

# **Political Preferences**

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**Social divisions in discursive approach – political  
narrative of Law and Justice after 2015  
parliamentary elections**

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**Abstract:**

Many political scientists treat Poland as a democracy that confront the challenges from the "tyranny of the majority", since Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) party gained parliamentary majority in 2015. It is also considered that using constitutional amendments, institutional arrangements and new legislation PiS has deeply divided Polish society.

The aim of the paper is to examine the multidimensional nature of hidden social divisions that strongly reappear in Poland after 2015. In the paper authors analyze their historical aspects, visualize them and try to disclose direct impact that political narration of the winning party has on them. By analyzing PiS stance – presented at the official PiS YouTube channel – in the light of classical Lipset-Rokkan theory of socio-political cleavages we are trying to show that discursive strategies adopting by parties might go against existing deep-rooted social divisions due to historical narration adopted by the party.

**Key words:**

Post-Rokkanian analysis, Semantic Network Analysis, cleavages

***Introduction***

The category of cleavage plays an extremely important role in political theory, but when approaching it through the historical background of Poland, its interpretation differs from the classical frame proposed by western scholars. Nevertheless, it can be the basis for an alternative explanation going against popular belief that the narrative strategy pursued by PiS has solely populist groundwork.

Our main assumption is that in times of the information revolution, institutionalization of social divisions takes place through the process of their narrative appropriation, ending with what John Petrocik called "issue ownership" (Petrocik 1996). The process of institutionalizations goes therefore through two phases reflected in the internal structure of our paper: firstly, we will argue that cleavages might be politicised – have a visible impact on the shape of the Polish political scene. We will discuss how the phenomenon of spatial dimension of major social cleavages in Poland pair with the parliamentary election results of Law and Justice (PiS). Secondly, we will check if these cleavages are also deliberately politicized – used by party leaders to obtain a stable electorate. We will analyse the content of the videos uploaded on PiS official YouTube channel in search of narrations based on references to social cleavages, presented by different politicians.

Our main aim is to clarify the communicative strategy used by PiS by analysing main elements of: 1. major narratives used after electoral campaigns; 2. main characteristics of communication style used by PiS after electoral campaigns. Together those two elements make PiS communicative strategy more consistent, responding to the needs of the broader socio-political surrounding and creating clear distinction between PiS and other political parties in Poland (Turska-Kawa 2010; Kolczyński 2007). Therefore, we want to ask:

**Q1:** What were the key elements of PiS political narration created during first year after electoral campaign that made their communicative strategy consistent?

**Q2:** What were the key elements of PiS style of political communication used during first year after electoral campaign that made their communicative strategy consistent?

In the context of these research questions we test two main hypotheses:

**H1** The key element of PiS political narration was the concept of deep social divisions existing in Poland, strengthened by the elements of “classical” cleavages elaborated by West European scholars and politicians.

**H2** The key elements of PiS style of political communication were links binding main element of created narration with personal experience of particular politics, what might be identified as a personalization of the party’s politics.

### ***Literature review***

Numerous authors discuss the political shift that occurred in Poland after 2015 parliamentary elections as a part of a global-wide populist revival (Hanley & Sikk 2016). The phenomenon of populism, however, has evolved from the “pathology” of the democratic

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state to something Cas Mudde called “populistic Zeitgeist” (Mudde 2004; Taguieff 1995). Margaret Canovan, one of the most influential theoreticians working on populism, has distinguished at least seven different types of populism, but the list is hardly exhaustive since the array of different examples varies from the 19th century Russian “Narodnik” movement to what Paul Taggart called the “new populism” describing new kinds of parties and movements at the end of the 20th century (Canovan 1981: 264; Taggart 1995; Walicki 1969). In our work we use a “thin definition of populism”, considering it “as a political communication style of political actors that refers to the people (...) simply a strategy to mobilise support, it is a standard communication technique to reach out to the constituency” (Jagers & Walgrave 2007: 322-323). The latest publications concerning populism in Poland enclosed works such as Paweł Przyłęcki (2012) and a special issue of e-Politikon (2017). In our view PiS after their electoral campaign create communicative strategy that goes beyond this populist shift.

As Tomasz Zarycki argues, when analysing the impact of cleavages on the Polish political system, one must first take into account the different interpretation of the communist and early post-communist period, which strongly limited the usefulness of categories developed by western scientists (Zarycki 2000). It is therefore hard to adopt the idea of post-industrial cleavages well described by Ronald Inglehart when cultural dimension of political competition in Poland is still dominated i.a. by the issue of decommunisation of the public sphere (Inglehart 2015). The impact of post-communist elites on process of formation of cleavages raised similar concerns among political commentators all around the region, as Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield argued (1993). The issue is not limited to cultural sphere – it is also a vital part of an economical dimension – second axis of most cleavages in the region according to numerous authors, though one must mention the work of Herbert Kitschelt as probably the most salient (Kitschelt 1992). Similar to Kitschelt’s comparative works, the idea that two distinctions – between free-market and pro-state supporters and between those supporting liberal and those in favour of more conservative values – is a key to interpretation of socio-political cleavages in Poland could be find in theories proposed by authors such as Radosław Markowski (1997), Adam Przeworski and Krzysztof Ostrowski (1996) and the already-mentioned Zarycki (2015).

In contrast to the aforementioned authors we decided to refer more directly to the classical works of Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) since our aim is not to produce another interpretation of the ‘Left vs. Right’ distinction described in the post-Rokkanian style as an almost catching all friction, but, in line with some later critical comments, we put more emphasis on normative elements of cleavages (Bartolini & Mair 2007: 216; Hloušek 2010).

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Bearing in mind the methodological diversity one can find in the works of Lipset and Rokkan's followers (see: [Bértoa 2014](#); [Karvonen & Kuhnle 2001](#)), we decided to present a different, discursive approach to this issue: we will argue that cleavages might be predominantly understood as a vital component of a political party's narration, aiming not only to gain public support but also to "reproduce the institution, reproduce or challenge its power structures, induct new members, create identity of the institution and its members, adapt to change, and deal with contested or contradictory versions of the past" ([Linde 2010: 518](#)). Using a taxonomical approach developed by Ruth Wodak in the field of the discourse-historical approach (DHA) we will treat appeals to cleavages in political party narration as a part of "discursive strategies" shaping two important dimensions of politics<sup>1</sup>: 1. the mass production of politics via media and 2. the impact of politicians' personality on its performance ([Wodak 2009: 24](#)). We accept the general assumption, according to which cleavages are deeply rooted in social practice and therefore can be perceived as tangible and material, but our aim is to analyse them as a part of PiS's political narration, to trace how politicians use them as major "binary codes" in their narration ([Alexander & Smith 1993: 157](#)).

### *Case overview*

The Polish Revolution of 1989 not only contributed to the dismantling of the Soviet Bloc but also founded the predominant socio-political cleavage in Poland, which is still visible when analyzing the Cabinet of Beata Szydło ([Rozwadowska 2016](#); [Waller 1996: 23-44](#)). Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński in the early 1990s adopted a skeptical attitude towards the achievements of the Polish Round Table Agreement, openly questioning the role of its main founders ([Wojtaszczyk 1995: 236-239](#)). As a result of the decomposition of parliamentary representation of the Solidarity movement (Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny – OKP), the Centre Agreement (Porozumienie Centrum – PC), the first political party of the Kaczyński brothers emerged. The party publicly urged for the acceleration of political transformation, further political scrutiny ("lustracja") and decommunisation of political elites ([Czerwiec et al. 1991: 71](#)). PC also openly admitted its attachment to the socio-cultural teaching of the Catholic Church and called for some adjustments to Leszek Balcerowicz's plan for economic revival ([Knyżewski 1998: 79](#)). The remains of those postulates are clearly visible in the current PiS political manifesto (*Manifest polityczny 2001*).

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<sup>1</sup> In fact mentioned Wodak and Reisigl distinguish 6 different dimensions in their discursive analysis. Critical reading of this approach one can find in ([Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 21-25](#)).

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PiS was established in 2001 but has become a major political force after 2005 when Lech Kaczyński beat Donald Tusk from Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska – PO) in the presidential election. In this case, the foreseen coalition between the two parties became impossible – a new distinction between “solidarity” (PiS) and “liberal” (PO) Poland emerged (Migalski 2006: 160-166). In 2006 Jarosław Kaczyński became Prime Minister. However, ongoing quarrels among politicians forming the coalition government led by PiS caused an early elections resulting in PO victory (Bojarowicz 2011: 167-169; Kaczyński 2007a, 2007b).

After the parliamentary defeat numerous politicians decided to leave PiS, but the most serious changes in the party structure emerged in 2010 after the crash of a Polish Air Force Tu-154 near Smoleńsk. The death of the party co-founder - Lech Kaczyński - and numerous other prominent PiS politicians, such as Przemysław Gosiewski, Grażyna Gęsicka or Krzysztof Putra, brought Jarosław to the conclusion that there was a connection between the personal attitude of Prime Minister Tusk towards the Kaczyński brothers and a mishandling in preparation of presidential visits that led to the tragedy.

In 2011 PO again won parliamentary elections, what was perceived as a stabilization of Polish political scene – for the first time after political transition in 1989 the same political party remained in power. In this period of time PiS had to face a series of political defeats (local government elections and elections to the European Parliament, both in 2014). Nevertheless numerous political scandals concerning politicians of the ruling coalition and the formation of alliance of the right-wing parties led by PiS were a forerunner of the upcoming political change.

On 25th October 2015, after an intensive campaign, parliamentary elections took place in Poland (Marcinkiewicz & Stegmaier 2016). Two days later the State Electoral Commission announced their official results. Exit polls had already indicated a victory for PiS, but official results just confirmed the survey data. PiS emerged as the sole winner of the election, gaining 235 seats, which allowed them to form a “one-party” government. Apart from PiS, four more election committees held their deputies in the Sejm: PO, Kukiz’15, Modern (Nowoczesna Ryszarda Petru) and Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronictwo Ludowe - PSL). Detailed results may be found in the table below. It is not without significance that the PiS electoral committee constituted a three-party coalition. Clearly, PiS was the dominant party, while PR and SP commanded approximately 2–3% support each during the two years prior to the election (Markowski 2016: 1314-1315).

**Table 1.** The results of the 2015 parliamentary elections

Party/Coalition	Seats	Votes (000's)	Votes (%)
Law and Justice	235		
<i>including:</i>			
<i>Law and Justice</i>	217		
<i>Solidarity Poland</i>	8	5 712	37.58
<i>Poland Together</i>	9		
<i>Independent</i>	1		
Civic Platform	138	3 662	24.09
Kukiz'15	42	1 339	8.81
Modern	28	1 155	7.60
United Left	–	1 147	7.55
Polish Peasant Party	16	780	5.13
KORWIN/New Right	–	723	4.78
Together	–	550	3.62
Other	–	113	0.87

**Source:** PKW (State Electoral Commission), [www.parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl](http://www.parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl)


Voter turnout in the analysed election was 50.92%. PiS won the election in most voivodships, while PO only in two. The final outcomes show clearly that higher support for PiS was especially more visible in rather rural and more conservative eastern part of Poland – so called Poland B – a concept more broadly described below (Grabowska 2004). That reinforced our suspicions that different aspects of existing cleavages played the most important role during the first year of PiS government.

### **Methodology**

Lipset and Rokkan placed their analysis of party system and voter alignments in perspective of Talcott Parsons' theory of four functional subsystems of every society (Lipset & Rokkan 1967: 7–9)<sup>2</sup>. Their final goal was to present 1. how lines of cleavages influence the emergence of political representations for specific social conflicts; 2. how pressure of those lines inclines people from different households to support politicians theoretically representing their interests. What is crucial, the whole scheme of their theoretical backgrounds is based on transactional logic.

<sup>2</sup> They underline in their seminal work that their predominant interest lies in connection between a subsystem of pattern of maintenance („L” - households, schools) and a subsystem of goal attainment („G” - the polity).

**Picture 1.** Transactional approach to functioning of a political cleavage.




**Source:** Authors' own elaborations.

According to our interpretation Lipset and Rokkan in their political analysis present cleavages as an arrangement of facilities and boundaries that enable political parties (G) to create a stable „lines of interchange” with their electorate (L). The elements of economical (A) and public sphere (I) are simply parts of particular arrangement. The feedback loop of transactions means that political parties might affect existing scheme of divisions (T1) and in return might be granted with an electorate support (T2). The communication process (C1, C2) in this model is present but plays only a secondary role in the general transaction – treated simple as an information exchange.

To distinguish our understanding of cleavages we propose discursive approach presented below.

**Picture 2.** Discursive approach to functioning of a political cleavage



**Source:** Authors' own elaborations.

All the necessary elements of previous model are preserved, but the change in perspective places communication process in the foreground while the other aspects of „material” exchange are visible only as a necessary background. The change of perspective is connected with different understanding of cleavages that are treated as central elements of discursive strategy – *topois* structuring political narration around different concepts of cleavages („cleavage”) (Wodak 2009). We perceived acts of communications (C1, C2) not merely as an information exchange but as a part of the process of social construction of reality (Berger & Luckmann 2010).

In our research on political narrations of social divisions in Poland we used data from YouTube to analyse seventy-nine videos uploaded to the official channel of PiS at this portal. There are several arguments that explain the choice of YouTube as a source of information. Firstly, it is the only source of the full-length political speeches delivered by main politicians from PiS during between-election period. Secondly, because of pragmatic reasons – it has over one billion users (YouTube Press), an international reach and open access for every user and even if we refer it only to the Polish context, YouTube still has the widest reach among other video services (Chmielarz 2014). Thirdly, this is the only official video channel of PiS and thus one can be sure that the content posted there is selected directly by members of the party. What is more, YouTube is an example of “hybrid media” - it consist of materials created for both new audience of the Internet users and “old media” institutions (Chadwick 2013: 14). We have focused on all of the videos posted on the YouTube PiS channel for one year from the date of the parliamentary elections – the first video comes from 28th October, 2015 and the last one from 16th October 2016.

The content of the speeches of individual politicians who appeared in the videos were analyzed, appropriately classified and coded by two researchers independently. The results were subsequently compared and in case of matching indications combined into one analytical matrix. For coding purposes we focused on narrative elements indicating presence of politicized conflicts. For this particular need we adopted the classification of socio-political cleavages proposed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 14) to mark the use of the most widely recognized socio-political conflicts in the analyzed videos: centre versus periphery (CS), state versus church (SC), owner versus worker (OW) and urban versus rural (UR). Moreover, while conducting our research we decided to add an additional populist cleavage (PC), which proved to be necessary to adequately interpret the speeches. At the methodological part of the article it needs to be

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explained that our interpretation of this new cleavage, proposed by PiS members in their videos, refers only to the case study analysed by the authors, although the described division goes hand in hand with theory of YouTube's digital populism, according to which a virtual village is created by a professionally generated content (Kim 2012). More arguments for adopting the cleavage will be presented at a later stage of this paper.

Besides the cleavages described above we have classified the subject of our analysis (e.g. politicians speeches, press conferences) using: a) the temporal orientation expressed in the statements, which were oriented on past (oP) or future events (oF) and b) used attribution of responsibility for past or future events – expressed by adopting a side in the “we – others” dichotomy (rW – rO).

### *Socio-political cleavages in discursive approach*

According to our interpretation, the scheme proposed by Lipset and Rokkan does not perfectly fit to the Polish case – one cannot identify such long-lasting relations between the party system and the society. As stated by the two abovementioned researchers, the national and industrial revolution gave the beginning to mentioned by them classical cleavages. One major factor changing the explanatory power of the Lipset-Rokkan theory in the Polish case is the fact that those historical revolutions were conducted in different ways in different regions of Poland (Zarycki 2015)<sup>3</sup>. The consequences of this deep division were even strengthened by the semi-authoritarian system of “communist” regime in Poland after the Second World War although not all of them were politicized (Przeworski & Sprague 1986: 7). Long-lasting spatial patterns of the main divisions were noticed by politicians and scientists and by that also visible for public opinion in terms of the general distinction between Poland A and B (Kowalska 2010).

This division contains elements of all major cleavages indicated by Lipset and Rokkan. One of the major elements of socio-economical cleavage might be the unemployment rate. According to the data prepared by the Central Statistical Office of Poland (GUS) in the October 2015 the unemployment rate was much higher in eastern Poland and fluctuated from 16% to 11.8% (GUS 2015). What is more, five among the twenty poorest regions in EU are situated in eastern Poland (voivodships: Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Warmińsko-mazurskie, Podlaskie,

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<sup>3</sup> Mostly because the country lost its independence and was divided between three occupiers for more than one hundred years – through the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century.

Świętokrzyskie) (Piechowiak 2016). This means that the socio-economic division can be combined in this case with other cleavage mentioned by Lipset and Rokkan – centre vs. periphery. As Zarycki (2000) stated, a possible interpretation of this cleavage could be based on the larger, international perspective, where Poland is perceived as a periphery of the European Union area while Poland is the most excluded part of it. On the one hand this assumption could be supported by the interpretation of Polish history in light of postcolonial theory presented e.g. by Ewa Thompson (2006) or by how Eastern Europe is locked on a borderline of Western Civilization due to colonial discourse still present in EU, what argues Nataša Kovačević (2008: 11-20).

Ulf Lindström (2001) argues that in East Central Europe – conflicts both of cultural and economical origins, when appearing on peripheral level are attached to “stationary arenas” while when functioning on central level are occurring as a play of “interactive nodes”. This means that regardless of the historical dependency the conflicts related to changing boundaries of economic and cultural systems are more dynamic and “detached” because of the changes in global economic and cultural landscape (Appadurai 1990; Lindström 2001). The geographical dimension of this distinction is somehow confirmed by the lower support for the Polish membership in the EU in eastern part of Poland – this part of the country which is more detached from the cultural heritage of Western Europe and more dependent on economical support of the state (PKW 2003).

The urban vs. rural cleavage seems to go at least partially in line with described above distinction – rural areas are more often found in the eastern part of the country<sup>4</sup> although their commonness proved that the distinction between Poland A and B has figurative rather than descriptive character. It needs to be stressed that this urban vs. rural distinction in a particular way influenced the electoral geography of Poland. As stated by Lars Johannsen, who perceived Poland as an example of state in a democratic transition, the political line of post-communist political blocs referring to a paternalistic view on the role of the state was especially supported among the rural population (Johannsen 2003: 296). Tomasz Zarycki and Andrzej Nowak emphasised that apart from the historical division after the Second World War, the urban

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<sup>4</sup> In 2014 official statistics shows that the percentage of rural population stand at 39.7% and the largest part of this population was located in the eastern part of Poland (Wilkin et al. 2016: 40). Also the low rate of urbanization in this part of Poland confirms high proportion of the rural population in the eastern voivodeships, e.g. Lubelskie 46.4%, Podkarpackie 41.2% (GUS 2017: 73, 103).

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vs. rural cleavage was the most important factor shaping electoral behaviour in Polish presidential and parliamentary elections after 1990 and, according to *Polska wieś 2016* report, higher support of inhabitants of rural regions was one of the key elements ensuring electoral win of former member of PiS president Andrzej Duda in 2015 (Nowak & Zarycki 2000: 338; Wilkin et al. 2016).

The general division between Poland A and B is also valid when we pay our attention to the “church vs. state” cleavage. First it needs to be stressed, that during communist period this cleavage was especially visible although it was based on “functional” rather than “geographical” dimension to use Lipset and Rokkan’s distinction. Lucyna Stetkiewicz argues that not only the Catholic Church was an important actor during that time on political scene but religiosity in overall could be treated (to some extent) as a “manifestation of objection to the imposed political system” (Stetkiewicz 2013: 5). After democratic transition the special role of Catholic Church was emphasized in the Polish constitution and by the concordat agreement although its political role was limited by this institutional arrangements (Mazurkiewicz 2001). It is well proven that southern and eastern Poland is more populated by people describing themselves as religious or believers and this distinction seems to impact the final electoral results – according to CBOS non-religious persons were significantly less visible among the voters in the last parliamentary elections (CBOS 2015; Rykała 2013).

In the description presented above, we confirmed that different cleavage lines in Poland reinforced each other and therefore in the eastern part of the country there is no cross-pressure phenomenon. Thus, according to the classical theory of Paul Lazarsfeld, there is no presence of conflicting partisan commitments (Berelson et al. 1954: 126). The presence of those cleavages in the PiS political narrative seems to be understandable, especially in order to maintain their stable electorate.

### ***Findings***

The most interesting outcome of our analysis is the unveiling of the way in which the populist narrative is used by PiS politicians to allegedly reproduce the more general divisions in society. The general cleavage in Polish society might be described as a division between “true patriots” and “traitors”, which is visible at both levels: of a polarised party system (PiS vs PO) and at a social level (supporters of the aforementioned parties). Appearance of this kind

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of political conflict dimension was also predicted by Lipset and Rokkan, who stressed that “friend-foe” binary distinction usually consists of traits of deep ideological or (quasi)religious commitment

“...by strictly political criteria of membership in «we» versus «they» groups. We shall consider the possibility that the parties themselves might established themselves as significant poles of attraction and produce their own alignments independently of the geographical, the social, and the culture underpinnings of the movements” (Lipset & Rokkan 1967: 3).

Taking into account the above comments our findings surprisingly did not confirm the our first hypothesis. The table below contains the data on narration of PiS politicians in the context of socio-political cleavages in Polish society. Our findings proved that populist call was the most frequently used discursive strategy in PiS political narrative, but was rarely strengthened by other important cleavages.

The Urban vs. Rural cleavage proved to be especially insignificant. It was rarely mentioned in the analysed speeches. It might be explained by the assumption presented by Johansen, who indicates that the lack of political protests organised by the rural population led to relative autonomy of the political elites (Johannsen 2003: 292). Such a social situation does not require the ruling party to strengthen this kind of cleavage. Also the Church vs. State cleavage almost never appeared in the videos, which is surprising, since at the beginning of the 1990s the lack of organizational linkage between newly-established political parties and social structures induced a phenomenon of political patronage, meaning high dependency of political parties on influential external institutions such as the Catholic Church (Antoszewski et al. 2003: 152; Szczerbiak 2007: 48-69; Wesołowski 1996: 230). The owner vs. worker and centre vs. periphery cleavages were simultaneously used in describing social inequality in Polish society – especially regarding the impact of the European Union. As stated by Gary Marks and Carole Wilson, it is clear that the European Union creates division between winners and losers in the sphere of national economies, but, for the present, the social bases of support and opposition to European integration are unclear (Anderson 1998: 56; Marks & Wilson 2000: 435).

One can justifiably claim that while the speakers were orientated towards past events they attributed responsibility for those events to “others” (communist, PO), while emphasising the importance of their own activities when talking about the future. Our analysis shows that by using a populist narrative they were strengthening their supporters’ beliefs that the “others” are



responsible for the socio-economic disproportions and divisions in the past, while PiS’s aim is to solve this problem in the future.

**Table 2.** The matrix of narrative strategies’ frequency in the videos

	Owner vs. Worker		Church vs. State		Urban vs. Rural		Centre vs. Periphery		We vs. Others (populist)	
	Future	Past	Future	Past	Future	Past	Future	Past	Future	Past
We	7	2	2	0	0	1	8	1	8	5
Others	0	8	0	1	0	0	0	3	1	21

**Source:** Author’s own elaborations.

Our analysis confirmed our second hypothesis. The most “active” actor within the governing party – at least in the context of their YouTube activity – was Jarosław Kaczyński, however some interesting aspects of his activity need to be mentioned. He was the person who most frequently appeared in the videos uploaded to the official PiS YouTube channel, but what is more important, other speakers visible in collected materials were unwilling to express their own opinions on political issues – their role was to establish a clear picture of the current situation.

The leader of PiS did not only set the general framework of the party narrative, but also showed the way to interpret the existing cleavages at political and social levels. According to our findings Kaczyński became the person who most frequently addressed in his speeches a new, proposed by PiS kind of historical-political cleavage, making this division the most salient one. It is worth mentioning that Prime Minister Beata Szydło appeared in the videos only in the context of the electoral campaign and parliamentary elections, however her position in the party (Szydło is vice-president of PiS) could indicate a more active role. In our research we also found that for tactical reasons, only a few main speakers were presented in the videos, although there were no technical limitations nor financial reasons to shorten the number or longitude of posted videos.

During our research we also discovered the marginal number of views of most of the videos uploaded to the official party channel and the high number of only a few of them. The most popular (276,494 views) was “Daliśmy wam słowo” movie posted on 12th March 2016, which refers to the owner vs. worker cleavage in the broader sense: the division between the small, wealthy and influential group of politicians and numerous indignant Polish citizens

deprived of any influence on the current political situation, represented by PiS. What is more, the content of the video is past-orientated and focuses on the prejudicial role of PO politicians, foggily described as “others” (*Daliśmy wam słowo* 2016).

The second video with more than 167,000 views is entitled “Polityka zagraniczna” and was posted on 16th January 2016. It relates to connection between the opponents of PiS and external political forces – mostly the European Union. In the video we can distinguish a past-orientated narrative focused on the “others” (*Polityka zagraniczna* 2016).

The third one, entitled “Pozwólcie nam pracować” gained 76,000 views and was posted on 26th January 2016 (*Pozwólcie nam pracować* 2016). Once again we can observe a past-oriented narrative, which was focused on the “others” - political journalists, politicians of opposition parties and their supporters. In this video PiS directly requests from opposition to let the government work for the common good. The last film, “Silna Polska w Europie” significantly differs from the previous three videos (*Silna Polska w Europie* 2016). Three of the four videos mentioned above were posted at a time of constitutional crisis, when the PiS-controlled parliament passed a series of statutes to weaken the constitutional tribunal. In these videos we observed the use of an anonymous narrator and all of them were accusing and concentrating on the “others”. The last among the most popular videos was posted on YouTube much later – on 7th May 2016 and it refers to the positive sides of EU membership, although it stresses the importance of the growing potential of the Polish negotiation position within the organisation.

What is crucial, only in the last of the mentioned videos one can hear the voice of Kaczyński, who adopts a more conciliatory tone. The video was posted just before Europe Day, which is celebrated on 9th May and it becomes clear that in this way Kaczyński tried to detach himself from the negative campaign conducted by PiS during the constitutional crisis in Poland.

### ***Conclusions***

In the end our findings proved only one of the stated hypotheses. Firstly, the analysis of videos posted on the official PiS YouTube channel proved that however electorally PiS is strongly concentrated in some areas of Poland, party leaders, instead of focusing on the existing cleavages decided to transfer the ideological bases of elite divisions into the social structure. What is more, by making clear the links between relatively recent party history (like the tragic

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death of Lech Kaczyński) and some distant events (like the actions undertaken by Władysław Anders' army during the Second World War) they try to alter the meaning of both Poland's distinction on post-communist and post-solidarity parties, or the most common right-left division in political theory. It seems that the final aim of Jarosław Kaczyński is to prove the long-lasting division between "true patriots" - nowadays grouped in PiS, and "Poles of the worst sort" ideological heirs of (mainly) the communist regime - mostly PO, Nowoczesna and their supporters (Davies 2016; Lyman & Berendt 2015).

Secondly, PiS politicians used populist narrative as a core part of their discursive strategies to ensure a favourable (for them) division of the party electorate in Poland. The preferable narrative was focused either on negative aspects of past events, when "others" were the most active political actors and, on the other hand, on the positive aspects of the future with PiS as the main political actor. In both cases, at the first level they did not take responsibility for the existing social cleavages and simultaneously they created an image of the party which is functioning above the divisions. It is surprising because at the second level they used a clearly populist narrative, they did not take into consideration the possibility of the positive influence of "others" on the situation of the decreasing level of different social divisions.

Finally, Jarosław Kaczyński has turned out to be the most active actor among politicians using a negative narrative to strengthen social cleavages in Poland. Nevertheless, the party leader raised the negative issue in most videos which were less popular, while he neither appeared in the most popular video nor used a conciliatory tone to separate himself from a negative party image.

The conclusion stemming from the conducted research is that the ruling party is now in the process of creating ideological bases of mass partisanship by using different discursive strategies based on some elements of classical cleavages but mostly on new historical-political divisions, which include features of the populist narrative.

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**Vision of East Central Europe in the thoughts  
of Polish intellectual elites of a 1989 turning point**

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**Abstract:**

The thesis presented in this article advances that creation of the idea of East Central Europe, which was shaped by the social elite of Central-European nations since the 50s, played an essential role on the turn of 1989. The creation of such idea laid foundations of political talks and treaties on the recognition of borders. It reduced mutual claims and helped avoid conflict of borders and ethnic riots. Discussions between the elite of border nations reduced mutual prejudices and stereotypes, also in the context of relationships between the entire societies. In Poland, the deliberations on the idea of East Central Europe had later determined prerogatives of foreign policy conducted by the first non-communist governments and had become a manifestation of the fact that the country on the Vistula River had always been part of European civilization, separated by the Iron Curtain for several decades of the second half of 20th century.

**Key words:**

East Central Europe, intellectual elite, intellectuals, transformation, foreign policy

The concept of Europe divided into the East and the West makes both Poles and the nations to the north and south of the Carpathians uncomfortable<sup>1</sup>, as the latter would rather be considered to be members of the Centre of the Old Continent than its eastern parts. They prefer to be called 'borderland space' of western European civilization than represent its east, and thus essentially Russian, face. They want this part of Europe to be, as it once was, a meeting place of civilizations, where creative confrontation between conflict and dialogue would often take place. Moreover, it was at that time, when this unique sensitivity to one's national identity

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<sup>1</sup> (...) After 1945, an extremely astounding concept of East Europe (instead of Slavic Europe), lying behind the Iron Curtain and basically equated with Russia and the Russian language, became established in the consciousness of the world.' (transl. TP; Kłoczowski 2014: 3)

and the civilization status of communities living in these regions, was shaped. But when the 'Russian East' came closer than ever, and the West turned its back, the Yalta cut led to a paralysis of European identity of the 'countries lying in the continent centre' for nearly 50 years.

The Poles questioned their 'easterness' many times, often against the facts. Until recently, for many observers this part of Europe did not exist, it was an illusion, a usurpation perhaps. Memories of European borderlands were only flashes of the past. Mieszko's (the first historical ruler of Poland and creator of the Polish state) descendants showed, however, that they had all the arguments in their favour, indisputably proven in 1989. It turned out that the Poles, together with other nations hidden behind the Iron Curtain, are able to create the space of freedom<sup>2</sup>. The new reality in the East of Europe after 1989 became not only their salvation, but also a great opportunity. Seeking a method to get rid of the crippling impact of the 'burdensome situation', the Poles, but also the Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Lithuanians and others, at the end of 20th century began to widen the space of freedom and rebuild Europe. In fact, after 1989, the point was not to have Poland back in Europe<sup>3</sup> (after all, Poland has been its part for centuries), but quite the opposite: to get Europe back on the Vistula River.

### *Intellectual elite and East Central Europe*

This article, through the analysis of the literature on the subject and historical sources, aims to show the role of the intellectual elites and the ideas they create for raising social awareness or national identity, but also for the state's foreign policy. Paper is focusing on the example of creation of the idea of East Central Europe, which was shaped by the social elite of Central European nations since the 50s, and which played an essential role on the turn of 1989.

For the purpose of this article, the term 'intellectual elite' will be used herein to describe the opposition circles taking part in the Round Table sessions, and later in the creation of the Citizens' Committee with Lech Wałęsa, Chairman of the Independent Self-governing Trade Union, and also Mazowiecki's government, and finally the circles that shaped foreign policy of the first government in free Poland. Why not 'intelligentsia' or 'intellectuals'? So much has been written on the subject of the Polish intelligentsia as a social category that at first glance it

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<sup>2</sup> 'Poland, subjected to the Yalta order, could not until after 1989 participate in the rebirth of European unity. Europe, however, has always remained the Polish dreams of freedom', said Bronisław Geremek during the ceremony of awarding him the International Charlemagne Prize of the City of Aachen on 21 May 1998 (Geremek 1999: 9).

<sup>3</sup> These slogans appeared in the press and numerous publications, including academic ones.

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may seem that nothing significant can be added. The paradox lies in the fact that historians and sociologists dealing with this problem in such a great number of publications, to this day have not really agreed on an acute and consistent definition of this category. Often, however, this blurring of semantic distinctions simply reflect chronic vagueness of real divisions, hierarchies and roles; let us raise here, for example, an issue of occupational diversification of intelligentsia, which is reflected in its division into separate segments (Domański 2008: 11-14).

One of these segments is the elite of intelligentsia, usually called the intellectuals. This is a category which we constantly hear and read about, but which is still covered with a veil of secrecy. Despite definitional problems, we know that an educated person is a member of historically formed social group which can be (better or worse) described in terms of sociological or historical categories. An intellectual is not defined in terms of any affiliation (hence his classlessness and Mannheim's (1954) eradication), but rather in terms of the use he makes of his mind, creative abilities or knowledge. It is also important what kind of relationship he has with the world and the surrounding reality. This is the reason why an intellectual seems to escape sociological, economic and historical categories. Moreover, this category suits the description of democratic reality much better: the requirement of democratic freedoms is associated with an educated person's critical attitude, which is not fully possible when freedom of thought and expression is limited by totalitarian reins. This is why we will stick to the term 'elite of intelligentsia' (according to Merton's (1968) concept, intelligentsia is a natural audience of intellectuals called their 'elite'); however, we will refer to such elite as 'intellectual elite' comprising people of culture, its creators and distributors (in the broad sense); because their social and professional situation is similar and because they are aware of their own responsibilities towards the world and neighbours, they grant themselves the right to interfere in the surrounding reality (Micińska 2000).

The elite can be metaphorically presented as a lens or an oil field. The first comparison is to show that the elite are like a magnifying glass focusing the most important features of a given society of which they are the product. According to the second metaphor, the elite are condensed human resources which are at the disposal of each society. Both approaches start from the simple assumption, paraphrasing de Maistre: 'every society gets the elite it deserves'. This matter, however, can be put in another way, namely that there is a gap between the elite and the society: the masses are noted for moral indifference as well as political and civic immaturity. They are

like too much ballast on a dangerously overloaded ship which goes out to the quiet sea only thanks to responsible elite. Here the assumption is slightly modified: 'what elite such a society' (Misztal 2005).

In order to describe the situation at the turn of the last two decades of 20th century in Poland, the use of only second approach, which spontaneously comes to mind, would be abuse. The truth is that during communism the elite generated the elite, their social base was small as whatever came into being in the Second Republic, was lost in the ashes of war and the dark days of Stalinism; there is, however, another side to the coin: after all, it was not only a handful of people who attended protests shouting: 'Solidarity! Solidarity!', or who distributed underground publications, secretly taught the children about the Katyn massacre and even gave up Communist party membership cards. But still, it was this handful that was called on the carpet to the Viceregal Palace (after World War II, the Palace served as the seat of the Council of Ministers) to sit at the big table 'without edges'. The Round Table, completing the Citizens' Committee electoral lists and the way Mazowiecki's government was created, interpreted by some as a kind of 'deal with a group of cronies', reminds rather the old times of 19th century and typical behaviour of the intelligentsia (to take matters into their own hands): 'The Citizens' Committee with Lech Wałęsa was a successful coup of the union workers. The intelligentsia seized power. Citizens' Committees were created in order to build political Poland, not workers' or union Poland. (...) The intelligentsia assumed power in Poland the same way they did in the Second Republic, although the mechanism was different (...) They seized power in Poland totally ignoring social support. The elite seemed to gladly commit gradual suicide, but they managed to achieve what they headed for. The intellectuals knew which Poland they wanted and achieved their goal. (...) They were all anti-political, they believed that there are some higher goals to be achieved regardless of the cost. In this sense, the intelligentsia disappeared, when they should have that is at the end of the transformation. They accomplished the task as Poland somewhat returned to normality, perhaps this normality was not too beautiful, but it rarely is beautiful' (transl. TP; Smolar 2009).

The issue how Polish intellectual elite saw Poland on the map of Europe back then, how (if at all) they wanted to shift their country to the West, from East Europe to Central Europe, seems extremely striking. It is also thought-provoking why the matters of geopolitical and cultural affiliation would be of any interest to them at all. Other very important questions result

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from deliberations on East Central Europe such as the question of the purpose of Polishness or national and civilizational identity of the Poles. The system transformation is often the time of exceptional crisis of bonds and values. Side effects of even the most positive changes might generate uncertainty, insecurity, isolation or some kind of identity disorders (historical, cultural, national or political identity – on a macro social scale). Identity, as a changeable value shaped by different experiences, primarily includes two main components: self-definition of an individual and collective self-awareness of a group. These processes take place in two ways: through positive verification (identification with specific ideas, values, socio-cultural groups such as national one) as well as negative verification (separation from others, defining oneself in opposition to 'strangers') (Wolff-Powęska 1998: 313-314).

It is true that the peoples of East Central Europe had regained freedom, but to a large extent – as Wolff-Powęska claimed – they lost their sense of security. The citizens of the Netherlands or Sweden do not have any serious dilemmas associated with their place on Earth. Their roots in particular culture and civilization have in fact never been denied or fought against, and their attachment to confirmed political or moral values has never been called into question (Wolff-Powęska 1998). Such experiences in the era of transformation enhance fears. At the time of change – just like on a road that we do not know – road signs are much needed. Who then, if not the intellectual elite, can set these road signs for those who travel all round the new reality?

It is the elite that give the society a perspective of viewing things. Or, to put it more simply and plainly, the elite call the reality. Moreover, if we consider that social reality is socially structured and only by means of such tools and categories which themselves are subject to such a structure, then everything that we are conceptually experiencing already is, in a certain sense, social reality. Therefore, creating specific concepts based on scraps of ideas and passing them to a wide range of people already accounts for reality creation. The role of the intellectual elite in this perspective takes on a whole new meaning. They not only call the reality, but simply create it. Therefore, this article is an attempt to determine the origin of the vision and ideas of East Central Europe, it's a reference to the thoughts of influential groups, and it will not only be an attempt to get to know the reality, but, one could say, will try to comprehend it.

The questions asked in previous paragraphs are not insignificant also for other countries of East Central Europe, no matter where we would mark out its borders. These questions – about the role of an elite, about setting directions and providing perspectives – are of the interest to all

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societies going from socialism to democracy. And the term 'East Central Europe' (or 'Central Europe'), appropriately popularized, plays a very important role. Timothy Garton Ash already mentioned this term in 1987 in *Zeszyty Literackie*, proving that the term of 'East Central Europe' 'reminds an American or British newspaper reader that East Berlin, Prague or Budapest are not quite in the same position as Kiev or Vladivostok and that Siberia does not begin at Checkpoint Charlie. And also, because it suggests American or British students that the study and analysis of this region may be something more than just an annex to kremlinology' (Ash 1987: 26). At the time, when Ash was writing these words, the situation in this part of Europe used to be described as: 'Eastern Europe in actu, Central Europe in potentia' (Ash 1987: 48).

***Inspirations: getting through to the elite***

Every idea has its progenitors as well as those who later try to put it into practice. The concept of East Central Europe does not have a long tradition, but it originates from certain way of thinking which has been rooted in history for a long time (Kłoczowski 2000). It seems, however, that two concepts could have an impact on Polish intellectual elite of the last two decades of 20th century and the way they perceived central part of the continent. These concepts derived from two different circles, namely Polish historians debating about it before the war, and intellectuals gathered around Paris emigration magazine *Kultura*, the writers of which created pragmatic foundations of foreign policy for future Poland.

The term 'East Central Europe' is not only a geographical, historical or political name; it is a kind of *topos*<sup>4</sup>, inclusive of the whole spectrum of phenomena, yet mainly political, economic and cultural ones. This term appeared for the first time in the mid-20th century, but – as highlighted by Jerzy Kłoczowski (2007) – has its roots in a debate held before the war by groups of historians from countries east to Germany and Italy, the debate organized on Polish initiative (mainly of M. Handelsman and O. Halecki) and chaired by Polish historians in the years 1927-1939 under the aegis of the Federation of Historical Societies of East Europe. This cooperation, however, lasted only until the outbreak of World War II, and after it ended, the Iron Curtain began to erect which prevented members of these respectable influential circles from

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<sup>4</sup> *Topos* (in short the 'key-word'), also known as a place of preference, is a point of view common for specific audience. This is a fundamental figure of speech which organizes the space of discourse – an argumentative scheme, widely recognized in given epistemic community. When one refers to some *topos*, he may expect that it will be immediately approved by such community. *Topoi* thus help consolidate or bring back some visions of reality in the minds of consumers much faster (Perelman 2002: 43-45).

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before 1939 from assembling again. The idea survived, but principally in exile. Polish historian Oskar Halecki, who found himself in the post-war years in the United States, began to continue the work he had begun in the country before the war. In 1950 he published a book on European region entitled *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (Halecki 1994), about which Kłoczowski (2004: 5) wrote that it is 'a kind of the conclusion of the movement of international cooperation of historians before 1939 and at the same time an intellectual protest against Soviet domination'. And thus, according to Halecki, the following countries ranked among East Central Europe: Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland together with the federated Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth which for many centuries was united with Lithuania, Ruthenia (i.e. Ukraine and Belarus), Latvia and part of Estonia. It is also worth noting that Halecki as early as then (in 1950!) mentioned Ukraine and Belarus, hoping for their separation from Russia, as he was convinced that the links of these countries indicate they belong to East Central Europe (Halecki 2000: 131-132).

Halecki's thought was continued in Poland for instance by Jerzy Kłoczowski, who established the Institute of East Central Europe in the first years after regaining freedom (1991), but who propagated his ideas among Polish historians many years before the breakthrough of 1989. As early as in the 70s, and especially in the 80s, in spite of many difficulties, the circles of historians promoted this idea in the form of various publications, projects and a number of conferences, at which such issues as divisions in Europe or Poland's relationships with its neighbours and the whole idea of East Central Europe were discussed. Not to be underestimated are also initiatives opening Poland to the Western world and cooperation with the 'French school' and the so-called 'new history' of the Annales group (Pleskot 2010). Thanks to this, historical research – although taken up in a totalitarian state – was examined and treated in a many-sided way, 'together with many scientific disciplines, always in a broad context and over a long time, thereby at every step inevitably leading to comparisons, to the necessity to go beyond the byways of a small region or country, and thus to a better understanding of one's own past and culture' (Kłoczowski 1993: 28).

Since the early 70s, certain trend in Polish historiography has become noticeable: the medievalists in their broad studies used the term 'East Central Europe' to improve their knowledge of the early Slavic world and the origin of countries from eastern part of Europe; furthermore, they often indicated multiple economic, political and cultural ties with the West as

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well as the contacts of early Slavs with the Byzantine Empire in the East. In the end, the experts on modern history began to use this term also with reference to contemporary times (Kłoczowski 1993: 28-29). Back at that time historians used to meet together, for example, at mediaeval meetings that reinforced the sense of Central-European identity<sup>5</sup>. It was then when an attempt to co-operate more closely with the circles of historians of Central-European countries was taken<sup>6</sup>. An event that was the coping stone of these efforts was the congress organized by the Catholic University of Lublin and the Lateran University in Rome on 3-7 November 1981, the theme of which were common historical roots of Christian nations of Europe. On Polish side, the plenary lectures were delivered by A. Gieysztor, J. Kłoczowski and S. Kieniewicz, thereby providing a framework for discussion about Christianity in East Central Europe. This meeting was held under the patronage of Pope John Paul II, who was keenly interested in the subject of Central Europe. As Kłoczowski (2006: 7-8) points out, the Holy Father from the beginning was '(...) our Friend and a Friend of the Federation of Institutes of East Central Europe as well as people from the countries of the region, which, together with freedom they have just regained, have established friendly international cooperation in this part of Europe, so sorely tried in historical terms. The idea of closeness of the peoples who once co-existed for centuries within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which in fact consisted of many nations, was very dear to John Paul II'. In addition to the conference, there was also an evening meeting of a few people well aware of what the situation of Poland and the 'Solidarity' movement was. Bronisław Geremek attended this meeting at that time, answering the questions of John Paul II about the situation in Poland. The meeting took place a month before the imposition of martial law in Poland.

The authority of Pope John Paul II strongly affected both the Polish intellectual elite and the society as a whole, and the Holy Father's involvement in specific projects made them assume great importance and be discussed not only in the narrow circles of historians. The so-called Roman meetings of 1990 and their later consequences, which we will discuss later in this article, were extremely important here. Since the beginning of his pontificate John Paul II repeatedly

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<sup>5</sup> For example, a conference in Krakow in 1976 on St. Stanislaus.

<sup>6</sup> It is worth paying attention to an atlas of Christianity in Poland and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth drafted by the Institute of Historical Geography of the Church in Poland at the Catholic University of Lublin under the leadership of J. Kłoczowski; the work on the atlas had started in the late 50s, and from the very beginning its authors placed great emphasis on broad, European context of presented phenomena, which was reflected in the fact that towards the end of the 80s the atlas programme was extended to cover the entire East Central Europe (Kłoczowski 1993: 34).

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showed that East Central Europe was a special place to him, not only because of its political, geographical or cultural differences, but above all because of the uniqueness of its historical, religious and cultural experiences. According to Łaszkiewicz (2006), the Pope wanted his ideas on East Central Europe to reach to and be understood particularly by people inhabiting these lands. The suffering they endured and the memory of these bitter experiences along with the need for freedom and human rights defence remain to this day an exceptional strength that these nations bring to the European heritage.

It should also be noted that Central-European tradition of Polish historians, supported by John Paul II, is so characteristic also due to the fact that many of the opposition members, participants of the Round Table sessions, were history graduates (and even academics) – just to mention Bronisław Geremek, Henryk Samsonowicz and Karol Modzelewski, all very active both in the field of science and politics. One of the members of the Civic Committee with Lech Wałęsa, Jerzy Kłoczowski, whom we referred to in the text repeatedly, also had multiple contacts with the opposition. Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuroń or Aleksander Hall were also history graduates. The influence of environment in which they were growing up probably was not without significance.

The Paris emigration magazine *Kultura*, reaching the Polish elite through underground channels, was also a window on the world for those imprisoned in fetters of the totalitarian state. Interestingly enough, after World War II Jerzy Giedroyc, who settled in exile, strived to create conditions for a long-term political action and did not try to either organize paramilitary structures and combat groups, or create political structures; instead, he established a magazine and publishing house. He was convinced that in the ideological struggle with communism it would be a much more important weapon as it is not enough to oppose force to totalitarianism; it is also necessary to counteract its effects on the Polish elite. In exile, Giedroyc was a pioneer in this kind of thinking (Pomian 2001). This way *Kultura* was a proponent of ideas important to Polish opposition, thereby giving some hope to the suppressed elites. Over the years, the *Kultura* people had developed a programme that had become the foundation (especially when it comes to politics in the East) for future foreign policy of free Poland<sup>7</sup>. As early as at the beginning of the

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<sup>7</sup> 'Giedroyc and Mieroszewski's great intellectual achievement was, therefore, a combination of acceptance of the state borders with the prediction that communism would collapse, and with the awareness that this situation would require new Polish strategy. Developing such strategy and providing grounds for it accounted for their great theoretical achievement, whereas promoting this programme in such a way that the Poles, who since 1989 were to play an important role in politics, considered it to be obvious, was their great political achievement' (Snyder 2006: 255, Cf: Geremek 2001: 97-98).

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70s, Juliusz Mieroszewski formulated theoretical justification for Poland's eastern strategy once it shook off its Soviet shackles. He was of the view that individual nations beyond Polish eastern border, that is Lithuanians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, should be strengthened in the respective Soviet republics. He also supported the idea that all claims to lands lost in 1945 should be given up; he predicted that 20th century would witness the 'Spring of Nations' in Central and Eastern Europe (Mieroszewski 1976: 110-122, 175-186).

According to Snyder (2006), the impact of Mieroszewski on the Polish opposition was very important. The Polish Independence Alliance (Polskie Porozumienie Niepodległościowe, PPN) in its eastern policy kept to the guidelines of the magazine, followed by the Workers' Defence Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników, KOR), the members of which attached great importance to eastern neighbours. In 1972, Father Jan Zieja (a co-founder of KOR in 1976) addressed the following words to Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians: 'We forgive and ask for forgiveness' (Kuroń 1989: 347-349). Snyder (2006) points out that the programme of *Kultura* was accepted and taken over by the 'Solidarity', which was an excellent platform through which a view on the nations beyond eastern border reached millions of Poles. This new thinking was reflected in solidarity press articles, in the statements made by activists and, finally, in the resolution of the union convention of 1981 called 'The Message to the Working People of Eastern Europe'. It was not an appeal addressed to the Soviet proletariat, but to the working people of every nation of the Communist bloc. According to an American historian, these were the first moments in modern Polish history, when considerable number of Poles thought about their immediate eastern neighbours, hidden behind Soviet republics, as their equals. Then, throughout the eighties, in many publications and through various initiatives the elite attempted to take up the issues of good relations with eastern neighbours (Snyder 2006). No wonder that in 1989 the need for good relations with neighbouring nations represented a well-thought-out view of larger part of the intellectual elite. It is also interesting that even Aleksander Kwaśniewski (1998) referred to *Kultura* when he was explaining the implementation of his own foreign policy as well as the entire post-communist bloc's which came to power in Poland in 1993.

### ***Before the wall came crashing down***

The analysis of political thought of the Polish opposition of the 70s and 80s shows that the issue of East Central Europe was at that time visibly present in underground publications and

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considered at various levels (Rogaczewska 2004). It was discussed whether there is a common spiritual culture of Europe, whether the Rhine is actually the borderline between two different cultures and whether Poland, without any doubt, belongs only to one of them. Answers were usually sought in historical events showing the unity of European, or at least Central-European, spirit. However, less attention was paid to the future of this region and to Europe as a whole; the notion that the dominance of the Soviet Union in the east central part of the Old Continent would be long-standing with no real chances for a change prevailed.

According to policy documents of the Polish Independence Alliance founded at the end of 1975 and at the beginning of 1976 by Zdzisław Najder, East Central Europe was the area between three seas: the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black Sea, inhabited by nations clearly defined in historical and cultural terms, unresponsive to foreign domination and homogeneous enough that it was difficult for them to create common political structures. These nations unmistakably share the same historical destiny, the same tragedies and foreign supremacy – first of the three superpowers, then of constitutionally and ideologically super state, which cut off this part of Europe from its western part: 'For centuries shut away from the world, police, and distrustful Russia imposed its political style to Europe as far as the Elbe and Danube' (Rogaczewska 2004: 182). Even then, at the end of the 70s, the members of the Polish Independence Alliance declared that in the east Poland borders on Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania, not the Soviet Union; there were also no claims made to Lvov and Vilnius. Furthermore, it was emphasized that free Poland without free Czechs and Slovaks, Hungarians, Romanians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Estonians, and Latvians is simply impossible. People were, however, aware how conflict-ridden this territory was; they knew about its diversity, distrustfulness of one another and hostile attitude of some countries of this part of Europe. Klaus Zimmer (2007) noted an interesting fact, pointing to an article published in the Paris magazine *Kultura* in 1978. It was a kind of Polish Independence Alliance policy statement (Najder was its main author) and it stated that Poland should strive for the unification of Germany (on condition that the Oder-Neisse will be recognized as Poland's western border), which would give our country a direct territorial contact with the West. According to Najder (PPN 1978), the German Democratic Republic was in fact a Soviet satrap and blocked the direct access to the neighbourhood with the West.

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These assumptions and ideas were transferred to the Workers' Defence Committee through such persons as Józef Rybicki and Jan Olszewski who were the first members of the Polish Independence Alliance. Other important personages, including Władysław Bartoszewski, Gustaw Herling-Grudziński, Marcin Król, Jan Józef Lipski, Józefa Hennelowa or Tadeusz Mazowiecki, cooperated with the Alliance. The issue of East Central Europe was constantly present in the opposition underground. Within the 'Solidarity' itself a variety of concepts regarding the unity among Central-European countries kept coming up, like for example the so-called Intermarium concept, which was to guarantee these countries' independence and inviolability of their borders (Mięguszowiecki 1984: 5-7). There were concepts of federation with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Lithuania in the centre (Bądkowski 1980). Not always, however, the idea of the unity of East Central Europe was a goal in itself; sometimes it was only a means helping achieve higher level goal, that is the unification of the whole of Europe<sup>8</sup>. Jacek Kuroń (1985) had different idea, though; he believed that both German republics, Poland and other Central-European countries should make up a demilitarized and neutralized zone under international control. Abandoning the arms race would give the countries of Central Europe the chance to meet their economic needs.

In addition, Central-European issues were undertaken in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, *Więzi* (Tadeusz Mazowiecki was the latter's editor-in-chief for a long time) and *Znak* – in a specific way, as an attempt to smuggle the thought nonetheless, after numerous censor's deletions – on the pages of which the works of both Polish and, more importantly, foreign historians were frequently published. The Lublin magazine *Spotkania* (Independent Magazine of Young Catholics associated with historians from the Catholic University of Lublin) was also an unusual initiative operating in samizdat (the magazine lived to see its branch in Paris), often undertaking the issues of East Central Europe. No wonder that in the intellectual circles of the Polish opposition long before 1989 there was an understanding regarding mutual relations in Europe under communist system. Furthermore, international and multidisciplinary session held in June 1989 in Tyniec and Krakow, dedicated to the past and mainly to the present of East Central Europe, also gained symbolic meaning. In one of the lectures Jerzy Kłoczowski (1990) said: 'Our road leads primarily through the relationship with our neighbours, with East Central Europe. When setting about cleaning in our own house, we cannot forget about this task even for a

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<sup>8</sup> Such ideas appeared in the writings of the group called Freedom -Justice-Independence

moment, neither we, nor all of our close and distant neighbours'. The international conference 'Belarus – Lithuania – Poland – Ukraine. Fundamentals of historical and cultural traditions of East Europe', previously mentioned herein, held in Rome from 28th April to 6th May 1990 and commonly referred to as 'Vatican meetings', was the continuation of this kind of meetings. The group of several dozen people, primarily historians, included mostly visitors from countries just regaining freedom, that is Belarusians, Lithuanians, Poles and Ukrainians (Kłoczowski 2006). It was then, during Roman-Vatican talks, when not only the most difficult issues were brought up, but also future Institutes of East Central Europe and their Federation were established<sup>9</sup>. This was after 1989.

However, during the Round Table sessions, the issues of Europeanism and, in general, the place of Poland in the international arena were not – for obvious reasons – brought up. The opposition, in order not to irritate the authorities, did not even try to talk about them (the internal problems of the country were indeed much more urgent); on the other hand, the authorities considered foreign policy of the country to be the area of action to the greatest extent dependent on the prerogatives of Moscow. It was enough, however, that *Gazeta Wyborcza*, and many other titles alongside, appeared on Polish media market which no longer had to go through the building at ul. Mysia, where everything that was brought to light legally was censored, that the discussion around Europe and our place in it was revived again, and not only in intellectual circles.

### ***The vision: back to Europe***

Why back to Europe? Aleksander Smolar (1988), when considering in 1988 the impact of communism on Polish society, asked: how far have we walked away from the West – in our mind, reactions, public and private attitude? To what extent has communism left its mark on us? Are we still part of Europe? As he witnessed the already decaying system and observed Polish authorities ready to modify the existing system with minor reforms and gradually give people more autonomy and freedom, but rather negative freedom, Smolar was tormented by the question: does this movement lead to Europe or does it only move us away from it? Hence, we

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<sup>9</sup> As a result of the conference, on 19th October 1992 (the actual cooperation begun in 1993) the International Federation of National Institutes of East-Central Europe was established on the initiative of professor Jerzy Kłoczowski, Chairman of the Board of the Institute of East Central Europe in Lublin. It is open to peer Institutes in Lublin, Minsk, Lvov, Kiev, Budapest, Vilnius, Prague, Sofia and Vienna. In 1999, the Federation was registered as a NGO with UNESCO.

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may draw the following conclusion: during communism there was no Europe in Poland. Even Tadeusz Mazowiecki (1990: 3), when speaking on 30th January 1990 in the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, said: 'Europe is going through an extraordinary time. Half of the continent, separated from the parent stem nearly half a century ago, wishes to be back to where it belongs. Back to Europe! This sentence has become a catchword in the countries of Central and East Europe lately. Politicians, economists, people of culture talk about it, although the latter never really left Europe; they remained in Europe of spirit, in Europe understood as a community of traditions and values'. Also Adam Michnik (1995: 166) wrote about the return to Europe in terms of Polish desire. Although he considered this idea to be more a 'landmark, declaration of intention rather than real political programme'<sup>10</sup>. East-European idea of return to Europe means just an option in favour of some features of European culture which are to be contrasted with the dogmas of communism. According to Michnik, we came back to Europe to keep the distance from ourselves, to get back the criticism, scepticism, objectivity, tolerance and the need to confront competitive views with one another.

In Poland, but also for the majority of people in the East Central Europe, the term 'Europe' has strictly positive value, but also particular significance. According to T. G. Ash, it refers to this cultural and spiritual unity and community extending at least from Santiago de Compostela to Vilnius and Lvov. Indeed, we often consider the West to be haughty, capricious, devoid of reason, perhaps even decadent; yet the two concepts, namely 'Europe' and 'the West', are complementary and in the eyes of both Poles and every other inhabitants of East Central Europe there are no contradictions between them (Ash 1987). So what would this Central Europe be? Nothing other than, to quote Milan Kundera (1984), 'the West in the East'.

Mazowiecki (1990: 3-4) said in Strasbourg that for the residents of Central and East Central Europe, Europe has always been the point of reference for questions about identity. According to him, for many years the Poles felt they were defenders of Europe and loved it; for three hundred years the ideology of the bulwark of Christendom, and therefore the bulwark of Europe, remained firmly fixed. After the turning point of 1989, nothing changed: the Poles still considered Europe to be 'the homeland of freedom and rights'. However, the resentment towards the West and grudges against it for abandoning us on the other side of the Iron Curtain,

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<sup>10</sup> Michnik's article entitled 'Myśli wschodnioeuropejskie' originally appeared in *New York Times Magazine* on 11th March 1990, and was later reprinted in Polish *Krytyka* (No. 32/33, 1990). The text also appeared in the collection edited by A. Romanowski, already cited herein (Michnik 1995).

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for agreeing to such division of Europe, remained deep. This specific community of political tragedies along with geopolitical realities, collective memory, societies' awareness and political status of state organizations – often uncertain, unstable, contested by the East or the West – are typical of the countries of East Central Europe. Bronisław Geremek (1995: 173-174, 185) considered this to be the source of frustration and increased nationalism syndrome resulting from constant fear for both state existence and identity, which is very fragile. This region is neither uniform nor distinct enough on the cultural map of Europe to clearly define its identity.

Michnik (1995: 168-169) also noticed this problem; he saw both in Poland and in every other country in Central and East Europe the struggle between European spirit and – in the case of the country on the Vistula River – Poland-centrism. When Michnik was writing these words in 1990, he had very specific concerns: if we assumed that Yugoslavia was the miniature of Central Europe, and its internal conflicts could have been the miniature of future conflicts in post-totalitarian Europe, it would be easy to imagine that this Central-European mosaic may face many similar feuds over the borders. According to the chief editor of *Gazeta Wyborcza*, unhappy nations, living for years in humiliation, enslaved, imprisoned, full of complexes, feed on resentment, which often arouses hatred. According to Michnik, back then East Central Europe was facing two alternative ways: either the war for borders involving barbed wire entanglements placed around them, or an attempt to bring a new order based on pluralism and tolerance. The first was related to nationalism and isolationism from the world, whereas the second was the way leading back to Europe.

Hence, perhaps, comparison of Poland meaning the entire East Central Europe, to 'a man after a serious illness' (Mazowiecki 1990: 4). Countries, which regained their freedom after years of oppression, are weak and strong at the same time: their weakness is manifested in state structures, institutions, or economy, but their strength lies in experience of survival of a community based on European values. Only one thing, namely closing the gap between the East and the West, may prevent this part of Europe from 'balkanization'. Not to mention joint march of Poland and its neighbours towards Europe.

### ***Common march towards Europe: on foreign policy***

Firstly, to annul the division – Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, began his first international speech by calling

to annul the Ribbentrop-Molotov (Mazowiecki 2010) pact dividing Europe into two spheres of influence: the German Third Reich and the Soviet Union. The first country lost the war and its sphere of influence; the second, however, won it, therefore, the border remained where it was previously set. Naturally, breaking the pact was symbolic as Europe was definitively divided into two parts at the Yalta Conference in 1945. However, it was no accident that safety assurance was the main goal of Poland's foreign policy. East Central Europe – as it was stressed out – could not become a grey area, a buffer or neutral zone, because the area of such status, due to its location, would easily become the subject of competition between stronger states. This was the reason why it was important to annul the dualistic division of Europe.

It was Skubiszewski's task to outline a new concept of international policy<sup>11</sup> and conduct it in an extremely difficult situation, in reality subject to rapid and radical changes. The first Minister of Foreign Affairs after the turn of 1989 actually took over the programme of *Kultura*<sup>12</sup> and enriched it with two very important elements: firstly, the idea of Europeanism and common European institutions using their attraction (although back then there were very few signals showing that someone in the West might be even considering the extension) and secondly, establishment of this policy according to international law, agreements and treaties. Snyder considers the policy of this Minister of Foreign Affairs towards the Soviet Union to be unique in the world: Skubiszewski conducted the policy in two directions, addressing both central authorities in Moscow, but also individual Soviet republics, which no other government in the world did at that time (Snyder 2007: 330-331). Skubiszewski, when speaking about foreign policy and his major tasks, mentioned both widely understood pro-European policy and establishing this orientation by including Poland in integration structures and networks of West-European interdependences. The other thing, equally important, that the Minister pointed out, was strengthening and deepening regional links within the Visegrád Group, the Council of Baltic Sea States and the Central European Initiative (Hexagonale) (Skubiszewski 1994: 6-9).

Of course, in accordance with *Kultura* guidelines, Eastern policy was supposed to be an important factor in European policy as well, because – as the Minister himself said – 'trouble in the East will have its resonance in the West' (Skubiszewski 1994). Foreign policy was to be based on the imperative of reversing the function of Poland's position between the East and the

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<sup>11</sup> However, Krzysztof Skubiszewski was not the only creator of Polish foreign policy in the first years of democracy. Naturally, Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Bronisław Geremek, mentioned herein many times, played an important role, too.

<sup>12</sup> It might be surprising that Jerzy Giedroyc, as one of the people who shaped Polish foreign policy of that time – albeit indirectly – was also one of its committed critics.

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West (however, domination of the East prevailed in Poland's history). Hence clear tasks: supporting democratic and free-market tendencies in the East and independent statehood of eastern neighbours. Skubiszewski emphasized that we should help and support Ukraine and make other countries overcome their aversion to Ukraine: 'An important task was to create some relations between us and Ukraine that would balance the asymmetry and contrast between increasingly stronger linkage between Poland and the West and the lack of comparable bonds of Ukraine with the West' (Skubiszewski 1994: 9).

'Regional structure of the march towards united Europe' was to help Poland join the West; three (later four) countries made up this structure: Poland, Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic, Slovakia) and Hungary as these countries – as Bronisław Geremek (1990: 339) argued – shared common experiences, problems and related interests. The alliance of these three countries was also supposed to create a bridge between the North and the South of Europe, that is between Scandinavia and the Baltic, where Poland took most of actions, and the Mediterranean Sea and the Danube, which was the zone of Hungary's operation. Notwithstanding, this concept remained nothing but theory: Bronisław Geremek, with the support of Zbigniew Brzeziński, proposed a reorientation of the East-West axis in favour of the North-South axis. To finally break the stereotypes, to stop being only the bulwark of the Latin world on the one hand and Slavic cape on the other, Poland was to be the keystone of the arch connecting the North and the South (Geremek 1990). The interest of Polish government in a group referred to as Pentagonale, that is: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Italy, was very deep back then. Poland and these countries, as Minister Skubiszewski (1990: 3) emphasized in his parliamentary speeches, have various bonds and long tradition of cooperation as well as shared history (almost all of these countries were members of the Federation of Historical Societies of East Europe, already mentioned herein). This new regionalism, in particular the cooperation with Prague and Budapest, was considered to be an element assuring safety in central part of Europe: 'This is a positive action, not aimed at any new divisions. Its purpose is to connect for common good, the good of Europe, and not to divide anything against anyone. The point is not to create the cordon separating anyone. Europe is a wholeness, and certain regional unions strengthen this wholeness and do it good. It is diversity that Europe is noted for' (Skubiszewski 1991: 11).

European cooperation – as it was believed – would lead to a different world, a world eliminating antagonisms or at least reducing them, a world without violence and various annexation. And it was not a utopia, but a real chance. This was a great dream of that generation

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of intellectual elite, not only Polish but – in a broader perspective – also European. In 1990, Tadeusz Mazowiecki (1990: 7) asked the members of the Council of Europe to imagine 'our Europe' Anno Domini 2000: 'It will certainly not be the Europe of goods, capital and people moving freely across borders but it might be the Europe of significantly reduced customs and border barriers, fully open to the youth. After all, the future of our continent will depend on what Europeans we will jointly bring up'.

The philosophy of foreign policy promoted by such people as Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Bronisław Geremek and finally Krzysztof Skubiszewski, was actually developed before 1989. Therefore, it was impossible to predict what would happen to the Soviet Union and its satellite states; it was also still uncertain whether the Round Table or the June elections would be held or whether the Berlin Wall would come down. Still, the project that was taking shape in the offices of Polish historians, in the Paris suburb of Maisons-Laffitte, and that was refined on solidarity polystyrene, in shipyards, in the haze of Bronisław Geremek's pipe, set very ambitious demands and high goals. Perhaps it was so because sometimes, according to Max Weber, 'one can attain the possible only by wishing the impossible'. It is a matter of method. For Poland, the state policy goals must always be high. This is a result of our history, our place in Europe, the challenges of today and of the upcoming decades' (Skubiszewski 1993).

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The creation of the idea of East Central Europe played an enormous role of a 1989 turning point. Firstly, the initiative of Polish historians in favour of neighbourly cooperation between Poland and other countries of this part of Europe seeking common values in history, in similar experience and goals for the future, have laid solid foundations of purely political talks, thereby greatly facilitating them. The talks between the elites, for example Polish and Lithuanian elite at conferences in the early 90s, toned down mutual prejudices between the two nations and stereotypes created in their minds, thereby allowing the authorities of both countries to carry out peaceful and friendly negotiations regarding state borders, minorities, but also future cooperation in other areas. Secondly, Halecki's or Mierosławski's visions of independence of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, defining prerogatives of policy with an emphasis put on the fact that future, independent Poland would not raise borderland territorial claims and accept the borders agreed on in the ill-fated Yalta, reached the masses, thereby making it possible to avoid both conflicts



about the borders and ethnic riots. Thirdly, emphasizing the separateness of this part of Europe showed to the world that there are countries which, although they do not belong to Russia, are situated in the East of Europe and do not differ civilization-wise so much from the western part of the continent. These are the countries situated between the East and the West, the countries of the so-called Younger Europe.

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**The Sino-Indian rivalry in South Asia in the XXI  
century on the examples of Nepal, Sri Lanka and  
the Maldives**

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**Abstract:**

In the article the author focuses on the analysis of Sino-Indian rivalry in the three countries, seeking common points and differences in their situation. These are the inland Nepal, located between India and China; the islands of Sri Lanka, lying adjacent to the Indian subcontinent; and the Maldives, five hundred kilometer away from it. Author claims that in the 21st century there is an increase of intensity in relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India in the field of competitive impacts in the analyzed countries. However, due to the significantly lower potential of India in the economic sphere and less activity in the international arena, the policy of this country in South Asia is most often reactive to China's actions. In the 21st century a significant change in the political situation in Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives can be seen. India's former hegemony has been undermined by China, which has gained an advantage in all of these countries.

**Key words:**

India, China, South Asia, rivalry, sphere of influence

***Introduction***

One of the most significant issues of the contemporary international relations is a change in the global balance of power. Joseph Nye reads it as a transfer of power from the West to the East, from the Atlantic to the Pacific (Smolar 2011). Zbigniew Brzeziński talks about shifting the center of the global power from the Atlantic world to Asia, at the same time mentioning the "global political awakening" – an increase in social and political aspirations of huge numbers of the world's population (Brzeziński & Scowcroft 2009). Ryszard Kapuściński (2007) puts it this way: "If you look at the world's calendar, you can see in which direction the motor

of civilization is moving. It began with the Sumerians and Mesopotamia, then the Mediterranean, then the Atlantic, and now the Pacific region. Taking into account both Americas, Australia, Russia, China, Indonesia (...) it constitutes an extraordinary conglomerate of cultures, religions, races".

There is no doubt that importance of Asia has been growing in the global international system for several decades. Dynamically developing Asian countries exert an increasing influence on the international balance of power not only in the economic, but also in political, military and cultural dimensions. China and India are the key actors in this process. They have an increasing impact not only in their immediate geographical neighborhood, but also in other parts of the world. Both countries are already among the most important world powers, and their role will probably grow. It makes analysis of Sino-Indian relations very important, because their significance goes beyond the bilateral dimension. They contain elements of cooperation (especially in the aspect of economics) and competition, the latter being much more important for the assessment of the nature of mutual relations.

The most important area of competitive impacts of India and China is South Asia. Since the creation of the Republic of India in 1947, it has been the traditional zone of influence of this state, but at the moment there is a consistent increase in the importance of China in the region. This process was partly initiated already in the era of the Cold War, but it was intensified after its end and gained real impetus from the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century (Chanana 2010).

Currently, each South Asian country is an arena of Sino-Indian rivalry, regardless of its size, the specificity of the political or economic system. It should also be mentioned that the South Asian region is characterized by high instability. It results not only from the competing international strategies of the region's states, but also the lack of institutionalization of political cooperation and low level of institutionalization in the economic sphere, interstate, intra-state and transnational conflicts, the presence of numerous asymmetrical threats and, finally, the serious problem of poverty and illiteracy (Zajączkowski 2009).

In the article the author focuses on the analysis of Sino-Indian rivalry in the three countries, seeking common points and differences in their situation. These are the inland Nepal, located between India and China, the islands of Sri Lanka lying adjacent to the Indian subcontinent, and the Maldives, five hundred kilometer away from them.

The hypotheses put forward by the author are as follows:

- 1) In the 21st century, there is increase of intensity of relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India in the field of competitive impacts in the analyzed countries.
- 2) Due to the significantly lower potential of India in the economic sphere and less activity in the international arena, the policy of this country in South Asia is most often reactive to China's actions.
- 3) In the 21st century can be seen a significant change in the political situation in Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. India's former hegemony has been undermined by China, which has gained an advantage in all of these countries.

### *Nepal*

The importance of Nepal in Indo-Chinese relations in the 21st century is based on similar considerations as in the previous period. In the geological dimension, the Indian and Eurasian plates collide on the territory of Nepal, while in the geopolitical sense, Kathmandu is a small enclave analogically pressed between two powers, increasingly competing for influence in this area. This is a fundamental problem shaping the strategic identity of the state, trying to skillfully balance between India and China, drawing the benefits from both neighbors. Just as the earthquakes affect Nepal in a tragically literal sense, there have been metaphorical shocks in Kathmandu's foreign policy for more than a dozen years. Remaining earlier in the Indian zone of influence, Nepal is approaching China more and more decisively. While it could have been interpreted as an attempt to balance foreign policy, the PRC has now gained an advantage in Nepal. And to a lesser extent, the obstacle in this process is the objective difficulty associated with the location of the PRC and Nepal on opposite sides of the Himalayan chain.

Over the years, the political scene in Nepal was so dominated by New Delhi that after the creating of the multi-party system in 1990, the majority of parties had Indian financial support, while relations with south neighbor were always one of the most important topics of the election campaign. New Delhi helped to conclude an agreement terminating the civil war in Nepal in 2004, but at the same time it was repeatedly accused of destabilizing the political situation in the country, among others, by seeking to overthrow those governments who run an insufficiently pro-Indian policy (six changes of prime minister took place in 2013-2017). The Embassy of India located in the Lainchaur district was unofficially called the "Lainchaur manor", because important decisions for Nepal were made after consulting this institution. Currently, the embassy of the People's Republic of China in Balouatar is at least equally important. In November 2016

the Prime Minister of Nepal Pushpa Kamal Dahal welcomed there the newly appointed ambassador Yu Hong (*Chinese Ambassador calls on Nepal PM*).

Until recently, the only possibility of transporting goods from Nepal was to use the territory of India. In 2016, Beijing and Kathmandu, however, signed a contract for use Chinese infrastructure and seaports to transport goods. However, for its effective implementation, it is necessary to expand the infrastructure also on the Nepalese side. The Chinese provide development assistance and investment loans to Nepal, build roads and beltways, scientific and congress centers, hospitals and power plants. It would be difficult to find a sphere in which Chinese capital would not have been present for the several years. The next step in the direction of rapprochement with China turned out to be the decision by the authorities in Kathmandu to join the Belt and Road initiative promoted by Beijing. The PRC indicates that one of the elements of the initiative will be the development of infrastructure connections with Nepal, with particular emphasis on the railway line from Tibet to Kathmandu. The development of cross-border infrastructure allowing free exchange of people and goods between China and Nepal would be a real revolution, also in the geopolitical dimension. The possibility of direct transport of goods from China without the troublesome stop in Indian ports would change economic relations in this region.

When Nepal suffered a catastrophic earthquake in April 2015, China and India were the largest donors to Kathmandu. Beijing offered assistance in the amount of 483 million dollars, and New Delhi 250 million dollars and 750 million dollars in loan. What's more, the Indian and Chinese rescue teams had to outdo each other in the speed of help given to the injured. Nepal, in turn, refused to accept support from Taiwan fearing exposure to the PRC's wrath (*Furmanowicz 2015*).

Narendra Modi attempted to regain initiative on the political Nepalese chessboard, when shortly after being sworn in as a prime minister, and as the first head of government for seventeen years, he went to Kathmandu in August 2014 (two months earlier Prime Minister of Nepal Sushil Koirala made a successful trip to the PRC). During the visit, for the first time the Indian side distanced itself so clearly from the treatment of Nepal as a "younger brother", which could have marked a new opening in mutual relations that would have a more equal character from that time. An important gesture in the symbolic sphere was Modi's confirmation that Prince Siddhartha Gautama (later Buddha Shakyamuni), was born in the territories currently belonging to Nepal (*Muni 2017: 126*).

However, it soon turned out that the partner relations of both countries will remain in the wishes sphere of the authorities in Kathmandu, because India is not going to give up maintaining relationships based on hierarchical dependence. The controversial issue was the work on the Constitution of Nepal, conducted by the Constituent Assembly established in 2008. Narendra Modi has repeatedly referred to this matter in public statements, however, the Indian treatments ultimately did not bring the expected results.

In September 2015, the Nepali Parliament passed a new constitution, which India took as a threat to its interests, or at least an act insufficiently consulted with New Delhi. The axis of the dispute was the undervaluation of the people of Madhesi, who live in Teraju (south of Nepal) and show the strongest cultural ties with India, especially the inhabitants of the border states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh – and therefore politically oriented towards New Delhi. Representatives of this community were not involved in the work on the constitution, and perceived the act as unfair. The claims made by Madhesi concerned the course of their provincial boundaries and the rules for granting citizenship to their family members, as well as the insufficient representation of Teraju citizens in the Nepali Parliament. The second group, which India supported against Nepalese authorities were the Dalits – located outside the varnas division and, therefore the worst situated as a group in the society of Nepal. New Delhi has repeatedly, especially since the BJP took power as a party that promote Hindu nationalism, appealing to a cultural community with Dalits based on a religious dimension. If we add to this the influence exerted on Nepalese political parties, we get an image of a powerful instrument of pressure on Kathmandu.

India also criticized the provisions of the constitution stating that single women would not have the right to transfer citizenship to their children, which was justified by the fact that offspring from Nepalese women relationships with foreigners, mostly Indians, may show greater loyalty to fathers' countries of origin than to Nepal. What's more, the constitution has decreed that Nepal is a secular state, which can be interpreted as an attempt to weaken the influence of India resulting from the Hindu community (Tharoor 2015).

The reaction of India to the adoption of the constitution in an undesirable form proved to be very decisive. Madhesi's protests led to the blocking of the Indo-Nepalese border, which is a matter of great importance to the smaller country, given the dependence on New Delhi in various areas of life. India was not formally involved in the blockade, but they did not abstain from supporting Madhai's demands, so it was clear to everyone that in fact the protests punish Kathmandu and attempt to discipline the Nepalese. The blockade lasting until February 2016 caused huge damage to the economy of Nepal, as estimated, even exceeding the costs of the

previous tragic earthquake. The inability to bring fuel was particularly important, because Nepal has sufficient supplies for only a dozen days or so.

China rapidly used the Indo-Nepali mismatch. During the crisis cooperation was undertaken by the oil companies Nepal Oil Corporation and China National United Oil Corporation, which broke India's monopoly in the supply of raw materials. Cooperation has also been intensified in other areas, or such steps have been announced in the future (Baral 2017). It seems, therefore, that New Delhi has achieved the opposite effect from the intended one. Declaration of Nepal in 2016, which states that "No Nepalese area will be used to act against neighbors," could have been read as a concession addressed to China (Rybczyńska 2016).

Katmandu's warming of relations with Beijing also involves limiting the rights of Tibetan refugees staying in Nepal. The successive agencies dealing with diaspora matters are being eliminated, and crossing the border from Tibet is becoming increasingly difficult. Tibetans displaying anti-Chinese views are detained, and in the event of Buddhist monks self-immolation in Nepalese territory, the authorities refuse to issue bodies to celebrate funeral ceremonies in order not to anger China with political demonstrations.

In January 2018, the Sino-Indian struggle for influence in Nepal in the next sector began. Beijing offered Kathmandu to launch a fiber-optic Internet service which would allow the Nepalese to break the New Delhi monopoly (*Nepal accesses internet through China...*). The ten-day Chinese-Nepali military exercises with the codename "Sagarmatha friendship" (Sagarmatha is the Nepalese name of Mount Everest), which took place in April 2017, also echoed loudly. Earlier, the armed forces of Nepal were practicing only with the Indian and American armies (Arif 2017).

On the one hand, the cultural proximity of India and Nepal is obvious, but on the other, it involves also problems. The latter are associated primarily with the treatment of a smaller neighbor by New Delhi as a part of their own civilization and a more or less concealed disregard for the Nepalese people. Many of them work in India, but most often they do heavy and often physical jobs – many Nepalese are employed, for example, for the construction of mountain roads in the north of the country. In addition, they are often treated by locals with superiority. Many Indians view Nepal as a sovereign state only formally and recognize the interventions of New Delhi in its internal affairs as absolutely natural and even desirable.

The Chinese, in turn, do not raise resentment in Nepal, the PRC government does not interfere too insistently in Nepal's internal policy – it is therefore no surprise that Kathmandu is seeking to strengthen relations with Beijing, especially since Nepal is largely functioning thanks



to international financial assistance. In 2014, China took the place of India as the main foreign investor in Nepal and one can expect to maintain an upward trend in mutual relations.

In addition to struggling for influence on Kathmandu himself, New Delhi fears the use by the PRC of the territory of Nepal to support the centrifugal tendencies in India, for example insurgent groups in Bihar or Gurkhas in Darjeeling demanding the creation of a separate state (Paudyal 2017). However, the cultural proximity itself and the Indian belief in the rightness of their reasons may prove insufficient foundation for maintaining the Nepalese enclave in their sphere of influence. And even if Indian politicians rightly argue that the social and political problems of Nepal are a fact and not an invention of New Delhi, they push the Nepalese into the arms of Beijing with their rhetorics and actions. Krzysztof Iwanek (2012) accurately notes that in the fight for Nepal "the first to cross the Himalayas will win - in the case of China they will be the physical Himalayas, whereas in the case of India - the Himalayas of mental habits".

### *Sri Lanka*

Sri Lanka is an island located south of the Indian subcontinent. At the narrowest point, the sea border between India and Sri Lanka is just 50 kilometers long. According to Hindu mythology, there once existed a bridge connecting both territories, which was built by god Rama. Due to its location and specific shape, Sri Lanka is sometimes called the "Tear of India". In the last decade, the island could indeed cause tears to Indian strategists, because its foreign policy was turning towards China.

The most important political problem of Sri Lanka during the last few decades was the conflict between the majority of the Buddhist population of the Sinhalese and the minority of Hindu Tamils whose armed representation was the Tamil Tigers. The dispute was often interfered by India, which not only want to controlling the events in its own sphere of influence, but also feel ethnic and cultural affinity with part of the Sri Lankan community. The Tamils are the majority of the population of the more than 70 million Tamilnadu state in the south of India.

The paradox of Indian involvement in the conflict in Sri Lanka reflects well the fate of Rajiv Gandhi, who as the Prime Minister made the rapprochement with the Island in 1987. Then, the day after the signing of the bilateral agreement on friendship, Sinhalese extremist made the failed attempt on Gandhi's life, in revenge for Indian support for the Tamils. After sending Indian peace forces to the island and supporting the Sinhalese Sri Lankan government, in 1991 Rajiv Gandhi was unable to save his life from the assassination by the Tamil Tigers. In addition to Gandhi's policy regarding the conflict in Sri Lanka, the assassination was probably

also due to India's aid to the Maldivian government during the coup carried out by the Organization of the Liberation of the People of Tamil Ilam in 1988 (Huggler 2006).

The Sinhala-Tamil conflict also proved to be crucial for strengthening the relationship between Sri Lanka and China. In 2005 Mahinda Rajapaksa came to power on the island. During the first presidential term he ended the civil war by military pacification of the remaining Tamil forces, carried out by government troops in 2008-2009. The last phase of the operation aroused indignation of the international community due to war crimes committed to a large extent thanks to weapon bought from China. It was common to use Tamil civilians as live shields (which both sides did). This did not bother the PRC, which advocate the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and in no way could gain the support of India, as well as Western states, paying attention to the observance of human rights<sup>1</sup>.

The Rajapaksa's presidential decade ending in 2015 brought a very strong rapprochement with China. The government in Beijing provided Sri Lanka with multi-billion dollar loans, which allowed to create highways, airports, ports and other infrastructure facilities. This helped the island to rise from the destruction of the civil war. In 2005-2017, China invested almost 15 billion dollars in various ways in Sri Lanka, while, in comparison, the International Finance Corporation, which is part of the World Bank Group, in 1956-2016 put out only 1 billion dollars (Tarabay 2018).

The most important Chinese investment on the island is Hambantota, once a small fishing village destroyed by the tsunami in 2004, located in the most southern point of the island. The PRC decided to build there a huge port, capable of serving the Chinese transoceanic fleet, and the accompanying infrastructure. Hambantota is in the same part of the island, which one of the expeditions of Admiral Zheng He has reached six hundred years ago – it is also worth remembering that in the 15. century the lands of present-day Sri Lanka were under Chinese rule for three decades (Kaplan 2013: 244). On the occasion of the investment in Hambantota, the frequency of visits by Chinese warships, including submarines, in other Sri Lankan ports, increased significantly.

In 2015, Rajapaksa unexpectedly lost presidential elections with Maithripala Sirisena. One of the reasons for this election result was the conviction of part of the electorate that the dependence on China, despite the economic benefits it brought, went too far. Sirisena announced the balancing of foreign policy, and to some point it was clearly visible. There has been an improvement in relations with India, also in terms of security, but in January 2016 another crisis

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<sup>1</sup> In this context, it is worth recalling Marvin Ott's law, that the less interests the United States has in a given country, the more human rights count in US policy towards it – and Sri Lanka is a peripheral area for the US.

took place in mutual relations. The authorities in Colombo have signed an agreement to buy eight Pakistani JF-17 Thunder fighters, which were created in cooperation with China. On the lost field, it left Indians proposing their own HAL Tejas construction (Hladij 2016). Earlier, the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka also expressed interest in buying Chinese transport aircraft. The Chinese and Pakistani interference that came together was too much to the Indian power ambitions and the government in New Delhi sent a diplomatic note to Colombo in which it pointed to the JF-17's defects and claimed that Sri Lanka does not need fighter aircraft. The island buckled under pressure and gave up the contract (Panda 2016).

In December 2017 it turned out that despite the desire of President Sirisena to maintain an equal distance from India and the PRC, Chinese initiatives have too strong grounds to reject them. Sri Lanka was unable to pay its debt to China a \$ 8 billion US, which is why it decided to sell to Chinese 80% stake in Hambantota port (*Sri Lanka formally hands over...*). This decision was protested on the island and eventually the authorities gave control over the commercial activity in the port to two companies managed by China Merchants Port Holdings, which are to lease it for 99 years – just as the British had once leased from the Chinese Empire Hong Kong (Stacey 2017). Formally, the Sri Lankans have to participate in managing the port and take care of security issues, and no vessel, including Chinese, will be able to enter the port without their consent. However, there is a fear on the island that taking over Hambantota is a step towards making Sri Lanka a de facto Chinese colony. PRC has also gained permission to invest in a special economic zone created around the port, where the construction of factories is planned. It was protested by the local population whose land was leased to the Chinese (Lim & Mukherjee 2017).

India also held talks on the investment in Hambantota. Former President Mahinda Rajapaksa said that he firstly proposed the expansion of the port to government in New Delhi, but the Indians were not interested in the costly expansion (Velloor 2010). Now, however, India is trying to balance Chinese assets in the port by taking over the management of the Hambantota airport (built by Chinese) together with the Sri Lankan Aviation Services Limited. Control over the Hambantota airport would allow the Indians to oversee Chinese operations in the port. At the same time, India proposed setting up a flight school and service center at Mattala airport to increase its revenue and make it a destination for Indian tourists (Aneez & Miglani 2017).

In the policy of balancing between China and India, Sri Lanka has been much closer to the Middle Kingdom in the last decade. President Maithripala Sirisena is seeking to rebalance the policy, but the extent of Chinese influence combined with the economic problems of Sri Lanka

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means that the rulers in Colombo must decide for further concessions to China. India, it seems, has neither political will nor financial resources to replace China as the patron of the island. At the same time, they rightly fear that the economic dependence of Sri Lanka on the PRC can significantly reduce the sovereignty of its foreign policy (Chandran 2017).

The Indian domestic policy influences the shaping of the relations with the island by the government in New Delhi. Political realism would require India to develop relations with Sri Lankan authorities dominated by Sinhalese, regardless of any objections that could be made against them, but the authorities cannot disregard the feelings of the Indian Tamils who are a significant group of the electorate. At the same time, Sinhalese perceive themselves as the last defenders of Buddhism in the Indian subcontinent, still threatened by Hindu Tamil expansion from the north. Thus, Sri Lanka is another state after Nepal, with which historical and cultural ties are rather a burden for India than an asset, while China shapes relations with them from more neutral positions, supported by the power of money.

### ***The Maldives***

The Maldives are another state of the region whose significance for Sino-Indian relations is expressed primarily in its geographical location. They constitute an archipelago of almost 1,200 islands, located just above sea level and more and more threatened by flooding. Their total area is only 300 km<sup>2</sup>, and it is inhabited by less than 400,000 people. The archipelago, however, lies about 500 km southwest of the southern tip of India, that is, on the most important Asian transport route, and at the same time the sea branch of the Chinese Belt and Road initiative. The straits of the Maldives are used by Chinese tankers sailed from Saudi Arabia to China (*Saudi Arabia intends to...*). There are also transport routes between India and Africa nearby.

From the moment of gaining independence from Great Britain in 1965, the archipelago was in the Indian sphere of influence. The authorities in New Delhi conducted a Machiavellian policy by parallelly supporting for three decades dictator Maumoon Abdul Gayoom and opposition to him. The latter was led by Mohamed Nasheed, with whom, under pressure from India, Gayoom ultimately faced in the 2008 presidential election and lost. The victorious Nasheed remained loyal to the India, but in 2012 he had to submit the office due to strong public protests. From that moment, the policy of the Maldives towards India and China has changed radically. Nasheed's successor, Mohammed Waheed, canceled the contract with the Indian company GMR to manage the international airport in the capital, Male, while the current president, Abdullah Jamin, who has ruled since 2013, awarded it to the Chinese company Beijing Urban Construction Group (*Maldives airport to be expanded...*).

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China, which before 2011 did not even have an embassy in the Maldives, started the rapid expansion of its influence on the archipelago. During Jamin's term, further Chinese investments took place (for example the Friendship Bridge connecting Male with the Hulhule Island), crowned with the signing of a free trade agreement with China in December 2017, which made the Maldives the second state after Pakistan, which has this type of deal with PRC. At the same time, a memorandum inviting the Maldives into the Belt and Road project was signed (Oleszko-Pyka 2018). Previously, from the constitution was deleted regulation prohibiting the purchase of land by foreigners, which was interpreted through the prism of the Chinese people who would buy paradise islands for the purpose of creating their own resorts.

The unofficial struggle between India and China occurred when in February 2018, Abdullah Jamin declared a state of emergency in response to the decision of the Maldivian Supreme Court ordering the release of political prisoners from the opposition. At the president's order, two judges were arrested, and the others canceled the earlier decision. This was the culmination of the whole Jamin's presidency, which was full of cases of human rights violations (Mandhana 2018).

After the proclamation of the state of emergency, speculations quickly arose as to whether India would send troops to master the situation in the archipelago, as it did in 1988, when Indian troops halted the coup, supported by Tamil partisans from Sri Lanka. Probably taking into account this eventuality, the Chinese Navy warships appeared near the Maldives, which supported Abdullah Jamin's political position. Modi's government only decided to express "deep concern", pointing out, quite rightly, that the prolongation of the state of emergency took place in violation of the constitution. In fact, India is less concerned with the restoration of democracy, and much more with the removal of Chinese influence from the Maldives - but in both cases it seem to have no idea how to do it. Modi's government did not feel strong enough to say "check", after the Chinese bluff with the appearing of ships close to the archipelago.

The Maldives have become the place of practice of the same Chinese strategy that the Beijing has also applied to Sri Lanka. The partner was seduced by promises of substantial investments, supported by bribes to local decision makers. Investments in the long run proved to be unfavorable. Then debts are used by the PRC to get even more political and economic influence (Stacey 2017). Former President Nasheed estimated that three-quarters of Maldivian's foreign debts already is connected with China, and interest on loans account for over 20% of the state budget (Tarabay 2018).

In February 2018, during the political crisis, there were reports that the Chinese would build an underwater ocean observatory at the Makunudhoo Atoll on the northwestern tip of the

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Maldives, which could also be used as a base for submarines in the future. There are also regular rumors that China plans to build a port in the southern Maldives on the Laamu atoll. Although the Maldivian side denies any agreement, the fact of evacuation of the inhabitants of the atoll is significant (Swarajya 2018).

India has so far behaved passively, hoping to create an alliance with the United States and the United Kingdom and putting pressure on the President Jamin to restore democracy and organize new elections. New Delhi hopes that as a result there would be a new political arrangement on the archipelago. C. Raja Mohan believes that patience may pay off, and the experience of Indian interventions in the countries of South Asia says that it is not easy to solve problems and the consequences of actions are unpredictable. According to this narrative, the priority for India should be primarily stability in the region (Krishnan 2018). The question, however, is whether this policy does not serve to consolidate China's newly acquired influence not only in the Maldives, but in all of South Asia, showing at the same time that India is weak.

### ***Conclusions***

In relations with all analyzed countries of South Asia, China uses a similar pattern of action. They use their economic opportunities to make large-scale investments in partner countries, most often financed by the Lorans (Ping 2013: 21-40). This is followed by gaining political influence and cooperation in the field of security, including the sale of weapons as well as various forms of cooperation of armed forces. China is a leading supplier of weapons to most regional entities and, because the military is an important center of power there, close ties with the armed forces of these countries give the PRC greater opportunities in shaping their policy (Bhandari & Jindal 2017).

The final (so far) effect of Chinese activities is taking over facilities located in other countries, with particular emphasis on deep sea ports. This way, piece by piece, South Asian countries are assigning their sovereignty to the PRC. In return, they receive opportunities (which are not always made use of) for faster economic development, as well as a chance to balance the influence of India, which has always tried to dominate the region. The Chinese promise of building roads, ports, airports and railways is particularly attractive when remembering that South Asia is the least integrated region in the world – according to the World Bank, intra-regional trade accounts for less than 5% of the total turnover of the countries located here, compared with 35% in East Asia and 60% in Europe. Better infrastructure can certainly contribute to the change of this state of affairs and a more intensive development of an area of 1.7 billion inhabitants (*In South Asia, Chinese infrastructure...*).

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In this way China builds, or, according to its own narrative, rebuilds a kind of tribute system, similar to the one that functioned in the imperial period. As part of the hierarchical perception of the international system, the Middle Kingdom is located in the center, while "barbaric" countries (all others) can enjoy its favors, if they recognize Chinese authority.

In relation to Sri Lanka and the Maldives, PRC also implements the "two oceans" strategy (connected with other strategy called „String of Pearls”), i.e. the development of the backward western part of the country thanks to access to the Indian Ocean. A one-off investment in South Asian deep sea ports is not a sufficient guarantee for China that their ships will have free access to these in subsequent years, for example when unforeseen political tensions arise. Even in the case of formal concluding port lease agreements from the point of view of the authorities in Beijing, it is necessary to maintain the dependence of the region's states on the Chinese political protectorate, investment, or both (Kaplan 2013: 246). Nepal, in turn, has additional value for China and India in the context of the border dispute between those two countries. It lies in the vicinity of the disputed areas, and in addition its own territory can be used by neighbors forces.

India for many years seemed surprised by the PRC's activity in South Asia. New Delhi was inclined to pay more attention to shaping bilateral relations with China, hoping that their improvement would also bring about harmonious cooperation between the two countries on the international arena. It was no different with the cabinet of Narendra Modi, who counted on a new opening in relations with the PRC, recognizing that the prospect of multibillion contracts will convince the Beijing authorities to treat India in South Asia (and not only) in a more partner way.

It seems, however, that in New Delhi there was a re-evaluation of the relationship with the Middle Kingdom, which was reflected in the crisis around the Bhutanese Doklam in 2017. Then, for the first time, Chinese efforts in South Asia were met by such a determined Indian resistance. The policy of Modi is also active in relation to other countries in the region, but it does not always bring expected results. The reasons for this phenomenon are not only objective – China simply has more to offer, but also subjective – historical-cultural relations of India with other countries of the region are more often a burden than an asset. The Republic of India appears as a country with exceptional soft power, the world's largest democracy that boast (not always rightly) the reconciliation of internal differences and contradictions, and thus can serve as example (see: Hasanat Shah et al. 2017: 268-288). However, without disregarding this potential, it is worth noting that the experiences of individual countries in the region with the democratic system are different, and the attitude of India towards its neighbors often does not reflect the

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lofty ideas that are being proclaimed. For example, in relation to Nepal India still has a syndrome of a larger neighbor who knows better what is good for the Nepalese people.

David Malone (2011: 150) accurately points out that Indian soft power may gain in importance comparing with China, if in the future it would turn out that democratic India develop faster than authoritarian PRC. However now India undoubtedly needs a more pragmatic approach to South Asian countries, as in the case of relations with Burma. In them, negative historical heritage and Burma's internal problems have been put in the background, and the focus has been on real possibilities for developing cooperation (Prasad Routray 2010: 304-306).

At present, the Indo-Chinese relations in South Asia are definitely confrontational. Both powers are determined to defend their possessed influence and to acquire new. Therefore a sensible balance policy between Beijing and New Delhi, carried out by the countries of the region, can bring them significant benefits. The requirement here, however, is to maintain a safe distance from both capitals, because the lack of it can result in becoming a protectorate rather than the partner of one of them. Of course, it is easier to fall into a similar trap, when the country is poor, and there are plenty of poor countries in South Asian.

Finally, it is worth emphasizing that too large increase in tension between India and China instead of acting in favor of the states of the region accepting initiatives of both powers, may result in a direct threat in the case of the Sino-Indian military confrontation. In the case of inland states, there is a fear of waging a war on their territory (the casus of Bhutan in 2017 is an instructive example), and when it comes to coastal countries – also naval fights or the economic blockades. It is worth emphasizing all the more because China and India strengthen the military presence year by year both near the land border and in the Indian Ocean. PRC still has an advantage in most types of armed forces with aircraft carriers as an important exception (GFP 2017; IISS 2018), but India is intensively expanding its potential, being the world's largest global arms importer in 2017 (Blanchfield et al. 2017). Thus, they pose a growing challenge to China in this regard (Malik 2001: 84).

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**Gender roles of Polish female emigrants and their  
paths of self-realization in relation to work-life  
balance policy**

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**Abstract:**

A numerous previous reports on Polish women's emigration provided information on their passive role in the decision making process concerning leaving Poland, obtaining employment predominantly in the sector of household services or their marriage-oriented strategy of survival in the foreign country. The current picture of women's roles in emigration has been changed. The purpose of the presented research was to explore the paths of self-realization of Polish female emigrants regarding the gender roles realised by them in the field of the work-life balance idea. The research was conducted in psycho-sociological approach.

There were 113 adult Polish female emigrants, who had spent a period of time exceeding one year on emigration in Europe, North America, Australia and Asia admitted to the research. This project was realised on the basis of quantitative data gathered throughout online survey and supplemented by qualitative data in the shape of 15 semi-structured interviews.

The obtained results showed that the examined Polish women declare to undertake gender roles compliant with the new cultural model, and to lesser extent compliant to the traditional one. They demonstrated proactiveness in the phase of decision-making about emigration and as they attempted to combine their family life with the professional sphere in the country they have arrived in what corresponds with the WLB idea promoted in developed countries.

**Key words:**

work-life balance, gender roles, self-realization, Polish women, emigrants

### ***Introduction***

The world of late modernity is characterised by “frontierlessness” (Lusińska-Grabowska 2012: 8), where an individual’s biography is less and less frequently attached to one geographic location, together with the increased mobility and opening of national frontiers migrations have become a common and, in a certain sense, a natural phenomenon. An ever growing number of individuals perceive the change of their place of residence as a chance to lead a better, more interesting or successful life.

Emigration is defined as migration of individuals outside the boundaries of a certain territory which is connected with the alteration of their permanent place of residence and temporary place of stay (Schmitz 2003). In terms of duration two types of migration are defined, namely the short-term (frequently seasonal) migration usually focused on improving the financial situation of individuals, relying in the change of the country of residence usually for the period between 3 and 12 months; and secondly, long-term migrations connected with the change of the country of residence for the period of over 12 months, frequently treated as permanent migration (*Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland 2017*). This dissertation is devoted to the second variant.

### ***Women emigrating from Poland***

Those specialising in research into migration agree on the fact that Polish accession to the European Union in 2004 significantly altered the dynamics and sources of emigration in this country (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2008: 1). In comparison to the pre-accession period the amount of individuals leaving Poland increased considerably, while the reasons behind mobility with the leading economic motivation have remained unchanged (Cekiera 2014: 143). Analogically, Polish entry to Schengen zone, which allowed Polish citizens to cross state borders freely, constituted a specific form of encouragement to search for employment and as a result also settle outside of their homeland. The emigration wave from Poland has reached its stable level and it has remained at the similar level since 2008, namely, between 2 210 and 2 130 individuals annually (Bielecka-Prus & Kruk 2014). The largest group among Polish emigrants is constituted by those of the so called “mobile age” that is individuals aged between 18 and 44, additionally women outnumber men in this sphere (*Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland 2017*).

The most important characteristics of the contemporary migration trends include feminisation apart from the migration globalisation, its acceleration, differentiation and increased level of political involvement (Castles & Miller 2003: 7-9). Whereas in the past men constituted the vast majority of economic emigrants, it was in the 1960s that females started to play an ever growing role in migrating abroad in search for employment – a fact, which led to present situation, when the number of emigrating women exceeds the number of men. These tendencies were confirmed both by international data (Castles & Miller 2003) and Polish statistics (*Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland 2017*).

Due to the limited presence of women among migrants, emigration of females until 1970s was treated as a natural consequence of male emigration, as women were supposed to be financially dependent on men (Kindler & Napierała 2010: 8). Female passivity in migration movements was assumed as well as their attachment to running the household and limiting themselves to taking care of family life, thus treating female emigrants, as if they were invisible (Boyd & Grieco 2003). The character of this approach reflects the image of main gender stereotypes at that period: femininity connected with passivity and commitment and masculinity related to agency and initiative (compare Wojciszke 2012: 125).

According to the research from the first decade of the 21st century financial migrations of Polish women were connected with performance of low prestige jobs, without opportunities for promotion, frequently in household service sector (as baby-sitters or carers of the elderly) (Kindler & Napierała 2010: 13). The character of employment niches entailed the depreciation of qualifications of female emigrants. It was also accompanied with an unequal division of household duties, which decreased women's possibilities of self-realisation by creating barriers in acculturation process due to the lack of time to build social networks in the receiving country (Kawczyńska-Butrym et al. 2016; Kindler & Napierała 2010)<sup>1</sup>.

But if we consider the reports on the newest research into migration of Polish women conducted as recently as in the 2010s there are considerable changes reported that occurred in the scope of employment of Polish female emigrants. Multiple research focuses on the following destinations: Great Britain (e.g. Cekiera 2014; Eade 2007), Germany (Krasnodębska 2009;

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<sup>1</sup> In articles devoted to Polish female emigrants the hypothesis that women are usually motivated to emigrate by family benefits and rarely by desire to obtain personal benefits prevails. These actions are frequently of „emergency” character in economic sense and they are always migration for somebody else. (after: Slany et al. 2014).

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Czubińska-Gańczak 2013), the USA (Slany & Małek 2005), Italy (Slany & Małek 2005; Kordasiewicz 2010), Spain (Redondo Toronjo 2010) and Scandinavia (Kawczyńska-Butrym et al. 2016; Napierała 2010). It has been shown that the employment of Polish female emigrants may also be associated with different sectors of economy compliant with their qualifications, providing them with opportunities to make use of their professional skills (Kawczyńska-Butrym et al. 2016). Although not only the occupational area seems to be the field for analysing the personal development among female emigrants. Nowadays, the identification of self, defined by social expectations towards feminine and masculine behaviours and roles, has become the axis of numerous research into migration tendencies (Boyd & Grieco 2003; Kindler & Napierała 2010). This implies considering the importance of gender in the motivation of female emigrants to change their country of residence and also in various spheres of life and adaptation to new social and economic conditions encountered in the receiving country (Boyd & Grieco 2003).

### ***Gender roles and self-realisation in context of females emigration***

It is likely that the above mentioned transformation of Polish feminine emigration occurs as a result of gradual liberalisation of the imprinted schemes concerning gender in western cultures, which has been observed for more than twenty years (Twenge 1997). Gender roles constitute an integral part of social roles system – these are social expectations concerning activity in interpersonal spheres: partnership, family and professional spheres created on the basis of perception of belonging to a given biological sex (Eagly 1997; Zosuls et al. 2011). The system of gender roles thus expresses the social and cultural differences between women and men, it penetrates the whole life of an individual and is connected with configuration of cultural patterns characteristic for a given society (Marecek et al. 2004). Sanctions used by agendas of socialisation contribute to the strengthening of appropriate attitudes and their purpose is to teach girls and boys to adjust to the descriptions of definite gender roles (Eagly 1997).

In the period between 2006 and 2010 the work-life balance programme was implemented in the EU (Commission of the European Communities 2006). The importance of the WLB programme for European social policy is demonstrated by the fact of priorities of the “European Pillar of Social Rights” – to modernise the existing legal framework, the European Commission has proposed a directive on work-life balance which will preserve existing rights and build on them with improved and new rights for both women and men (European Commission 2017a).

The Commission's project "seeks to promote a good balance between family and professional commitments and to provide more equal opportunities for women and men in the workplace and at home" (*Work-life balance for parents and carers*)<sup>2</sup>. This supported reducing barriers in female participation in the labour market – for instance, through propagation of flexible forms of employment in connection with the transfer of taking care of a child onto both spouses (European Commission 2017b). The WLB is not only the European policy, but this idea is also implemented through various social and work programmes in Australia, USA and Canada (*Work + Family Roundtable 2013; Paid Parental Leave and Other Legislation Amendment (Dad and Partner Pay and Other Measures Act) 2012; Bhushan 2012; Higgins et al. 2008*).

The WLB strategies reflected the ever growing awareness of the patterns of realisation imposed on both men and women by culture and also of gradual disappearance of radical limits in typically masculine and feminine roles, while simultaneously promoting relations based on partnership and reduction of the existing harmful inequality of the sexes. These changes may be connected with the increasing independence and self-reliance of Polish women in the scope of decisions concerning their own emigration (it no longer needs to be emigration to join the bread-winning partner who migrates for economic reasons) and also with the selection of their path of personal development in the new state.

When analysing the situation of migrating females, here to Polish women, it seems to be vital to consider its dynamic conditions in the term of self-realization. Self-realization, according to Maslow (1974), signified pursuit of realisation (making real) one's own positive capabilities and it was considered the highest need in the hierarchy, maintaining human motivation for undertaking actions. The full expression of self-realization was conditioned by satisfying lower rank needs including the sense of security and belonging. Self-realization is closely connected with the concept of well-being and life satisfaction (Pavot & Diener 2008: 138). However, from the anthropological and philosophical point of view (Taylor 1999: 213) self-realization means life orientation focused on self, closely connected with the idea of freedom "where being free is a matter of what we can do, of what is open to us to do, whether or not we do anything to exercise these options". Undoubtedly, the gratification of needs for the sense of security and belonging as well as freedom of "what is allowed" tends to be particularly threatened among emigrants (see:

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<sup>2</sup> The proposal for a new directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on work-life balance for parents and carers repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU was submitted 26th of April 2017 (European Commission 2017b). In December 2017 the Council assessed progress on the equal treatment and work-life balance directive.

Maruoki et al. 2011). This dissertation assumes the self-realization of emigrants as their conscious choice of the most optimal way of development in both individual and interpersonal spheres in the culture of the receiving country, connected with the acceptance of gender roles in a professional and family life.

The presented study was to attempt to answer the following research questions:

1. What are the gender roles undertaken by Polish women emigrating to other highly developed countries?
2. Do these gender roles of Polish female emigrants shape the paths of their self-realization that correspond with the work-life balance idea?

The exploration of paths of self-realisation of Polish female emigrants has been analysed through the following variables: motivation for migration, being in a relationship and type of the created relationship, manner of realisation of family life and roles within the family, commencing education in the receiving country, professional activity realised in the receiving country.

### ***Subjects***

The concept of sampling in the research assumed participation of adult Polish female citizens who made the decision to emigrate independently and reside permanently outside the territory of Poland in an economically developed country for the period not shorter than 1 year<sup>3</sup>. The total number of 113 women aged between 18 and 72 participated in the research (M=35.04; SD=7.32). Table 1. presents the sociodemographic description of this group.

The selection of women for the researched group was conducted through purposive (non-probabilistic) method with the use of the so called “snow ball” effect. Information on the research was sent to the target group via social networking sites and theme groups existing on such websites dedicated to Poles in emigration for instance *Polish woman in Europe*, through blogspots such as *Briskly-into-the-sky* and it was also propagated by private individuals.

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<sup>3</sup> Two women residing in medium developed countries according to the value of Human Development Index for 2015 have been included in the tested group, namely residents of Vietnam and the Republic of South Africa. Due to the fact that these were only two cases it has been decided to include questionnaire answers provided by them into the research material as these exceptions do not falsify the obtained results.

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**Table 1.** Sociodemographics of the researched group

Sample characteristics	N	%	M (SD)
<b>Age</b>			
in general			35.04 (7.32)
18-25	6	5.3	
26-35	56	49.6	
36-45	46	40.7	
46-55	3	2.7	
56 or more	2	1.8	
<b>Education</b>			
vocational	1	0.9	
secondary	27	23.9	
higher	85	75.2	
<b>The length of the period of living abroad (in years)</b>			
less than 1	4	3.5	
1 - 5	35	31	
over 5 -10	21	18.6	
over 10 - 15	39	34.5	
over 15 - 20	8	7.1	
over 20	6	5.3	
<b>Country of respondents' current living – high and very high developed countries</b>			
United Kingdom	41	36.3	
Germany	12	10.6	
Belgium	8	7.1	
France	6	5.3	
Canada	5	4.4	
USA	4	3.5	
Spain	4	3.5	
Norway	4	3.5	
Ireland	3	2.7	
Italy	3	2.7	
Netherlands	3	2.7	
Portugal	2	1.8	
Australia	2	1.8	
Austria	2	1.8	
Sweden	2	1.8	
Czech Republic	1	0.9	
Cyprus	1	0.9	
Denmark	1	0.9	
Switzerland	1	0.9	
Finland	1	0.9	
Turkey	1	0.9	
Kuwait	1	0.9	
Mexico	1	0.9	
China	1	0.9	
<b>Country of respondents' current living – medium developed countries</b>			
Vietnam	2	1.8	
South Africa	1	0.9	

**Source:** Own study and assessment (N=113).

### ***Methods***

The research was conducted with the use of CAWI (*Computer-Assisted Web Interview*) technique, it was conducted online in the form of own survey questionnaire published in the portal *ebadania.pl*. Thanks to the implementation of this research technique it was possible to gather answers from respondents living in various countries of the globe in a relatively short time. All respondents expressed their consent to participate in the research, the procedure was approved by the University Committee for Research Ethics. Qualitative collection of data was conducted simultaneously through semi-structured interviews via Skype (N=15) in order to obtain a wider image and examples illustrating the data from the questionnaire. Randomly selected women were interviewed among the group of the survey respondents who volunteered for Skype meeting. In total 47 women expressed their readiness to participate in the interview and 15 out of them were randomly selected. The interviews were recorded in audio format with respect for confidentiality and subsequently transcribed and analysed with the use of software for qualitative data analysis Nvivo10 (QSR International, Burlington, MA) and theme analysis method (Thomas & Harden 2008). The research lasted from March to July 2017.

### ***Results***

As presented in Table 2 **the main reasons (motives) underlying migration of Polish women** include above all “willingness to break free from their life as it has been so far” (28.3%) and “desire to provide themselves and their families with better living conditions” (25.7%). A considerable percentage of the studied females hinted the motivation connected with a perspective of a better paid job with opportunities for personal development (in total 45.2%). A smaller percentage of respondents mentioned marriage or joining their partners who had emigrated earlier due to their contract of employment as their motives for emigrating.

The analysis of the answers “Other reason” enabled to differentiate subsequent categories of repetitive migration motives listed by the respondents, which include the following: joining their partners (4.4%) or emigration conditioned by their husbands’ contracts of employment (3.6%). Less popular reasons for female emigration included emigration connected with the plan to continue their education abroad (2%) or seasonal employment which subsequently transformed into permanent emigration (2.7%).

**Table 2.** Main motives of emigration of Polish women

Category of motives of emigration*	N	%
The need to "transcend" the current life conditions	32	28.3
The perspective for better quality of life for her and her family, then she or they had in Poland	29	25.7
The perspective for the job, that would bring better possibilities to develop career	28	24.8
The perspective for better-paid job	23	20.4
The need to cut off the previous life experiences	19	16.8
Hardships with finding any employment in Poland	13	11.5
Missing the family which was abroad (husband, children)	12	10.6
The perspective of marriage	12	10.6
The need to overcome serious financial problems (her or her family's)	9	8
The hardships connected to self-reliant home keeping and upbringing of children	1	0.9
Other reason	20	17.7

\*Multiple choice was possible

Source: Own study and assessment (N=113).

To obtain the picture of the gender roles as indicators of self-realization the **remaining in a relationship and type of the created relationship** within the examined group of Polish female emigrants were analysed. Table 3 indicates that a significant majority of respondents that is 87.6% remained in partnerships, while other respondents were single. Married women were the largest group among those in relationships (55.8%), the majority of respondents created relationships with male citizens of the state they emigrated to (41.6%) and the current relationship for majority of respondents began in emigration.


**Table 3.** Marital status of respondents

Sample characteristics	N	%
<b>Type of relation</b>		
marriage	63	55.8
cohabitation	34	30.1
concubinage	2	1.8
single	14	12.4
<b>Period in the life in which the woman entered the present relationship</b>		
before emigration	47	41.6
in emigration	52	46
<b>Nationality of the current woman's partner</b>		
a Pole who emigrated from the country about the same time as me	43	38.1
a Pole who grew up in the country in which I am currently living	2	1.8
a citizen of the country in which I am currently living (the nationality of the country in which I am currently staying)	47	41.6
an emigrant from other country	7	6.2

Source: Own study and assessment (N=113).

The female emigrants were also requested to define **the model of their current relationship**. The results (see Figure 1) showed that women declaring that they remain in partnership or a mixed relationship<sup>4</sup> dominated among the respondents – approximately every third respondent listed either of these models. The traditional model was declared much less frequently. Several females defined their relationship in a different way. Two of them admitted that their husbands are more involved in their carers and household chores are relatively evenly shared by both partners.

**Figure 1.** Models of the respondents' current close relationships



**Source:** Own study and assessment (N=113).

Also during the interviews the respondents most frequently declared partnership in their relationships, yet some of them emphasised that the current role model required negotiations with their partners.

*(...) I could see that my husband was really trying to push me back into the kitchen, stereotypically. Of course we had fights here, so I said: "if you are hungry, food is to be found in the fridge, you can prepare it yourself, so yes, in the beginning we didn't have arguments about it exactly, it was more like defining our place and what we wanted to do in the house and I think we've made it. We managed to reach a compromise." [92/ES]<sup>5</sup>*

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<sup>4</sup> Partnership has been defined as such relationship in which husband (partner) and wife (partner) devote approximately the same amount of time to work, both of them contribute equally to housekeeping and taking care of children. A mixed model assumes that both husband (partner) and wife (female partner) work but the husband (partner) devotes more time to his career, while the wife (female partner) apart from her career takes care of the house, children etc.

<sup>5</sup> Symbols placed after the quoted fragments: research participant's number assigned to maintain her anonymity / abbreviation of the country of her current residence.

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Another fact worth emphasising is that some women defined the model of their current relationship as partnership but they admitted that the man acted as the head of the family – they tend to leave the final decisive power to him, when making important decisions and they are prepared to accept such decisions. The respondents believed that this model is appropriate and beneficial for all family members.

*I would respond by saying that my relationship is actually a partnership, still I don't have any doubt that my husband is the head of the family in the sense that he earns more, much more than me. He makes decisions, because I, I simply don't like making decisions. [101/ES]*

Subsequently data connected to the **manner of realisation of family life and roles performed within this sphere** were analysed. Table no 4 presents the respondents' replies to the question concerning who most frequently performs various household chores in their families.

**Table 4.** People responsible for particular housekeeping duties

Type of duty	Respondent	Husband (partner)	Child (children)	Other person	
Preparing meals	N	82	37	2	5
	%	73.2	33.0	1.8	4.5
Daily cleaning	N	87	29	7	12
	%	77.7	25.9	6.3	10.7
Solid housekeeping	N	83	38	7	12
	%	74.1	33.9	6.3	10.7
Washing	N	86	22	1	4
	%	76.8	19.6	0.9	3.5
Ironing	N	65	27	2	15
	%	58.0	24.1	1.8	13.4
Ordering jobs from third parties	N	38	80	0	4
	%	33.9	71.4	0.0	3.6
Dealing with administrative matters	N	63	63	2	5
	%	56.3	56.3	1.8	4.5
Paying main bills	N	51	74	1	4
	%	45.5	66.1	0.9	3.6
Providing minor repairs	N	23	86	0	10
	%	20.5	76.8	0.0	8.9

\* Multiple choice was possible.

Source: Own study and assessment (N=113).

The results suggest that women were those who more often prepare meals, take care of daily cleaning, as well as cleaning and washing than their partners – the percentage of females declaring the performance of the above mentioned chores exceeded 70.0% for each of these activities. Similarly, ironing was one of those duties which was mostly performed by the respondents (58.0%).

Dealing with administrative matters was the domain of women and their partners in equal proportion (56.3% replies each). Male activity was larger in realisation of tasks connected with performance of minor repairs (76.8%), ordering jobs from third parties (71.4%) and paying bills (66.1%). It is worth mentioning that some respondents used the support of third parties, especially in the scope of cleaning.

The presented results indicate a greater burden of household chores resting on female shoulders, especially those chores which are stereotypically considered typically feminine. However, a certain percentage of the respondents' partners were involved in these duties. This was suggested by the replies of those females who declared that both they and their men are those family members who take responsibility for the performance of certain tasks. Approximately every third interviewed female remained in a relationship where household duties are divided between the woman and the man.

These data were confirmed by the opinions of the interviewed women – nearly all respondents declared participation of their partners in activities conducted within the household.

*I don't like cleaning so he does it. I can cook better so I do the cooking and set the washing machine because I prefer to segregate my clothes in a proper way. But when it comes to other activities like ironing and others – we simply share the duties. (...) It's not because we have agreed to have it that way or prepared some kind of schedule defining who does what, it just happened naturally. [94/GB]*

Female emigrants who were not employed or were less involved in their work admitted that they performed the majority of household chores. What is more, they put emphasis on the fact that they were satisfied with this situation.

*The family do not wander around hungry, there is dinner every day. When he [husband] gets back home from work there is always dinner waiting for him. My child is also always fed. I don't work, so I need to get busy with something. So I cook, bake, experiment, have fun, the division of duties in our family is really cool because.... Well, I don't really know if there is any division because at the weekend he will also cook something. [51/B]*

**Table 5.** People most often engaged in various activities related to childcare in the respondents' households

Type of activity		Respondent	Husband (partner)	Other person
Activities connected with children hygiene	N	62	37	1
	%	98.4	58.7	0.9
Feeding/serving meals	N	60	35	1
	%	95.2	55.6	1.6
Taking children to a doctor	N	61	26	0
	%	96.8	41.3	0.0
Putting children to bed	N	60	35	0
	%	95.2	55.6	0.0
Teaching children discipline	N	58	50	0
	%	92.1	79.4	0.0
Spending free time with children	N	61	44	5
	%	96.8	69.8	7.9
Walking or driving children to the kindergarten or school	N	49	37	8
	%	77.8	58.7	12.7
Helping children with the homework	N	39	19	3
	%	61.9	30.2	4.8
Attending parents-teacher meetings	N	47	27	2
	%	74.6	42.9	3.2
Participating in the shows and parties in the kindergarten or school	N	50	36	3
	%	79.4	57.1	4.8

\* *Multiple choice was possible.*

**Source:** Own study and assessment (N=63).

Women having a child or children slightly outnumbered those without any offspring – such declarations were provided by 55.8% of respondents. They were questioned on who performs or performed various activities connected with childcare most frequently in their relationships. The summary of replies presented in Table 5 shows that mothers were usually more strongly involved in taking care of the children – nearly all of the questioned women admitted that they either used to or still perform activities connected with children’s hygiene, feeding, taking them to the doctor, putting them to sleep, teaching them discipline and finally spend free time with the children. Slightly smaller proportion of respondents admitted that it is their duty to walk or drive children to the kindergarten or school, help them with the homework,

attend parents-teacher meetings and participate in the shows and parties prepared by and for children. The gathered data also indicated that a large group of male partners became involved in childcare. Their participation in raising of sons and daughters was the greatest, when the need to discipline a child arose, if the child was naughty; additionally, men spent free time with the children relatively frequently. The activities performed by fathers least frequently included: helping children with the housework, taking children to see the doctor, and attending parents-teacher meetings.


The quantitative data were confirmed in the interviews. Respondents usually admitted that they were responsible for the majority of duties connected with childcare, however, they seemed to believe that it is natural and they simultaneously appreciate the time their partners spend with the children.

*It's mostly me who takes care of the child. This is simply the natural course of events, that at that time I didn't have a permanent job (...) when it comes to duties, so if my husband is at home, you see he works most of the time, so if he is home, he helps me, changes diapers, plays with him. For instance, I told him that I needed to do something here, for instance, to learn and my husband is sitting with the baby now. He used to wake up to check on the baby at night, but I have to say honestly that I was doing more things anyway. [70/ES]*

The women also provided answers to the questions diagnosing **the forms of education undertaken after emigration**. Nearly half of them did not start any education. However, one quarter of the respondents declared a plan to change it in their near future. The every fourth of the surveyed women made an attempt to improve their qualifications or competences following their arrival into the target country. The summary of replies presented in Figure 2 proves that the most frequently selected form of education were language courses. The second position in terms of frequency of selection of this answer was occupied by post-graduate courses, while further positions were occupied by on-the-job trainings and courses as well as BA/BSc and MA/MSc university courses. Several respondents mentioned in their answers forms of educating themselves other than listed, such as courses focused of self-development, those developing interest and hobbies or apprenticeships. It is worth emphasising that the individuals who commenced some form of education after emigration usually selected several various forms of education in different areas.



**Figure 2.** Forms of education undertaken by respondents in emigration



**Source:** Own study and assessment (N=113).

This fact was confirmed by the respondents’ answers. The majority of female emigrants enumerated several courses and trainings.


*I learnt French in Switzerland. After my arrival in the States I did two online courses, one concerning purchase, to consolidate the vocabulary, also this section of vocabulary related to purchases and to learn a bit of American English and American purchase terminology. Within the frames of my personal education and development I have also completed a course called “Study of Happiness” held at University of Berkeley. [72/USA]*

Several of the interviewed women emphasised the fact the decision on further education was in their case dictated by the necessity to obtain employment at a position different than their qualifications. This was the consequence of the fact that upon arrival abroad the diplomas obtained in Poland were not sufficient to find an interesting job.

*At the very beginning, right after I was left alone, I tried to organise some courses to obtain some certificates here. I qualified as an agricultural engineer, but here no one was interested in the fact that I graduated from a university, a kind of equivalent of their Bachelor, nobody paid attention to this. I also have some experience from Poland in the area of preparation of applications for the EU financing, but it also didn’t matter here. [94/GB]*

The indicator **professional activity realised in the receiving country** was analysed through several questions in the survey. The data collected in this manner (Figure 3) hint that women working full-time constituted the largest group (almost 50.0%) among the surveyed females. Approximately, every sixth respondent worked part-time while every tenth ran her own business. Several of them performed temporary jobs and the total amount of 7 women mentioned other forms of employment which included: keeping a blog, voluntary work and working as a freelancer. As many as 13.3% of respondents declared they were not employed in any form. The most frequently provided reasons underlying lack of employment included the break in employment connected with raising a child and also difficulties in obtaining employment relevant to the respondent's qualifications (5 replies for each of these options). The following reasons were listed by two respondents each: poor health, difficulties in finding any employment, studying at university and good material situation of the family allowing women to resign from professional career.

**Figure 3.** Current employment of respondents




**Source:** Own study and assessment (N=113).

The results of the survey were reflected in the interviews – the respondents usually worked full-time, however several of them mentioned other forms of employment. One of them was a freelancer – she accepted various tasks upon request or order. She declared being satisfied with her work but she felt the need for stabilisation, which – in her opinion – would be provided by a standard contract of employment.

*(...) I am not connected with any company and I work as a freelancer. It's fine with me because I decide on my working hours and now I do some work on Saturday mornings (...). I am satisfied, but I miss working in a standard way, you know, full time, I miss the stabilisation, paid holidays etc. [4/D]*

Women, who were currently employed, were asked what their job means for them. As shown in Figure 4 their jobs constitute above all the source of income for a definite majority of respondents. Approximately half of the employed female emigrants declared that their jobs constitute a source of satisfaction. Every fifth respondent admitted that her job gives her pleasure. Slightly smaller number of respondents expressed the opinion that their job simply constitutes a necessity. Answers indicating that professional career is a manner of avoiding boredom, the reason of problems and frustration and finally an escape from family problems appeared sporadically.

**Figure 4.** The meaning of work for respondents



\* Multiple choice was possible.

Source: Own study and assessment (N=63).

Analogically, opinions that their job is mainly their source of income were also mentioned most frequently in course of interviews with the female emigrants. However, several of them also emphasised that their job is their passion, it constitutes an activity which makes them feel satisfied.

*(...) I devote a lot of time to my work because yes, of course it is the source of money, but it is also my great passion (...). You could say that I am simply so engrossed in my work, I mean the official working hours have no significance for me (..) Most often I tend to spend long hours in the evening in front of the computer working, it often happens at the weekends so it is a big challenge, but is also a very big pleasure and passion. [91/B]*

In case of majority of employed respondents (60.2%) their current job is compatible with their competences. Approximately every third respondent (37.8%) admits that her current position is below her level of qualifications.

Those women who perform work compliant with their competences were the biggest group among the interviewed respondents. Nevertheless, the remaining respondents mentioned the necessity to accept jobs below their competence level. This was frequently connected with insufficient knowledge of the language:

*(...) I feel as if all my competences have been taken away from me, well maybe nearly all of them. (...) I feel like a student who is starting from scratch, but I also have the reflexion that one day, maybe, my language competence will catch up. [4/D]*

### ***Discussion and conclusions***

The results of the study showed that already in the sphere of motives for emigration the surveyed Polish women proved to be seeking change, they initiated activities aimed at improvement of both their material and psychological welfare. This result opposes the previous reports on marital motives, which were supposed to prevail among females who chose to emigrate (Boyd & Grieco 2003). Moreover, this result breaks the stereotypical image of feminine roles emerging from the previous research on female emigrants. It is possible that the cultural changes concerning feminine roles supported by political and social movements such as the WLB, have opened a less traditional path of development for Polish female emigrants. However, the analysis of motives underlying the decision to emigrate remains partially compliant with the findings that the economic aspect is the leading reason for emigration of Polish females (Cekiera 2014). Undoubtedly, the fact that the largest percentage of the respondents' replies mentioned

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their need “to break free from their lives so far” deserves attention. This category seems to have strong connotations with the idea of pursuit of self-realization and psychological wellbeing (Pavot & Diener 2008; Taylor 1999), as it expresses the desire for freedom and to initiate action aimed at the realisation of freedom. This freedom provides chances to make choices and control an individual’s own life, which constitutes an orientation of self-agency, stereotypically perceived as a masculine trait (Wojciszke 2012). As has been confirmed by the research (Miquelon & Vallerand 2006) those individuals who pursue to realise a self-appointed goal resulting from personal choice and strong interest, possess higher sense of happiness and self-realization.

Another of analysed spheres of self-realization of Polish females in emigration was **maintaining a relationship**. A definite majority of respondents have created partnerships (with domination of married women). For nearly half of the surveyed women their current relationships began in emigration. Similar number of respondents were in a relationship with a Pole as with a citizen of the receiving country. This fact could lead to the conclusion that Polish female emigrants are motivated by marriage perspectives, yet when we compare it with the motives underlying emigration declared by the respondents it changes its form – their migration motives are not compatible with their current status in the relationship. Thus the partnerships and marriages of emigrating Polish women created with the citizens of the receiving countries constituted rather as a natural consequence of living in the given territory at the time.

The **manners of realisation of family life and functions performed within the family** tend to vary within the examined group. Approximately every third respondent declared being in a partnership, simultaneously the amount of females describing the model of their relationships as mixed was nearly the same. An in-depth analysis of the data on the division of the respondents’ household duties revealed that women were more heavily burdened with household chores as well as activities connected with childcare. This suggests that contrary to the female emigrants’ declarations the dominating model of relationships among the surveyed women is the mixed model of relationship, that is such a model in which apart from being professionally active women tend to perform the majority of household chores. Hence the reasons underlying the fact that females described their relationship model as partnership seem worth considering. Perhaps the reason is that they appreciated the mere fact of men becoming involved in the performance of household chores and this provided them with sufficient justification to classify their

relationships as partnerships. It is probable that most of the women acknowledged the difference between the division of roles realised by men and women in their current relationship in relation to that of their parents, which, was mainly based on double burden resting on female shoulders (Firlit-Fesnak 2007: 193)<sup>6</sup>.

The majority of respondents did not begin **education in the receiving country**, but every fourth of them plans to do so in the future. The result is consistent with the motives of emigration indicated by researched women – education was one of the rarest reasons for them. The surveyed females mostly participated in language courses, which seems to be a natural behaviour of every immigrant wishing to obtain employment or at least be able to communicate with the surroundings. Post graduate courses and on-the-job trainings were popular among the surveyed females too. It is worth emphasising that there was a group of women among the emigrants who had completed several various courses or trainings. These females were clearly characterised by large motivation to self-development, as they were aware of the fact that their professional development requires continuous improvement of their qualifications. These women seem to be open to new experiences and to develop themselves, which are crucial aspects of self-realization. A considerably numerous group of the surveyed females declared that courses free of any fees are particularly desirable due to the fact that for some emigrants education abroad is too costly, which may constitute an important barrier for self-realization of an individual who has just arrived into a new country.

The overwhelming majority of surveyed females was constituted by **professionally active individuals** employed either full or part time. The female emigrants did not decide to run their own business abroad too frequently. Realisation of professional roles seems to be important for female emigrants, yet when they were questioned about the meaning of work their most frequently selected responses focused on work as the source of income. Work was not always perceived as source of self-realization, although it was usually compliant with the possessed qualifications. It is possible that a better, more interesting work would reward them with greater satisfaction and the sense of fulfilment. However, the fact that females are deeply involved in family life cannot rule out the possibility that they purposefully do not seek more absorbing jobs,

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<sup>6</sup> The family model with double burdening of women: both parents work, thus obtaining financial resources for the family but the working mother bears the main responsibility for childcare and running the house. The results of Research into Economic Activity of Society for 2001 showed that 57% of Polish females and males maintained this model of relationship (Firlit-Fesnak 2007: 193).

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which could interfere with the household roles realised by women (it is worth mentioning at this point that young women with young children demanding a lot of attention and care constituted the majority of the surveyed respondents).

To sum up, the study allowed to answer the research questions. The surveyed Polish female emigrants realised their goals – in fact emigration was for them the equivalent of the self-realisation concept. The participants manifested their entrepreneurship, many of them succeeded in obtaining employment compliant with their qualifications,. Polish women on emigration attempted to combine their careers with their family life, yet the roles performed by these females in their families are usually characteristic for the mixed family model, in which the overwhelming majority of both household and childcare duties relies on women in spite of the fact that both partners are employed. This pattern was observed both in relationships of the respondents with Polish men and with the citizens of the countries these women have emigrated to. What is important, Polish women appreciated the involvement of their partners in family roles and subjectively they treat their relationships as partnerships. Hence one may conclude that the surveyed females undertook gender roles compliant with the newer cultural model supported by the WLB strategies – in case of majority of them it was this very combination of professional activity with successful family life which constitutes the source of satisfaction and self-realization on emigration.

The authoresses are aware that the size of the researched sample constitutes the limitation of this study as well as of the fact that it may not meet the representativeness criterion. It is highly probable that digitally excluded female emigrants failed to participate in the survey. Another factor reducing the extrapolation of results is the lack of representation of females belonging to the oldest age group (50+). Nevertheless, it is necessary to stress that in this generation migrations resulting from free choices did not occur too often (Castles & Miller 2003). An unquestionable advantage of the research relies in obtaining respondents from the countries of residence that coincide with the most frequently registered destinations of Polish female emigrants (*Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland 2017*). Moreover, the research model based on the triangulation of methods supported the statistical image of gender roles and self-realisation of Polish women on emigration with a subjective, phenomenological accent originating from direct quotes of the emigrants' opinions. Thus the showed exploratory outcome may be useful for designing further programmes of the migration policy regarding more

affordable education for women on emigration, and focusing on the WLB strategies in their way of self-realization.

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**Financial analysis of the city of Zamość for the  
years 2013 - 2017**

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**Abstract:**

In short-term, the activities of local government units are significantly different from those of enterprises. The short-term goal of the activity of a local government unit is to meet collective needs of its residents, and the short-term goal of commercial enterprises is to maximize profits. However, in long-term, in the case of local government units and commercial enterprises, both goals are similar – an increase in the value of the territorial self-government / commercial enterprise assets). In both cases, the financial analysis tools can be considered as helpful in the decision-making process as well as the assessment of the broadly understood effectiveness. Therefore, based on the models developed for enterprises in the field of financial analysis, it is worth making an attempt to assess the financial effectiveness of local government units. The aim of the article was to show, on the example with specific indicators and their interpretation, that the financial analysis of local government units provides a lot of useful information both to the manager of the unit and entities cooperating with a given local government unit. The article stresses the legitimacy of financial analysis in local government units and presents the basic tools for such.

**Key words:**

local government units, cities with powiat rights, Zamość, public finance, financial analysis, evaluation of the unit's activity, efficiency of operations

***Introduction***

In contrast to commercial entities geared towards making profits, local government units measure the effectiveness of their actions by the level of satisfaction of residents, not the maximization of their profits. On the other hand, as the name "self-government" indicates, it has

independence, also in the financial sphere. Expenditures incurred on the implementation of public tasks play an important role in meeting the collective needs of residents. Therefore, it seems reasonable to learn about the factors determining financial phenomena and processes related to the management of financial resources. Therefore, the financial analysis of local government units should be focused on the identification and assessment of these factors and processes.

In this study, preliminary financial analysis of the city of Zamość was carried out in 2013 - 2017. This analysis was made on the basis of reports on the implementation of budgets and cash flows of the city of Zamość. Data on cash flows constitute a modification of reports on the implementation of the budgets of the city of Zamość in the audited period. The study was divided into two parts. The first shows analysis and assessment of the structure and dynamics of reports on the implementation of the budget and the cash flow of the city of Zamość. The second part presents and analyses the most important financial indicators of the city of Zamość, on the basis of which it was possible to assess the data contained in the first part.

The main goal of the article is the analysis and evaluation of the city of Zamość in 2013-2017. The detailed objectives focus on the analysis of the structure and dynamics of specific items of reports on the implementation of the budget and specific cash flows of Zamość. Among the research methods used in this study, one can distinguish: comparative method, historical systemic, functional and quantitative method.

## **1. Analysis of the financial statements of the city of Zamość**

### ***Report on the implementation of the budget***

The income of territorial self-government units is their own income as well as general subsidy and targeted subsidies from the state budget (Dz. U. 1997, no. 78, item 483). Out of these income groups, own revenues are the most predictive. The characteristic feature of own revenues is their non-returnable and unconditional nature. The greater the share of this group of income in the total of local government units, the better and more precise it can be estimated.

It should be emphasized that the constitutional law very widely regulates the category of its own revenues. In order for local self-government units to be able to conduct independent financial management, they should have power to shape their income. In order for the authority to be effective in this respect, local government revenues must meet certain conditions. Above

all, they should permanently belong to local government units means that these revenues are directly part of the property of local governments (Sochacka-Krysiak 2008: 151).

In addition, they should be ordinary (cyclical) income as opposed to extraordinary (periodic) revenues arising from some extraordinary items. An example of extraordinary income may be inflows from self-taxation of residents, which are temporary (usually 1-3 years) most often related to the necessity of eliminating the effects of extraordinary states (natural disasters, fortuitous events, etc.). Unconditionality of inflows from particular sources of income means that they cannot have a predetermined purpose. The main goal of local government revenues should be to top up the budget of the local government unit. This requirement is in line with one of the basic principles of budget law (the principle of unity of the budget). Acquiring income by local government units in its entirety means that no other entities participate in the sources of income from which they are acquired by local governments.

The dependence of the local government budget on transfers from the state budget may be the cause of many conflicts, among which one can distinguish:

- conflict with the autonomy of local administration (especially when the award criteria are not clear);
- equalization of the differences between territorial self-government units by subsidies is in conflict with the effective allocation of capital;
- conflict with the principle of the legitimacy of local government administration<sup>1</sup>,
- subsidies are anti-motivating to local and regional economic development<sup>2</sup>.


Targeted subsidies and general subsidies represented, on average, 64% of total income of the city of Zamość during the analysis period. The quotient of the share of subsidies and subsidies in total revenue, counting the years 2017 to 2013, decreased by 5%, which should be assessed positively. A detailed breakdown of the Zamość income structure in 2013 - 2017 is shown in Chart 1.

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<sup>1</sup> When income comes only from local taxes, the relationship between taxes and services provided by local government units is clear, which promotes responsibility as well as the clarity of the political process. Subsidies of this clear process may disrupt, because local government administration does not feel so much responsible to the taxpayer.

<sup>2</sup> In its own way, the increase in the tax base of a local government unit is punished because it is due to lower subsidies

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
**Chart 1.** City's income Zamość in 2013 - 2017 (in PLN thousand)

**Source:** Own study based on Reports on the implementation of the budget of the city of Zamość for 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.

Due to the goal, the expenditure can be divided into current and property. The current expenditure is related to the day-to-day operation of the local government sector. The property expenses are investments (*in the broad sense*), i.e. purchases of fixed assets, construction of municipal facilities and capital investments (purchase of securities).

Property expenses are the most desirable group of expenditures, because through them the local government can influence the development of the region they administer, they can attract private sector investment, while contributing to reducing unemployment among local communities as well as increasing the tax base in their area. This means the creation of a specific market, in which local governments compete with each other for attracting investments. In the private sector, the importance of the material factor is decreasing, and the importance of know-how, management methods, etc. is increasing. As a result, the private sector is looking for optimal locations for its development. Local governments wanting to compete for private sector investments must provide qualified personnel in this sector with an appropriate standard of living through well-developed infrastructure (cultural, service, communication, housing), adequate quality of the natural environment. It is worth emphasizing, however, that there is natural competition between current and property expenditure, because with given financial resources local government authorities must make choices between these expenditure groups. A detailed breakdown of the Zamość income structure in 2013 - 2017 is shown in Chart 2.

**Chart 2.** Expenses of the city of Zamość in 2013 - 2017 (in PLN thousand)




Source: Own study based on: Reports on the implementation of the budget of the city of Zamość for 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.

Capital expenditures accounted for an average of 10% of total expenditures of the city of Zamość during the analysis period. The quotient of the share of capital expenditures in total expenditure, counting the year 2017 to 2013, decreased by 10%, which should be assessed negatively. The highest value of property expenditure was realized in 2014. It was related to the implementation of, among others, such investments as: "Zamość Miasto UNESCO, Monument to the history of the Republic of Poland with a tourist product of the Polish economy" for which PLN 19.9 million was spent and "Creation of the Museum of Fortifications and Weapons within Bastion III and Arsenal in Zamość" for which PLN 18.8 million were spent.

In addition to the revenues and expenses, local government units also use repayable funds (revenues), which must be returned at their maturity (expenses). In order to be sure about the appropriateness of incurring financial liabilities, an assessment of fairness and the effectiveness of the use of this financial instrument should be made. To use the funds held by local government units in an effective manner, it is necessary to use debt. If the projects are made only with the help of current revenues (own or received - targeted subsidies and general subventions), the value of the investment may be at most equal to these incomes. If the debt is used, the same means allow investments of much higher value. In addition, if the current funds are spent on investment expenses, then it happens at the expense of ongoing operations. It is both ineffective and unjust. Of course, the issue of the cost of debt service is not insignificant.

The sources of the revenues of local government units are, among others, loans and credits received. They belong to the category of return revenues and are used to cover budget deficit, i.e. a negative difference between the forecasted income and the planned expenditure of the local government unit. Within public finances, they are earmarked for specific public expenditures, so they are intended to be purposeful and should be used in an economical way. A detailed comparison of the revenues and expenditures values of the city of Zamość in 2013-2017 is shown in Chart 3.

**Chart 3.** Revenues and expenditures of the city of Zamość in 2013 - 2017 (in PLN thousand)



**Source:** Own study based on Reports on the implementation of the budget of the city of Zamość for 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.

Revenues and expenses in the city of Zamość were at the average annual level of around 2% of total revenues during the period under consideration. In 2013, the value of revenues achieved at a record low level (PLN 350 thousand), and in 2014, the value of revenues of the city of Zamość exceeded PLN 18 million. This state of affairs was a consequence of the implementation of relatively "large" investment expenditures in 2014 (see Chart 2), the value of which exceeded the income possibilities of the city of Zamość, hence it had to be profit-based. The highest value of expenditures was realized in 2017 (over PLN 10 million), of which PLN 9 million was allocated for the purchase of municipal bonds.


The positive difference between total income and total expenditure is the budget surplus (the negative difference is the budget deficit). The difference between revenues and expenditures is financing (repayable funds, budget deficit). A positive value of financing means that the local

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government unit increases debt and a correspondingly negative value of financing means debt relief. The sum of the budget surplus (deficit) and financing determines the value of the budget result. The budget result cannot be negative, as it would mean that not all expenditures and expenses have been covered by revenues and revenues. A detailed comparison of the budget surplus, financing and the budget result of the city of Zamość in 2013-2017 is shown in Chart 4.

**Chart 4.** Budget surplus, financing and the budget result of the city of Zamość in 2013 - 2017 (in PLN thousand)



**Source:** Own study based on Reports on the implementation of the budget of the city of Zamość for 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.


In the city of Zamość, in the analysed period, the budget deficit occurred only in 2014 and was a consequence of financing the above-described investment expenditures. In addition, financial commitments were made for this purpose, which was reflected in the increase in financing (Chart 4). In the remaining years of the analysis, the city of Zamość noted budget surpluses. In addition, in 2013 and 2015 it was getting longer (it made more expenditures than revenues). As a result, the budget result of the city of Zamość in the years 2013-2015 amounted to around 0% of total revenues, and in 2016 - 2017, respectively at 2.2% - 2.3% of total revenues.

### *Cash flow*

Financial statements of local government units published by the Ministry of Finance are similar to the profit and loss account prepared by business units by the means of their construction. However, by making appropriate transfers of items in these statements, to supplement this methodology, a similar statement to the cash flow statement prepared (direct method) by economic entities may be obtained. As part of the adjustments made, for the purposes of the subject of this analysis, cash flows from operating activities are understood as the difference between inflows (from taxes and local fees, shares in taxes constituting state budget revenues, general subsidies, targeted subsidies for current tasks and other income) and outflows (related to current expenses reduced by the amount of debt servicing). Flows from investing activities are the difference between income from property income, subsidies for investment tasks and privatization of assets, and outflows related to property expenses. In turn, cash flows from financing activities are the difference between inflows from loans and borrowings, issue of securities, repayment of loans granted and other revenues, and outflows from repayment of loans and advances, debt service, loans granted, deposits in banks, buyout of securities and other expenditures. The common (merging) financial statements published by the Minister of Finance, and the methodology for the recognition of cash flows proposed in this analysis is "budget result". In terms of "ministerial" reports, the budget result is the sum of income and expenditure differences as well as revenues and outlays. In terms of this methodology, the budget result is the sum of cash flows from operating, investing and financing activities. The amount of the budget result combines both methodologies of the financial situation of local government units (Jańczuk 2016: 507).

In the city of Zamość in 2013-2017, cash inflows and outflows from operating activities were at a similar level, with a slight majority of inflows. This meant that cash flows from operating activities (understood as the difference between inflows and outflows) were positive throughout the analysis period and fluctuated from PLN 15.2 million in 2013 to PLN 19.9 million in 2017. Cash flows from the operational activity of the city of Zamość are presented in Chart 5.

**Chart 5.** Cash flows from the operational activity of the city of Zamość in 2013 - 2017 (in PLN thousand)



**Source:** Own study based on Reports on the implementation of the budget of the city of Zamość for 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.


Throughout the analysis period, there was a characteristic relatively high growth rate of inflows and outflows from operating activities of the city of Zamość (from 2017 to 2013 it was 32%). In 2013, they amounted to around PLN 283 million and gradually increased to PLN 374.3 million in 2017. This means that in the analysed period, the city of Zamość gradually increased its operating income, but the current mandatory expenses increased as a result.

The increase in obligatory expenditures resulted mainly from the additional tasks imposed by the legislator on local government units (not always providing adequate sources of their financing). An important element of increasing mandatory current expenditure was the implementation of investment tasks (usually co-financed by the European Union), the effects of which had to be maintained as part of current expenditure. It is worth noting that throughout the analysis period, the cash flows from the operating activity of the city of Zamość did not take any negative values, which meant that the city generated sufficient income to finance the obligatory expenditure. In addition, the positive cash flows from operating activities were the evidence of the financial liquidity of the city of Zamość and set the margin for free internal financing, including they indicated the level of payment equipment reserves that could be used to cover such special expenses as: expenditure on repayment of debt incurred and investment expenditure.

Cash flows from investing activities form the basis for the analysis of financial operations and they result from the purchase or sale of fixed assets of the city and related financial costs and benefits. Cash inflows from investing activities were related to the privatization and restructuring of the city's assets. Cash outflows from investing activities indicated the scale of purchases of fixed assets.

Throughout the analysed period, the city of Zamość recorded negative cash flows from investing activities, which meant that the city gradually increased its fixed assets. The best year in terms of cash flows from investing activities was the year, in which relatively large capital expenditures (described on the occasion of spending analysis) were made. In addition, the largest investment inflows in the entire analysis period were recorded, which was connected with the sale of a part of the Zamość estate. In 2017, the process of privatization and restructuring of the assets of city was halted, which actually lasted from 2014. After 2013, this process has slowed down. The cash flows from the investment activity of the city of Zamość are presented in Chart 6.


**Chart 6.** The cash flows from the investment activity of the city of Zamość in 2013 - 2017 (in PLN thousand)



**Source:** Own study based on Reports on the implementation of the budget of the city of Zamość for 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.

Financing of cash flows from investing activities during the analysis period at the average annual level of PLN 18.3 million would be possible only from cash flows from operating activities (annual average in the analysis period PLN 19.9 million). The exception was 2014, in which the city of Zamość would not be able to finance investment expenditures only from operating activities without using repayable funds. However, the city of Zamość (with the exception of 2013 and 2015 additionally made use of returnable funds.) In 2013 and in 2015, the city of Zamość grew (negative flows from financial activities), however, in the remaining years of the analysis the city's debt was increased. Cash flows from the financial activities of the city of Zamość in 2013 - 2017 are presented in Chart 7.

**Chart 7.** Cash flows from the financial activities of the city of Zamość in 2013 - 2017 (in PLN thousand)




**Source:** Own study based on Reports on the implementation of the budget of the city of Zamość for 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.

The analysis of individual groups of cash flow streams does not allow for a synthetic assessment of the finances of the city of Zamość during the considered period. A synthetic assessment of the finances of Zamość should be a summary of cash flows from individual types of operations. The sum of cash flows from operating, investing and financing activities is the net cash flow. The net cash flow cannot take negative values, because investment tasks cannot be realized without proper sources of financing them (operating activity and / or financial activity).

Net cash flows along with cash flows from particular types of activity of the city of Zamość are presented in Chart 8.

**Chart 8.** Net cash flows of the city of Zamość in 2013 - 2017 (in PLN thousand)



**Source:** Own study based on: Reports on the implementation of the budget of the city of Zamość for 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017

The net cash flow of the city of Zamość in the analysed period fluctuated from zero in 2015 to PLN 8.7 million in 2017. In the entire analysis period, the net cash flow amounted to PLN 17.8 million. The higher than average accumulation of net flows in 2016-2017 will probably be aimed at achieving growing investment expenses in the following years. In addition, net cash flows (except for the years 2014-2015 provided for the financial liquidity of the city of Zamość at the turn of individual budget years (part of the tasks must be financed by the city from the beginning of January, while income affects with a certain time delay).

## 2. Analysis of basic financial indicators

### *Financial liquidity of the city of Zamość*

From a formal point of view, a local government unit (LGU) cannot go bankrupt, but there are often situations, when there is a significant difference in time between the date, when the debt becomes due, and the date of its settlement. LGUs as a result of loss of liquidity, like entrepreneurs, have problems with timely payment of their obligations. That is why it is also

very important for LGU to maintain financial liquidity, especially that for many of them it is a fundamental problem (Filipiak 2014: 35).

The financial liquidity of LGUs can be defined as a state in which, at a given moment, local government units have sufficient funds to cover necessary, planned expenses and outlays. Liquidity is maintained when there is a proper symmetry of income and revenues as well as expenditures and outlays (Kosek-Wojnar & Surówka 2007). This requires precise combining of the collection and spending dates. LGs cannot increase their income by increasing taxes immediately, but they can, however, improve their collectability (in order to obtain cash). They can also take out loans (both on the financial and merchant market).

The financial liquidity in local government units cannot be measured by standard methods, as on December 31 each LGU is able to cover its liabilities, and the use of cash accounting means that all budget lines will be executed (Piekunko-Mantiuk 2008). However, the budget shown at the end of the year does not illustrate what is going on during the year. LGUs finance their activities mainly from earned income, and receivables and liabilities operate in a specific way, hence the assessment of financial liquidity will not be measured by current assets (as in the standard liquidity measurement formulas), but the inflow of funds that this property generates (Kosek-Wojnar & Wojnar 2005: 48). During the year, when there may be temporary surpluses and shortages of funds, liquidity can be calculated using the formula:

**Formula 1.** Financial liquidity of local government units

$$CR = \frac{\text{budget revenues} + \text{budget revenues (realized at a given moment)}}{\text{budget expenses} + \text{budget expenditures (realized at a given moment)}}$$

The CR indicator means the ability to meet commitments on time and the actual financial coverage of those expenses whose payment date has already passed. If both indicators are below 1.0, this means that the LGU budget has become ineffective, and consequently the risk of losing the ability to finance current operations. It will undermine among others the credibility of LGs as a debtor, it will make incur additional financial costs in the form of, for example, contractual penalties, interest for late payment, as well as will result in difficulties in obtaining a bank loan.

To sum up, it can be assumed that good financial standing of LGUs will occur when the CR ratio is at the level of 1.5-2.0, which means that there are no difficulties in regulating the

current liabilities of LGU (Kosek-Wojnar & Wojnar 2005: 49). Similarly to other units, the indicator at the level exceeding 3.0 speaks of LGU surplus, which may indicate that the local government does not carry out the tasks assigned to it and inefficiently uses the funds possessed, and the income flows irregularly. The financial liquidity ratio in the city of Zamość is presented in Table 1.

**Table 1.** The value of the financial liquidity ratio of the city of Zamość in 2013 – 2017

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
CR	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.02	1.02

**Source:** Own calculations based on template 2 and reports on the implementation of the budget of the city of Zamość for the years: 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017

The values of the financial liquidity index of the city of Zamość in the analyzed state inform that the city was balancing on the verge of losing financial liquidity. This is also confirmed by the data contained in charts 4 and 8. This was a quite specific situation, especially since the city of Zamość did not fully use its financial potential to carry out optional investment tasks, co-financing them with returnable financial resources. All the more that since 2014, new legal regulations concerning the limits of incurring financial liabilities have been in force, consisting in the introduction of the Individual Debt Index (Dz. U. 2009, No. 157, item 1240, art. 243).

### ***The debt of the city of Zamość***

According to the Public Finance Act, the body constituting the territorial self-government unit may adopt a budget whose implementation will cause that in the budgetary year and each year following the budget year the relation of the total repayment amount (...) to the planned total budget revenue will exceed the arithmetic average calculated for the last three years of the relation of current income increased by income from the sale of assets and diminished by current expenses to the total budget income. The individual debt ratio is shown in the formula 2.

Formula 2. Individual debt ratio and in each year following the budget year the relation of the total repayment amount (...) to the planned total budget revenue will exceed the arithmetic average of the current account receivable for the last three years, increased by income from the

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sale of assets and less expenses current to total budget revenues. The individual debt ratio is shown in the Formula 2.

**Formula 2.** Individual debt ratio

$$\frac{(R+O)}{D} \leq \frac{1}{3} \left( \frac{(Db_{n-1} + Sm_{n-1} - Wb_{n-1})}{D_{n-1}} + \frac{(Db_{n-2} + Sm_{n-2} - Wb_{n-2})}{D_{n-2}} + \frac{(Db_{n-3} + Sm_{n-3} - Wb_{n-3})}{D_{n-3}} \right)$$

where:

R - total amount due for repayment of loan and loan instalments and securities buy-outs for financing the planned budget deficit, repayment of earlier contracted liabilities, pre-financing of activities financed from funds from the EU budget, as well as financing of investment projects

O - interest on loans and credits contracted for the budget year to cover the transitional budget deficit in the course of the year, financing the planned budget deficit, repayment of earlier liabilities, pre-financing of activities financed from the EU budget and financing of investment projects, interest and discount on securities issued for these purposes and repayment of amounts resulting from granted sureties and guarantees

D - total budget revenue in a given budget year

Db - current income

Sm - income from the sale of property

Wb - current expenditure

n - the financial year on which the relationship is determined

n-1 - the year preceding the budget year on which the relationship is established

n-2 - the year preceding the budget year by two years

n-3 - the year preceding the financial year by three years.

**Source:** (Dz. U. 2009, No. 157, item 1240, art. 243).

Individual debt ratio for the city of Zamość for 2016 (calculated on the basis of the arithmetic average for 2013-2015) and for 2017 (calculated on the basis of the arithmetic average for 2014-2016) are presented in Table 2.

**Table 2.** Individual debt ratio of the city of Zamość

2016		2017	
0,4%	< 11,4%	2,7%	< 11,8%

**Source:** Own calculations based on template 2 and reports on the implementation of the budget of the city of Zamość for the years: 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017

The indicator  $(R + O) / D$  in 2016 for the city of Zamość was smaller than the arithmetic average calculated for the last three years referred to in art. 243 of the Public Finance Act by 11%, and in 2017 by 9.1%. The relatively large difference between the permissible and actual

indebtedness of the city of Zamość was evidence of incomplete utilization of the city's potential in the implementation of pro-development investment tasks with the use of repayable funds.

***Assessment of financing possibilities for the development of the city of Zamość***

The attractiveness of local government units can be defined as the ability to create development, which in turn requires the authorities to systematically incur financial expenses, especially for tasks other than obligatory ones. The indicators that measure the attractiveness of local government units from the point of view of the possibility of financing development are (Dylewski et al. 2010: 116):

**Formula 3.** Operational development ability indicator (WOZR)


$$\text{WOZR} = \frac{\text{current income} - \text{current expenditure}}{\text{current income}}$$

**Formula 4.** Total development ability index (WCZR)

$$\text{WCZR} = \frac{\text{current income} - \text{current expenditure} + \text{property income}}{\text{current income}}$$

The information content of the indicators shows the actual possibilities of financing expenditures related to the development of a given local government unit on the basis of the possibility of obtaining surplus of free financial resources.

The WOZR indicator does not include property income, so it can be used for projection of repetitive expenditure, while the WCZR indicator includes property incomes that are incidental. Both indicators illustrate the ability to finance new tasks, usually having pro-development character, taking into account the incurring of obligatory expenditures. These indicators also serve well for comparisons in time and space. Operational (WOZR) and total (WCZR) indicators of the development capacity of the city of Zamość are presented in the Chart 8.

**Chart 8.** Indices of WOZR and WCZR of the city of Zamość in 2013 – 2017

**Source:** Own calculations based on formulas 3 and 4 and reports on the implementation of the budget of the city of Zamość for the years: 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017

A comparison of the WOZR and WCZR indexes in dynamic terms (in particular years) enables the identification of the trend characteristic for the city of Zamość. In the analysed period, the financing possibilities (operational) of the development of the city of Zamość oscillated around 6.2% of its current revenues. Including income from property that is incidental and limited, in the analysed period the total development capacity of the city of Zamość decreased (from 15.9% in 2015 to 7.3% in 2017).

### ***Conclusion***

The results of the presented research (especially the analysis of liquidity and indebtedness) provide the information necessary to select the options regarding, among others, obtaining debt instruments to finance the implementation of tasks (current and investment), while measures of development financing have an important cognitive value mainly for the local community and members of the governing and executive bodies. Determining the real possibilities of establishing and creating income and the freedom to spend them, makes one aware of the actual scope of decisions that Zamość municipal authorities can make in terms of income and expenditure. Awareness of the actual level of financial independence may in turn be helpful in the effective disposition of public funds, including those of a reflexive nature.

The city of Zamość did not make full use of its financial potential in the implementation of pro-development investments during the period under consideration. The incurred financial liabilities were mainly used to co-finance investment projects based on non-returnable financial resources of the European Union. It is worth emphasizing that this type of liability is not included in the individual debt ratio. The implementation of investment tasks co-financed that the European Union funds were more consistent with the tasks for which EU co-financing was provided than in the real needs of the city in this respect.

The results of the conducted research induce a postulate that the executive and executive bodies of the city of Zamość should consider the possibility of identifying developmental tasks, which would significantly affect the development of not only the economic, but above all socio-economic cities. In addition, these tasks should not increase current expenses in the future, related to the need to maintain investment effects and should contribute to the growth of the local tax base of the city. In order to meet these challenges, we should consider better utilization of the city's financial potential, also based on returnable funds.

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