities from 20 to 100 thousand residents	Cities from 100 to 500 thousand residents	Cities over 500,000 residents	Total
Decidedly yes	32.8%	38.5%	42.0%	41.7%	46.8%	38.9%
Rather yes	25.3%	31.8%	26.1%	25.5%	25.0%	26.4%
Difficult to say	18.3%	10.7%	9.8%	9.6%	10.3%	13.0%
Rather not	16.3%	12.9%	16.1%	15.5%	11.9%	14.9%
Decidedly no	7.3%	6.1%	6.0%	7.7%	6.0%	6.8%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

Source: own elaboration.

Table 7. State interference in the life of the Catholic Church from the perspective of place of residence

After 1989 in Poland, did the State often interfere in the organization and life of the Catholic Church?	Place of Residence					
	Village	Cities up to 20,000 residents	Cities from 20 to 100 thousand residents	Cities from 100 to 500 thousand residents	Cities over 500 thousand residents	Total
Decidedly yes	10.5%	17.1%	14.8%	7.6%	5.2%	11.0%
Rather yes	24.6%	26.7%	14.9%	18.1%	16.5%	21.0%
Difficult to say	20.1%	17.3%	19.5%	20.2%	13.8%	18.6%
Rather not	31.3%	27.1%	32.7%	33.9%	38.3%	32.3%
Decidedly no	13.5%	11.8%	18.2%	20.2%	26.2%	17.1%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

Source: own elaboration.

Table 8 shows that the view of the Church's intense interference in politics and legislative issues prevails among non-believers (75.7%). However, as shown in Table 9, regardless of their attitude towards religious beliefs, the distribution of the dominant view among respondents that the state did not interfere in the internal life of the Catholic Church is relatively even (31.6–39.3%). The data, therefore, indicate that there are more supporters of the view that the Church dominates over the state in issues shaping Church-state relations in Poland after 1989.

Table 8. Interference of the Catholic Church in politics and the creation of laws from the perspective of religious faith

Did the Catholic Church in Poland after 1989 often interfere in politics and legislative issues?	Attitude towards religious faith			
	Non-believer	**Believer**	**No answer**	**Total**
Decidedly yes	75.7%	33.5%	32.2%	38.9%
Rather yes	14.4%	28.1%	32.5%	26.4%
Difficult to say	5.4%	13.6%	30.6%	13.0%
Rather not	1.7%	17.3%	2.4%	14.9%
Decidedly no	2.8%	7.5%	2.3%	6.8%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

Source: own elaboration.

Table 9. Interference of the state in the life of the Catholic Church from the perspective of attitude towards religious faith

Did the state of Poland after 1989 often interfere in the organization and life of the Catholic Church?	Attitude towards religious faith			
	Non-believer	**Believer**	**No answer**	**Total**
Decidedly yes	6.3%	12.0%	2.0%	11.0%
Rather yes	16.0%	21.7%	21.4%	21.0%
Difficult to say	12.5%	19.2%	28.5%	18.5%
Rather not	36.0%	31.6%	39.3%	32.4%
Decidedly no	29.2%	15.5%	8.8%	17.1%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

Source: own elaboration.

Discussion and Conclusions

Focusing the reader's attention on establishing the sources of knowledge and the opinions of respondents on the subject of a secular state, I see several issues that must be discussed. First of all, the presented data should be read in the categories referenced to by Engelke (2010) as the media and religion turn. In the context of Poland, mass media predominated over other preferred sources of information in the general or local information area (Gierula 2016; Gierula & Jachimowski 2000; Jachimowski 2006). At the same time, as part of these analyses, the importance of direct communication was emphasized (Gierula, 2005). In the current study, it can be seen that the media plays a constitutive role in the process of acquiring knowledge and views on religious topics. This confirms the adopted H1 hypothesis. Lövheim's (2014) view presented in the context of high modernity countries is also justified in the context of post-communist Poland. We accurately perceived the topic of the relationship between the lack of religious belief and the acquisition of knowledge about religion from the Internet, but this requires a separate analysis.

The H2 hypothesis that *television and printed press play a fundamental role in providing knowledge about the secular state* in the light of the results of the research is subject to partial falsification. Television is included among the basic sources of information. However, the Internet took the place of the printed press, which clearly distinguishes the findings of this project from previous studies (McCloskey 2010). In the context of the basic medium for spreading the knowledge of a secular state, one more aspect is worth paying attention to. The weak participation of religious institutions in communicating content in sermons and parish announcements weakens the communicating power of traditional religious communities. This contributes to the transformation of religion and the search for something that unites in the space of digital media, for example, forums (Kołodziejska 2014). This regularity, however, involves diversification in the choice of media. Table 6 shows that the larger the locality, the higher the preference for using the Internet as the main source of information about the secular state. When we combine this regularity with general Internet access in Poland, it is legitimate to state that the level of knowledge from the Internet depends on the degree of digital exclusion of a given region, especially in the Polish countryside (Popiołek 2013).

The answers confirming the truth of hypothesis H3 allow us to confront the obtained data from Neuberger's (1999) taxonomy. In fact, H3 is falsified. Only 26% of respondents endorse an

opinion, that the postulate of a secular state is combined with the need to break the concordat. In turn, two basic postulates with which respondents link the introduction of a secular state refer to the withdrawal of religion from schools (35.8%) and the liquidation of the Church fund 35.1%. This state of affairs explicitly excludes the possibility of implementing a type of Church-based relations based on recognized communities. Instead, a disproportion appears in the assessment of the Catholic Church's influence on the state and the state's influence on the Church after 1989. The fact that the respondents point to the lack of state interference in the Church's internal life prompts us to a certain type of separation. On the other hand, the Church influencing the legislative process reveals its real and symbolic power of action. In practice, the opinions of respondents indicate that the picture of Church-state relations provided to them mainly by the media: (1) overlaps with the endorsed Church model, however, it does not exclude the participation of other contents in it, and (2) indicates the Church's efficacy and pressure towards the state, and not the other way around.

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Polish Catholic Press and Political Communication of the Church on the Basis of the 2000-2015 Presidential Election

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Abstract:

The article is an attempt to answer the question what role in political communication of the Catholic Church in Poland play the most important Polish Catholic opinion weekly magazines (*Gość Niedzielny*, *Niedziela*, *Tygodnik Powszechny*). Span of the analysis covers last 15 years. The research included the presidential campaign period in 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015. The analysis was conducted with regard to the articles published during the period of one month prior to the presidential elections. The author assesses to what extent the analyzed press titles were convergent with the official announcements of the Polish Bishops' Conference regarding the political involvement of the Catholic Church. It is important to find an answer to the question of how the Catholic press supported one of the candidates for the office of President of the Republic. Another important question that needs clarification is whether and to what extent journalists discussed electoral programs of individual candidates. According to the author, the results of research regarding political engagement of Catholic press in the four presidential campaigns are a representative sample to determine the role of the analysed Catholic press in political communication of the Catholic Church in Poland.

Key words:

political communication, Catholic Church, presidential election, catholic press

Introduction

Literature concerning political sciences contains several fundamental perspectives for the term "politics" (Skarżyński 2014: 9-20). Politics is the mechanism for exercising power understood as authoritative allocation of values (Easton 1953). Politics refers to various processes which are used by the governments to respond to the pressure from the widely understood society by means of allocation of awards and punishment. Therefore, the notion of

"politics" is connected with formal or authoritative decisions describing the action plan of the community (Heywood 2009: 6-9; Joseph 1988: 41-42). The second proposal associates politics with the wide area of "public life" or "public affairs" (Heywood 2009: 10). The third perspective treats politics as the decision-making process, conflict-solving method based on compromise and consensus (Heywood 2009: 11). Thus, it is about citizens' freedom of action in the public sector (Corriero 2014: 80-82). The fourth definition describes politics as the ability to achieve the desired effect with the use of any means. It is associated with power (Heywood 2009: 13). As far as democratic systems are concerned, citizens become engaged in politics to a various degree in an individual or institutional way.

The present paper considers the Catholic Church in Poland as an institution which manifests its involvement in the mechanisms of exercising power in various ways (e.g. by means of its teaching mission with regard to the Catholic social science), becomes engaged in public life, and aims at achieving its targets in the area of widely understood politics by means of certain specific decision-making processes. One of the forms of its involvement is participation in the political and media discourse, which reveals the method and scope of Church's activity in the public sphere.

The author of this text focuses on the question about the role of the most important Polish Catholic opinion weekly magazines in the political communication of the Church over the period of the last 15 years. The voice of the Church with regard to political matters is expressed in various ways. Among them, in the form of official messages of the Polish Episcopal Conference, pastoral letters, other official publications featured on the official website http://episkopat.pl, but also in the Catholic press published usually by the Church institution and other Catholic media. The present research tackles the problem of convergence between the institutional messages of the Polish Episcopal Conference and the content of the Catholic press.[1] The context for the research is provided by the presidential campaigns between 2000-2015, which the author treats as an independent variable in this analysis. The dependent variables are various forms of involvement of the Catholic Church in Poland in the processes of political communication in Catholic press during the above-mentioned electoral elections.

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[1] In this paper, the term "message of Polish Episcopal Conference" is understood as one of the forms of informational message of Polish Episcopal Conference which is short, official information announced to the public.

The existence and way of functioning of religious institutions, including the Catholic Church in Poland after the communist period, have been the object of numerous studies, particularly from the point of view of the Law on Religious Denominations. However, apart from rare academic papers depicting the relations between the Catholic Church and the media (e.g., Hess 2009), there is no detailed study on the function of the Catholic press in Poland in the political communication of the Church after 1989.

Project methodology

The aim of this study is twofold. First, its goal is to determine whether the Polish Catholic press has become a forum for the political communication of the Church with regard to information and interpretation during the presidential campaigns.[2] Second goal is to determine the extent to which the Catholic media have become an entity that supports candidates from the political parties which identify with the teachings of the Church in their attempts to become the President of Poland.[3] The results of the research are based on a representative sample in determination of the functions of the analysed Catholic media in the political communication of the Church in Poland in the 21st century.

The author has formulated the following hypotheses:

1. The topic of politics and elections was present in the Polish Catholic press both in terms of information and interpretation.[4]

2. Polish Catholic press supported the right wing candidate (by means of creating a positive image of the politician) and/or criticised other candidates.[5]

3. Political communication in the Catholic press was convergent with the official messages of the Polish Episcopal Conference.[6]

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[2] Both informing (reference to the journalistic Five Ws rule) and interpreting (the attempt to give sense to the information, comment, assessment of the news from a given point of view) are important in the process of political communication. As far as the modern journalism is concerned, it is necessary to verify whether the news is the execution of correspondence theory of truth and whether the rule of objectivity is executed in the neutrality of the message, presentation of different information contexts and supplementing the theory with new facts (Conboy 2004; The Guardian 2002).

[3] The following terminological simplification is used in the project: "candidates from the political parties which identify with the teachings of the Church" are called "right wing candidates".

[4] The information level is understood as execution of the journalistic Five Ws rule, and the interpretation level is a method of "reading the sense" of information (Barbano 2016).

[5] The following right wing candidates stood for election: in 2000 Marian Krzaklewski, in 2005 – Lech Kaczyński, in 2010 – Jarosław Kaczyński, in 2015 – Andrzej Duda.

[6] Considering that Catholic media are supervised by the Polish Bishop's Conference, the author of the article assumes the convergence of the content published in the Catholic press with official Episcopal messages.

The following press titles were chosen for analysis: *Gość Niedzielny*, *Niedziela*, *Tygodnik Powszechny*. As far as the circulation and scope of influence is concerned, they are among the most important Catholic printed media in Poland. *Gość Niedzielny* is an all-Poland Catholic weekly magazine published by Instytut Gość Media. The Institute and its publishing house are owned by the Archdiocese of Katowice. Average sales of the magazine in 2015 amounted to over 130,000 copies. Such a result made this title a leader in terms of average sales of opinion weekly magazines.[7] *Niedziela* is published by the Metropolitan Curia in Częstochowa. The average sale of this weekly magazine is close to the result of *Gość Niedzielny*.[8] *Tygodnik Powszechny* is published by Tygodnik Powszechny z o.o. The common perception of the paper is that it attempts to combine liberal values with the principles of faith. The average sales of *Tygodnik Powszechny* amount to around 20,000 copies.[9] All analysed newspapers and magazines are Catholic and address ethical, social, political and economic issues. Moreover, the analysed titles invite representatives of various political parties to participate in the discussion concerning politics and social issues.[10]

The research material was obtained from paper editions of Catholic weekly magazines. All issues of the magazines published during the period of one month prior to the elections of the President of Poland were analysed (8.09.2000-8.10.2000; 23.09.2005-23.10.2005; 4.06.2010-4.07.2015; 24.04.2015-24.05.2015). The research included articles containing the following keywords: "presidential election", "president", "head of state" and relating to the presidential elections in Poland as part of the ongoing campaign. The author omitted the articles that were not related to the ongoing campaign, even if they included the aforementioned words in a different context, e.g. in the context of the presidential campaign in Germany. The criteria of analysis were fulfilled by 164 articles, including 52 in *Niedziela*, 48 in *Gość Niedzielny*, 64 in *Tygodnik Powszechny*.[11]

The research included the presidential campaign period in 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015. The analysis was conducted with regard to the articles published during the period of one month

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[7] According to the data for 2015, the average sales of *Gość Niedzielny* amounted to 134,026 copies (ZKDP 2016).

[8] The information was obtained by the author from Head of Marketing of *Niedziela* Mariusz Książek via email on 18.01.2016.

[9] According to the data for 2015, the average sales of *Tygodnik Powszechny* amounted to 19,441 copies (ZKDP 2016).

[10] Famous Polish journalist and historian EwaCzaczkowska perceives *Tygodnik Powszechny* as a newspaper of "Catholicism of blurred borders" (cf. Czaczkowska 1998). However, the editorial team of *Tygodnik Powszechny* describes the magazine as "Catholic social and cultural magazine". Such subtitle accompanies the title of the paper.

[11] The full list of analysed articles can be found in final bibliography.

prior to the presidential elections. In 2000, the presidential election was held on 8 October. Twelve candidates stood for election. Three of them enjoyed the highest number of votes: Aleksander Kwaśniewski, standing for re-election (53.9% of votes), Andrzej Olechowski (17.3% of votes), Marian Krzaklewski (15.57% of votes) (PKW 2000). Five years later, after 10 years of Aleksander Kwaśniewski's presidency[12], the presidential election was conducted in two rounds, which were held on 9 and 23 October, respectively. Lech Kaczyński won the election with 54.04% of votes in the second round of voting. Donald Tusk came second with 45.96% of votes (PKW 2005). In 2010, the presidential election was conducted in two rounds held on 20 June and 4 July. Bronisław Komorowski won the election with 53.01% of votes in the second round. Jarosław Kaczyński came second with 46.99% of votes (PKW 2010). In 2015, the date of the presidential election was set for 10 May. Again, a second round of voting (held on 24 May) was necessary. Andrzej Duda won the election with 51.55% of votes. Bronisław Komorowski came second with 48.45% of votes (PKW 2015).

The author used the method of content analysis (Krippendorff 2004) in the research, which allowed him to assess the scope of political communication in the Polish Catholic press and the convergence between the institutional messages of the Polish Episcopal Conference and the content of the analysed articles. Moreover, the author used decision analysis (Johnson, Reynolds, & Mycoff 2016) in order to assess the Polish Episcopal Conference and the Catholic press as political decision centres which formulated messages to the voters concerning making specific political decisions.

The term "Catholic press" in Poland is understood by the author as press published by members of the Catholic Church in Poland. The editorial teams of such titles keep regular contact with the local Catholic Church hierarchy. The contact between the editorial team and the representative of the Church is supposed to ensure dissemination of the stance which is not contrary to the teachings of the Catholic Church or to the position of a given local Church[13] (Guzek 2016: 26). The Catholic press is distinguished by the fact that it has a Church assistant, who acts as the liaison between the Church authorities and the editorial team (Lepa 1995: 172).

The term "political communication of the Church" is defined by the author as political communication (Davis 2010: 114-130; Dahlgren 2005; Scheufele 2000; Michalczyk 2005)

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[12]Aleksander Kwaśniewski became the president of Poland in 1995.
[13]Local Church is understood by the author as a diocese.

forwarded by the institutional Church and the Catholic press (González Gaitano 2016; Lesniczak 2016). Therefore, what is analysed here is the process of presentation and promotion of the official voice of the Church, which is expressed in two areas: official messages of the Polish Episcopal Conference and the Catholic press treated in this article as a supplement to the Polish Episcopal Conference during the presidential campaigns. Political communication of the Church expressed in various press titles may display certain differences connected with their varying programmes and political policies. The two perspectives of political communication (institutional and press) are contained in Brian McNair's concept (McNair 2011: 26), which indicates three basic elements of political communication: political players, mass media and citizens. Therefore, the Catholic Church was treated as a political player in the analysis undertaken in this paper. At the same time, the Catholic press represented both the first (political player) and the second element (mass media). Citizens as the third basic element of political communication are potential voters and addressees of the messages issued by the Catholic Church. The very fact that the Church is an institution does not automatically make it an element of political communication. However, Polish reality, especially after 1989, shows its substantial role in election campaigns (Zuba 2010; Bingen 1996).

Political communication of the Church: 2000-2015 presidential campaigns

Among the four analysed campaigns, the Polish Episcopal Conference referred to the presidential elections by means of overall instructions only in 2005 and 2010. In 2005, the bishops appealed to the faithful in a laconic message, encouraging them to pray for the homeland and electing smart, honest members of parliament who care for the good of the nation (Polish Episcopal Conference 2005: 4). On the other hand, in 2010 the Polish Episcopal Conference called for participation in the election to reflect the sense of responsibility for Poland (Polish Episcopal Conference 2010: 4). In their institutional messages, the bishops did not indicate the candidate for whom people should vote, but rather emphasized the significance of participation in the election.

On 26 August 2005, the Standing Council of the Polish Episcopal Conference and diocese bishops issued a message concerning the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2005, as well as the pilgrimage of Pope Benedict XVI to Poland. In point 6 the bishops called for participation in the election and expressed their hope that the newly elected president will defend

life from the moment of conception to the natural death, protect basic rights of the family and marriage understood as a long-lasting relationship between a man and a woman.

The bishops did not refer to the presidential campaign and elections in the official messages of the Polish Episcopal Conference directly preceding the elections of the new President of Poland in 2000 and 2015. What is important, there were two events that were discussed by the public opinion and set the context for the campaigns in 2000 and 2010. In 2000, several weeks before the election, a video fragment was shown in the campaign advertisement of Marian Krzaklewski. It featured the incumbent president Aleksander Kwaśniewski with his minister Marek Siwiec parodying Pope's blessing in Kalisz in 1998. Their behaviour was highly criticised by the Catholic circles and the Polish right wing (Millard 2001: 392). The election of 2010 was conducted with the plane crash in Smoleńsk in the background (Niżyńska 2010: 467-479; Cześnik 2014: 518-539; Bugajski 2011: 104).

Among the four analysed presidential campaigns, only the pre-election polls in 2000 indicated the potential winner in the first round of voting very clearly (TNS OBOP 2000). None of the candidates for president in the following years managed to gain the same political position prior to the election as Aleksander Kwaśniewski did in 2000. Certainly, political divisions of the right wing parties and Aleksander Kwaśniewski's care for his own image should be indicated as the reasons for his success. The Freedom Union party (Unia Wolności) did not identify with any person standing for the presidential election. Akcja Wyborcza "Solidarność", which decided to appoint Marian Krzaklewski as the rival for Aleksander Kwaśniewski, was internally divided to such an extent that even the politicians from The Conservative People's Party (Stronnictwo Ludowo-Konserwatywne) questioned the leader of "Solidarność" as the candidate. The leader of the left wing tried to make the media show him as a good administrator of the country, President of all Poles, who cares for the security of Poland (in 1999 Poland became a member of NATO) and improvement of economic conditions (attempts to become a member of the European Union). This was enough for him to gain over 53% of votes (Millard 2001: 393). As far as the rivalry between Donald Tusk and Lech Kaczyński in 2005, Bronisław Komorowski and Jarosław Kaczyński in 2010, as well as Andrzej Duda and Bronisław Komorowski in 2015 is concerned, none of the candidates was a certain winner up to the moment of voting. In 2005, the small

interval between parliamentary and presidential elections[14] could result in the presence of references to both presidential and parliamentary candidates in the press articles.

Political communication in Niedziela

The fundamental aim of the political discourse of *Niedziela* in 2000 was to present the reasons why people should not vote for Aleksander Kwaśniewski. The incumbent president was depicted as a person who mocks Catholic faith and Pope John Paul II, and as an alcoholic, fraudster and supporter of abortion (Nowak 2000b: 20; Chrzanowski 2000: 8). None of the 23 articles published in *Niedziela* with regard to the presidential campaign in 2000 depicted positive achievements of Aleksander Kwaśniewski. As many as 21 articles contributed to building his negative image (which equals 91.3% of the articles referring to the presidential campaign in 2000). What is more, *Niedziela* showed the incumbent president [Aleksander Kwaśniewski] as a person who does not respect history and Polish tradition (Ryszka 2000: 26; Nowak 2000c: 20).

In *Niedziela* bishops asked the readers not to vote for Aleksander Kwaśniewski (Michalik 2000: 7; Nowak 2000a: 6).

Less attention was paid to the leader of Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Marian Krzaklewski, even though he was the person supported by *Niedziela*, which presented him as a genuine statesman, head of the family, defender of Christian values, a faithful man who deserves a vote (Czuba 2000: 11; Editorial team 2000a: 7). Therefore, the measures aiming at creating the negative image of Aleksander Kwaśniewski in *Niedziela* were easy to notice, whereas the positive campaign of this weekly magazine with regard to the right wing candidate was almost unnoticeable. The attitude of the discussed title is also confirmed by the existing study concerning involvement of the Church hierarchy in political communication. According to Waldemar Wojtasik (2011: 98), in 1995-2005 the involvement of the institutional Church during the election campaigns was particularly visible with regard to one political camp.

As compared with the 2000 campaign, the political communication of *Niedziela* during the 2005 campaign showed a significant decrease in the number of articles concerning the presidential election. There were eight such articles in 2005, and in 2010 only three such texts were published. It is worth noticing that the political communication in *Niedziela* during the

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[14] Parliamentary elections were held on 25.09.2005, only two weeks prior to the first round of presidential elections. (Cf. Postanowienie Marszałka… 2005; Postanowienie Prezydenta… 2005).

presidential campaign in 2005 was positive – it did not focus on discrediting Donald Tusk, but on showing the advantages of electing the PiS candidate for president. Four out of eight articles clearly supported the candidate of Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość): two columns by Czesław Ryszka and interviews with Lech Stefan, vice president of the "Pro Cultura Catholica" Association, and the then president of Warsaw. The column entitled "Poznaje się po czynach i owocach" (By their fruits and deeds you will know them) indicated the most important elements of the PiS programme (care for a strong and safe state, strong economy, eliminating unemployment, care for family, improvement programme for healthcare), which can be easily understood as support for Lech Kaczyński during the presidential campaign (Ryszka 2005b: 19). On the other hand, in the article entitled "Druga runda" (The second round) Ryszka (2005a: 19) wrote:

> "The election is not over yet. There is a second round ahead, which is in fact the first round of the presidential election, and then another, decisive one. For me the choice is simple: Lech Kaczyński offers us a country of social solidarity, whereas Donald Tusk offers us a country based on some liberal experiment, which can be proven by e.g. proposing 3x15 flat-rate tax, which is but a continuation of liberal capitalism with no place for the weak, the disabled and large families which are less economically adapted. There is no doubt about the fact that the victory of Tusk is a safety valve for the post-communists (…) It is only by upholding the momentum, that is by electing Lech Kaczyński for president after the victory of PiS, that we can be sure that the social programme for which most of the voters cast their votes will be implemented."

The long-standing President of the Polish Episcopal Conference, archbishop Józef Michalik from Przemyśl, did not refer directly in *Niedziela* to any of the candidates, but he addressed the issue of participation in the election as the issue of social responsibility. He reminded the readers that the Church is not and has not been interested in gaining direct political power, but rather wants the power to be exercised by "responsible, skilful, competent and honest people" (Michalik 2005: 18). On the other hand, in the article entitled "Wybrać prezydenta" (Choosing the president) Rev. Walerian Słomka called for election of the man of truth, who is able to love the nation and follows the doctrine of the Ten Commandments and Gospel (Słomka 2005). Therefore, it was a clear reference to the deontological level of human decisions.

The topic of politics and presidential election in 2010 was presented in *Niedziela* in the context of the president's plane crash in Smoleńsk. The weekly accepted the programme of right wing candidates Lech Kaczyński and Marek Jurek, so it granted legitimacy to their political aspirations (Żukowski 2010: 28-29; Jurek 2010: 24-25; Jakubiak 2000: 26-27).

The year 2015 showed larger interest of *Niedziela* as compared to 2005 and 2010. As far as the 18 analysed articles are concerned, the weekly magazine focused on: the need to change the ruling group, significance of participation in the election and support for the right wing candidate, Andrzej Duda. *Niedziela* also emphasized PO-PSL coalition's fear of losing power, and presented the potential failure of Bronisław Komorowski as the beginning of the process of healing the state (Czerniakowska 2015: 44; Skotnicki 2015: 44; Czabański 2015: 45). The author found eight articles supporting Andrzej Duda or criticising Bronisław Komorowski and Civic Platform party (Platforma Obywatelska) which supported him.

Political communication of the Church hierarchy in *Niedziela* was limited to the presentation of the book entitled "Polsko, uwierz w swoją wielkość. Głos biskupów w sprawie Ojczyzny 2010-2015" by Joanna Szczerbińska. This was the voice in defence of morality, tradition, Polish identity, honesty. This presentation was convergent with the criticism addressed towards "dishonourable politicians and their obsequious media" (Szczerbińska 2015: 38-39), which should be interpreted as criticism of the political actions of Civic Platform party. The Catholic weekly magazine also reminded us of the Church teachings with regard to the involvement of Catholics in the political life and the moral obligation of voting for a man of conscience (Ryszka 2015: 40; Dudkiewicz 2015: 3).

Andrzej Duda was the only candidate for president of Poland who was interviewed and asked about his election programme and vision of Poland. It is easy to conclude that by adopting the form of self-presentation, the interview contributed to creating a positive image of PiS politician (Duda 2015: 1, 10-11).

The analysis of *Niedziela* showed that the political communication of the Church in this press title was aimed at supporting the right wing candidates or criticising their rivals (it was found in 35 out of 52 articles, which means that in 67.3% of the research material *Niedziela* supported the right wing candidate or criticised other candidates).

The decision of *Niedziela* to grant support to right wing candidates or criticise their rivals is viewed as the reflection of its attitude to the following issues discussed by the candidates and their political parties: adopted Christian and patriotic values, views on family, defending life from the moment of conception to the natural death, bioethical issues, faith.

Political communication in Gość Niedzielny

Political communication in *Gość Niedzielny* in 2000 was similar to the communication of *Niedziela*. Three out of twelve articles directly built a positive image of Marian Krzaklewski, and eight articles (or at least their fragments) referred to Aleksander Kwaśniewski and the reasons why people should not vote for him. *Gość Niedzielny* showed Marian Krzaklewski as a good husband (Kasprzykowski 2000: 28; Editorial team 2000b: 12), head of the family. On the other hand, Aleksander Kwaśniewski was shown in the perspective of the scandal in Kalisz connected with the parody of John Paul II, political lies (lack of higher education, false property statements), unaccomplished promises (flats for young married couples, social pensions for former employees) and the despicable behaviour at the cemetery in Katyn (Bratkowski 2000: 5; Kucharczak 2000: 13; Grajewski 2000: 6).

Marian Krzaklewski was the only candidate who was offered an interview presenting his election programme published in *Gość Niedzielny* (Krzaklewski 2000: 5; 12). This should be interpreted as an expression of political support granted to the right wing candidate by this weekly magazine. As opposed to *Niedziela*, *Gość Niedzielny* did not publish the voice of the Catholic Church hierarchy in Poland, but only extensive fragments of the statement issued by the Country Management Board of the Institute of Catholic Action, urging the faithful not to vote for an atheist, that is Aleksander Kwaśniewski (Editorial team 2000f: 12).

Gość Niedzielny did not support any of the main candidates during the 2005 presidential campaign. Five articles tackled the issue of rivalry between Donald Tusk and Aleksander Kaczyński, but it was limited only to the presentation of the programmes and main political aims of both politicians, without any form of negative campaign directed at them.

The editorial team of *Gość Niedzielny* published interviews with both Donald Tusk and Lech Kaczyński (Tusk 2005: 22-25; Kaczyński 2005: 22-25). Moreover, this Catholic weekly magazine suggested that the voters should take into consideration the Polish Episcopal Conference's statements concerning moral requirements for political representatives of a faithful voter . However, no official statements of the Polish Episcopal Conference hierarchy were found in *Gość Niedzielny* (Bartoszewski 2005: 50). The weekly also presented the scope of president's powers, which may be regarded as a very important piece of information for the voters (Bartoszewski 2005: 50).

During the presidential campaign in 2010 *Gość Niedzielny* did not support any of the candidates. However, the views of the main candidates for the president of Poland (Łoziński 2010: 1, 16-21) and the profiles of Jarosław Kaczyński and Bronisław Komorowski were extensively presented (Grajewski 2010: 28-29). The authors of the articles paid close attention to the historical perspective with regard to the previous elections held after 1989 (Grajewski 2015: 7) and to the significant errors of pre-elections polls. At the same time they attempted to explain the reasons for such a huge divergence of results. They also asked the question whether it was the cause of manipulation, errors of poll centres or false information provided by the respondents (Dziedzina 2010: 32-34). Just like in 2005, *Gość Niedzielny* did not publish any statements from the Polish bishops concerning the presidential election.

During the 2015 election the weekly magazine performed a factual assessment of the 5 years of Bronisław Komorowski's presidency, exposing his weakness with regard to playing the role of the head of state and conducting the campaign (Grajewski 2015: 7; Legutko 2015a: 6). The author singled out seven articles that either supported Andrzej Duda as the candidate meant to bring good change, described him as a patriot or criticised Bronisław Komorowski (Jurek 2015: 74; Legutko 2015: 4; Legutko 2015a: 6; Legutko 2015b: 26-27; Legutko 2015c: 36-37; Grajewski 2015: 7; Fedyszak-Radziejowska 2015: 74).

Political communication of the Church with regard to the presidential election in 2015 was represented by a single article, where Tomasz Jaklewicz referred to the homily delivered by the President of Polish Episcopal Conference, archbishop Stanisław Gądecki on 3.05.2015 on Jasna Góra (politics is about thoughtful care for the common good, and each Catholic has the right and obligation to participate in the election). However, the Metropolitan Archbishop of Poznań did not mention the candidate for whom Catholics should vote (Secler 2016).

The analysis of the content of *Gość Niedzielny* revealed that the political communication of the Church in this press title was aimed at supporting right wing candidates or criticising their rivals for the position of the president of Poland only in 2000 and 2015 (it was found in 18 out of 48 articles, which means that in 37.5% of research material the analysed weekly magazine supported right wing candidate or criticised other candidates).

The decision of *Gość Niedzielny* to grant support to Marian Krzaklewski in 2000 was primarily the result of the different values and programme of the right wing candidate as opposed to the ones proposed by post-communist candidate Aleksander Kwaśniewski. In 2015 the right

wing candidate, Andrzej Duda, gained support of *Gość Niedzielny* due to the awkwardness of Bronisław Komorowski, who (according to the weekly magazine) did not deserve the second term after 5 years of dull presidency.

Political communication in Tygodnik Powszechny

In four out of seven articles referring to the 2000 presidential campaign in *Tygodnik Powszechny* the negative attitude of the authors towards Aleksander Kwaśniewski can be found (Editorial team 2000f; 2000d; 2000e; Boniecki 2000). The articles contained the allusion to gestures of Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Marek Siwiec that were meant as a parody of the Pope, recorded in 1997 and the consequent disapproval expressed by Polish bishops such as archbishop Stanisław Szymecki, bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, bishop Kazimierz Górny, bishop Kazimierz Ryczan, archbishop Józef Życiński, archbishop Władysław Ziółek, bishop Adam Lepa, bishop Ireneusz Pękalski (Editorial team 2000c: 2; 2000d: 2).

During the campaign in 2005 *Tygodnik Powszechny* did not support any of the candidates. It only presented the profiles of Donald Tusk and Lech Kaczyński, their political goals and the economic consequences of their victory (Graczyk 2005: 5; Majcherek 2005: 5; Jankowiak 2005: 4).

The magazine emphasized the fact that during the presidential campaign in 2005 the Polish bishops did not support any of the candidates (Boniecki 2005: 5; Stala 2010: 48; Majcherek et al. 2010: 6-7). *Tygodnik Powszechny* paid attention to the negative campaign conducted by Radio Maryja against Donald Tusk (Hennelowa 2005: 16). This observation made by the magazine, which noticed the area of political support granted to the Polish right wing by Redemptorist from Toruń Tadeusz Rydzyk, is confirmed in literature. Bartłomiej Secler (2013) points to the controversies connected with signing in 2006 of the so-called stability pact between Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), Self-Defence party (Samoobrona) and League of Polish Families party (Liga Polskich Rodzin), which took place in the presence of reporters from *Radio Maryja*, *TV Trwam* and *Nasz Dziennik* — the media associated with Tadeusz Rydzyk. Damian Guzek (2015) emphasizes the political and sanctimonious character of the influence of Radio Maryja, which highlights the sense of national identity of its listeners. According to Janusz Bugajski (2011: 104), "Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, an ultraconservative member of the Redemptionist order and the founder of Radio Maryja, has used these outlets

[Radio Maryja and TV Trwam] to engage in scathing attacks on assorted enemies, including the Tusk government".

On the other hand, Piotr Sula (2008: 152) notices that the political involvement of Tadeusz Rydzyk's media is not a new phenomenon:

> "Radio Maryja and its listeners have been supportingLeague of Polish Families partyfor a long time now. However, before the parliamentary election of 2005 those centred around Tadeusz Rydzyk, who was in charge of the station, gave their support to Law and Justice party. At the moment, Tadeusz Rydzyk has a new instrument to use, since in 2003 Telewizja Trwam, a new TV station, gained the broadcasting licence. As of today, the environment of Tadeusz Rydzyk backs up PiS and the government with Jarosław Kaczyński as the Prime Minister".

Also Rafał Riedel (2009: 12) and Stanisław Burdziej (2008: 208-209) confirm that the listeners of Radio Maryja are supporters of Polish right wing parties and addressees of the messages from father Rydzyk.

In 2010 the authors of the articles published in *Tygodnik Powszechny* presented the image of the Polish political scene and the consequences of electing Bronisław Komorowski and Jarosław Kaczyński, but did not support neither of the two main candidates (Flis 2010: 10-11; Staniszkis 2010: 12-13; Stala 2010: 48; Zaremba 2010: 3-5; Wielowieyska 2010: 3-5).

During the presidential campaign in 2015 the magazine did not support any of the candidates. It just presented the views of the candidates for the president of Poland (Szułdrzyński 2015: 24-26; Ogórek 2015: 18-21; Flis 2015: 5; Reszka 2015; Pszoniak 2015: 22-23; Zelnik 2015: 24-25; Reszka 2015b: 6-7). However, it is worth noticing that *Tygodnik Powszechny* honoured Bronisław Komorowski with the Saint George Medal. This event became an impetus for Bronisław Komorowski to express his gratitude towards the editorial team. This was interpreted as a form of political support granted by the magazine to Bronisław Komorowski (Komorowski 2015: 69).

Tygodnik Powszechny paid attention to the greater circumspection of the institutional Church with regard to expressing its political views and to the fact that the secretariat of the Polish Episcopal Conference did not issue any letter containing support for any of the candidates (Strzelczyk 2015: 9). In 2015 no Polish bishop made a statement concerning the election and candidates in *Tygodnik Powszechny*.

The analysis of the content of *Tygodnik Powszechny* revealed that the political communication of the Church in this weekly magazine was aimed at supporting right wing

candidates or criticising their rivals for the position of the president of Poland only in 2000. In 14 out of 64 articles positive campaign towards the right wing candidates or criticism of other candidates (left wing or liberals) could be noticed.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that the information in the analysed Catholic press titles was just a starting point for discussion of topics connected with the presidential elections. In 2000-2015, Polish Catholic opinion weekly magazines joined the political discourse in the context of the ongoing presidential campaigns. The involvement of the analysed Catholic media was expressed both with regard to information and interpretation. It is confirmed by Józef Krukowski (2007: 36-40), who treats religious institutions as public and legal persons, which results in them executing certain functions in social life, including the right to make statements as part of the political discourse.

The Catholic press in Poland supported the right wing candidates, but the level of such support was not equal in all analysed magazines published during the subsequent presidential campaigns. In 2000 the right wing candidates were supported by *Niedziela*, *Gość Niedzielny* and *Tygodnik Powszechny*, in 2005 and 2010 only by *Niedziela*, and in 2015 by *Niedziela* and *Gość Niedzielny*. Among the three Catholic magazines, *Niedziela* should be perceived as the most politically involved medium (supporting the right wing), whereas *Tygodnik Powszechny* should be perceived as the magazine which is open towards the representatives of different parties from the Polish political scene. On the other hand, the official messages of the Polish Episcopal Conference were considerably different from the political messages conveyed in the analysed Catholic weekly magazines. The Polish Episcopal Conference explained (in a general way) the significance of political participation on the basis of the Church teachings only in 2005 and 2010, but did not indicate its own favourite candidate.[15] On the other hand, in 2000 and 2015 the official messages of the Polish Episcopal Conference did not contain any reference with regard to the presidential elections. The analysis undertaken also revealed the political involvement of father Rydzyk's media for the benefit of right wing politicians. This phenomenon has been

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[15] The documents of Catholic Church tackle the issue of Christians' involvement in social and political life [e.g Second Vatican Council. Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World *Gaudiumetspes* (1965); *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (1994); Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Doctrinal Note on some questions regarding the participation of Catholics in political life of 24 November 2002]. The indications mentioned above predispose the Catholic Church to take part in the political discourse.

pointed out by Stanisław Burdziej (2008: 219), who mentions the disparate positions of the institutional Church and the media associated with the Redemptorist and adds that "any discussion of church-state relations in contemporary Poland needs to take account of these significant nuances".

The results of the research prove the lack of convergence between the institutional messages of the Polish Episcopal Conference and the political communication of the Church in the press. This should rather be perceived as institutional and press complementarity with regard to the execution of the function of political communication by the Church.

Taking part in the political discourse is one of the forms of political participation, which reveals the level and manner of involvement of a given entity in the public sector. The Catholic Church emphasizes the fact that Catholics should respect justified political differences and expresses objection to the concept of pluralism based on moral relativism. Its task is not to formulate specific political solutions. Catholics may find their place in different political parties, as long as their programme is not contrary to faith and natural law (Nitecki 2014). According to the author, this is the reason for the various positions of different editorial teams of Catholic press with regard to the candidates for the president of Poland in the context of analysed election campaigns (providing support, adopting neutral position or conducting negative campaign).

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News Consumption and Political Party Preferences in Poland

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Abstract:

The objective of this paper is to determine the scale of influence of the media (both traditional and social) on party preferences. The complicated contemporary media ecosystem, in which the boundaries between traditional and internet media are blurred (internet versions of newspapers), news coverage is increasingly de-professionalized (emergence of civic journalism), verification of information becomes increasingly problematic (fake news) leads to a number of theoretical and methodological challenges. Theoretically, the paper uses the model in which mass media act as a factor triggering the emergence of latent views. Empirically, the effort is undertaken to cover the whole universe of information sources, including both print and electronic media, both traditional and internet sources. The analysis determines citizens' sources of information, tracks consistencies in selecting particular categories of sources (thus outlining 'information bubbles'), correlates sources with party preferences and measures generalized attitudes to media categories. The study is undertaken on a sample representative for adult Polish population, fielded with CAWI methodology.

Key words:

mass media, political attitudes, news, public opinion

Introduction

The main aim of the research project[1] discussed here is to determine the scope and character of the influence of media on political orientations. In the broadest sense, the question is: Do the media matter for democracy? Do they have a role in changing citizens' minds, influencing their cognitive processes and, ultimately, decisions? We know a lot about public

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opinion, and we have in-depth knowledge about the media. However, we do not know enough about their interactions. Sociology and political science have gathered a significant body of theory and data on the structure and correlates of social and political attitudes. We know which factors differentiate political orientations in the society, and how attitudes relate to the programs of political parties. Polish sociology and political science have a long-term experience in conducting empirical research of voters and political parties, both in-depth and comparative. On the other hand, communication studies have gathered a body of knowledge about the changing landscape of print and broadcast media. We have determined structural constraints of functioning of this sector. In recent years, the focus has shifted to internet communication: the web is both a channel of distribution for traditional media sources and a source of exclusive material. Moreover, thanks to interactivity, it brings qualitative difference to media exposure: consumers are often also producers.

Specifically, the objective of this paper is determining the scale of influence of the media (both traditional and social) on party preferences. The complicated contemporary media ecosystem, in which the boundaries between traditional and internet media are blurred (internet versions of newspapers), news coverage is increasingly de-professionalized (emergence of civic journalism), verification of information becomes increasingly problematic (fake news) leads to a number of theoretical and methodological challenges. Theoretically, the paper uses the model in which mass media act as a trigger of the emergence of latent views. Empirically, the effort is undertaken to cover the whole universe of information sources, including both print and electronic media, and both traditional and internet sources. The analysis determines citizens' sources of information, tracks consistencies in selecting particular categories of sources (thus outlining 'information bubbles'), correlates sources with party preferences and measures generalized attitudes to media categories. The study is undertaken on a representative sample for adult Polish population, fielded with CAWI methodology.

Conceptual framework

Significance of the topic

Access to fair, balanced, objective and comprehensive information about public institutions is indispensable in a functioning democracy. The dissemination of mass communication is a phenomenon parallel to democratization and is in a cause-and-effect relationship with it, where the two processes are mutually driven. Historically speaking, these

processes, urbanization and elimination of illiteracy allow to broaden the spectrum of available mass communication media (press, television, radio, and later social media), which provides citizens with both information and means of participation in the political process (Lerner 1958; Pye 1963; Lipset 1959). As Lerner (1958: 60) wrote, the ability to read is initially available only to a few. Only at the next stage, when industrial development technology is relatively advanced, the society creates newspapers, radio stations, and mass-scale films. This process, in turn, speeds up the elimination of illiteracy. The institutions of participation (e.g. voting) come from the interaction of these processes. Contemporary understanding of the public sphere in liberal democracy, which we adopt as a norm, is described by Habermas (2008). For him, public sphere is the area of social life in which the formation of public opinion takes place. It is a space of critical and rational debate in which citizens form a public group by arguing about community issues. Habermas emphasizes the role of 'communication rationality' in the consolidation of the public sphere. Free and independent media are a necessary condition - though insufficient - to create such a public sphere.

There is empirical evidence for the role of political communication in shaping the quality of democracy and conscious citizenship. The use of the media, as Norris (2000) shows, has a positive impact on political knowledge, trust and participation in politics. The modern media environment in Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland, is exposed to multiple threats. Let us list two of them: politicization (concerning, above all, but not limited to, public media) and commercial pressure (affecting mainly, but not only, private media). Subordination of public media to political parties threatens such values as openness, accountability of power and equality (Diamond & Morlino 2005). The takeover of media by political parties distorts the main role of the media, as they lose impartiality. Political control creates party journalism (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013).

Market restrictions on media operations are fluid in the post-systemic transformation period. After the liberalization in the early nineties, there was a rapid process of privatization, internationalization and then concentration of media ownership and digitization in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. After the crisis of 2008, however, the process reversed. The following years marked the period of weakening of the position of international media groups and the emerging media oligarchisation. Against the background of other countries in the region, in Poland both the position of international corporations and oligarchisation were relatively weak (Štětka 2013).

Another approach to the intersection of the media and politics is from the comparative perspective taking into account different relations of media with political systems (Hallin & Mancini 2004; Dobek-Ostrowska et al. 2010). In Hallin and Mancini's classification, there are three major model media systems in Europe, differentiated, among others, by different level of maturity of democracy. The relatively recent democracies (the 'Mediterranean model') are characterized by high degree of political parallelism, understood as strong political orientation of the media and high degree of party-media links. In this system, the newspaper circulation is low and print media are elite and politically-oriented. Professionalization is weak and journalism is strongly oriented towards commentary. The state exerts strong control over the media and periods of censorship occur. East European media systems display many characteristics of this model.

Model of media influence on attitudes

In a classic definition, Allport (1935: 310) defines attitude as "a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive and dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations to which it is related." Attitudes are a cognitive process containing axiological and emotional elements as well as a behavioural dimension: they result in actions. Measuring attitudes, however, is a contentious issue. Not only are the validity and reliability of measurement questioned, but the very existence of attitudes themselves. Responses to attitudinal questions are unstable and inconsistent. At an extreme, it can be claimed that political attitudes are non-existent for large portions of populations, even for well-educated societies of old democracies. In his paper on 'The nature of belief systems in mass publics', Converse argued that opinion instability is due mainly to individuals who lack strong feelings on the given issue but choose available responses randomly because of conversational requirements: "large portions of an electorate simply do not have meaningful beliefs, even on issues that have formed the basis for intense political controversy among elites for substantial periods of time" (Converse 1964: 245).

A refined conceptualisation of attitude formation and measurement takes into account the availability of attitudes for the purpose of the survey question: an attitude may rest in mind in a quasi-formed state and the validity of a question in a survey rests on its potential for retrieving it. According to Tourengau et al. (2000), formulating a response to any survey question typically involves four component processes – interpreting the questions, retrieving relevant information

from memory, integrating that information into a judgement, and reporting the result. The key element of this process is thus the information retrieval: the degree of availability of an opinion is crucial in producing an answer. According to Fazio (1990) an attitude is a structure consisting of an attitude object, an evaluation, and the link between them. A key property of an attitude is the strength of an object-evaluation link, which determines the accessibility of an attitude: the stronger the link, the more likely that the evaluation will be activated (come to mind) when the object of the attitude is encountered. With highly accessible attitudes, the evaluation will come to mind automatically. If there are weak links between the object and evaluation, evaluation will be constructed on the spot based on information salient at the moment.

A widely used theory of this link was conceptualised by Zaller (1992). He designed the so-called *RAS (Receive-Accept-Sample)* model that describes how people receive new information, decide whether to accept it, and sample at the moment of answering questions. His concept highlights the role of the media in forging the link between latent attitudes and responses to survey questions. It is clear that individuals react differently to the same media message, and the level of political sophistication (knowledge of and interest in public affairs) may moderate its effects on individual's opinions. "Highly aware persons tend to be little affected by … campaigns. (…) Meanwhile, at the lower end of the awareness spectrum, those who pay little attention to politics tend to get little or no information about … politics, hence they are also relatively unaffected. That leaves the moderately aware most susceptible to influence: they pay enough attention to be exposed to the blandishments of the incumbent, but lack the resources to resist." (Zaller 1992: 19).

Moreover, the content of the information flow may affect the activation of attitudes. If media messages are one-sided, it signifies a political consensus on the issue. Therefore, there is no basis for rejection of the content on the grounds that it is incompatible with the value-system of a respondent. In such a situation, the contact with the media should be predictor of strength of attitude. It is the *mainstream effect*. On the other hand, if the information is mixed (several points of view are presented in adversarial manner), there is no political consensus on an issue. In such a situation, the level of political sophistication plays a role. Individuals with low interest in politics are usually not exposed to the information. People with high competence process information selectively, match the input with their pre-existing beliefs. However, the people in the middle of the scale of competence (not sophisticated, but reading or watching news) tend to be affected the most. This is the *polarisation effect*: in the case of evenly divided partisan elite

and a balanced flow of partisan communication, the effect of political awareness is to promote the polarization of attitude reports. The more balanced the information to which individuals are exposed, the less likely we are to find a media effect as opposite effects may cancel out. Polarization effect is possible in a cross-cutting media exposure, which means that people must be exposed to political perspectives that they do not find agreeable. It is the best overall description of the way in which citizens relate to the partisanship of their news sources outside of experimental settings (Goldman & Mutz 2011: 42). The opposite is the selective exposure: people expose themselves to like-minded media whenever possible. The latter type of exposure results in the "friendly media phenomenon" of citizens effectively selecting like media for contact.

Media presentation of an issue is frequently explained with the use of the concept of framing. Frames can be defined as patterns of interpretation through which information is classified in order to handle it efficiently, based on (but not identical with) cognitive schemata. "To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicative context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (Entman 1993: 52). Framing involves the contextualization of issues. "When people regard several considerations … as more important than others, this can have substantial implications for opinion formation. It follows that every framing effect is potentially a persuasion effect" (Matthes & Schemer 2012: 321). Frames contain axiological and psychological components. Media presentation elicits emotions by presenting reality in black-and-white terms, by naming and shaming and creating good and bad characters. Such a construction enables the reader/viewer/listener to easier fit the content into his or her own value structure. By contextualizing, media frames put certain aspects of the topic in the foreground and provide - in a positive, negative or neutral manner – an organizing principle to the structure of a news story and therefore potentially to citizens' understanding of and thinking about political, economic and social topics.

Internet as qualitative difference

Internet introduces a qualitatively different information ecosystem compared with traditional media. Dispersion of information sources makes users customize information content, unlike in the case of traditional media, where professional journalists establish the hierarchy of

importance of different items. Participation in this new model requires more activity from internet users and conveys on them the role of experts, a role hitherto reserved for professionals.

Internet offers almost unlimited access to information, but internet access is not a sufficient condition to be competent and well informed about policy and politics. Conscious information selection requires certain skills. In addition to digital divide understood as lack of internet access, there is a second level digital divide, which refers to the lack of skills of necessary for competent use of the IT, including the ability to perform information retrieval (Hargittai 2002). People possessing digital competence understand the way the web is operating, are able to more effectively obtain necessary information, while those unfamiliar with web and technology do not obtain the sought information, or stop at suggestions offered by search engines, which often turn out to be sponsored links (Hargittai 2008). The level of technological skills also translates into the extent to which the user is able to generate content, speak in discussions, and post materials on the web. This, in turn, strongly depends on the socio-economic location of internet users (Hargittai & Walejko 2008). It must be assumed that inequalities are to some extent replicated online. The ability to create content, participate in the discussion is available to everyone, but in practice, it is used by only a few, and the majority are recipients. Moreover, cognitive skills and education are necessary to select and organize information in a meaningful way.

The new information model is also associated with a weakening of mechanisms of controlling and verifying information that function in traditional media. Users are, therefore, more exposed to 'fake news'. Interactive media created by the internet community are more vulnerable to the possibility of manipulating the opinion of users, and the detection of falsehood is more complicated. Anonymity of senders means that everyone can generate information by assuming any identity. For example, an anonymous and seemingly impartial blogger can be a spin-doctor of a political group, opinions can be machine-generated by state or institutional actors, etc.

Empirical analysis

Structure of the analysis

The study was undertaken in a political context that has to be described for the findings to be interpreted. In 2015 parliamentary and presidential elections were held in Poland and, as a result, executive power was concentrated in the hands of one party, Law and Justice (PiS).

Parliamentary opposition was formed by: Civic Platform (PO), Modern Party (Nowoczesna) and Kukiz'15 movement, while the left-wing parties failed to enter parliament in 2015. The government of PiS broke the continuity of institutional development. PiS activities strengthened the degree of clientelism (party colonization of state enterprises) and undermined the rule of law (subordination of the legal branch to the executive)[2]. The position of Constitutional Tribunal and Supreme Court was compromised by a series of legislative acts that undermined their independence. As a result, the European Commission launched a procedure under Article 7 of Treaty on European Union against Poland. Moreover, state policy severely weakened mass media: a change of legal framework of public media was introduced and consequent takeover of state radio and TV ensued. In consequence, both Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders downgraded Poland in their rankings of press freedom. In Freedom of the Press 2017 Poland is no longer classified as "free", but "partly free". These actions strengthened political parallelism in the Polish media, with consumption and trust of particular news channels largely determined by political views. One of the project goals is to map this differentiation.

The analysis presented in this paper is based on the assumption that the structure of the information flow is a salient factor in determining political opinions. We assume that the friendly media phenomenon is manifested in creation of media ecosystems consistent with political preferences. The ecosystems consist of networks of outlets. We believe that ownership and control structures observable on the level of the outlets are reflected in the audience. For instance, public radio and television (supporting the government) are expected to have common consumers, while major commercial networks and print media are expected to occupy a different niche. We suppose that these divisions overlap with political preferences.

In the first stage, we map media usage with regard to political preferences of respondents. They indicated all media they used to collect information and selected the most important sources. They chose from a list that included all major national-level information media in Poland (TV, radio, newspapers, magazines and internet portals).

Secondly, we analyse correlations between the choices of important sources to verify the supposition that they are structured into ecosystems. We expect to find major clusters: 1. public media taken over by the party in government; 2. major private media; and, as a separate cluster, 3. most important online portals.

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[2] A concise account of post-electoral developments for a reader unfamiliar with Poland can be found in Kotnarowski & Wenzel (2017).

Thirdly, we probe in-depth to establish the degree to which the enumerated ecosystems reflect value system of respondents. We are also interested in opinions 'across the aisle", i.e. how the opposite ecosystems are perceived.

Findings

In the first step, we asked respondents to list their information sources (table 1). The use of various outlets is quite strongly related party preferences. We divided our respondents into four groups: The first consists of Law and Justice (PiS) voters. The second comprises electorates of Civic Platform (PO) and Modern Party (Nowoczesna), grouped together based on their attitudinal proximity. The third contains voters of parties other than PiS, PO and N and includes electorates of: Kukiz'15, Polish Peasant Party (PSL), Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD), Together (Razem) and Freedom (Wolność)[3]. The fourth group consists of the politically passive, i.e. the undecided and non-voters.

As far as the most commonly mentioned sources of information are concerned, the biggest differences can be seen between the use of TVP and TVN[4]. On the other hand, no statistically significant differences between the electorates can be noticed in case of FB and Polsat.

In the hierarchy of information sources, the PiS electorate is clearly dominated by TVP (three of the four most-chosen sources are the programs of this broadcaster). They watch Polsat more often than TVN. PiS voters are less likely to use Onet and wp.pl, as well as Gazeta Wyborcza. They read for Super Express slightly more often than others, listen to the news of Polish Radio, read Gazeta Polska, Nasz Dziennik, wSieci and Do Rzeczy, watch TV Trwam and TV Republika, listen to Radio Maryja and use the "Niezależna.pl" portal. In short – they consistently prefer right-wing media.

PO and N voters, in turn, have a strong preference for TVN. They listen more often than other voters to RMF FM, Radio Zet and radio TOK FM, read Gazeta Wyborcza and Polityka and use Onet. They watch TVP much less often than others and rarely listen to information on Polish Radio.

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[3] This procedure is suboptimal but inevitable. This is a very heterogeneous group guided by different values and identity. They were grouped together due to small numbers of respondents making more detailed statistical analysis impossible.
[4] Please see the Appendix for a description of news outlets.

Table 1. Use of news programs

Use of news programs. Percentage of respondents who use news programs of a given outlet at least once a week					
	Total	Electorate			
		PiS	PO/N	Other	Undecided/non-voters
Facebook	75.4%	72.0%	78.9%	76.9%	73.3%
TVN	66.7%	51.4%	88.3%	63.4%	64.5%
Polsat	62.0%	61.0%	66.8%	64.0%	56.6%
TVN24	53.9%	39.4%	74.9%	52.6%	49.6%
TVP1	51.3%	77.0%	36.8%	41.1%	54.3%
RMF FM	49.8%	46.8%	58.3%	44.4%	51.2%
Onet.pl	49.5%	44.0%	57.4%	51.0%	46.1%
TVP Info	47.1%	70.0%	36.3%	44.9%	39.9%
wp.pl	46.5%	39.4%	49.8%	52.8%	42.2%
Radio Zet	43.6%	41.3%	52.2%	38.0%	44.6%
Polsat News	41.7%	35.8%	50.2%	44.4%	36.0%
TVP2	41.4%	63.6%	25.4%	38.9%	39.4%
naTemat.pl	28.3%	18.3%	16.6%	13.9%	10.9%
Fakt	27.8%	26.1%	30.5%	29.4%	25.2%
Gazeta Wyborcza	27.5%	18.4%	34.5%	31.7%	23.9%
PR I	25.1%	33.5%	23.3%	25.4%	19.4%
Super Express	23.8%	29.4%	15.2%	24.8%	25.6%
Newsweek	20.6%	18.8%	24.2%	19.9%	19.7%
TOK FM	19.5%	10.6%	34.5%	19.9%	14.0%
Polityka	18.4%	17.9%	28.3%	16.8%	12.0%
PR III	17.9%	25.2%	14.3%	17.5%	15.1%
Superstacja	17.8%	18.4%	22.8%	16.8%	14.0%
Gazeta Polska	15.9%	24.3%	19.7%	9.6%	12.4%
Rzeczpospolita	15.5%	13.8%	17.5%	13.9%	17.4%
wPolityce.pl	15.3%	22.0%	19.6%	11.9%	10.1%
Niezależna.pl	14.7%	20.7%	9.0%	12.6%	10.8%
Gazeta.pl	13.2%	27.6%	31.4%	31.4%	22.5%
wSieci	12.8%	25.7%	10.3%	8.3%	9.7%
Nasz Dziennik	12.4%	22.5%	9.4%	8.9%	10.4%
Do Rzeczy	12.2%	15.6%	14.3%	11.6%	8.1%
TV Republika	11.3%	14.7%	6.7%	13.2%	10.1%
Telewizja Trwam	11.1%	23.9%	13.0%	3.3%	8.1%
Radio Maryja	6.9%	15.1%	3.6%	3.6%	7.0%

Unshaded cells: Chi-sq. test significant at p<0.05 or lower. Shaded cells: insignificant.
Source: own elaboration.

Citizens usually use many different media, not necessarily paying equal attention to them and with differing level of confidence. It is therefore necessary to specify which broadcasters are the basic source of information (table 2).

TVN programs (including TVN 24) were mentioned most commonly. Almost half use them as primary source of news. Polsat is the primary source for one third and TVP for around a quarter of respondents. Facebook is mentioned by over a quarter. Next in line are: RMF FM,

Radio Zet, as well as Onet and wp.pl. Gazeta Wyborcza is the most frequently mentioned print title.

The differentiation between electorates are distinct. For the majority of PiS voters, TVP is the basic source of news, and they relatively often indicate media such as TV Republika and Radio Maryja - these two broadcasters constitute the main source of knowledge about the world for a certain part of the PiS electorate. In general, the hierarchy of information sources is similar for PO / N voters, other parties and non-voters, while the PiS electorate lives in a different communication world. For example, TVP is only the sixth most important source of news for voters of parties other than Law and Justice. It is noteworthy that choosing Polsat as the source of information does not depend on political preferences.

Table 2. Most important sources of information

Most important sources of news. Up to three answers possible.					
	Total	Electorate			
		PiS	PO/N	Other	Undecided/non-voters
TVN, TVN24	48.6%	28.6%	68.6%	50.2%	46.3%
Polsat, Polsat News	34.2%	32.6%	41.3%	31.4%	32.9%
Facebook	27.9%	28.9%	22.9%	26.7%	32.9%
TVP	26.1%	54.6%	16.6%	17.5%	20.5%
RMF FM	23.5%	17.0%	20.5%	27.7%	26.7%
Radio Zet	15.6%	10.6%	17.5%	19.2%	14.0%
Onet.pl	12.2%	7.8%	11.7%	14.5%	13.6%
wp.pl	10.0%	4.6%	11.2%	10.9%	12.4%
Gazeta Wyborcza	8.5%	6.0%	14.7%	9.3%	4.2%
Polskie Radio (PR)	6.5%	15.1%	1.8%	6.6%	3.1%
Super Express	6.1%	7.8%	0.9%	5.0%	10.5%
Gazeta.pl	5.3%	1.4%	6.7%	7.6%	4.7%
Fakt	4.7%	5.5%	1.3%	6.9%	4.2%
Superstacja	3.6%	1.8%	4.0%	5.3%	2.7%
Newsweek	3.3%	2.3%	6.3%	2.0%	3.1%
TV Republika	3.2%	12.4%	0.0%	1.3%	0.4%
Radio Maryja	2.7%	11.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%
Gazeta Polska	2.5%	4.6%	1.3%	2.0%	2.3%
Niezależna.pl	2.3%	4.6%	0.0%	3.3%	1.2%
Telewizja Trwam	2.1%	5.5%	1.3%	1.0%	1.2%
Rzeczpospolita	2.0%	0.9%	3.6%	1.7%	1.9%
Polityka	1.8%	0.5%	3.6%	1.3%	1.9%
TOK FM	1.7%	0.0%	2.7%	1.7%	2.3%
wPolityce.pl	1.1%	2.8%	0.0%	0.7%	1.2%
wSieci	0.9%	3.2%	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%
Do Rzeczy	0.9%	0.9%	0.4%	1.7%	0.4%
Nasz Dziennik	0.7%	1.8%	0.4%	0.0%	0.8%
naTemat.pl	0.5%	1.4%	0.4%	0.0%	0.4%

Unshaded cells: Chi-sq. test significant at p<0.05 or lower. Shaded cells: insignificant.
Source: own elaboration.

Table 3 shows the relationship between the choices of individual media as key sources of information. TVP viewers are clearly unlikely to follow the TVN coverage, and vice versa. They relatively rarely use the main private radio stations, tabloids, major internet portals, as well as such titles as Gazeta Wyborcza, Polityka and Newsweek. However, they tend to listen to news broadcasts of Polish Radio and watch TV Republika.

The TVN audience is, to some extent, the reverse of TVP viewers. They do not tend to watch TVP, TV Trwam, TV Republika and Polish Radio and Radio Maryja, as well as such titles as: Nasz Dziennik, Gazeta Polska, Fakt, wSieci and Do Rzeczy, as well as portals: Gazeta.pl and Niezależna.pl and FB. They often read the Newsweek weekly.

Citizens who watch information on Polsat tend not to listen to news on the radio and on major portals such as Onet and Gazeta.pl. They also do not use TV Trwam and TV Republika. They read Fakt and Gazeta Wyborcza relatively often.

Viewers of TV Trwam are often also people who receive news from TV Republika, Radio Maryja, Nasz Dziennik, wSieci and Gazeta Polska. Interestingly, there are relatively weak relationships between the use of information provided by various media within certain capital groups. The same groups do not use TOK FM, Gazeta Wyborcza and Gazeta.pl, belonging to Agora. No correlations were found. Similarly, there is not a correlation between the portal wPolityce and the weekly wSieci, perhaps due to low number of users. On the other hand, there are strong relationships in the use of Gazeta Polska, TV Republika and the Niezależna.pl portal, as well as Radio Maryja, TV Trwam and Nasz Dziennik. These are media with a strong identity profile, which limits the group of users, but cumulates the use of these media.

Table 3. Correlation between use of different information sources

	TVP	TVN	Polsat	Trwam	TV Republika	Superstacja	PR	RMF FM	Radio Zet	Maryja	TOK FM	GW	Rz	ND	GP	Fakt	SE	Polityka	wSieci	Do Rzeczy	Newsweek	Gazeta.pl	Onet.pl	wp.pl	wPolityce	Niezależna	Na Temat	FB
TVP	X																											
TVN	-.22**	X																										
Polsat		-.22**	X																									
Trwam		-.10**		X																								
TV Republika	.07*	-.14**	-.13**	.12**	X																							
Superst.	-.08*				-.08*	X																						
PR	.20**	-.16**	-.08**	-.07*	-.08**	-.09**	X																					
RMF FM	-.07*	-.07*	-.20**	-.07*	-.20**	-.09**	-.09**	X																				
Radio Zet	-.12**	-.06*	-.17**		-.08**		-.09**	.21**	X																			
Maryja		-.16**	-.08**	.32**	.41**		.07*	.07*	.21**	X																		
TOK FM	-.07*	-.16**	-.08**		.07*			-.09**	.07*		X																	
GW	-.16**	-.06*	-.08**				-.12**	-.09**	-.12**			X																
Rz		-.07*	.06*		.18**				-.07*		.11**		X															
ND				.29**	.11**					.31**			.11**	X														
GP	-.08*	-.12**	-.09**	.10**	.11**		-.07*	-.07*	-.06*	.31**		.07*	.11**		X													
Fakt		-.10**	.09**				-.06*	-.09**				.26**				X												
SE	-.10**	-.10**					-.06*	-.09**									X											
Polityka		-.09**											.18**		.07*			X										
wSieci	-.06*		-.06*	.18**				.06*		.20**		.06*							X									
DoRzeczy		-.06*	-.07*					-.07*											.20**	X								
Newsweek	-.08**	.06*	-.07*			.14**						.06*			.17**			.10**			X							
Gazeta.pl	-.11**	.06*	-.09**				-.06*										-.06*					X						
Onet.pl	-.09**	-.09**	-.08**		-.06*			-.12**		-.06*		-.08**											X					
wp.pl	-.08*		-.09**																					X				
wPolityce																									X			
Niezależna		-.10**	-.08**																	.17**						X		
naTemat																											X	
FB	-.17**	-.17**	-.10**	-.08**	-.08**					-.06*		-.12**		-.07*		-.06*	-.10**	-.06*				-.08**	-.09**	-.08*				X

*Significant at p<0.05; ** Significant at p<0.01. Negative correlations were shaded.

Differences in information source preferences are confirmed by evaluation of reliability of different media categories (table 4). Public media are a clear point of reference, as they are owned, controlled and regulated by the state, whose institutions are under control of a single political party. In case of the private media, the question measured generalized views on their model of operation in comparison to public media.

Private media generally have better ratings than public ones. A significantly larger group of respondents (a difference of 10 percentage points) believes that they present information reliably and truthfully. An even greater difference is recorded when asking about the value system represented by them. Most adults think that public media are not guided by values such as the theirs.

There are noticeable differences between the electorates in the assessments of the two media categories. PiS voters are mostly positive about public media, whereas PO and N electorates usually express negative opinions, while others are located between these two groups. As regards private media, PiS voters are negative, while the majority of others - regardless of party preferences - express a positive opinion.

Table 4. Reliability and value orientation of public and private media

Do most … media	Total	Electorates (percentage of affirmative responses)			
		PiS	PO/N	Other	Undecided/non-voters
a. public					
- give reliable and true information;	54.9%	76.6%	37.7%	52.5%	54.1%
- act on values similar to yours	44.0%	60.6%	30.0%	40.9%	45.7%
b. private					
- give reliable and true information;	64.7%	44.0%	77.7%	67.9%	67.2%
- act on values similar to yours	59.6%	39.4%	78.9%	58.3%	61.2%

Chi-sq. test significant at $p < 0.001$ for all four pairs of variables.
Source: own elaboration.

The majority of respondents are of the opinion that public media support the government (table 5). When it comes to private broadcasters, opinions are divided.

In assessing public media, PiS voters are different from other citizens. Most voters of other parties and non-voters believe these media to be supportive of the government, while PiS voters are divided in their opinions.

When assessing private media, the PiS voters are also clearly different from the others - most of them think that they favour the opposition. PO / N voters and the undecided / non-voters usually attribute impartiality to them.

Table 5. Perceived media attitude to government and opposition

	Total	Electorates (percentage of affirmative responses)			
Do most … media		PiS	PO/N	Other	Undecided/non-voters
a. public					
support the government	61.1%	34.4%	77.9%	67.3%	62.0%
support the opposition	13.3%	20.6%	6.8%	19.8%	4.7%
are impartial	25.7%	45.0%	15.3%	12.9%	33.3%
b. private					
support the government	14.6%	11.4%	8.1%	14.9%	22.5%
support the opposition	43.5%	75.8%	28.7%	48.8%	22.9%
are impartial	41.9%	12.8%	63.2%	36.3%	54.7%

Chi-sq. test significant at p<0.001 for both pairs of variables.
Source: own elaboration.

Conclusion

Summarizing the results, as far as sources of information are concerned, Facebook is the medium most commonly used for acquiring information, and treated as an independent source of knowledge. Respondents often do not quite know which specific sources of information they are using there. Of the main television stations, TVN is used more intensively than Polsat and TVP. Of the strictly informational channels - TVN24 has more regular users than TVP Info and Polsat News. RMF FM stands out among radio stations. The most popular press daily print news outlets are Gazeta Wyborcza and Fakt.

The use of various sources of information is strongly related to party preferences. The end points of the continuum are marked by, on one side, PO and N voters and, on the other side, by the PiS. Voters of the other parties and non-voters are located in the middle. In the hierarchy of information sources, the PiS electorate clearly prefers TVP. Relative to others, they frequently read Super Express, listen to the news on the Polish Radio, read Gazeta Polska, Nasz Dziennik, wSieci and Do Rzeczy, watch TV Trwam and TV Republika, listen to Radio Maryja and use the "Niezależna.pl" portal. PO and N voters, in turn, use TVN in the first place. They listen more often than others to RMF FM, Radio Zet and radio TOK FM, read Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita, Newsweek and Polityka and use Onet. These differences between electorates are

confirmed by generalized attitudes to public and private media. PiS voters, unlike other people, value public media (currently under control of 'their' party) and distrust privately-owned sources. A separate position is occupied by Polsat, selected irrespectively of political views.

Finally, let us refer back to the broad questions guiding our analysis. We expected that friendly media create ecosystems operating on two levels: media linked by ownership/control structures have separate audiences united by political preferences. We expected to find major clusters consisting of public media, major private and, as a separate cluster, online portals. We believe our hypotheses to be largely confirmed. There is a clear difference in media consumption and evaluation between the governing party electorate (PiS) and everyone else. It appears that the state-controlled media are trusted primarily by PiS voters, while others identify more strongly with and trust major private broadcasters.

A separate phenomenon is the strong position of social media aggregators (here exemplified by FB). Its use as primary source of information is negatively correlated with using news programs of both TVP and TVN, the centres of the two information ecosystems. It is therefore plausible to suppose that users of FB as information source are a separate, depoliticized category. Since FB acts as aggregator, naming it as primary source indicates limited competence in identifying and verifying information. Such incompetence can be treated as a manifestation of digital divide of the 2nd level, i.e. lack of competence necessary to navigate the web safely and competently.

Appendix: Data source and brief description of media outlets

Data source

The analysis uses a survey containing a series of questions about media consumption and evaluation of outlets. The survey was conducted on a sample a representative for the citizens of Poland. It was fielded with CAWI methodology. Post-stratification weighting was used taking into account: age, gender, region, size of locality and education. The survey was conducted by PBS, a reliable research institute. The number of cases was 1005. Fieldwork was performed in 18-25 May 2017.

Media outlets

Outlet	Description
Do Rzeczy	Weekly newsmagazine, right wing
Facebook	Social media news aggragator
Fakt	Tabloid daily newspaper
Gazeta Polska	Weekly neewspaper with a daily mutation, right-wing
Gazeta Wyborcza	Daily neewspaper, left-liberal
Gazeta.pl	Major news portal
Nasz Dziennik	Daily newspaper, right-wing
naTemat.pl	Niche news portal, left-liberal
Newsweek	Weekly newsmagazine, liberal
Niezależna.pl	Niche news portal, right-wing
Onet.pl	Major news portal
Polityka	Weekly newsmagazine, liberal
Polsat	Major private TV station
Polsat News	News channel of major private TV station
PR 1	Public (state) radio station 1
PR III	Public (state) radio station 3
Radio Maryja	Radio station, conservative Catholic
Radio Zet	Major private radio station
RMF FM	Major private radio station
Rzeczpospolita	Daily newspaper, centre-right
Super Express	Daily tabloid
Superstacja	Minor private TV station
Telewizja Trwam	TV station, conservative Catholic
TOK FM	Talk radio station, left-liberal
TV Republika	Minor private TV station, right-wing
TVN	Major private TV station
TVN24	News channel of major private TV station
TVP Info	News channel of public (state) TV
TVP1	Public (state) TV, channel 1
TVP2	Public (state) TV, channel 2
wp.pl	Major news portal
wPolityce.pl	Niche news portal, right-wing
wSieci	Weekly newsmagazine, right wing

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The Private Side of a New Security Identity

in French Cities

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Abstract:

Focusing on the joint analysis of security trends and the organization of the private security market in France, this article addresses the new relationships between different security players and modern citizenship and society within the framework of metropolization. Despite the construction of an extended sovereign power, especially after the Second World War, the governments started to cooperate in the 1990s with other partners and to vary the levels of decision making in terms of security policies. Experts from private security companies or local councillors are new operators in the so-called "security co-production". An analysis at the metropolis scale seems important in order to understand the issues related to security for two reasons: firstly, because of the particular pressure connected to the recent terrorist attacks than can affect the "identity" of the city; secondly, because "incivility" – constructed as a major political problem since the 1990s – is linked to social structures of local territories within a wider one, with differentiated means for the people who live in the metropolitan center of social framework. The social representations of order and social control are still based on the relationships between private property, transports and public (access) spaces. The new security identity of cities depends on the relationships between local policies and the socio-economic reality of citizens, including private security guards, whose life conditions are an expression of the paradoxes of modern life.

Key words:

private security, professionalization, metropolis, social control

Introduction

"Law and order issues in metropolitan areas have become a worrying phenomenon, and can have serious repercussions on social cohesion and balanced development. Paradoxically, the

assets and demographic features of metropolitan areas make them particularly vulnerable to certain types of risk. On the one hand, the way they operate as a system can be weakened by any attack related–however marginally–to law and order issues on one of their vital components. On the other, metropolitan features encourage flows of people and goods that are conducive to illegal activities linked to national or international criminal networks. They can facilitate the establishment of activist groups by offering anonymity, logistical support and a recruitment base. The nerve centers of metropolitan areas are a particular target for new forms of terrorism. These trends are worrying in the current international political situation." [1]

More than one decade ago, the European Economic and Social Committee identified few major security issues in metropolitan areas, pointing out the relation between their distinctive features and the risks involved. Since 2015, along with other European countries[2], France has been hit by major deadly Islamist terror attacks, especially the ones in Paris on November 13, 2015 (130 dead and 413 injured), and Nice on July 14, 2016 (86 dead and 458 wounded). The latest large-scale attack dated back to two decades ago. In common representations, the identities of major French cities now seem associated with the terrorist risk, which can have significant negative consequences on socio-economic and symbolic levels. These tragic events create an exceptional political situation: the state of emergency, declared on the night of 13 to 14 November 2015, has been extended several times and remains in force at the time of writing. However, it should be noted that the previous state of emergency was not related to Islamist attacks, but lasted nearly two months (from November 21, 2005 to January 6, 2006) when riots broke out in the suburbs of some major French towns. These outbursts were a response to the death of two teenagers, the cause of which was attributed to police officers who, after being questioned, were finally released.[3] This episode has been an opportunity to see the discrepancies between different urban groups.

These two types of situations are at the heart of the current issues with French security policies. This also follows three decades of construction of "security" as an issue at the forefront of the political and media agendas (Bonelli 2008; Mucchielli 2014). In a paper published in 2001, the political specialist and criminologist Sebastian Roché championed "security

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[1] Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on 'European Metropolitan Areas: socio-economic implications for Europe's future' (2004/C 302/20).
[2] For example, Brussels bombings on March 22, 2016 or the Manchester bombing on May 22, 2017.
[3] The lawyers of the victims' families announced their intention to appeal to the Supreme Court.

metropolitanization", according to the rise of communities in public decision making and commodification of the security sector. Indeed, at the local political level, mayors saw an increase in legitimacy in the management of safety in the mid-1990s. It resulted in forms of partnerships with uncertain effects in the consequences of co-production and complex reasons, including the conflicts between managers and ground logics (Ferret & Mouhanna 2005). Sebastian Roché, however, remained pessimistic about seeing the "head of an urban area" ("chef d'agglomération") become the "true coordinator of local actions of security", particularly because of the weight of political and police corporations and the risk of inequalities between municipalities. Fifteen years later, even though the mayor had since then become in charge of prevention policy (2007), the facts proved him right. But his words, like many political analysts working on private security, suffer from a too functionalist-centric approach, even if a recent collective analysis made the effort to confront elements of public policy and empirical sociology (Bonnet, De Maillard, & Roché 2015).

The economic interests of metropolitan centers and the practices of many players also explain why cities do not produce a continuous and consistent security, in a modern form of social control mechanisms of integration comparable to that of the "Community". For example, the 'metropolitan network' ('toile métropolitaine') (Halbert 2010) is characterized by a "movement of dissociation of housing, jobs and places of consumption, leisure, training" (Morel 2014). This situation produces safety constraints and partially influences the work of professionals.

The reflection in this article is at the intersection of political sociology and the sociology of work. It deals with certain forms of contemporary security issues in cities. It aims to understand what the new safety devices reveal about the identity of cities today, and to grasp the new issues for their inhabitants. This reflection extends the results of a research that was focused on the construction of private security sector and the journey and experiences of individuals working in this sector of activity. These works show in particular how private security is based on flexibility and social insecurity for individuals, and what are the additional social functions of private security agents (Bauvet 2015).

As a first step, I will present the evolution of security production in France, and more specifically the advent of private security in a country where security often appears as part of the 'regalian' duties (Bonnet, De Maillard, & Roché 2015). Secondly, I will define specific security

social issues for metropolies as institutional and political structures (Pyka 2011), which will allow to question joint developments in citizenship and metropolitan identity through the prism of the new security relationships.

Evolution of the design and production of security in France

I will begin by sketching a general historical framework of the evolution of security production in France. It is possible to identify several key processes. They correspond to three general models of protection development, which are not strictly linked in their chronology.

Originally, on the one hand, when cities were not as politically important as they are today, the protection model was feudal and seigniorial. It was based on private ownership military means (regular and mercenary troops). Urban security, on the other hand, was provided both by a kind of "City police" and a set of small trades of surveillance without coercive powers. Overall, security missions were shared between public and private sectors (Robert 1999), depending on the nature of the controlled object (urban security or tax collection).

Since the modern period, the sociologists and historians have shown a process of state-building through the monopolization of legitimate violence. This well-known process has been theorized by Max Weber (1959) and shown by Norbert Elias (1969) to be valid in the French case until the end of the Modern period: the Lords related to Kingdom-State did not have personal armies but were dependent on the King's soldiers. Some troops were sometimes bigger than the city police. However, it is only after the Second World War that the state police truly started dominating daily security (Le Goff 2005), namely with the nationalization of many municipal police forces. The latter would find some strength from the 1980s, in parallel to an improvement in the training of the national police.

The last identifiable model is that of the co-production of security (Ocqueteau 1997). It is inherited from the theories of security experts, especially in the United States, where the aim of co-production security is supposed to be at the crossroads between public authorities, private security and citizens. In France, since the mid-1990s, the state has retained the most important security missions but created other entities (communities, institutions and businesses) for day-to-day security missions. It should be noted that since the 1980s, in parallel, insurance companies have also insisted that their corporate customers invest more in security (Lemaître 1995). Thus, while there were 235,000 members of the public security forces in France by 2015–about

140,000 police officers and 95,000 gendarmes[4] (IGF & IGA 2017), the staff of private security agents amounted to about 160,000 people, with a near-constant increase in volume since the beginning of the 1980s (OMPS 2016). In comparison, according to the Ministry of the Interior, municipal police officers are only about 21,000[5], assisted by 7,000 monitoring street police officers ('agent de surveillance de la voie publique').

Since France has entered a process of decentralization (that started in the 1980s), the model of 'co-production' of French security has changed.

Firstly, the 1983 Act regulating the activities of private security was a great first step, but an ambiguous one: it marked both the 'recognition' of the sector, but also its 'probation' (because many small businesses had been created since the 1970s, without regulation, giving rise to multiple abusive and unlawful situations, especially to the detriment of the employees).

Then, the 1995 law orientation and programming for safety, and two years later, the Villepinte Symposium (Ministère de l'Intérieur 1997) marked a fully assumed political and legal inflection to a logic of "co-production". It is notable that the use of private security expertise is increasing, particularly at the local level, through local security contracts ('Contrats Locaux de Sécurité' – CLS): this type of contract between various public and private operators determines a security policy in a particular territory. In addition, the signature of a CLS is subject to a "local safety diagnosis", which involves private upstream expertise (Bonelli 2008).

From 2001, and the so-called 'daily security law' (Loi de Sécurité Quotidienne – LSQ), links with companies monitoring and controlling the 'production of security' were reinforced, including their integration into the Vigipirate plan (the French national security alert system) and granting some additional rights for private security officers.

Finally, the 2010s marked the beginning of the "privatization of the regulation of private security" (Ocqueteau & Warfman 2011: 122), through the creation of a public administrative institution responsible for accreditation and control: the Council of Private Security Professions ('Conseil national des activités privées de sécurité' – CNAPS). This joint administration, which still gives the majority of seats to representatives of the State, is funded through a tax paid by security companies. At the same time, new professional unions are emerging (for example,

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[4] This corps is a branch of the military, operating in rural and semi-rural areas.
[5] https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/datasets/police-municipale-effectifs-par-commune/. The most important numbers are in Marseille (402), Nice (378), Lyon (330), Toulouse (233) and Cannes (197).

Syndicat du conseil en sûreté in 2010, or Fédération française des acteurs de formation en sécurité in 2012).

On a local level, the development of the scope of intervention of mayors, through local security contracts, has given new orientations in programs of security policies based on a politically neutralized production and a presence of a 'strategist' (Le Goff 2002). It also revived the pragmatic 'neutralizing' effects of presentation of the field of expertise. Tanguy Le Goff shows that mayors who have an original role of "guarantor of the peace [...] seize insecurity to strengthen their hold on their constituencies by their policies and their speech" (Le Goff 2005: 416). Mayors are gradually recognized as partners of the state in its struggle against insecurity in all aspects of crime prevention, and gradually rely not only on municipal police, but also on new professionals responsible for surveillance of public space missions: local social mediation agents, urban mediators or even night correspondents.

The CLS policy was based on 'citizenship' (the access to which would be promoted through instances of socialization, such as family, school and society), and 'proximity', to "guide the police based on the–too long neglected–concerns of the people, so as to better coordinate social and criminal dimensions and not to cancel one another" (Roché 2005: 9). The next actions being based on social prevention, operations are clearly developing within a paradigm of situational prevention: stemming from American Criminology of the 1970s-1980s, this approach aims to organize space and security devices with the idea that the offender is a rational actor who acts opportunistically (Benbouzid 2010; Bonnet 2012). This approach would be used in managing local public space of French big cities from the middle of the 1990s on.

The book *Peur sur les villes* ('Fear in the Cities') co-written by Jérôme Ferret and Christian Mouhanna (2005) juxtaposes the analyses of different local safety devices in an attempt to answer the question of the advent of a 'punitive populism', defined initially as a psychological phenomenon, as a discourse deriving from 'common sense', a-ideological, marked by the figure of the victim, and at the root of a crisis of traditional mediations. It is aligned with the transformation of the state. The authors analyze the 'safe interventionism of mayors' as one of the reasons of a "competitive co-production of local public order". They show converging procedures that form local actors despite a "real or perceived insecurity [that] is not of the same nature from one site to the other". They stress that cooperation as an aspect of 'security' is not the new dominating topic (Ferret & Mouhanna 2005). The authors do not extend this observation

to homogenization in other instances of security production. However the private security market, the management of employment and the organization of work appear also as a source of reflection on the homogenization of modes of security regulations in the broad sense.

As part of a large 'contractualization movement', the register of the 'council and engineering' is thus at the heart of the positioning of private security market expertise (Sina 2005), spreading social prevention supported by educational associations, mediator businesses, etc. There is a double cost: 'diagnostic' (in the case of CLS especially) and evaluative, supported by an inflation of public policy assessment mechanisms leading to their commoditization (Barbier 2010). It is quite logical that security experts, shaped the empirical results of the use of devices designed to combat crime and insecurity, used local data to show the viability of the new security 'solutions', as it can be observed in some events with different partners of private security: for example, trade shows are an opportunity to see local actors articulate 'requests' at a national level and 'local problems', the first of which is the 'sense of insecurity' of communities. Thus one speaks as much of 'urban shortcomings' (which involve questions of cleanliness or lighting) as of 'social solutions' to reinforce citizen protection.[6]

This legitimization by the local level, which gives the opportunity to security experts to mobilize their 'de facto skills' and get economic remuneration, is never without risk since the local political power itself can be subjected to citizen criticism of the management of safety devices, coming sometimes from local elected officials, in a reference to the responsibilities of the State and its sovereign missions.

Regarding labor, private security experts frequently emphasize the 'moralization' and 'sanitation' of the sector (Bauvet 2015), and since 2000 have tried to legitimize their position of security 'co-producer'. A series of measures of workers' 'professionalizing' have been implemented:

– 2006: implementation of a grid 'business leader', i.e. the definition of 17 specific "professions" within the private security;

– 2009-2010: diploma became mandatory for recruitment, a professional certificate ('Certificat de Qualification Professionnelle' – CQP) as professional 'prevention and security officer'. Each agent must also be in possession of a professional card;

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[6] Richard Olszewski, councilor and supervisor of video surveillance department in Lille, Public statement at Expoprotection, security trade show, Villepinte, November 5, 2008.

– 2013: the duration of the CQP training went from 70 to 140 hours (many professionals judging the initial training too short and evaluation procedures as too easy).

This legal-political structuring of private security in France can give an impression of rationalized new forms of safety production, contrasting with some elements of its implementation. Before further analysis of this contradiction, I will present some general data about the policing performed by the private sector.

The reports of the professional branch of private security[7] establish that private security officers are employed by more than 10,000 companies, of which two-thirds are in fact self-employed individuals. There is a great contrast between the multinational companies that dominate the market and many small businesses struggling to survive, mainly because the market is highly competitive, with public contracts representing around 25% of the overall turnover. The latter henceforth overtakes 6 billion euros, with an increase of 22% in ten years. It is notable that private security companies are known for illegal employment and labour practices (Hassid 2010), especially in undeclared work.[8]

With reference to the workers, more than a third are between 26 and 39 years old, with 9.5% aged less than 26 and 9.5% aged 55 and older. There are 86% of men and 14% of women, and the rate of the latter increases with the hierarchical rank, except in director positions, especially in large companies. The employment conditions of workers appear precarious. In 2012, the average salary was 1,489 euros, which is less than the services workers administrative category and barely higher than cleaning professions (1,367 euros) or jobs in the fast food industry (1,391 euros).[9] Since the beginning of the 2010s, fixed-term contracts represent the majority of new contracts: they amounted to 69% in 2014 and 74% in 2015. These rates must not hide the disparities among agents: if part of the agents are in a stable situation (20% of the agents have 11 years' seniority and more), the majority worked very temporarily, and are partially ignored by official statistics. These, at least, reported an annual turnover rate that has varied between 40% and 100% since 1998 (Bauvet 2015). Similarly, the daily geographic constraints of

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[7] Unless noted otherwise, statistics for this paragraph are taken from the last report of the professional branch of private security (OMPS 2016).
[8] Research interview with a health and safety inspector, Paris region, March 2011.
[9] http://dares.travail-emploi.gouv.fr/dares-etudes-et-statistiques/etudes-et-syntheses/dares-analyses-dares-indicateurs-dares-resultats/article/les-salaires-par-secteur-et-par-branche-professionnelle-en-2012.

private security agents' work appear to be characteristic of metropolitan life and patterns of inherent inequality.[10]

These dimensions of employment are indicative of the economic logic at work in cities: although these are territories characterized by capital accumulation, they also create significant inequalities among the population, and precarious conditions for some workers. Private employment in urban security does not escape this logic. In the third part, I will further analyze this issue, to show that the metropolitan identity and its security challenges influence the form of labor and employment in private security itself.

Metropolitan security and society

Generally speaking, cities now appear as the attractive place for the majority of the French population, and inevitably contribute to their experience and identity. Urban planning is historically marked by attention to safety. Some scholars argue that this is part of the 'visibility' culture linked to urban development, through policing jobs but also equipments, such as for example lighting (Marchal & Stébé 2011). The development of cities has led the recent approach to cross economic and security issues, as evidenced by the development of *surveillance studies* (Bardet & Purenne 2010), which take into account essential aspects of social control, including the collection of personal information on the population and the control of their mobility.

As regards security in the classical sense of the term, the cities are today affected by two major issues:

– First of all, 'incivility' (Roché 2002) has gradually taken an essential role on the political and media agenda since the 1980s. Expanding the definition of 'delinquency', this poorly defined term refers to a set of actions and behaviors (rudeness, small damage to public facilities and communal areas of buildings, occupation of public space, etc.). These would feed a sense of insecurity through the degradation of the environment in the broad sense (both material and social). Stereotypically, some media or politicians sometimes associate incivility to the figure of a young man with an immigrant background and living in the popular suburbs.

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[10] In INSEE surveys, security officers mostly live in a different Department their employer's compared with the employed population (approximately 20 points difference). Furthermore, the gap between the Île-de-France (the Paris region) and the rest of the country is important: in 2011, more than 65% of private security officers living in Île-de-France worked in a different Department than their employer's in France, while the rate is only 40% for metropolitan France. This phenomenon affects the employed population or employees in comparable proportions (Bauvet 2015).

– Islamist terrorism has been present since the mid-1990s, but became increasingly important in the collective representations only later: first with the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States and the Madrid (March 11, 2004) and London (July 7, 2005) bombings and more particularly in France since the 2015-2016 attacks.

During this period, in parallel with their legitimization in the political field, private security experts have brought these issues to the risk for businesses. One expert recalls that "a company is a creator of wealth, and therefore this wealth becomes a target, because this wealth interests everyone – it goes from the mafia to terrorist organizations, because we should not separate the two of them, often there are connections between them – and that, of course, wealth is a target for these organizations, by the profit they can get."[11] This expert links terrorism and mafia, and as the mafia is also based on petty crime, he hints at possible links between terrorism and crime. It presents a cross security risk for legal persons (companies) and, therefore, a risk to major cities. In practice, large companies, as major players in metropolitan centers, have largely reinforced their security for a decade by appealing to private security companies.

Besides the closed corporations, private security unfolds based on the issues of mobility and flows in different mixed spaces, and is part of the metropolitan security culture:

– Video surveillance is increasingly used on the public highway. From the early 2000s, many municipalities equipped themselves with cameras. For example, large metropolises have significantly invested in such devices. They are sometimes criticized for their potential intrusive and discriminatory effects, but may also be supported on behalf of their technical neutrality, especially when the implantation of these devices are validated by expertise committees from engineering, as is the case in Lyon (Benbouzid 2010). Indeed, the new expression 'vidéoprotection' (video protection) describing the features of video surveillance, promoted by mayors and private security experts, seems to justify the privatization in the name of public safety.

– In the new business districts located in disadvantaged areas (for example, the business center of Plaine Saint-Denis, in the Seine-Saint-Denis department), decision makers use security architecture and social mediation agents to ensure the tranquility of workers commuting from

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[11] Régis Poincelet, Security Director at GDF Suez and Vice President of the *Club des directeurs de sécurité des entreprises (CDSE)* (Enterprise Security Directors Club), Public statement at Expoprotection, security trade show, Villepinte, November 8, 2008. CDSE is one of the most important security specialists associations, with 114 companies, mostly French (Sécurité & Stratégie 2017).

other areas in the Paris region. As in other types of spaces (for example, public transport), public policy makers or private companies in charge of public service missions, resorted to new companies to ensure local peace (Bonnet, De Maillard, & Roché 2015). It should be noted that these new jobs are often precarious.

– In stores and malls (which are part of what the literature defines as 'mass private properties'), beside more and more surveillance cameras, private security agents provide security of public spaces on regular basis. They also ensure 'good conduct' of the local population (in major malls located in the suburban towns), so as to reassure the customers. This role is particularly interesting to explore the new metropolitan identity at the junction between the socio-political issues and the question of work implementation.

The new security identity of cities is based on similarities between the new security forces and more general characteristics of metropolitan features and population. While recruiting the public force, the process is based on a national logic recruitment (only French citizens may pretend to join police, and the competitive recruitment is done at national level), into private security it is linked with the socio-economic rules of the metropolis, at least for two reasons:

– Proximity between economic players: cities attract businesses to increase their economic and/or symbolic capital, and seek partners and providers to join forces. Businesses try to reconcile security and marketing, and want a customized security service. To that purpose, they can turn to private security companies which are essentially multinational companies (for example, Securitas or G4S) or many companies settled at a metropolitan or local level. This logic is felt regarding the distribution of agents or the establishment of company head offices: 35% of companies and 44.5% of employees were concentrated in the Île-de-France region in 2015, for a rate of 589 employees per 100,000 inhabitants (OMPS 2016). In work activity, looking for a match between these constraints is observable. For example, even Parisian uptown luxury store may greet customers originally from the working-class but economically successful. According to some private security agents, this entails adapting part of the host device, and first of all the sociological characteristics of security agents themselves.[12] More generally speaking, the sociology of work helps to show that sales and security recruitment is crucial in this adaptation. The "good profile" is one that fits the 'profitable visitor', i.e. who makes purchases, and some

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[12] Research interview with a private security officer, Paris, December 2014.

abuse or negative behavior towards staff (regardless of the social origin of the client) are 'absorbed' by employees, not only sales-persons, but also private security officers.

– Proximity between populations: the "metropolitan" population does not correspond to a 'national' population according to the Ministry of the Interior (2014), foreigners represented 4.67% of the total population in 2014, but there are strong differences between departments: the population of the Paris region has a lot more foreigners, with inner Paris (13.29%) or Seine-Saint-Denis (18,36%), a disadvantaged department located North of the capital, with a population essentially from former French colonies, in particular from Africa, but also 40% European Union (EU) citizens.[13] The mobility of EU citizen has been on the rise in recent years, in line with a metropolitanization process attracting foreign labor. Thus, the presence of many foreign security officers, especially immigrants of African origin, testifies to the post-colonial reality of globalization, and their mobility (place of residence and place of work) is spread across the metropolitan territory.

Two ideal-types among private security officers can be distinguished:
– On the one hand, a minority trained for careers in public safety (and more particularly former military personnel) may seek a job with a professional 'resemblance'. Some of them call to mind the earlier generations, nostalgic for the colonial order and/or aspiring to the exercise of authority (Ocqueteau & Warfman 2011). This minority may be supplemented by people seeking or aspiring to careers in public safety who couldn't integrate these professional bodies or are still preparing for the competition exams.

– On the other hand, a majority of individuals followed very different academic and/or professional courses and joined the sector "by default" or "by chance". These are the successors of workers changing their profession, students or pensioners who needed an extra income in the 1970s. Some workers are referred by Job Centre (initially directly to employers, and then through mandatory training at the end of the 2000s), others get a position through their friend or family networks. This is particularly true for African workers, for whom private security is an example of 'ethnic' hiring (such as cleaning services, some fields of the building trade, etc.), and a large number of small agencies are working from a network of informal recruitment (Gandaho

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[13] This data is based on the Census of legal residents, suggesting that the actual foreign population is slightly more numerous. It may also be noted that immigrants (people born outside France, regardless of past and current nationality) represented 8.7% of the population in 2012. 38% of them live in the urban area of Paris, where 17% of the non-immigrants live (https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2121524).

2010). Private security is among the professional categories with more immigrants: they hold 21.9% of those jobs (Jolly, Lane, & Breem 2012), alongside "racialized" French people.

It is not to imply that private security agents are incompetent; not only because security does not "naturally" belong to the public forces, but also because their involvement in employment is based on a strong sense of responsibility. It brings them to face the conditions of employment and precarious work in a dynamic of social relations including the use of interpersonal skills (Bauvet 2017). However, the observation of practices of principals (clients of private security companies) and the testimonies of agents regarding their relationships at work (namely their interactions with clients) show an attenuation of this security responsibility in representations of their functions. In reality, there is a preference to minimum of staff employment (that is, contractors who employ private security guards often stick to the minimum requirement of insurance companies). Conversely, they frequently expect security agents to perform tasks usually done by other workers (cleaning, storage, sales support, switchboard, customer intelligence). In the same way, store customers can easily turn to the private security agent for requests that have no connection with security. This complex process is testament to the transformation of cities' identities, marked by commoditization, with three criteria: the extension of a new market (private security), the search for productivity gains (new private security jobs absorb part of other jobs), and competition and/or the weakening of traditional groups of social control. These elements appear as concrete forms of what some authors refer to as cultural impact of the "market society" (Roustang 2009).

Conclusion

The current role of private security in France, as in many countries, can reflect the transformations of Nation-States and highlights the importance of metropolises in developments related to globalization. After becoming the principal place of concentration of political power, the city was logically put under the protection of police security to ensure "conservation of goods and people". However, metropolitan development, especially in terms of economic issues, must take into account three essential dimensions of "control": selecting individuals and goods in order to ensure a return of economic devices, the fluidity of their passages and their displacement, and mutual transparency of devices and individuals increasingly identified through their consumer identity (Gros 2012). Implantation of a private metropolitan-wide security might

seem to go in the direction of the event of a transfer of political community legitimacy in civil society. However, the current limits are reflected by the remaining obstacles in civic life. Indeed, the decision-making process is conditioned by traditional political mechanisms, and instances of participatory democracy reproducing the problems existing at the national level: weight in decision-making, lack of social representativeness of participants, lack of stimulation of participation (Lefebvre 2012). When social and political innovations come directly from civil society, it is difficult for them to enter the legitimate public landscape at the level of the metropolis, and networks remain essentially militant (culture of closeness, solidarity, etc.).

Private stakeholders at the metropolitan level security encounter similar difficulties: as things stand, regulation leaves a lot of power to principals, often at the expense of the conditions for security missions' realization; private security agents are presented as figures of future security, but actually they remain an atomized segment and can't find professional representation to rise to the challenges of their profession. They do not find the practical conditions of their legitimacy within the division of social work. They are sometimes viewed as illegitimate in society in general (partly due to their ethno-national origin) and are kept at distance from their own functions. The new security identity of cities is marked by socio-economic differentiation of players who are increasingly under security and commercial pressure. Accordingly, the new forms of policing need to provide for a more integrative dynamics from a social point of view.

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Value marketing as a Determinant of Forming a Political Offer in the Process of Communication between Politicians and Voters

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Abstract:

At the heart of the concept of value marketing is the evolution of its use. Starting with a mere information about the presence of a product on the market, through subsequently satisfying the needs of the buyer of the product or service, to finally reaching a full dialogue between the bidder (offerer) and the customer. This relationship is based, inter alia, on the common definition of the characteristics of the desired goods and their adjustment to the values indicated by the customers. Also, important values for the buyer of a political product should be similarly shaped in the marketing sense. Creating bonds, the partnership relations between the exchange parties on the political market is a mechanism that makes this process very effective. The article points to the "value" present in the political product and explains how it is created. It also analyses two key contexts of what "value" is, describes marketing and its core tools on the economic and political market. The author of the paper makes a hypothesis that "value" as the core of the political offer generated by the politician-voter relationship is of fundamental importance in political transactions and is at the same time a determinant of electoral decision.

Key words:

value, value marketing, provision of value, voter, politician, political offer, political market

The concept of value in the marketing process

The penetration of marketing mechanisms from the economic market to the political market is confirmed by a statement of Michał Jaśniok (2016) in his article on the concept of building system products on the local political market: "The growing awareness of market pressures draws the attention of politicians to theory and practice of political marketing that hopes to find ways to optimize decisions, including strategic decisions. However, a review of literature suggests that most of the research devoted to political processes is done by researchers

working in the field of humanities (especially in the fields of sociology, psychology and law) which popularizes such concepts as political scene, the actors of the political game. Relatively few research studies devoted to direct political marketing use the conceptual apparatus of management science to describe political processes. In particular, the issue of a specific type of political offer – the system products - allowing for a different, often improved, sometimes completely innovative way of satisfying the needs of different types of stakeholders operating on the political market - has not been recognized or described" (Jaśniok 2016: 26).

The cited quotation, referring to the problem, should be supplemented by invoking another significant statement by the author: The foundation for shaping the systemic offer of a political product, as is the case on other markets (Prahalad & Ramaswamy 2004: 36) are certain solutions in the marketing sphere characterized by a modified approach to customer (voter) value creation, its provision and communication (Jaśniok 2016: 36).

Penetration of marketing mechanisms applied in the business of the enterprise to the area of the political market can significantly enrich its instruments and tools, as their effectiveness has already been verified on the economic market. Significant determinants are also technological progress or innovation, which allow access of its subjects to practically unlimited financial resources. Unlike the political market, however, a continuous pursuit of profit results in the search for new ways to achieve it, and the need to frequently repeat the exchange transactions intensifies these efforts.

The common core of marketing design, in marketing on the economic and political market, which is the center of attention of the author of the article as well as quoted Jaśniok is "value" constituting one of the fundamental purchasing determinants. The buyer not only identifies with the product that is enriched with this value, but also with the product which is the result of the joint creation. The author of the article, however, emphasizes the understanding of "value" as a result of the bidder – receiver relation, whereas Jaśniok points to the "value" which is the feature of the offer made to the recipient. Hence, the nature of the discussion is bipolar. In the first context, the "value" comes directly from the concept of value marketing, while in the second, from the concept of the customer value management. Nevertheless, in political marketing, both these "values" can and should be complementary.

Marketing - search for analogies

Underlying the application of social marketing, including the political market, is the success that results from the efficient exchange of the product or service offered, into the value desired by a company. Social organizations, companies, and individual professionals similarly, in the process of soliciting the client, constantly apply methods, techniques and marketing instruments. The goal of the entrepreneur is financial gain, the policy of winning the electorate, the artist, in addition to financial gain seeks publicity and fame.

All these cases have a common feature and one common denominator of the actions being performed. This is the desire to create in the customer, in the nearer or more distant environment, the need to own the goods offered. In addition, the desired effect is the awareness of the customer's participation in the activities around which the offer is being formed. The bidders, at the same time, strive for a one-off sale and, optimally, consistently with the adopted marketing strategy, to its multiplication. Repetitiveness of transactions is usually the result of building a long-term relationship between the bidder and the client. Sales obviously depends not only on the relevance of marketing activities, but also on, among others, the characteristics of the product and the purchasing power of the buyer.

According to Jaśniok, "building of the long-term relationships with voters through the use of digital communication will make the groupings more open, and the most important element of social capital is loyalty of voters. Networks, not hierarchies, are becoming a key form of shaping the product offer on the transforming political market" (Mueller-Seitz 2012: 33). Confronted with the marketing objectives of relationships used on the economic market, and, as a result, also on the political market, the long-term relationships modify the behaviour of the bidders, while the effect of loyalty of the stakeholders is the goal of their actions. Jaśniok confirms the author's thought when writing about digital communication, whose origins and development should be sought on the economic market. It should be noted, however, that the technological innovations present on the market were most often based on state funds in the military sector, which, due to their importance and resulting consequences, should be treated separately and clearly marked in the formation of genotypes of technological solutions. Hence, apart from the economic market and the vast social market, there is a market of security and public order.

Formation of the product on the economic market is to satisfy, and often generate, the need of the customer for the provided product or service. It is to meet the customer's vital needs

of elementary importance or of other significance, including higher needs. The pursuit of an effective exchange transaction is determined by the buyer's characteristics, such as the financial resources, cultural attributes, environmental impact, and, of course, the impact of successful marketing activities. In political marketing, the identified purchasing determinants are almost analogous, with the exception of the financial determinant in the universal sense, which is of fundamental importance on the economic market. However, it must be stated that the financial determinant on the political market will be related not only to the buyer's purchasing power, but also to the financial gain resulting from the outcome of the political activities. The effect of creating a need for a product is a frequent reason for changing electoral preferences.

A client on the economic market and a voter on the political market is not just passive, under the influence. Occasionally he becomes an active part in the dialogue with the bidder. In many cases, using the communication technologies identified by Jaśniok, the client has the opportunity to exert influence himself by programming his or her actions to stimulate interest in their views or evaluations of the primary bidders. The customer/voter can also effectively review product offers, political offers, or, using his or her personal skills, create the offers on their own, and add features to the products that will distinguish them from others. This mechanism, which can be described as elements of marketing activities, does not need to be focused solely on gaining financial results. When backed up by effective marketing it can strive to meet other needs: aspirational, emotional, creative, or the need to be present in the political life or social environment. The need to create an offer leads to the dissemination of the values that the product is marked for.

The evolution of marketing on the economic and political market shows common features. At the heart of marketing on the economic market, there was a sense of confusion about the presence of a product on the market caused by the competition. Marketing 1.0 focused on providing the prospective customer with the widest possible information, exposing the features of the product that were supposed to mobilize the customer to acquire it. The primary purpose of political marketing was to inform voters of the political product. It described politicians and their grouping, in this way becoming a party in a "political game", and by creating a political program, the marketers also produced a political product. Its development was also determined by competition. Although for the first-time political marketing appeared in the presently known form in 1941, in 1952 in the presidential elections in the US, and in 1959 for the first time in the

United Kingdom in parliamentary elections, the political activities and alleged sales activities originated much earlier.

In historical terms, the presence of politics was recognized in antiquity, and in almost all geographic regions in which civilization developed. This phenomenon was most vividly described by the Greek philosophers: Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle. They showed the meaning and goals of politics through the prism of the state as a political organization of society. They also saw that politics was a commodity which the various social strata were fighting for (Muszyński 1999: 19). This statement is of fundamental importance for seeking economic and political market unions. Although they are not identical, analogies between them are historically justified. Following the philosophical reflection of the relationship between man and politics, it is necessary to recall the views of Plessner, who argued that politics transcends all interrelationships. "Politics takes place between a man and a woman, (...) the teacher and the student, (...) the artist and his principal and in any private relations, just like in the public sphere there are legal, economic, cultural, religious and social forms of policy along with the main state and political party policy". The political nature of man is thus an optimal ground for the functioning of the political market, where a political product is created based on the needs and values (Plessner 1994: 72). The political nature of a man who is, according to the opinions in question, the primary determinant of the purchase of a political product.

The political nature of a man has set a particularly important element of the political market and political market-related behaviour – the political leadership, which seems to be a historical factor in the significant influence on the development of civilization. Leszek Sobkowiak (2002: 20) defines political action as: "a form of political behaviour consisting of rational, targeted and arbitrary conduct of an entity fulfilling its needs, interests and values - under conditions of conformity and/or contradiction, cooperation and/or conflict with other entities – connected directly or indirectly with political authority". From the perspective of political marketing, leadership can be seen as a form of peculiar pressure on the processes of creating and functioning of the political market, including the final transaction of this market (Muszyński 2001: 169). The pursuit of political leadership is, in a sense, a phenomenon that triggers enormous decks of social activity.

On the political market, following the thought of Michał Jaśniok, under democratic conditions, the acquisition of power consists in gaining social acceptance by creating a specific

set of benefits for the voters. Under conditions of competition and pluralism, this process is carried out on the political market which we are talking about when four conditions are fulfilled simultaneously (Jaśniok 2016: 27):

    – there are at least two parties of exchange with unmet political needs,

    – there is will and means to meet these needs,

    – there is the possibility of dialogue between the parties,

    – there is exchange on offer.

Political leadership, unlike management on the economic market, is strictly personalized and is a clear feature of the product, often determining the effectiveness of the exchange for votes. On the economic market, personal identification is less significant for the buyer.

Evolution of marketing

During the improvement of the marketing process, the concept of understanding and satisfying the client's needs has emerged as it has been recognized that the repeatability of transactions is guaranteed not only by the attractiveness of the offer, but also by maintaining a constant relationship with the recipient. Recognizing the nature of the customer through marketing research has facilitated the professionalization, not only of the first element of the marketing mix chain which is the product itself, but also the adjustment of the right price, distribution method, the techniques of promotion and advertising as well. Marketing 2.0 was identified with the concept of satisfying needs, pioneered in the information age, where information technology began to play a key role. Consumers are well informed in this regard and can easily compare, for their own benefit, several similar offers. The value of the product is defined by them, and their preferences are very diverse. The marketer acted on the basis of a well-thought-out strategy, had to divide the market into segments and develop the best product that was targeted to a specific market. The strategic goal was to make a product that could successfully compete with other products and other bidders on the market (Widera & Sarna 2016: 21).

The recognition of customer's needs has become unequivocal to inspire the recipient of the formed bids, to actively participate in their emergence, and a constant dialogue with the manufacturer or service provider. As a result, this phenomenon has caused certain behaviour with bidders to be currently perceived as innovative.

So, what is the difference between the customer-oriented marketing 2.0 and the new approach resulting from the evolution, the 3.0 marketing? This marketing is referred to as a value in which the value jointly obtained by the bidder and the consumer is a particularly important determinant of the exchange transaction. The product in the marketing process, apart from emphasizing its elementary utility, has to satisfy the higher wishes and desires of the customer, serve the higher purpose of improving the world. In this context, in addition to making a profit as the cornerstone of any business, bidders become involved in solving social problems.

Marketing 3.0 empowered the consumer, recognized his/her aspirations, values and spirit. "Paradoxically, in times of crisis, marketing 3.0 was supposed to be a panacea for the neo-liberal concept of the world development in which the marketing tool causes violent change, economic, social and environmental turbulence" (Widera & Sarna 2016: 22). According to Philip Kotler, "marketing 3.0 provides the answer to the misery, and fills concerned people's hearts with hope, so that bidders are entering a higher level of communication with their customers" (2010: 17-18). By using Kotler's phrasing, political marketing should provide answers to "social insecurity and pour hope into the hearts of the concerned people, so that politicians and their groups can step up to a higher level of communication with their constituents".

"Marketing 3.0 launches the value-oriented era. There is no nameless consumer any more - there is a human being. A man who has his or her reason, heart and soul. An increasing number of these customers are trying to find a solution to their problems, striving to fulfill their dreams - looking for something that will make the world a better place for them. In a world where nothing is certain, they are looking for companies that in their mission, vision and the set of corporate values emphasize goals that meet the consumers' deepest desire for social, economic and environmental justice. They do not just expect that the product or service will meet their functional and emotional needs. They make a purchase expecting to fulfill their spiritual requirements" (Widera & Sarna 2016: 22).

When identifying with Kotler's views, marketing 3.0 must be perceived by approaching a potential and actual buyer as a human being, in full understanding of the word. The potential characteristics of such a consumer, above all as a human, are described by Stephen R. Covey, who specifies four elements:

1. The physical body;
2. The mind, being capable of forming an independent thought and making analysis;

3. The heart able to feel emotions;

4. The spirit - the soul understood as the philosophical center of being.

The mind, as a valid marketing term, appeared in the concept of the consumer mind, described in the book "Positioning" by Al Ries and Jack Trout (Shih 2012). In the next period, attention was paid to the emotional component of the human psyche, in connection with consumer's decisions. The special advantage of marketing 3.0 is the appearance of perceiving an important element defined as the "consumer spirit". It began with understanding his/her desires, inhibitions and fears. "Bidders of products and services were forced to treat their clients as wholesome human beings, consisting of mind, heart and spirit." (Kotler 2010: 52, 53).

Marketing 3.0 is illustrated by a triangle which consists of brand, positioning and distinction on the market. Kotler completed the 3.0 symbol with the symbol 3.i, i.e. brand identity, integrity and image, justifying it as follows: "In a world of horizontal relationships between consumers the brand does not matter if it is simply positioned. It can have a very clear identity in the minds of customers, though not necessarily a positive one. Positioning is just a branding statement made by the company, which only sharpens the vigilance of customers towards non-authentic products. In other words, the triangle is incomplete without a product distinction strategy. The distinction is ensured by the brand DNA that reflects its honesty. This is a solid proof that the brand delivers what it promises. This is primarily about ensuring the promised product performance and consumer satisfaction. Creating brand identity is about positioning a given brand in the minds of consumers. It should be unique so that the brand does not go unnoticed in the crowded market" (Widera & Pravdova 2016).

System products in marketing

In the context of perceiving the common characteristics of political marketing and economic marketing, how closely related are the 'system products on the local political market', researched and described by Michał Jaśniok, to the deliberations on the meaning of "value"? Jaśniok, basing his inference on the aforementioned term, writes: "Identifying and analyzing the key problems of marketing system products on the political market in the process of shaping the value for the electorate" (2010: 26). According to Leszek Żabiński (2013: 3), the "system products (products of knowledge, modern or technologically complex products) are a new generation of complex, multi-core products, including service products whose emergence in

highly developed, market-oriented economies has enabled a dynamic technological progress, particularily in the field of microelectronics and information technology".

Jaśniok presents the concept of designing system products through their values for voters and other types of stakeholders, taking into account the specificity of the environment in which they occur. When conducting a survey in closer environment, Jaśniok analyzes five local entities in which he saw the innovation in marketing strategy implementation processes that are based on the concept of system products. The research included the political groups that submitted the lists of candidates in municipal elections to such local authorities as: the district (Bieruńsko-lędziński), the town (Bieruń) and to districts on city rights (Dąbrowa Górnicza, Gliwice) in 2014. The main research method was the internal participant observation. In particular, there were: a constant penetration of the websites of the entities, the analysis of press articles, the analysis of the presentation of strategic assumptions (electoral, training and program materials) and announcements issued by individuals/councils/boards authorized to represent the entities outside (Jaśniok 2010: 26-27).

The close link to economic marketing manifests itself when there is, emphasized by the author, "awareness of the complexity of the composition of a political product (in the theoretical layer), which reveals the potential for strategic product choices in relation to product strategies, and the resulting consequences for the marketing strategy of the political entity". One of the options with significant strategic consequences is the decision to create systemic products by the political market entities. Under this concept we mean here an offer that includes not one but several products, satisfying the needs attributed to more than one level of needs (Żabiński 2013). Product systematism appears when the entities find it beneficial that the product is used extensively by other users with whom they interact (Szymura-Tyc 2012: 54). The foundations of this offer, as is the case on other markets (Prahalad & Ramaswamy 2004: 210), are specific solutions in the marketing sphere characterized by a modified approach to customer (voter) value creation and its delivery and communication. "In the process of planning and marketing products based on a system model it is necessary to make decisions that shape the political offer in three dimensions of perception simultaneously: cognitive, affective, and conative, in such a way that it satisfies the diverse needs of the voter in the most complete manner, also not directly related to politics" (Jaśniok 2010: 28).

The perception of system products on the political market should be complemented by

their essence in the marketing concept that emerges on the economic market. Leszek Żabiński puts it in the following way: "Nowadays, this new field of products is of great interest in contemporary marketing practice because:

1. A frequent, active involvement of consumers, suppliers and business intermediaries in the creation of a systemic product (the so-called open innovation model) requires a change of traditional, one-way market orientation of the company to the target customer for a new, multidimensional orientation to the company stakeholders and their knowledge;

2. Market offers of system products become a new, more effective and efficient basis/base for competition and co-operation between businesses, quite often supported by state efforts to increase the attractiveness and competitiveness of the whole economy (at the international level) and to modernise consumption structures;

3. In general, the innovative nature of system products and the active participation of consumers and other stakeholders in the enterprise (its employees, distributors, local communities) in the creation and delivery of multiple values for the customers requires other than the classic organization of marketing activities, systems of their management, and often implementation of different, innovative business concepts.

Unlike traditional tangible goods or services, the so-called monoproducts, thanks to many parallel values (benefits) provided for the consumers, they meet many needs and expectations, both complementary and autonomous, considered important in different areas of needs and consumption. Creation and dissemination of system products also generally requires new innovative business models and business management concepts" (Żabiński 2013).

Value marketing or value delivery marketing

Based on the two terms of "value" identically applicable to the economic market, when it is to be characterized on the political market the question arises: how the 'values' identified by Michał Jaśniok, especially after mentioning the paper of Leszek Żabiński, are complementary to the Kotler's concept of value marketing, and how useful are they merely in the context of the customer value management concept, which in essence is a management concept that responds to the key customer role for the functioning of the business? It is worth noting, on the margin of reflection, it is a common practice for many researchers who often use different concepts to describe the same phenomena. Żabiński states: "Thanks to the bundle of many parallel values

(benefits) to the consumer they simultaneously satisfy several/many of his/her needs and expectations".

The literal quotation of Jaśniok seems to clearly refer to the concept of customer value management: "The offer addressed to target groups on the political market can have features of a system product if it contains a whole set of values for the voter (...). At this point, it is necessary to clarify that 'customer value management is understood to be a management approach that treats customers as a business asset whose value can be measured and enhanced through the organization of processes around relationships" (Doligalski 2013).

The difference in the meaning of the term "value" may be interesting in the light of the current considerations because Kotler's "values" are activities that involve the joint building of "value" in the process of creating the product by the bidder and the receiver (also the political offer), while in the concept of customer value management the customer related processes, according to R. Blattberg et al., represent customer value management from the perspective of three processes: customer acquisition, additional sales, and advocating loyalty (Doligalski 2013).

How should one understand providing value of system products on the political market for the voters to the process of value creation when forming them? Is the delivery of the offer exclusive of building it with a prospective customer - a voter? The inspiration of Jaśniok's article leads to the development of these interesting considerations about the definition of "value" in the process of building and delivering system products, about the process of their creation taking into account the concept of value marketing. Thus, he encourages discussion about the creative transfer of market researchers findings from the economic market to other areas, including political marketing. However, in the light of the aforementioned thinking on the political nature of man, political marketing, and, more specifically, its features, seem to have a much longer tradition than is commonly described.

Conclusion

Michał Jaśniok's paper, supported by research results, is an interesting attempt to tackle the transfer of marketing instruments present on the economic market to the political market. It is important, as the author states, that such practice is scantily described in scientific publications. Through his work, he provokes an additional question: to what extend is invoking concepts arising from the economic market, terminology used in descriptions, and later transferred to

another area, legible and unequivocal?

Should one include in the process of delivering value for the stakeholders (customers) of political offer, according to the theory of customer value management, the element of building offers in accordance with the Kotler's concept of marketing 3.0? Common sense seems to suggest a simple solution: the product should be created in the process of constant relations and building it with the customer, which does not exclude, and even enriches, the process of delivering the product from the bidder to the recipient.

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