

Political Preferences

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**The Influence of the National Political Scene on
the Behavior of Local Politicians and Voters in
Polish Local Elections in 2018**

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Abstract:

Polish local elections in 2018, many months before their commencement, became one of the main elements of the political discourse. Due to the specificity of the electoral calendar, for the first time since the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2015, voters had to assess the actions taken by the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) in the electoral act. Of course, this could only happen indirectly, precisely through local elections, which due to their specificity, are not able to fully reflect the balance of powers that operates on the national arena. However, also in this way voters could refer to national events. Expressing support for them by voting on PiS, or by showing negations of their actions by voting for groups remaining in opposition. The aim of the paper is to check whether, in the perception of voters, events on the national political arena determine the behavior of two types of participants in local elections: local politicians and voters.

Keywords: local elections, national arena, local arena, voters

Introduction

Many political scientists and sociologists are reflecting on what influenced the electoral decisions of voters in selected elections. We can distinguish a few main and traditional approaches to electoral behavior. Sociological models make the electoral decision dependent on the place the voter occupies in the social structure. According to this approach, social status and related affiliation to specific groups influence attitudes, opinions and beliefs of people. Among the psychological models, the party identification model became particularly popular. The central concept of this approach is the concept of identification with the party, understood as affective

attitude towards important objects on the political scene. There are also economic models, at the base of which lies the model of a rational voter. It is construed on the assumption that the voter decision is the result of the calculation of economic profits and losses. Of course, the so-called issue voting model also appears here (Żerkowska-Balas et al. 2016: 71-73). However, voters themselves do not approach their behavior in a theoretical way. Many voters know remarkably little about politics, including even basic facts about their own surroundings. They don't analyze everything that surrounds them and what may affect their electoral behavior. However, there is a question whether voters are aware of whether certain aspects of political life (in this case national policy) affect their decisions in local elections.

Local elections, as an example of the so-called democracy in action (Mazur 2008: 139, Putnam 1995), can be considered as the closest to the citizens, mainly by dealing with the basic public issues and having a direct impact on the functioning of local communities. Involvement of a whole range of entities (political parties, social organizations, associations and independent candidates) changes the rules of the political game, known to political parties from the national scene, but also definitely influences voters' preferences. However, elections to regional assemblies (and due to their specificity to other local authorities) in particular, may arouse interest of national political parties for several reasons. First of all, winning votes in such elections gives them a possibility of shaping regional policy (e.g. by deciding on the redistribution of EU funds). Secondly, sejmik wojewódzki (regional assembly) is a "personnel base" for political parties before the elections to other bodies (e.g. parliamentary elections). Winning regional elections can also be a question of prestige (Cichosz 2013: 313). This prestige was particularly important for PiS in 2018. Jarosław Kaczyński's party wanted to show social acceptance for its actions.

The local elections in 2018, many months before the start of the official election campaign, aroused great interest among Poles and politicians, especially those operating on the national scene. In September 2018, the elections to local authorities have been attracting noticeably higher interest than all previous ones (CBOS 126/2018). According to the electoral calendar, these were the first elections since the victory of Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) in 2015, but also the first in the new election cycle having started in 2018. The largest Polish parties treated this election as the first test before the parliamentary elections that were planned for autumn 2019. The intensity of the political conflict at the national level

drew the attention of the public to the local elections, and at the same time made the largest political parties, both governmental and opposition, to concentrate their efforts on them. Local government has not been such an important element of the public dispute over power, the vision of Poland and the condition of Polish democracy for a long time.

Poles consider local elections to be the most important of all elections held in the country, assigning them the highest marks on a 10-point scale of importance. Local elections (average result 7.63) are slightly ahead of presidential elections (7.24) and parliamentary elections (7.20), and much more clearly, elections to the European Parliament (6.12) (CBOS 23/2018)¹. During elections in 2018, the fact of the importance of local elections can be also seen in the high turnout². It amounted to 54.9% of persons entitled to vote. This is the highest turnout in local government elections since 1990. It was also higher than the turnout in the 2015 elections to the Sejm (50,9%) and in the first round of the presidential election in the same year (48,9%). Apart from the highly-rated rank of local elections, the turnout could undoubtedly be influenced by the very high intensity of political emotions among Poles. Also, starting from 2015, the number of people who declared their participation in the strike or demonstration has significantly increased, in 2017 it was 7% of adult Poles, and this is the highest percentage since 1989. Residents of large cities, with higher education, people not participating in religious practices and identifying themselves with the left, protested more often than average (CBOS 17/2018). A series of street protests and political demonstrations, that took place in the years preceding this election, may lead to the conclusion that in recent time many Poles are more and more interested in political life. In 2018, Poles were mostly interested in the actions of the central authorities - parliamentarians, the government and the president (87% of respondents declared their interest). To a slightly lesser extent, there was also a visible interest in decisions of gmina (commune) authorities (78%). The decision of the powiat (poviat) authorities and regional assembly aroused the least interest. Comparing the data from 2014 and 2018, there is a noticeable increase in the interest in the policy, both nationwide and local level (CBOS 23/2018).

It is worth emphasizing that just after the local elections, half of Poles recognized that the main goal of those elections was only what is believed to be the primary goal of local elections,

¹ This seems to strongly contradict the approach of Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt (1980) that local elections belong to the so-called second order elections, as less important for voters, political parties or the media than the parliamentary or presidential elections, so-called first-order elections.

² As per Polish standards.

i.e. the selection of the best candidates for local authorities. However, what seems to be more important, more than 40% of Poles believed that the local elections in 2018 were not only of local significance, but to a greater or lesser extent were also a consequence of the situation on the national political scene and constituted an opportunity for voters to express their opinions to changes taking place in Poland (CBOS 17/2018). A month before the elections, in September 2018, voters, in determining the hierarchy of the most desirable features of a candidate for a councilor, considered that the most important is knowledge of the local problems of inhabitants (it was important for 97% of persons entitled to vote) and experience in working in local government (78%). On the other hand, for the majority of adult Poles, the party support for the candidate for a councilor was less important (63% of indications considered this feature irrelevant). The party recommendation was only valid for one-third of those entitled to vote (33%). Over 60% of the respondents declared that while voting in local elections they would prefer to vote for independent candidates, unrelated to any political group (CBOS 139/2018).

As we can see, Poles appreciate the importance of local elections, considering them as the most important in the entire election cycle, putting them above the elections to the central offices. In addition, voters consider party membership of local politicians as irrelevant or even undesirable. It can therefore be assumed that the events taking place on the national scene will not affect the behavior of local politicians or the voters themselves. However, at the same time, the research indicates that Poles are first of all interested in the achievements of the central authorities, and a significant part of them saw in the local elections (2018) something more than the ability to choose local authorities, i.e. a chance for them to express their opinions on changes taking place in Poland after 2015. So, there may be a transfer of conflict and struggle between supporters and opponents of government actions from the national to the local level.

At the same time, it is worth noting that the local government was, not only historically, a form of struggle with the central authority (Antoszewski 2008: 45). So maybe a similar situation takes place today. The thesis then arises, whether during the local elections in 2018, the behavior of local politicians and the voters themselves were determined by what was happening on the national scene. Was this what happened on the national scene, for example conflicts, protests, changes of law, a determinant for local politicians' behavior? As they preferred to run from small local committees, not committees with a party logo.

Do political views matter?

In this article, the influence of domestic events on the behavior of politicians and voters during the election campaign in local elections in 2018 will be explained on the basis of the quantitative and percentage distribution of answers to two theses: 1) *Events on the national political scene influenced the behavior of local politicians during the election campaign*, 2) *Events on the national political scene influenced my choice during local elections*. The basic unit of analysis is the political party (electoral committee) and the political views of the voters. To expand the possibilities of analysis, additional factors have also been added, namely: religiousness, place of residence, level of education. The nationwide sample was selected in Poland in a quota-layered manner (970 people). The disjointed layers were voivodeships (N = 16), while the amount controlled variables were sex, age and place of residence (city-village). The research was carried out using the questionnaire method.

The purpose of the paper was to verify two main hypotheses. In the voters' perception, in a situation of the large social polarization³, in 2018:

- 1) domestic events influenced the behavior of local politicians and voters,
- 2) voters of opposition parties believe in much higher influence of these events.

In the case of voters of opposition parties, they assume that the conflict from the national scene must be moved to the local scene, as this may initiate the beginning of the end of the Law and Justice rule. In particular, when, after 2015, only local authorities were not, to a lesser or greater extent, under the influence of PiS.

³ According to the research, 84% of Poles believe that there are major differences in Polish society, and 63% pointed to differences in political views as the reason (Ipsos MORI 2018).

Table 1. The quantitative and percentage distribution of responses to the thesis "Events on the national political scene influenced the behavior of local politicians during the election campaign" in individual party electorates and among voters who did not participate in elections to sejmiki wojewódzkie (regional assemblies) in 2018

In the elections to the sejmiki wojewódzkie in 2018, I voted for:		Definitely not	Probably not	Hard to say	Probably yes	Definitely yes	The sum of the answers
Bezpartyjni Samorządowcy	Q	1	6	12	20	10	49
Nonpartisan Local Government Activists	%	2,04	12,24	24,49	40,82	20,41	100,00
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe	Q	2	10	26	19	8	65
	%	3,08	15,38	40,00	29,23	12,31	100,00
Platforma Obywatelska/ Koalicja Obywatelska	Q	3	12	51	95	69	230
	%	1,30	5,22	22,17	41,30	30,00	100,00
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej/ Lewica Razem	Q	2	2	9	22	6	41
	%	4,88	4,88	21,95	53,66	14,63	100,00
Kukiz 15	Q	1	6	8	9	10	34
	%	2,94	17,65	23,53	26,47	29,41	100,00
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	Q	5	24	87	78	32	226
	%	2,21	10,62	38,50	34,51	14,16	100,00
Komitet regionalny (Regional Committee)	Q	0	5	9	23	13	50
	%	0	10,00	18,00	46,00	26,00	100,00
Other party	Q	4	6	11	32	12	65
	%	6,15	9,23	16,92	49,23	18,46	100,00
I did not vote	Q	5	8	70	47	16	146
	%	3,42	5,48	47,95	32,19	10,96	100,00
I do not remember	Q	1	1	33	20	5	60
	%	1,67	1,67	55,00	33,33	8,33	100,00

Q = Quantity

Source: own research as a part of the project „Preferencje polityczne. Postawy-Identyfikacje-Zachowania”.

Table 2. The quantitative and percentagedistribution of responses to the thesis "Events on the national political scene influenced my choice during local elections "in individual party electorates and among voters who did not participate in elections to sejmiki wojewódzkie (regional assemblies) in 2018

In the elections to the sejmiki wojewódzkie in 2018, I voted for:		Definitely not	Probably not	Hard to say	Probably yes	Definitely yes	The sum of the answers
Bezpartyjni Samorządowcy	Q	8	11	7	14	10	50
Nonpartisan Local Government Activists	%	16,00	22,00	14,00	28,00	20,00	100,00
Polskie Stronictwo Ludowe	Q	6	17	10	16	16	65
	%	9,23	26,15	15,38	24,62	24,62	100,00
Platforma Obywatelska/ Koalicja Obywatelska	Q	23	41	33	74	59	230
	%	10,00	17,83	14,35	32,17	25,65	100,00
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej/ Lewica Razem	Q	2	10	6	12	11	41
	%	4,88	24,39	14,63	29,27	26,83	100,00
Kukiz 15	Q	1	10	6	10	7	34
	%	2,94	29,41	17,65	29,41	20,59	100,00
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	Q	26	53	52	68	25	224
	%	11,61	23,66	23,21	30,36	11,16	100,00
Komitet regionalny (Regional Committee)	Q	8	15	3	13	10	49
	%	16,33	30,61	6,12	26,53	20,41	100,00
Other party	Q	13	15	9	15	12	64
	%	20,31	23,44	14,06	23,44	18,75	100,00
I did not vote	Q	30	27	48	26	15	146
	%	20,55	18,49	32,88	17,81	10,27	100,00
I do not remember	Q	4	9	25	15	8	61
	%	6,56	14,75	40,98	24,59	13,11	100,00

Q = Quantity

Source: own research as a part of the project „Preferencje polityczne. Postawy-Identyfikacje-Zachowania”.

The data presented in Table 1 show how the supporters of individual parties and groups perceived the impact of domestic events on the behavior of local politicians. On the basis of the data mentioned following conclusions can be formulated. First of all, the percentage of respondents who admit that such influence existed (answers: presumably yes and definitely yes)

is very high, around 60%⁴, i.e. almost two thirds of voters saw a clear relation between what was happening on the national scene and the local scene. Much more interesting, however, is the distribution of opinions on this subject among the electorate of individual parties. Definitely, the greatest influence was noticed by the voters of local committees (72%), Citizens' Platform/Citizens' Coalition (Platforma Obywatelska/Koalicja Obywatelska, PO/KO) (71.3%), Democratic Left Alliance/Left Together (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej/Lewica Razem, SLD Lewica Razem) (68.29%) and the so-called other, smaller parties not shown in the study (67.69%). Thus, the highest indications were noted among voters of opposition groups who more or less disagree with the actions taken by the government of the Law and Justice. Therefore, they were transferring the national conflict to the local scene. It is worth emphasizing the very high rates of influence among voters of local committees. Their vote can be interpreted just as an opposition to national policy, as a whole, which for them may be too far from the needs of voters. The smallest influence was recorded among the voters of PiS (48.67%) but above all the Polish Peasants' Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) (only 41.54%). The indication of the PSL voters, whose leaders were definitely against the actions of the government, is definitely surprising. The voters of this party, perhaps due to the lower interest in domestic politics, and to a greater extent to local policy (especially during local elections) downplayed this influence. This can be related to a large membership base, an extensive field structure and strong rooting in local government units. PSL voters are loyal to their party and they choose candidates from their immediate environment (Peszyński 2011: 248). PSL voters focus on their own representatives, whom they have been choosing for years and their actions seem to be quite stable. The results of PiS voters are not surprising, they accept government policy and, consequently, political and social changes. National conflict seems to be much less important for them.

Table 2 shows individual electoral preferences, in the context of the discussed issue. The data confirm previous results. It is worth noting, however, that in the case of this thesis, the respondents much less frequently admitted to the fact of determining their electoral preferences on the basis of events on the national scene (average 49%). So the voters, in their opinion, considered themselves less wavering in political decisions and behavior than local politicians, who have to take into account a wider spectrum of issues and have to adapt to the new political situation. This tendency is also repeated in the further part of the research. Also in the case of individual preferences, the highest indicators of influence were shown by PO/KO voters (57.82%) and SLD Lewica Razem (56.1%), while the lowest by electorate of PiS (41.52%). It is

⁴ The average result for all voters, except those who answered: *I did not vote* and *I do not remember*.

worth noting, however, that there is a change in the preferences of the PSL supporters. In this case, the voters were significantly affected by the impact of the domestic situation (49.24% of the respondents indicated answers yes and definitely yes⁵). This is one of the few cases in the whole study, when the voters admitted that national events affect their behavior more than the behavior of local politicians. This may also suggest that voters of this party are more susceptible to changing electoral behavior than local politicians, especially PSL.

Tables 3 and 4 show the distribution of responses to both theses, in the context of declared political views. The results seem to uphold the data from the first two tables, and perhaps also partially explain the phenomenon of PSL voters. People with left-wing views noticed a great influence on local politicians (74.64% - the highest percentage of indications in the entire study) but also on themselves (59.02% - again the highest percentage of responses only in answer to thesis no. 2). Leftist voters, who after 2015 had not had their representatives in central authorities, stress the importance of national events much more, they express their negation by taking part in protests and demonstrations. People with centrist views, and, above all, right-wing views (including, among others, PSL voters) do not attach so much importance to national events. In the case of the latter, there were 57% of indications in the first thesis and 44.58% in the second thesis.

Table 3. The quantitative and percentage distribution of answers to the thesis "Events on the national political scene influenced the behavior of local politicians during the election campaign" in the context of declared political views

Declared political views		Definitely not	Probably not	Hard to say	Probably yes	Definitely yes	The sum of the answers
Left	Q	6	13	33	94	59	205
	%	2,93	6,34	16,10	45,85	28,78	100,00
Center	Q	4	15	58	64	45	186
	%	2,15	8,06	31,18	34,41	24,19	100,00
Right	Q	10	29	99	130	56	324
	%	3,09	8,95	30,56	40,12	17,28	100,00
I do not know, I cannot determine	Q	4	23	125	77	21	250
	%	1,60	9,20	50,00	30,80	8,40	100,00

Q = Quantity

Source: own research as a part of the project „Preferencje polityczne. Postawy-Identyfikacje-Zachowania”.

⁵ In the questionnaire, voters had a choice of five types of answers: definitely not, probably not, hard to say, probably yes, definitely yes. The last two answers meant that such an influence existed. For the purpose of the analysis, this answers were added together.

Table 4. The quantitative and percentage distribution of answers to the thesis "Events on the national political scene influenced my choice during local elections" in the context of declared political views

Declared political views		Definitely not	Probably not	Hard to say	Probably yes	Definitely yes	The sum of the answers
Left	Q	18	42	24	53	68	205
	%	8,78	20,49	11,71	25,85	33,17	100,00
Center	Q	23	36	33	58	35	185
	%	12,43	19,46	17,84	31,35	18,92	100,00
Right	Q	42	73	64	96	48	323
	%	13,00	22,60	19,81	29,72	14,86	100,00
I do not know, I cannot determine	Q	38	57	77	56	22	250
	%	15,20	22,80	30,80	22,40	8,80	100,00

Q = Quantity

Source: own research as a part of the project „Preferencje polityczne. Postawy-Identyfikacje-Zachowania”.

Do education, religiousness and place of residence matter?

In Tables 5 and 6, we find voters’ answers correlated with their declared level of religiousness. According to official data provided by the Central Statistical Office (Główny Urząd Statystyczny) in 2018, nearly 94% of Polish citizens aged 16 and more have a religious denomination. Almost 81% describe themselves as believers and 3% as non-believers (GUS 2018). These values are much higher than those observed in the analyzed studies, where more than 17% of respondents defined themselves as non-practicing or non-believing. This difference may, of course, arise from the fact that some people who declare belonging to a religion may not at the same time practice their religion. According to the survey results, people representing the category: non-practicing/non-believers noticed a significantly higher impact of domestic politics on the behavior of local politicians (67.76%) and themselves (52.98%). And people who declared any religious activity (all other categories together) see its limited influence. In the whole category of believers, the values are as follows: in thesis no.1 53.85%, in thesis no.2 43.26%. The results of religious people, and the PiS and PSL supporters definitely belong to them, coincide with previous analyses.

Table 5. The quantitative and percentage distribution of answers to the thesis "Events on the national political scene influenced the behavior of local politicians during the election campaign" in the context of the declared level of religiousness

Declared religiousness		Definitely not	Probably not	Hard to say	Probably yes	Definitely yes	The sum of the answers
Non-practicing (including non-believers)	Q	4	9	36	61	42	152
	%	2,63	5,92	23,68	40,13	27,63	100,00
Practicing only occasionally	Q	5	17	79	94	40	235
	%	2,13	7,23	33,62	40,00	17,02	100,00
Practicing irregularly	Q	4	28	69	82	36	219
	%	1,83	12,79	31,51	37,44	16,44	100,00
Practicing often	Q	5	22	91	89	40	247
	%	2,02	8,91	36,84	36,03	16,19	100,00
Practicing very often	Q	6	4	42	36	21	109
	%	5,50	3,67	38,53	33,03	19,27	100,00

Q = Quantity

Source: own research as a part of the project „Preferencje polityczne. Postawy-Identyfikacje-Zachowania”.

Table 6. The quantitative and percentage distribution of answers to the thesis "Events on the national political scene influenced my choice during local elections" in the context of the declared level of religiousness

Declared religiousness		Definitely not	Probably not	Hard to say	Probably yes	Definitely yes	The sum of the answers
Non-practicing (including non-believers)	Q	16,00	28,00	27,00	38,00	42,00	151,00
	%	10,60	18,54	17,88	25,17	27,81	100,00
Practicing only occasionally	Q	33,00	46,00	49,00	64,00	44,00	236,00
	%	13,98	19,49	20,76	27,12	18,64	100,00
Practicing irregularly	Q	26,00	55,00	47,00	59,00	32,00	219,00
	%	11,87	25,11	21,46	26,94	14,61	100,00
Practicing often	Q	26,00	58,00	55,00	77,00	29,00	245,00
	%	10,61	23,67	22,45	31,43	11,84	100,00
Practicing very often	Q	20,00	21,00	21,00	25,00	22,00	109,00
	%	18,35	19,27	19,27	22,94	20,18	100,00

Q = Quantity

Source: own research as a part of the project „Preferencje polityczne. Postawy-Identyfikacje-Zachowania”.

The data in tables 7 and 8 present the scope of the answers to both theses, compared to the next variable, which is the place of residence. In this case voters were divided into three categories: inhabitants of villages, cities up to 100,000 inhabitants and cities with a population of over 100,000. Before presenting the results of the research, it is worth quoting the results of exit poll surveys from the day of local elections (Ipsos 2018). In these studies, there were five categories of residence (a village, a city of up to 50,000 residents, cities with a population of 51,000-200,000, 201,000-500,000 and a city of over 500,000 inhabitants). Two extreme categories seem particularly interesting, where differences in the support given to the winning parties could be seen clear. In the countryside elections were definitely won by PiS (39.9%). The next results were obtained by PSL (20.9%) and PO/KO (15.5%). In large cities (over 500,000 inhabitants) the results were very different. PO/KO won (47.3%) over PiS (23.1%) and SLD Lewica Razem (6.6%). To make the situation even more clear, one can mention the PiS's defeat in the elections for the posts of presidents of Polish cities. In 107 analyzed cases PiS won only in 5 but PO/KO in 28. It is easy to observe that the electoral decisions in both cases were definitely different. Is it in this case, that the situation will be repeated and voters of the opposition parties (except the PSL), living rather in large cities than villages, will notice the greater impact of domestic events. As it can be seen from the answers to both theses, rural residents assessed this impact as definitely lower. In the case of thesis no. 1, only 49.19% of the respondents confirmed the existence of influence, while in the case of the second thesis it was 40%. The situation is different in larger cities (in the study, defined as cities with a population of over 100,000). Here voters noticed a much greater correlation between the events of the national scene and the local scene. In the case of the influence on local politicians it was confirmed by 62.57% respondents, while the influence on voters was determined by 49.84%. To sum up, the inhabitants of villages, who are, to a large extent, voters of PiS and PSL (about 60% of all voters) noticed a much smaller impact than residents of larger cities, especially cities over 500,000 inhabitants, where over 55% of voters are voters of PO/KO and SLD Lewica Razem.

Table 7. The quantitative and percentage distribution of answers to the thesis "Events on the national political scene influenced the behavior of local politicians during the election campaign" in the context of a place of permanent residence

Permanent place of residence		Definitely not	Probably not	Hard to say	Probably yes	Definitely yes	The sum of the answers
Village	Q	9	37	140	135	45	366
	%	2,46	10,11	38,25	36,89	12,30	100,00
City to 100,000 inhabitants	Q	9	27	77	105	57	275
	%	3,27	9,82	28,00	38,18	20,73	100,00
City over 100,000 inhabitants	Q	6	16	100	125	79	326
	%	1,84	4,91	30,67	38,34	24,23	100,00

Q = Quantity

Source: own research as a part of the project „Preferencje polityczne. Postawy-Identyfikacje-Zachowania”.

Table 8. The quantitative and percentage distribution of answers to the thesis "Events on the national political scene influenced my choice in the local elections" in the context of a place of permanent residence

Permanent place of residence		Definitely not	Probably not	Hard to say	Probably yes	Definitely yes	The sum of the answers
Village	Q	37,00	83,00	99,00	96,00	50,00	365,00
	%	10,14	22,74	27,12	26,30	13,70	100,00
City to 100,000 inhabitants	Q	43,00	58,00	44,00	83,00	45,00	273,00
	%	15,75	21,25	16,12	30,40	16,48	100,00
City over 100,000 inhabitants	Q	41,00	67,00	56,00	85,00	78,00	327,00
	%	12,54	20,49	17,13	25,99	23,85	100,00

Q = Quantity

Source: own research as a part of the project „Preferencje polityczne. Postawy-Identyfikacje-Zachowania”.

The last set of data, presented in Tables 9 and 10, shows the answers to the theses in correlation with the level of education of the respondents. As in the previous case, it can be compared to the results of the exit poll survey (Ipsos 2018). The largest number of PiS voters is found among people with primary and junior high education. Almost half of this group (45.7%) voted for the party of Jarosław Kaczyński. In the same group, PO/KO voters constituted only

15.2%. Along with the increase in the level of education, the percentage of PiS voters falls, while the number of PO/KO voters increases. Among people with the highest level of education (bachelor and above), their number is 35.7%, and in the case of PiS voters it is only 23.7%. Certain tendency can be also seen in answers to analyzed theses. Voters, along with the increase in their level of education, notice an increase in the impact of events from the national scene. People with primary and junior high education, in answer to the first thesis gave only 35.71% of responses: probably yes and definitely yes. The same answers were given by 62.72% of people with higher education. A clear difference can be noticed. The impact of education on the perception of influence can be clearly seen, but this should not come as a surprise since the socio-political activity of Poles increases with the level of education (CBOS 16/2016). In the case of the answer to the thesis no. 2, the difference is not so large and amounts only to 4.5 percentage points.

Table 9. The percentage distribution of answers to the thesis "Events on the national political scene influenced the behavior of local politicians during the election campaign" in the context of the level of education

Education		Definitely not	Probably not	Hard to say	Probably yes	Definitely yes	The sum of the answers
Without education	Q	3	0	1	2	1	7
	%	42,86	0	14,29	28,57	14,29	100,00
Primary/junior high education	Q	3	8	16	12	3	42
	%	7,14	19,05	38,10	28,57	7,14	100,00
Basic vocational education	Q	4	9	51	45	23	132
	%	3,03	6,82	38,64	34,09	17,42	100,00
Secondary/post-secondary education	Q	7	35	130	144	66	382
	%	1,83	9,16	34,03	37,70	17,28	100,00
Higher education	Q	7	27	114	162	87	397
	%	1,76	6,80	28,72	40,81	21,91	100,00

Q = Quantity

Source: own research as a part of the project „Preferencje polityczne. Postawy-Identyfikacje-Zachowania”.

Table 10. The percentage distribution of answers to the thesis "Events on the national political scene influenced my choice in the local elections" in the context of the level of education

Education		Definitely not	Probably not	Hard to say	Probably yes	Definitely yes	The sum of the answers
Without education	Q	1	0	2	4	0	7
	%	14,29	0	28,57	57,14	0	100,00
Primary/junior high education	Q	7	9	7	15	4	42
	%	16,67	21,43	16,67	35,71	9,52	100,00
Basic vocational education	Q	15	14	41	38	23	131
	%	11,45	10,69	31,30	29,01	17,56	100,00
Secondary/post-secondary education	Q	47	94	89	97	57	384
	%	12,24	24,48	23,18	25,26	14,84	100,00
Higher education	Q	50	89	59	109	87	394
	%	12,69	22,59	14,97	27,66	22,08	100,00

Q = Quantity

Source: own research as a part of the project „Preferencje polityczne. Postawy-Identyfikacje-Zachowania”.

Conclusions

According to the examined thesis, the events of the domestic scene had an impact on the behavior in local elections, but it is worth stressing that the electoral calendar also significantly raised the importance of local elections to the politicians at the national level. The local elections in 2018 definitely played a significant role in the shaping of the national policy. Large parties, primarily PiS and PO/KO decided relatively quickly that the campaign should be launched. PO together with Modern (Nowoczesna, .N) initiated it in August 2018 with a wide outdoor campaign, which was quickly answered by the campaign of the ruling party. Both PiS and PO/KO spent large sums on campaigns (PiS - PLN 34.5 million zloty, and PO/KO 25.1 million zloty). Such a situation could not remain without influence on voters. As can be seen in the presented analysis, the impact of actions taken on the national stage can be considered very important. Over 60% of respondents in the study noticed it in the context of local politicians' activities, and almost 50% of them admitted that it also had an impact on themselves. The difference in the answers to theses 1 and 2, i.e. lower impact assessments on voters, should not

come as a surprise. Voters will rarely admit that their individual preferences were affected with something else than purely substantive issues and concerning only this subject. Of course, it needs to be added that local politicians, especially those belonging to relevant parties in the national arena, in the strategies of their actions must also take into account the recommendations and guidelines of the party authorities. None of the analyzed groups of the electorate eliminated the existence of such influence, and more importantly, except for one group (persons with primary and junior high education), it always exceeded 40% of the answers. It should be emphasized that voters of opposition groups or regional committees see much greater influence. Perhaps this is due to the fact that domestic events, PiS decisions determining a number of areas of life, especially those quite controversial, such as changes in the judicial system, are more noticeable and more important for their opponents than supporters. People with leftist views, educated, from large cities more often protested against them than any other social group. And it was these people who most often indicated the impact of domestic events on the actions of local politicians or voters themselves. The only exception seems to be the PSL voters, who, in their opinions, are definitely closer to the electorate of Law and Justice. In the case of sociodemographic factors they are quite closely related to each other. Although the PSL remains in opposition, the views of their electorate are in large part in line with the views of supporters of the party of Jaroslaw Kaczynski.

You cannot tear the local scene away from the national one. The proportion of information provided by the media concerning both these levels also has a significant impact on it. At the same time, local government elections are not and will never be just a tool for choosing local authorities. In addition to other functions, they are also a testing ground for political parties for subsequent elections.

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**The Results of Elections for the Śląskie
Voivodeship Assembly in 2018 in the Reality of
Territorial Heteronomy**

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Abstract:

The main aim of the paper is the theoretical analysis of the concept of the territorial heteronomy. Conclusions concerning the idea of territorial autonomy, regionalism or federalism easily can be found in the scientific literature. But they are useless to investigate and explain many political processes and political preferences in states of the Central and Eastern Europe. It is because states of this part of the continent did not have a chance to create and develop their own models of classic administration institutions in the nineteenth century, inter alia the local and regional government. Their only experience in this area is limited to the interwar period between 1918 and 1939. They have gained a new chance for a democratic division of public tasks after the collapse of the communist system in the very end of the twentieth century. But in that period they have focused more on the horizontal division of powers than on the vertical one. For that reason up till today political phenomena in the political centre have more importance than the regional policy impact attempts. The inspiration for such a research were electoral results obtained by two regional parties at elections to the Śląskie Voivodeship Assembly in 2018.

Keywords: territorial heteronomy, territorial autonomy, Silesia, regional parties, Śląskie Voivodeship, elections

Introduction

On October 21, 2018 local and regional government elections took place in Poland. Among the other representative bodies, the composition of the Śląskie Voivodeship Assembly was also elected. These elections paid a particular attention to the researchers involved in problems related to the operation of regional parties in Europe. It was because for the first time since 2010 none of the Silesian regional parties won seats in the regional body adopting enactments of regional law.

The main aim of this paper is to analyze the concept of the territorial heteronomy in the reality of political competition during the elections to the voivodeship assemblies in Poland. Its specifics seem to favour electoral preferences related to the votes cast on statewide parties, and not regional parties.

The inspiration for such research were electoral results achieved by two regional parties at elections to the Śląskie Voivodeship Assembly in 2018. The case of Silesia is particularly interesting, because this is the only Polish region that in the period between the two World Wars in the 20. century had the territorial autonomy (Ciągwa 1988). Despite the fact that it was a legal solution applied only on a part of the historical territory of Silesia, granted to Poland after the 1921 plebiscite, the memory of owned political rights is very strong in the region until today. Although relations between political center and peripheries in contemporary Poland can be defined as a classic example of territorial heteronomy, political behaviors in Silesia differ from those that are typical of all other regions of the state.

The research question stated before the research was as follows: what are the characteristics of the phenomenon of the territorial heteronomy?

The adopted research hypothesis was: the ideal-type of the territorial heteronomy is the exact opposite phenomenon to the ideal-type of an institutionally fully-developed and autonomous regional political system. A political system of this type creates more attractive conditions for political rivalry of statewide parties and can be a favourable factor to cast electoral votes on them and not on regional parties.

The survey methodology is based on the institutional and legal analysis method. The starting point for the research is the concept of the ideal-type of an institutionally fully developed and autonomous regional political system, presented in 2018 by Régis Dandoy, Giulia Sandri and Lieven De Winter (2018: 135-136).

Two Silesian regional parties in the 2018 local government elections

On August 13, 2018, the local government elections were ordered by the Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. Elections to municipal councils, powiat councils, voivodeship assemblies and district councils of the capital city of Warsaw were announced to be held on October 21, 2018, as well as the first round of elections of mayors and city presidents. The particular attention of researchers investigating problems related to the operation of regional parties in Europe has focused on the political rivalry in Śląskie Voivodeship. It was because for the first time in Poland

after 1989 two regional political parties: the Silesian Regional Party (*Śląska Partia Regionalna* - ŚPR) and the Silesians Together (*Ślonzoki Razem* - ŚR) took part in this type of elections. Moreover, for the first time the Silesian Autonomy Movement (*Ruch Autonomii Śląska* – RAŚ) did not participate in the regional elections. It is an association, which has consistently had its representation in the Śląskie Voivodeship Assembly and has also almost continuously co-created the regional executive since 2010. In 2019 the leadership of RAŚ decided to take part in elections not under its own name, but as part of a wider political project that was to be the Silesian Regional Party. On June 21, 2017 Henryk Mercik and Grzegorz Franki, leaders of two biggest and most influential regional associations – the Silesian Autonomy Movement (created in 1990) and the Upper-Silesian Union (*Związek Górnośląski* – ZG, created in 1989) – announced the creation of the first regional party in Poland after 1989 (Pawlik 2017a). At the beginning, the project looked very promising. Particularly, hoping for its success was the favourable attitude of the President of ZG, Grzegorz Franki (Pawlik 2017b). In the past, the problem for the unification of the regional forces of these two major associations was the reluctant attitude of the ZG leaders to such a project. The hope, however, did not last long. In the end of November 2017 Grzegorz Franki has announced his resignation from the project. Despite the fact that it did not mean the end of the Silesian Regional Party, it has significantly weakened it before the local and regional election. Grzegorz Franki, despite the chance of becoming the leader of the first regional party in Poland after 1989, has chosen a career in the statewide party Civic Platform (Zasada 2017).

Finally, in the elections to the Śląskie Voivodeship Assembly, the Silesian Regional Party has gained 3.10% of votes cast in the voivodship, and the Ślonzoki Razem gained 3,23%. This meant that none of the regional parties exceeded 5% of the electoral threshold and could not take part in the distribution of seats.

The situation described above shows that in modern Poland not only the results of regional elections, but also the attitudes of leaders of political parties and associations indicate that the attractiveness of statewide parties is greater for them than that of the regional ones. This may be particularly puzzling in the case of Upper Silesia, because it is the only region of Poland that between the two World Wars in the twentieth century had territorial autonomy. The intellectual tradition of this systemic solution has returned after the 1989 transition. At that time, social and political associations began to emerge, gathering activists of the Silesian movement. But the 2019 local and regional elections have shown that the construction of the Polish political system greatly diminishes the chances of regional parties for the emergence and relevance of political success.

An institutionally fully developed and autonomous regional political system

To understand the influence of the construction of the political system in Poland, related to the vertical division of public tasks, on political preferences of voters and political leaders, the concept of territorial heteronomy should be analyzed first. The useful theoretical construction to refer in this case is the ideal-type of an institutionally fully developed and autonomous regional political system, presented in 2018 by Régis Dandoy, Giulia Sandri and Lieven De Winter (2018: 135-136). The authors have pointed for eleven features that should characterise it. They were:

1. The region existence is guaranteed by constitutional or other basic law;
2. The region has its own constitution that specifies its competencies in which the state level cannot interfere;
3. Revision of the state constitution (regarding the division of competences between state and region) can only be made by co-decision between state and regions (under consensus or special majority rule);
4. Proper policy competencies are guaranteed by constitutional or other basic law;
5. The region has a directly elected regional assembly and is granted classical parliamentary functions (legislation, executive oversight, government making);
6. The region is autonomous in the design of regional or sub-regional (local) institutions;
7. The region has the right to appeal to a constitutional or other higher (federal) court to solve conflicts with the state level;
8. The region has a constitutional court or other specialized courts to autonomously solve conflicts between actors within the regional political system (like in US states);
9. The region participates in the decision-making at the national level though a guaranteed representation in a second chamber, or through other explicit provisions or intergovernmental agreements for policy coordination;
10. The region participates in EU decision-making when matters of (executive) regional competence are treated by the European Council of Ministers, through a variety of ways;
11. The region enjoys large taxing and spending autonomy.

Nevertheless, after indicating these features, the authors point unambiguously that: “Currently, no European region enjoys fully the entire set of these institutional development and autonomy features.” (Dandoy et al. 2018: 136). The problem is, that in the case of Poland none of them can be confirmed.

“The region existence is guaranteed by constitutional or other basic law.”

In Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997 no regulations concerning regions are included. The most probable reason to explain this situation is the fact that at the time of the constitution adoption the state was still divided into forty-nine small voivodeships. They were the heritage of the administrative division made in the 1970s, in reality of non-democratic political system. The process of political transition in Poland has begun at the beginning of 1980s. It has brought a redefinition of relationship in the horizontal division of powers (between the legislative, executive and judiciary branch) and restored a local self-government in the form of communes. The next stage of the reform, concerning the vertical division of power, was implemented in 1998. Its effect was the creation of 373 poviats (intermediate level between the commune and the region), as well as the division of Poland into 16 voivodeships. The reform of the administrative division, later than the adoption of the Constitution, resulted in the fact that regions have not been included in its regulations. It means that they have no constitutional guarantee of existence. They can be liquidated by the ordinary law, adopted by the central parliament.

“The region has its own constitution that specifies its competencies in which the state level cannot interfere.”

The situation in Poland can be described as the total opposition to this idea. The existence of all regional self-government entities is based on one law, adopted by the central, state parliament. Moreover, voivodeships do not participate formally in that process. None of their organs is able to present projects of law, improving functioning of self-government at this level. The idea is that the same regulation should serve all 16 voivodeships. It means in practice, that the regulation does not consider significant historical, economic, demographic or even geographic regional differences between the biggest administrative units in Poland.

“Revision of the state constitution (regarding the division of competences between state and region) can only be made by co-decision between state and regions (under consensus or special majority rule).”

The Polish Constitution of April 2, 1997 change proceeding regulates article 235 of this act. According to it, a bill to amend the Constitution may be submitted by the following: at least one-fifth of the statutory number of Deputies, representing Sejm (the first chamber of Parliament); the Senate (the second chamber of parliament); or the President of the Republic.

Firstly, the project is proceeded in Sejm, where it requires 2/3 of votes to be adopted. Then is passed to Senat, where the absolute majority of votes is required. Moreover, if a bill to amend the Constitution relates to the provisions of Chapters I, II or XII, the subjects entitled to submit such a bill may require, within 45 days of the adoption of the bill by the Senate, the holding of a confirmatory referendum. Such subjects shall make application in the matter to the Marshal of the Sejm, who shall order the holding of a referendum within 60 days of the day of receipt of the application. The amendment to the Constitution shall be deemed accepted, if the majority of those voting express support for such an amendment. Anyhow, the referendum is not compulsory. In practice it means that about the revision of the state constitution mainly decide statewide parties. Because of the shape of the electoral system they are the only entities which can obtain the majority of the seats at both chambers of Polish parliament. For this reason, they are also only subjects which have a potential possibility to change the Constitution. Administrative regions do not have any legal competences in this process.

“Proper policy competencies are guaranteed by constitutional or other basic law.”

Like it was mentioned above, no regulations concerning Polish regions can be found in the text of Polish Constitution. For this reason, it does not contain information about its competences. This element is the subject of law regulation, adopted by the central parliament. It means, that regions depend in this sphere Polish totally on the political will of the representatives of statewide parties, without any constitutional guarantee.

“The region has a directly elected regional assembly and is granted classical parliamentary functions (legislation, executive oversight, government making).”

The idea of the regional representation, elected in free and direct election, has got the form of the Regional Assembly (*sejmik wojewódzki*). It is elected for the 5 years term. Its composition depends on the number of inhabitants of voivodeship. Each Regional Assembly is composed of thirty councillors in voivodships with up to 2,000,000 inhabitants and three additional councillors for each subsequent 500,000 inhabitants commenced. The division of seats between presented lists of candidates is made in proportion to the total number of validly cast votes. The d'Hondt method is used for the division. In the distribution of seats can participate those lists on which at least 5% of valid votes were cast in voivodeship.

The regional assembly elects the executive body, that is called the Council of Voivodeship (*zarząd województwa*). It is composed by its head, called the Marshall of

Voivodeship (*marszałek województwa*), vice-marshalls and members. The Council is politically responsible before the Regional Assembly.

It seems – at the very first sight – that the construction fits to the idea presented in the theoretical proposal that we refer to in this paper. However, the Regional Assembly is not equipped by the basic competence for the model: it does not have any legislative competence. It can only adopt the regional laws that in the hierarchy of Polish legal acts are inferior to laws adopted by the central parliament and therefore must be in accordance with the central laws.

“The region is autonomous in the design of regional or sub-regional (local) institutions.”

In Polish model of decentralization all levels of administrative division depend on the central parliament and government. The structure of three levels of Polish self-government is fully controlled by central authorities of the state.

The first level – communes – was created in 1990, just after the first partly democratic elections after the communism collapse. The law about the self-government (called this way at the moment) was adopted by the state parliament on March 8, 1990. In this act all aspects of institutional organization and competences of communes were regulated. On the legal basis of this document Poland was divided into 2479 administrative entities of this type. It means that the law equips all Polish communes with the same competences and structure. It also means, that only the state parliament has possibility to revise the law. At the same time communes do not have any competence to present the project of revision of the law that regulates their existence. What is worth to mention is the fact, that although Polish communes were created in a quite artificial way – not like local groups of citizens, living in the area, but like entities with possibility to offer public services – they have the legal possibility to ask the central government to revise their boundaries. If the local community wants to change it, it can ask the Prime Minister to organize the local referendum. If it succeeds, the central government can change administrative boundaries of the commune.

Those same rules concern the second level of the Polish self-government, called poviats. It was created at the same time that the regional self-government of voivodeships in 1998. Almost ten years after the democratic transition the central government of Jerzy Buzek has decided to complete the administrative reform of the state. At June 5, 1998 two laws were adopted by the Polish parliament: about the poviat and voivodeships self-government.

The law about poviats has regulated their institutional structure and competences. Like in the case of communes, one centrally adopted law regulates the functioning of 380 poviats. They do not have any possibility to participate formally at the process of revision of concerning them legal base. However, also like communes, they can present the demand to the state government to change their boundaries.

The most serious controversies concern the regional level of voivodeships. First of all, the administrative division of the state into 16 entities was the result of the central consensus of statewide parties, without the place for opinion of regional communities of citizens (Dudek 2013: 458-459). The latter were not asked with whom they would want to create the administrative region. On June 5, 1998 the law – one for all voivodeships – was adopted by the state parliament. It has the inferior position that the regulations of Constitution. It equips all administrative regions at the same competences and obligate to create the same institutions. What is also worth to mark, the communes and poviats have a legal possibility to postulate the revision of their boundaries by the state government. Voivodeships have not been equipped with this kind of competence.

The conclusion is that Polish regions have neither the legal possibility to decide about their territorial shape, nor autonomy to design of regional or sub-regional (local) institutions.

“The region has the right to appeal to a constitutional or other higher (federal) court to solve conflicts on the state level.”

According to the article 22, point 9, §2 of the act of 14 June 1960 Code of Administrative Procedure Poland: “Jurisdictional disputes between local government bodies and national government bodies shall be settled by an administrative court”. It means that regions, (as well as communes and poviats) are regarded in Polish law as a part of the public administration system and not as constitutionally recognized subjects.

According to the article 188 of Polish Constitution of 1997, the constitutive organs of units of local and regional government may make application to the Constitutional Tribunal regarding the following matters:

1. the conformity of statutes and international agreements to the Constitution;
2. the conformity of a statute to ratified international agreements whose ratification required prior consent granted by statute;
3. the conformity of legal provisions issued by central State organs to the Constitution, ratified international agreements and statutes;

4. the conformity to the Constitution of the purposes or activities of political parties;
5. complaints concerning constitutional infringements, as specified in Article 79, para. 1.

“The region has a constitutional court or other specialized courts to autonomously solve conflicts between actors within the regional political system (like in the US states).”

Polish system of the judicial branch is highly centralized. This situation is the effect of the construction of the hierarchy of legal acts, regulated by article 87 of Polish Constitution. According to it, Constitution can be found at the top of the hierarchy and laws just below. If the only institution that can adopt laws is the central, state parliament it means, that the Constitutional Court at the level of the state is enough to resolve constitutional conflicts. Regional Assemblies, operating at the level of voivodeships, do not have competence to adopt laws. Adopted by them legal acts are inferior to the state laws and must be in accordance with them. In case of any doubts whether the regional regulation is according with the state law or constitution, the governor (that is the representative of the central government at the regional level) can send it to be investigated before the administrative court of voivodeship.

No regional constitutional court exists in Poland.

“The region participates in the decision-making at the national level through a guaranteed representation in a second chamber, or through other explicit provisions or intergovernmental agreements for policy coordination.”

Polish second chamber of parliament is not a chamber of territorial representation. However, the electoral system differs from the one used in the case of the first chamber. To elect Sejm (the first chamber) the proportional system with the d'Hondt method is used. And to elect Senat (the second chamber) the majority system is used. It makes possible to elect independent candidates, as well as those who represent political parties. But analyzing general rules of electoral systems in both cases, it can be observed that their effects are very similar. Both chambers are representing voting citizens, so they have the same character. The idea to transform the second chamber into the real territorial representation is present at political programmes of the Silesian Autonomy Movement (since 2011) and Incubator of the Social Contract (*Inkubator Umowy Społecznej – IUS*) (since 2019). Anyhow for the moment they are only political proposals presented by two associations that are treated more like the theoretic idea than the main stream political discussion.

“The region participates in EU decision-making when matters of (executive) regional competence are treated by the European Council of Ministers, through a variety of ways.”

The only representation of Poland in the EU decision-making process is always formed by the central, constitutional organs of the state. No formal regional representation to participate in such processes is legally defined.

“The region enjoys large taxing and spending autonomy.”

Poland is a unitary state which means that all key political decisions are adopted at the political centre. It also concerns the taxing system. Polish administrative regions can do not shape their own tax politics.

Local and regional self-government units in Poland participate only in part of the PIT (*Personal Income Tax*) collected by the state, constituting approximately 17.6% of the total annual income of the state and part of the CIT (*Corporate Income Tax*), which revenues account for only about 9.7% of all state revenues. The act on the income of local and regional self-government units in the article 4 para. 2 and 3 stipulates that the share of communes in income of PIT, from taxpayers living in the area of the commune is 39.34%, while the share in CIT receipts from taxpayers having their seat in the commune is 6,71%. In the case of poviats, the share of these units in the aforementioned taxes, originating from their payers residing or operating in the poviat's territory is 10.25% of PIT and 1.40% of CIT (Article 5, para. 2 and 3, respectively). While the voivodship self-government participates in 1.60% of PIT tax obtained from taxpayers living on its territory and 14.75% of CIT obtained on the same territory. It should be clearly stated here that local and regional government units in Poland – at any level – do not participate in tax revenues, which bring the highest profits to the central budget. It concerns primarily VAT (Value-Added Tax), from which funds account for over 46.3% of all annual state revenues per year, and also for excise duty, which provides over 24.1% of annual revenues of the central budget (NIK 2017).

Conclusions

The main aim of this paper was to analyze the concept of the territorial heteronomy in reality of the political competition in elections to the voivodeship assemblies in Poland. The inspiration for such research were electoral results achieved by two regional parties (the Silesian Regional Party and the Silesians Together) at the elections to the Śląskie Voivodeship Assembly in 2018. The starting point for the research was the concept of the ideal-type of an institutionally

fully developed and autonomous regional political system, presented in 2018 by Régis Dandoy, Giulia Sandri and Lieven De Winter. The research question put before the research work began was: what are the characteristics of the phenomenon of the territorial heteronomy? The conducted analysis has shown that the realities of the Polish political system do not meet any of the conditions presented by the authors. Obtained results lead to the conclusion that the case of Poland can be considered as a model example of territorial heteronomy. In opposition to the idea of Régis Dandoy, Giulia Sandri and Lieven De Winter it can be described as the system characterised by the following features:

1. Region existence is not guaranteed by constitutional or other basic law;
2. Region has not its own constitution that specifies its competencies in which the state level cannot interfere;
3. Revision of the state constitution (regarding the division of competences between state and region) is not made by co-decision between state and regions (under consensus or special majority rule);
4. Proper policy competencies are not guaranteed by constitutional or other basic law;
5. Region does not have a directly elected regional assembly and is granted classical parliamentary functions (legislation, executive oversight, government making);
6. Region is not autonomous in the design of regional or sub-regional (local) institutions;
7. Region has not the right to appeal to a constitutional or other higher (federal) court to solve conflicts with the state level;
8. Region has not a constitutional court or other specialized courts to autonomously solve conflicts between actors within the regional political system (like in the US states);
9. Region does not participate in the decision-making at the national level although a guaranteed representation in a second chamber, and other explicit provisions or intergovernmental agreements for policy coordination;
10. Region does not participate in the EU decision-making where matters of (executive) regional competence are treated by the European Council of Ministers, through a variety of ways;
11. Region does not enjoy large taxing and spending autonomy.

The adopted research hypothesis was: the ideal-type of the territorial heteronomy is the exact opposite phenomenon to the ideal-type of an institutionally fully developed and autonomous regional political system. It is a system that in provisions of constitution neither

guarantees the existence of political authorities at the regional level nor defines their competences. For those reasons this model does not create conditions propitious to creation and operation of regional parties. A political system of this type creates more attractive conditions for political rivalry of statewide parties and can be a favourable factor attracting the voters to vote on them and not the regional parties. The results obtained by two Silesian parties (the Silesian Regional Party and the Silesians Together) in regional elections of 2018 have confirmed that in the reality of territorial heteronomy statewide parties are more attractive for many party leaders and voters.

Like it was mentioned above, the inspiration for such research were electoral results of the two regional parties in the elections to the Śląskie Voivodeship Assembly in 2018. However, elections in a modern European democratic state cannot be considered only at the level at which they are held. Usually the result of one election has a significant impact on another one (local, regional, state and European). It also characteristic for the Polish case. The territorial heteronomy system has a huge impact on electoral processes, the shape of the party system (including the position of regional parties) and political preferences of voters.

First of all, this rule can be observed in reference to regional elections in Poland. The lack of constitutional subjectivity and clearly defined competences of regional authorities means that in Polish reality they are considered only as an element of the state power. In the speech made in Otwock Wielki by the leader of the Law and Justice (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* – PiS) party during the electoral campaign on October 15, 2019, Jarosław Kaczyński said: “In Poland – I recall – local government authority is also a state power. There are such states and there are theories that say that the self-government is not a state, but a social organization. I, myself, was a student of a professor who was deeply convinced about it, but in Poland a different solution was adopted and the self-government is a state power.” (dk/PAP 2018). This assumption underlines the importance of statewide parties, also at the regional level. Such vision of the political representation combined with the lack of legal recognition of regions in the Constitution and the lack of tradition of territorial autonomy in most of the contemporary voivodships of Poland results in the lack of need to create regional parties. It is not a coincidence that they exist only in the Śląskie Voivodeship that has its historical tradition of autonomy. However, even this tradition is not stronger than current interests and political influences of statewide parties, operating in the system of territorial heteronomy. A good illustration of this phenomenon are electoral results of 2018. Law and Justice finally won elections to the Śląskie Voivodeship assembly, offering

previously to all state citizens – as the governing party – generous social privileges. The effect of having power in the political centre, combined with conservative values, important for many Silesians, ended up to be electorally more important than proposals presented by two regional parties.

Additionally, the adoption of the territorial heteronomy model has its consequences in the state electoral system. The principle that in the elections to Sejm (the first chamber of the Polish parliament) only parties that exceed 5% of the electoral threshold on whole state territory can participate in the distribution of seats, practically eliminates regional parties from the political rivalry. In this situation, the creation of regional parties does not make much sense for politicians aspiring to obtain a mandate in the central parliament. For a regional party obtaining 5% of validly of the votes in the whole state territory – even in densely populated Silesia – is the aim impossible to achieve. In the case of Silesia, it is worth to pay attention to the attempt to enter a political cooperation with German minority, which is not obligated – like all other national minorities, recognised legally by the Polish state – to cross a 5% electoral threshold (Muś 2017). However, so far, such attempts did not bring the politically expected results.

The 2018 political defeat of regional parties in regional elections in Silesia has also political consequences for elections to the European Parliament, held in Poland on May 26, 2019. Also in this case, Polish electoral law requires political parties to exceed 5% of the electoral threshold in order to participate in the distribution of seats. This is a very restrictive regulation that is impossible to be fulfilled by regional parties. In this situation their independent participation in elections to the European Parliament does not make much sense. However, an analysis of election results to the European Parliament in Poland in 2019 unveils an interesting phenomenon. The defeat of Silesian regionalists in 2018 regional elections was probably one of the reasons why voters in this part of the state territory have voted mainly on the leaders of the most influent statewide parties: the ruling Law and Justice and the opposition called the European Coalition. For all 1.611.781 votes validly casted in the Silesia constituency no. 11, Jadwiga Wiśniewska (the leader of Law and Justice list) got 409.373 votes and Jerzy Buzek (the leader of European Coalition list) – 422.445 votes. This means that the sense of "wasted" vote (casted to parties that did not obtain representation, including regionalists) in regional elections prompted many voters to vote for the leader of supported statewide party to be sure that this time the vote will be "well invested".

The main purpose of the article was to define the concept of territorial heteronomy. Considerations presented in the text also indicate the most important areas of the behaviour of politicians and voters in conditions of existence of such a model. Furthermore, the author believes that this theoretical approach may be a good basis for conducting further empirical research in this area.

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**Reclaiming the House of the Representatives
from Republicans: Case Study of Districts TX-32
and NJ-3**

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Abstract:

2018 midterm elections in the United States allowed more ethnically and racially diverse candidates to become members of the Congress. The use of social media tools helped them to reach out to their community and get out the vote, which is especially important in Democratic campaign tactics. The article, by focusing on Colin Allred's and Andy Kim's Congressional bids, focuses on how their issue-oriented campaigns helped to mobilize the liberal voters. Furthermore, by analysing the rapidly changing demographics, it tackles the crucial question: do they mean the doom of the Republican Party?

Keywords: political campaign, social media, midterms, endorsement

Theoretical assumptions

Predictions for the 2018 Senate midterm elections looked extremely unfavorable for the Democrats, mostly because of the fact that in the Class 1 (2012-2018) they were defending 26 seats, whereas Republicans were only defending nine of them. Moreover, ten of these seats were in the states that Donald Trump won during the presidential elections in 2016 (compared to only one seat GOP was defending in the state won by Clinton). According to pundits there was a 1 in 5 chance that they would flip both chambers. On the other hand, the election forecasts for the House of Representatives were quite sure that the Democrats would win back the lower chamber of the United States Congress. How was that possible?

Mainly because of the fact that in most of cases, midterm elections tend to reflect the approval ratings of the president in charge. Even though this mechanism is more visible when analysing the second-term midterms of the incumbent president (1938, 1950, 1958, 1966, 1974,

1986, 2006) elections in which the president's party faced large congressional and gubernatorial losses (Kilgore 2015: 3).

In some cases, the party that has its representative in the White House faces significant losses during president's first midterms, with the latest case of Barack Obama in 2010, when the Democrats lost 63 (!) seats in the lower chamber, six Senate seats and also six Governors, or 1994 midterm elections when they lost accordingly 52 and 8 congressional seats and ten Governors (Kilgore 2015: 3). Nonetheless, 1998 and 2002 midterms provided gains for the party in charge of the White House; it is especially important to mention 2002 congressional elections, as the Democrats were unable to run an effective negative campaign, linking George W. Bush to weakening economy. What is more, 9/11 and sniper incidents in Washington D.C, combined with a wide media coverage of the intervention in Afghanistan (and the announcement of similar confrontation in Iraq) dominated the campaign discourse. As Bush campaigned the battleground states during the last two weeks of the campaign, GOP managed to gain 2 seats in the Senate and 6 House seats, much to everyone's surprise (O'Connor & Sabato 2005: 8).

The article, through the analysis of campaigns in TX-32 and NJ-3, tackles the question why the Democrats managed to overturn so many seats in the Lower Chamber and if it was possible because of their more active use of new technologies? As the research presents cases of Colin Allred's and Andy Kim's campaign, it focuses on a new Democratic wave that allowed the representants of various ethnic groups engage in politics and become politicians. Are the millennials more progressive, as they started tackling problems such as white privilege and decided to give back to the society by voting on the candidates that come from the underrepresented societies? Or maybe this is caused by changing demographics, which allow more ethnic minorities to voice their support for candidates, who represent their background?

The methodological approach that was chosen for this particular article focuses on content analysis, especially digital media, as they are publically accessible. By establishing the theoretical frames describing how do the new media affect modern political campaigns, the article first describes the collected data from newspapers and internet websites, in order to later focus on the campaigns themselves by analysing various marketing tools that were chosen by candidates on their social media platforms. It is especially important while describing the image content posted on Instagram and Twitter, which through examination of data samples allows to distinguish various types of content that was created.

The main aim of the research is to examine how the candidates used the social media during the midterms to get out the vote within the Democratic base in order to flip the seats in the House of Representatives. Furthermore, by focusing on two campaign cases, it studies how the Democratic candidates conducted an issue-oriented campaign, by at the same time framing the Republican candidates as Trump-related to mobilize the moderate voters, who despite the POTUS. Finally, by focusing on the demographics, the study attempts to prove how (through changing demographics), ethnically diverse base of Democratic voters is changing the racial makeup of the Lower Chamber.

New media and the new waves of the voter behaviour

Over the years, new technologies have been heavily influencing how the modern political campaigns are led. Especially when focusing on the American politics. According to Fuchs et al. (2012: 3), modern internet has evolved from information-oriented model to user-oriented that focuses on community building. With every new election, candidates and their staffs are given new tools that allow them to increase the amount of people that may receive content from them. But before using Web 2.0 tools, what do the researchers say about the perfect candidates? Weber's concept of a „charismatic leader” relies on the idea that their „virtue” allows them to distinct themselves from ordinary men and women and influence their decisions (Tucker 1968: 731). Furthermore, he argues that not only charisma and public trust are important components that form a good politician, as he predicted that the strategy implemented during the campaign process may be soon the most important factor that determines the winner of the elections (Beetham 2013: 98). This is especially important in 21st century, when climbing up the social ladder is no longer needed to become a recognizable political actor. Nowadays the social skills combined with the use of new media allow the candidate to not only distinct themselves from the party establishment, but also appeal to the voter as an ordinary person that will represent their interests in Congress. Political campaigns can be described from three perspectives: behavioral, functional and rational (Wiszniowski 2000: 97). The behavioral concept relies on the analysis of the voting patterns and personal strategies, whereas the functional focuses on how do the political actors behave and measures the efficiency of political advertisements. Finally, the rational perspective is explained through the research on the decision-making process of the voter. Denton Jr. (2017: 5) further demonstrates the functional model; the campaign content that is created by the candidate and their staff is strictly focusing on getting more votes than the

opponent. In order to win the elections, the candidate needs to become more recognizable through various appearances during the campaign events. They need to remember though that they do not need to earn sympathy of all the people eligible for voting, as only more than 50% of them are enough for them to win. What is more, the candidates need to distinct themselves from their rivals; that is when the communication with the voter starts, as informed about the political program, voter realizes that their goals are different from the rival. Politician has to choose at the very beginning, how would they spread the message to the voter and what tactics would they be using. It all depends on what kind of voting group is the staff targeting, as some of the voters may respect more aggressive approach, while the others may expect more issue-oriented campaign.

Nowadays, the campaign faces the era of internetization, which continues the trends that were set up during the early stages of postmodernization back in the 1990s (Farrell 1996, Wiszniowski 2000: 105). As the telecommunication evolved, it allowed the candidate to get closer to the voter. Average American customer started to get access to the cable TV and internet services, hence started to obtain news from these media. Because of that fact, political marketing specialists were able to target specific voting groups, thanks to the development of information banks and mail subscription. Paid experts could provide the groundworks on different groups of citizens that shared similar cultural or social background and let divide them into electorate segments (Wiszniowski 2000: 110).

The internetization stage, further explained in my forthcoming doctoral dissertation, is defined as a „retreat of the political campaign from the traditional media to Web 2.0”. Web 2.0 term, popularized by O'Reilly Media Group back in 2004, is the internet that allows the user to interact with the content. Back in the 1990s, the internet was only used to obtain information; now, the so-called „digital natives” can rate, share, exchange the material, which creates a form of cyber-socializing (Tomaszewski 2018b: 98). Such observation seems plausible when observing how the social media have evolved throughout the beginning of 21st century. As modern campaigning becomes more and more expensive, Web 2.0 tools allow to reach more viewers, while spending less money and time on sharing the campaign message. Political advisors are no longer the only PR experts, social media influencers can also help the candidate to present their image as „cool”, especially when talking about targeting young voters, who usually are not that interested in politics. Fans can take active part in the campaign by fundraising, recommending the content to their friends, but also by organising in small groups in order to run campaign rallies in their area.

The Americanization of the political campaigns is not only linked to the professionalization of campaign advertising, but also means that the campaign is perceived as a popularity contest, just like the reality shows. Voters are likely to sympathize with the candidate that is mostly liked. In order to appeal to the potential voter, politician needs to show their more personal side, often by sharing more personal and less campaign-related content on social media. It is definitely easier for celebrity turned politicians, who know how to combine these types of messaging. Additionally, campaigns may use celebrity endorsement in order to mobilize the voters, especially the young ones. The data on this subject is more likely to be obtained when analysing the presidential campaigns, such as the relationship between Barack Obama and Jay-Z during the 2008 campaign or Bernie Sanders and Killer Mike during 2016 presidential primaries (Tomaszewski 2017). The value of the endorser depends on how many specific voting groups they are representing; their role is to transfer the support they are receiving from fans towards the candidate they are supporting (Tomaszewski 2018a: 159). According to Marland and Lalancette (2014) there are two groups of celebrity endorsers: celebrity political endorsement publicists and fundraisers. The first type of celebrity is using their status to gather media attention for the campaign and the endorsement. The second group not only focuses on this issue, but also helps to organize fundraisers, often VIP events during which the money for the campaign is collected (Tomaszewski 2018a: 162).

Having established the theoretical approach, it is crucial to determine: do these mechanisms really work during the midterm elections? Can the results really be influenced by effective use of campaigning tools, or it all depends on the voting patterns and demographics?

Midterm elections have never really been perceived as entertaining. According to some studies, as the modern technology emerged, public polling has created a new model in which campaigning means governing (Blumenthal 1980). Ornstein and Mann (2000) agree with this model, by stating that modern governing does not differ much from campaigning, especially when talking about the presidential governing (Doherty 2007: 750). This means that political actors permanently seek for an approval from the voter: politicians need to focus on the results of opinion polls to keep the majority of the voters happy. It is also worth noting that midterms are not as popular as presidential elections and the lower turnout is, the better result Republicans have. Let's take into consideration the last two midterm elections: from 122.6 million voting in 2008, the number of voters dropped in 2010 to 87 million, accordingly in 2012 122.3 million voted and 81.7 million in 2014 (Kalb 2015).

The Democratic wave that allowed the Congress to be more racially and ethnically diverse, has been on a roll for some time. The 115th Congress that was chosen during the 2016 elections, consisted of 339 White members of House of Representatives, 46 Black members, 33 Hispanic, 10 Asian and three belonging to other ethnic groups. According to Pew Research Center analysis, it started to resemble the diverse population of the United States. As 19% members of the Congress consisted of nonwhites, at that time 38% nonwhite Hispanics and other minorities represented 38% of the population (Bialik & Krogstad 2017). What was important, was the fact that when comparing to the 114th Congress, 115th Congress had a higher number of new members representing ethnically and racially diverse background. For example, 11 of 71 new members of the 114th Congress were an ethnic or racial minority, whereas 20 out of 59 new members of 115th Congress were non-white Hispanics or represented other minorities (Bialik & Krogstad 2017). It is also worth mentioning that the biggest growth has been noted among Hispanics and Asians.

Why is that so important? Mostly because of the fact that this situation has been rapidly evolving due to changing demographics and more racially cautious voting by White Millennials. 116th House of Representatives has even less members that are Non-Hispanic Whites. Currently, the House has five more African American members, one more Hispanic/Latin American member, two more Asian/Pacific Islanders and two more Native American members (Panetta & Lee 2019). Although it is not a part of case study, women were „riding the blue wave”, as more than ever won their elections, also representing different ethnic backgrounds as Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar became first Muslim women in Congress (McBain 2018).

As the House of Representatives has been reclaimed by the Democratic Party, I decided to have a brief analysis of two cases, where the Democratic candidates flipped the seats. Colin Allred and Andy Kim are perfect examples of a new wave within the party, as the 116th Congress has more people of color than ever and this is trending upwards as the party supporters, especially millennials and progressives demand to increase the diversity and to allow the marginalised communities to speak up.

TX-32: from NFL to politics

Even though Colin Allred's campaign was not really covered nationwide, its analysis shows some promising patterns that can be helpful for the future campaigning staffs. First of all, it is worth noting that Allred had a very strong party backing. After ending his short NFL career,

Dallas native pursued his lifelong dream to go to law school. As he graduated, Allred became an assistant in the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Office in Obama's administration. This short biography is crucial to explain his career's development, as he worked there under Julian Castro. Although this may seem as a privileged position to run in the House of Representatives primaries, his two rivals also had a history of working for Obama. Moreover, his runoff rival Lillian Salerno is also from Dallas and is also an attorney. Although he struggled to raise money for the campaign and did not air any TV ads (mostly because media market in Dallas is expensive), he managed to win (Debenedetti & Schneider 2018). Potentially most important power that Allred's image had, was his easiness to appeal to the millennial voters, similar to the one that Beto O'Rourke has. As Salerno attacked him for being inexperienced, he won with her and got the party nomination. It is interesting how from this perspective one can recognize him as a political underdog during the primaries, a person that won the elections against all odds. The data was also predicting that his eventual success would heavily rely on young voter. Even though this was not an outstanding research result, TX-32nd district was placed 38th in 2018 Youth Electoral Significance Index, data-based tool created by The Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning and Engagement, ranking the congressional districts that have the biggest potential for the young voters to have impact on the outcome (Circle 2018).

Another factor that allowed the Democrats to think about flipping the seat, were the results of the 2016 presidential elections. Hillary Clinton won the district TX-32 by a two percent margin. This was one of the three Republican-controlled districts in Texas that were won by her with other being 7th District in Houston and San Antonio-to-El Paso 23rd District. Allred's rival, Pete Sessions ran unopposed during the last cycle (Livingston 2018). Many Texans are voting republican, especially in the rural areas, but the moderate Republicans, who live in the suburbs or in urban areas do not like the POTUS. That is why linking the candidate to the president might have been a good tactic. Sessions could be easily framed as a Trump supporter, as he voted for repealing Obamacare. Sessions, who voted for repealing Obamacare, were an easy target. The voters in TX-32 are mostly white and highly educated with the median income of over \$66,000 (Barba 2018). However, in this area 19.9% citizens are living below poverty level, which is 8.6% higher than the national average. Taking this into consideration, Allred's main campaign theme was focusing on the healthcare, but his campaign message was also mentioning his upbringing and how he fought obstacles to be where he is right now.

Allred's Facebook posts that were targeting policies supported by Sessions, focused on health insurance and immigration. On the 8th of June his Facebook page posted that Sessions voted to cut funding from the Children's Health Insurance Program (Allred 2018a). As he stated during rallies, in North Texas 330,000 people have preexisting conditions and Sessions wanted to take away the protection plans from them (NDG 2018). This issue-oriented approach to the campaign was supported with all the Web 2.0 tools that Allred had, as he also eagerly shared healthcare-related content on Twitter, with short statements linking to his website and political program. Even though some media labelled Allred as a progressive (mistake that seemed quite common in 2018 as O'Rourke was also perceived by some journalists as such), former NFL player should have been perceived as a centrist. It is worth noting though that this is a result of the Democratic Party slowly leaning left, as the issues his campaign staff was mostly focusing on, such as health policies, gun violence, equal rights, raising the minimum wage and social security (even paid family leave) few years ago would have been met with surprise even within the party. It is interesting how the campaign used the endorsements to reach out to the voters: as TX-32 was never really making any media buzz, the campaign trail lacked any momentum with famous people attending the rallies (as opposed to the Senate campaign). The data shows that most of the endorsements were political, as Allred was supported by the politicians and Democratic organisations. Apart from Obama, whose support for the Democratic candidate was one of the first during last year's midterms (Caldera 2018) and aforementioned Castro (along with his twin-brother), Allred was also endorsed by Kamala Harris. From his Facebook campaign profile, one may have learned that the campaign received the endorsements from Planned Parenthood, Human Rights Campaign and League of Conservation Voters Action Fund. There is one celebrity endorsement that is interesting, as Kelly Rowland (ex-member of Destiny's Child) took part in the Get Out The Vote Phone Bank event on the 5th of November (Allred 2018a).

Allred ran a grassroots campaign. His campaign page posted on the 5th of August, that its campaign staff along with the volunteers has knocked on 75,000 doors at that time (Allred 2018a) During the Congressional campaign, Allred managed to outraise Sessions by a very small margin – even though it is indeed a huge success (over \$800,000 more according to the opensecrets.org report) it is the style that matters. Democratic candidate followed the pattern of other underdogs and the huge part of this money were small donations from individual contributors. He was, however, supporter by End Citizens United, a grassroots PAC that ran TV ads in Dallas worth \$284,000 that attacked Sessions for taking \$2.5 million from corporate PACs. Furthermore, the

organisation spent \$148,000 on digital spots aimed at women and independents and \$100,000 for direct mail. Candidate's Twitter was mostly used to run ads, as he is not really a political celebrity (although he is described by the media as an "ex-NFL player turned politician"; at the end of April 2019 he has over 21,000 followers on this platform. Pinned at the top of the profile, is the most recognizable campaign ad in which Allred explains how being raised by a single mother that worked two jobs to make ends meet, he was able to become a sportsman and a civil lawyer. By pointing that right now, he wants to share his experience and help others in need, Allred shows that he is not some kind of D.C. supported politician, but an activist that wants to change his surroundings. The clip has over 53,000 views on Twitter and perfectly connects the dots that create his public image. On his profile, Allred shared his campaign-related materials such as pictures from rallies and his political program. In some posts, Allred is positioning Sessions as a hardcore Trump supporter, at the same time targeting the independents; for instance his tweet from the 15th of September is a screenshot of Trump's endorsement for Sessions, posted with a statement that Sessions votes with Trump 98% of the time and addresses the voters, who do not want to be associated with any party that „he cannot be an independent voice for North Texas”. It seems like a really good led campaign in social media, but it lacked an X factor that would attract more followers – Allred looks like a wonderful person that smiles with his teeth out on each of the campaign pictures, but we did not really get to see what is he doing in the free time. On the other hand, this may also show some potential voters how far he is committed to his cases. What draws the attention are the family and pet photos that attracted the biggest amount of hearts on his Twitter profile page. Based on the analysis of his Twitter content in March 2018, on average, pictures with his newborn child or wife got around 271 more hearts than the standard posts (Allred 2018c). For example, in March 2018 Allred made 22 tweets, getting 264,5 hearts on average. His family pictures from March 2018 got accordingly 859, 504, 338 and 441 hearts. The next good move that draws the attention is that Allred is clearly a dog person and his staff used this to mobilize the voters in more casual way. A tweet from the 27th of July 2018, shows a golden retriever chilling by the „Colin Allred for Congress” sign, with the message inviting to pick up in Richardson, city located in Dallas and Collin counties, suggesting the \$15 donation for this piece of campaign merchandise (Allred 2018c) Another tweet was posted on the National Dog Day, with the picture of Allred's beloved dog Scarlet, telling in a first-person narrative that Colin was there for her when she had cancer and provided her the best healthcare possible, so he would do the same for North Texans (Allred 2018c). It is needed to stress that Sessions has more

Twitter followers than Allred (34.4K) and both Allred's and Sessions's Facebook campaign profiles have around 11,000 followers, but Sessions was building his internet community for years, whereas Allred was rather unknown and it was the campaign that made him famous on the state level.

And what about the Instagram? Beloved millennial social media tool that made Ocasio-Cortez and O'Rourke viral for their livestreams? On the colinallred profile that is followed by over 4,800 Instagram users, similar content can be observed that has been posted on other social media outlets. Content mostly consists of campaign material such as graphics that describe issues that are important for the candidate and pictures from the campaign rallies. There is one attempt at showing Allred's personal side, as on the 14th of April 2018 a picture of him bowling has been posted with a text „Trying out other sports. Results TBD.” (Allred 2018b).

NJ-3: Kim Possible

Second case that I would like to focus on, is Andy Kim's Congressional campaign in district NJ-3. Why? Simply because of the similarities he shares with Allred. Not only he unseated the Republican incumbent, but he also presented on an issue-oriented campaign focused on public healthcare. What is more, Kim, as an Asian-American, just like Allred, represents the „new wave” of Democratic representatives in Congress, who belong to ethnic groups that were previously underrepresented. Finally, he also worked for Obama.

As Kim announced his candidacy in June 2017, he made it very clear that he decided to run against Rep. Tom McArthur, mainly because the Republican representative was one of the architects of American Health Care Act. NJ-3 was predicted as a toss-up; the district voted for Obama twice, only to switch to Trump in 2016. There were 12,000 more Democrats living in this constituency than Republicans.

From the very beginning, Kim wanted to position himself as a bipartisan expert who was both Obama's and George W. Bush's advisor. MacArthur's main strength was the money – his net worth is around \$53 million and he consistently loaned himself money for the reelection bid (Wildstein 2018). Just like in Allred's case, Kim's ability to attract small donors allowed him to conquer MacArthur – by the end of 2017, he managed to raise around \$600,000 with \$345,000 coming in the end of 2017. At that time, this grassroots support was not enough as MacArthur's campaign raised over \$1.2 million. Not only Republican incumbent was helped by the Super PAC's, but also Trump hosted a fundraiser for him in July 2017, which brought \$800,000 (Cronin

2017). Kim pledged to not use support from Super PACs, although he received some funds from other Democratic campaign committees. Still, most of the money was transferred by individual donors, so MacArthur's tactics were to distract voters from the corporate PAC money that he received. Kim's campaign started to attract more and more supporters as during the first quarter of 2018 he managed to raise over \$530,000 (Levinsky 2018). It was the summer, when Kim began to outrun MacArthur, as by the end of August 2018 he already had more than \$2.5 million with average donation of \$34 (Rosenberg 2018b). Once again similar mechanism can be observed – the bigger amount of money the candidate raises from individual small donors, the more media attention he gets as he becomes an underdog to the campaign. It is more likely for the Democrats to play that role and after Obama's, Sanders's and Beto's quite successful bids, the campaign staffs found the way to attract the undecided voters – by appealing to them as anti-establishment personas. At that time, Kim also started trending in public polls: Monmouth University poll was showing the Asian-American candidate winning by one percent with MacArthur (with a 5.7 margin of error).

NJ-3 is overwhelmingly urban with only 3.83% of its territory rural. Once again, the most important part of the campaign was mobilization of the undecided voters. The eastern part of the district in Ocean County preferred MacArthur, whereas the western part of Burlington County preferred Kim. Once again, the best tactic that was available was to show MacArthur's loyalty to Trump, as according to FiveThirtyEight, he supported Trump's stances more than any other member of the House of Representatives from New Jersey (Jackson 2018).

Kim on the other hand, focused on attracting the moderate base, while at the same time flirting with the party progressives: not only he was endorsed by the Congressional Progressive Caucus PAC, but he also pledged to support new leadership in the party, instead of backing Nancy Pelosi (Biryukov 2018). It was August, when Kim received the endorsement from Obama, who posted on Twitter his first group of endorsed candidates. As the campaign, similarly to Allred's, did not attract much media hype that would bring the „cool” factor, there is only one celebrity that publically supported Kim and attended door-to-door events for him. Piper Perabo, Toms River native (Ocean County) took part in the „Get on the Bus Vote Blue” campaign. She also tweeted that she's supporting Kim to flip the House.

In September, Kim started to strengthen his lead in the polls: apart from winning the DCCC poll administered between September 4-5 (Kim won by a two-point margin), he performed very well in NYT Upshot/Siena College poll conducted between 22nd and 26th of

September, in which his lead increased to ten points (SCRI 2018). It is interesting as exactly during that month, the negative campaign funded by the Republican PAC's reached its momentum as three spots have been released by NRCC (National Republican Congressional Committee) that have been heavily criticised in the media. „Meet Andy Kim”, „Andy Kim: That Guy” and „D.C. Andy” were supposed to focus on the illegal tax break Kim got from his condo in D.C and the taxes he avoided in New Jersey. The main slogan from the spots was „Andy Kim – NOT one of us”, which, when taking into consideration Kim's ethnicity, was so unthoughtful it is amazing. That is not all, as the Republicans have also prepared fliers titled „Something is real fishy about Andy Kim” with „real fishy” and „Andy Kim” written in a „Chop Suey” red-black font that is often associated with Asian food and films. The leaflets, accompanied with the picture of raw fish, may have fired back at MacArthur's results in the September polls (Duhart 2018). Entering September, Kim had around 1,200 volunteers working within the district and still recruiting in Philadelphia and nearer towns, where the Democrats were safe. The rallies were quite informal, as Kim's campaign staff offered free beer and the candidate wanted to show how he is an activist-turned-politician. This form of anti-distinction is helpful as it allows the supporter to see more personal side of their candidate (Rosenberg 2018a).

During July, August and September, Kim raised \$2.3 million which was a historical result, as no other candidate ever managed to raise that much funds in NJ-3 district (Insider NJ 2018). According to Kim, 92% of the donations were provided by the small-donor donations. This has secured him a 17th place on a list of Democrats that raised the biggest amount of cash from small donors (Burns et al. 2018). Experts predicted that in order for Kim to win, the white, college-educated suburban moderates would have to show up in sufficient numbers and outnumber less-educated rural white men (Romano 2018). At the end of the campaign, Kim once again stressed how important the healthcare is for him and his supporters: the Concerned Seniors organisation helped prepare 65,000 voter postcard initiative to mobilize senior voters to vote against MacArthur, who helped raise the prices of prescription drugs and voted for cuts to Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid (Insider NJ 2018). Joe Biden showed up to canvass for Kim in Golden Dawn Diner in Edgewater Park (Hefler 2018). This shows how important the contest was as he was touring across the most competitive districts. Kim also held a Women's rally, during which he stressed support for health benefits, maternity care and protection for people with pre-existing conditions (Insider NJ 2018). During the campaign trail, Kim often stressed how his personal experience crafted his political views; his father was a Polio survivor

and orphan, who earned a Ph.D. and his mother was a nurse, by observing them he learned that everyone deserves a chance and should be provided with public healthcare.

Kim released a few campaign spots that tackled different subjects, for example the „Situation Room” spot highlighted Kim's willingness for bipartisanship, whereas „Service” explains various ways one can put people first instead of special interest and reminds his work for Obama and George W. Bush, once again to stress that he represented presidents of two different parties. „August” spot shows Kim's son, who was underweight before being born. By showing his personal experience, Kim argues that no family should be put at risk by not being allowed public healthcare and he promises to work with both Democratic and Republican Party to provide such for all citizens. There were, however, a few spots that focused on negative campaigning. The „Booth” spot attacks MacArthur for taking \$400,000 from drug and insurance companies. Finally, the most popular spot (apart from the one announcing his candidacy), „Worst of Washington” shows an unfavorable picture of MacArthur with information that he wrote a dangerous healthcare bill that denied protection for people with pre-existing conditions (Kim 2018b).

But what about other digital media? At the end of April 2019, Andy Kim had over 11,000 likes on Facebook. On this platform, Kim posted short clips that combined campaign related material such as spots or videos from rallies with more personal stuff. Such posts tended to receive from 150 to 350 reactions; apart from the posts announcing his candidacy and his win, the most reacted one is a video of his son taking first steps – the video received 838 reacts and it was posted on the 25th of August 2018. The second most reacted video is Kim with his two sons asking for help with door-to-door canvassing in various locations less than 48 hours until the election day and was posted on the 4th of November (Kim 2018a).

On Twitter, Kim has 17,900 followers (30.04.2019). Both on Facebook and Twitter, the content was dominated by the „reason” series, which was prepared by Kim's staff. On 14th of July a first infographic was posted with 115th reason to vote for Andy Kim. From this day, one graphic daily was posted with another different reason to vote for the Democratic candidate with the last one posted the day before general election. Other materials posted on Twitter were reposts from the volunteers and some campaign rally content. Family content was posted on these platforms rarely, that is because Kim's Instagram account focused on this way of appealing to the voter (Kim 2018d).

Andykimnj Instagram account posted for the first time on the 5th of January with a photo album consisting of eight pictures. Album consists of various content, which shows different ways how the campaign should be conducted on social media. Four of the pictures show Kim's sons, three of them are campaign related and the last one is MacArthur's picture with Trump with bottom text that he voted three times to give himself and his donors a tax cut. During the campaign trail, 40 posts were uploaded to this Instagram account and what is interesting is the fact that although all of them were somehow campaign related, Kim's staff focused on presenting more personal side of Andy Kim with most of the pictures presenting his kids. Most of the pictures and videos did not get more than 100 likes and his account started to gather attention at the very end of the campaign, for instance the post from 3rd of November showing Kim doing door-to-door with his kids received over 400 likes. From that moment, his posts have regularly been receiving more than 300 likes (Kim 2018c).

Colin Allred's and Andy Kim's campaign trail and its outcome were quite similar. The race ratings that were released in October 2018 were showing that both of the districts were a Toss-up (only Inside Elections with Nathan Gonzales predicted that NJ-3 is Tilt Democratic). Both of the candidates eventually flipped the seats and helped the Democratic Party to reclaim the majority in the House of Representatives.

What can we learn from these cases? How to conduct a modern mobilization campaign?

Allred won by slightly less than 18,000 votes and a key to winning this district were the suburban votes from the Dallas County, in which Allred got around 20,500 votes more than Pete Sessions. According to Catalist Analytics (2019), there were four factors that allowed the Democratic candidate to win. First of all, the composition of 2018 electorate leaned more Democratic than in 2016, when talking about age and racial diversity. For instance, voters of color increased their vote share by two percentage points. What is more, Allred performed better than Clinton within the middle partisan groups: white voters with college degrees and single white voters. The most interesting discovery is that Allred was able to bring the voters of colour that previously voted for Sessions back to the Democratic camp (Catalist Analytics 2019). Finally, the early voters, who were dominantly younger and more racially diverse than the overall 2018 electorate, allowed Allred to secure an early lead and mobilize the rest of the voters. I would like to add another factor that ensured that Allred will flip the seat – the down-ballot effect of Beto O'Rourke's senatorial bid helped to get out the vote in most urban areas, such as Dallas

County, where O'Rourke won by 240,000 votes (Issenberg 2019). TX-32 is the 12th-most-gerrymandered district in Texas, which was created to favor Republicans, who are living in the suburbs of Dallas. Without the support of Beto volunteers, this bid would be much more difficult (Petersen 2018).

Kim on the other hand won by a smaller margin, as he received only slightly less than 4,000 votes more than MacArthur. Predominantly urban district was (just as predicted) split into Democratic Burlington County and Republican Ocean County. According to Matt Friedman, a liberal non-profit group did a research that stated that the voters in this district would be most hurt by repealing Obamacare. That is why healthcare was a main focus of this campaign. Although it is not as clear as when analysing TX-32 results, Kim was also helped by young, racially diverse voters. But what if there was something else? The third-party candidate, Larry Berlinski managed to receive 3,902 votes and if he did not run, most of these votes would be casted on MacArthur. Why is that? Berlinski is in fact aligned a lot more closely with the Republicans than the Democrats. Can we be sure that his candidacy „Nadered” MacArthur out of his seat? Not necessarily, as the Democrats in the Burlington County have exceeded their historical turnout (Ford 2018).

The statistics of the 116th Congress can't be wrong – for the fifth time in a row, the Congress is most racially and ethnically diverse (Bialik 2019). This is especially visible within new members, who tend to swipe the non-Hispanic white candidates during the primaries. In Nevada, Latinx and Asian-American vote was the main power that allowed the state to have two female U.S. Senators and a female-majority state Supreme Court (Milligan 2018). Hispanic population of New Mexico influenced the election results and as a result, Michelle Lujan Grisham became first Democratic Latina governor.

Unarguably, Allred's and Kim's campaign analysis shows that modern Democratic voters want their Congress to be more ethnically diverse. That is (apart from other significant factors), why they may have won the primaries. The demographics show that their Get Out The Vote campaigns attracted young voters, which is crucial to determine the elections outcome, as usually the older the voter is, the more likely they are to cast a ballot. Both candidates had an issue-related campaign, as they decided to mainly focus on healthcare. Of course, they supported many other important policies, in Allred's case the immigration issue, in Kim's case the transparency, but their main goal was to position themselves as supporters of public healthcare, while attacking their opponents for siding with Trump. Through framing the opponents as the ones working very

closely with POTUS, they decided to activate the Trump card, which plays well with moderates and independent voters, who easily get appalled whenever they see him in the news. Both of the candidates focused on the grassroots campaign, which has lately been effective when combined with the underdog approach, as this allows politician to position themselves as „one of many”, who decided to run against the establishment. The strategy that helped Obama or Sanders, also helps in Congressional elections, especially within the Democratic Party candidates. Social media played an important role in getting out the vote, as the campaign content could be distributed among the internet users from various platforms. Content had two sides – professional and personal. The rally material played the informational role, while much more reacted material that presented everyday life of the candidate with highlighted family content, allowed the staff to work on candidate's image, by showing him as he is. Candidates did not rely on celebrity endorsers, as they focused on getting the endorsements from high-ranked party officials and organizations. Last year's midterm election showed that the voters are more and more interested in politics and they want to cast the ballot more often, especially the young ones. Is there any better way to combine politics and entertainment than social media? Everyone, who followed the latest elections and their results, should know the right answer to that question.

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**Policy of Transcultural Diversity and Idea of City
Diplomacy: the Case of Wrocław**

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Abstract:

Cities create a transcultural sphere and a platform for transcultural dialogue. Cities play an important cultural-creative role and they try to become policy players on the international level. The aim of this study is to evaluate the actions taken in cities from two perspectives. On the one hand we are interested in how the multicultural (multi-lingual and multi-religious) cityscape is shaped, how the city is governed in order to create a space termed as a ‘meeting place’. On the other hand we want to know how these undertakings affect the image of the city on the international stage and how they contribute to the city diplomacy strategy.

The study presented in this text is based on documents, governments’ reports and academic literature. The research is also based on interviews carried out in Wrocław between 2017-2018 with researchers, workers of NGOs and representatives of City Council of Wrocław.

Keywords: city diplomacy, policy of diversity, transcultural cities, Wrocław

Introduction

Cities have always been a space where inhabitants must get used to living with diversity. People in cities are different, as regards, for example, the language, the religion, their aspirations or behaviors in public spaces. From this perspective multiculturalism is an inherent characteristic of every city, even the most ethnically and religiously homogenous one. Cities have created hybridizations platforms, where globalization and localization constitute and feed each other.

Cities and local governments, including self-government units, are therefore simultaneously at the periphery of the global scene and at its centre; the socio-economic and cultural hub for individuals' and communities' lives, but a marginal actor in politics and international relations. Lying on the faultline between top-down policy implementation and bottom-up policy contestations, status quo preservation and search for fresh visions, cities and local governments experiment a dichotomic tension both as democratic spaces (poleis) and as accountable bodies in the multi-level legal framework ([Introduction to the International Conference *Cities, territories...* 2018](#)).

We also have to remember that cities play an important cultural-creative role and it has been noticed that they have become an important policy player on the international level ([Melissen & van der Pluijm 2007](#)). At the same time, they work on creating images, and thus strong city brands. City branding aims to change the image of the city, but also of the region, using concepts and marketing tools to the advantage of their economy, culture and tourism.

Cities create a transcultural sphere and a platform for transcultural dialogue (even if we are not able to observe it on the national level). Many cities support the idea of the “inclusive city”, which means that all citizens have the right to take part in “governing” of their cities. The aim of this study is to evaluate the actions taken in cities from two perspectives. On the one hand we are interested in how the multicultural (multi-lingual and multi-religious) cityscape is shaped, how the city is governed in order to create a space termed as a ‘meeting place’. On the other hand we want to know how these undertakings affect the image of the city on the international stage and how they contribute to the city diplomacy strategy.

As we mentioned above cities in the modern world play an increasingly significant role as an actor on the stage of international relations. One may refer to Michael Keating ([1999: 6](#)), who claims that international relations are not solely in the domain of nations but an increasingly significant role is played not only by multi-national corporations and international and para-statal organisations, but also regions and cities. This view is also reflected in the work of Benjamin Barber ([2013](#)), who formulates a brave vision of the governments of mayors.

According to researchers, including Robert Putnam ([1988: 427](#)) there are strong links between local and international policy and these should supplement each other. There is also the growing significance of local structures along with their increasing promotional role. Local authorities participate in a variety of associations, which contribute to promotion but can also be

a significant factor in development (Skorupska & Wojnarowicz 2015: 1). Cities, on the one hand conduct diplomatic campaigns addressed to foreign recipients, but on the other these messages reach their own residents (internal dimension), playing a particular role, such as reinforcing identity.

As is noted by Teresa La Porte undertakings in the sphere of diplomacy may be viewed as public diplomacy. International actions undertaken by cities often coincide with communication strategies, involvement and interaction, which are part of what is now called new public diplomacy. The extent to which cities may exert influence is limited to transmitting values and principles, which are communicated by local initiatives and undertakings (La Porte 2013: 87). Therefore just as in the case of soft power articulated by Joseph Nye while thinking about the city as a political entity we must depart from the classical definition of power that assumes the imposition of will on other foreign policy players. Cities, through their activity accentuate their presence on a wider stage, build their brand and also try to solve problems and shape policy, such as that in the domain of transculturalism.

Dan Koon-hong-Chang (2016) supports such view, in an article on city diplomacy he notes that in recent years cities have become able to cooperate on questions of a global nature. The author is of the opinion that cities are a source of hope that citizens will become interested in global problems and that diplomacy conducted well may even solve these problems.

According to Jan Melissen and Roger van der Pluijm (2007: 11), “*city diplomacy could be defined as the institutions and processes by which cities engage in relations with actors on an international political stage with the aim of representing themselves and their interests to one another.*” They recognised six dimensions of city diplomacy: security, development, economy, culture, networks and representation. Our text is a part of deliberations concerning a cultural dimension and, indirectly, that of security.

Michele Acuto et al. (2016: 6) understand it as the mediated or negotiated relations of city representatives with other political communities (states, regions and other states) as well as non-governmental bodies (business, community groups, advocacy coalitions), ‘city diplomacy’ is a well-established practice of cities all over the world. The Committee on City Diplomacy, Peace-building and Human Rights of United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), established in 2005, defined the concept of city diplomacy as “*the tool of local governments and their associations in promoting social cohesion, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-*

conflict reconstruction with the aim to create a stable environment in which their citizens can live together in peace, democracy and prosperity” (Sizoo & Musch 2013: 8).

Cities can have multiple reasons for engaging in city diplomacy. We would like to mention the three most important reasons. First, cities can engage in city diplomacy in order to serve the interests of their city and its authorities. Serving the interest of the city and its community can be interpreted very broadly. For example, it can be said to be undertaken to protect the international legal order, but may truly be undertaken to prevent refugees from the conflict area in question from seeking asylum in the city that is undertaking the conflict-resolution activities. Second, citizens may force their municipal representatives to engage in specific diplomatic activities. City diplomacy in that sense is a manifestation of citizen activism. Finally, cities can engage in diplomatic acts out of solidarity with other cities (Melissen & van der Pluijm 2007: 15).

Diversity in the cities

As we know cities have always been culturally diverse. What has prompted this study is very significant changes in the ethnic and religious make-up of Polish cities. They have not been affected by the migration crises unlike most cities in Western Europe but their ethnic structure has changed to a significant extent. Clearly, in studying Polish cities it is necessary to draw attention to the wider social context- the attitude of Poles to foreigners, a relatively small number of multicultural contacts that Poles have and fewer intercultural skills. This is why we are interested primarily in how the city space for communities representing other cultures is managed. At this stage we are not studying the hosts. The aim is to assess the strategy adopted by the local authorities in cities in cooperation with academic institutions, the diasporas, ethnic group organisations and NGOs. This study is important for another reason, namely that the policy of the majority of large Polish cities in the domain of admitting refugees, openness to others and help extended to migrants is at odds with the policy of the Polish government. Mayors of Polish cities have often declared willingness to accept refugees, openness to migrants and readiness to take part in humanitarian corridors. A joint declaration was made on 30 June 2017. Then mayors of the 12 largest Polish cities (Białystok, Bydgoszcz, Gdańsk, Katowice, Kraków, Lublin, Łódź, Poznań, Szczecin, Rzeszów, Warszawa, Wrocław) signed a declaration on migration. They stated that they are prepared to create a model for accepting migrants. They also

stated that migration is a dynamic process that is common, unavoidable and one that may also accrue benefits: “*Large Polish cities have for years been open to migration and diversity of residents. Friendly service in civic offices (help with) finding accommodation, access to the job market, access to education and healthcare are the cornerstones in the integration of people of different origins*” (UMP 2017). The declaration stressed the need for cooperation between local authorities with central government agencies, NGOs, academic and cultural institutions, churches, business and the job market. A working team on migration was established that is supported by the expert knowledge of two specialist agencies International Organisation for Migration and UN Refugee Agency.

The question addressed by the mayors of the Polish cities is a key element in the policy of many cities throughout the world. The problems of cultural diversity, refugees and migration, cultural differences, but also those in the social and economic sphere, as well as human rights, are significant questions, which constitute an element of city and metropolitan areas administration. There are many studies and projects in this domain, but just two examples:

1. The first one - the Coalition of Cities against Racism, is an initiative launched by UNESCO in 2004 to establish a network of cities interested in sharing experiences in order to improve their policies to fight racism, discrimination and xenophobia. The Coalition is working on promoting human rights and respect for diversity in Europe; representing and promoting the common interests of member cities at the European Union, the Council of Europe and with the governments of European states; strengthening the cooperation with institutions and organizations which are also committed to fighting racism and discrimination, as well as with other European municipal networks. Since 2004 cities from over 23 European countries have joined the network (ECCR).
2. The second one – The Intercultural Cities Program supports cities in reviewing their policies through intercultural lens and developing comprehensive intercultural strategies to help them manage diversity positively and realise the diversity advantage. Over 130 cities from Europe, North Africa, Canada, USA, Australia and Mexico work together in some areas: cultural heritage and diversity, media and diversity, refugees, business and diversity. Some of them create international network and others work on the national group (*Intercultural Cities Program*). The network “Città del Dialogo” is the Italian

Network of cities that collaborate on promoting intercultural policies, defining good practices of local governance and capitalizing on the benefits of cultural diversity. Set-up in 2010, the Italian Network already comprises 28 member cities and is now working on an updated strategic plan for its future development (*Città del Dialogo*).

This subject is not just limited to Europe. Interesting studies are also being conducted in the USA and Canada, including comparative analyses, taking into account various urban policies (Good 2014).

The case of Wrocław- memory city?

Wrocław is located in Lower Silesia in the south-west of Poland. It is the fourth largest city in Poland. It has good communication links by train, air and road not only to Warsaw and other Polish cities but also to other European capitals such as Prague and Berlin. It has a highly educated workforce with a large number of universities and other institutions of higher education.

Wrocław was founded under German law, probably in the Spring of 1241 or 1242. In 1335 the town came into the possession of the Czech crown, wielded at that time by John of Luxembourg. Since the foundation of Wrocław, the town was inhabited principally by a large German population but the Polish element enjoyed a powerful and decisive influence for many years to come. After the dynastic agreements made in 1526 Wrocław was submitted to the Habsburg crown. After the Silesian Wars in 1740-1763 Silesia and its capital were taken over by the Prussians.

Wrocław entered the 19th century as a highly fortified and militarized Prussian town – surrounded by moats, walls, and embankments, strengthened by powerful bastions. After the Napoleonic Wars and a period of stagnation that followed them, a new boom in trade and industry breathed new life into the town again, attracting new residents from neighbouring villages and smaller towns. The industry of Wrocław was growing dynamically at that time.

The Great War and a severe crisis into which Germany slid as a result of the defeat slowed the process of modernization and development of Wrocław down considerably.

Just before the Second World War broke out Wrocław had 629 thousand inhabitants. As the war went on, the front-line inexorably approached Wrocław. In the face of the oncoming successful Soviet armies, the Nazis made a fatal and ruthless decision to turn the town of

Wrocław into a fortress – the Festung Breslau, and it was given an order to fight to the bitter end. The last months of the Second World War were certainly the most tragic in the whole history of Wrocław. This period brought the town to almost a complete ruin. 90 per cent of buildings were destroyed completely; only the historic Old Town suffered losses of 60 per cent of its structures.

The image of the city of Wrocław has two major components. On the one hand, there is historical heritage of mixed Polish, German, and Czech cultures. On the other, especially in recent years, a great influence on its image is exerted by the initiatives undertaken by local government. Among these initiatives a prominent place is occupied by the international presence of Wrocław (e.g., the city unsuccessfully run for EXPO exhibitions several times, or recently contested for European Capital of Culture) and active partnerships with cities from all over the world: Wiesbaden and Dresden (Germany), Lviv (Ukraine), Grodno (Belarus), Hradec Kralove (Czech Republic), Ramat Gan (Israel), Breda (the Netherlands), La Vienne (France), Guadalajara (Mexico) and Charlotte (the United States) (Latussek & Ratajczak 2014: 56-57).

Wrocław is, however, using fragments of its history to construct an image of a vibrant, open, and friendly place. It highlights that over the course of years, the city has been under Czech, Austrian, German and Polish administration. Thanks to this policy concept and multicultural myth: *“German, French or Dutch tourists come to ‘multicultural Wrocław’ and they do not mind that there is no Chinatown, no equivalent of Berlin’s Kreuzberg, or Paris’ bidonvilles. They look at the architecture, admire the old Market Square, visit the Raclawice Panorama, then walk around the Japanese Garden, the cemetery of Italian soldiers, they wonder at Soviet tanks in the military cemeteries, then they perhaps learn about the Ossolineum library and they nod: well, yes, it truly is a very multicultural city.”* (Bachmann 2005: 2).

The second pillar of modern multicultural identity of Wrocław is the make-up of its contemporary inhabitants. Before the Nazi regime and then Second World War Wrocław was a mix of several nations and religions (Catholics, Calvinists, Lutherans, Jewish) (Davies & Moorhouse 2002). After 1945 its population was completely changed. The city had no Jewish population but was still inhabited by Germans. It also became a destination for many Poles forced to leave their homes in the former Eastern parts of the country as well as those inhabitants of the central parts of Poland who were seeking improvements of their life and entrepreneurially set out to move to “new” parts of the country. Between 1945-1948 the population of the city changed almost completely. From being one of the biggest cities of pre-war Germany (with

almost 600,000 German and Jewish inhabitants) it became a city with a population of 250,000 that came from almost every corner of Poland. And this is precisely what forms the second pillar of today's much praised multicultural character of the city – the cultural richness and richness of heritage brought by post-war Polish immigrants of Wrocław.

Among the new Wrocław's inhabitants cultural differences became visible very quickly. They resulted mostly from the variety of regions new citizens came from and variety of experiences they brought with them. There were striking contrasts between immigrants from cities and rural areas, irrespective of where exactly they came from. Meeting of Poles, but from very different geographical locations and from different social classes resulted for many in a cultural shock and conflicts (Thum 2005). Quite a number of new immigrants came from former Eastern territories of Poland, where people were used to a cohabitation of many ethnic groups: Poles, Jews, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Latvians and Russians. Yet, these people were often regarded as backward or 'barbarian' by former inhabitants of central parts of Poland. What further exacerbated the cultural shock was the difference in war-time experiences between parts of Wrocław population. People from the Eastern borderland suffered from Soviet and German occupation at the same time, and then after the war they were in dramatic circumstances relocated to unknown Western territories, so-called 'regained territory' (Thum 2005). The feeling of uncertainty resulting from all these experiences had a profound impact on the emerging identity of Wrocław's inhabitants. On the one hand there was mistrust and uncertainty about German citizens still remaining in the city. On the other, there was mistrust among very diverse Polish population, as they shared not much more than formal citizenship and language. Language, however, instead of constituting a bridge among people often becoming a conflicting issue. Immigrants from the Eastern borderland often spoke with a regional accent and therefore it sometimes raised doubts about the 'authenticity' of their Polish identity. After these difficult years of coexistence it seems that in subsequent generations this experience became one of cultural advantages of Wrocław among other Polish cities.

All inhabitants of post-war Wrocław happen to live in an atmosphere pervaded by the feeling of cultural inconsistencies. On the one hand the authorities were heavily investing in policies that were aimed at establishing and reinforcing the "always-Polish" image of the city and were launching numerous initiatives of writing "the Polish history" of Wrocław. On the other hand, however, Wrocławians frequently encountered remnants of the multicultural heritage

of the city in their everyday life in, for example, architecture, or geographical plan of the city that bore witness to its very complex history. After the transformation, in early 1990s, the City Council of Wrocław started consistent or better concerted efforts towards promoting Wrocław as a multicultural metropolis, using its history, traditions, architecture, and, last but not least, its citizens. Even if there are no characteristic large ethnic communities in Wrocław, the roots of its citizens are very diverse. This cultural richness of Wrocław's population has now a decisive significance in promoting Wrocław as a multicultural, open and friendly place (Latusek & Ratajczak 2014: 58-59).

Meeting place with a future?

The attractiveness of Wrocław for immigrants has increased especially after accession of Poland to the European Union, and in the past two years it has increased additionally among the citizens of Eastern Europe and other countries outside of the EU. It is worth mentioning that migrants coming to Wrocław are not a competition for local employees. Before that, Wrocław was a rather homogenous city.

The concept of multiculturalism along with the ideas of openness and tolerance, is being consistently applied to the efforts of building the city's image also on the national level, including the reinforcement of local identity of Wrocław's modern citizens. The leading promotional punslogan: "Wrocław – the meeting place" became a leitmotif for various cultural initiatives taking place in Wrocław. This slogan fits to the idea of multicultural Wrocław as a platform of intercultural dialogue. For Wrocław's inhabitants and other Poles, the critical highlighting of the multicultural character of the city came in 1999, when Pope John Paul II visited Wrocław and announced it to be a special place located on the intersection of three countries bound together by common history, for better and for worse. He also underlined that Wrocław is the place where the spirits of the West and East of Europe meet and mix. This Pan-European appeal of the city was further reinforced through promotional activities after Poland's accession to the European Union (Latusek & Ratajczak 2014: 58-59).

Taking into account the key importance of inter-religious dialogue in the context of the city being perceived as multi-cultural we feel that the opening of the so-called 'Four Faiths Quarter' also referred to as a 'District of Mutual Respect' is important. The multi-cultural nature of Wrocław was symbolised by churches both from the architectural and spiritual point of view.

The presence of representatives of many faiths was the result of the city's complex past. A legacy of the German protestants is the Evangelical German-language community. There is also a Polish Evangelical community, Orthodox and Greek-Catholic communities as well as a Jewish one and Moslem, which are not too numerous. Since 1995 in Wrocław the project of the Four Faiths Quarter in the District of Mutual Respect is being implemented and the Catholic, Evangelical, Orthodox and Jewish communities participate in it. This is the only project of its kind in Poland in which the aim is to promote ecumenical dialogue. As Dariusz Jaworski (2010) from *Tygodnik Powszechny* wrote, "*the multiplicity of languages (for prayer, artistic, social and ideological aims) is reflected in the multitude of names for the Quarter, for some it is the Quarter of the Four Temples, for others Four Faiths, others still Mutual Respect and Tolerance. And no one minds. It would seem that even the multiplicity of names is a guarantee of the openness of the Wrocław idea*". The idea of the Mutual Respect Quarter is a very good one. Initially many people treated it as a tourist attraction. City authorities tried to market the idea of the 'product' that the Mutual Respect Quarter is in numerous ways including the efforts to organise cultural events. Over the years this centrally situated district started to symbolise cooperation transcending faiths. It has to be said though, that these four streets, four temples, four cultures and four faiths create a magical space, which rightly is also one of the more important tourist attractions of the capital of Lower Silesia. The spirit of this Quarter is created by the people who speak many languages, as Dorota Hartwich (2010) from *Tygodnik Powszechny* notes, "*speaking not only in the words of prayers and holy books but also on the stage in gestures and prompts, solo vocals and choral tones, the painters brush and sculptors tool*". There are cyclical concerts, meetings and youth workshops in the churches and synagogue. As Hartwich notes the ecumenical dialogue is not the only aim that the initiators of the Four Faiths Quarter had in mind when they set out. What is also important is the notion of inter-cultural understanding, which is why representatives of many ethnic minorities are invited to the events (Hartwich 2010).

The city of inter-cultural dialogue

Taking advantage of its rich inter-cultural heritage Wrocław is creating a new space in the city, which already has a different ethnic make-up. Today the city is much more varied ethnically and one can discern groups:

- A growing number of foreign nationals – mainly employed in numerous foreign corporations and companies. It is noteworthy that Wrocław is the city of choice for relocating managers. It has also been chosen as the best place to work and live by expats who value the support offered by the city to new comers. Its elements comprise an Infolink, information centre for foreign nationals and national associations. The high quality of life goes in hand with low living costs.
- Growing number of foreign students. Wrocław as an academic centre attracts more and more foreign students each year. In the academic year 2005/2006, 650 foreigners studied in Wrocław, and in the academic year 2015/2016 – 4,661 foreign students. In the following years we can see the growth of foreigners' interest with the academic offer of Wrocław.
- A growing number of migrants, especially Ukrainians who amount to 80,000, comprising 14% of the population as a whole, including students in schools and children in kindergartens.
- Growing number of tourists – 5,000,000 in 2017. Wrocław won a competition „European Best Destination 2018”.

We have to remember, that according to the data of the National Census from 2011, the biggest group among national and ethnic minorities living in Lower Silesia are the Lemko – 4,763 people, what constitutes 28% of the total number of members of minorities. The second biggest group is the German minority – 4,700 people. Almost 2,400 people belong to the Ukrainian minority. Association with the Romani people was declared by 2,028 people. Among the other groups we can find the representatives of Russian, Jewish, Belarusian, Lithuanian, Czech, Armenian, Slovak, Karaim, Kashubian and Tatar minorities.

According to Anna Szarycz (2017) from City Council: *“Mutual understanding and cooperation between culturally and ethnically different people and groups is continued in Wrocław. Representatives of national, ethnic and religious minorities have created a unique place open for others, because they were ready to start a dialogue.”*

Wrocław is the origin of understanding and the “Kaleidoscope of Cultures” - the foundation uniting national and ethnic minorities. The capital of Lower Silesia holds a unique (on a Polish and European scale) “District of Mutual Respect”, where within a distance of 300 metres you can find an Orthodox church, an Evangelical church, a Catholic church and a

synagogue belonging to the Jewish Community of Wrocław. In the other part of the city there is a Muslim Cultural Centre that engages in local initiatives teaching values shared by all religions. Wrocław also actively participates in various actions as a part of an international solidarity, e.g. books for Conakry in Guinea, resources for the hospital in Aleppo, distance adoptions of children or supporting oppressed writers as a part of the International Cities of Refuge Network (ICORN).

The community of foreigners differentiated by their ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural characteristics is growing rapidly and changes the community of Wrocław, giving multicultural features to the city. In the integration process three dimensions are the most important. The first dimension is the integration of the economic and institutional system of the city, relatively the easiest to achieve. Cooperation with other co-workers requires finding a common language and mutual learning of the cultural codes and patterns for users of those relations. The second dimension is the area of private life, potentially the character of community/neighbour relations. Immigrants are after all, the citizens of districts in Wrocław. The third dimension is the civil community of the citizens. Public spaces for the citizens of Wrocław, including immigrants, where there are conditions to participate in public life, realisation of one's rights, but also, what needs to be specifically pointed out – where there are duties in respect of the city and the citizens, too. In other words - this dimension of community assumes mutual respect in public space and public life of various needs presented by the citizens and organisations, churches and religious associations, where there is contribution from Polish and foreign citizens.

It is impossible to gloss over events that negatively impact on the image of the city. It is in cities that nationalist movements are gaining strength. These movements base their existence on racist slogans, declaring the primacy of the white race and the lack of acceptance for others. There are well-known demonstrations, mainly organised to commemorate national holidays, during which these slogans are clearly visible. In Wrocław such a demonstration also took place, which echoed around the world, and during which an effigy of a Jew was burned in the Market Square.

These events prompted the start of the *Strategy for Intercultural Dialogue*. These encompassed ethnic, religious groups, diasporae, migrants, foreign students and Wrocław

residents. *Strategy for the Intercultural Dialogue in Wrocław* was created because of the social need. Work on this project was initiated by the Mayor of Wrocław.

Non-governmental organisations, churches and religious associations and representatives of national and ethnic minorities have undertaken actions to support new coming foreigners. During the intersectoral cooperation it became more frequent to report the need of creating a strategic document that would set the direction of actions addressed to foreigners and local communities in order to simplify the life in mutual understanding of needs, expectations and values.

At the basis of the *Strategy for the Intercultural Dialogue in Wrocław* there was dialogue. The document was created in close collaboration with non-governmental organisations, institutions, people engaged in the topic of multiculturalism, migration and integration. Existing collaboration with national and ethnic minorities and engaging migrant diaspora of Wrocław turned out to be a very valuable point from the perspective of the identification process for issues relevant to the strategy. Thanks to the systematic participation of foreigners in organising meetings and forums, two key areas were identified that set the direction of actions from 2017 until 2022 (*Strategy For Intercultural Dialogue 2017: 14*).

In January 2017, the President of Wrocław has appointed the Council of Intercultural Dialogue, including the representatives of social organisations, churches and religious associations, universities, and the business sector. *Strategy for the Intercultural Dialogue in Wrocław* is consistent with the Wrocław 2030 Strategy, especially with priority number 6: Open city, mission: The city that unites, actions: Shaping the atmosphere of tolerance and intercultural dialogue.

As a result of the conducted analyses, research and consultations, four area of needs have been distinguished, and strategic goals were indicated within them:

1. Education - raising the knowledge level and reinforcing intercultural competences,
2. Integration - building a sense of social belonging,
3. Security - reinforcing safety of citizens,
4. Collaboration and Communication - creating the collaboration platform and reinforcing communication processes (*Strategy For Intercultural Dialogue 2017: 17-19*).

Currently the strongest centre for inter-cultural dialogue in Wrocław is Fundacja Ukraina (Ukrainian Foundation), which coordinates many integrative undertakings. The aim of the

Foundation, established in 2013, is to support migrants and foreign nationals, especially persons of Ukrainian descent in personal, social and professional development and in integration with the Polish community. The foundation implements its aims by way of organising conferences and seminars, organising shows, contests, fairs, sales, meetings and training as well as providing support centres for foreign nationals and organizing cultural and artistic projects.

As Artem Zozulia (chairman of Ukrainian Foundation) states, the Ukrainian community in Wrocław as well as in the rest of Poland is very varied. There are language as well as religious differences as Ukrainians often come from very different regions: *“They represent different faiths, Moscow church Orthodox, Catholic Orthodox, Greek-Catholic, Catholics and Atheists. We cooperate with churches but it is cooperation that transcends divisions. For us the question of language is of key importance, which is why we place great emphasis on language learning in language courses and practice through speaking clubs. We also run an Info point which serves migrants in 4 languages- Polish, Ukrainian, Russian and English.”* (Zozulia 2018).

Although the Foundation naturally cooperates primarily with Ukrainian migrants, who constitute the biggest migrant group in Wrocław, it directs its service to all migrants regardless of origin and religion.

Finally, it is worth pointing to the work of the Intercultural Dialogue Team at the Wrocław Centre for Community Development (an institution of the Wrocław local authority). One of its key projects, being implemented for a number of years now, is ‘Multicultural Wrocław’. Within this project there are workshops, meetings, training sessions, fairs and intercultural consultations for teachers. In 2019, for the fifth time, Wrocław organised an Intercultural Education Fair. According to Manuela Pliżga-Konarska (2018), the coordinator of the inter-cultural dialogue, these activities, started a few years ago, are beginning to bring tangible effects. The work of the team is a proof that inter-culturalism is here and now and that the actions undertaken by the city are to serve integration.

Closing remarks

In this paper we confront different approaches to the subject, rooted in political science, intercultural communication, city diplomacy, city branding. We present Wrocław’s case illustrating the process of implementing the concept of city diplomacy and how different tools and institutions are used to create the image of a multicultural city. In this paper we provide a

description of Wrocław's efforts in creating a new image of the city using dialogue - intercultural and inter-religious.

We are convinced that support for different communities (ethnic, religious, migrants) could be used as a tool of city diplomacy. In that sense it is also a part of the concept of the "inclusive city". The interests of a city understood as the interests of its citizens and community could be very helpful for idea of city diplomacy. In that sense city diplomacy is a kind of platform for different ethnic, religious and language groups.

When we look at various lists of cities, indexes, we can see that Wrocław is on quite good positions in several of them. Some examples:

1. According to Globalisation and World Cities Index 2018, Wrocław is recognised as gamma city. *"All gamma level cities - These can be world cities linking smaller regions or states into the world economy, or important world cities whose major global capacity is not in advanced producer services."* (GaWC 2018).
2. According to fDi's European Cities and Regions of the Future 2018/19, Wrocław took 7th place in the group of Eastern European Cities in the Future. In the same ranking Wrocław was included in the group of mid-sized cities with economic potential –6th position and business friendliness – 2nd position. fDi's European Cities and Regions of the Future ranking seeks to find the most promising cities and regions across the whole of Europe (fDi 2019).
3. In Mercer's 2018 Quality of Living, Wrocław got 100 points. According to this ranking, *"cities in emerging markets, though challenged by economic and political turmoil, are catching up with top ranking cities following decades of investing in infrastructure, recreational facilities and housing in order to attract talent and multinational businesses"* (Mercer 2018).

That's why it's so important to create conditions for reinforcing bonds and increasing intercultural competences, which are essential aspects of mutual understanding and collaboration. Accepting and appreciating the values that other cultures bring remains in the strict correlation with knowing and understanding your own cultural identity. It is a starting point and condition for any type of intercultural dialogue with people from other cultures. The better and deeper you know your own roots and accept your basic values and historically created cultural patterns, the higher tolerance for other cultures and their representatives you develop.

Although research on city diplomacy is not particularly widespread in Poland, the ongoing changes in the international environment increase the importance and significance of self-government diplomacy. This increase will continue due to the inevitable process of decentralisation of the country's foreign policy. Olaf Osica (2012: 18) notes that Poland's foreign policy is based on three pillars: the EU, national and self-governmental one. It is the last one that can be used for strengthening the European policy. In the current situation, the focus should be placed on the third pillar since it can both reinforce the existing European policy and serve as a unique laboratory for new ideas and concepts. We can also notice a peculiar 'feedback' mechanism in this regard: city authorities benefit from the EU urban policy, which ascribes a special role to cities. Integration processes between cities from various countries and prospects of using good practices lead to undertaking joint actions which become the foundation of modern diplomacy. However, according to a study carried out by the National Institute of Local Government (Narodowy Instytut Samorządu Terytorialnego – NIST), although Polish self-governments realise the necessity of participating in such cooperation, as many as 54% are not involved in cross-border programmes and, worse still, 63% do not take part in transnational programmes related to various fields. In reality, there is no regular cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Polish cities, with as many as 77% not using any support while engaging in international cooperation. When talking about city diplomacy, we are dealing with building a new quality in international relations, which rely on bonds between societies, local and regional communities as well as individual citizens and members of civic societies. This leads to deformalisation of interpersonal relations, which in turn provides real possibilities of direct communication, learning about one another, making friends and breaking various nationalistic stereotypes prevalent in different countries. That is why self-government diplomacy can be viewed as an excellent tool for communicating diversity (Szewczak, Ganczar & Jaszczuk 2016: 23).

Today cities are increasingly active in building their position and brand, acting both on a local, national as well as international level. Cities are beginning to see the significance of cooperation. They build networks of cities, which may also exert greater pressure. In this way they can also impact on government policy. This glocal aspect is connected with the global aspect of cities' undertakings, which is particularly clear in areas such as human rights, help for refugees and migrants as well as integration (Bendel & Sturmer 2018).

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