

Political Preferences

25/2019

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Journal is published by the Institute of Political Science at the University of Silesia and the Center for Innovation, Technology
Transfer and Development Foundation of the University of Silesia.

Political Preferences is official journal of the Central European Political Science Association (CEPSA).



www.cepsanet.org

ISSN: 2449-9064

Political Preferences continues the tradition of journal called *Preferencje Polityczne* (ISSN: 2083-327X) which was published from 2010 to 2015.

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How Republicans and Democrats Strengthen Secret Surveillance in The United States

Political Preferences
2019, vol. 25: 5-20
journals.us.edu.pl/index.php/PP
Submitted: 30/11/2019
Accepted: 22/12/2019

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Abstract:

The purpose of the paper is to assess the relationship between secrecy and transparency in the pre- and post-Snowden eras in the United States. The Author analyzes, from both political and legal perspectives, the sources and outcomes of the U.S. politics of national security with a special focus on domestic and intelligence surveillance measures. The core argument of the paper is that, due to the role of the executive which has always promoted the culture of secrecy, there is no chance for the demanded transparency in national security surveillance, despite the controlling powers of the legislative and judiciary. As the analysis proves, the United States in the post-Snowden era seems to be the most transparent and secretive state, at the same time.

Keywords: politics of surveillance, secrecy, transparency, national security, separation of powers, United States, Snowden

Preliminary remarks

On November 7th, 2018 the President of Warsaw, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, announced her decision to ban the National March planned for the centenary of Polish independence, arguing that the law enforcement agencies are not able to provide security in case of street riots and disorder (Agerholm 2018). The organizers of the march filed a complaint to the district court, which repealed the President's decision, as it violated one of the most important values in a democratic state: the freedom of assembly (Sandford 2018). Although the President appealed to the circuit court, she lost, as the verdict was based on the principle that security is important, but it cannot infringe on the basic freedoms of individuals in a democratic state.

The above-mentioned example is just one of many cases revealing the clash of two fundamental values of democracy: security and freedom. The clash of these values is nothing new in history, but, especially since 9/11, it has determined the character of public debate about democracy around the world, and, most significantly, in the United States (Johnson 2018; Keller 2017; Goldfarb 2015; Lester 2015; Posner & Vermeule 2006; Northouse 2006; Mania & Laidler 2004). The freedom-versus-security challenge plays a crucial role in surveillance studies, and the question which value prevails in the process of implementation of governmental surveillance policies seems to be deeply rooted in their character. Several studies focused on the scope of such freedoms as right to speak, to assemble, to be informed, to enjoy privacy, or the due process rights in the context of existing surveillance legislation and policies (Angwin 2014; Solove 2011; Farber 2008). Most of them showed Hobbesian approach towards the conflict of security and freedom: in order to achieve the first, the society has to give up the latter (Kuntze 2018). In other words, there is no place for the full protection of both values, as “any increase in security requires a decrease in liberty” (Posner & Vermeule 2006). This all-or-nothing argument is, in my opinion, disputable, as one could argue – following the Machiavellian approach – that there is no freedom without security, and “people desire freedom in order to be secure” (Coby 1999: 94). Not plunging deeper into the philosophical debate about the scope of freedom and security in governance, it is important to acknowledge, that the crucial conflict of values in the politics of surveillance, despite its clear reference to the security vs. freedom challenge, focuses on the relation between two other principles: transparency and secrecy. It is the key conflict, which determines the real scope of fundamental freedoms colliding with the idea of a security state.

According to Aftergood, the system of secrecy is “an ordinary, bureaucratic artifact” subject to pressures on many levels, such as “political, legal, sociological, international, and others” (2010: 841). The aim of the paper is to determine the scope of the U.S. secrecy system using two of the approaches mentioned by Aftergood – political, and legal – and to assess whether U.S. surveillance policies throughout history have been transparent enough to ensure functioning of a democratic system based on the rule of law. Assuming, that for an accountable government equipped in social trust it is necessary to act in a transparent way, I am aiming at defining the proper relation between transparency and secrecy thus determining the scope of governmental actions, which need to be held in secret. Such an analysis is especially necessary in the pre- and post-Snowden eras, during which the clash of values of security and freedom, and – more importantly – transparency and secrecy is not only visible, but it affects contemporary political debate and decision-making process at the highest political level in the United States. It

is important, therefore, to assess the possible future directions of government surveillance policies from the perspective of the tensions between openness and secrecy, focusing both on political and legal context, taking into consideration that in the said period the United States were governed by both Republican and Democratic administrations. It seems crucial to assess whether the politics of surveillance, and especially national security surveillance, were different under different administrations, or, maybe, referred to similar values and principles of security and secrecy.

Secret surveillance state

Despite the fact, that the concept of ‘Secret Surveillance State’ brings to mind communist regimes which existed in the 20th century Europe, it could also be applied to contemporary democracies which conduct broad surveillance policies (Svenonius & Bjoerklund 2018; Boersma et al. 2014). Surveillance, which should be understood as the “collection of information in order to manage control” (Lyon 2015: 3), has always been interconnected with the notion of “power and political struggle” (Parenti 2003: 3). Governments used their powers and resources to control the societies, and surveillance measures seemed to be an effective and successful way to achieve that goal. The rhetoric of safety or security served often as the legitimization of surveillance policies, and political leaders in democratic states strongly supported a vision that full security can only be achieved with surveillance measures (Green & Zurawski 2015: 22). In times of inner or outer danger, usually referred to as times of emergency, governments implemented broad surveillance programs which expanded their authority, thus potentially limiting the rights and freedoms of the people (Greenwald 2014; Farber 2008). And, what seems crucial, broad surveillance, in order to be effective, had to be achieved in secret, which was especially characteristic for surveillance conducted in the name of national security.

The analysis of U.S. surveillance policies and programs, which were implemented in 20th and 21st centuries, clearly indicates that contemporary United States can be named a Secret Surveillance State. Already after first major disclosure of secret surveillance measures imposed by U.S. government, which happened in 1970s as a consequence of investigations by two congressional committees led by Otis Pike (House of Representatives) and Frank Church (Senate), it became clear that several governmental agencies were involved in illegal eavesdropping and spying of American citizens (Arnold 2014; Prados 2014; Solove 2011; Theoharis 2011). The number and purpose of secret programs conducted by National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),

showed existence of an uncontrolled system of surveillance aiming at collecting information about subjects who should not have been surveilled. Certain features of a Secret Surveillance State could already be observed in the times of Harry Truman administration (Glennon 2015; Prados 2014), and the secret character of surveillance allowed the leaders of the agencies to use governmental programs for abuses, like in case of J. Edgar Hoover's FBI (Robertiello 2017; Theoharis 1993). While exposing secret programs, the Church Committee stressed, that "too many people have been spied upon by too many government agencies, and too much information has been collected" (Solove 2011: 10). The reforms initiated by congressional oversight committees in the late 1970s focused on greater transparency of governmental surveillance programs and their institutional and legal check by both legislative and judicial branches (Glennon 2015). The new system, build on active control of the executive agencies by stable congressional committees and a special Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court (FISC), did not prevent the government from imposing active surveillance measures in the next decades (Edgar 2017). Things have gone even further after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, when Bush administration introduced several policies and programs aimed at limiting the terrorist threat during new period in American history, the 'war on terror' (Graham 2017; Glennon 2015; Parenti 2003). Most of these measures led to the creation of an unprecedented system of international and domestic surveillance, equipping the executive branch with unique powers, and holding the truth away from public.

The scale and character of U.S. surveillance was revealed to American society and the world in 2013 and 2014, when international journals and newspapers published articles based on nearly two million secret documents leaked by Edward Snowden (Graham 2017: 189). The substance of these documents revealed that the U.S. government was involved in collecting billions of data and pieces of information on foreign nationals, but also on U.S. citizens, who were not aware that such surveillance programs even existed. The Secret Surveillance State became a reality, which resulted from both the quantity and quality of collected data, changing ordinary surveillance into dataveillance (Lyon 2014; van Dijck 2014). Such a statement may be reflected by the statistics: the NSA intercepts nowadays about two million types of communication per hour (Kuntze 2018: 91), and collects several billions of items of information from electronic sources (Prados 2014: 341). Overall, the government is capable of storing various types of information about its citizens, such as public information from public records and Web sites; personal communications, internet and social media usage, location information, and other nonpublic stored information (Mills 2015:217).

Historically, the U.S. government often referred to national security paradigm as a justification for its policies affecting rights of individuals (Laidler 2011; Farber 2008; Dudziak 2000). Several presidential administrations, both Democratic and Republican, decided to announce the state of emergency, during which constitutional freedoms were limited and due process was not ensured (Akerman 2006). In his analysis of emergency powers of U.S. government in history, Akerman listed numerous measures the authorities imposed, such as “curfews, evacuations, compulsory medical treatment, border controls, authority to search and seize suspicious materials and to engage in intensive surveillance and data compilation, freezing financial assets and closing otherwise lawful businesses, increasing federal control over state governments, expanding the domestic role of the military, and imposing special limitations on the right to bear arms” (2010:96). There is no doubt that extended surveillance measures had played a significant role in the use of emergency powers by the U.S. government, and that national security arguments enabled the authorities to classify most of its operations in that respect.

During the pre-Snowden era there had been a lot of references made by governing administrations to the necessity of national security protection, which, in the scope of surveillance policies, focused on functioning of several secret government programs. Although the first U.S. president to use the national security paradigm was Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II, it was President Truman, whose activity in that respect led to creation of certain legislation establishing the national security state with such institutions as Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency in its center (Theoharis 2011). Institutionally, all three major agencies, NSA, CIA, and FBI, were involved in the process of protecting national security during the Cold War era, and their activities were held far from public scrutiny due to imposition of a broad secrecy system (Edgar 2017; Masco 2014). It is important to acknowledge, that activities undertaken by the next presidential administrations led by Republicans Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon continued the policies initiated by their Democratic predecessors. Furthermore, Republican presidents made NSA involved not only in counterintelligence activities, but also, in collaboration with both CIA and FBI, in sharing information about foreign and domestic threats to national security (Keller 2017). In the first two decades of the Cold War, a system of excessive secrecy was created governing the use of national security surveillance measures without any oversight or control from the legislative or judicial branches.

The investigations undertaken by two congressional committees in the 1970s revealed information not only about the existence of certain secret government surveillance programs, such as HTLINGUAL, MHCHAOS, Mockingbird, Minaret, and Shamrock, but also about their

unlimited scope. The reports prepared by the committees indicated that the executive agencies applied excessive secrecy in their conduct of surveillance programs in order to limit congressional oversight and the knowledge of the people, who were often targeted by government surveillance due to their political beliefs (Prados 2014; Theoharis 2011). A careful analysis of the reports provides clear argumentation for the support of the politicization of surveillance policies during the Cold War period, as both Republicans and Democrats promoted strengthening the powers of the executive at a cost of the other two branches. The idea of a Secret Surveillance State became a reality. It was justified by the state of emergency, as well as the fact, that majority of surveillance measures imposed by the government remained uncontrolled due to the absence of a system of oversight and transparency. Such a system was introduced in the aftermath of Church's and Pike's Committees investigations, leading to the creation of stable intelligence oversight committees and a special court controlling the scope of government surveillance policies (Glennon 2015). It seemed that the problem of excessive secrecy of the politics of national security had been solved. At least for two decades.

It came back to American political reality after the terrorist attack of 9/11, when Congress implemented anti-terrorist legislation, the U.S.A. Patriot Act. Interestingly, the Act, which expanded the investigative and surveillance powers of executive agencies, has been approved by the representatives of both political parties in Congress, almost without any debate (Smith & Hung 2010). The legislation turned quickly into the main source and legitimization of controversial executive actions of the Republican President, George W. Bush, including his Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP). One of the key surveillance measures undertaken in the post-9/11 America, the Stellar Wind program, which forced telephone and internet providers to share metadata of potential terrorist suspects, was operated in secret until being revealed in the 2005 by the press (Fisher 2013: 251-252). It was legitimized by the Office of Legal Counsel's memorandum arguing for the necessity to keep the surveillance programs out of public and congressional reach, so they can serve the national security goals more effectively (Edgar 2017: 43). Similar argumentation was used to support the launching of a new surveillance program, PRISM, aiming at monitoring data (e-mails, chats, photographs, but also log-ins and stored files) of the most important internet providers, and leading to a collection of billions of data on U.S. citizens by government (Lester 2015). In contrary to Stellar Wind, however, the PRISM was authorized by Congress in 2007 and 2008, providing for a certain level of congressional and judicial control over the surveillance activities of the executive (Edelson 2016). It does not change the fact, that majority of activities undertaken by the Republican government in the name

of national security were kept secret, which led to a significant criticism from Democratic politicians, including the next U.S. president, Barack Obama.

Many supporters of Obama believed that he could change the national security surveillance system, and diminish the level of secrecy over executive surveillance programs (Olmsted 2018: 220). Actually, the president not only continued, but also expanded some of the surveillance programs initiated by his predecessor, thus proving a certain unity among American leaders concerning the politics of national security in times of emergency. His support for new legislation strengthening the government surveillance powers, as well as his promotion of the state secrets privilege in judicial cases in which Americans demanded greater transparency of surveillance programs, made Barack Obama a proponent of Secret Surveillance State, despite his anti-secrecy rhetoric (Graham 2017; Glennon 2015). Even if the Democratic president did not initiate new secret surveillance measures, he legitimized earlier existing programs by making them legal (Olmsted 2018: 221).

Similarly, after the disclosure of secret documents concerning the scope of surveillance programs conducted by the National Security Agency, Obama's rhetoric differed from the decisions undertaken by his administration. On the one hand, the President supported modifications to legislation regarding the scope of congressional and judicial oversight of executive surveillance powers, such as the Freedom Act of 2015, but, on the other, most of the institutional solutions resulting from the Snowden affair did not bring an effective system of oversight and transparency (Graham 2017: 198). As a confirmation of the differences between the rhetoric and activities of the presidential administration, despite several promises to support greater transparency, Obama's government denied access in the name of national security to several requests for information about government's actions (Keller 2017: 31). An analysis of the legal regulations governing the functioning of the oversight system proves that the scope of control of the surveillance measures depended on the will of the executive, which could easily be justified by the argument of national security. Even the publishing of annual transparency reports by the NSA (Alloa & Thoma 2018) did not change the fact, that in the first years after Snowden there was more rhetoric of openness rather than real transparency, which made the Secret Surveillance State stronger than ever before.

The election of Donald Trump for the U.S. President did not change anything in the scope of executive powers concerning surveillance. Yet, in the presidential campaign the Republican candidate referred a few times to the necessity to protect the United States and its citizens from terrorist threat even at the cost of limiting civil rights of Americans (Nelson 2018). Surprisingly,

however, it was President Trump who openly criticized the use of surveillance measures by executive agencies against him and the members of his campaign team. President's critical attitude towards FBI, CIA, and NSA caused the decrease of trust of the Republican voters towards national security agencies, whereas some Democratic voters showed their support towards national security surveillance (Nelson 2018: 181). Apart from such personal negative attitude of the President towards concrete investigation, Trump generally opted for the continuity of the culture of secrecy with regard to surveillance measures of the state realized both on domestic and international level. From that perspective, he proved to be another strong supporter of the Secret Surveillance State which has ruled the United States from the late 1940s (Glennon 2015; Theoharis 2011).

Why secrecy?

Secrecy had played an important role in American political system even since its creation. Secrecy seemed a value during the Revolutionary War, when it assured effectiveness of the government (Ginsberg 2016:7), and during the Philadelphia Convention when the Founders referred to the executive branch, which had to “possess the powers of secrecy, vigor, and dispatch” (Farrand 1966: 70). And it was the executive, which, from the very beginning, invoked the principle of secrecy as a guarantee of its proper functioning (Graham 2017). The growing impact of secrecy on the operations of U.S. government in the 20th century led to a notion, that there is a specific ‘culture of secrecy’ (Moynihan 1997; Theoharis 1998), manifested not only in the amount of classified information kept far away from the public's reach, but – above all – in a conviction that secrecy ensures effectiveness and accountability (Edgar 2017: 345; Ginsberg 2016: 7).

Surprising or not, that conviction is shared by the representatives of both sides of political scene, whose attitude towards secrecy varies depending on their political role. Generally, the majority of U.S. presidents since 1940s, shared similar vision concerning the necessity to effectively protect national security, and among the leading proponents of secret surveillance state there were Republicans (Richard Nixon, George W. Bush), and Democrats (Harry Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson). Members of Congress from both parties supported legislation which increased the powers of law enforcement and intelligence agencies, as well as initiatives aiming at effective control and oversight of these powers. The difference between Republicans and Democrats could be observed in their political rhetoric, but not in the politics of surveillance they conducted. The comparison of the Bush administration's secret initiatives expanding the powers

of executive and intelligence agencies, and Obama administration's anti-secrecy rhetoric which turned into the continuation of his predecessor's policy (Graham 2017) confirms that argument. Today it is very likely that presidents from two different political parties will agree to conduct similar politics of surveillance. Similar observations may be derived from the analysis of statements made by people responsible for heading surveillance agencies, such as NSA directors James Clapper and Michael Hayden (Kuntze 2018: 86), high-ranked governmental officers like Democratic secretary of state John Kerry (Edgar 2017: 28-29), as well as members of Congress – Republicans John McCain, or Dianne Feinstein (Glennon 2015: 69). Their political affiliation is not the main determinant of their argumentation, as they all present an approach supporting necessary secrecy of governmental activities relating to security issues, especially when they are undertaken by the executive branch.

It seems as if the culture of secrecy is deeply rooted in activities undertaken by the executive branch, or is a “product of the executive branch's very nature” (Kitrosser 2015:2). As she correctly observes, the executive, unlike the legislative and judicial branches, has more space to act in the shadow, because both Congress and the courts operate through publicly recorded legislation and written public opinions. Furthermore, the executive branch has also access to human and technological resources enabling it to act in broader secrecy than any other part of the government (Kitrosser 2015: 2-3). Even the analysis of constitutional provisions concerning functioning of the three branches of government leaves an impression, that the Second Branch was meant to be the most secret one (*U.S. Constitution, Article Two*). It all has led to the creation of various theories about the secretive powers of the executive, which aimed to serve as legitimization of surveillance policies of presidential administrations. Especially three of them – executive privilege, unitary executive theory, and state secrets privilege – have determined the character and scope of contemporary U.S. surveillance practices (Siegel 2015; Garvey 2014; Arnold 2014; Theoharis 2011).

All of these theories served as a justification and legitimization of certain policies, including imposition of often unlimited surveillance of individuals and institutions potentially endangering national security. Controversial character of some of these theories is even bigger when one realizes that the government has discretionary power to decide which information should be secret without thoroughly explaining the reasons of classification. However rational it would seem with regard to the intelligence community, which operates within the realm of secrecy (Edgar 2017:76), there is no doubt, that the executive has overused the use of theories, as well as principle of national security, and the status of emergency state. Whenever presidential

administrations or Congresses announced ‘times of emergency’, it meant automatic change in the scope of protection of basic civil rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, due process of law, and the right to privacy (Farber 2008). Such an approach was usually supported by other branches of government, especially courts, which followed the rule, that in “times of emergency and peril” the scope of constitutional protection of basic rights and freedoms may be limited (*Korematsu v. U.S.*). The Surveillance State, though, could not exist without certain level of secrecy, justified by objective circumstances of emergency, as well as subjective beliefs of the executive determining the scope of information provided to the society.

Politics and the culture of secrecy

The culture of secrecy resulting in excessive classification of surveillance policies observed in contemporary U.S. political system, no matter how explained or justified, may bring a lot of negative consequences not only to political subjects, but also to the society, and the system in general. There are at least four counterarguments to secret surveillance: the potential of abuse, the lack of effective control and accountability, limitations of rights and freedoms of individuals, as well as the deterioration of trust.

The history of U.S. secret surveillance in the 20th century proves, that lack of transparency could serve to hide illegal actions undertaken by governmental officials, such as warrantless eavesdropping of political opponents, social activists, or organizations (Theoharis 2011). It may also lead to a paradox, that if secrecy serves to hide abuse, and abuses can weaken national security, therefore limiting secrecy could become a way to protect national security (Prados 2014:112). Excessive secrecy means that the system lacks transparent oversight of governmental programs and actions, or that the applied measures of control are ineffective and inefficient. In both perspectives the stable or ad hoc control is imposed marginally, as there is not enough information which can be revealed to the public. It seems that only the press or single whistleblowers could become the “sunlight” to which Justice Brandeis (1914: 92) referred 100 years ago when supporting the necessity of governmental transparency.

Furthermore, the culture of secrecy threatens the constitutional protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, including freedom of speech, the right to be informed, and the right to privacy (Keller 2017). In U.S. history administrations tried to restrain publication of secret documents (Nixon and *Pentagon Papers* case), hid behind state secrets doctrine in order to limit courts’ knowledge on the facts (principle confirmed in *United States v. Reynolds*), and violated the privacy of U.S. citizens by imposing several secret surveillance programs (NSA’s

operations Stellar Wind and Prism). The Secret Surveillance State also lacks democratic accountability, as the decisions concerning the implementation of surveillance policies are made in secret, and without any serious control from other branches of government. Congressional oversight seems more effective when carried out ad hoc, as a result of intensified control, rather than as a stable and thorough analysis of the legality of actions undertaken by executive agencies. Judicial check, if imposed, serves as a reaction to already implemented surveillance policies, and any efforts of preventive control come down to the confirmation of warrant requests. As Kitrosser argues, “insufficient checking breeds unnecessary, even counterproductive, secrecy” (2015: 2).

Lack of accountability leads to the deterioration of trust in government, by using non-verifiable arguments justifying excessive surveillance programs. According to the intelligence community officials, the measures undertaken by NSA in 21st century led to the detection of several terrorist plots, but the real number of successful operations limiting terrorist threats, as well as their real character remains classified. And even if the society understands the reason of keeping the statistics about NSA’s successful operations secret, there is no way these statistics could be verified.

The analysis of the legal and political consequences of the Snowden affair allows to argue, that in 2013 the United States faced similar reality as in the mid-1970s. There are, of course, obvious differences in the political circumstances in which the Church and Pike Committees operated, but the scope and character of challenges seems exactly the same. Arnold argues that contemporary secrecy regime is “at least as excessive as it was in the 1970s when Washington promised something new” (2014: 6). The shock caused by 1975 congressional investigations forced the political establishment to introduce various means of control which aimed at exchanging secrecy for transparency. The idea of an open government became the fundamental principle of political leaders aware of the social distrust in Washington (Solove 2011). Snowden’s revelations also raised questions and concerns about the legality of surveillance programs and – in a more general context – the state of American democracy. Even the critics of Snowden decision, as Attorney General Eric Holder admitted, that he “made public service by raising the debate that we engaged in” (Edgar 2017: 6).

Although the challenges faced by the 21st century surveillance are different from the ones present in times when electronic surveillance was only a dream, and the agencies collected less data, but the general problems concerning the legality of surveillance measures are the same. The main question arises concerning the adaptability of old laws to modern era. The Fourth

Amendment, which served as the basis for state surveillance, but also as a protection of the right to privacy, was written in 1791 and used in the 20th century to determine the scope of eavesdropping, telegram searches, or telephone wiretapping (Glennon 2015). As Edgar observes, “in an era of global mass surveillance, the inevitable consequence . . . is that the Fourth Amendment protects only a tiny fraction of the world’s data” (2017: 68). But even if the technological change has outrun the legal text, American judiciary has often actively interpreted the constitution to expand the meaning of its clauses (Laidler 2011).

Secrecy and transparency cannot fully co-exist at the same time, therefore the institutions responsible for the interpretation of the law should pose a concrete limit to both values. It seems that the limit depends on the state of mind of the society: in times of intensified press investigations or whistleblower leaks, of active operation of oversight committees, and of frequent judicial review, there is pressure for greater transparency. But in times of crises, wars, or terrorist attacks, secrecy not only prevails, but is treated as a value by both the authorities and the society (Fung et al. 2008: 106). Post-9/11 polls indicated that a lot of citizens were ready to give away some of their freedoms for stronger security, and that they were able to approve of the anti-terrorist measures imposed by the government (Parenti 2003: 184). The problem occurs when one realizes that the level of threat to security is not only determined by exterior factors (terrorist attacks) but also by the government. Numerous times in history the government declared times of emergency, thus expanding its powers, and the power of secrecy. Therefore, in the Secret Surveillance State it is almost impossible to enjoy broad transparency, as the government may always use the rhetoric of national security to limit fundamental freedoms of the people. And if, as a result, people do not trust the government, their choice during the electoral process is not determined by the politics of surveillance, which are similar in the Republican and Democratic governance. Secrecy knows no color, and it becomes a value for ‘red’ and ‘blue’ presidents.

The paradox is, that the United States as a Secret Surveillance State are at the same time one of the most, if not the most transparent country in the world. Analysis of the 20th and 21st century legislation proves high institutionalization of disclosure processes, which were legitimized by the reference to the First Amendment’s freedom of speech. Despite the fact that today these disclosure institutions are mainly taking preventive measures to limit the possibility of excessive secrecy, their creation was determined by reactive measures taken by U.S. Congress. Such situation occurred in 1970s with the Federal Election Commission established to control the campaign financing in federal elections (Mutch 2014), the implementation of special prosecutor responsible for checking the legality of actions undertaken by executive officials (Salokar 2000;

Harriger 1992), or as a result of the Church and Pike Committees' findings leading to creation of the FISA Court. One should add to this several disclosure regulations promoting the idea of an open government, as well as numerous oversight committees which role was to verify legality of governmental actions and support greater transparency. The post-Snowden era, affected by the truth about secret governmental surveillance programs was also marked by public exhortation for openness and transparency, but the legislative and institutional effects were not significant. Implementation of the Freedom Act in 2015, requiring the government to request records from phone companies for foreign intelligence purposes under court order, was the only central regulation, which – at least theoretically – strengthened the control over secret actions of surveillance agencies. It was supported by Democratic President, Barack Obama, but also by several Republicans who backed the bill in House of Representatives and Senate. On the other hand, there have been no disclosure measures and institutions established after 2013, which would be equipped with oversight powers, except for Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board which received broader competences, but existed since 2004 (Edgar 2017: 29). Of course, the said paradox between secrecy and transparency is not only rooted in the character of the U.S. separation of powers and checks-and-balances system, but also, as Levitsky and Ziblitz (2018) argue, can be derived from the style of current governance which undermines other branches of government or political opposition.

Conclusion

Whether we are analyzing times before Snowden when the growth of national security paradigm in U.S. foreign and domestic policies was significant, or the post-Snowden era when mass surveillance conducted by the government received political and social attention, the research findings concerning the engagement of Democratic and Republican politicians in the process of sustaining the Secret Surveillance State are equal. As members of the executive they are somehow justified, because secrecy is not only an indispensable element of functioning of the executive from the birth of American statehood, but it is also the core idea of how intelligence agencies operate. Congress, as the main legislative body which is responsible for implementing legal framework for surveillance, but also for imposing effective oversight measures, has been struggling to limit too broad secrecy of executive actions. Although it seems more likely to see Democratic Congressmen actively promoting the ideas of transparency rather than their Republican counterparts, history proved that in times of crisis, defined as times of emergency,

both political parties united in order to strengthen the powers of the government. Cold War and the war on terror have served as a legitimization of initiating secret surveillance programs which scope went far beyond constitutional and statutory delegation, and only the disclosure of these programs by the press or whistleblowers made any change possible. Still, the change American citizens were longing for has never come to fulfillment, providing for a system of limited transparency. The Secret Surveillance State, where National Security Agency is able to intercept metadata of anyone using mobile phone or internet, where telecommunication companies have to cooperate with the government sharing data of their clients, where every next Congress increases the budget of executive and intelligence agencies conducting national security surveillance, and where congressional oversight committees and special judicial institutions are provided only limited information about the scope of surveillance programs, is contemporary American reality. The culture of secrecy attracts politicians from both parties, and even if they use the rhetoric of transparency, they are finally charmed by the possibility to expand their powers in the name of security - national security.

Funding:

The article is a result of the Polish-German research project *Beethoven-2 Trust and Transparency in an Age of Surveillance. American, German and Polish perspective* funded by the Polish National Science Center (UMO-2016/23/G/HS5/01864).

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President Barack Obama's Policy Choices in NATO Rhetoric

Political Preferences
2019, vol. 25: 21-36
journals.us.edu.pl/index.php/PP
Submitted: 03/04/2019
Accepted: 22/12/2019

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Abstract:

This article uses Michael C. McGee's concept of the ideograph to reflect Obama's early foreign policy course regarding transatlantic relations. Specifically, the article draws on the ideograph "alliance" to demonstrate how the president redefined agents, acts, agencies, scenes, and purposes that fall within the rhetoric, thus informing how and why he changed US commitment to NATO. Analyzing Obama's use of alliance serves to interpret his political choices as well as understand his ability to get the public to support them. By extension, a study of this nature offers a reading of the president's perspective on US foreign policy and America's global role.

Keywords: NATO, alliance, ideograph, Barack Obama, foreign policy

Introduction

An examination of relations between the United States and Europe during the first months of Barack Obama's presidency should begin with a discussion of the foreign policy legacy of President George W. Bush. For it is the policies of the Bush administration that isolated the US from Europe and thus shaped Obama's early approach towards the transatlantic alliance. Among the most commonly quoted sources of the drift is the US strategic orientation (Kupchan 2012; Hodge 2010; Rielly 2008). Scholars find that the challenge of contemporary terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks predisposed the Bush administration to choose unilateralism and preemption over multilateral policymaking. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 is invoked as the most telling example of America's one-sided action. The US took combat operations in Iraq ignoring Europe's arguments that the use of force was excessive and military action was counterproductive, fueling instability, tensions, and divisions in the region instead of

eliminating them. Amid the rift over Iraq, the discord between the US and Europe concerned the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty negotiated in 1972 between the US and the Soviet Union regarding the superpowers' strategic capabilities (Bush 2001b). The US justified the termination of the treaty with circumstances compelling it to develop a national missile defense system against possible terrorist ballistic missile attacks. Moreover, during the Bush years, the US ended its participation in the formation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), launching a campaign against the Court to weaken its authority and undermine its legitimacy (Heindel 2004). Core concerns raised by Washington against the Court included fear of political prosecution and infringement of US sovereignty as well as concerns over the Court's accountability and standards. The US also refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on global warming and prevented the agreement on emission control to go into effect (Bush 2001a). The decision was defended on the ground that the terms of the Protocol seriously harmed the US economy and failed to address the problem of global climate change effectively. Finally, the US opposed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, one that regards the obligation of the parties not to carry out any nuclear explosion, while supporting the continuation of the US nuclear testing moratorium (CTBT Report).

Strained transatlantic relations posed a major challenge for Bush's successor. In confronting the task of how to restore Europe's confidence in the US commitment to multilateralism and global leadership, Barack Obama ran his presidential campaign on a pledge to end the war in Iraq (Obama 2007), cut investment in missile defense systems (Obama 2008b), and eliminate nuclear weapons. He declared to reverse the Bush administration's course taken for the ICC and to begin cooperating with its leaders and staff (Feinstein & Lindberg 2009). He ensured that America would renew the Kyoto Protocol treaty and work with the international community on a constructive response to the threat of climate change (Obama 2008a). When he took office, he scheduled his first overseas trip to Europe, beginning with a visit to England, where he attended the G-20 summit, continuing his travel to France and Germany, where he participated in the NATO summit, to the Czech Republic, where he took part in the US-EU summit meeting, and concluding his tour in Turkey. The goals of the G-20, the NATO, and the US-EU summit meetings aside, the overarching objective of the president's trip was to demonstrate his administration's resolve to set the US on a new course in its relations with Europe and project a clear vision and direction for America's leadership in world affairs. International trips have long been recognized as strategic means to an end for presidential foreign

policymaking (Weitsman 2004). First state visits and international summits have been suggested to be an important element of US administrations' efforts to form, maintain, strengthen and/or restore foreign relations; and presidential communication with foreign partners has been considered as being central to positive outcomes of such undertakings.

Obama's Policy Choices and Public Opinion

What priority did Americans and Europeans place on Obama's foreign policy and what expectations did they hold for the president in the realm of transatlantic relations? As June 2008 surveys carried out by The German Marshall Fund of the United States and Pew Research Center showed, Americans and Europeans overall agreed that international terrorism and international economic problems should be the top priorities for the next American president, that global issues should be addressed in partnership rather than independently, and that Europeans and Americans had enough common values to cooperate on common problems. A majority of Americans and Europeans also agreed that NATO was essential for their countries' security, that all NATO countries should contribute troops to NATO military actions and share the financial costs of NATO combat missions.

Looking at the American and European publics' expectations, 69 percent of Europeans favored Obama and 47 percent believed that US relations with Europe would improve after his inauguration. Europeans were not only optimistic about a post-George W. Bush era American foreign policy, but were clearly excited about the prospects for an Obama-led US foreign policy. 84 percent of the French, 82 percent of the Germans and 74 percent of the British expressed strong confidence in Obama and his performance in world affairs. Among Americans who viewed Obama favorably, 48 percent thought that US-European relations had gotten worse in the previous year and 56 percent hoped that the partnership in security and diplomatic relations with Europe would become closer.

However, specific policy preferences of the European public presented a major challenge for the president's political course. On the question of policy options in Afghanistan, a majority of Europeans opposed conducting combat operations (57 percent) and disagreed with the statement that "under some conditions war was necessary to obtain justice" (71 percent). Support was shown for non-combat options, such as providing security for economic reconstruction (79 percent), assisting with military training (68 percent), and combating narcotics production (76

percent). On the issue of troop commitment to US and NATO mission in Afghanistan, Europeans were either divided (43 percent of the British remove troops vs. 48 percent keep troops) or favored removing troops (54 percent of the French and the Germans). The president's attempts to address economic issues were also likely to be challenged, considering that over 70 percent of the British, the French, and the Germans viewed the impact of the US economy on their country's economy to be negative.

In the aftermath of the 2008 presidential elections, European and American public continued to hold great expectations for President Obama. Extraordinary high assessment of the president after he entered the White House in early 2009 was a reflection of those hopes. The Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, conducted in April 2009, found that Europeans' overall opinion of Barack Obama remained very positive (88 percent in Germany, 84 percent in France, and 64 percent in Britain). Data collected from Gallup polls on presidential job approval between January and March 2009 showed that satisfaction with the president's job performance was also high at home, within 67 and 59 percent. According to a CBS News poll administered between February and April 2009, a majority of Americans agreed that Obama shared their priorities for the country (65 percent) and approved of the way he was handling foreign policy (50-59 percent) and economy (55-56 percent). Such context clearly provided very high support for Obama on his first state visit overseas thus generating a unique opportunity for the president to use his popularity to influence and handle opposition to his policy choices.

Ideographic Analysis

The analysis of how President Obama communicated his approach to the issue of the transatlantic alliance is informed by Michael C. McGee's (1990: 341-343) concept of the ideograph. McGee defines the ideograph as "an ordinary language term found in political discourse . . . a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal." For McGee, the ideograph "warrants the use of power, excuses behavior and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and belief into channels easily recognized as acceptable and laudable." It is "culture-bound" and is "always understood in its relation to another." The ideographs are structured in two ways: diachronically, that is "in isolation . . . such that current meanings of the term are linked to past usage of it" and synchronically as "together . . . thought at any specific

“moment” to be consonant, related one to another in such a way as to produce unity of commitment in a particular historical context.”

McGee’s notion of the ideograph has been used as a lens to critique different rhetorical subjects from both of the above structural perspectives. It has been used in the study of identities, agenda, and practices of niche groups (Bennett-Carpenter 2009), memetics (Johnson 2007), corporate rhetoric (Amernic & Craig 2004), marriage discourse (Grindstaff 2003), religious reform movement (Jasinski 2002), rail communication (Coogan 2002), Castroism (Delgado 1999), depictive rhetoric (Edwards & Winkler 1997), Chicano movement rhetoric (Delgado 1995), midwifery debate (Miller 1999), and constitutive rhetoric of state sovereignty (Charland 1987). Research has discussed the questions regarding how ideographs constructed public issues, shaped political debate, and encouraged collective commitment to restrictive action (Kuypers & Althouse 2009; Parry-Giles 1995). It has asked specifically how the ideograph of terrorism affected general US foreign policy principles and specific US foreign policy decisions and actions (Long 2013; Winkler 2006; Valenzano III 2006), how the ideograph of patriotic changed the understanding of a patriotic American during times of war (Towner 2010), how the ideograph of victim directed a discussion of the death penalty in Illinois in 2003 (McCann 2007), how non-verbal representations of the ideographs of woman and man influenced the woman suffrage (Palczewski 2005), how the ideograph of family values structured the problems of poverty and racism in the 1992 presidential general election campaign (Cloud 1998), how the ideograph of equality reflected the understanding of legal practices (Hasian et al. 1996), and how the meaning of the ideograph shifted over time in the process of negotiation among different social groups (Condit & Lucaites 1993). Clearly, the scope of the discussion regarding ideographs is widespread amongst disciplines and can be used to further investigate the impact of presidential rhetoric.

As part of the discussion, this study asks how the ideograph of alliance shaped President Obama’s foreign policy course and discourse at the onset of his presidency. It analyzes the ideograph within presidential rhetoric to explain how and why the president changed US commitment to this international partnership. Obama challenged both the Cold War and post-Cold War model of the alliance, looking for a transformation of the partnership from a relationship focused on Europe’s needs and wants to one attuned similarly to America’s interest. Analyzing Obama’s definition of alliance, its setting, the means of its protection, and the reason for its continuation can be helpful in interpreting his political talk and the consequent action.

Moreover, examining the president's appropriation of the ideograph of alliance can help to understand his ability to get the public to accept and support his less popular policies. By extension, a study of this nature offers reading of the administration's perspective on foreign policy and America's role in the world as it is shaped by the president and his policies' long-term consequences. This study performs a textual analysis of statements made by Obama during his first state visit to Europe. First, a term search for the word alliance was conducted across all presidential statements made during the trip. Second, the obtained data set was narrowed to the statements which focused on the issue of the transatlantic alliance. Third, the selected statements were examined synchronically to describe the use of the ideograph and its relation to others within a particular historical context and at a particular point in time.

Alliance as Ideograph

The analysis of the ideograph of alliance within President Obama's rhetoric should begin with a brief commentary on the characteristics of the ideograph to demonstrate that alliance falls into the definition. First, the term meets the criteria of operating "clearly and evidently as [an agent] of political consciousness" and as "a part of the real lives of the people whose motives [it articulates]" (McGee 1990: 335). It exists in real public discourse and is easily encountered in the media, in politics, and in scholarship (Lee 2009: 295). Its impact on domestic politics only increases the likelihood of its usage in citizen political conversations (Winkler 2006: 12). Second, alliance represents functions that "unite and separate human beings" (McGee 1990: 336-337). It defines "a collectivity" and differs "in its meanings or its usage" among societies. Alliance is transcendent in character, broad in appeal, and flexible in interpretation (Winkler 2006: 13). It carries little cognitive meaning and much emotional affect. It is used to make judgments and represents something to be achieved (Lee 2009: 295). Third, alliance justifies the exercise of power (Lee 2009: 295). It rationalizes leaders' decisions and actions which negotiate historically and socially acceptable norms and values (Winkler 2006: 14). Fourth, alliance is "descriptive of an essentially social human condition" (McGee 1990: 337). It is a defining feature of a tradition and carries a culture-specific significance (Lee 2009: 295). Consent to or defiance of its interpretation determines one's membership within the society (Winkler 2006: 14).

When President Obama talks about alliance during his first foreign trip, he refers to the relationship created among members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Recognizing the damaging impact of President Bush's foreign policy discourse on allied relations, Obama establishes his own rhetoric of the alliance, redefining agents, acts, agencies, scenes, and purposes that fall within it, and thus shifting the discourse to one that sought to work with and within the partnership.

Strategic to the president's rhetoric of alliance are the agents. These include America and Europe, especially the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Across the discourse, the agents are described through the lens of 60 years of shared history (Obama 2009e, 2009g). The US is referred to as the agent who over the years has protected Europe and has guaranteed security in Europe while Europe is referred to as the agent whose concerns have been central to US foreign policy and whose opinions on major issues have mattered and have been respected. This perspective of legacy is contrasted with an approach which repositions the agents and reformulates the relationship between them. Europe is as strategic to the alliance as America and qualities of European countries are recognized and admired much as American values (Obama 2009e). Admitting one's mistakes, accepting others' arguments, and seeking compromise applies to all allies, including the US (Obama 2009e). Similarly, looking for solutions, responding to global challenges, and sharing the burden of the response fall within each ally's commitment, including Europe's (Obama 2009a). The alliance which so far has been understood as a forum dominated and led by the US is challenged to become an agency for a partnership of equals with shared benefits and responsibilities.

Fundamental to the task is reform, or in Obama's campaign language, change. The first one is that of attitude. America's arrogance, disregard, and scorn for its partners have to be replaced with acknowledgment and appreciation for their union and global role (Obama 2009a). Likewise, Europe's stance against Americanism, and critique and blame placed on American policies, has to make way for recognition of the good that these policies have done in the world (Obama 2009a). The second change is that of structure. The roles and responsibilities of the alliance must be defined and adjusted to the 21st century (Obama 2009f). A framework which has been successful at meeting the challenges of the Cold War should now be renewed to meet the demands of the post-Cold War and post-American world order. The third change concerns military capabilities and involves improving planning, modernizing the military, and strengthening Europe's defense. European countries are expected to rise above the challenge of ensuring mutual security and increase their commitment to allied military budget, take a lead in

the alliance's military operations, and manage conflicts and handle their consequences independently of the US (Obama 2009a). The fourth change relates to Afghanistan. The US needs to commit itself to review its approach to the war and balance military solutions against nonmilitary assistance, including aid, development, and diplomacy. But Europe also needs to rethink its own attitude toward the conflict and accept its military component by making a more meaningful contribution to ensuring security in the region (Obama 2009a). The final change applies to the alliance's relationship with Russia. Allies should work on a strategy for connecting the major global actors who act in concert not in opposition (Obama 2009g).

Now, there has not been one means to implement the changes. Instead, a series of steps have been suggested to push the reform through. Crucial to it has been the US attitude. Washington has declared to give up on always being right and having the best answers and has committed itself to show humility and respect for others (Obama 2009d). It has expressed the determination to take a new approach in its foreign policy, one in which listening is valued over speaking, learning over lecturing, and helping to shape the vision for the future over dictating solutions (Obama 2009d, 2009h). America has also come to understand that alliance presupposes concerted effort and that only unanimous decisions and collective action can ensure a common way forward (Obama 2009d, 2009e, 2009f). Likewise, Europe must realize that the era of acting alone and/or on behalf of others is over and allies cannot wait for the action of other partners but should take the initiative or equally contribute to the cause (Obama 2009a). Emphasis is placed on the values that bring allies closer together rather than on the differences that widen the divide between them; faith instead of resentment towards each other; compromise and cooperation on difficult issues rather than surrender to the problems that can leave allies only more isolated (Obama 2009a). The alliance is portrayed as an institution which has the potential to reinvent itself and allies as agents who are able to re-establish their relationship. A sense of enthusiasm is balanced against a sense of caution. It is recognized that allies will continue to have separate interests, negotiations will be difficult, disagreements will be unavoidable, and agreements will not always be achievable (Obama 2009d). The hope of seeing the alliance stronger and more productive is accompanied by the awareness that changes in attitude, structure, capabilities, and relations will neither come quickly nor easily (Obama 2009d).

NATO's mission in Afghanistan especially exemplifies this framework. Afghanistan serves as a scene for alliance and contextualizes the argumentation for NATO's reform, justifying

the steps and means needed to be taken to renew the relationship. The mission marks NATO's first operation taken beyond the borders of Europe and is described as a complex and difficult task with a lot of facets to it (Obama 2009f). Allies' contribution to Afghanistan is a measure of the alliance's way forward as it exposes their obligations and commitment to meet them (Obama 2009f, 2009g). It is also a test case for the partnership between the countries because it demonstrates how well allies can work together to achieve a common objective for a common cause (Obama 2009e, 2009f). NATO's engagement in Afghanistan checks allies' understanding of the purpose of the mission as much as the seriousness of purpose with which they approach NATO itself. It verifies whether declared principles of consensus and unity remain merely conference pledges or whether they apply to concrete practical action (Obama 2009e). In a broader perspective, NATO's renewed engagement in Afghanistan marks the end of irresponsible foreign policymaking and the beginning of responsible decisions. It no longer defines the US as a uniquely qualified ally to lead the mission; rather, it indicates Americans' preference for working through multilateral frameworks which proportionally engage all allies. Moreover, the mission is the point of departure for argumentation for extension of the operations in the region. It is used to persuade allies to also invest their resources into Pakistan and India (Obama 2009g). From this perspective, the mission in Afghanistan serves as one operation to shape interpretation of others. It represents a small scene taking place in a larger context.

Afghanistan is also the primary purpose of action. It works as the most immediate reason why NATO should make efforts to reform its structures and renew the relationship amongst the allies. A point made about NATO's mission in Afghanistan whose goal there is not to occupy or run the country but to provide it with the capacity to ensure its own security directly translates into Obama's sentiment about the United States' renewed role in NATO (Obama 2009f). According to it, America is part of the alliance not to dominate or lead it but, while continuing to provide the unique assets that only the US possesses, it is there to assist other allies in enhancing their military capabilities to become fuller and stronger partners. Moreover, a higher purpose is present. It is to combat fear and want, to guarantee peace and prosperity (Obama 2009a, 2009g). Despite these perpetual intentions of the alliance, the circumstances have changed with respect to the scope and means of their realization. The alliance's focus on the needs of and dangers in Europe has been redirected to the concerns of and threats around the world. Finally, there might be a personal reason for action. The fact that Obama is seen as the president who chooses to focus

on the Pacific region does not mean that Atlantic integration matters less to him. Turning NATO into an organization able to confront the challenges of the post-Cold War and post-American world order and rebalancing allied relations into productive cooperation would be a meaningful and lasting legacy of every president, including Obama. A notable profile of Europe in the president's administration's early official rhetoric and agenda might be read as a sign of such aspiration.

Alliances as Means to Security

President Obama's primary concern with continuing this alliance for the purpose of common security is to strengthen it by improving allied capabilities and renewing allied commitments. His sense of allied relations is built on the existence of a strong military, specifically on shared military responsibilities. Obama believes that the alliance will be able to repel an attack of an enemy if all allies are more capable defensively. Reading into the president's rhetoric of the alliance, there does not seem to be an alternative. Failing to improve strategic capabilities means failing to deliver on the core principle of the alliance that ensures mutual responsibility to common security.

To demonstrate the need for greater contribution to the partnership, Obama talks about past and ongoing terrorist activity. He recalls that terrorists have struck in both Europe and America and warns that "Al Qaida trains, plots, and threatens to launch their next attack" (Obama 2009i). He speculates that the "attack could occur in any nation," though "it is probably more likely that Al Qaida would be able to launch a serious terrorist attack in Europe than in the United States because of proximity" (Obama 2009g). Invoking the past and predicting future security threats, Obama strikes at the heart of the alliance. Transatlantic security defines the identity and mission of the partnership. It preserves and maintains the relationship among allies. Falling short of fulfilling one's responsibilities puts other partners at risk.

Directing attention to a tangible threat to the security of the allies, which consequently implies a weak alliance, is rhetorically effective in ensuring that the allies unite and feel empowered under a common threat. Obama suggests that force that has been driving partners apart can be used to ensure that their actions are unified and lead directly to the same outcome. Doubt that has accompanied the questions of war on terror can be turned into mutual reliance and trust in each other's concern about common peace and prosperity. Isolation can help allies re-convince themselves of the principle that "Europe's security [is] the United States security and

vice versa” (Obama 2009g) to the commitment that “An attack on one [ally is] viewed as an attack on all” (Obama 2009a).

Dealing with the problems involved in the mission in Afghanistan is a means to achieve the goal. Obama recognizes that “When 9/11 happened, Europe responded as a true friend would respond to the United States, saying, ‘We are all Americans’ ” (Obama 2009a). He praises France for its leadership and understanding regarding the mission. He honors the British and German troops and governments for their service and resources. In appreciating Europe’s role in Afghanistan, the president tries to countermeasure some of the failures of the Bush administration. His words of thanks are an attempt to revive in allies the feeling of identity and belonging, re-inspire in them the sense of commitment, and encourage them to rally again around a shared vision of their way forward.

For this purpose, he grounds the vision in the alliance’s core values, which he describes as antithetical to those of terrorists’. Obama states that terrorist “organizations are willing to kill innocent people because of a twisted, distorted ideology. And we as democracies and as people who value human life can’t allow those organizations to operate” (Obama 2009a). The core values of the alliance are the foundation of the partnership’s identity and its cause. They define its philosophy and system as superior to those represented by the enemy. The values contain an obligation for allies to prevent vicious and evil acts and hence guarantee that allied action is humane and good. Moreover, they imply that the action is morally justified, regardless of the means taken to carry it out. The injustice to be righted serves to rationalize the extent of violence.

A similar line of thinking applies when Obama persuades Europe to strengthen its commitment to the alliance’s military structures. He makes a point that during and after the Cold War it was precisely the US military power that ensured the continent’s recovery and stability. The president remarks that “we take this peace and prosperity for granted, but this destination was not easily reached, nor was it predestined. The buildings that are now living monuments to European union – unity were not drawn from simple blueprints. They were born out of the blood” (Obama 2009a). In the stated message, Obama leads Europe to a sense of obligation. He summons it to translate its intentions into action, to stop making excuses and participate in joint efforts. The implied message is that time has now come to pay one’s duty to the alliance. Europe needs to accept that the partnership’s activity extends beyond the continent’s borders and its leaders’ tactics in solving problems so far.

Credibility as Means to Alliance

Building credibility for the argumentation for a stronger alliance, Obama recalls the September 11, 2001, attacks. He stresses that “The United States of America did not choose to fight a war in Afghanistan” (Obama 2009a) and reminds that “We were attacked by an Al Qaida network.” He continues to emphasize that in the attacks an Al Qaida network “killed thousands on American soil, including French and Germans.” His discourse is powerful because it imposes an interpretation that is difficult to disagree with. It calls the enemy’s attack a deliberative offensive and defines allied use of force a matter of necessity. It casts the alliance in the role of a guardian of peace, a defender of freedom, and a warrior on the righteous side in the struggle between the forces of good and evil. It legitimizes its actions in the name of protection of nations and territories as well as their systems of governments, religious beliefs, and civic values.

Speaking about the problems of the partnership instead of closing eyes and pretending that they do not exist also gives the president the credibility to act. Obama openly admits that “Nowhere have we seen more suspicion than around questions of war and peace and how we respond to terrorism” (Obama 2009a). By acknowledging that America deserves part of the responsibility for the difficulties within the alliance, he communicates the will to rebuild partners’ trust and confidence in the US’ readiness to act together for common purpose. Saying without equivocation that “we must be honest with ourselves” (Obama 2009a) and “that there’s something more that has crept into our relationship” conveys his determination to get to the root of the problem rather than merely state that it is there. Behind these words lies a rare shift in the US presidents’ approach to foreign policy making. Although only three months into his first term, Obama makes remarks that may not sound particularly radical but are an isolated case of a sitting US president trying to reverse the trend that asserted America is always right while admitting his country’s fallibility.

The way Obama uses the concept of American exceptionalism is also relevant in the discussion of legitimizing his approach towards the alliance. In the treatment of the concept, the president explains that “the fact that I am very proud of my country . . . does not lessen my interest in recognizing the value and wonderful qualities of other countries” (Obama 2009e). He thinks that “we have a core set of values . . . that, though imperfect, are exceptional” (Obama 2009e). He sees “no contradiction between believing that America has a continued extraordinary role in leading the world . . . and recognizing that that leadership . . . depends on, [the US] ability to create partnerships” (Obama 2009e). While there may be no contradiction, the choice of the

model of America's activism in the alliance that Obama favors is ambiguous at least. The use of the concept suggests that the president wants room for maneuver and justification of less popular policy stances and practices. He demonstrates support for active policy and multilateral approach but also signals his approval for US' limited international role and independent global action.

Obama's discourse on the alliance is not without boundaries, however. The president clearly distances himself from previous US administrations' approaches to NATO and takes his own attitude. His choice of words is strategic in nature, repeating reform and renewal to stress that it is time to end the status quo and move forward, substituting alliance with partnership to subject restructuring of the organization to a joint effort, and using modal verbs of obligation to make it clear that cooperation is not a matter of choice but of necessity. Consequently, it is not hard to define where, according to Obama, the border should be for the alliance, if it wants to become an international good for allies to inherit and a means to accomplish the task it is called upon to perform, rather than becoming a burden to carry and an impediment to development of productive mutual affairs.

Conclusion

From this analysis, three conclusions can be drawn. First, President Obama creates his own vocabulary of the alliance. Second, the rhetoric sets the course and defines the nature of his policies. Third, the policies demonstrate his political practice. Obama's rhetoric of the alliance defines NATO in terms of a relationship/a partnership. It restates allied values and tasks but reinvents the way to stay committed to them. It continues to appreciate allies' shared history but shifts on how present and future challenges should be confronted. It puts responsibilities first, balances interests, and leaves little room for negotiation. The working of the alliance within the president's rhetoric is suggestive of his motive. The proposed assumption is that Obama wants public opinion to share his view of the relationship in which all allies have a mission in the world. Positioning the obligation argument as the purpose behind the alliance's actions allows him to justify involvement in existing conflicts, manage disagreements about the necessity to carry out new engagements, and embrace the ambiguities in his own statements regarding why and how operations should be conducted.

Moreover, Obama's rhetoric of the alliance informs of his administration's course in transatlantic relations. While the president's presence at the celebration of the 60th anniversary of

the establishment of NATO can be seen as a sign of the US support for the partnership, his rhetoric clearly makes this support conditional, in that it obliges allies on both sides of the Atlantic to work harder for their relationship: Europe to place higher priority on common purpose than individual interests and to look at American policies through the lens of benefits instead of risks and the US to attach more importance to allied cooperation and to show more respect for allies' policies. Rhetoric which goes beyond the niceties of diplomatic protocol and openly addresses core disagreements on critical issues signals that the administration is approaching the alliance in a very pragmatic manner.

In doing so, it is attempting to break the deadlock in transatlantic relations, one in which Europe does not block US war on terror policy but does not support it enough either; the US demands much from Europe in terms of assistance with war on terror challenges but implements policies that widen the divide between allies and keep them more isolated. In trying to narrow the differences, the president is convincing that preserving the transatlantic partnership in its current state is as unlikely as decoupling from it and pursuing a successful independent foreign policy course. Unlike allies driven by either sentiment or skepticism associated with the alliance's main focus and concerns, Obama is motivated by political reality. Deciding whether this motivation served him well is bound to take time and generate discussion. The ideographic analysis is part of this process and conversation, explaining how motives are developed and translated into action, and why this matters.

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**Satisfaction from the Actions of the Local
Governments: Research Report**

Political Preferences
2019, vol. 25: 37-52
journals.us.edu.pl/index.php/PP
Submitted: 08/12/2019
Accepted: 29/12/2019

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Abstract:

In the article two main issues are depicted: the evaluation of activities of voivodes, mayors and also the evaluation of local government activities. In a research conducted from the end of 2018 until the beginning of 2019 we decided to verify 3 hypotheses. First one was: confidence towards the local government results from positive evaluations of voivodes and mayors activities. The results were compared with the data from previous research. The second hypothesis assumes, that positive evaluation of local government activities is not connected to the activities of single executive body, but is connected to how the whole system of local government works. Third one, however, assumes that local government on the level of voivodeship is rated lower than city (commune) government. Relatively high level of satisfaction about the activities of voivodes and mayors, that were recorded in 2012 research not only remained but even increased. This is the factor that strengthens confidence in local government and favors their positive evaluation. Also voivodeship governments are positively evaluated by the surveyed, however, the level of satisfaction is lower than those of other local authorities.

Keywords: 2018 local government election, local government, executive bodies of local government

Introduction

“And yet in commune lies the strength of free societies” Alexis de Tocqueville (1976: 134) wrote once, when analyzing how the USA democracy works. Those words could be used as a motto for the authors of the local government reform initiated in Poland at the turn of 1989/1990. In next three decades “restoration of local government as valued social appreciation and practical principles of the functioning of a democratic state” (Tomaszewska-Hołuż 2015: 23).

Rafał Lisiakiewicz (2015: 50) indicates “decentralization of Polish Republic is one of huge achievements of Polish reforms after the fall of communism. Most research of Polish local government in Poland highlights that this part of Polish reform gave a positive result and one can say about the success of Polish local government”.

However, the next stages of local government reforms, with the return of commune government in 1990 by Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s administration, with creating land and municipal districts along with voivodeship government by Jerzy Buzek’s administration in 1998/1999 and finally introducing direct election of voivodes and mayors since 2002, did not only receive positive opinions of experts, but were also relatively well received by Polish society, which was reflected in public opinions research. This positive attitude is not changing even with objections towards horizontal and vertical accountability of regional governments raised in many publications towards the topic¹ and also revealed from time to time scandals. Local governments are the part of public administration, that Polish people have the highest confidence in, leaving institutions like parliament, state government, courts and political parties far behind. For example in CBOS 2016 survey, 64% interviewees had confidence in local authorities (11% full confidence, 54% rather has confidence). Lack of trust to local authorities declared 23% of the surveyed (17% rather has no confidence, 6% lack of confidence). In the same research 38% interviewees declared confidence in government (8% “full”, 30% “rather), and 50% declared lack of confidence (30% rather had no confidence, 20% lack of confidence). Regarding Sejm and Senate 30% had trust and 54% had not. In reference to courts it was accordingly 45% and 42%. Of the 24 institutions included in this survey, local authorities were placed on the 8 spot (behind WOŚP – The Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity, Caritas, Polish Red Cross, army, scouting, Roman Catholic Church and police), where courts were 15th, government 17th and parliament 20th. The lowest confidence interviewees declared for political parties, which is trusted by 20% (and only 2% have full confidence) and 65% did not trust (CBOS 18/2016). According to the data from table 1, this kind of situation persists since 20 years.

¹ See: Hausner’s team remarks, in which attention had been paid for the factors that limits horizontal and vertical responsibilities of local government bodies. In reference to the first, degree of executive bodies dominance, authority and legislative position, position of other control and balance bodies. For second: degree of competition, position and independence of local media, transparency of authorities and the use of public funds (Bober et al. 2013: 28).

Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question: *Do you, in general, trust or do not trust those institutions?*


Institutions	I 2002		I 2004		I 2006		I 2008		I 2010		I 2012		I 2016	
	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
Political parties	15	65	13	72	24	61	28	54	14	76	20	65	20	65
Sejm and Senate	28	54	21	67	30	54	39	44	21	68	29	55	30	54
State government	42	45	21	68	47	40	56	32	31	60	39	49	38	50
Courts	40	49	31	60	39	51	59	29	44	45	45	44	45	42
City/commune authorities	43	41	53	34	56	33	68	23	55	34	58	30	64	23

In table answers “I definitely trust” and “I rather trust” were summed up, replies “I definitely don’t trust” and “I rather don’t trust” were also summed up and answer “hard to say” was omitted.

Source: CBOS (18/2016). *Zaufanie społeczne*. Komunikat z badań CBOS nr 18/2016. Warszawa: Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej.

Despite the fact, that when Law and Justice rose to power conflicts between local government and ruling political party were quite frequent (especially with those local authorities controlled by the opposition), it did not affect people confidence for the local authorities. On the contrary, during 2014-2018 term of office – according to the chart 1 – number of positive answers increased by 10 points.

Chart 1. Evaluation of city/commune authorities activities



Source: CBOS (121/2018). *Oceny działalności instytucji publicznych*. Raport z badań CBOS nr 121/2018. Warszawa: Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej.

In the research conducted by “Political Preferences” project in 2012 I verified a hypothesis that confidence to local authorities is a result of positive evaluation of voyts nad mayors activities (Alberski 2013: 33-46). In 2018 I decided to repeat the research. Also two new questions were added to the questionnaire. One was to serve to clarify, if the positive evaluation of local government is only connected to the activities of one-man executive or it is connected to the whole system of local government. Second question referred to the evaluation of local government activities (on the voivodeship level). It served to verify a hypothesis assuming that local governments on the voivodeship level are rated lower than local governments working in the city (commune).

In case of analyzing the empiric data I created following research questions. First of them, whether the very positive evaluation of voyts and mayors activities indicated in 2012 research maintained in the situation, where their activities in 2014-2018 term of office were heavily criticized by the Law and Justice party? Second, how much positive and negative evaluation of regional authorities activities, formulated by political parties elite are reflected in the views of the supporters of individual political parties? Third, what kind of factors have an impact on more positive evaluation of local authorities by the interviewees than those on the voivodship level? Fourth and last, what sociodemographic variables have an impact on evaluating regional authorities in Poland.

The research was carried out between December 2018 and February 2019. The nationwide sample was selected in Poland in a quota-layered manner (970 people). The disjointed layers were voivodeships (N = 16), while the amount controlled variables were sex, age and place of residence (municipalities or countryside). The research was carried out using the questionnaire method.

Satisfaction with the activities of voyt and mayor

In the research conducted in 2018 almost half of interviewees (49,6) expressed satisfaction with the activities of voyt and mayor in their place of living (12% answers of “definitely yes”, 37.6% “rather yes”). Quarter of surveyed declared dissatisfaction (9.5% answers “definitely no”, 15.4% “rather no”). 25.5% had no opinion in the matter. Compared to the research from 6 years ago, number of satisfied people rose by 5 points, just as the undecided did. The number of dissatisfied from the activities of their voyt and mayor fell by 10.5 points.

Table 2. *I am happy about a voyt (mayor) activities in my place of living – answer percentage according to the place of living in 2012 and 2018.*


Place of living	Yes		No		Hard to say	
	2012	2018	2012	2018	2012	2018
Countryside	44.1	48.6	38.1	24.6	17.8	26.8
Municipality up to 20K inhabitants	47.5	51.0	39.6	20.2	12.9	28.8
Municipality between 20K-100K inhabitants	38.8	55.8	38.8	20.9	22.4	23.3
Municipality between 100K-200K inhabitants	52.8	47.6	24.1	27.4	23.1	25.0
Municipality with more than 200K inhabitants	42.3	46.6	32.9	29.9	24.8	23.5

In table answers “Yes” and “Rather Yes” were summed up as “Yes” and answers “No” and “Rather No” were summed up as “No”.

Source: Alberski (2013: 37) and own sources.

According to the data from table 2, the highest satisfaction from local authorities activities (in this case mostly mayors) declared residents of municipalities between 20K to 100K inhabitants (17.4% definitely yes, 38.4 % rather yes). In these group of interviewees in years 2012-2018 there was the largest increase in positive ratings (up by 17 points). To a lesser extent, satisfaction with the activities of a voyt or mayor was observed among respondents living in the countryside (+4.5 points), residents of municipalities up to 20K inhabitants (+3.5) and municipalities more than 200K inhabitants (+4.3). Only residents of municipalities between 100K – 200K inhabitants declared lower rate of satisfaction than six years ago (-5.2 points). Also only in these group the number of dissatisfied increased by 4,3 points. However, inhabitants of the biggest municipalities with more than 200K inhabitants are more critical to their mayors (9.3% of answers was “definitely yes”, 37.3% “rather yes”, 16.7% “rather not”, 13.2% “definitely not”)

Chart 2. Distribution of average answers to the question: *I am happy of a voyt (mayor) in my place of living*” in each electoral supporters in 2018 local election (full test: 3.27 people)



Source: own elaboration.

Satisfactory rate for the activities of voyt and mayor decreased with the increase in the level of education. “Definitely yes” and “rather yes” answers were chosen by 61.2% of interviewees with lower secondary education, 50% with vocational education, 49.7% with secondary education and 47.7% with higher education. In this last group we can also notice the highest percentage of “definitely not” and “rather not” answers (28.7%). The least frequently those answers were chosen by interviewees with vocational education (18.9%), however in this group we also have the highest number of people without an opinion (31.1% “hard to say”). In comparison to the already mentioned research from the end of 2012 (Alberski 2013: 37) satisfactory rate increased in all groups distinguished by the level of education – from 1.8 points in interviewees with higher education to 14.7 points in people with the lowest level of education. Also in all analyzed groups rate of dissatisfaction has dropped. Even in the most critical group of interviewees with higher education number of answer “definitely not” and “rather not” decreased by 5 points.

Comparing data from 2012 and 2018 one more variable should be mentioned – the age of the surveyed. In 2012 age did not differentiate interviewees’ answers. In 2018 three from six age

groups differentiated. Interviewees above age 65 express above average satisfaction from their voyts and mayors activities: 57.7% of “definitely yes” and “rather yes” answers and only 18.6% of “definitely not” and “rather not” responds. Most often moderate or high dissatisfaction declares interviewees from 18-24 years old group (30.4% of “definitely not” and “rather not” answers), however in this group also positive responses prevail (44.8 % of “definitely yes” and “rather yes” answers). Lower rate of satisfaction are expressed by the interviewees from the age group of 25-34: only 43.7% of “definitely yes” and “rather yes” answers. Also more than quarter of surveyed in this group (26.5%) have chosen “definitely not” and “rather not” answers. At the same time there was the highest number of undecided people in this age group with 29.8% of “hard to say” answer.

As for other variables, like gender, declared income level and religion did not significantly differentiate interviewees’ answers.

Similarly to previous researches, the variable differencing the satisfactory rate of the activities of a voyt and a mayor was political parties preferences. According to the chart 2, supporters of Polish People’s Party (PSL), Left Together and Civic Coalition have the highest satisfactory rate. In case of PSL even 20% of interviewees chose “definitely yes” and 47.7% “rather yes”. Only every tenth of PSL voter declares dissatisfaction. Even fewer dissatisfied responders are in left electorate – only 7.3%. In this group moderate satisfaction dominates (61% of „rather yes” answers). On the opposite side there are supporters of Kukiz’15 and other (smaller) parties. In those groups negative rating prevail over positive. Among Paweł Kukiz party supporters only 29.4% of interviewees gave answers “definitely yes” or “rather yes”, when 41.2% gave “rather not” or “definitely not”. In other parties supporters those percentages were 32.3% and 43.1% respectively. Among the surveyed that did not vote in 2018 local election, answers about their satisfactory level with the activities of a voyt and a mayor are very diverse. In this group 40.4% of answers were positive, 27.4% negative, and almost one third had no opinion (32.2% of “hard to say” answers).

It seems, supporters of political parties, which representatives more often perform or performed local government function, are happier with the executive authorities of local government, when supporters of new or smaller parties and also those who did not vote are more skeptical in their evaluation.

Table 3. *I am happy of a voyt (mayor) in my place of living* - answer percentage in electorate supporters of the two biggest political parties in 2012 and 2018.

Political parties	Yes		No		Hard to say	
	2012	2018	2012	2018	2012	2018
Citizen Platform (Coalition)	55.5	62.3	26.3	16.0	18.2	21.7
Law and Justice	36.8	44.3	40.8	31.4	22.4	24.3

In table answers “Yes” and “Rather Yes” were summed up as “Yes” and answers “No” and “Rather No” were summed up as “No”.

Source: Alberski (2013: 38) and own sources.

According to the data from the table 3, supporters of the two main parties still differ much from each other, when it comes to the level of satisfaction from a voyt and a mayor activities. Also in both supporters in years 2012-2018 similar changes appeared – level of satisfaction have increased (in Citizen Platform supports for 6.8 points, Law and Justice – 7.5 points) and the number of dissatisfied dropped (in Citizen Platform supporters for 10.3 points, Law and Justice – 9.4 points).

Table 4. *I am happy of a voyt (mayor) in my place of living* - answer percentage by declared political views in 2012 and 2018.

Declared political views	Yes		No		Hard to say	
	2012	2018	2012	2018	2012	2018
Left	49.4	60.4	32.3	19.8	18.3	19.8
Centre	48.1	56.1	29.1	17.7	22.8	26.2
Right	39.2	41.0	40.5	38.0	20.3	21.0
I don’t know/Hard to say	43.0	47.2	36.3	17.6	20.7	35.2

In table answers “Yes” and “Rather Yes” were summed up as “Yes” and answers “No” and “Rather No” were summed up as “No”.

Source: Alberski (2013: 39) and own sources.

In the research conducted in 2018, like 6 years ago, satisfactory rate of a voyt and a mayor activities was higher in interviewees that declare left and centre political views. Among respondents declaring right wing political views, opinions – according to data from table 4 – are much more polarized, however, in 2018 the number of satisfied people slightly increased. Although it can be seen that differences between interviewees with left wing or centre views and

right – wing in the described case increased in comparison to previous research. Noticeable changes appeared among respondents that cannot define their political views – in this group, in comparison to previous research, number of undecided significantly increased (by 14.5 points) and the number of dissatisfied dropped (by 18.7%).

Data from 2018 research indicates, like 6 years ago, that the majority of interviewees are satisfied with a vojt and a mayor activities in their place of living. Relatively higher level of satisfactory declares supporters of PSL, Left and Civic Coalition, respondents with left wing and centre political vies, inhabitants of municipality between 20K to 100K inhabitants and interviewees in age group 18 to 24 years old. 2018 local election supporters of Law and Justice declares slightly lower level of satisfaction of a vogt and a mayor activities than the general respondents, and significantly lower than supporters of PSL, Left and Civic Coalition. In comparison to 2012 research the declared level of satisfaction slightly increased in Jarosław Kaczyński’s party supporters. The interviewees that did not participate in local election seem to be the most undecided and also could not determine their position on the left – right political view axis.


Opinions about the activities of local government

In the research conducted in 2018 we asked interviewees in the questionnaire to give their view on two opinions: “local government in my commune (city) does its duties well” and “my voivodeship government does its duty well”. For the first opinion, 6.9% of the surveyed answers were „definitely yes”, 39.8% “rather yes”, 16.9% “rather not”, 6.1% “definitely not” and 30.3% of interviewees give “hard to say” answer. In reference to voivodeship governments the number of uncertain people is even higher – 43% of interviewees gave “hard to say” answer. Rest of respondents gave moderately positive responses, more than 1/3 of them answered “rather yes” (35.1%), 4.9% - “definitely yes”. 12.8% of interviewees gave “rather not” answers and 4.2% - “definitely not”.

Similarly to the question about voyts and mayors the most satisfied with the activities of local governments are supporters of the left, Civic Coalition and Polish People Party. In the case of the first two groups the assessment of activities of local governments are almost the same, however, PSL supporters seemed to be more critical about the local authorities. Similar situation appears between the supporters of local committees, but in this case the shift in the scale is

mostly determined by “hard to say” answers. 16% of interviewees chose this answer in the question about local government and in the case of voivodeship government the number of answers increased to 60%. Respondents that claimed to support Law and Justice and also the group of people who did vote the satisfaction of voivodeship government activities are slightly higher than for the local ones. The most critical of the local government’s activities are supporters of Kukiz’15 and other smaller parties. 30.3% of Kukiz’15 supporters chose “rather not” and “definitely not” to assess the activities of commune (city) authorities (27.7% interviewees of this group had opposite opinion).

Chart 3. Distribution of average answers for questions : “local government in my commune (city) does its duties well” and “ my voivodeship government does its duties well” in each supporter groups in 2018 local election (entire sample 3.24 for both questions)



Source: own elaboration

In reference to voivodeship government those ratings arranged similarly: 29.4% on “no”, 26.5% on “yes”. Even more critical were supporters of smaller parties. In this group of interviewees answers spread accordingly 49.2% and 21.5% in reference to local authorities, 44.6% and 23.1% in reference to voivodeship authorities. The obtained research results confirm that voters who relatively well evaluate activities of local government are willing to “reward” with their votes (at least in voivodeship election) those political parties, which so far dominate in those authorities. More critical voters, as can be assumed, search on political market for new, often extreme offers or resign from participating in the election at all.

According to data from the table 5, declared political point of view differentiates the interviewees’ assessments regarding the functioning of local government. The most positive ratings came from interviewees declaring left-wing views, little more critical are respondents with more centre views. Respondents with right-wing views are most divided in their assessments. Interviewees that cannot define their political views more often chose “hard to say” answer. In reference to voivodeship authorities this response was chosen from more than half of this group of respondents. It can also be noticed that for interviewees it is much easier to evaluate the activities of authorities on the level of commune (city) than voivodeship. The respondents avoided extreme answers – answers “definitely yes” and “definitely not” represent only a few percent of responses in each group.

Table 5. “Local government in my commune (city) does its duties well” and “ my voivodeship government does its duties well” – answer percentage distributions in context of declared political views

Declared political views	Local government	Yes	Not	Hard to say
Left	Commune (city)	59.4	18.4	22.2
	Voivodeship	50.0	13.6	36.4
Centre	Commune (city)	50.3	18.2	31.5
	Voivodeship	45.1	14.0	40.9
Right	Commune (city)	39.8	33.2	27.0
	Voivodeship	33.0	24.7	42.3
I don't know/hard to say	Commune (city)	42.8	17.6	39.6
	Voivodeship	37.2	12.4	50.4

In table answers “Definitely yes” and “rather yes” were summed up as “Yes” and answers “definitely not” and “rather not” were summed up as “Not”

Source: own elaboration.

From other considered variables, it is worth to notice age and place of living. In case of the first one the oldest voters (65 years old and more) stand out. They gave the highest marks for local authorities. 43.3% of answers in this group gave “rather yes” answers and 7.2% “definitely yes” about local government activities. The opposite opinion had only 15.5% (9.8% “definitely not” and 5.7% “rather not”) of the oldest interviewees. In reference to regional government the oldest voters have also high marks (37.1% of “rather yes” answers, 6.7% “definitely yes” to 9.8% “rather not” and 5.7% “definitely not”).

In reference to local authorities interviewees in age group from 18 to 24 rarely make positive assessments (38.1% of “rather yes” answers and 4.8% “definitely yes”). The highest number of negative answers gave respondents in age group of 55-64 (22.4% of “rather not” answers, 6.4% “definitely not”). The lowest number of positive marks to the activities of regional government gave interviewees from 35-44 years old (31.7% of “rather yes” answers and 3.8% “definitely yes”). The most critical are the youngest respondents from 18 to 24 (14.3% of “rather not” answers, and .6% “definitely not”).

According to the data from the table 6, local authorities’ work is appreciated by inhabitants of small and medium municipalities. In group of respondents living in municipalities up to 20K inhabitants 45.2% of surveyed gave “rather yes” answer and 4.8% “definitely yes”. In municipalities between 20K and 100K inhabitants it was accordingly 38.4% and 10.5% of respondents. In those groups there was the smallest number of critical responses. In case of evaluating the work of voivodeship authorities, the interviewees living in municipalities of 100K to 200K inhabitants stand out. Almost half of them gave positive evaluation of regional government authorities (44.4% of “rather yes” answers and 4.8% “definitely yes”). It is about 10 points higher than in other respondents groups. The mentioned group is also the only one that is more positive about the activities of voivodeship authorities than those of local government. Perhaps it is due to the fact that interviewees living in big municipalities are more oriented in voivodeship government activities. Also in this group we also can observe a relatively small number of “hard to say” answers (34.7%).

Table 6. “Local government in my commune (city) does its duties well” and “ my voivodeship government does its duties well” – answer percentage distributions by place of living.

Place of living	Local government	Yes	Not	Hard to say
Country-side	Commune (city)	45.0	24.5	30.5
	Voivodeship	39.0	18.4	42.6
Municipalities up to 20K inhabitants	Commune (city)	50.0	22.1	27.9
	Voivodeship	37.5	19.2	43.3
Municipalities between 20K-100K inhabitants	Commune (city)	48.8	18.0	33.2
	Voivodeship	37.8	8.7	53.5
Municipalities between 100K-200K inhabitants	Commune (city)	46.0	21.0	33.0
	Voivodeship	49.2	16.1	34.7
Municipalities above 200K inhabitants	Commune (city)	46.6	26.5	26.9
	Voivodeship	39.2	21.1	39.7

In table answers “Definitely yes” and “rather yes” were summed up as “Yes” and answers “definitely not” and “rather not” were summed up as “Not”

Source: own elaboration.

Also other variables, like gender, level of education or declared religion did not remarkably differentiate the answers for questions regarding the evaluation of local authorities.

How can be expected, satisfaction in the activities of voyts and mayors is strongly connected with positive remarks of local governments work. In group of people who were satisfied from the executive body in the commune (city), 88.8% of interviewees were also satisfied about local government activities (opposite opinion had 1.7% respondents of this group). Also, among those who were unsatisfied from the activities of a voyt or a mayor, 81.3% of respondents were also unhappy about local government activities, satisfied – 2.2%. This relation is not so clear in reference to voivodeship governments. In groups satisfied from the executive body activities in commune (city), satisfaction from voivodeship government work declare 63.8% of respondents, 5.2% are unhappy and 31% have no opinion. In group unsatisfied from the activities of vogts and mayors majority (51.1%) are also displeased with voivodeship government work. 15.2% of interviewees in this group are satisfied and more than one third (33.7%) have no opinion.

Results from the presented research indicates, that positive assessments of local government more often are expressing supporters of Left, Polish People Party and Civic Coalition in the 2018 voivodeship government election, people with left and centre political

views, voters from age group more than 65 years old and supporters satisfied from the activities of voivodeships and mayors in their place of living. Relatively more critical are supporters of smaller parties, Kukiz'15, those who did not vote in 2018 voivodeship government election and also voters with right wing political view, and those who are unsatisfied from the activities of voivodeships and mayors. Local governments are generally evaluated more positively than voivodeship authorities, but in the second case, it has to be pointed out the high number of "hard to say" answers. However in some group of respondents the reverse is true. This is especially true for the Law and Justice supporters, those who did not vote and citizens of municipalities between 100K-200K inhabitants.

Summary

Referring to the hypotheses presented at the beginning, it can be said that they had been confirmed. Relatively high level of satisfaction in voivodeships and mayors activities, recorded in 2012 research, not only persisted in 2018, but even slightly increased. This might be a factor that increases confidence to local authorities and promotes their positive assessment. Also voivodeship governments are evaluated positively by interviewees, but level of satisfaction is generally lower in comparison to other local authorities.

Referring to the research questions raised in the beginning of the article, it has to be said, that the Law and Justice critic of regional authorities activities during electoral campaigns in 2014 and 2018, and also during 2014-2018 term of office, did not decrease the satisfaction of interviewees in voivodeships and mayors' activities. Moreover, in 2018 research the satisfactory level increased a little. The high number of positive remarks was not even hurt by the increasing conflict between the government and some regional authorities (represented in particular by presidents of the biggest cities) since 2015. However, it has to be remembered that during the time of the research a tragedy took place – President of Gdańsk, Paweł Adamowicz was assassinated during the final event of Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity (Wielka Orkiestra Świątecznej Pomocy - WOŚP). This circumstance could have some influence on some responders and their answers. Referring to the second research question, it has to be said, that in the evaluation of voivodeships and mayors' activities, and also regional authorities the difference between political parties supporters is much smaller than the difference between those individual parties leaders. What is important, the number of positive responses on regional authorities'

activities increased even in the supporters of Law and Justice, when negative decreased. The same tendency occurred in the supporters of Civic Platform.

Regarding two last research questions, the collected data does not allow to formulate categorical theses. In reference to the difference between the evaluation of local and voivodship you can get the impression that voivodship activities are lesser known by interviewees (as evidenced by the high number of “hard to say” answers). According to the research results, influence on the evaluation of regional authorities activities have variables like age, level of education, place of living and – in lesser extent – declared political view. However to answer these two questions required more detailed research.

Analyzing the results of described research there are two additional factors to consider. First, expectations of local governments, especially those on the lower level, systematically increase. It is confirmed by CBOS surveys conducted in 2017, which indicate that 58% of surveyed agreed that “state should pass more authority to local government and social organizations” is important and 28% as slightly important (CBOS 107/2017). In analogous survey conducted in 2010, only 46% of surveyed considered the stated issue as very important (CBOS 60/2010). However, still less than a half of interviewees recognizes that this rule is respected by the state (7% of “definitely yes” answers, 37% - “rather yes”). Opposite opinion had almost one third of respondents (24% of “rather not” answers, 6% - “definitely not”) (CBOS 107/2017). Secondly, in the last decade local governments became another place of political rivalry between the ruling party and opposition. This situation promotes two things: an increased interest in local political conflicts and also strengthens the recognition and position of local leaders. Frequently work on the local government level is shown as “unpolitical” and conducted for social interest in contrast to activities on the state level. All of this helps to build a positive image of local governments, which is reflected in assessments made by the surveyed.

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The Use of Regional Marketing in the Conduct of Regional Policy

Political Preferences
2019, vol. 25: 53-62
journals.us.edu.pl/index.php/PP
Submitted: 30/11/2019
Accepted: 30/12/2019

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Abstract:

The purpose of the article is to demonstrate the close relationship between regional development and territorial marketing, which based on the implementation of the marketing concept focuses on creating regional and local products and their effective positioning towards potential buyers. The presented thesis is a result of reflection on using regional marketing in creating regional policy, based on consideration of the specific features of the region which marketing specialists are supposed to know in order to create a marketing plan for the respective region. Further, the marketing plan may be used in the political strategy of regional development based on the satisfaction of the residents' needs and their individual development. The care of politicians, who fulfil their functions following the election by the citizens, and the development of residents would coexist with the creation of regional development. The phenomena should be closely interrelated. When describing the interrelation from a scientific perspective, it must be said that synergy of the indicated types of activity depends on a series of facts and correlations which fall within various scientific domains. Therefore, there is a need for multidisciplinary approach. The authors of the article hypothesize that management of regional development should be supported by the professional use of regional marketing, taking into account the assumption that each organization should shape its impact system by analysing its needs, already used solutions and the needs of its stakeholders. The views expressed are based on the analysis of selected literature.

Keywords: regional policy, regional marketing, residents' needs, regional development

Introduction

The issue of regional development on the country level within the globalisation process is extremely important. This refers not only to economic factors. First of all, it is related to the political, and further social, sociological and psychological influence of regionalisation on the residents of the region. If residents are not convinced about the development of the place they live in, and regions are not economically stable, it is difficult to talk about social and economic stability of the state. An effective regional policy requires stirring in the residents of the feeling that being properly managed they participate in a phenomenon of favourable economic trends. Growth of the importance of regions contributed to the development of a new scientific discipline which is commonly known under the term of regional science.

The interest in the development of a region is not completely new. It may not be perceived solely as a reply to the current globalisation trends. Formulation of spatial relationships by way of economic instruments appeared in the theory of economy already at the end of the 18th century. Initially, it referred to agricultural production, but at the beginning of industrial revolution it gradually started to appear in the economic theories of all sectors. At the same time, that resulted in a growing number of aspects with which we may differentiate and define a region. The specifics of the respective regions may be considered from various perspectives: economic, geographic, social, residential, cultural, etc. We refer to a multidisciplinary approach which enables a region determination by way of a broad range of aspects. On the other hand, that leads to a problem of finding a general definition of the term 'region'. Therefore, nearly all of the theoretical literary works begin with a statement that a universal definition of a region is highly problematic, because the limits of a certain space are always set out based on a previously defined objective.

Particularly important in the effective regional policy is the social and political communication of the public administration institutions and the residents of the region, because the type of communication is more anonymous than such communication in cities. Political communication may reach to methods of marketing communication strategy and avail of the same tools. Although the respective regions strive for the same objectives, both political communication and marketing communication in each of them will have their own characteristic features. The issue refers equally to internal and external communication. They may be created and organised differently in the different regions. There are, however, common features that may

be described in a scientific manner. When we start to develop a marketing mix, within the selected method, we ask ourselves two fundamental questions - what is the goal and who do we want to address (Kita 2001). De Vito, who in the connection with the intercultural differences, points out to the fact (which should be noted and accepted also in the marketing), that within the cultural dimension we have to distinguish not only the cross-cultural specifics, but also the differences within individual cultures. In other words - every major culture is composed of subcultures of various ethnic groups that are represented in the society. According to De Vito, these cultures live next to each other in relative isolation, with no tendency to interact. Some theorists call these subcultures "co-culture" (DeVito 2001). An important role for the formation of natural regions, which are developed on the natural, socio-economic, cultural and historical base, is the so-called regional identity (Strussová 2007).

Regional development is not only a political problem but also a marketing one when viewed from another research and practical perspective. The issues overlap. Important is the awareness among the researchers that beside the social and economic differences a growing role is played by the regional differences of the researched regions. The more so because regions evolve along with the inflow of immigrants whose culture and professional characteristics may be significantly different to those of the local people. What is more, when analysing demographic phenomena as well as the social and political situation of the western European countries, the effect will intensify. Europe has been changing its face, which forces a new approach in regional policy that, when well created and managed, should use the experiences of regional marketing. The marketing focuses on regional and local products and is to promote them to find buyers, tourists, investors and new residents.

In the literature available, only general categories of the issue may be found. In practice, every region following the formal grounds of local-government activities develops its own strategy of operation, a part of which refers to relations with the environment. An analysis of the strategies of provincial governments indicates that they focus mainly on political indications. The accompanying document, in which development is determined with the use of marketing, comes down to the strategy of promotion. Marketing strategy is a rare document in the Polish local government units and, if any, its contents describe promotional actions (Widera 2019). Therefore, it is not possible based on secondary sources to describe the relationship between the political strategies of the regions and their marketing strategies. In-depth research in that area is needed. A

juxtaposition of the scientific theoretical descriptions and real activities of the political authorities of the regions will enable a definition of the scientific gap and deficiencies in the practice of managing regional governments. Working out a model of using marketing activities in creating political actions may result in improving the effectiveness of the region activities towards the region development. A synergy of the indicated areas may contribute to a growing interest in a region, building an offer directed to the selected market segments, and in effect different from the competitors.

Cohesion of political activities and marketing management in a region

‘Holding political power in a region is directly related to the idea of managing a local government, which is related to marketing management, and that is further directly related to the idea of public management. Public management as a sub-discipline of management, located at the meeting point of two scientific disciplines according to the view of Szumowski, is particularly affected by the lack of systematisation and non-cohesion of terms. The researchers differentiate traditional public management, which is equivalent to administration and managerial directing of public, connected with the concept of *new public management*’ (Widera 2019). In practice each of them is subjected to the regions functioning to guidelines resulting from the creation of regional policy. In the opinion of Barbara Kożuch (2011: 17-74; Szumowski 2014: 88), public management may be defined from many perspectives. The main perspective is the identification of the management with the activities of public institution, which is further determined by the process of political elections.

Paweł Romaniuk (2010: 162) identifies management with the provision of public services, which basically leads to the common satisfaction of public needs regardless of the method of organisation of the very satisfaction. Another definition context integrates the so called normative orientation related to the traditional understanding of public administration and instrumental orientation of the general management. Particular importance is assigned to the system of values and processes leading to the efficiency of political organisations. Each of the organisations should use the available internal resources and also the surrounding resources optimally in the process of attainment of the formulated objectives. The essence of correct public management is to understand ‘public management as an effective operation of the whole system instead of particular organisations, whereas an important element differentiating it from other types of

management is its simultaneous association with solving structural problems, mainly with regard to creating the public sphere structure' (Widera 2019; König 2003: 4; Kożuch 2005: 16).

In marketing management performed on the regional level the following key features may be indicated:

1. Marketing management in a region should be shaped by the awareness of the political authorities of their long and short-term objectives, and whether the objectives are cohesive with the plan for regional development, considering the development of residents as a priority.
2. Marketing management should comprise innovativeness and systematic use of the available knowledge.
3. Its implementation must be based on a professional team, open to using the experiences of other regions.
4. The essence and benefit of using marketing activities should be supported by local communities, which should be reflected in educational activities.
5. Educational actions for the residents may not be omitted in the activities of the political authorities of a region, which assign tasks to marketing services.
6. The main role in marketing management is played by the political authorities of the region. They should be the ones to delegate activities and monitor the effects.
7. Building marketing activities may take place based on internal services or be outsourced to external organisations.
8. As regards extensive marketing activities carried out by regional authorities and supporting organisations, an above-standard model of actions is needed compared to the currently applied methods of coordination.
9. Marketing management of a region, cohesive with political actions, should be determined by strategic objectives. Strategic planning may not be a one-off activity. It must be continuous and based on setting out the particular stages. A strategic plan is a fundamental tool in marketing management of a region (Florek 2007; Jędrzejewski 2018: 83-95).

The development of regions in Poland may not be solved solely by mobilisation of local resources. Regional policy must be cohesive with politics. Not all regions may develop, as their resources differ. Territorial marketing based on the implementation of the marketing concept

focuses on the creation of regional and local products. It is particularly directed to foreign investors. It may be said that economic globalisation resulted in the setting up of a global market of foreign investments. Therefore, activities on regional and consequently on local level are essential. They significantly affect the maintenance of regions which are directed towards attracting investments. Building local development based on foreign projects is extremely important. A significant requirement while considering regional policies is to take into account the trend that in developed market economy countries foreign investments are more difficult to enforce. It is because the target country usually imposes harder investment conditions. It is also important to consider that with regard to large investment projects the political role of national authorities is as important as the willingness of the regional authorities. In that case the political dependence may be seen. The role of regional and local marketing is the performance of a continuous process of preparing the region as a product offered to investors. In such formulated strategy extremely important are the local marketing services within the resources of local authorities who cooperate with the marketing services of the region on a regular basis. Nevertheless, despite the obvious need for the existence of such system, this usually boils down to promotional and public relations activities. PR and promotional programmes do not concentrate, however, on the very regional and local product. And the latter is usually a highly imperfect one. The marketing formulation of regional and local products should take into account many factors which contribute to the attractiveness of a product.

Marketing information system in the resources of local political authorities

A proper tool for cohesive political activities and the supporting marketing activities in a region is a marketing information system. The role of the system is to systematically estimate the needs related to information, processing of the essential data and provision of the data at the proper time to the staff creating political processes in the region with the use of subordinated organisational structures. A marketing information system is a domain where people and procedures interact. The system uses tools selected adequately to the current needs. It adapts solutions which best facilitate its operation. It is an ordered collection of information, operating in accordance to the purposefully applied programmes, which exports adequate information to the inside and outside of the organisation. The information is a supporting tool in taking decisions by the political authorities.

There is no universal, model system of marketing information. Each organisation should independently shape the system by analysing their needs and solutions already applied. The system organised for the regional authorities should comprise functionalities for the subordinate institutions. The system is an extensive collection updated on a current basis, which should extend its resources as well as the tools it is using. The components of the system include: for example marketing survey, marketing research, or supporting of marketing decisions. An essential element is gaining information as a result of the research. Political authorities are dependent on their electors, therefore, knowledge of the voters' views should determine decision making. One of the reasons for carrying out marketing research is striving for the reduction of risk of making faulty decisions. The research may support regional authorities in launching and developing a project or long-term activities. A marketing information system uses statistical methods, data collections, models and techniques. It is important for the system that adequate tools are available to enable collection and interpretation of the extending sets of information, for the purpose of their transformation into a base for marketing activities. Decision-making models and statistical methods are tools which transform all of the collected data in the researched area into information of real value for the marketing services supporting the regional political authorities and managers. Models enable the understanding of marketing problems, foreseeing market events and determining the possible consequences of marketing activities (Klisiński & Widera 2006; Kotler 1994: 117-134).

Importance of quality in regional political actions models based on the practical application of marketing

The achievements of applied marketing on the economic market resulted in the re-phrasing of the term of quality from internal into an external one. It is now identified with the quality for the consumer. Quality, perceived from the marketing point of view, is a collection of features and characteristics of the service provided, which affect the capability of satisfying the research-determined or presumed needs of a customer. The quality of services directly affects the fulfilment of customers' expectations and their satisfaction from the transaction. If the quality perceived by the person acquiring a service does not coincide with the person's expectations, it may mean that the person will not acquire the service in the future or will turn to a competitive offer. As opposed to technical quality referring to the material importance of service, which may

be assessed and controlled more easily, image is a phenomenon much more difficult to assess. On the political market, the image of a politician and their party is one of the key determinants whether they receive a mandate to rule as a result of democratic elections. In the eyes of electors, the image is related to the quality of tasks performed within the occupied position. A regional politician is responsible for the quality of the services of the organisation they manage. As regards a region – this refers to regional government. Identification of faults in the quality of the services provided is one of the key elements creating the risk of losing the authority exercised. When referring to the experience of marketing, basic determinants which contribute to bad quality services may be listed. They include:

1. Discrepancy between the assessment by the political authorities of the regional development strategy implemented and the development contributing value.
2. Discrepancy between the expectations of the regional government stakeholders and the assessment of the expectations.
3. Discrepancy between the assessment by the regional government managers of the quality of the services provided and the actual quality thereof.
4. Discrepancy between the assessment by the regional managers of the effectiveness of communication with the stakeholders and assessment of the communication quality made by the stakeholders themselves.
5. Discrepancy in the assessment of the quality of the subordinated services.
6. Discrepancy in the assessment of the problems solved.
7. Discrepancy in the assessment of the extend and the usefulness of availing of knowledge and innovation, which should contribute to the improvement of the quality of the services provided.
8. Discrepancy between the assessment of the usefulness of the applied tools and their actual usefulness.
9. Discrepancy between the quality of the regional product prepared and its actual buying power.

The generally understood quality of the regional political authorities and the subordinated services should be assessed. The principle is only partially followed and refers mainly to employee assessment.

It is not applied towards the ruling politicians. In practice, the quality of their activities is verified in a democratic election. The election is in fact a key element in ruling, however, in that regard regional management seems to be insufficient. Creation of the mechanisms of periodical assessment with the use of scientific methods, for example, will not only contribute to a higher probability of repeating an electoral success but, which is more important, may be a factor leading to the improvement of the quality of political authority regardless of the interrelation of its assessment and the elections.

Diagnosing discrepancies in the assessment of quality may be carried out by way of comparison. The quality of regional development may also be tested with the use of benchmarking. The principle is to compare the region's development level to the development of other regions in the country. The actions are combined, for example, by an assessment of the quality of life for the residents, the value of investments, economic potential, number of higher education facilities, their rankings, or the number and quality of organisations providing public services. In a more advanced assessment, engagement of citizens in social life may be compared, e.g. by way of analysing the number of NGOs. An assessment in reference to a country only may not be sufficient, as the EU's binding principles, including the freedom of movement and residence, may cause that low quality of a region, and especially of its labour market, will contribute to emigration. Subsequently, the latter will lower the professional and intellectual potential of the region. The necessity of making comparisons to the other European regions is, therefore, highly justified. Even more so, because the concept of the development of the European Union has been perceived through regional development.

Conclusion

By presenting the selected interrelations between regional policy and regional marketing, the intent of the authors of this article was to emphasise that regional policy should incorporate marketing methods, techniques and tools. This refers particularly to territorial marketing, which is mostly understood as regional marketing. In the practice of managing a region and local areas, marketing is used to a lesser extent and is usually associated with promotional actions, which does not mean that such understanding of it is correct. Political actions in the term of ruling, and particularly during election campaigns, are based on political marketing. It is, therefore, hardly understandable that the awareness of the people managing the region and ruling as result of a

democratic decision of voters is so low when compared to the advantages brought about by supporting development actions based on marketing. It is hard to imagine a market success in the economic sphere without including marketing management in the management of a company. How, therefore, are regions and local areas to achieve success without being supported with marketing when they are subject to competitiveness processes? Perhaps the reason for a failure to understand that correlation is insufficient knowledge among the political creators with regard to transferring economic mechanisms to the social sphere together with the positive effects brought about by that phenomenon. Perhaps the regional services which participate in managing a region do not sufficiently avail of scientific resources. Obviously the reasons for such situations are multiple but when referred to the operating practices of fast developing regions, and at the same time to the scientific output, it is hard to contradict a thesis that in contemporary times there is no organisation on the market which may continue without marketing.

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