

Political Preferences

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**Policy and Voting Preferences of Romanian
Migrants 2000-2016**

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Abstract:

In most studies of voting behavior, political preferences are explained at the level of the “country, election, electoral cohort or individual voter” (Franklin 2004). Notably absent from these studies is the impact of voters living abroad. Their importance is not to be neglected, especially in democratizing states.

This research targets the predictions that lie behind the turnout and preferences of Romanian emigrants. Romanian Diaspora consistently votes for parties and candidates that promise reforms. This vote is associated with liberal economic policy preferences and support for minority groups. I test these hypotheses with elections results data from 2000 to 2016 coupled with data collected from Votulmeu.com an online Voting Advice Application from the 2012 parliamentary and 2014 presidential elections in Romania.

Key words:

emigrants, voting, policy preferences, Romania, Voting Advice Applications

Introduction

The results of the first round of the 2014 presidential elections in Romania suggested a comfortable win for the incumbent Prime Minister Victor Ponta, the president of the Social Democratic Party. After the first round, Ponta held a 10% lead over the Christian-Liberal Alliance ethnic German candidate Klaus Iohannis. The runoff campaign was marked by reports displayed on all TV channels showing the Romanian labor migrants not being able to vote abroad in the first round. Surprisingly, Klaus Iohannis, who obtained 54% of the votes, won the second round of elections. Romanian migrants queued at the Romanian embassies and consulates, massively mobilized via Facebook, and organized ad hoc street protests in front of voting stations when they were not able to cast their votes. They overtly supported Iohannis

for the second round of elections and reacted strongly against the Romanian government handling of external voting in the first round of elections. The importance of the impact of migrant political behavior and attitudes is not singular to Romania. In Nigeria, president Jonathan contemplates on allowing Diaspora to vote starting 2015 (Adichie 2014) but only after the Nigerian Diaspora collected signatures to permit their right to vote and organized several protests. In Scotland, at the 2014 referendum, up to 800,000 Scottish people living in England expressed discontent about not having the opportunity to express their preferences (Mycock 2014). In some rare cases, diasporas had a decisive effect on the national politics of countries of origin. In 2006, in Italy, Romano Prodi won a majority in the Senate with the help of the expats voting abroad. In the United States, the military overseas played an important role in providing support for the republican candidate George W. Bush while, at the same time, the civilian elections were poorly organized (Christie 2004).

Long voiced concerns with question on when and why immigrants impact electoral politics have prompted some scholars to investigate how does emigration impacts the politics of the sending countries. This gap is troubling given the increasing number of emigrant populations that sometimes cast a decisive vote in electoral contests in the country of origin. To gain a complete understanding of the impact of emigrants on national politics and particularly to answer a question whether they are a distinct electoral block, researchers must address certain puzzles. These include a comparison of emigrant and non-emigrant political participation; whether emigrants vote differently than the citizens that did not emigrate; institutional constraints on voting; determinants of emigrant voter turnout; and whether emigrants have different issues that determine their voting preferences than those that did not leave their country. Admittedly, this stream of research is facing the challenge of scarce data resources. This paper begins to fill this gap by investigating the political behavior of the emigrant population of one of the most important European countries with recent emigration – Romania. As a first step the paper will ask whether the political participation of emigrants and their political preferences differ from the non-emigrant citizens. Namely I focus on elections results to tap party preferences and on VAA data to discover the preferences on key issues such as welfare state and minority rights. As a second step I explore the determinants of vote choice of Romanians and test whether the migration experience has an effect on vote choice.

These issues are important in all countries of emigration but the investigation is focused on Romania for practical and theoretical reasons. Firstly, emigrant political behavior and its

impact on the politics of the country of origin is becoming a highly salient topic in Europe and it is likely to remain so in the future. Secondly most studies of emigrant impact on the politics of the sending country is focused on US and Mexico. Finally, Romanian migrants have become important political actors in Romania. In the 2009 and 2014 presidential elections their contribution to the election results made former Prime Minister Adrian Nastase wonder whether emigrants should enjoy the political rights of the country they have left behind. From 2007, since Romania joined the European Union, to 2014 more than three million Romanians went abroad for work, study or join their families. The electoral strength of the emigrant Romanian electorate has prompted main political parties in Romania to devise strategies and deliver promises to capture the emigrant vote, an entirely new phenomenon in Romanian politics.

On a practical level, the election results of emigrant voting are provided at the voting section level by the National Electoral Authority. Secondly, the Voting Advice Application (an online application that compares the political preferences of users to political parties) “Votul meu” (My Vote) for the presidential elections in 2014 yielded approximately 1400 users, which voted abroad. Although fraught with issues of accurate representation, these data provide a rare opportunity to survey the emigrant issue preferences and compare them to those that did not emigrate from Romania.

The political participation of emigrants will be restricted to turnout. I investigate the attitudes of emigrants towards the market and minority rights (Kitschelt 1992). These issues have defined Romanian electoral politics since 1989 and are contested issues. I expect that that Romanian emigrants would be more supportive of the market and be more open to minority rights than non-emigrants. Further on, I explain how these preferences relate to partisan and presidential candidate support. I use regression to test whether migration affects the political choices they intend to make.

The article proceeds as follows. The next section relates this study to the relevant literature on migrant political behavior followed by a short overview of Romanian post 1989 emigration history. I then turn to data analysis and discuss the evolution of emigrant political participation starting from 2004 and display the differences on political preferences between emigrants and non-migrants in Romania. Next I evaluate the impact policy preferences and migration experience have on political behavior. Conceptual fuzziness characterizes the usage of terms such as Diaspora, migrant, trans-national community or citizens living abroad (Sheffer 2003). This paper, due to the complexity of migration circumstances does not emphasize

distinctions and characteristics. Most migrants can be qualified as “unskilled immigrant group that is locked into a subordinate status” (Cohen 1997: 163). Others are highly skilled and some are long settled while others are recent migrants. The reasons to migrate are also diverse. Some escaped their oppressive regimes; others left their country when the regime permitted, such as the Eastern Europeans. Some have an ideal view of their home community other despise it. Some plan to return while others are not sure. Given that the focus of the project is on political participation, rights, attitudes and behavior there is no operational reason to differentiate among migrants and restrict the use of the term Diaspora. There is no cost associated with grouping migrants all together as Diaspora or emigrants since formally the country of origin treats them in the same way.

The Political Role of Romanian Migrants

The emigration from Romania took place in three important historical stages. During communism, diaspora was largely dissident. Given the restrictions to travelling abroad, the Romanian politically active diasporic community was composed of people that emigrated illegally, were expelled by the communist authorities or chose not to return once they arrived to a democratic country risking their family’s safety back home. The Romanian dissidence movement was feeble (Angi 2011). Political participation occurred mainly through protests of intellectuals broadcasted through Radio Free Europe. Paul Goma, Mihai Botez and others issued communiques and open letters addressed to the communist leader Nicolae Ceausescu. Dissidents residing in Romania often wrote the letters. The Diaspora intermediated the publication of these documents altering the image of Ceausescu as a good communist friendly to Western European leaders. The response of the communist regime was to try to repress Diaspora with the help of the Romanian Secret Police.


The second stage began after the fall of the communist regime in December 1989 that emphasized the role of the kin communities living in the neighboring countries. The 1991 Romanian constitution recognized the existence of Romanian communities abroad and established polling stations in embassies and consulates. The government focused on the strengthening of the ethnic identity of Romanians living in Hungary, Moldova, Ukraine and Serbia. Most of the initiatives focused on symbolic politics (Iordachi 2004) to strengthen the existence of a transnational community.

A wave of emigration took place in the years following the regime changes. Nearly 100,000 Romanians changed their residence to a domicile abroad. At the same time a wave of immigration took place from Moldova, a country with a majority Romanian-speaking population. The majority of emigrants consisted of ethnic Germans and Hungarians. During communism the western Germany officials negotiated the emigration of ethnic Germans by offering money to the Romanian authorities for each person. In this way approximately 200,000 ethnic migrants left Romania ([Adevarul.ro 2010](#)). After the regime change most ethnic Germans left Romania. Citizenship problems with Hungary were complicated. In 2004 the Hungarian government organized a referendum to discuss the awarding of citizenship rights to the three million Hungarians living in Romania. The referendum was annulled due to low turnout. Later the Hungarian government adopted the “Act of Hungarians living in neighboring countries” that offered symbolic citizenship. A few years later the Hungarian government enacted the law that was defeated in referendum allowing anyone who could prove the Hungarian origin, to receive the Hungarian citizenship. The immigrants consisted of Moldovan citizens. The supporters of granting political rights to Diaspora successfully lobbied for Romanians living in Moldova to acquire Romanian citizenship. Around 200,000 Moldovan citizens received formal Romanian citizenship through this special procedure. The number of Moldovan citizens applying for Romanian citizenship increased after Romania joined the European Union.

The third stage, the focus on identity construction was replaced by economic concerns related to European labor migration. This process started in 2001 with the European Union officials’ decision to lift visa requirements for Romanian citizens. This decision was a first step that facilitated the access of Romanians to the EU labor market. The Spanish government was most visible in trying to employ a large number of temporary workers from Romania, a program that was successful also due to the language similarities between Spanish and Romanian. In 2007, with Romania becoming a member of the European Union, the labor oriented migration accelerated. In 2008, Spanish and Italian authorities reported 1 million legal Romanian residents ([Adevarul 2009](#)). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a “Department for Relations of Romanians from Abroad” that elaborated policies related to the Romanians living abroad ([Soros 2009](#)). In 2008 a new electoral law established special parliamentary seats for Romanians living abroad. Political parties focused their electoral campaigning in Italy and Spain. Attention to the votes from Diaspora was great during the 2009 presidential elections. The news media showed Romanians queuing. The process of voting took longer time because each voter had to

fill in a form and sign a statement that they would not and did not vote in another polling station. Due to the closeness of the election results the Diaspora’s vote input mattered determining the winner in these critical elections. The most contested voting station was in Paris where in 14 hours 3,785 voters casted a vote triggering suspicions of fraud. The vote recount did not result in a change of the final count. In 2009 the turnout increased dramatically (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Turnout of Romanians living abroad, 2000-2016



Source: own elaboration.

In this section I detail the program and the electoral messages that targeted the Diaspora during the 2014 presidential elections. The popularity of certain candidates among the Romanians living abroad might be explained by the electoral promises politicians made to the emigrant community.

The political rights of Romanian emigrants did not become an electoral topic during the electoral campaign of the first round of presidential elections. Klaus Iohannis (2014) had a special section dedicated to Diaspora. The other political programs contained no more than one paragraph (Victor Ponta and Monica Macovei) or one phrase (Elena Udrea, Călin Popescu Tăriceanu, Dan Diaconescu) about Romanian communities living abroad.

Iohannis promised electronic voting, vote by mail, more consulates and Romanian classes in schools where the Romanian community is present. He proposed the creation of an advisory

board that would further the Diaspora's interests and offered encouragements for diaspora related activities by funding of NGOs. In similar vein to other candidates, he swore to protect the traditional communities of Romanians living in the neighboring countries and improve the image of Romanians abroad.

Monica Macovei promised to introduce mail voting to all elections and to be a supporter of Diaspora. Elena Udrea (2014) stated that she will protect the cultural identity of Romanians abroad. Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu (2014) focused on the need to reduce the emigration of the workforce. Victor Ponta's (2014) program focused on stopping the brain drain by promoting a program called SMART that opened jobs in the public administration for emigrants. He also promised to strengthen the identity of the traditional communities.

Dan Diaconescu, the president of the People's Party Dan Diaconescu (2014) promised the introduction of compulsory voting for Romanians living abroad and one of the 100 points program mentions that emigration has to be stopped. In 2012 the party became known for its promise of 20,000 euro for each Romanian that returns to the home country.

William Brînză was the first representative of Diaspora that ran in the presidential elections. His electoral slogan was "Let's Break their Gang" a direct antiestablishment message. He was not very popular though losing with 0.45% (43,194). In Diaspora he obtained 25,466 votes out of the 160,065 casted. Later, Brînză retired from politics following investigations of financial embezzlement.

During the first round of election the attention to the votes of Diaspora became visible. In the first round of the presidential elections the media showed, again, Romanians queuing at the Romanian embassies and consulates. Several Romanians living abroad were not able to cast a vote due to high participation. This led to protests in UK, Germany, Austria, Belgium and Italy that were portrayed across European media. Representatives of Diaspora criticized the deficient organization of the electoral process by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and asked for more polling stations and voting booths for the second round of the presidential elections. The refusal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to respond to the demands of Diaspora led to his resignation. Yet, despite the second round of elections taking place with two polling stations less the turnout of Diaspora doubled. In seven polling stations, there were more than 4,000 votes casted in 14 hours. The highest reported turnout (4,626) was at a voting station in London. Similarly to 2009, the polling agencies projected Ponta as a winner. The next day, after the votes

were counted from abroad the outcome was overturned. Iohannis gathered more than 89% from the Diaspora. It determined the winner in a critical election.

The deficient voting process and the refusal of the government headed by Victor Ponta to increase the number of polling stations abroad had immediate results. The emigrants overwhelmingly supported Iohannis in the second round of the presidential elections.

The next section reviews other studies that investigate the political role of emigrants.

Migrant Political Behavior

Most migration studies emphasize the political integration of migrants in the host community and analyze political participation from that perspective (Audebert & Dorai 2010; Bauböck 2006; Black et al. 2010; Dancygier & Saunders 2006; Dijstelbloem & Meijer 2011; Wallace & Stola 2001). These studies focus on political integration that seems to be dependent on how permissive is the host state with granting political rights (Martiniello 2006). There are two key approaches to the analysis of attitudes of migrants and their involvement in the politics of the country of origin. First, the granting of political rights is the result of emigrants pressuring governments in the country of origin. Migrants exert pressures on the less liberal regimes (Østergaard-Nielsen 2012; Koinova 2009) through lobbying donor organizations (Koinova 2009) or sending out calls for democracy and human rights as it was the case for the diaspora of the former communist regimes in Eastern Europe (Falk 2003). Being offered an exit from the political system, dictators hoped to reduce the number of voices that support liberalization. In turn, migrants became agents of democratization from outside. Oppressive regimes attempted to reduce voting opportunities like in Zimbabwe where only military and consular service officers living abroad are allowed to vote (Magaisa 2008). In Uganda, Ghana, and Zimbabwe voting rights of the Diaspora were reduced (Boateng 2005). According to the second approach the political participation of migrants is shaped by a discussion about citizenship (Bauböck 2006; Shevel 2014, Ziemer & Roberts 2013). Voting rights of a Diaspora confronts the question regarding the appropriate conceptualization of a political community that increasingly becomes mobile. On the one hand extending voting rights to expatriates is the main element of political integration with the goal of full political inclusion for all of a nation's citizens and social groups. On the other hand expatriates are seen as renegades who should not be permitted a say in government selection since they are not affected to the same extent by its decisions, laws, and regulations as citizens living in the home country. If one is to follow the principle of "No

Taxation Without Representation,” migrants that do not pay taxes in the home country should not have political rights. In both instances the Diaspora is often a marginalized category, both by the country of origin that views them as being outside the political community and by a host country that views them as foreign, temporary, and perhaps, second-class inhabitants. States in transition are more likely to enfranchise groups that were previously excluded or marginal or enemies to national politics (Østergaard-Nielsen 2012: 72). There are significant examples of countries that extended the rights of migrants (IDEA 2007) during transition from authoritarian rule. The political influence of migrants in the country of origin is especially important in the context of the wave of migration from East-Central Europe to Western Europe. The type of migration that occurs from East to West is *liquid* (Snel et al. 2006) with temporary migrants going back and forth and having a more determined goal to settle in the home country. However, these approaches do not sufficiently consider the impact of the behavior and attitudes of emigrants towards the democratic political process of the country of origin. The former emphasizes the pressure for liberalization of authoritarian regimes and focuses less on consolidation of democracy. The latter focuses on normative discussions of citizenship rights in the origin and host countries and less on their use and impact on the attitudes of migrants (Bauböck 2006).

The political participation of Diaspora in the origin country is an increasingly relevant phenomenon (Bauböck 2006; Martiniello 2006; Burean 2011; Østergaard-Nielsen & Ciornei 2012). Findings show that granting voting rights to Diaspora accelerates the diffusion of liberal principles to neighboring countries (Turcu & Urbatsch 2015). In Mexico, migrants remit democracy through external lobbying, voting from abroad and, upon return, by influencing others to be involved in politics (Perez-Armedaniz & Crow 2010). In Eastern European countries returned migrants have political attitudes that support European Union institutions and inherit a stronger sense of political efficacy (Careja & Emmeneger 2012).

Voting is one of the most popular forms of political participation (Blais 2000) and is an indicator of democratic quality (Fieldhouse et al. 2007). Increasing turnout has become an important objective in Europe especially following the lowering turnout rates in national (Rubenson et al. 2007) but mostly in European elections. One method to foster turnout is by facilitating access to vote for excluded or marginalized groups. Lowering the voting age (Wagner et al. 2012) produced positive effects in increasing turnout. Allowing migrants to vote

at elections could be one method of increasing turnout and improving the democratic quality of a state.

Emigration is a result of an individual-self selection process that would yield systemic differences between emigrant and the non-migrant population.

The presence of migrants' changes attitudes in host and origin countries (De Haas 2005) especially when migrants' socioeconomic status suffers dramatic alterations (van Meeteren, Engbersen & van San 2009). One might postulate the economic interests would dictate preferences for candidates that encourage less redistribution and more private economic initiative. Few studies ask whether migrants acquire democratic attitudes and become agents of democratization in their home countries. Mexican migrants that live in the United States remit democratization from abroad by voting and pressuring authorities of the country of origin for reforms. Careja and Emmenegger (2012) find that the financially successful return migrants from Eastern Europe have a stronger sense of political efficacy, are more satisfied with democracy and have a higher support for the EU.

Political attitudes are influenced by socio demographic characteristics (Almond & Verba 1989) and institutional context (Anderson & Tverdova 2001). The reason to emigrate is a factor that significantly impacts the granting of voting rights. Refugees from war torn countries, political asylum recipients can have stronger pro democratic attitudes. At the same time ethnic emigrants would have more hostile attitudes towards the political system of the country of origin (Koinova 2009).

The emigration experience in a consolidated democracy increases satisfaction with democracy (Careja & Emmenegger 2012; Perez-Armedaniz & Crow 2010; Camp 2003) although some of the temporary migrants have minimal contact with the host country and rely on the bonding social capital of their co nationals. Yet financial success can have positive effects towards the attitudes towards the regime, political participation and political interest (Mishler & Rose 2001; Williams & Baláž 2006) of the host country with spills over effects on evaluations of the regime in the country of origin. Hence migrants have more liberal values than non-migrants. I expect emigrants to have more liberal preferences on economy and on granting minority rights (Hypothesis 1). These translate into support for parties that promise radical reforms that take the shape of new political parties and presidential candidates that are independent from the old political parties (Hypothesis 2). Finally I assert that the migration experience has an effect on vote choice in supporting center right candidates (Hypothesis 3).

Controls include socio-demographics (education, age, gender), past declared turnout and political interest.

Methodology

This is a case study on the political participation and voting behavior of the emigrants from Romania. As a case study its relevance relies on inspecting a phenomenon that is deviant from the classical studies of voting behavior and political participation and it has a potential impact on comparative studies. This study is relevant in the sense that it takes into account, besides the classical determinants of political supports, the experience of migration. This element seems to be particularly important in the Romanian context. The paper investigates what motivates Romanian migrants to have center-right, liberal political preferences. More generally it tries to understand emigrants role in the politics of the country of origin by describing a case where this has implications on who gets elected to the presidential office. The selection of the 2014 presidential elections data is fortunate. Similarly to 2009, the Romanian Diaspora's electoral support for the candidate of the center right National Liberal Party produced a stunning result with Klaus Iohannis gaining on the 10% deficit he had in the first round of the 2014 Romanian presidential elections and ultimately winning the elections. Almost 5% from that gain came from the emigrant vote. I use election results at the country level to assess the turnout levels of Romanians living abroad and report of their voting preferences. I use VAA data to report their preferences on issues.

The Romanian VAA Votulmeu.com data contains thirty questions on issues and a few socio demographics. The selection of the most important issues is done with Mokken scaling that led to the selection of eight issues that seem to compose an economic and a distribution of rights dimensions. The analysis was performed by Vasilis Manavopoulos. The left right self-placement taps on the level of economic liberalism. The GAL-TAN tests users permissiveness on the distribution of rights. These were transformed into dummy variables that measure the economic liberal placement and liberal distribution of rights. Candidate selection variable measures whether the candidate is preferred because of the ideas she/he promotes and it is also a dichotomous variable. The preference for issues were transformed into dichotomous variables and measure support for an issue. Table 4 shows the eight issues that were identified as relevant. Socio demographics include age, measured through the year of birth, gender and education. The education variable separates university graduates from other citizens. I use binomial logistic

regression since the dependent variable is nominal and independent variables are dichotomous and one continuous (age). I included the logarithm of the age variable and found no significant effects thus I could include age in the model. The estimates I use are b logit coefficients that measure the association between variables. There are three types of predictors used: socio-demographic variables (age, gender, education), political variables (past reported turnout, interest in politics) and issues (reason for the selection of the candidate, GAL-TAN, left-right, support for private health care, reduce public sector, market economy, gay rights, use of marijuana, abortion, religion in school, church in public life). These three sets are added one at a time to evaluate their effects when introduced as a set of explanatory variables.

The regressions use the entire database to assess the effect of what Dancygier and Saunders (2006: 967) in a similar study on immigrants termed the *self-selection hypothesis* that measures the opinion gaps among migrants and population that does not migrate. This hypothesis explains the inherent differences that might result from the different life experiences of migrants and non-migrants.

Data

The scope of the paper is to link the turnout and the election results to information about emigrant programmatic preferences with the help of data obtained from the Voting Advice Application, hereafter “VAA”. The online revolution proved to be a solid ground for the development of VAAs. Created initially as paper-and-pencil tests in the late 1990s (Ruusuvirta 2010; Gemenis & Rosema 2014), VAAs became used worldwide, with millions of users seeking advice during electoral campaigns. Initially implemented in the Netherlands, then Switzerland and Germany, VAAs are now present in almost all European countries (exceptions are Malta and Slovenia) (Garzia & Marschall 2012). VAAs are present in second-order elections as well, with the EU Profiler and EUvox in the elections for the European Parliament in 2009 and 2014. VAAs are campaigning tools that eliminate the cost of information, offering a tailored advice, simulating the context of full information. The growing importance of issue voting (Dalton 1996; Franklin et al. 2009) following Downs (1957) spatial model, where every policy can be placed on a left-right continuum, is accommodated by the VAAs (Cedroni & Garzia 2010). In order for issue voting to be meaningful, voters have to have clear issue preferences, parties have to compete over the same policy issues (Nie & Verba 1979) and voters have to be able to identify their position relative to the position of parties (Butler & Stokes 1969). VAAs help voters in

making more informed political decisions, lowering the costs of information, by presenting to the voter the parties' position on salient policy positions, by comparing, based on an algorithm, the position of the user with the position of the parties, and presenting the user with a rank-order list of parties, following a proximity logic (Cedroni & Garzia 2010). As a web survey tool, the quality of VAA data suffers from overall survey error, made out of coverage error, sampling error, non-response error and measuring error (Dilman 2011 in Andreadis 2014). Coverage error occurs when part of the population cannot be included in the sample; in the case of VAAs, this has to do with Internet usage, more specifically with the Internet penetration rate and Internet literacy. Sampling error represents the inaccuracy in estimating a certain quantity based on the sample, when the entire population is not available; here, the sampling error has to do with the self-selection bias of users into using the tool. Non-response error occurs when users do not respond to questions, and this pattern can be discerned when compared to the answers of other users. Measurement error occurs when the answers provided by the users are wrong or inaccurate (Andreadis 2014).

Although extremely cost effective, the use of this type of data is criticized. This is due to the bias the VAA generated data carries. The most important caveat one has to acknowledge when dealing with VAA is that the data is not representative of the population at large. More precisely, the data is biased towards the young, better educated (Marschall & Schultze 2012), from urban areas, with more left-wing orientation (Mendez & Wheatley 2014). An additional bias is represented by the gender, with two-thirds of the respondents being male (Mendez & Wheatley 2014). The Romanian VAA *Votulmeu.com* organized for the 2014 presidential elections contained 18,000 users. After cleaning the data 10,039 users remained out of which 956 declared that they vote abroad. Despite its obvious limitations this data offers a chance to glance at the issue preferences of Romanian emigrants. Thus this application offers a unique chance to access a population that is often not present in surveys. Although some research institutes such as CURS and Metromedia Transylvania implemented surveys on Romanian migrants living abroad they do not contain information about their voting behavior and programmatic preferences. One way to find surveys that include migrants from Romania is to find them with in the Eurobarometer data following the Careja and Emmenegger (2012) study. This was not a successful solution due to the extremely small number of citizens that were living outside Romania and declared themselves as coming from Romania in the 2014 Eurobarometer surveys. Not having an accurate picture of the emigrating population of Romania makes it difficult to

assess the representativeness of the 956 Romanians that declared that they would vote abroad and used the Romanian VAA. The users of the 2014 VAA have graduate studies, and they are young. Thus the interpretation of these data has to be done while having in mind these serious limitations.

Political Preferences of Romanian Emigrants

This Klaus Iohannis obtained 89.73% of the migrant vote in the 2014 presidential second-round runoff, receiving 338,873 of the 377,651 votes. His majority helped in winning him the presidency. Iohannis garnered almost three times the number of votes than the previous president Traian Basescu (115,831).

It is not surprising that Iohannis was popular in Diaspora. Candidates from center right parties perform better than candidates of the left. This claim holds for the Czech and the Polish Diaspora (Doyle & Fidrmuc 2005). Table 1 records the vote of the Romanian Diaspora since 2007. The vote percentages for the main Romanian political parties show a remarkable consistency in the vote. PD-L, PNL, ARD (The Right Romania Alliance) was a plurality winner in elections until 2012. Since then new parties and their candidates became increasingly popular with Diaspora. In the 2014 EP elections it was PMP (Popular Movement Party) that won the elections in Diaspora with 28.63% of the valid votes.

Table 1. Voting Preferences of the Romanian Diaspora (Percentage of Valid Votes Cast)

	PSD	PD-L	PNL	UDMR	USL	ARD	USR	ALDE	PMP	Other
2007 European Parliament	8.84	44.10	10.31	2.78						33.97
2008 Chamber of Deputies	15.17	46.52	21.22	4.21						12.87
2008 Senate	13.23	46.46	23.52	5.12						11.67
2009 European Parliament	14.87	37.13	15.68	7.16						25.16
2009 President (1st Round)	12.41	56.05	17.43	1.06						13.05
2009 President (2nd Round)	21.14	78.86								
2012 Chamber of Deputies				1.89	27.32	27.27				43.52
2012 Senate				1.53	28.37	39.46				30.64
2014 European Parliament	11.05	15.71	8.63	1.22						63.39
2014 President (1st Round)	15.90		46.17	0.54						37.39
2014 President (2nd Round)	10.26		89.73							
2016 Chamber of Deputies	9.95		25.93	2.34			28.87	2.87	23.18	6.86
2016 Senate	9.96		26.09	2.36			29.18	2.96	23.82	5.63

Source: own elaboration.

In the first round of 2014 presidential elections Monica Macovei, independent candidate came in third (24,342) just behind Victor Ponta (25,466 votes) and in front of Elena Udrea (15,656). Thus even if there is a shift in the Diaspora vote to new parties, this shift remains

within the center-right ideological camp. PSD never won more than one fifth of the vote in Diaspora.

Not surprisingly, in Diaspora, Iohannis was the plurality winner in the first round of the presidential election garnering 46% of the vote. In Romania it was Victor Ponta that was the plurality winner having a 10% advantage against Iohannis. In the second round Iohannis increased his margin with 14% compared to the extra five percentage points obtained by Ponta. In the Diaspora, Iohannis's percentage grew by 43 percentage points while Ponta's percentage points actually decreased by 5%. Iohannis's gain was double than that of Basescu in 2009. This is not necessarily a result that shows that even Ponta's voters shifted their votes to Iohannis. It might be an effect of the more than doubling of the turnout between the first and the second round. Perhaps the turnout increased because Diaspora anticipated a second round and given the difficulties related to travel many decided to vote only in the second round. It is thus more likely that the increasing support for Iohannis came from new voters that showed up in the second round. A geographical inspection seems unnecessary to see where the votes for Iohannis came from. Starting the 2009 elections it is possible to scrutinize the country-level voting results for the Romanians that cast a vote outside the borders of Romania. The support for Iohannis was uniformly strong across all continents. Compared to Basescu in 2009, in the first round Iohannis won in 89 out of the 95 countries that had polling stations for Romanians. Iohannis lost elections in North Korea to Victor Ponta (by one vote out of the 7 casted votes) and in Brazil (by 3 votes), in Cuba to Monica Macovei (by one vote out of the 22 votes) and not surprisingly, in Hungary, to Kelemen Hunor. He had the same amount of votes with Ponta and Macovei (5 votes) in Angola and he had the equal number of votes with Victor Ponta (5) in Armenia. In the second round, Iohannis won in 93 out of the 94 countries where Romanians voted. Klaus Iohannis lost to Victor Ponta in Palestine by one vote. Ponta obtained 10 votes and Iohannis 9. In 27 countries, Iohannis obtained more than 90% of the vote. These include countries where there are many Romanian migrants. These include Spain, United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada, Ireland and Austria. In Italy he obtained 88% of the votes. Iohannis's triumph among Romanian migrants was overwhelming. A more systematic analysis is required to better understand the variation for the support for Iohannis in the first round.

Given the extremely limited availability of surveys on political preferences of migrants and especially the surveys of Romanian migrants in 2014, I decided to make use of the data available from the VAA Votulmeu.com. Out of the 10,039 users I could identify 965 persons

that declared that they would vote abroad. This data is not a representative sample of Romanian migrants. More than 70% of the users that declared that they vote abroad have graduated a university and nearly half of them have post graduate studies. Half of them are male. Table 2 compares the elections results with the voting intentions of users of the VAA. Voters of Victor Ponta are severely under represented while the supporters of Monica Macovei are over represented.

Table 2. Voting intentions of VAA users compared to election results

Voting intentions	VAA		2014 Election results first round	
	migrants	non-migrants	migrants	all voters
Klaus Iohannis	32.5	41.3	46.17	30.37
Victor Ponta	1.6	4.6	15.9	40.44
Monica Macovei	54.8	37.1	15.2	4.44
Others	11.1	17.0	22.73	24.75

Source: own elaboration.

Next, using a dimension reduction technique, out of the thirty statements eight issues were selected that compose an economic and a distribution of rights dimensions (Table 3).

Table 3. Relevant dimensions identified through Mokken scaling (items that have a homogeneity coefficient higher than 0.3 the threshold for scalable items)

<u>Economy</u>	0.365
The free economic competition makes the health system work better	0.340
The number of employees from the public sector should be reduced	0.363
The state should intervene as least as possible in the economy	0.391
<u>Society</u>	0.426
Homosexual couples should enjoy the same rights as heterosexual couples	0.442
The usage of cannabis as a recreational drug should be legal	0.394
Women should have the right to decide in matters connected to abortion	0.423
Religion should be a compulsory course in public schools	0.448
The state should offer a privileged status to the Orthodox Church	0.421

Mokken analysis performed by Vasilis Manavopoulos: vmanavopoulos@gmail.com

Source: own elaboration.

Then I compared the preferences of VAA users that declared that they would vote abroad to those voting domestically. The data support the liberal policy orientation of migrants (Table 4). On economic issues migrant users support a pro-market type of economy similarly to the non-migrant users. On the distribution of rights migrants support to a greater extent gay rights (19 percentage point more in favor) and are more pro-choice (7% more) while non-migrants are more supportive of teaching religion at public schools (7% more).

Table 4. Political preferences on issues of migrants and non-migrants (percentage agreeing)

Economy	migrants	non-migrants	Gama
The free economic competition makes the health system work better	57.2	60.3	-.026
The number of employees from the public sector should be reduced	65.8	65.5	-.043
The state should intervene as least as possible in the economy	50.6	55.1	-.046
Society			
Homosexual couples should enjoy the same rights as heterosexual couples	74.6	55.6	.339***
The usage of cannabis as a recreational drug should be legal	49.9	41.6	.162**
Women should have the right to decide in matters connected to abortion	91.1	84.6	.309***
Religion should be a compulsory course in public schools	9.3	16.3	-.259***
The state should offer a privileged status to the Orthodox Church	3.2	4.7	-.189***

* = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001

Source: own elaboration.

Next I tested the effects of these policy preferences on vote choice. At the same time I intended to find out whether being a migrant has an effect on vote choice. The VAA application contained several socio demographic and political preference questions such as past turnout behavior, political interest, voting intention, left right self placement and the reasons for choosing a presidential candidate. Thus using binomial logistic regression I tested for three categories of likely determinants of the vote for Iohannis and Macovei - the two most popular presidential candidates: socio-demographics, political variables and preferences on issues. I added a Migrant dummy variable to find out whether being a migrant has an effect on the voting preference controlling for other possible determinants (Tables 5 and 6).

Table 5. Determinants of vote for Iohannis of VAA users

Dependent variable: vote for Iohannis (logit estimates b)			
Age	.008**	.008**	-.014
Male	.060	.063	.119
Education	-.200**	-.198**	-.196
Migrant	-.393**	-.442**	-.021
Interest in politics		-.185*	-.016
Past turnout Behavior		-.195**	-.171
Candidate selection /programmatic			-.936***
GAL-TAN			.101
Left-Right			1.052***
Private health care			-.067
Reduce public sector			-.277
Market economy			-.491*
Gay rights			-.405
Marijuana use			.137
Pro-choice			-.379
Religion in school			-.006
Pro-church			1.113*
Constant	-16.500***	-14.530***	27.632
	(5.282)	(5.857)	(16.072)
Nagelkerke R ²	.011	.017	.113

N=10039 * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001

Source: own elaboration.

The results show that once the issue preferences are included in the model the effect of migration disappears for both Iohannis and Macovei. The data show statistical associations between the support for Iohannis and center right ideological profile and a reduced role for Orthodox Church (Table 5). Next I measured the predictors for the vote for Macovei (Table 6).

Table 6. Determinants of vote for Macovei of VAA users

Dependent variable: vote for Macovei (logit estimates)			
Age	.018***	.018***	.043***
Male	-.204***	-.172**	-.166
Education	.615***	.641***	.797***
Migrant	.647***	.598***	.317
Interest in politics		.175*	-.094
Past turnout Behavior		-.253***	.058
Candidate selection			1.088***
/programmatic			
GAL-TAN			.065
Left-Right			-.292
Private health care			.119
Reduce public sector			.928**
Market economy			.939***
Gay rights			.500*
Marijuana use			.040
Pro-choice			.604
Religion in school			1.122**
Pro-church			.250
Constant	-38.623***	-37.824***	-95.749
	(5.601)	(6.222)	(18.307)
Nagelkerke R ²	.042	.049	.281

N=10039 * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001

Source: own elaboration.

Macovei is supported by users that chose her for her ideas, are pro market, support the reduction of the public sector, support gay rights and disagree with the introduction of religion to schools. They are educated and young. The effect of migration experience dissipates once issue preferences are introduced in the statistical model.

Conclusion

Presidential elections in Romania seem to become peculiar events for the Romanian emigrants. In 2009 the presidential elections brought the highest number of Romanian migrants to the polls (Figure 1). In 2014 this number more than doubled. It is the second time that the Romanian diaspora votes are decisive for settling the outcome of the presidential elections.

The paper examined the political preferences of migrants by inspecting elections results and a group of Romanian VAA users that intended to vote abroad. The election results show that

emigrants prefer to vote for parties that promote reform and since 2012 favor new political parties as well. The electoral preferences of migrants are different from non-migrants.

More migrants support gay unions, less influence of religion in school and are pro choice. The differences are statistically significant. These attitudes translate into support for Iohannis and Macovei for both migrants and non-migrants.

Ideally I have to take into account the years spent abroad, the tendency to return to the home country, income level, work status, access to media, integration in the receiving country and exposure to values of the receiving country. The political influence of Romanian migrants has increased despite the lack of political interest and difficulty to cast a vote and it seems decisive when elections are close.

One interesting finding is that migrant users are more likely to be inclusive with gay rights, are pro-choice and reject religion in schools. Is it likely that the Romanians living abroad have internalized the values and the practices of the host country? Did the fact that emigrants live in consolidated democracies influenced their attitudes to support Iohannis and Macovei? It might be that the emigrants not only act as a catalyst for economic reform but they act through their political preferences. Alternatively, it is more likely that self-selected pro-reform individuals chose to live abroad and they are the driving force of electoral engagement abroad. I found that these individuals are not much different from the self-selected pro-reform users and did not migrate. Better quality surveys are necessary before one would be able to link personal experience abroad to support for political parties that promise reform and change in a democratizing country.

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Appendix

Independent variables

Socio-Demographic variables

Migrant: This variable is coded 2 if a respondent declared that he/she will vote abroad and 1 otherwise.

Age: the respondents' year of birth

Gender: A dichotomous variable coded 2 for females and 1 for males

Education: An ordinal variable transformed in a dichotomous variable in which 2 represent respondents with graduate and postgraduate studies (BA, MA, PhD) and 1 is high school graduate and under

Political variables

Interest in politics: An ordinal variable transformed in a dichotomous variable in which 2 represents “I am very interested” and “somewhat interested” while 1 is represented by “I am little interested” and “I am not interested at all”

Past turnout: An ordinal variable transformed into a dichotomous variables in which 2 is represented by the persons that have voted and 1 by those who have not

Issue variables

Candidate selection/ programmatic: It is the recoded answer to the question “What is the main reason you have chosen this candidate”. It is an ordinal variable transformed into a dichotomous variable in which 2 is represented by “the ideas of the candidate are close to mine” and 1 is represented by the following answers: “more competent”, “supports people like me”, “my friend

and family supported this candidate”, “I like this candidate”, “I identify with the candidates’ party”, “another reason”, “I will not vote”

GAL-TAN: in an ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 10. 0 means liberal and 10 means conservatism. It was transformed into a dichotomous variable that measured center right wing vote. 2 is represented by those that have chosen a position from 0 to 4 and the rest are placed at 1.

Left-Right: is an ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 10. 0 means full statism and 10 full liberalism in economy. It was transformed into a dichotomous variable that measured center right wing vote. 2 is represented by those that expressed a position from (6 to 10) and the rest are 1.

Private health care: Respondents level of agreement with the following statement “The free economic competition makes the health system work better”. It is an ordinal variables transformed into a dichotomous variable in which 2 means agreement with the issue.

Reduce public sector: Respondents level of agreement with the following statement “The number of employees from the public sector should be reduced” It is an ordinal variables transformed into a dichotomous variable in which 2 means agreement with the issue.

Market economy Respondents level of agreement with the following statement “The state should intervene as least as possible in the economy” It is an ordinal variables transformed into a dichotomous variable in which 2 means agreement with the issue.

Gay rights: Respondents level of agreement with the following statement “Homosexual couples should enjoy the same rights as heterosexual couples” It is an ordinal variables transformed into a dichotomous variable in which 2 means agreement with the issue.

Marijuana use: Respondents level of agreement with the following statement “The usage of cannabis as a recreational drug should be legal” It is an ordinal variables transformed into a dichotomous variable in which 2 means agreement with the issue.

Pro-choice: Respondents level of agreement with the following statement “Women should have the right to decide in matters connected to abortion” It is an ordinal variables transformed into a dichotomous variable in which 2 means agreement with the issue.

Religion in school: Respondents level of agreement with the following statement “Religion should be a compulsory course in public schools” It is an ordinal variables transformed into a dichotomous variable in which 2 means disagreement with the issue.

Pro-church: Respondents level of agreement with the following statement “The state should offer a privileged status to the Orthodox Church” It is an ordinal variables transformed into a dichotomous variable in which 2 means disagreement with the issue.

List of issues

1. Romania should never adopt the Euro
2. There should be a common foreign policy of EU
3. EU should impose economic sanctions to Russia
4. International partners (EU and USA) have the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of Romania when they feel that there is a threat to democracy.
5. Getting close to China would be beneficial to Romania
6. The Free economic competition makes the healthcare system work more efficiently.
7. The number of employees from the public sector should be reduced.
8. The state should intervene as little as possible in the economy.
9. The reduction of social security benefits is a necessary measure
10. Citizens should benefit from a reduced income tax.
11. Foreign borrowings from institutions like the IMF are a good solution in crisis situations.
12. The Romanian state should permit the Gabriel Resources Canadian company to continue its mining explorations at Rosia Montana
13. Homosexual couples should enjoy the same rights as heterosexual couples.
14. The use of cannabis for recreational purposes should be legal
15. Women should have the freedom of choice regarding abortion.
16. Religion should be a compulsory course in public schools.
17. The death penalty should be reintroduced for heinous crimes.
18. Currently prosecutors have too much power when they investigate citizens.
19. The existence of undercover agents of the secret service in important public state offices is beneficial for national security.
20. Immigrants should adapt to the Romanian values and culture.
21. Romania should pursue the union with The Republic of Moldova
22. A territorial reform should include the creation of an autonomous Hungarian region..
23. Minorities should have the right to education exclusively in their mother tongue.
24. The state should offer a privileged status to the Orthodox Church.
25. The president should be an ethnic Romanian.
26. Ethnic political parties should be banned.
27. The Romanian parliament should remain bicameral.
28. Mayors should be able to switch party membership without losing their mandate.
29. The ombudsman should be elected by citizens.
30. Romania should introduce postal voting.

Romania should pursue the union with The Republic of Moldova

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	completely disagree	121	10.9	10.9	10.9
	disagree	99	8.9	8.9	19.8
	Neither agree nor disagree	238	21.4	21.4	41.2
	agree	219	19.7	19.7	60.9
	completely agree	307	27.6	27.6	88.5
	I do not know	113	10.2	10.2	98.7
	No answer	15	1.3	1.3	100.0
Total		1112	100.0	100.0	

Romania should pursue the union with The Republic of Moldova

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	completely agree	1312	13.1	13.4	13.4
	agree	2279	22.7	23.3	36.7
	Neither agree nor disagree	2784	27.7	28.5	65.2
	Disagree	1968	19.6	20.1	85.3
	completely disagree	1434	14.3	14.7	100.0
	Total	9777	97.4	100.0	
Missing	no opinion	262	2.6		
Total		10039	100.0		

Romania should pursue the union with The Republic of Moldova

migrant vs. non migrant		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	
.	Valid	completely agree	35	13.4	14.1	14.1
		agree	63	24.0	25.4	39.5
		Neither agree nor disagree	71	27.1	28.6	68.1
		Disagree	50	19.1	20.2	88.3
		completely disagree	29	11.1	11.7	100.0
		Total	248	94.7	100.0	
Missing	no opinion	14	5.3			
Total		262	100.0			
.00	Valid	completely agree	1142	13.0	13.3	13.3
		agree	2019	22.9	23.5	36.8
		Neither agree nor disagree	2424	27.5	28.2	65.1
		Disagree	1724	19.6	20.1	85.2
		completely disagree	1274	14.5	14.8	100.0
		Total	8583	97.4	100.0	
Missing	no opinion	229	2.6			
Total		8812	100.0			
1.00	Valid	completely agree	135	14.0	14.3	14.3
		agree	197	20.4	20.8	35.1
		Neither agree nor disagree	289	29.9	30.5	65.6
		Disagree	194	20.1	20.5	86.2
		completely disagree	131	13.6	13.8	100.0
		Total	946	98.0	100.0	
Missing	no opinion	19	2.0			
Total		965	100.0			

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**Values versus Interests Dynamics
of Parliamentary Campaigns**

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Abstract:

The paper explores the dynamics of parliamentary campaigns in Europe. Results obtained in the fields of pharmacology and psychology indicate that the emotional tension among the electorate rises as the election day draws closer. Therefore, parties should adjust their campaigning strategies accordingly. I am attempting to verify whether these dynamics influence the proportion between interest and value-related appeals within party communication. Using newly collected data from the Comparative Campaign Dynamics Project, I demonstrate that there is no general tendency towards the increasing saliency of either of the dimensions. However, the relationship under scrutiny becomes strong and robust after the moderating effects of inequality have been accounted for. Most strikingly, as the election draws closer, parties tend to focus more attention on economic issues only if the country experiences high or rising rates of inequality.

Key words:

party strategy, electoral campaign, campaign dynamics, emotions in politics, inequality

Introduction

Electoral campaigns are times of great activity of parties and politicians and elevated interest in politics among the citizens. Parties consciously construct their vote-seeking strategies which are largely determined by the social context (Spoon & Klüver 2014; Spoon & Klüver 2015; Ward et al. 2015; Farstad 2017) and their decisions matter for electoral results (Petrocik 1996; Tavits 2007; Evans & Northmore-Ball 2018). Despite identifying numerous factors influencing party strategies, most studies are targeted at explaining long-term dynamics and explore the change of party strategy between elections (Fagerholm 2016; see also Adams et al. 2009; Adams & Somer-Topcu 2009; Somer-Topcu 2009; Somer-Topcu & Zar 2014; Tavits

& Potter 2015). So far there has been a single article by Banda (2015) demonstrating that in course of a campaign parties' strategies of issue emphasis evolve. Therefore, the short-term campaign dynamics remain largely an underexplored topic. This article aims at filling this gap.

I depart from the assumption that social factors conditioning party behaviour such as inequality or social heterogeneity do not change during the campaign. I believe they are insufficient to directly explain any short-term alternations in the proportion of references to economic interests versus values. The contribution of the article lies in theoretically linking the social context and the rise of emotional tension in course of an electoral campaign (Waismel-Manor et al. 2011) with the short-term change of salience of issues associated with economic interests and social values as well as demonstrating the actual existence of this relationship.

The paper proceeds as follows: first I present the bases of the assumption of the elevation of emotional tension in course of electoral campaigns and link mental predispositions arising with it with premises for party issue emphasis strategy. Then I build the argument about how these premises are related to social context and formulate the hypotheses regarding the conditions under which parties should be inclined to talk about certain issues more at the end of the campaign. Next I describe the data used and controls. The data analysis follows. The final part of the article concludes and discusses the results in the context of the recent economic crisis.

Emotions in Electoral Campaigns

During a relatively short time of an electoral campaign the context characteristics such as the general economic situation or social cleavages within the society usually do not change dramatically, so they cannot directly explain the alternation of party strategy. However, Waismel-Manor et al. (2011) in a study involving measuring the level of cortisol among voters on the election day demonstrate that there is a significant rise of emotional tension in the course of a campaign.

Cortisol has profound consequences for attitude formation and decision-making: it strengthens memory connected with emotions and the propensity to emotional arguments (Kuhlmann & Wolf 2006; Payne et al. 2006; see also Zajonc 1980; Erdley & D'Agostino 1988). When the emotional tension is elevated close to the election day, voters' cognitive abilities are impaired and therefore they will rely on heuristics to a greater extent in their decision-making. This implies that appeals to issues associated with emotions and issues that are cognitively

accessible and strongly related to voters' living conditions should be made closer to the election day, when the emotional stress has been already elevated.

Linking Emotions to Issue Dimensions

Having established the significance of the rise of emotional tension for voter's cognitive capacities, I proceed to linking these prerequisites to the two dimensions of policy issues: interests and values. The question is which of them parties should emphasise more to take advantage of the elevated emotional tension among voters and their tendency to rely on heuristics.

The choice to distinguish these two particular dimensions believed to encompass all the domains of domestic policy follows the approach enrooted well in political science. Since Downs' (1957) seminal book economic postulates have been considered the underpinning of how parties differentiate themselves from others. They encompass the issues of social protectionism, welfare state expansion and protectionism. The political competition in many countries in the late twentieth century relied also on social issues that cannot be linked to economy, such as cultural identity and law and order, regulations associated with family life and sexual morality as well as national and minority rights. They make up the 'values' or 'social' dimension (Kitschelt 1994; Laver & Hunt 1992; Evans & de Graaf 2013).

The very nature of the issues constituting the values dimension suggests that this is the one that ought to be emphasized more when the emotional tension is elevated. Matters of national, ethnic or sexual identity are built into individual conscience during early childhood as a part of primary socialisation and are strong and durable. Social norms, habits and cognitive schemes derived from culture and religion and imprinted at this stage influence one's vision of self and individual lifestyle. These matters are principled in nature and therefore are not subject to negotiation or alteration (Domke et al. 1998; Shah et al. 1996; see also Coser 1964). Trading principles is considered treason, it is not easy to compromise on these matters (Riker 1982). Parties who change their positions on principled matters are punished by voters (Tavits 2007). Because issues related to social values are entrenched in the individual and group identity, they are also easier to politicise (Tavits & Potter 2015: 745) and more accessible when cognitive capacities are impaired due to emotional tension.

These considerations establish a link between value-based political issues and the elevated emotional tension at the end of an electoral campaign and lead to expecting a rise of relative salience of this dimension as the election day approaches. Also the final stage of the campaign is when less politically engaged and less knowledgeable citizens join in and make their elective decisions. They are more likely to rely on heuristics in their decision-making which leads to relying on value-related cues. The less politically sophisticated are also the ones who are less likely to make their decisions basing on the economic factors in general due to their complexity (Basinger & Lavine 2005). This leads to formulating hypothesis H1:

H1: As the election day approaches parties tend to move away from economic interests and turn to issues related to social values instead.

Social and economic conditions and important events contribute both to objective significance and cognitive accessibility of issues associated with them (Aldrich & Griffin 2003: 247; van der Brug & Berkhout 2015; Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2015: 749) so parties devote more attention to them during campaigns (Ansolabehere & Iyengar 1994; Spoon & Klüver 2015) and in their manifestoes (Tavits & Potter 2015). The argument about elevated emotional tension and greater tendency to rely on heuristics at the end of the campaign suggests that the cognitive accessibility generated by contemporary circumstances should be even more influential close to the election day and in regard to less politically knowledgeable voters who join later during the campaign. Thus parties ought to shift towards emphasising issues related to the contemporary context more at the end of the campaign.

Social heterogeneity contributes to greater salience and accessibility of issues associated with the social values dimension. People of different cultural backgrounds who use different languages, profess different religions and follow varying traditions and customs in their everyday life have a greater potential to find themselves in a conflicting situations when living in one country and vary in regard to their political attitudes. The diversity they experience in everyday like contributes to the salience of values for voting decisions. This leads to formulating hypothesis H2:

H2: The tendency to shift party appeals during a campaign from interests to values will be particularly pronounced in countries with high social heterogeneity.

Poverty, alienation and inequality contribute to discontent and political unrest and have been identified as the one of the principle factors driving voting behaviour, political change (Ost 2004; Finseraas 2009; Garand 2010: 1113) and party system polarisation (Pontusson & Rueda 2006; Garand 2010; Tavits & Potter 2015). As the inequality rises the living conditions of the median voter deteriorate leading to greater support of redistributive policies (Meltzer & Richard 1981; Kenworthy & Pontusson 2005; Milanovic 2000). High income inequality also contradicts one of the crucial components of the democratic ideal: the equality of citizens. When people significantly differ in the resources they own, they become unequal in the political domain (Scervini & Segatti 2012; Castillo et al. 2015; Cicatiello et al. 2015). Comparing one's situation with fellow citizens leads to calling for a change and contributes to the salience of economic issues and demand for redistribution (Powell & Whitten 1993; Anderson 2000; Alesina & Rodrik 1994).

The contradiction between inequality and democracy suggest the gap between pragmatic economic interests and principled value-related issues might be not as ample as it seems. Mass poverty and social degradation touches upon the very base of material preservation and individual lifestyle. In extreme cases it endangers one's existence in a capitalist society. Thus high or rising inequality will link emotions to economic issues. As a result vote-seeking parties will be motivated to focus more on the interest dimension at the end of the campaign when the emotional tension is elevated. My argument here does not differentiate whether the inequality is high or it is the rise of the latter that contributes to the cognitive availability of the issues related to the interest dimension. Both should have similar consequences for individual attitudes and party strategy.

These considerations lead to formulation of hypothesis H3:

H3: In times of elevated or rising income inequality parties are expected to shift their appeals towards greater focus on interests at the end of the campaign.

Summing up, the campaign commences with parties presenting their propositions both in regard to interests and values dimension. As the campaign proceeds and the emotional tension rises and voters are more dependent on cognitive accessibility of issues and heuristics, parties switch their focus towards the issues that are more accessible and can be easily associated with emotions. I expect a general tendency to move towards their greater prevalence at the end of the campaign (H1). This tendency ought to be particularly pronounced when cultural divides are

present in the society (H2). However, when the country experiences high or rising levels of inequality, parties will shift towards more emphasis put on economic issues as the election day draws closer (H3).

Data and Methods

The data used to conduct the empirical analysis was gathered as a part of the ‘Where Is My Party? Determinants of Voter Agreement about the Ideological Positions of Political Parties’ project funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). The original data on party behaviour during electoral campaigns was appended with information about competing parties, countries and elections ([Comparative Campaign Dynamics Project](#); [Debus et al. 2016](#)). The CCDP data was collected basing on a comprehensive coding of the content of press articles released in the last month before the elections in 10 European countries: Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In each of the countries data on two elections was gathered, except for the UK, where three elections were included. In each country one right-leaning and one left-leaning daily newspaper was selected. The information on elections and newspaper titles is gathered in Table 1.

Table 1. Daily newspapers and election years included in the study

Country	Daily newspapers		Election years		
Czech Republic	Mladá fronta Dnes	Právo	2010	2013	
Denmark	Jyllands-Posten	Politiken	2007	2011	
Germany	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	Süddeutsche Zeitung	2009	2013	
Hungary	Magyar Nemzet	Népszabadság	2006	2010	
The Netherlands	De Telegraaf	de Volkskrant	2010	2012	
Poland	Gazeta Wyborcza	Rzeczpospolita	2007	2011	
Portugal	Jornal de Notícias	Público	2009	2011	
Spain	El Mundo	El País	2008	2011	
Sweden	Aftonbladet	Dagens Nyheter	2010	2014	
United Kingdom	The Guardian	The Daily Telegraph	2005	2010	2015

Source: Baumann and Gross (2016: 7).

For each newspaper during every included electoral campaign at least 60 articles were coded, which makes at least 240 articles included in the study in each of the countries. All first page articles related to the campaign were coded along with a random sample of articles from further pages. The press articles were coded in regard to their policy-related and valence content in party campaign messages. Coding rules and original data structure have been described by Baumann and Gross (2016).

Main Dependent and Independent Variables

In order to perform the presented analysis of issue dynamics the data on all of the campaign content were aggregated into country-election-party-day units. For each unit I calculated the indicators of salience of interests and values by counting the number of references to issues included in those dimensions. See Table 2 for details.

Table 2. Issue domains included in analysed issue dimensions

Interest dimension	Values dimension
Taxes	Environment
Social Policy/Public Services	Immigration, Asylum
Inflation	Justice System
Unemployment	Law and Order, Security, Terrorism
Other Economic Performance	National Way of Life
Agriculture/Rural Affairs	Traditional Morality, Family Values, Religion

Based on Tavits and Letki (2014) and Baumann and Gross (2016: 7).

Then for each of the units I calculated the percentage of value-related messages in relation to the sum of all interest and value-related messages on that day produced by a given party (expressed as a fraction on a scale from 0 to 1). The aggregation was done separately for self-references and discussions of other parties’ positions. Created datasets were combined, with a total N = 2422. The main dependent variable is therefore the *proportion of value-related messages versus interest-related messages on a given campaign day, separately for self-references and references to others*. These observations are clustered by party making the references and country*election year. The main dependent variable should be interpreted as the total relative emphasis parties give to issues included in the values dimension.

The absolute number of references to all issues was also included in the analysis to control the overall intensity of competition based on emphasising interests and values in the course of the campaign as well as the number of references to valence party characteristics such as party competence, integrity, unity and leader charisma (Clark 2009: 113).

The main explanatory variable captures the *additive inverse (negation) of the number of days until the election*. It varies from -30 to 0 and is labelled as ‘Time’. It should be interpreted as ‘counting down’ the days until the election.

In order to measure the social heterogeneity in the investigated countries I utilise the index of ethnic fractionalisation. It has been found useful in studies of issue competition (Tavits & Letki 2014; Tavits & Potter 2015: 748) as well as in research on the consequences of electoral

laws to represent cultural cleavages (see Amorim Neto & Cox 1997). The data were taken from Quality of Government dataset (Teorell et al. 2017) and were gathered by Alesina et al. (2003).¹

The post-tax Gini index values in the year preceding each election were retrieved from SWIID 5.1 (Solt 2016). In order to grasp the change in the level of inequality I calculated the difference between the level of inequality in the year preceding the election and 5 years before the election. The 4-year span represents the most common length of a parliamentary cadence – a period taken into consideration when making voting decisions. I also follow Finseraas (2009: 96, 101) and utilize the post-tax values of the Gini indicator as they are better to reflect the economic situation of the society than the gross values used in the study by Tavits and Potter (2015: 749). The argument build in the theoretical section of the article does not differentiate between the consequences of the inequality and its growth for party campaigning strategies, therefore I use both indicators.

Controls

First, to ensure that the detected statistical effects are not due to differences in the intensity of the campaign I control for the *total number of references to interests and values* and the *number of valence mentions* made on a given election day (in a given country during a given election). I control for these two factors as they may be related to the rise of emotional tension and voters' propensity to rely on heuristics when making their voting decisions. At this level I also introduce the 'Self' variable which is a dummy denoting if the reference was made to the party making it (code '1') or another political actor (code '0').

At the level of political actors I take into account if the party belongs to the right side of the ideological spectrum. Studies by Spoon and Klüver (2014) and Tavits and Potter (2015) demonstrated that programmatic strategies of rightist parties in regard to interests and values dimension are distinct from others as they are both more responsive to shifts and public opinion and tend to draw away public attention from the economic issues which they are disadvantaged on in times of high inequality (see also Adams et al. 2009). *Rightist parties* were coded as '1' basing on the assignment to liberal, Christian Democratic, conservative or nationalist party

¹ Other indicators of cultural divisions such as religiosity and percentage of foreign-born population (see Tavits & Potter 2015: 748) cannot be used for the studied set of countries, because their distributions includes significant outliers such as the case of Poland with very high religiosity (52.7% attending religious services at least once a week according to EVS 1981-2008 dataset) and very low-foreign born population (1.75%; OECD 2017) in comparison to other countries in the sample.

families in Comparative Manifesto Project and all other parties – as ‘0’ (Tavits & Potter 2015: 749; Volkens et al. 2017).

Moving to party system level controls it is important to note a widely held expectation derived from the works of Downs (1957) and Sartori (1976) that parties in two-party systems are expected to focus on a single economic dimension and multiparty constellations allow for more issues to emerge. Thus I included an indicator of *party system fragmentation* (the **Effective Number of Electoral Parties**; Laakso & Taagepera 1979) in the analysis. The ENEP data were taken from the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al. 2016) and supplemented with my own calculations. Also when testing hypotheses associated to the indicators of inequality I control for the *level of development* represented by logged GDP per capita (World Bank 2016).

All models have been estimated with a three-level random intercept linear regression with subject*days (N1=2422) nested within parties (N2=147) nested within country*elections (N3=21), using xtmixed command in Stata 12.

Results

Models 1 and 2 (Table 3) were estimated to test the hypothesis H1 expecting a general tendency for parties to focus on values more as the election day approaches. Model 1 includes only level-1 and level-2 controls and Model 2 is expanded by adding covariates representing social heterogeneity as well as the level of inequality and logged GDP per capita.

Both models lead to same conclusion regardless of the inclusion of level-3 controls. Hypothesis H1 is rejected and the data exhibit a weak tendency for the parties to emphasise issues related to economy more as the election day approaches (significant at $p < 0.1$). However this tendency is dependent exclusively on the inclusion of Poland in the studied sample. If Poland is excluded from the analysis, the detected dependency is no longer statistically significant.

Table 3. Salience of value-related issues in party campaigning

Dependent variable: Relative salience of values	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Time	-0.00183* (0.000952)	-0.00179* (0.000951)	-0.00278* (0.00163)
Ethnic fractionalisation (scale 0-1)		0.535** (0.215)	0.610** (0.237)
Time*Ethnic fractionalisation (scale 0-1)			0.00611 (0.00817)
Gini (scale 0-100)		-0.0139 (0.00956)	-0.0137 (0.00958)
Logged GDP per capita		0.205** (0.0868)	0.205** (0.0870)
Self	0.0163 (0.0174)	0.0171 (0.0174)	0.0172 (0.0174)
Total salience of issues	-0.0119*** (0.00359)	0.0121*** (0.00359)	0.0122*** (0.00359)
Salience of palence	-0.00142 (0.00284)	-0.00108 (0.00285)	-0.00110 (0.00285)
Rightist party	0.0631** (0.0284)	0.0570** (0.0284)	0.0574** (0.0284)
ENEP	-0.0203 (0.0204)	0.0679*** (0.0262)	0.0678*** (0.0262)
Constant	0.405*** (0.102)	-1.182 (0.895)	-1.200 (0.897)
lns1_1_1	-2.144*** (0.200)	-2.446*** (0.240)	-2.444*** (0.240)
lns2_1_1	-2.130*** (0.124)	-2.136*** (0.123)	-2.133*** (0.123)
lnsig_e	-1.015*** (0.0149)	-1.014*** (0.0149)	-1.015*** (0.0149)
Observations	2,422	2,422	2,422
Number of parties	147	147	147
Number of groups	21	21	21

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses

Source: own elaboration.

After rejecting H1, H2 is reformulated to expect parties to shift towards greater emphasis of values as the election day approaches in socially heterogeneous countries. Model 3 (Table 3) does not allow to confirm this. The conditional effects of Time depending on the levels of ethnic fractionalisation are insignificant throughout the whole empirical range of the moderating variable except for those between 0.07 and 0.15 that indicate a very slight shift towards a greater salience of interest when ethnic fractionalisation is low (significant at p<0.05). These margins however fail to remain significant after performing robustness tests such as reducing the sample size by deleting some level-3 cases. Thus H2 ought to be rejected.

I proceed to testing the hypothesis H3 expecting a rise of salience of economic issues during a campaign in countries with high or augmenting inequality. Model 4 tests this expectation in regard to the level of post-tax Gini while Model 5 utilises the 4-year change of the latter while controlling for the level of inequality (Table 4).

Table 4. Salience of value-related issues in party campaigning – moderating effects of inequality


Dependent variable: Relative salience of values	Model 4	Model 5
Time	0.0157** (0.00785)	-0.00154 (0.000948)
Gini (scale 0-100)	-0.0213** (0.00997)	-0.0108 (0.00938)
Time*Gini (scale 0-100)	-0.000606** (0.000270)	
Change of Gini		-0.00244 (0.0167)
Time*Change of Gini		-0.00311*** (0.000699)
Ethnicfractionalisation (scale 0-1)	0.512** (0.212)	0.512** (0.202)
GDP growth		
Logged GDP per capita	0.200** (0.0857)	0.230*** (0.0812)
Self	0.0195 (0.0174)	0.0181 (0.0173)
Total salience of issues	-0.0124*** (0.00359)	-0.0116*** (0.00357)
Salience of palence	-0.000754 (0.00285)	-0.000202 (0.00284)
Rightist party	0.0564** (0.0282)	0.0530* (0.0282)
ENEP	-0.0671*** (0.0258)	-0.0579** (0.0251)
Constant	-0.917 (0.891)	-1.579* (0.844)
lns1_1_1	-2.465*** (0.243)	-2.552*** (0.254)
lns2_1_1	-2.143*** (0.124)	-2.145*** (0.123)
lnsig_e	-1.015*** (0.0149)	-1.019*** (0.0149)
Observations	2,422	2,422
Number of parties	147	147
Number of groups	21	21

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses

Source: own elaboration.


Both models indicate the existence of a strong moderating effect of inequality. The interaction term Time*Gini in Model 4 is significant at $p < 0.05$ and Time*Change of Gini in Model 5 at $p < 0.001$ indicating that in each case a unit change of Gini index (Model 4) or Gini Change (Model 5) results in a respective statistically significant change of the conditional effect of Time (Figures 1 and 2). A shift towards greater salience of economic issues during the campaign occurs when Gini is at least 30 on scale 0-100 (coefficient for Time negative and significant at $p < 0.05$). The change of inequality exerts an even more pronounced effect. A rise of the Gini index of at least 0.5 enables a shift towards greater salience of interests during the campaign (marginal effect of Time at this value is negative and significant at $p < 0.005$). Moreover, when inequality decreases by at least -1.5, parties tend to shift towards more emphasis put on the values dimension instead of interests as the election day draws closer – the relevant effect is negative and significant at $p < 0.05$. These results confirm hypothesis H3. The detected statistical relationships are robust to inclusion of different sets of control variables and are invariant of deletion of level-3 observations. The exhibited dynamics described in hypothesis H3 does not differ significantly between rightist and other parties.

Figure 1. Effect of time to election day on relative salience of value references to interests, conditional on economic inequality (post-tax Gini index scale 0-100).



Source: own elaboration.

Figure 2. Effect of time to election day on relative salience of value references to interests, conditional on the 4-year change of economic inequality (post-tax Gini index scale 0-100).



Source: own elaboration.

Further Exploration of the Conditionality of the Dynamics

What might be found puzzling about the results presented so far is the lack of dynamics towards a greater prominence of value-related appeals even in heterogeneous societies despite the strong theoretical arguments behind it. On the other hand it has been found that decreasing inequality enables parties to move their focus away from interests and towards greater prominence of value-related issues at the end of the campaign. This leads to a question whether the rise of salience of value-related appeals at the end of the campaign can be found in heterogeneous societies after the moderating effect of inequality is accounted for, i.e. when the inequalities are not an important problem? I consider this expectation as an supplementary hypothesis H4:

H4: Parties tend to shift towards greater salience of values as the election draws closer in countries with high social heterogeneity only when inequality is low or decreasing.

Table 5. Salience of value-related issues in party campaigning – further exploration

Dependent variable: Relative salience of values	Model 6	Model 7
Time	-0.0206 (0.0132)	-0.00276* (0.00163)
Gini (scale 0-100)	-0.0225* (0.0120)	-0.00544 (0.0103)
Time*Gini (scale 0-100)	0.000570 (0.000455)	
Change of Gini		0.0509* (0.0267)
Time*Change of Gini		0.000393 (0.00115)
Ethnicfractionalisation (scale 0-1)	-1.530 (2.496)	0.498** (0.224)
Time*Ethnicfractionalisation (scale 0-1)	0.261*** (0.0722)	0.00713 (0.00816)
Change of Gini*Ethnic fractionalisation (scale 0-1)		-0.332** (0.135)
Time*Change of Gini*Ethnic fractionalisation (scale 0-1)		-0.0185*** (0.00476)
Gini (scale 0-100)*Ethnic fractionalisation (scale 0-1)	0.0713 (0.0828)	
Time*Gini (scale 0-100)*Ethnic fractionalisation (scale 0-1)	0.00834*** (0.00240)	
Logged GDP per capita	0.0508 (0.104)	0.211*** (0.0790)
Self	0.0208 (0.0173)	0.0186 (0.0173)
Total salience of issues	-0.0125*** (0.00358)	-0.0115*** (0.00357)
Salience of palence	-0.000482 (0.00284)	4.73e-05 (0.00284)
Rightist party	0.0567** (0.0281)	0.0483* (0.0279)
ENEP	-0.0194 (0.0325)	-0.0514** (0.0250)
Constant	0.442 (1.155)	-1.554* (0.835)
lns1_1_1	-2.596*** (0.264)	-2.594*** (0.260)
lns2_1_1	-2.150*** (0.124)	-2.162*** (0.125)
lnsig_e		-1.021*** (0.0149)
Observations	2,422	2,422
Number of parties	147	147
Number of groups	21	21


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses

Source: own elaboration.

Accounting for moderating effects of inequality requires using a three-way interaction and exploring the marginal effects of Time depending on both inequality and ethnic fractionalisation. Thus I estimate Models 6 and 7 to test H4 (Table 5) using the two indicators of inequality: the post-tax Gini index and Gini 4-year change respectively.


Because interpretation of the coefficients of a three-way interaction is anything but straightforward, I proceed to Figures 3 and 4 exhibiting the calculated marginal effects of Time depending on ethnic fractionalisation and Gini index levels and Gini change respectively. Figure 3 shows that when the inequality represented by Gini is below 25 (scale 0-100) and ethnic fractionalisation index equals at least 0.2 (scale 0-1), the conditional effect of Time is positive and the confidence intervals exclude zero which indicates a shift towards greater salience of values as the campaigns proceeds (Model 6). Similarly when Gini decreases by at least -2.5 (scale 0-100) and ethnic fractionalisation is at least 0.2, the predicted margins are positive, confidence intervals exclude 0 and are disjunctive from the ones estimated for a perfectly homogenous society inequality (Model 7 and Figure 4). These results provide some evidence supporting the claim expressed in H4.

Figure 3. Effect of time to election day on relative salience of value references to interests, conditional on economic inequality (post-tax Gini index scale 0-100) and social heterogeneity (ethnic fractionalisation).



Source: own elaboration.

Figure 4. Effect of time to election day on relative salience of value references to interests, conditional on the 4-year change of economic inequality (post-tax Gini index scale 0-100) and social heterogeneity (ethnic fractionalisation).



Source: own elaboration.

Conclusion and Discussion

The article explores the relationship between social and economic context and programmatic dynamics of electoral campaigns in regard to economic issues versus those related to social values. Theoretical argument is built on an assumption of rising emotional tension as the election day approaches and leads the citizens to rely to a greater extent on emotional cues and heuristics in making their voting decisions. Thus parties are expected to adjust their strategies of issue emphasis to take advantage of this tendency by putting greater emphasising on cognitively accessible issues or the ones that can be easily linked to emotions. I argue that while in general these prerequisites are better met by the issues related to the values dimensions due to their non-negotiability and principled character, the decision which issues should be emphasised more at the end of the campaign depends on the context of the campaign, namely social heterogeneity and economic inequality.

The study shows that while there is no general tendency for parties to shift towards a greater prominence of value-related issues, changes of proportion between values and interests depend on inequality. In countries when the latter are high or rising parties tend to focus more on the economy at the end of the campaign than they do further away from the election day. There is no direct effect of social heterogeneity on the dynamics. However a careful scrutiny suggests that after taking into account the moderating effects of both inequality and ethnic fractionalisation a shift towards a greater relative salience of the values dimension occurs if economic inequality is low or decreasing and ethnic fractionalisation relatively high. This last result has to be taken with caution as it was obtained using data from only 21 elections in 10 European countries, so the sample is fairly limited for such a complex set of covariates and interactions.

The results exhibit the importance of economic inequality in determining party strategies. This should not be that surprising given the fact that the period when data were collected (2005-2015) encompasses the greatest economic crisis Europe experienced since the 1930s. It also suggest that while the obtained results exhibit tendencies valid in the recent European context and contribute to a better understanding of factors influencing short-term change of party competition strategies in contemporary democracies, they need to be taken with caution when generalising to other contexts. However uncovering these factors that have been already identified as influencing greatly party strategies in a long-term perspective have an impact on what's happening within a short pre-electoral period is not a surprising result, yet it provides an interesting insight to some patterns of political competition.

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**Barack Obama's Rhetorical Management of
Public Opinion in the Context of Focusing Events**

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Abstract:

This article explores President Barack Obama's management of public opinion regarding his policy towards the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)¹ by analyzing the content of the address delivered on 10 September 2014 concerning the US strategy to defeat ISIL. Set in the context of the Obama administration's approach to American foreign policy and with particular reference to videos released by ISIL showing the execution of US journalists, James W. Foley and Steven Sotloff, the analysis offers insights into how external events affect presidential attention, agendas, and public opinion management.

Key words:

Barack Obama, ISIL, presidential rhetoric, public opinion, focusing event

Introduction

There is a growing body of literature that concentrates on the constructs of the rhetorical presidency and presidential rhetoric. Comprehensive reviews of these studies have been provided by Aune and Medhurst (2008), Dorsey (2002), Medhurst (1996), and Stuckey and Antczak (1998). They have established that much of the scholarly interest in presidential rhetoric commenced with the publication of the essay "The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency" (Ceaser et al. 1981) where basic assumptions were then extended and given formal explanation in *Rhetoric and American Statesmanship* (Thurow & Wallin 1984) and *The Rhetorical Presidency* (Tulis 1987). Among works that have also played an important role in addressing the issue are *Going*

¹ An acronym used by US and UK governments and media to describe the jihadist group which controls large territory of Iraq and Syria. ISIL stands for Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, where al-Sham can be translated as the Levant, which is understood to be comprising what is now Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian Territories and part of south-eastern Turkey, Greater Syria, Syria, or Damascus. Two other terms have been used to describe the group: IS, which stands for Islamic State group, and Daesh, a label that does not have any meaning as a word but sounds similar to an Arabic verb that means to tread, trample down, crush.

Public (Kernell 1997) and *The Sound of Leadership: Presidential Communication in the Modern Age* (Hart 1987). Views contrary to the one which promotes the power of presidential governance through popular leadership have been offered by George C. Edwards, III (1996; 2006) and responses to those views have been made by Medhurst (Aune and Medhurst 2008), Hart (Aune 2008), and Zarefsky (2004). During the past three decades, much information has become available on the genres of presidential discourse (Jamieson & Campbell 2008), presidential crisis rhetoric (Bostdorff et al. 2008; Kiewe 1994), presidential civil rights rhetoric (Aune and Rigsby 2005; Pauley 2001; Windt 1991), presidential relations with Congress (Villalobos et al. 2012; Stuckey et al. 2008; Edwards 1989), with the media (Jamieson 1988; Turner 1985), and with the American public (Beasley et al. 2008; Hogan et al. 2008; Hogan 1997).

To better understand the mechanisms of presidential rhetoric and policies, a point regarding presidential policy leadership of and responsiveness to public opinion needs to be addressed. Findings about the connection between policy and opinion are mixed. The first strand of research reflects the view that presidents tend to respond to the opinion of the masses. Among the most recent research, Canes-Wrone (2015) finds that public opinion preferences translate into policy, which suggests that shifts in opinion are important causes of policy change. At the same time, the author observes a departure of policymakers' views from those of constituents, which indicates a decline in presidential responsiveness to mass opinion. Likewise, Druckman and Jacobs (2011) show congruence between opinion and policy. The authors demonstrate, however, that in maneuvering for political advantage presidents shape their domestic policy statements and craft foreign policy positions to win over only strategic segments of the electorate. Consistent with these findings, Knecht (2010) reports that presidents are attentive and responsive to public opinion especially when it concerns groups whose interest in policy increases and when the impact of those groups on politics rises as elections near. Similarly, Rottinghaus (2010) indicates that presidents lead rather than follow public opinion, attributing the process to a deterioration of the climate of opinion for their actions and a decline in the use of certain communication strategies. In a discussion of resources which presidents use to follow public opinion, Tenpas and McCann (2007) report on unabatedly high presidential spending on polling. Rottinghaus (2007) contributes to findings on presidential use of opinion mail. Druckman and Jacobs (2006) investigate the use of specific and general ideology data.

It is in the second strand of research that the view that presidents do not tend to respond to mass public opinion is placed. For example, Mueller and Stewart (2016a; 2016b) observe that politicians do not tailor policy to opinion. On issues of national security (Goldberg 2016), presidents are likely to counter public perception of what poses a threat to national security than seek to serve it. As another example, Miles (2016) finds that on issues in which the partisan public is divided, such as minimum wage, gender equality, or medical care, presidents are able to lead by policy agenda if they frame their policies consistent with cross-partisan moral foundations. The view that presidents do not yield to public opinion is also represented in the work of Druckman and Jacobs (2015) who argue that presidents make policy by largely manipulating broad public opinion in favor of narrow constituencies. Shapiro (2011) concurs that presidents are more likely to lead by manipulation, persuasion, and deception, responding to the opinions of small segments of voters (wealthy, political elites, insiders, and activists) at the expense of the larger electorate. In an analysis of institutional and political changes in American politics, Jacobs and Shapiro (2002) report that government does not respond to public preferences but creates the appearance of responsiveness. It uses polls and focus groups as resources of information about the language, symbols, and arguments needed to adapt the public's perceptions, understandings, and assessments to pursued policies. Cohen (1999) offers similar findings. His quantitative and qualitative analysis shows that presidents lead opinion on substantive policy issue and follow public preferences on symbolic decisions and actions. They lead when a position needs to be taken and a policy needs to be formulated and legitimated and respond when a problem needs to be identified or when a policy and policymaking process get beyond their interest or control.

The view that circumstances condition presidential responsiveness is reflected in the third strand of research. These studies suggest that responsiveness and leadership vary according to issue type, congressional agenda setting, presidential standing, and electoral cycle. For instance, the results of Asher's (2015) study of public opinion polls indicate that while presidents make themselves responsive to public will on some issues, they refuse to subject their performance to compliance with public wishes about others. More specifically, Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004) point out that presidential responsiveness is high on issues that are close to citizens' everyday lives, such as crime, health, education, and social security, and low on issues that citizens are less familiar with, such as defense, foreign aid, and space. In a debate over responsiveness, Canes-

Wrone and Kelly (2013) consider the role of the partisan composition of Congress. The authors note that presidents are more likely to lead public opinion under conditions of divided government, placing policies on the agenda which do not correspond to public preferences, and follow public opinion under conditions of unified government, offering policy proposals which are aligned with public position-taking. Also of importance to the degree of responsiveness is presidential popularity. Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) find that average presidential approval ratings create the most favorable conditions for presidents to follow opinion. Distinctly high or low popularity discourages following. The level of responsiveness is also reported to be shaped by electoral dynamics. Zaller (2003) observes that sufficient policy levers at reelection time cause presidents to ignore the opinion expressed in the polls and follow the opinion which might be formed in the future in response to presidential decisions and actions. Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) offer similar observations. While reelections incline presidents to enact popular policies, low standing of the challenger with the electorate encourages incumbents to introduce unpopular policy initiatives.

The present analysis falls within the third strand of research, addressing the issue of presidential responsiveness and leadership in the context of tragic events. It attends to President Obama's rhetoric to gain insight into his political performance. This study contributes to the research on the president's discourse and policies to date primarily focused on the analysis of Obama's first-term presidential rhetoric (Murphy 2015; Terrill 2015; Vaughn & Mercieca 2014; Abraham & Smith 2013; Ferrara 2013; Danisch 2012; Leeman 2012; Garvey 2011) and the treatment of his first-term speeches, including the inaugural address (Medhurst 2012; Frank 2011), the State of the Union addresses (Mosley-Jensen 2015; Cox 2012), speeches responding to national tragedies (Amsden 2014; Stuckey & O'Rourke 2014; Frank 2014), dealing with the questions of war and peace (Rhodes & Hlavacik 2015; Reeves & May 2013; Bostdorff 2012; Ivie 2011; Mohammed & Zarefsky 2011; Terrill 2011), facing racial conflicts and race (Dyson 2016; McPhail & McPhail 2011), and tackling health care reform (Rowland 2011). There are three primary goals of the article: 1. To determine whether the president managed public opinion using substantive or symbolic rhetoric. 2. To decide whether the president assumed the role of a leader and a visionary, showing initiative and taking action, or that of a follower, reflecting and reacting to the views of the populace. 3. To ascertain the potential effect of external events on the president's agenda setting. The discussion attempts to provide answers to the following

questions: What accounted for the substantiveness or symbolism of the address? Was the address a demonstration of the president's responsiveness to public expectations or was it an expression of the president's will to maintain responsibility for leadership? Were external events potential triggers for the president's increased attention and agenda setting? This analysis enhances the understanding of the president's political choices with data on his foreign policy rhetoric using Cohen's (1999) study of the content of sentences in the State of the Union Addresses and Ragsdale's (1982) examination of the types of statements in major presidential speeches. This analysis finds that Obama attempted to take a position and lead opinion on US counterterrorism policy. It provides evidence in favor of the assumption that he did not respond to opinion but created the appearance of responsiveness and adapted the public's perceptions and assessments to pursued policies.

Background

Because presidential management of public opinion is mediated by political conditions, the analysis is embedded within a more general discussion of the president's policy and discourse on foreign affairs. Obama entered office with the conviction that terrorism was the greatest threat to US security and with determination to center the administration's efforts on pursuing an effective counterterrorism policy (Stern 2015; McCrisken 2011). The president's comments from the Inaugural Address of 20 January 2009 (Obama 2009b) suggesting that America was "at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred" and followed by the pledge to defeat "those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents" reflect the president's thinking and assert his core imperative. The preferred approach to achieve this goal was to move away from the overuse of and overreliance on force (Stern 2015). "A campaign against extremism," Obama (2009f) argued in a speech on US strategies for Afghanistan and Pakistan on 27 March 2009 delivered in Washington, D.C., "will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone." He called for a broader range of tools. In a commencement address delivered on 28 May 2014 at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York, the president (Obama 2014b) upheld Americas' right to use military force unilaterally if issues of global concern posed a direct threat to its interests, but, he cautioned that they "still need to ask tough questions about whether our actions are proportional and effective and just."

The preferred means of reaching the goal were targeted killing, electronic surveillance, and partnering with countries around the world (Lynch 2015; Stern 2015). Strikes of unmanned aerial vehicles armed with guided missiles to kill terrorist operatives have been ordered under two programs: the Pentagon's program which operates in the recognized war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq under congressional and judicial oversight and the C.I.A.'s program which strikes targets around the world and is classified as covert. Pressed for justification and explanation of how drone strikes were conducted, the president acknowledged in an appearance on 18 October 2012 of *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart* on Comedy Central that "one of the things we've got to do is put a legal architecture in place, and we need Congressional help in order to do that, to make sure that not only am I reined in, but any president's reined in terms of some of the decisions that we're making" (Stewart 2012). Obama (2013a) made his first major comment on the legality of strikes under US and international law in a State of the Union address on 12 February 2013, when he expressed his intention to engage with Congress "to ensure not only that our targeting, detention, and prosecution of terrorists remains consistent with our laws and system of checks and balances, but that our efforts are even more transparent to the American people and to the world." On 22 May 2013, he signed Policy Guidance that provided the framework for governing the use of force in counterterrorism operations outside the United States and made counterterrorism policy standards and procedures clear (Obama 2013e). When referring to the document in remarks delivered a day later at the National Defense University at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C., Obama (2013b) ensured that his "administration has worked vigorously to establish a framework that governs our use of force against terrorists – insisting upon clear guidelines, oversight, and accountability."

The second element of Obama's counterterrorism policy was reliance on electronic surveillance. When on 26 May 2011 Obama signed a four-year extension of the Patriot Act, which expanded the Federal Bureau of Investigation's counterterrorism and surveillance powers, he renewed the provisions for allowing roving wiretaps, government searches of business records, and conducting surveillance on individuals suspected of terrorist-related activities. Commenting on expanded surveillance in the National Defense University speech, Obama (2013b) stressed that there was a need to "keep working hard to strike the appropriate balance between our need for security and preserving those freedoms that make us who we are." In his first comments after reports of government surveillance and collection of information were

revealed, he stated in an exchange with reporters on 7 June 2013 in San Jose, California, that the surveillance programs were overseen by Congress and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) Court (Obama 2013c). He assured that the government “is not abusing [the program] and that it’s being carried out consistent with the Constitution and rule of law.” To reassure the public about the legality of the programs, the president announced a public review of US surveillance programs. At a 9 August 2013 news conference in Washington, D.C., he promised to work with Congress to pursue appropriate reforms to the program that collects telephone records and improve the public’s confidence in the oversight conducted by the FISA Court (Obama 2013d). He said nothing, however, that suggested that he would radically change collection of phone data and surveillance of Internet activities. In a 17 January 2014 speech delivered in Washington, D.C., dedicated to intelligence and electronic surveillance programs, the president (Obama 2014f) restated his case, announcing a new directive for US intelligence activities, greater transparency of American surveillance activities, additional protection for the interception of the communications of foreign targets overseas, amendments to the use of national security letters, and a replacement of the existing bulk telephone collection program. Again, no mention of any major alterations to the mass surveillance was made.

Forming a coalition with countries around the world for the purpose of combating terrorism was the third element of Obama’s counterterrorism policy. In the 2009 State of the Union address the president (Obama 2009a) said that “a new era of engagement has begun.” While promising that the US would not “ignore the foes or forces that could do . . . harm,” he stressed that “America cannot meet the threats of this century alone.” The belief was that working in a coalition with other countries was the means to deal with the danger. In the 27 March 2009 speech, Obama (2009f) made it clear: “Security demands a new sense of shared responsibility.” “This is not simply an American problem.” “As America does more,” he stated, “we will ask others to join us in doing their part.” In a series of speeches delivered in 2009 during his international presidential trips Obama reflected on the theme. In Prague, he insisted that “We must strengthen our cooperation with one another and with other nations and institutions around the world to confront dangers that recognize no borders” (Obama 2009e). In Cairo, he maintained that “we have a responsibility to join together on behalf of . . . a world where extremists no longer threaten our people” (Obama 2009d). In Moscow, he repeated that security from extremism demanded “global partnership.” Much stress was also placed on

partnering with states where terrorist networks operated (Obama 2009c). Explaining the purpose of US missions in the region, Obama denied in his Cairo remarks that Americans “want to keep . . . troops in Afghanistan” and made it clear that Americans would “leave Iraq to Iraqis.” In remarks on the Middle East and North Africa on 19 May 2011 made in Washington, D.C., he expressed the will to partner with Pakistanis, Afghans, and Iraqis to rebuild their economies and promised to show support “based on ensuring financial stability, promoting reform, and integrating competitive markets” (Obama 2011).

When the president (Obama 2014d) announced the return of US forces to Iraq on 13 June 2014 in Washington, D.C., he argued that it was in response to the call of the Iraqi government for assistance in assessing and advising the Iraqi forces as they confronted ISIL. He contended that after considering the gains made by ISIL and the nature of the terrorist organization, there was a need to protect US interests in the region. He emphasized, however, that it was not “a military challenge” and repeated that the United States was not going to involve itself in a military action. “The United States will do our part,” he indicated, but ultimately, “it’s up to the Iraqis, as a sovereign nation, to solve their problems.” In what was claimed to be revenge for US airstrikes, ISIL beheaded two American journalists, James W. Foley and Steven Sotloff. Execution videos were released by ISIL on 19 August 2014 and 2 September 2014, respectively. They were shot at an unknown desert location and lasted a few minutes each. They opened with a blurred shot of Obama speaking about US airstrikes against ISIL. They then cut to Foley and Sotloff dressed in orange jumpsuits kneeling next to a masked, black-clad ISIL fighter where they made their statements. After they stopped, the executioner spoke and started to cut at the hostage’s neck, yet the actual moment of decapitation was not shown. The next shot showed the beheaded corpses and the executioner revealing that ISIL was holding another hostage and warned of his execution.

In the statements made on 7 August 2014 and 28 August 2014 in Washington, D.C., the president (Obama 2014e; 2014c) justified “why we must act and act now.” He contended that targeted airstrikes were authorized to protect US citizens, help Iraqi civilians, and stop ISIL advances in the region. He denied that they were ordered to involve the United States into fighting another war in Iraq. Even as US airstrikes were conducted, he argued, “reconciliation among Iraqi communities and stronger Iraqi security forces” were the only lasting solutions to the problems in the region. Making it clear that any successful strategy needed strong regional

partners, he urged Iraqi leaders to form a government that would be “unified and inclusive” and therefore “more effective in taking the fight to ISIL.” The president adjusted the statements during a national televised address delivered on 10 September 2014, which revised the administration’s objective in its dealing with the threat posed by ISIL in Iraq and Syria and reviewed the steps to achieve it (Obama 2014a).

Gallup polls administered between 7 and 10 August 2014 and between 4 and 7 September 2014 reflect the political environment in which the 10 September 2014 speech was made. Data was collected from Gallup polls on Americans’ satisfaction (*Satisfaction With the United States*; Jones 2014c; Saad 2014), top US problems (McCarthy 2014; Riffkin 2014a; 2014b), and presidential job approval (*Presidential Approval Rating*; *Presidential Ratings – Issues Approval*; Jones 2014b). Their results indicate that over the course of two months, Americans’ satisfaction with the way things were going in the country was relatively stable, measuring 22 percent in August and 23 percent in September. Mentions of foreign policy and war as the most important problems facing the US remained stable too, between six and seven percent mention foreign policy and three percent mention war. Mentions of terrorism and Iraq recorded an increase, from a half percentage point to four percentage points regarding terrorism and from one percentage point to three percentage points regarding Iraq. Presidential job approval ratings did not show major shifts in opinion. Satisfaction with the president’s job performance was within 42 percent in August and 41 in September. When focusing on specifics – the president’s handling of foreign affairs – approval ratings were 36 percent in August and the level of trust in the federal government’s ability to deal with international problems was at a record-low 43 percent in September.

On the question of US military action in Iraq and Syria against ISIL the Gallup poll (Dugan 2014; Jones 2014a; Jones & Newport 2014; Newport 2014) taken between 20 and 21 June 2014 found that 54 percent of respondents disapproved of potential US military actions in Iraq, showing a majority approval for the US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, 61 percent, and a disapproving majority for the US decision to send troops to Iraq in 2003, 57 percent. Ranked among the highest level of disapproval for a new military action Gallup had measured, the lack of approval may have indicated that US citizens were wary of the country’s long engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. A Wall Street Journal (WSJ)/NBC poll (Hook & Lee 2014) conducted between 3 and 7 September, just after the beheading of a second American journalist, showed a

major shift in opinion, finding that 61 percent of respondents considered military action against ISIL to be in the national interest. When asked what military action should be taken against ISIL, 40 percent of those polled said action should be limited to airstrikes only and 34 percent said that it should include both airstrikes and US ground troops. The poll also found that 47 percent thought that the country was less safe than it was before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and 43 percent believed that the US had a national interest in responding to ISIL. A poll conducted by Washington Post and ABC News on 9 September 2014 showed similar findings (Balz & Craighill 2014). It revealed that 91 percent saw ISIL as a threat to the vital interests of the United States. When it came to airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq and Syria, 71 percent supported airstrikes to target the Sunni insurgents in Iraq, and 65 percent supported expanding airstrikes into Syria.

Analysis and Discussion

The speech entitled “United States Strategy to Combat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Terrorist Organization (ISIL)” delivered by President Barack Obama from the State Floor in the White House on 10 September 2014, the eve of the 13th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, is a major presidential address. Coe and Neuman (2011: 731) define a major presidential address as “a president’s spoken communication that is addressed to the American people, broadcast to the nation, and controlled by the president.” Obama’s 10 September 2014 speech meets these criteria. It is a spoken message delivered on the eve of the 13th anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks and only weeks after the release of videos showing the execution of American citizens. It is addressed to the American people, and opens with the familiar phrase “my fellow Americans,” which makes the speaker’s intentions to address a wide audience and make a broad impact explicit. According to 10 September 2014 Nielsen (2014) estimates, the speech was carried live on 14 networks and attracted over 34 million viewers, with a combined household rating of 21.8. Additionally, 4.2 million people saw one or more of the 234,000 Tweets sent about the speech, which increased its potential for the desired outcome. The speech assured message control, that is to say that the organization of the address and the choice of words were carefully planned and rehearsed in advance.

The speech outlined the United States’ plan to “lead a broad coalition to roll back the terrorist threat” with a clear objective to “degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL through a

comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy.” The president (Obama 2014a) described the campaign as “different from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,” assuring that it would not “involve American combat troops fighting on foreign soil” but would “be waged through a steady, relentless effort to take out ISIL wherever they exist, using [US] air power and [US] support for partners’ forces on the ground.” The strategy had four core elements: systematic airstrikes against ISIL, increased support to forces fighting the terrorist organization on the ground, the use of substantial counterterrorism capabilities to prevent ISIL attacks, and humanitarian assistance to the civilians displaced by the terrorist organization. As part of the strategy, Obama asked Congress for “additional authorities and resources” to support the Syrian opposition and advised the American public that the effort “to eradicate a cancer like ISIL” would take time. “And any time we take military action,” he continued, “there are risks involved, especially to the service men and women who carry out these missions.” The speech closed with an emphasis on the leading position that the United States presented in the areas of technology, industry, education, energy, and employment and on the leadership role that it played in helping Ukraine defend itself from Russian aggression, helping to fight the outbreak of Ebola, helping to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons, preventing the massacre of the Yazidis, and helping Muslim communities fight against terrorism. “Our endless blessings bestow an enduring burden,” Obama said, but “we welcome our responsibility to lead. . . . That is the difference we make in the world.”

Evidence for when the president spoke substantively and symbolically and therefore when he led and followed the public was collected using Cohen’s (1999) study of the content of presidential sentences in the State of the Union Addresses. Distinction was made between two types of presidential sentences: substantive sentences in which the president took a position on the issue and symbolic sentences in which the president only mentioned a policy. Raising ideological debate or offering details concerning a policy were considered to be forms of substantiveness as they informed about the policy direction that the president planned to take, while mere references to a policy were regarded as symbolic actions. An analysis by Ragsdale (1982) of the types of statements in major addresses provided additional information. Ragsdale distinguishes three types of presidential statements: policy actions, which include promises and achievements; policy discussions, which include descriptions of national facts, situations, and backgrounds; and non-policy remarks. Substantive tone was found in sentences which offered a

specific position on an issue or a policy detail, while symbolic emphasis was captured in sentences which merely referred to a policy area. The proportion of policy to non-policy sentences determined the overall sense of the emphasis of the president's address.

To capture the tone of the speech, each sentence was aligned against both its substantive and symbolic dimensions. Sentences in which symbol overrode substance were coded symbolic, while sentences in which the substantive aspect was more important were coded substantive. For example, the sentence "I have made it clear that we will hunt down terrorists who threaten our country, wherever they are" was coded symbolic because it mentioned the president's general policy goal, while the sentence "That means I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq" was coded substantive because it specified what form the policy was planned to take and where it was planned to be implemented. Sentences which presented an achievement, as exemplified in the sentence "We took out Usama bin Laden and much of Al Qaida's leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan," or a promise, as illustrated by the sentence "This is a core principle of my Presidency: If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven," were categorized as policy actions. Sentences which referred to facts, as seen in the sentence "Last month, I ordered our military to take targeted action against ISIL to stop its advances," or described backgrounds, as evident in the sentence "Over the last several years, we have consistently taken the fight to terrorists who threaten our country," were classified as policy discussions.

The speech was coded by the author and two additional coders to establish inter-coder reliability. Each coder examined the speech and was required to mark the sentences as either substantive or symbolic. Additionally, for substantive sentences two categories were provided: policy action and policy discussion. Inter-coder reliability for the substantive-symbolic category was high, with 97 percent of the sentences coded consistently across the three coders. For the policy action-policy discussion category, inter-coder reliability was also high, with 98 percent of the sentences coded consistently across the three coders. The percentage of the substantive-symbolic category was calculated by dividing the number of sentences meeting the criteria for substantive or symbolic sentences by the total number of sentences in the speech. The percentage of the policy action-policy discussion category was calculated by dividing the number of sentences meeting the criteria for policy action or policy discussion sentences by the total number of substantive sentences in the speech.

The results of the analysis suggest that Obama was considerably substantive in his address. 85 percent of the sentences were found to be substantive and 15 percent symbolic. 43 percent of the sentences in the speech that were substantive addressed policy discussion, and 42 percent targeted policy action. These figures are close to ones that Ragsdale (1982) reports in a study that uses the State of the Union addresses and other major speeches. Ragsdale's study finds that 62 percent of statements are of policy discussion, 24 percent are of policy action, and 14 percent are non-policy statements. The findings regarding policy action are also similar to ones that Cohen (1999) presents in a study that uses the State of the Union address. The results show that 31 percent of sentences are policy action, though the percentage ranges from 13 to 58 percent.

These results allow for a consideration of the questions behind presidential management of public opinion. Did the president respond to public opinion or did he provide policy leadership? Did he follow public demand or did he offer to lead? The idea suggested in this article hypothesises that Obama attempted to take a position and lead opinion. He did not respond but created the appearance of responsiveness and adapted the public's perceptions and assessments to pursued policies (Jacobs & Shapiro 2002).

The president attempted to take a position when he announced that the US "will lead a broad coalition to roll back this terrorist threat" and "will degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy." Given that the process of building the case for an international coalition against ISIL was initiated at the onset of Obama's presidency, the announcement to lead a global partnership against terrorism appeared to mark the culmination of the campaign rather than its launch.

The president also offered to lead when he stated that "we will expand our efforts beyond protecting our own people and humanitarian missions" and "will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq;" "we will increase our support to forces fighting these terrorists on the ground" and "will send an additional 475 service members to Iraq;" "we will continue to draw on our substantial counterterrorism capabilities to prevent ISIL attacks" and "will redouble our efforts to cut off [ISIL] funding, improve our intelligence, strengthen our defenses, counter [ISIL] warped ideology, and stem the flow of foreign fighters into and out of the Middle East." Framed in terms of expansion, increase, and continuation, the policy proposals seemed more of a demonstration of a gradually developed foreign policy leadership than a

sudden reaction to public expectations of following. The president's decisions to deploy several hundred American service members to Iraq and conduct several hundred airstrikes in Iraq in June 2014 – a month before the execution videos were released – suggest that Obama pursued a course set to lead and shape public policy judgment rather than follow public opinion concerns.

The president exercised statesmanship when he spoke substantively – 85 percent of the sentences in the address were found to be substantive and previous research has established that speaking substantively to the public signals presidential leadership (Cohen 1999). When Obama explained that the proposed campaign was “consistent with the approach I outlined earlier this year: to use force against anyone who threatens America’s core interests” and “mobilize partners wherever possible to address broader challenges to international order,” he rationalized and justified the proposed course of action, which reinforces the message that his conduct and performance of public policy were in response to a political plan pursued with firmness and not a response to public will.

Account should also be taken of the Gallup trends in opinions that the American public was not then expressing a sustained desire for military action in the region. While the president assured that “American forces will not have a combat mission” and “will not get dragged into another ground war,” creating the appearance of responsiveness to public sentiment against the United States getting involved in Iraq again, he declared that the US would continue to wage the counterterrorism campaign “through a steady, relentless effort to take out ISIL wherever they exist, using our air power and our support for partners’ forces on the ground” – a declaration which was much in line with what he had set out to do than with what public opinion had expected him to do.

Two more considerations set the stage for leadership. First, halfway into his second term, the president was on the point in the electoral cycle in which he did not seem to be driven by the incentives to win votes, though his standing was likely to affect his party in the 2014 midterm elections. As the pressure of re-election receded, creating conditions conducive to raising issues that do not gather votes, his motivation and goal seemed to be public support which could be realized in the long term, unlike support that comes from responding to the public and is realized in the short term. Given the nature of Obama’s decisions and actions, it can be assumed that he considered them in relation to the implications they had for future public support and securing historic reputation (Cohen 1999).

Second, Obama faced low job performance ratings and recorded low confidence in the government's ability to handle international issues. While some research shows that low job ratings encourage presidents to respond to public demand (Stimson et al. 1995), other studies demonstrate that public opinion has little impact on presidential foreign policy activity and no impact on the use of force (Brace & Hinckley 1992). This analysis tends towards the latter view, considering that Obama announced decisions to take action against ISIL in Iraq and Syria and to increase US presence in Iraq against the then public sentiment. As Gallup polls show, there was no major shifts in opinion reported after the delivery of the speech. Satisfaction with the president's job performance was within 42 percent in August to 41 percent in September and October, approval of the president's handling of foreign affairs was within 36 percent in August to 31 percent in November, and support for the president's dealing with terrorism was within 42 percent in August 2014 to 41 percent in August 2015. Were the speech a direct response to the president's low poll ratings regarding his job performance, handling of foreign affairs, and/or dealing with terrorism and was designed to increase his popularity, it would stir a change in opinion towards an increase in public support for the proposed policies. Relatively stable approval ratings, however, run counter to the view that the president was more interested in popularity than actual leadership and support the assumption that the address was that of a leader, taking initiative, rather than of a follower, seeking approval.

Past research shows that foreign policy is a policy area with which citizens are less familiar, in which they expect presidential initiative, and for which they place responsibility on the president (Erikson et al. 1991). It is an area in which presidents have been most able to restructure public opinion (Cohen 1999). Moreover, foreign policy events create conditions that encourage presidents to demonstrate themselves as strong leaders and to persuade the public to follow them (Welch 2003b). International situations that threaten the mass public alongside matters that engage the public's interests and affect its well-being increase receptivity to presidential decisions and actions (Ostrom & Simon 1989; Edelman 1964, 1974). This research suggests that the ISIL video executions should have triggered the president's increased attention and affected his agenda. The assumption made in this article is that the ISIL beheadings worked as a focusing event, defined by Birkland (1997: 22) as a "sudden, relatively rare" event, which "can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms, inflicts harms or suggests potential harms that are or could be concentrated on a definable

geographical area or community of interest, and is known to policy makers and the public virtually simultaneously.” The ISIL beheadings had these characteristics because they were rare and unexpected. They manifested harm and showed potential for greater future harm. They were revealed to the public and policy makers at the same time. The proposition is that the beheadings provided the reinforcement for the announcement of a broad US campaign against ISIL targets.

The impact of rare and sudden events on individual attitudes and institutional behaviors has been studied by many social scientists. Cob and Elder (1983: 83) examined “circumstantial reactors” to see how issues are created. Kingdon (1984: 99) used the term “focusing events” to describe events which attract the attention of the public and bring about policy change. Stone (1989: 282) analyzed how “causal ideas” transform difficulties into political problems. Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 10) referred to “external force” to explain increased attention to a problem and change. Also, Sabatier and Weible (2007: 198-199) considered “external shocks” to be responsible for shifts in public attention and agendas. Birkland (1997: 29-35) identifies two kinds of reactions: extensive media coverage about the event and long-term policy reaction. Three elements determine media coverage: the scope of the event, the type of harm, and the rarity of the event. The long-term policy reaction is shaped by the scope and rarity of the event as well as by the amount of news coverage and the extent to which group attitudes and group mobilization influence attention to the problem. The present discussion focuses only on the first cycle of reaction. As Birkland (1997: 30-32) explains, news media have a greater ability to shape public attitudes. They affect people beyond those directly involved, have the capacity to manifest the harm inflicted by the event, and exploit the drama and symbolism that a given event can create.

A content analysis of media coverage indicates extensive reporting of the beheadings. The videos, which were initially uploaded to YouTube and Twitter, were widely circulated over other social media, including Facebook and Instagram. Breaking news about the executions appeared on all major television networks, including ABC News, CBS News, CNN, Fox News, and NBC. Top US newspapers, including *USA Today*, *The New York Times*, and *The Wall Street Journal*, offered extensive coverage of the events. As an 11 September 2014 poll conducted by the NBC News/*Wall Street Journal* (Wemple 2014) revealed, ISIL beheadings got the highest penetration of any news event since 2009. 94 percent of Americans reported having seen or heard the news about the killings. In polls taken in September through November 2014, Gallup

(Jones & Newport 2014) found that 50 percent of Americans described ISIL as a critical threat to US interest, with an additional 31 percent saying ISIL was an important threat. 60 percent of Americans approved US military actions in Iraq and Syria and 40 percent supported sending US ground troops to the region. The polls (McCarthy 2014; Riffkin 2014a; 2014b) also found that mention of foreign policy issues as the most important problems facing the US fell from six percentage points to three percentage points and mention of terrorism fell from four percentage points to three percentage points, but mention of the situation in Iraq/ISIS continued to rise by another two percentage points to five percentage points.

Conclusion

This article has explored President Obama's management of public opinion on his policy towards ISIL in the context of the president's approach to foreign policy and with particular reference to the videos showing the execution of two US journalists. It has argued that Obama took a position and led opinion on the US stand against ISIL, that he did not follow the public but created the appearance of responsiveness, and adapted the public's expectations and concerns to pursued policies. Using Cohen's study of the content of presidential sentences, the article has found that the president managed the public using predominantly substantive rhetoric. The substantiveness of the speech almost entirely accounted for presidential attention to policy discussion and policy action. External events have been found to trigger the president's increased attention and agenda setting. The content analyses of media coverage and polls suggest that the execution videos have created cause, determined public concern, and afforded the president an opportunity to follow his policy course. They have sustained the public fear of ISIL and support for US military actions in Iraq and Syria and have reinforced the president's commitment to announce comprehensive US counterterrorism policy, thus increasing US military involvement in the region. The findings of this investigation support those of earlier studies, in that presidents lead opinion on substantive policy issue, conduct and perform public policy in relation to the implications they have for public support in the long term, and take positions on issues which accommodate both their foreign policy objectives and public concerns. They provide an enhanced understanding of how Obama managed public opinion in his second-term when he was free of political constraints: he did not have to stand for reelection and could focus on actions that defined the legacy of his administration. Although the findings have been based on a single

case study and on limited qualitative and quantitative data, they still contribute evidence that suggests that second-term presidents face different incentives than polls and ratings regarding public opinion management. The results of this study also support the idea that external events affect public opinion and policy course through the media which have the potential to reflect and exploit the drama that tragic events create. They provide additional evidence with respect to the role tragic events play in promoting policy change and creating opportunities for new policy outcomes. An issue that was not addressed in this study concerned the long-term policy reaction. As Birkland (1997: 30) states, “the greater amount of activity in the two phases usually occur during a two-year post-event period.” While “the news media, because of news-gathering norms and imperatives, concentrate on immediate, sudden events and devote considerable attention to them for a very short time before turning to the next important news event,” institutions are “constrained by their rules, procedures, and folkways, and often cannot react as rapidly as the news media.” Following from this, questions about the effects of the policy were not addressed. A longer-term perspective is needed to explain and understand the many push and pull forces that impel institutions to act upon a problem.

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**Albanian Minority questions in Macedonia:
Selected Issues**

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Abstract:

In the article I tried to select the most important issues and events related to the Albanian minority question in Macedonia. In the very beginning I explain the origin of the name Macedonia, the location of Macedonia and roughly summarize its way to independence in the 90's. Then I elucidate where the Albanian minority in Macedonia came from and why the conflict in Tetovo broke out. At the end I try to chronologically describe the events from 2001 that had impact on today's political situation in the state with special regard to the political crisis that lasted from 2014 to the implementation of the law guaranteeing Albanian as the second official language in Macedonia.

Key words:

Macedonia, Albanian minority, identity, conflict

Introduction

The etymology of the term *Macedonia* (Macedonian: *Македонија*, Greek: *Μακεδονία*, Latin: *Macedonius*) is under discussion, for instance a *Greek-English Lexicon* explains that the term derives from the Greek adjective *makednos* (*μακεδνός*) which means *tall* and defines a kingdom named after the ancient Macedonians (Liddell & Scott 1940). Nonetheless, *Online Etymology Dictionary* states that the term *Macedonia* comes from Proto-Indo-European root *mak-* means *long, thin, tall* and suffix *don-* means *land*, therefore it's literally *highlanders* or *the tall ones* (Douglas 2001).

The Republic of Macedonia or the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is located in the Balkan Peninsula. The country has an area of 25,713 km², population around 2.2 million and borders with Greece to the south, Albania to the west, Serbia and Kosovo to the north and Bulgaria to the east (Kawka & Płaneta 2013: 23). It comprises of the Republic of Macedonia

(land of Vardar Macedonia) which covers the north-western part of geographical Macedonia and other regions such as The Blagoevgrad District in southwestern Bulgaria (Pirin Macedonia), and the district of Makedhonia in the province of Northern Greece (Aegean Macedonia).¹

A trial of dissolution of Yugoslavia – a creature of Tito, which conglomerated six republics together – has began in 1991. A popular saying stated that Yugoslavia is a country with seven borders, six republics, five nations, four languages, three religions, two alphabets and one leader (Szczesio 2013: 180). After Tito died, the nationalist parties whose main aim was the separation from Yugoslavia, came to power in Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina. Therefore, the bloody conflict in this countries has started.

It was not alike in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia because most of population nourished the nostalgic feelings about Tito and the Yugoslav welfare system (Brunnbauer 2003: 161). In September 1991, an independence referendum was held in Macedonia and was approved by 96.4% of voters. It is possible that the referendum question had some impact on the results due to its construction: *Are you for a sovereign and independent state of Macedonia, with a right to enter into any alliance with sovereign states of Yugoslavia?* However, it is worth mentioning that the turnout was only 71.6%. The reason was the case of Albanian minority who boycotted the referendum because they did not want to separate from the families they had in Kosovo (Majewski 2013:128).

Thus, after Macedonia gained full independence, new questions arise. The name issue with Greece, unwillingness of Bulgaria to recognize independent Macedonian language and nation, the Serbian pretention towards the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Already in February 1992, Macedonian Interior Minister Ljubomir Frčkovski said: *"Serbia recognizes the existence of a nation, but does not accept the Macedonian state, Bulgaria recognizes Macedonia as a state, but does not recognize the nation, and Greece does not accept the state or the Macedonian people"* (Stets 1992: A01). Additionally there was one more issue with Macedonian-Albanian relations and the problem of the Albanian as a second language in Macedonia.

The aim of the article is to present selected issues with the Albanian minority living in Macedonia. The dissertation has been divided into four parts. The first one describes issues related to the national identity of Macedonians, which complexity and problems affect today's events. In this part, the author defines the concept of identity and evokes events that influenced

¹ These lands were divided into three countries (Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece) after 1912 and 1913, as a result of the Balkan wars (Kawka & Płaneta 2013: 24).

its formation. In the second part the reasons related to the appearance of the Albanian minority, its population and the resulting animosities are explained. This part is an introduction to the third and the fourth part, which present the events of the conflict in Tetovo and contemporary events that have influenced the problems studied in this article.

Macedonian identity

National identity can be defined as a relation of the nation to oneself or collective self-knowledge and a possibility of identification of members of the community (Wojtaszczyk & Jakubowski 2007: 187). In Ottoman Macedonia the Slavs did not have clearly developed feeling of national identity (Stojanovski et al. 2014: 300). Individual units felt attached to their tribes, families and churches but not to the whole nation of Macedonia.

One of the elements which affect the formation of identity is religion. Thus, Macedonian models of self-identification were shaped by neighbouring Churches such as the Patriarchy of Constantinople, Bulgarian Exarchate, Serbian and Greek Autocephalous Churches. However, *Some of them may have had strong feelings of loyalty towards Greece or Bulgaria, when were asked who they are, many insisted on that they always were "Christians"* (Mazover 2000: 219).

Another identity binder is the state in the economic and social sense, but also its lack. Very often the national identity is getting stronger when the attributes of the independence are at risk, since the lack of future outlooks and the myths of *golden past* influence the identity connected to a given nation among the members of community (Sielska 2016: 141).

Nation and identity were developed on the Balkan Peninsula in the 19th century. This coincided with the era of Romanticism and *Volkgeist*, which made people think about their nationality. The Macedonian proto-nationalism developed simultaneously with the other Balkan nations. At the same time the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization was created, and it gave an impulse to the first Iliden Uprising in 1903 against Ottomans.

After two Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, most of the Macedonian territories were divided between Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. The territory of the modern Macedonian state² was annexed by Serbia and named "Southern Serbia". Thereafter Serbia started anti-Bulgarian campaign which was based on the fact that they wanted to build new Macedonian identity. They started systematic repressions of the Bulgarian activists, altering family surnames, and internal colonisation (Катарциев 2000: 329).

² Vardar Macedonia.

In 1944 the *Anti-Fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia* (ASNOM) proclaimed the People's Republic of Macedonia, *belonging to ethnic Macedonians* as part of the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the same assembly approved Macedonian language, the idea of equality of nations and their right to self-determination within the future state was promoted in Yugoslavia. Bulgarian and Greek nationalists, who proclaim that Macedonia is not an independent nation, insist that Macedonian identity rose because of Serbian propaganda.

After VMRO-DPMNE (eng. *Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity*, мац, *Внатрешна македонска револуционерна организација – Демократска партија за македонско национално единство*), a national party came to power, and the myths and symbols revived anew. In 2007, the authorities changed the name of the airport to the Alexander the Great and put ancient artefacts in front of the Council of Ministers building. It was the process of conducting the so-called "Anti-image" of the Macedonian identity, which was to refer to the ancient Macedonia and the discovery of a true Macedonian identity, which was based on the creative coexistence among contemporary Macedonians, anti-Macedonian and Slavic genes and ancient cultural heritage. The system of education and the basis of teaching were also subjects to changes (Brunnbauer 2003). In 2014 the "Skopje 2014" project was started, under which the centre of the capital acquired ancient features.

Albanian minority in Macedonia

Albanians are the largest minority in the Republic of Macedonia. According to the census of population households in the republic of Macedonia in 2002, 25.2 percent of the population consider themselves as Albanians (*Census of Population...*). Unfortunately, no censuses were made in the following years. However, in Macedonia there are more and more Albanians strongly identifying themselves with their nationality. The most influential factors here are the patriarchal family model and high birth rate. That is why the Albanian minority issue in Macedonia becomes more and more visible in the society.

Albanian minority is aggregated in the northwest of the country and in a region close to the capital Skopje. This nation appeared in Macedonia already in the Ottoman era, between the 19th and 20th century. Moreover, Ottoman Turks supported the settlement of Albanians because they willingly changed their religion to Islam and they filled the ranks of the Ottoman army (Stawowy-Kawka 1996: 81-93).

The diminishment of the Albanian population in Macedonia was visible since 1912. This was caused by the decision to create a state Albania. However, during the Second World War and also afterwards the migration of Albanians to the People's Republic of Macedonia intensified.

The next increased migrations waves took place after Macedonia gained full independence. After a trial of dissolution of Yugoslavia many Albanians migrated to their families in Macedonia, but also escaped from military activities in Kosovo and later Serbia (about 300,000 refugees) (Majewski 2013: 162).

It is worth pointing out that Albanians have built political groups representing their socio-economic interests and taking part in consecutive parliamentary elections beginning from 1990. Albanians have built several political groups, notwithstanding three are the most important parties: The Party for Democratic Prosperity (*Partija za demokratски prosperitet – ПДП, Partija za demokratski prosperitet – PDP*), and contemporary major parties: Democratic Union for Integration - DUI (*Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim/ Demokratska Unija za Integracija/ Демократска Унија за Интеграција*), Democratic Party of Albanians - DPA (*Partia Demokratike Shqiptare/ Demokratska Partijana Albancite/ Демократска Партија на Албанците*).

Significant problems with Albanians appeared after the right-wing Prime Minister Ljubčo Georgievski, famous for his anti-Albanian rhetoric, came to power (Wojnicki 2016: 164). The ethnical conflict was looming. In addition, the matter strengthened the disagreement between the Albanians on their social status and economic and democratic problems in the state (Гроздановска Димишковска 2010).

Battle of Tetovo and Ohrid Agreement

On February 16, 2001, armed groups of NLA³ attacked the Macedonian police stations in the village near Tetovo, killing one police officer and injuring three others. Then the military conflict known as a Battle of Tetovo began. Military operations took place in the areas of Tetovo, Kumanovo and at north Macedonia, until August 2001, when agreement in Ohrid was signed.

³National Liberation Army (Albanian: Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombëtare - UÇK; Macedonian: Ослободителна народна армија - ОНА, Osloboditelna narodna armija – ONA) also known as the Macedonian UÇK, is the Albanian terrorist organization that operates in Macedonia with Kosovo Liberation Army. Its goal is to create the “Grater Albania” - an irredentist concept of lands that are considered to form the national homeland by many Albanians, including Kosovo and the Preševo Valley of Serbia, territories in southern Montenegro, Northwestern Greece and a part of Western Republic of Macedonia (Kędziora-Płachciak 2015: 263).

The first sign of the NLA activity was the message from January 2000, that: *All armed attacks near Skopje in January and the killing of policemen in the village near Kičevo and the destruction of the police station was the work of the Albanians*” (Stawowy-Kawka 2016: 47). They added that the negotiations will be no longer conducted because they were ignored. Thereafter, until 2001 bomb attacks took place in Macedonian cities and at Kosovo-Macedonian border.

According to the Ministry of Defence and Kosovo Force (KFOR) the Albanian armed forces, Commanded by Ali Ahmeti, numbered about 8,000 people. A large group of warriors were radical Albanians from Macedonia or neighbouring countries, especially from Kosovo. Just as every terrorist organisation has been successful in recruiting young and unemployed people. In the initial phase of the conflict the goal of NLA was to overthrow the “occupation” power in Skopje and the territories where most Albanians lived (Stawowy-Kawka 2016: 50-51). They also wanted to establish the Albanian power and most probably to create Great Albania.⁴

After the Yugoslav Army, the Macedonian Army was very weak and practically devoid of equipment. Fifteen thousand soldiers served in the army and at the helm, according to the constitution, was the contemporary President of Macedonia – Boris Trajkovski (Valecki 2013).

During the conflict, the NLA attacked police stations, military units, communication routes and Macedonian population, forcing them to escape from areas mostly inhabited by Albanians. Thus, until March 14-16, the area of Tetovo was taken over. After that, the Macedonian Government announced the mobilization, however, due to the NATO and EU pressure they did not introduce martial law (Petrovski 2006: 16). Global public opinion was afraid that the conflict will escalate on to the whole country.

Military operations lasted whole March and April, bringing the state to paralysis and social discontent. In Bitola and Skopje people went out to protest against Albanians in Macedonia. Therefore, on 8th May 2001, President Trajkovski decided to engage in a new offensive against the NLA – “MX-2”, in order to drive them out of their strongholds in the villages north of Kumanovo. The action was unsuccessful, because the authorities in Macedonia were afraid of the increased number of victims among civilians. Albanian fighters took hostages and used them as living shields (Stawowy-Kawka 2016). As a consequence, a great coalition was

⁴ The concept of lands that in future will create Great Albania based on regions like Kosovo and the Preševo Valley of Serbia, territories in southern Montenegro, northwestern Greece and western part of Republic of Macedonia.

formed with the Albanian opposition party - DPD. The negotiations were led by Anna Lindh and Javier Solana and were successful but just for a short term.⁵

At the time, Ali Ahmeti sought support among Albanians parties in Macedonia. On May 22, the leading political leaders of DPA and PDPD met with representatives of the NLA in Prizren in Kosovo and the agreement was signed. The desire for peace was clearly outlined but amendments to the Constitution of Macedonia were an ultimatum for the completion of military operations. One of the points was to recognize the Albanian language as official in Macedonia (Iseini et al. 2008: 22-23).

The negotiations were resumed in June, but there was still no peace. The Ohrid Framework Agreement put an official end of the armed conflict. On August 13, 2001, the amendments to Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia were approved and signed in Ohrid. It is worth mentioning that agreement was signed under the influence of NATO and the European Union. The Macedonian side was represented by the VMRO-DPMNE and the SDSM⁶, while the Albanian side was represented by two Albanian parties - the DPA and the PDP. The NLA was included neither in the negotiations, nor in the signing of the document. The Ohrid Agreement contained⁷:

1. Reinstatement of the terms *national minority, Macedonian people, nationalities*, replacing it with *majority population, communities and communities not in the majority*.
2. Ethnic communities were granted the right to receive higher education in their own language, finance from the state budget.
3. *Communities* gained their representatives (in proportion to their number) in offices, courts, police and army.
4. The provision in Constitution that Macedonians were state-building nation was abandoned.
5. It was written down from the Constitution that the Macedonian Orthodox Church was the most important religious community in the country.
6. An official language was introduced in municipalities, where over 20 per cent of the population is not of Macedonian origin (this applies mainly to Albanians) (Brunnbauer 2002).

⁵ Anna Lindh was in that term Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sweden and Javier Solana was The EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Stawowy-Kawka 2016: 57).

⁶ SDSM (eng. *Social Democratic Union of Macedonia*, мац. *Социјалдемократски сојуз на Македонија*, *Socijaldemokratski sojuz na Makedonija*) is the main left-wing party in Macedonia. The party was established in 1991 due to transformation of the Macedonian Communist Party (Wojnicki 2016: 161-162).

⁷ The author of the article decided to point out only those provisions which were considered crucial for the article and issue.

As a consequence, the conditions of peace were introduced and the autonomy of the Albanians was broadened. Lubčo Georgevski was criticized by all political options in Macedonia and VMRO – DPMNE failed at the elections in 2002 (Majewski 2013: 165-166).

Contemporary issues of the Albanian minority in Macedonia

After the conflict and the Ohrid Agreement, Ali Ahmeti formed his own party – Democratic Union for Integration and in elections to the legislature on 15 September, 2002, won 11.9% of the popular vote (70% of Albanian votes). Furthermore, from 2002 to 2006 DUI was in the ruling coalition with SDSM and Liberal Democratic Party. New Prime Minister, Branko Crvenkovski, was a champion of the Macedonian and Albanian rapprochement.

Due to the new political reality and an open dialogue between the authorities and the Albanian minority, on April 1, 2004, the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union (signed in 2001) came into force (Lubik-Reczek 2011: 209). It was a real success for Macedonia due to the internal conflict and ethnic tensions inside the country.

After the aircraft crash in 2004, in which President Boris Trajkovski died ⁸, Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski took part in the election of the President of the Republic of Macedonia, and won it. Vlado became the president of the ruling party and the Prime Minister from December. Unfortunately, he did not have political backing, which is why conflicts broke out in the party. The consequence of these incidents was the breakdown of NSDP (New Social Democratic Party) in 2005. The cases of high corruption, clientelism and often a dishonest process of privatisation⁹ in the state also did not help the ruling party.

In July 2006, the next parliamentary elections took place in Macedonia. The election campaign was marked by serious cross-political confrontations, occasionally resulting in violence mainly between the two major ethnic Albanian parties DUI and DPA. Vice President of the DPA party, Menduh Taci, argued that the Albanian national question in Macedonia had not yet been resolved (Jordanovski 2006).

Therefore, the conservative party VMRO-DPMNE won the elections in Macedonia, obtaining 45 of the 120 seats in the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia and Nikola Gruevski remained the Prime Minister. After unsuccessful negotiations between VMRO-DPMNE and DUI considering the structure of the new government, Nikola Gruevski decided

⁸ Although the cause of the crash is not known, most of the Macedonians believe that it was an assassination attempt. On the same day, Macedonian efforts to enter the European Union were officially initiated.

⁹ Large-scale Privatization took place in 90s, while the SDSM was in power. As a consequence, the following factories such as "October 11", "Slavia", "Železara", "Centro" and many others were closed. As a result, thousands of citizens lost their jobs (Crvenkovski *so apsurdni...*).

to form a government with the DPA. VMRO-DPMNE ruled until 2016 winning the elections in 2008, 2011 and 2014.

After the elections in 2008, VMRO-DPMNE formed a coalition with the Albanian party DUI. However, there were plenty of problems with an ethnic edge. Before the elections in 2011, the DUI organised a protest against the construction of a church-like building, which was held around the old Skopje Fortress. The government claimed the building should become a museum. However, the remonstrance changed into violent inter-ethnic incident quickly (Stojanovski 2011).

After the coalition of VMRO-DPMNE and DUI won the elections in 2011, the opposition party SDSM and the other Albanian party DPA did not hide their dissatisfaction. The leader of DPA asserted that DUI had failed to advance the needs of ethnic Albanians. He also ordered the introduction of further amendments to the constitution, above all he wanted the Albanian language to be the second official language alongside Macedonian (*Macedonia: Ten years...*).

The situation between the Albanians and the Macedonians in the country was visibly tense. In April 2012, the incident which gave rise to the anti-Albanian offense took place. Five ethnic-Macedonian civilians were shot and killed by ethnic Albanians at a man-made lake near the village of Smilkovci. The Macedonians named this occurrence a *massacre at Smilkovci Lake*. In response to the murders, the protests were organised in cities throughout Macedonia. In the village of Smilkovci and the city of Skopje, the remonstrance turned violent. The protesters chanted: *A good Albanian is a dead Albanian and Gas chambers for the Albanians* (*Марш низ Битола...*).

Early elections were held in 2014. The ruling party won, and Gorge Ivanov was reelected. He was strongly associated with VMRO-DPMNE, and criticized the Ohrid Agreement from 2001, which gave a number of rights to the Albanian minority. During this period, dissatisfaction among the Albanians grew, which led to tension between the Albanians and the authorities in 2014. In July this year, the Albanian minority took to the streets to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with a death sentence for the Albanian from Smilkovci (Biernat 2014).

The political and economic crisis with corruption in the background led to a great dissatisfaction of the society, leading to the outbreak of demonstrations by students and other social groups. In the meantime there have been numerous attacks on police stations, but also on the headquarters of the Albanian party or incident using grenades for the parliament building. In 2015, the incident in Kumanovo took place. According to the Macedonian Ministry of the Interior, on May 9, police forces entered the Albanian district in Kumanovo to capture people

suspected of planning terrorist attacks on state institutions. As a result of two days of clashes, 8 policemen and 14 Albanians were killed, and 37 people were injured. These people were associated with the NLA terrorist organization. Views on the incident are divided. According to the Polish organization *The Center for Eastern Studies*, this act could be used especially by VMRO-DPMNE and Nikola Gruevski. At the time, the opposition party SDSM published a series of wiretaps that the party was supposed to perform on politicians, dignitaries, and members of the government (Szpala 2015).

The political crisis in Macedonia was increasing all the time. On 11 December, 2016, early parliamentary elections were held and were considered a part of an agreement brokered by the European Union to end the protests against the government of Nikola Gruevski

The ruling party, with 39.39% of votes, has won the December elections but it was only 1% more than SDSM (37.87%). As a consequence, the coalition with Albanian parties was important for the formation of the future government. The leaders of the three Albanian parties: DUI, BESA and AzA¹⁰) created the so-called *Tirana Platform*¹¹ and began post-election negotiations with a joint list of postulates which contained the strengthening of the Albanian language status and co-financing Albanian communes. Among the Albanian applications, there were also proposals for changing the flag, national emblem and national anthem. President Ivanov appealed to international leaders that the demands of the *Tirana Platform* threaten the sovereignty and independence of Macedonia (EWB Archives 2017).

After the failure of talks between the Albanian parties and Nikola Gruevski, the *Tirana Platform* started negotiations with the opposition - SDSM. Zoran Zaev, the chairman of the party, claimed the mandate to form a government but President Gorge Ivanov refused to give his consent. Mediation was conducted by Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy until May 2017. Finally, after EU involvement in the Macedonian conflict, the new government was constituted on the 31st of May 2017 (Domachowska 2017).

Many people were disappointed, especially conservatives and nationalists from the association called *За заедничка Македонија* (*For A United Macedonia*). This society was formed in February 2017 to organize protests across the country against the *Tirana Platform* („*За заедничка Македонија*“) and was responsible for the incident in April 2017. Storming

¹⁰ *Besa Movement*, Albanian *Lëvizja Besa* – Albanian party formed in December 2014; *AzA - Alliance for Albanians*, Albanian - *Aleanca për Shqiptarët* – Albanian party formed in 2015.

¹¹ The declaration, which formed The *Tirana Platform* of the political parties DUI, the Alliance for Albanians and Besa, was signed in January 2017 in Tirana with the mediation of Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama.

of the Macedonian Parliament¹² also known as Bloody Thursday was a reaction to the election of Talat Xhaferi, an ethnic Albanian, as a speaker of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia. Around 200 demonstrators broke through a police cordon, entered Macedonian parliament and attacked the MPs, despite a months-long deadlock in talks to form a new government (Testorides 2017).

The Zaev's party along with the Tiranian platform in January 2018 voted in The *Sobranie* for the use of Albanian as another official language, with 69 votes "for". The opposition party VMRO-DPMNE boycotted the vote (*Sobranje potvrdilo...*). Passing the bill was considered controversial and the President Ivanov did not sign it into law as Macedonian nationalists strongly oppose it. As a result, he returned the bill to *Sobranie*.

On March 15, 2018 the law was again voted in *Sobranie*, by a majority of 64 votes to 123 (*Macedonia's Albanian language...*). The President announced that he would not sign it. According to the Article 75 of the Constitution the president is obliged to sign the decree on the pronouncement of the Law on languages because he has already exercised the veto power, but the deadline for doing so is not prescribed (*Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, art. 74*).

The previous law, which arose from a 2001 peace deal that ended an armed conflict between ethnic Albanian rebels and government forces, secured the official use of the Albanian language in communities where the minority is more than 20% of the population. After Macedonian Parliament has approved a law Albanian is going to be the second official language throughout the country, in institutions like municipalities, hospitals and courts, even in the regions where Albanians do not live.

As Prime Minister Zoran Zaev pointed out: *There are no bilingual notes, there will be no bilingual uniforms in the Army, unless the Venetian Commission confirms that this is in accordance with the Constitution, we do not have prejudices (Што содржи законот за јазуџи?)*. However, in municipalities where Albanians population exceeds 20% of the total ,the police, fire fighting and health units will be in Albanian and the banknotes will contain the elements of Albanian culture, but not the text in Albanian.

These are not only the problems of the Zaev's government, since January 2018 negotiations with Greece related to the name of Macedonia have been conducted. Greece does not want the word *Macedonia* to appear alone in the name of the country,¹³ and proposes such

¹² Macedonian Parliament/ The Assembly of the Republic of *Macedonia or Sobranie, mac. Собрание*.

¹³ Greece accuses Macedonia of the attempts to steal a part of its cultural heritage, stressing that Macedonia is a geographical and historical concept referring to a specific region of 'Aegean Macedonia', not a state with a capital in Skopje.

names as *Republic of Skopje* and *Upper Macedonia*, mac. *Горна Македонија*, *Gorna Makedonija*. However, the Albanian party Alliance for Albanians wants to take part in the negotiations, and proposes that the name of Macedonia should not be Slavic and should also refer to the Albanian minority (*Albanci u Makedoniji...*).

Conclusion

The process of shaping identity in the territory of the Balkan Peninsula undergoes constant transformations along with the transformation of cultural reality, and thus consciousness. National identity was getting stronger when the attributes of the independence were at risk, which is why Macedonia, together with the whole region of South-eastern Europe, is often referred to as a *Balkan Cauldron*.

Today's Macedonia is being developed as a politically and economically stable state. According to the government data from 2017, the year-on-year economic growth has reached 1.2% (*Macedonia Economic Outlook 2018*). Macedonia is also a full member of international organizations, for instance: International Monetary Fund, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Council of Europe, World Trade Organization and United Nations. However, Macedonia is still referred to as the provisional name of the FYROM in the international forum. That is caused mainly by the non-recognition of the name *Macedonia* by Greece and the blocking of accession talks with the European Union and membership in NATO.

Macedonia has always been a strategic political area in the Balkans. For this reason, Macedonia's neighbours have always sought to subjugate this state. Till now Serbia does not accept Macedonia as a state, Bulgaria does not recognize the Macedonian language and nation, and Greece does not accept the state, even a nation. But Macedonia not only must face the external identity problems, but also its internal aspects.

The Albanian issue in Macedonia began with the disintegration of Yugoslavia leading to the conflict in Tetovo in 2001. Thanks to the intervention of international organizations, a consensus was reached on the basis of the Ohrid agreement. However, the animosities between Macedonians and Albanians are still visible. However, Prime Minister Zoran Zaev expects a quick resolution of the political stalemate in 2018 and the implementation of the law guaranteeing Albanian as the second official language in Macedonia. Society seems to be divided into those who are tired of constant conflicts and lack of perspectives, who are able to devote their country's name and the whole complex of emblems and national symbols and those who strongly identify with the name and tongue and will protest and show dissatisfaction.

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**International radio broadcasting – a case of Radio
Poland – an external service of Polish public radio**

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Abstract:

Since its beginning radio has also been used as an instrument of international communication. Broadcast stations sending messages abroad began to appear shortly after the first wireless transmissions were successfully performed with the use of the Morse code. The discovery of radio waves enabled sending information on long distances without wire. This invention gave the new possibilities to communicate between continents, from ships to shores and back, or between military troupes during wartime. International broadcasting was also used to communicate with allies and with enemies during military conflicts. At that time an ability to transmit voice using radio waves had already been developed, then radio transmissions entered the dimension of entertainment as well as political communication with citizens and foreigners. The international voice broadcasting service has been developed from 1927 with the purpose of keeping the citizens in touch with the mother countries and also of helping the governments to disseminate its culture throughout the world. In this context the article is an analysis of the legal basis, purposes, directions and technical aspects of broadcasting, and organisational structure of the Radio Poland (former Polish Radio External Service).

Key words:

international broadcasting, radio broadcasting, Radio Poland, Polish Radio External Service, short waves

The aims of the study and methodology

The activity of Polish Radio External Service, now operating under the name Radio Poland, has not been described in any separate chapter so far, neither in any separate monograph or scientific article. Only Maciej Józef Kwiatkowski, the radio historian, on several pages in his monograph "Tu Polskie Radio Warszawa" (1980) describes the uprising and the first years

(1936-1939) of the activity of Polish Radio External Service. Also Stanisław Mischczak (1971) in his monograph in the 1970s mentioned a reactivation of the Polish Radio External Service after the Second World War. Later, activity of this radio has not been subjected to scientific analysis.

Abroad, international radio broadcasting, despite the dominance of television, is constantly being researched. That is why I considered it necessary to fill the gap in research on the Radio Poland. The general aim of the article is exploration and description of the studied issue as a prelude to further, in-depth studies. My goal, in particular, is to show how the Radio Poland carries out tasks related to ensuring communication with Poles staying abroad and informing foreign listeners about matters of Poland and Poles. I am also interested how it adapts the editorial structure and directions of broadcasting to these tasks.

The author used research methods and techniques involving critical analysis of documents, analysis of the organizational structure of the radio, as well as initial qualitative analysis of the radio programmes. The Polish Radio Timeline available on the Internet was helpful in establishing historical facts in the period after World War II until now. In addition, the information posted on the websites of Polish Radio External Service/Radio Poland, articles and information published in magazines and media industry portals, as well as the reports of the National Broadcasting Council and public documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were taken into consideration.

Development of (international) broadcasting

The desire of messaging beyond the borders of one's own country is the basis of radio broadcasting. It pushed inventors to the initial and subsequent attempts to transmit electromagnetic waves, which could reach across the ocean to distant places and people. They did not immediately recognize the nature of radio waves and their physical properties which were discovered gradually, along with successive transmissions. The solutions used in telegraphy were originally used with long waves achieved by means of very high power transmitters. Long waves guarantee immunity to magnetic interference and are characterized by stable signal regardless of weather conditions and physical obstacles during transmission. The high power transmitters enabled sending signals over a distance of 8000 km. Such devices required large space and installation of sufficiently large masts and antenna systems which generated high costs of transmission (Nahin 2001). Radio amateurs were interested in radio transmissions but, unlike

an increasing number of commercial broadcasters, they did not have significant financial resources, so they drew their attention to short waves, which had been discovered and regularly tested since 1918. It is worth mentioning that the first radio transmission attempts were performed with the use of short waves by Guglielmo Marconi during the years 1896-1901, but then it was believed that long waves are more useful (Baker 1972: 216). Marconi came back to short waves during World War I when, in 1916, Italian Navy reported the demand for radio waves to be used in a strategic short sea communication. G. Marconi and his colleague C.S. Franklin developed a system of transmitting waves of two meters and at the end of the war C.S. Franklin set up a connection on the wavelength of 15 meters through which a message was sent from London to Birmingham (Baker 1972: 217).

Radio amateurs from the US and such European countries as France, Great Britain, Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary – organized a joint experiment of broadcasting on shortwave, under the auspices of the association of The American Radio Relay League (ARRL). Testing the possibilities of short wavelength of 200 m generated by means of low power initially consisted in the fact that the experts of the association travelled to Europe with the equipment and attempted to receive programmes broadcast by radio amateurs from the US. During the first of its kind attempt in December 1921 they received 30 programmes, during the next – a year later – as many as 315. The next step was to obtain a bilateral liaison, which was achieved in 1923 when two American radio enthusiasts joined for a few hours with two amateur radio stations in France. A month later, the experiment was repeated with stations in the UK (Wood 1994: 22). In the same year G. Marconi conducted short-wave tests from his ship "Elettra" by sending a signal at night at a distance of over 4025 km and during the day at approximately 2254 km (Berg 2013). In 1924 a British sixteen-year-old student exchanged signals via the short wave from New Zealand (Wood 1994: 23). The short wave (as well as the ultra-short) became even more interesting after 1925 – when the French explorer André Clavier conducted a radio transmission across the English Channel using a wavelength of only 18 metres (Orłowski, Płochocki & Przyrowski 1979: 296).

Finally, many experiments revealed that the use of short waves [of 200 m (100 m now) to 10 m] in combination with low-power transmitter and small masts and antenna systems enables sending information which can be heard over many thousands of miles away. The secret is the ionosphere – a layer of the earth's atmosphere from which shortwave signals bounce off,

rebouncing back to Earth hundreds or thousands of miles away from their point of origin. The advantages of using a low-power short wave transmitter include low costs associated with low-power, less space for short wave installations (masts, antenna systems, alternators), and an increasing number of amateur broadcasters. However, short waves exhibit some inconveniences: fading, unreliability of communication and loss of signal from time to time. Short waves can be useful in domestic communication, mainly in territorially vast countries such as the US, or in international communication, as it has been used mostly by European countries.

Broadcast stations sending messages abroad began to appear shortly after the first wireless transmissions were successfully performed with the use of the Morse code. The pioneering one was a broadcasting station established in 1906 in Nauen (Germany). This station was treated as a wireless telegraph and messages were transmitted to make connections with the German colonies in Africa (Fortner 1993: 90). The second was The Company “Radio-France” established in 1921 in Sainte-Assise (France) which in exchange for a license to broadcast overseas had an obligation to support the transfer of correspondence of the French officials to the overseas territories (Griset 1983: 90). The discovery of radio waves gave the new possibilities to communicate between continents, from ships to shores and back, or between military troupes during wartime. International broadcasting was also used to communicate with allies and with enemies during military conflicts. The one of the earliest international voice broadcasting service was the BBC Empire Service (now BBC World Service), which began experimental broadcasting in 1927 with the purpose of keeping Britain’s colonial civil officials in touch with the mother country and also of helping the government to disseminate the British culture throughout the world. In fact, the British economic interests were developed on a large scale, therefore good public relations with contractors and residents of foreign countries were of utmost importance (Mansell 1982). The next external services were Radio Moscow (1929) carrying propaganda broadcasts in German, English and French and concentrating its efforts on promoting the communist ideology (Miszczak 1971: 268); then French Radio Le Poste Colonial (1931) (Duval 1979: 252), a predecessor of Radio France International, linking France with its colonial possessions; and finally – Radio Bari from Italy (1934) the first regular international station broadcasting in Arabic language established because of Italian interests in Africa (Scales 2016: 259); and many other (Wood 1994).

International broadcasting of Polish Radio

The beginnings of Polish radio broadcasting are dated after World War I when in November 1918 the officers of Polish Army intercepted the “WAR” German military radio station located in Warsaw and broadcast a statement about the independence of Poland. Firstly, the “WAR” radio station was used by the new Polish state for both military communication and foreign connections with other countries. After the Polish Parliament had legislated the Post, Telegraph and Telephony Act to develop wireless communication in the country, in 1925 a broadcasting company named Polish Radio received a first radio license in Poland (Grzelewska 2001). As a result of World War I a large area of the former territory of Poland with its inhabitants was left outside the new borders, mainly in Eastern Europe, but previously many Poles had emigrated to the United States for economic purposes. Therefore, in 1936 the management of Polish Radio decided to establish Polish Radio External Service to guarantee communication with Polish citizens living abroad (Kwiatkowski 1980: 356). Polish Radio External Service stopped broadcasting during World War II, when the Nazi Germans took over Polish broadcasting stations, destroying them or using for their own radio productions of propaganda nature. Polish Radio External Service resumed its activity in 1945 after the war. In the 1950s (1956) broadcasting in multiple languages began: English, Danish, Greek, Finnish, French, Spanish, German, Russian, Turkish and Italian (Miszczak 1971). It can be assumed that the choice of languages was due to two reasons: first, they wanted to keep a connection with Poles abroad, and, second, the radio served communist propaganda purposes – programmes in Western languages also reached the Western listeners enabling the dissemination of communist ideology.

In 1990, after the political transformation, Polish Radio External Service – renamed as Radio Polonia – changed the scope of the programme, abandoning broadcasts in French, Spanish, Arabic and Scandinavian languages and started broadcasting mainly for Poles in the East and South of Poland, forming additional programmes in Lithuanian, Belarusian, Ukrainian, Czech and Slovakian (*85 lat Polskiego Radia*). After the shift of the political system foreign policy goals were changed as well – there was no longer any need to disseminate information based on communist propaganda in Western languages. Since then, the main recipients of radio programmes were Poles scattered around the world. The programmes started to be broadcast to new states which regained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, such as

Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraine, Belarus and Estonia. Later, in 1994, Polish Radio External Service began broadcasting via World Radio Network (WRN), the provider of the radio programmes from the leading international public broadcasters and independent producers from all continents (*World Radio Network*).

Multiple historic and current circumstances led Polish people to emigrate to every corner of the world. The main emigration movements took place in several waves, such as:

- political refugees in the mid-nineteenth century after the uprisings for independence against invaders from the Russian Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia and Habsburg Austria – the main directions of their emigration were France, Great Britain, Switzerland, Germany and North America.
- economic emigration from the mid-nineteenth century to 1939 – mainly to France, Belgium, Germany, the United States of America, Canada, Brazil, Argentina.
- emigration during World War II due to Nazi repressions and after the war for political reasons – as opposition to the new communist regime.
- political emigration because of martial law and political repression imposed by the Communists and the economic emigration caused by the economic crisis in the 1980s.
- economic emigration after 1989 and emigration for work after Polish accession to the European Union in 2004.

As a consequence, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimates, about 18 million Poles and people of Polish origin live abroad in different countries, most of them in the United States, but also in Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Australia, South Africa, Western Europe (mostly in Germany, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Holland, Belgium, etc.) and Eastern Europe (mostly in Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Russia, Kazakhstan) (*MSZ: ponad 18 milionów...*).

Currently, the tasks of Polish Radio, which are implemented by Polish Radio External Service – now renamed as Radio Poland – and other antennas including television, are laid down in Article 21, section 1 of the Act on Radio and Television (*Dz. U. 2004, No. 253, item. 2531*). The document states, that public radio should, inter alia:

- create and diffuse nation-wide programmes, regional programmes, programmes for audiences abroad in Polish language and in other languages, and other programmes catering for democratic, social and cultural needs of communities;

- pay attention to the needs of national and ethnic minorities and communities using regional languages, which include emission of information programmes in languages of national and ethnic minorities and in regional languages;
- and also create educational programmes and render them accessible to Polish people living abroad.

The points of the law mentioned above are the basis of activities of Radio Poland which broadcasts in six languages: Polish, English, German, Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian. Radio Poland, as we could read on its website, is focused on broadcasting “the programmes on developments in Poland, Polish foreign policy, economy, business and foreign investments. Polish Radio provides objective and impartial information about Poland and its stance on international affairs. It reports on developments in Polish society, its daily life as well as scientific and cultural achievements” (*Radio Poland, About Us*).

Radio Poland, as part of the public media, is financed from subscription fees and subsidies from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In recent years, funding has decreased, as shown in the table below.

Table 1. The costs of creating and distributing programmes of Radio Poland from 2010 to 2017 (in million zlotys).

Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
The costs of creating and distributing programmes	22,0	21,8	14,5	17,7	15,0	14,9	14,8	13,6

Source: own preparation based on the reports of the National Broadcasting Council ([KRRiT 2016A](#), [2016B](#), [2017A](#), [2017B](#), [2018A](#), [2018B](#)).

Radio Poland is divided into several sections devoted to editing broadcasts. These are: Belarusian Section, English Section, German Section, Lithuanian Section, Polish Section, Russian Section and Ukrainian Section. The broadcasts of all sections contain information on domestic affairs, foreign affairs, political events and business, sport and cultural topics as well as Polish music. But the content of each section in particular programmes and on the websites varies depending on a target group of Polish and foreign listeners. All sections – with the exception of the English Section – transmit programmes in Eastern languages 24 hours a day via the web radio called “Eastern Channel”. Each section puts its own news and content in Eastern

Channel. Some elements of daily programme are the same for all sections but they are broadcast in different languages. The English Section, for instance, transmits online via “English Channel”. Radio transmission and all its content are also available through the Polish Radio application installed on mobile devices and, of course, are transmitted on the air. The English Section creates website thenews.pl with current news, video content and radio podcasts.

The Polish Section of Radio Poland disseminates broadcasts primarily to the Poles living in Eastern Europe – mainly in Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus. For daily radio broadcasting Polish Section uses an airtime provided by local radio stations to emit half-hour broadcasts in Polish language. Broadcasts are emitted daily on the air of the “Radio znad Wilii”¹ at a frequency of 103,8 FM (from Vilnius, Lithuania) at 16.30 and 21.00 UTC, and on the Radio “Niezależnist” (Радіо “Незалежність” – Radio “Independence”; from Lviv, Ukraine) generally broadcast in Ukrainian language at a frequency of 106,7 FM at 18.30 UTC. All Polish programmes include news services from Poland and the rest of the world. Selected programmes referring to politics, economy and culture are rebroadcasted from national channels of Polish Radio during these emissions. Additionally, on Saturdays the programmes contain features and radio documentaries. Furthermore, on Sundays religious programmes, including the Catholic mass retransmissions from one of the Polish churches, are issued on the air. All programmes mentioned above disseminate mostly Polish music performed by Polish artists. The Polish Section of Radio Poland maintains the website with news texts and audio-video content, it shares podcasts of the programmes and provides an archive of the recent productions. The programmes of the Polish Section are also available via HOT BIRD satellite in daily transmission at 16.30 and 21.00 UTC.

The Belarusian Section of Radio Poland began broadcasting on the 13th January 1992, but earlier, from the 15th December 1991, its broadcasts had been transmitted within the content of the Polish Section. Since its beginnings, the purpose of the Belarusian Section was to inform Belarusian listeners about various aspects of Polish citizens’ life, about the relationship between Belarus and Poland, and about the situation of minorities – the Belarusian in Poland and the Polish in Belarus. The idea was to provide reliable information which would develop the knowledge about Poland among Belarusians and contribute to enhancing mutual understanding. As a result of political change in Belarus, when the state began to move away from democratic

¹ Radio znad Wilii (“Radio from the Neris”) has been established by Polish minority in Lithuania.

reforms by introducing information blockade and strengthening its connection with Russia, the Belarusian Section undertook a task to inform international public opinion about activities of political power in Belarus. The Belarusian Section established cooperation with an editorial staff of national minorities programmes which was preparing broadcasts for the Belarusian minority at Radio Bialystok, a regional station of Polish Radio. In addition, it cooperated with Belarusian radio stations, including “Belaruska maladiozna” (“Беларуская маладзёжная” – Radio “Belarussian Youth”), the main youth radio station from Belarus, which existed from 1963 – within the former Soviet Union – to 1994 – within The Republic of Belarus (*45 задаў..., Zakryivaetstva...*). After the Radio “Belaruska maladiozna” had been closed in 1996, the Belarusian Section broadcast its daily half-hour service via the first private Belarusian radio at 101,2 FM. In 1999 a new radio for Belarusian minority in Poland called Radio “Racyja”² was established in Bialystok and it started rebroadcasting programmes of the Belarusian Section on its waves. In the period from June to November 2015 listenership of Radio “Racyja” was estimated to be 0,2 percent³ (Radio Track). The Belarusian Section programmes are also available by Eutelsat Hot Bird and Astra satellites, 24 hours a day online and as podcasts on its website radyjo.net. It is possible to listen to broadcasts on the air in Belarus on medium waves on 1386 kHz (“Baltic Waves”) at 7.00 am (of the local time), also as transmissions from the earlier mentioned Lithuanian “Radio znad Wili” at 103,8 FM at 00.30 am and 6.00 am (local time). In some areas its signal is transmitted to Belarus by digital transmitters DAB + and can be received through digital receivers.

The Ukrainian Section of Polish Radio External Service (Radio Poland) was established in 1990. It can be reached on the Radio “Era FM” (Радио “ЕРА ФМ”, from Kiev, Ukraine) offering two ten-minute broadcasts at 12.20 and at 11.47 pm and one thirty-minute production at 7.30 pm (local time) aired daily. Its programmes consist of information about Poland and the European Union, they present European views on global and regional issues, show an image of Polish society and its achievements in science and culture. Broadcasts provide news, reviews of Polish press, economic services, features prepared by Polish Radio reporters, Polish and

²Radio “Racyja” (Radio “the Right”) opposes President Alaksandr Lukashenka’s regime and it is broadcast to Belarus from Bialystok in Poland. The radio was formed in 1999 and broadcast until 2002 when it was closed due to the lack of funding. In 2006 it was reactivated by several of its former journalists and it is funded, among others, by both the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Digital Affairs.

³ Radio Track Millward Brown SMG KRC, research sample of 857 respondents in the city of Bialystok, for the period from June to November 2015.

European specialists' comments, interviews and discussions, and also journalistic materials about culture⁴ (*Radio "Era" for Polish Radio*). The programmes of the Ukrainian Section are also transmitted by Astra satellite and on medium waves on 1395 kHz (214 metres) at 21.30 (Ukrainian time) in the Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Residents of western Ukraine may receive programmes from Radio Rzeszow (a regional channel of Polish Radio), in which the Ukrainian Section gives a half-hour broadcast called "News for Ukrainians" at 2.05 (Kyiv time) at night. The Ukrainian Section offers podcasts and prepares productions in Ukrainian language for the "Eastern Channel" web radio.

The Russian Section of Polish Radio External Service has the same objectives and principles of creating programmes as the sections described previously. Broadcasts are diffused by satellite and via Eastern Channel on the Internet. Listeners from the east of Ukraine, from Crimea and Moldova as well as from the Caucasus can listen to the radio on a frequency of 1395 kHz from 21.30 to 22.30 (Moscow time). The waves reach up to Israel and Cyprus. In the western part of Russia, in particular in the Kaliningrad region, as well as in Baltic States and Belarus half-hour programmes are transmitted on medium waves on a frequency of 1386 kHz at 18.30 in Kaliningrad (local time) and at 19.30 of local time in western Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Transmissions of the Russian Section can be reached via the World Radio Network on a frequency of 700 kHz in Moscow and in the Moscow district in several programme blocks at 17.00, 20.00, 21.00, 00.30, 05.00, 09.00, 12.30 of local time. Programmes of the Russian Section are partially rebroadcasted by Radio Svoboda (Radio Free Europe for Russia).

The English Section radio programme for foreign countries is the most comprehensive service and, according to the guidelines of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it should play a key role in informing Poles living abroad and foreigners about events in Poland and it should reflect Polish attitude to foreign affairs. The English Section provides more universal content, – in contrast to the services for residents of Eastern Europe which are concentrated on interests of the Poles living in Lithuania, Belarus or Ukraine. It refers to events important to all Polish citizens, wherever they live.

The English Section offers the most comprehensive transmission system – its programmes are available online via "English Channel" and are broadcast partially in the United Kingdom on spectrum DAB in London at 19.00-20.00 of local time and in Ireland by its DAB

⁴ The programme "Radio «Era» for Polish Radio" have been analyzed by Author.

radio network RTE Radio 1 Extra in Dublin, Cork, Limerick and in the Dundalk/Drogheda district. The English Section transmits to the USA through World Radio Network and as a result its programmes can be received in some areas of several states such as Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin and Virginia. Radio Poland is also broadcast via satellites in Europe, North America, Africa, Asia and Australia and is transmitted via cable TV in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Holland, Ireland and Switzerland as well as in the USA.

The German Section – is the smallest of the Radio's editorial offices and broadcast information services three times a day, at 8.00, 13.00 and 19.30 on the general channel of Radio Poland. He also runs website providing current information on Polish and German matters.

Summary

A characteristic feature of Polish international broadcasting is the lack of information on international affairs, unless they are associated with the Polish state or people. The most spectacular events of the world – such as terrorist attacks, disasters or accidents – are discussed, but ordinary foreign matters are mostly skipped. This issue would require in-depth quantitative and qualitative research.

The future of Radio Poland is difficult to predict. The only research conducted among Poles in Ukraine a few years ago – in 2010 – showed that only 0.1% of them listen to Radio Poland with the reference to the period of one year, a weekly listenership was estimated as zero (*Prawie zerowa...* 2011). The awareness of a possibility of listening to Radio Poland declared 4.3 percent of the respondents. This prompted Polish authorities to change the forms of broadcasting in Ukraine. However, neither Polish Radio nor Polish governments conduct regular surveys devoted to listenership of Radio Poland abroad, therefore it is difficult to assess whether anybody listens to it and who it is. In recent years the budget of Radio Poland was reduced, its editorial board was reorganized, and some journalists were dismissed. All due to insufficient incomes from the licence fee for public media and cutting off the funds for Radio Poland from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Report of the meeting...* 2014).

In times of easy access to information through new media and mobile applications, the demand for news delivered by the Polish broadcaster may appear smaller than in the years 1945-1989, until the fall of the communist regime in Poland and in Central and Eastern Europe. But

we must remember that modern technologies are not readily available in all corners of the world. In less urbanized areas where economy is poorly developed, traditional radio being broadcast by radio waves is the only chance to allow people to keep in touch with the world and with their country of origin. Radio waves are also the best solution where undemocratic governments restrict citizens' access to reliable and independent information. International broadcasting in such situations still remains the best option.

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