RIAS Nº 3.3–4.1
WINTER 2008/SPRING 2009
ISBN 1991–2773

Review of International American Studies

SPECIAL ISSUE

ON TERROR AND SECURITY

VOL. 3.3–4.1 WINTER 2008 / SPRING 2009 **ISSN 1991–2773**

TYPESETTING

ExMachina Academic Press / Wydawnictwo Naukowe ExMachina (Poland)

www.exmachina.pl

Review of International American Studies (*RIAS*), is the electronic journal of the International American Studies Association, the only worldwide, independent, non-governmental association of American Studies. *RIAS* serves as agora for the global network of international scholars, teachers, and students of America as hemispheric and global phenomenon. *RIAS* is published three times a year: in the Fall, Winter and Spring by IASA with the institutional support of the University of Silesia in Katowice lending server space to some of IASA websites and the electronic support of the Soft For Humans CMS Designers. Subscription rates or *RIAS* are included along with the Association's annual dues as specified in the "Membership" section of the Association's website (www.iasaweb.org).

All topical manuscripts should be directed to the Editor via online submission forms available at *RIAS* website (www.iasa-rias.org). General correspondence and matters concerning the functioning of *RIAS* should be addressed to *RIAS* Editor-in-Chief:

University College Ghent
Department of Translation Studies
Groot-Brittanniëlaan 45
B-9000 Ghent
Belgium

e-mail: michael.boyden@iasa-rias.org

SPECIAL ISSUE ON TERROR AND SECURITY

› Click on article page number

EDITORIAL

FEATURE ARTICLES

SECURITY UNLOCKED

FICTIONS OF TERROR

ANNOUNCEMENTS

SECURITY UNLOCKED AND FICTIONS OF TERROR

Susana Araújo
University of Lisbon

Since 9/11 and the rising interest in state security, academia has been one of the many arenas encouraged to invest in the research and dissemination of security policies and technologies, as can be seen by the growing number of programs and research funding dedicated to 'security studies' in both US and European universities. This issue of the Review of International American Studies aims to provide a critical response to this wider phenomenon, by examining and challenging the current political and cultural climate of fear, exacerbated by the 'war on terror.' The contributions to this volume will consider the rhetoric, history, and social impact of current notions of 'Homeland Security.'

Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in the US, notions of national and international security re-entered, with reinvigorated might, political discourse and praxis worldwide, through policies which extend to issues such as border protection, health and safety, immigration, citizenship and environment. This volume will explore 'security' not only as policy but as culture, as a central theme of official discourse and as a determining factor in the structure of our everyday life. Current constructions of national security can be said to be part of a mythology that goes back to the early captivity narratives, extremely popular in the US since the 17th century until the close of the 'frontier', but later rewritten and revisited in different forms and genres.[1] Narrative and fiction have always been fundamental to the construction of national self-images, as justifying means for political and military expansion. In this sense it may be opportune to draw on contemporary fiction as a way of seeing through the fictionalization of our national portraits. Jonathan Raban's novel *Surveillance* (2006), for instance, illustrates well the aggressive merge between political strategy and social anxiety which underlies our current obsession with security. Tad, one

[1] For an examination of how the motif of 'captivity narrative' is explored not only in contemporary US fiction but also in recent European fiction see Susana Araújo (2007), 'Images of Terror, Narratives of Captivity: the Visual Spectacle of 9/11 and its Transatlantic Projections,' *Symbiosis: A Journal of Anglo-American Relations*, 11 (2):27–47. In this analysis, Araújo pays particular attention to the way the image of the endangered citadel has recently migrated from New York fiction to European novels. The motif of captivity narratives in political rhetoric and the media is also explored in relation to gender issues in Susan Faludi (2007) *The Terror Dream: Fear and Fantasy in Post-9/11 America* (New York: Metropolitan Books). The paperback version of this book has had its subtitle changed to "Myth and Misogyny in an Insecure America."

of the main characters in the novel, is an actor who makes a living working on performances for the emergency services or, as the narrator puts it, participating in 'dress rehearsals for terror' (Raban, 2006:5). These performances, called 'TOPOFFs', dramatize possible states of emergency where the FEMA, the National Guard, the fire fighters, police, ambulance men, and civic officials plot 'their lines and moves' (5). 'In TOPOFF 26, nearly every rescue worker had been contaminated, fatalities had vastly exceeded predictions, chains of command had been broken down, hospitals were overwhelmed' (5). But TOPOFF 27 was even more 'realistic':

> A dirty bomb (two thousand pounds of ammonium sulphate, nitrate, and fuel oil, mixed with fifty pounds of caesium-137 in powdered form) had gone off in a container supposedly holding "cotton apparel" from Indonesia, recently unloaded from a ship docked at Harbor Island. A fireworks expert (the same guy who directed the 4 July display on Elliot Bay) created the terrific gunpowder explosion, and the rockets laden with talk to simulate the caesium. The tyre fire had been set with gasoline, the broken glass supplied by volunteers standing on roofs of neighbouring buildings. At least the pictures beamed to the other Washington would look great. (5)

Although this may sound like the stuff of fiction, Raban is drawing on an actual terrorism response exercise promoted by the Department of Homeland Security called TOPOFF2 (Top Officials 2) conducted, partly, in Seattle. The 'real' Top Officials 2 was one of a series of exercises 'involving top officials at every level of government, as well as representatives from the international community and private sector' (DHS, 2008). As the first emergency simulation since 9/11, Top Officials 2 was, at the time, the largest and most comprehensive terrorism exercise conducted in the United States:

> TOPOFF 2 was conducted from May 12 to May 16, 2003, and involved federal, state, local, and Canadian participants in a full-scale exercise that assessed how responders, leaders, and other authorities would react to the simulated release of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in two U. S. cities, Seattle, WA and Chicago, IL. The exercise scenario depicted a fictitious, foreign terrorist organization that detonated a simulated radiological dispersal device (RDD or dirty bomb) in Seattle and released the pneumonic plague in several Chicago metropolitan area locations. There was also significant pre-exercise intelligence play, a cyber-attack, and credible terrorism threats against other locations. (DHS, 2003)

Since then there has been a number of other such exercises—TOPOFF 3 and TOPOFF 4 are already described in detail by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, 2008). Raban merely takes this project some years into the future. In his novel, these exercises continue to be practised with intense regularity so that the escalation of terror is scrupulously explored and exploited. In these performances, the practice of besieging American cities by the military becomes common: tanks, artillery, and armored checkpoints make their statement clear. In Raban's portrait of the near future, the Department of Homeland security's main role is, clearly but paradoxically, to maintain the public in a constant state of insecurity.

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security by the Bush administration in November 2002 with the goal to prevent and respond to domestic emergencies, particularly terrorism, ignited a growing debate—later exacerbated by the disastrous response to Hurricane Katrina—about the premises and practices of this institution from scholars in different fields. In American Studies, this discussion has been, necessarily, intersected with debates about the future of the field itself. In 2003, in her presi-

dential address to the American Studies Association in 2003, Amy Kaplan encouraged American Studies scholars to re-engage with the question of Empire made pressing by the invasion of Iraq. Kaplan highlighted that this re-engagement should be a crucial part of the internationalization of American Studies. Yet addressing directly the ongoing debate about the re-conceptualization of the field, she inquired about the directions of the so-called 'new' or 'postnational' American Studies.[2] By reminding us that 'Empire was itself a form of transnationalism' (Kaplan, 2004: 10), she drew on the work of W.E.B. Dubois to encourage the need for scholars to 'decenter the United States' whilst continuing to 'analyze its centralized imperial power' (12).

This special issue will address the issue of security as both a national matter and international problem. 'Whose security?' is, obviously, a question more meaningfully asked by the citizens of Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention the prisoners held in the legal black hole which grounds Guantánamo Bay during the Bush administration. However, apart from observing the ways security strategies have been implemented by US foreign policies (both as military campaigns and soft power tactics), it is also important to notice how security policies have, increasingly, become all-embracing strategies for countries other than the US. As is well known, security has become a key word for politicians all over the world, as well as an incentive to increase international cooperation and partnerships, shaping not only the geopolitical landscape but also the cultural and social fabric of contemporary societies.[3] In order to address the issue of national/international security and its social impact, it is then vital to bring to this forum, not only the work of scholars from outside the US, whose work reflects a different experience of security, but also to highlight connections with other fields, by inviting scholars from outside 'American Studies' departments. This journal issue will be divided into two sections: the first section, Security Unlocked, will examine the historical, social and rhetorical workings of the 'security', hoping to open up the debate on this topic; the second section, Fictions of Terror, will look closely at the way novelists and directors challenge or absorb the new climate of fear.

SECURITY UNLOCKED

Entitled 'In the Name of Security', Amy Kaplan's contribution to this special issue pursues the project mentioned in her presidential address to ASA. If in her previous work Kaplan had scrutinized the concept of 'Homeland', in this article, she presents a historical and cultural etymology of the term 'Security'. She shows how, within the rhetoric of the Bush administration, this term breaks down boundaries between the domestic and the for-

[2] For a response to Kaplan's Presidential Address, questioning the role and positioning of the IASA *vis a vis* the internationalization of American Studies see Paul Giles (2004), 'Response to Amy Kaplan's Presidential Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Studies Association', *American Quarterly*, 56 (1) 19–24.

[3] This has had a direct impact in the funding of academic research. In Europe, for instance, security has become a priority in research and teaching in the social sciences particularly through collaborative projects. One of the dominant themes of the new Cooperation Project, the largest research call of the Seven Research Framework Program (FP7) in Europe, is dedicated to security. As part of the Cooperation project only a total of 121.44 million is to be committed from the 2009 Community budget to the 'Security Work' Programme 2009. See Cordis, http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/cooperation/home_en.html.

eign as it enables the merging of the military, border patrol, and police. Kaplan goes on to show how, since the Immigration and Naturalization Service was folded into the Department of Homeland Security, the borders of the US were further securitized and the Congress encouraged the construction of the security fence between Mexico and the US implying, among other things, that all aspiring immigrants are potential terrorists. Kaplan also highlights how the approach to 'freedom through security' underpinned by the Patriot Act and the secrecy and illegal surveillance of the Bush administration sees the upholding of free speech guaranteed by the constitution as a threat to security itself. Poignantly, her article concludes by showing how Bush's doctrine of preemptive war is as much about geopolitical expansion as about temporal projection: preemptive warfare is an expansion into a 'secure' (i.e. conservative) future, where social change is seen as a threat.

In 'Mobilizing Fear: US Politics Before and After 9/11' Scott Lucas shows how the concept of 'politics of fear' can be effectively applied to the reconsideration of US foreign policy in both historical and contemporary cases. By drawing comparisons between Truman's administration and later governments (not overlooking, for example, the contribution of the Clinton administration to the ongoing identification of countries such as Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya as 'rogue states') this article demonstrates how the mobilization of fear was linked to the quest for 'preponderance of power' as a main strategy of American foreign policy. Lucas goes on to show how a regime change in Iraq was on the agenda since the first meeting of George W. Bush's National Security Council in January 2001, and argues that September 11 was, thus, the opportunity for the Bush administration to reframe the battle for security in the service of its long-term foreign policy goals.

Frank Furedi presents us with a different take on this subject in his article '"The Long War": Who is Winning the Battle for Ideas?' He implies that the relentless expansion of security is not merely a foreign policy strategy and suggests, instead, that the tendency to expand the agenda of security is underpinned by the problems that Western societies have in endowing social experience with meaning. The focus of his discussion is the relationship between the inflated sense of insecurity and the ambiguities that surround the search for meaning. Referring to the so-called phenomenon of 'sudden radicalization,' Furedi argues that the media depicts radicalization as a symptom of vulnerability (i.e. as something that afflicts the young and vulnerable or those suffering from psychological problems) when it often expresses confidence and a firm set of beliefs. In opposition to this, the lack of confidence of political and cultural elites in the West to conduct a successful campaign in the battlefield of ideas reveals, according to Furedi, the absence of firm values and directions supporting 'the way of life', which the 'war of terror' is meant to defend.

Furedi's work also alerts us to the connection between current discussions on security raised by the 'war on terror' and previous debates about risk society—a discussion which has emerged over the past two decades in the social and political sciences. The work of Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens has been highly influential, placing the concept of risk society firmly on the political agendas. According to Beck, modern society has changed fundamentally from a society characterized primarily by inequalities of wealth and income to a society where threats cut across traditional inequali-

ties. Beck argues that preoccupations with risk in industry, chemicals, pollution, nuclear accidents, global warming and terrorism correspond to a new societal phase, highlighting that in Late Modernity risks have become global, rather than nationally specific (Beck, 1992). Giddens equally approaches risks as a result of the modernization process arguing that they arise from the nature of modern social organization and that 'manufactured risks' are produced particularly by innovative developments in science and technology. Giddens, who coined the term 'risk-society', highlights that although this term would suggest the world has become more hazardous, that is not necessarily true. Instead, it is 'a society increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of risk' (Giddens, 1999: 3). This point is taken up and reformulated by Furedi who argues that safety and security have lead to an increasingly moralizing approach to risk and change—a generalized posture which ultimately leads to social and economic paralysis (Furedi, 1997). Despite their differences, these approaches to the meanings, origins and consequences of risk in society are, nevertheless, worth taking into account when thinking about current questions of national/international security and the intrusion of security measures in everyday life. Indeed, seeing terrorism as a new chapter in world-risk society, Beck presents his vision of a 'realistic utopia': 'a cosmopolitan Europe, which draws its strength precisely not only from a fight against terrorism which simultaneously asserts liberal values, but also from the affirmation and domestication of European national diversity' (Beck, 2005). As scholars of International American Studies we may want to consider that view too, not only because of the ways in which it both connects to and detaches itself from US security strategies but, more significantly, because of the questions it raises about the creation and expansion of (perhaps competing, perhaps complicit) transnational surveillance states.

Surveillance, as the 'focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction' has undergone serious transformations in the twentieth century (Lyon, 2008: 14). Moving beyond the nation state model, it has gained new political and economical roles as it engages directly with consumer capitalism, supported by new digital technologies.[4] If Foucault had conceived the Panopticon as the archetypal model of modern discipline, restricted to confined spaces (schools, workplaces, prisons), Deleuze showed how surveillance has, now, spread to all areas of life. In 'Postscript on the Societies of Control,' Deleuze highlights the shift in social regulation from 'discipline' to 'control,' noticing that current digital technology has allowed for new forms of reductive coding of individuals (into what he calls 'dividuals'[5]) promoting free-floating monitoring and demanding constant compliance. Through the swiping of cards or screen thumb-printing in business, services and as a way to access both public and private spaces, new forms of social sorting processes are, thus, created based to a great degree on processes of

[4] David Lyon has offered useful overviews of the field of Surveillance Studies (see Lyon, 2001; Lyon, 2007) and has recently turned his attention to the role of suspicion and challenges of human rights which characterize the post 9/11 context (Lyon, 2003).

[5] By using the word 'dividual' Deleuze highlights how the physically embodied human subject is endlessly divisible and reducible to data representations via the modern technologies of control, like computer-based systems (see Deleuze, 1992).

consumption (see Hart and Negri, 2000; also Bauman, 1998). 'Surveillance culture' or 'surveillance society' are, then, inescapable notions when considering the political and social influence and repercussions of security policies today. These issues are scrutinized in David Murakami Wood´s 'Can a Scanner See the Soul? Phillip K. Dick against the Surveillance Society'. By drawing on the science fiction of Philip K. Dick, Murakami Wood takes us to a previous period of surveillance surge, during the 1960s and early 1970s. His article argues that Dick's works provide a discerning insight into the emerging Los Angeles model of neoliberal urban control which has become a key element of contemporary urban security worldwide. Dick´s perceptive and visionary approach to the politics and practice of surveillance provides a powerful critique of the shaping of our social landscape in the beginning of the 21st century.

FICTIONS OF TERROR

The role of the media in the promotion of increasing security measures and social practices gains center stage in the second part of this special issue. Media scholars, such as David Altheide, concerned with the blurring lines between news and entertainment, detected in the post-9/11 climate an increased confusion between mass media, popular culture and governmental rhetoric, which would have profound repercussions on both our social expectations and civil liberties (Altheide, 2006). In *Welcome to the Desert of the Real,* Slavoj Žižek saw in the 9/11 attacks a screen image intruding in our 'reality': 'The September 11 attacks were the stuff of popular fantasies before they actually too place' (Žižek, 2002:17). Indeed, as has been noted, although Žižek attributed the title of his book (*Welcome to the Desert of the Real*) to the film *The Matrix*, the line was, itself, a well-known quotation from Jean Baudrillard's book, *Simulacra and Simulations* (1981). For Baudrillard the attacks revealed the internal fragility of the system: '[t]he symbolic collapse of a whole system came about by an unpredictable complicity, as though the towers, by collapsing on their own, by committing suicide, had joined in to round off the event' (Baudrillard, 2002: 8). The Bush administration's response to the attacks, although ultimately abject, was characterized by what many considered to be a 'postmodern' war, with the invasion of Afghanistan (Kelner, 2005) and latter re-affirmed as 'fully postmodern' with the invasion of Iraq (Hanson, 2003). These nomenclatures did not mean to ignore the military and political reality of the war, nor the very real suffering it continues to cause—the growing and unaccounted number of deaths in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the hyper-reality of this 'long war' as a project did convey a generalized anxiety about its meanings and outcomes, as it became increasingly clear to many that the war, and the rhetoric of homeland security which underpinned it, could not be dissociated from the media spectacle which reflects 'the continuation of the absence of politics by other means' (Baudillard: 2002, 34).

A related semiotic crisis promoted the 9/11 attacks, and aggravated by the heightened security climate that followed, was the way individuals all over the Western world were soon invited to consider everyday objects in a gothic light. As Martin Amis put it in relation to the second plane that hit the tower, 'I have never seen a generically familiar object so transformed by *affect*'. This threatening potential was not only conveyed by the plane but by every sharp object carried by the plane: 'a score or so of

Stanley knives produced two million tons of rubble' (Amis, 2001). Indeed, as government representatives and the media were quick to point out after the attacks—and as we are now duly informed in every airport—there are long lists of items with destructive potential in one's own luggage.

In the climate of fear which followed the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the 7/7 attacks in London and the 11-M bombing in Madrid, suspicion became a keyword and a justification for renewed forms of marginalization and social othering. In the 'war on terror', this 'long war', citizens have to prove themselves against their potential double status—in a redoubling of the 'You're either with us or against us' rhetoric, everyone must be understood as both potentially suspect and therefore, necessarily, a proactive spy (Packer, 2006). In this flexible warfare and under a system which advocates the need for serious curtailing of civil liberties in the name of 'freedom', official procedures could not be short of contradictions. As the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in London (on the 22nd of July 2005) tragically revealed, an added problem of the new tracking and security measures was the confirmation that, not only is it difficult for authority agents to determine the behavior of a suspect, but police agents, themselves, receive contradictory and alarming messages about how to behave when facing a suspect. Indeed, the 'shoot to kill' policy that had been quietly implemented in the UK as a way of disabling bombers without risking detonating their explosives, was later considered a danger to public safety. The London Metropolitan Police was found guilty of 'failing to provide for the health, safety and welfare of Jean Charles de Menezes' (Crown Prosecution Office, 2006). To merely condemn the agents involved in this shooting would, however, entail ignoring the wider problems of the system which encourages such contradictory procedures. These issues are played out in many mainstream narrative texts produced after September 11th, as Stuart Price shows in 'Bureaucracy, Coercive Force and Individual Agency: The Gendered Protagonist in The "War on Terror"'. Stuart examines *The Kingdom, Spartan, and The Bourne Trilogy,* noting the existence of hostility to 'bureaucratic' rule that appears to be shared across the political spectrum. This 'anti-bureaucratic' perspective strives to demonstrate and validate the heroic agency of the professional specialist, an individual trained within, but often abandoned by, the coercive apparatus of the military and/or national security agencies. Agency is, thus, re-cast in fictional form as the attempt by a charismatic individual both to maintain personal integrity and to escape the restrictions of an overbearing and often anonymous structure. By paying particular attention to the performance of gendered behavior in these narratives and its imagined relation to the exercise of authority, Price shows how texts draw upon and re-compose salient features of the contemporary social order as these are circulated within fiction and non-fictional forms.

The omnipotence of the grand narratives provided by the media since the 9/11 attack has been a concern for many contemporary writers. This preoccupation is examined in David Brauner's article, '"The days after" and "the ordinary run of hours": counternarratives and double vision in Don DeLillo's *Falling Man*'. Brauner argues that the novel insistently explores how the 'ordinary run of hours' that constitutes daily life after 9/11 both differs radically from, and at the same time closely resembles, the quotidian structure that preceded it, creating a curious double vision that has, in DeLillo's words

'changed the grain of the most routine moment' (DeLillo, 2001: 6). Like Jonathan Raban's *Surveillance,* referred at the beginning of this introduction, DeLillo makes use of a performance artist to heighten the hyper-reality of lived experience, raising questions not only about the virtualization of risk but of trauma itself.

In 'The End of Innocence: Tales of Terror after 9/11' Catherine Morley looks at three novels from disparate national contexts: *The Unknown Terrorist* (2006) by the Australian writer Richard Flanagan, *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* (2007) by the Pakistani British author Mohsin Hamid and *Terrorist* (2006) by John Updike. According to Morley, although these writers have absorbed the rhetoric and mechanisms of an ideologically construed notion of 'homeland', they 'differ from the usual fare in that they are not steeped in the domestic, inward-looking dramas which many writers have emphasized in their treatment of the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York'. Most of these authors share the sense of hyper-reality, also described by Brauner in relation to DeLillos's novel, which is here conveyed by cracks of untamed surrealism in the otherwise intensely realistic texture of these novels.

The thorny relationship between agency, meaning and authorship in the post-9/11 context is perhaps more clearly conveyed in Aliki Varvogli's article, 'Ailing Authors: Paul Auster's *Travels in the Scriptorium* and Philip Roth's *Exit Ghost*'. In this article, Varvogli examines the image of the ailing author in these two novels in order to interrogate the role of authorship in the aftermath of 9/11. In their earlier work, both Auster and Roth have asked important questions about the role of fiction, linking the author with the image of the American terrorist. Here, however, they present a passive, weak and troubling image of the author: in Auster the author suffers from weakness and amnesia while in Roth he suffers from impotence and incontinence. The withdrawal, unwillingness to register opinions and reluctance to participate, conveyed by these characters can reveal hesitations regarding the importance of writing in a climate that has become hostile to introspection. According to Varvogli, Auster and Roth are now 'considering the possibility that the author is more marginalized than ever before: a ghost, or a blank'.

One may ask if this return to a tortured form of self-reflection, which in the work of some authors can resurrect the torments of the prison-house of language, can be seen as a reaction or a response to the paradoxical messages conveyed by the current climate of suspicion and insecurity. In fact, a glance through much of the fiction produced in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 reveals that anxieties about security have contributed to a generalized resurrection of captivity narratives—what I have called, elsewhere, 'fictions of white middle-class captivity', to reflect the emergence of many novels which, as response to 9/11, withdraw into insulate private middle class scenarios and meta-fictional strategies (Araújo, 2007). Indeed, the stalemate conveyed by many of the authors analyzed in these pages also reflects a significant duality at the heart of liberal governments, where civil society is seen as a means and an end, a target and a resource of the securitization project. In the current climate of fear, this has been clearly translated into the requirement for people to act as responsible citizens (i.e. constant watchers of their neighbors, colleagues, fellow passengers, etc.), while leading individuals and communities to deal with continuous messages about their own fragility. This double bind is reflected in the constructions of subjectivity here under

analysis. If, in the face of this, fantasies about vigorous and re-masculinized heroes dominate much mainstream fiction today (although these fantasies have not been restricted to the popular), other fictional texts reflect, through the image of authorial crisis, a more generalized social impasse.

WORKS CITED

— Altheide, D. L. (2006) 'The Mass Media, Crime and Terrorism', *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 4 (5): 982/997. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1147480

— Amis, M. (2001) 'Fear and Loathing', *The Guardian*, September 18. http://humanities.psydeshow.org/political/amis-column.htm

— Araújo, S. (2007) 'Images of Terror, Narratives of Captivity: the Visual Spectacle of 9/11 and Its Transatlantic Projections', *Symbiosis: A Journal of Anglo-American Relations*, 11 (2):27/47.

— Baudrillard, J. (2002) *The Spirit of Terrorism*. London: Verso.

— Bauman, Z. (1998) *Globalization: The Human Consequences.* Cambridge: Polity.

— Beck, U. (1992) *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage Publications.

— [—] (2005) 'The Cosmopolitan State: Towards a Realistic Utopia', *Eurozine*.http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2001/12/05-beck-en.html

— Crown Prosecution Office (2006), 'CPS statement: Charging decision on the fatal shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes', *The Crown Prosecution Service Website*, 17 July 2006. http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/pressreleases/archive/2006/146_06.html

— Deleuze, G. (1992) 'Postscript on the societies of control,' *October* 59:3/7.http://www.nadir.org/nadir/archiv/netzkritik/societyofcontrol.html

— DHS — Department of Homeland Security (2003) 'Department of Homeland Security Releases Summary Conclusions From National Exercise'. December 19. http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0325.shtm

— DHS (2008) 'TOPOFF: Exercising National Preparedness', Modified: October 6. http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/training/gc_1179350946764.shtm

— Faludi, S. (2007) *The Terror Dream: Fear and Fantasy in Post-9/11 America.* New York: Metropolitan Books.

— Furedi, F. (1997) *Culture of Fear: Risk Taking and the Morality of Low Expectation*. London/New York: Cassell.

— Giddens, A. (1999) 'Risk and Responsibility' *Modern Law Review* 62(1): 1/10.

— Giles, P. (2004), 'Response to Amy Kaplan's Presidential Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Studies Association', *American Quarterly*, 56 (1) 19/24.

— Hanson, V. D. (2003) 'Postmodern War', *National Review Online,* March 7. http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson030703.asp

— Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2000) *Empire*. Cambridge, M.A: Harvard University Press.

— Hay, J. and Andrejevic, M. (2006) 'Introduction: Homeland (In)Securities', *Cultural Studies* 20 (4/5): 331/348

— Kaplan, A. (2004) 'Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today', Presidential Address to the American Studies Association 2003, *American Quarterly* 56 (1) 1/18

— Kellner, D. (2002) 'The Politics and Costs of Postmodern War in the Age of Bush II'. http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/papers/POMOwar.htm#_edn1

— Lyon, D. (2001) *Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life*. Buckingham: Open University Press._

— [—] (2003) *Surveillance after September 11*. Cambridge: Polity.

— [—] (2008) *Surveillance Studies: An Overview*. Cambridge: Polity.

— Packer, J. (2006) 'Becoming Bombs: Mobilizing Mobility in the War of Terror' *Cultural Studies*, 20 (4 & 5): 378–399.

— Raban, J. (2006) *Surveillance*. London: Picador.

— Žižek, S. (2002) *Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11th and Related Dates*. New York: Verso.

IN THE NAME OF SECURITY

Amy Kaplan
University of Pennsylvania

In January 2001, the Bush administration started its reign with a neoliberal assault on the Social Security system, the last bastion of the welfare state. In his first major speech after the attacks of September 11 that year, the President announced the creation of the Office of Homeland Security. In January 2003, the White House turned it into a permanent Department, calling it 'the most significant transformation of the United States Government since 1947', the year the U.S.A National Security Act created the CIA. This governmental department was not the only significant transformation. The word 'homeland' was an unfamiliar way of referring to the American nation, an idiom not found in a traditional political vocabulary that includes national security, domestic security, and civil defense. These keywords, 'homeland security', have been changing not only the government but the contours of American nationalism and its relation to the world. The Department of Homeland Security is not only charged with protecting the nation from terrorism, but also with policing the borders of the nation, with its incorporation of the Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS). In addition, with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under its umbrella, the Department of Homeland Security was responsible for the disastrous disaster relief in New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.

This essay explores the ubiquity of 'security' in contemporary American political culture, which extends far beyond the working of the state. What is the relation of homeland security to the concept of freedom and to the language of empire? How do these terms coalesce in the more recent concept of homeland security? Social Security/ National Security/ Homeland Security. How are these concepts interconnected? What is the relation between the tremendous investment in the national security today, not only monetarily and institutionally, but also linguistically and conceptually, and the evisceration and impoverishment of language and institutions for conceiving and providing for human needs and social services? My conjecture is that within the logic of homeland security that question cannot be posed, because the meaning of homeland security works to eradicate the boundaries between military and social needs and between foreign and domestic policy. As the response to Hurricane Katrina showed, the politics of homeland security has made social security in the most basic sense impossible.

SAFETY AND SECURITY

Dictionaries and common usage distinguish the word 'security' (etymologically from the Latin, 'without care') from the word 'safety'. The nuance lies in security having the added emphasis on protection from dangers that originate from the outside, the sense of encroachment. Security implies a triangular relationship: a protector protects someone weaker from an external threat, one which often has racial and gendered connotations in the context of the home and homeland. In this triangle some people are rendered in need of and deserving protection while others are deemed as inherently dangerous. Security, as many have noted, is unthinkable without the production of insecurity, and it is unimaginable without imaging threats that shade into one another. For policy makers and academics, to subsume international relations and foreign policy into the field of national security implicitly avoids a theory of power, because the idea of security implies that the motivation for action and policy is a reactive defense to an outside power rather than a quest for domination motivated from within.
Security does not only refer to militarism, policing, and technologies of surveillance and governance. The word does the seductive work of creating a framework for seeing and experiencing the world in a way that fuses the macro level of global and national politics with the intimate world of home and psyche, with the existential level of faith and identity. The language of security has been colonizing every arena and idiom of daily life and political culture, globally and locally, socially and psychically, from domestic to national spheres, home to the homeland, city to battlefield, prison to gated community, airport to the internet, Wall street to immigration detention centers.

Homeland security in part draws on an ideal of a middle class home, heavily guarded by gates, private security guards, high tech surveillance technology to survey one's own home from afar or ones child's daycare. There is a huge consumer industry for products that can be purchased at stores and websites like Security Depot. Sexual offenders legally restricted from neighborhoods, like enemy combatants, can be incarcerated indefinitely in the name of protecting children. In the 2004 election, 'security moms' had replaced 'soccer moms' as the key voters to court. According to one self proclaimed security mom, there were two figures she feared the most: 'Islamic terrorists and criminal illegal aliens' (Grewal, 26).

The borders of the nation, like the home, have been securitized. Although there have always been anti-immigration movements in this country, only recently the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which was formerly part of the Justice Department, has been folded into the DHS, and immigration is increasingly discussed in terms of border security, which implies that all aspiring immigrants are potential terrorists. Congress has given the White House a blank check for Boeing to build a security 'fence' between Mexico and the US, despite the fact that not a single terrorist has been apprehended at the southern border, although one wouldn't know that from watching the popular TV series, *24*.

In addition to stationary security sites and borders, mobility has obviously been securitized—air travel, migration, tourism, visas, ports. Security is also a major concern in cyberspace. The first meaning of security to pop up on a web search is internet security: security codes, security alerts, security domains, security zones, credit card securi-

ty, security against identity threat. The U.S. Air Force has a new department dedicated to cyber security. And the web is famously a site of government surveillance abetted by the communications industry, as in the proposed 2003 Total Information Awareness (TIA) Program that was renamed the Terrorism Information Awareness Program after an adverse media reaction. The National Security Letter provision of the Patriot Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001) radically expanded the FBI's authority to demand personal records like Web site visits and e-mail addresses without prior court approval. The provision also allows the FBI to forbid or 'gag' anyone who receives an NSL from telling anyone about the demand for their records.

Homeland security rhetoric and technology that has proliferated in the 'war on terror' drew on the earlier 'war on crime,' and 'war on drugs', from the 1980s and 90s, on the metaphors and practices of urban policing and the prison industrial complex. Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib could not exist without super maximum security prisons in the US, and the exchange of techniques of incarceration, torture, and punishment continually circulate among these penal institutions. In the development of new antiterrorist research for the military, businesses are eager to sell the same products to police departments and private security companies.

This homeland security complex has to be understood internationally, as part of what Stephen Holmes has called 'security apartheid', the 'new normal' in the suburbs of Atlanta, and 'Johannesburg, São Paulo, New Delhi' (Holmes, 2008: 7). Gated communities have been proposed for Baghdad, with walls that divide neighborhoods and lock in certain people while keeping out others. The security fence at the US-Mexican border is being modeled on the Israel Security Wall built in the West Bank. 'Peace walls' in Belfast have been recommended as a model for policing ethnic neighborhoods in Iraq.

We are not simply living in a national security state, because all over the world, security has become a huge transnational private business, an engine of civil society as well as the state. The appeal to security contributes to the privatization of state violence and assent to being the subject of surveillance, with the tautological assumption that surveillance systems are only targeted at the 'bad guys'. A company that once would have been called mercenaries, such as the notorious Blackwater Worldwide, are now called private security companies. Wealthy enclaves all over the world rely on private security companies, rather than the public police, as they drain resources from local governments. Another newly thriving business is campus security at private and public universities, which includes not only issues of public safety, but issues of free speech as well, and is changing the physical and intellectual space of the university.

The most basic meaning of security stems from the economy. One of its earliest definitions is the object given over to guarantee the payment of debt—property pledged as a collateral for a loan. The word 'securities', accounting for most of what is traded in the financial markets, has come to encompass all financial contracts, such as bonds, shares, derivatives that grant the owner a stake in an asset. Hence, the Securities and Exchange Commission. The word 'securitization' emerged in the 1990s as an economic practice of bundling tradable debt, or future cash flow. In other words, securitization has exactly the opposite meaning of something like job security, which sounds

antiquated in contrast. It means that any debt can be made fungible and exchanged, which is at the heart of the sub prime crisis today (While home ownership has a mythic status of ultimate security in the US, mortgages are securities that mean the potential loss of security).

Security also has psychological and existential meanings. 'Insecurity' in the dictionaries is defined first as a psychic state, even an abnormal psychological diagnosis in the earlier 20th century, which assumes that insecurity as a state is generated from within. What does it mean to call someone secure in her identity, or to say, with assurance of explanation of behavior: 'he's insecure?' Is certitude about faith and religious fundamentalism related to other kinds of security?

Linguistically, security is often used redundantly—security bolts, security codes, security locks, maximum security prisons—a redundancy that refers to the double barreled quality of security that locks in and out at the same time. There is linguistic synergy among these uses. Brochures for home security system advertise 'rapid response' and use military language to show customers how to 'arm and unarm' their alarms, instead of turning them on and off. After the mass shooting at Virginia Tech University, the press kept referring to the belated 'lock down' of the campus, a term that comes from the prison system, referring to locking prisoners in their cells during a disturbance. 'Lockdown' has extended to the control of computer systems as well.

The language, practices and institutions of security contribute to a free-floating and interchangeable sense of threat and insecurity. When former Attorney General Gonzales, for example, was defending himself from the charges of political firings in the Justice Department, he pleaded in an op-ed for *The Washington Post*, that this scandal shouldn't detract from the 'great strides in securing our country from terrorism, protecting our neighborhoods from gangs and drugs, shielding our children from predators and pedophiles, and protecting the public trust by prosecuting public corruption' (Gonzales, 2007). He typically yokes terrorism and crime to the intimate violation of children, rendering the nation as both vulnerable and innocent. This linking of terrorists with sexual threats echoes earlier national security narratives: the 1915 classic film, *The Birth of a Nation*, for one, in which a free black man during Reconstruction attacks a young white girl, and the merging of the communist menace with the closeted homosexual next door in Cold War demonology.

As an alternative to the narrowly militaristic and nationalist conceptions of security, progressives and activists worldwide have expanded and transformed its meaning in the concept of human security. 'Security of person' and 'social security' are rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). In the same decade, Franklin Roosevelt spoke of a broader sense of security to accompany his four freedoms:

> The one supreme objective for the future, which we discussed for each Nation individually, and for all the United Nations, can be summed up in one word: Security.
>
> And that means not only physical security which provides safety from attacks by aggressors. It means also economic security, social security, moral security—in a family of Nations. (1944)

Nobel prize winning economist Amartya Sen and human rights activists have developed the concept of 'human security' to address issues of global justice and to redress social inequality. As opposed to the notion of security based on nation states, human

security means ensuring social needs, including protection from violence, access to food, clean water, health care and safe employment. 'Food security' means more than feeding the hungry as it refers to the right sustainable nutritional needs. Feminists have redefined security to include violence against women, care for families, the right to free clean water and health care. Using the word security can also give an issue political gravitas and urgency, for example, by talking about global warming or education as a security issue.

Thus it is important not to dismiss the language of security as merely paranoia and xenophobia mustered by the state to instill a culture of fear and further the aims of empire. It is that too, but it can only operate effectively because it appeals to desires and cravings for safety, peace, economic and psychic well being, stability, sociability, and responsibility for others.

FREEDOM THROUGH SECURITY

What is the relation between freedom and security in contemporary political discourse? These concepts have a long tangled genealogy in the history of western political thought. It is a commonplace that a degree of individual liberty has to be sacrificed, or traded, or balanced for national security. These are metaphors that need to be examined, although they are taken for granted as descriptions of reality. Enlightenment liberalism also defines security as protecting individual liberty from the tyranny of the state, rather than entrusting the state as a guarantor of freedom. (This is a position that traditional US conservatives have mobilized against their notion of 'big government'.)

Security today has become such a powerfully elastic and mobilizing term in part because it has accrued the density of meanings that the word freedom once evoked. If, the word 'freedom', as David Harvey has argued, has provided a powerful discursive engine for neoliberalism that made it seem continuous with enlightenment ideals, and progressive movements, security has come to predominate as a reaction to the ravages of neoliberalism, to compensate for the hollowness of its freedoms reduced to the liberty of unchecked capitalism and the privatization of the public sphere.

We can see this supplanting of the keyword freedom by security in national and international contexts. *New York Times* conservative commentator, David Brooks, advocates this shift in his effort to reorient the conservative movement:

> Today the big threats to people's future prospects come from complex, decentralized phenomena: Islamic extremism, failed states, global competition, global warming, nuclear proliferation, a skills-based economy, economic and social segmentation. Normal, nonideological people are less concerned about the threat to their freedom from an overweening state than from the threats posed by these amorphous yet pervasive phenomena. (Brooks, 2007)

Though he ideologically places Islamic extremism at the top of the list of threats, the rest of these 'decentralized phenomena' are associated with unregulated capitalism and neoliberalism. In response, Brooks advocates a new paradigm for conservatives: away from 'liberty v. power' to 'security leads to freedom.' Brooks abandons the 18th century liberal meaning of security as the protection of the individual from the tyr-

anny of the state, to dependence on the state for protection from transnational forces. And he starts his litany with Islamic extremism—a thinly code for terrorism, to give shape to what he sees as more amorphous threats.

This approach to freedom through security can be seen in one of the downloadable 'counterintelligence and security awareness posters' produced by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive in 2002. Framing a picture of Thomas Jefferson with the text of the 1st Amendment to the Constitution, the poster adds in the same print, as though it were part of the amendment: 'American freedom includes a responsibility to protect US security—leaking sensitive information erodes this freedom' (Turse, 2005). Free speech guaranteed by the Constitution can only be upheld by censorship in the name of security, a logic that underlies the provisions of the PATRIOT Act, and the secrecy and illegal surveillance of the Bush administration. According to this logic security is never adequate, as it generates the need to secure security itself.

If security is advocated as the avenue to freedom, one which supports the consent to repression in the US, it has similarly replaced the rhetoric about bringing freedom and democracy to the world as the justification of war and occupation in Iraq, Afghanistan and covert actions around the world. The War in Iraq was once called Operation Iraqi Freedom. But the 'security plan' has been held out as the justification for so called 'surge' of troops in 2007. On the fourth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, Bush downplayed 'freedom' and stated that 'at this point in the war, our most important mission is in helping the Iraqis secure their capital'. He added that 'American and Iraqi forces have established joint security stations. Those stations are scattered throughout Baghdad and they're helping Iraqis reclaim their neighborhoods from the terrorists and extremists' (Bush, 2007). This language resonates with the discourse of urban policing in the 'war against crime'.

Six months later Bush did not extend this search for security to the Iraqi government's feeble effort to throw out the private security forces for shooting Iraqi civilians. Blackwater's contract was renewed to provide security for American military, political and private projects in Iraq, and the Iraqi government has no legal jurisdiction over it or any other private contractor. The privatization of security, in this case, promotes extreme violence without oversight and with impunity. Blackwater troops are like mobile Guantánamos in their exemption from national, international, or military law.

One can see why freedom rings hollow coming from Americans in Iraq. Former Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld responded to the looting following the invasion with the quip: 'freedom's untidy'. Among Iraqis, reported Christian Parenti, the English phrase 'the freedom' had become a contemptible ironic term for the violent destruction of the occupation (Foehl, 2005). Rarely in the US media is the new 'security plan' ever seen as the source to the massive destruction, death, epidemics, displacement, terror, insecurities inflicted on the Iraqis by the US invasion and occupation. Indeed, in the US security serves as a euphemism for military occupation.

Safety is of course a dire need for Iraqis living under the violence of air strikes, kidnapping, car bombs, murder, rape, incarceration, the absence of basic needs, and everyday life subject to terror. We have to ask how the US narrative of security disavows its own major contribution to that violence. A Martian landing in the US today watching the news might assume that Iraq as a nation spontaneously combusted into sectarian vio-

lence, due to its uncivilized tribalism and religious hatred, and that the US intervened magnanimously to help bring order and security to internal sectarian chaos. Paternalistically, Democrats and Republicans alike have even threatened to leave if the Iraqis can't make peace among themselves. But the security plan has amounted to unreported air strikes, the invasion of private homes, and massive door to door round up of the unspecified 'enemy' of all ages, who are then tossed into overcrowded detention camps, with no access to a legal system. If the invasion of Iraq was justified by a familiar narrative of liberation—bringing freedom to the oppressed—underlying a long history of US imperial wars, the shift to the security narrative also has a history, which informs for example the 1904 Roosevelt corollary of the Monroe Doctrine for Central and South America: this narrative holds that the U.S. reluctantly and beneficently exerts force only to bring order to anarchy. Both narratives, of liberation and security, disavow the violence of military invasion as the source of the chaos that needs to be stabilized by occupation.

The US narrative of achieving security in Iraq relies on the threatened proliferation of global insecurity, which circles back narcissistically to the American homeland. As Bush claims, the specter of an unsecured Iraq would wreak havoc on America: 'I believe the consequences to American security would be devastating. if American forces were to step back from Baghdad before it is more secure, a contagion of violence could spill out across the entire country. In time this violence should engulf the region. The terrorists could emerge from the chaos with a safe haven to replace the one they had in Afghanistan, which they used to plan the attacks of September 11, 2001. For the safety of the American people we cannot allow this to happen' (Bush, 2007). Contagion and chaos imply no agency, no cause. In this narrative of security, America is both all powerful and ultimately vulnerable, and violence is legitimated ultimately in the name of homeland security.

EMPIRE AND SECURITY

In this narrative loop, terrorism threatens to crash through national borders, but the concept of homeland security already presupposes this breakdown. That is, bringing freedom and democracy to Iraq becomes a security operation upon which the security of the American nation stands or falls. This logic underlies Bush's doctrine of preemptive war, detailed in his National Security Statement of 2002. Historian John Lewis Gaddis has made this doctrine continuous with the origins of the American nation, since the War of 1812, as he explains in the introduction to his influential book, *Surprise, Security and the American Experience*.

> Most nations seek safety in the way that most animals do: by withdrawing behind defenses, or making themselves inconspicuous, or otherwise avoiding whatever dangers there may be. Americans, in contrast, have generally responded to threats—and particularly to surprise attacks—by taking the offensive, by becoming more conspicuous, by confronting, neutralizing, and if possible overwhelming the sources of danger, rather than fleeing from them. Expansion, we have assumed, is the path to security. (Gaddis, 2004: 13)

For Gaddis, security is synonymous with empire for Americans. They follow their own exceptional nature, which is inherently different from that of other nations, who are yoked with animals. According to Gaddis, expansion has temporal as well as geographic dimensions: Americans, he claims, have always expanded into chaotic or empty space not reactively but in anticipation of threats: from other empires, Native American attacks, power vacuums, failed states. In this logic, if threats are perceived as omnipresent and imminently on the horizon then expansion must continue everywhere into the indefinite future.

The 9/11 Commission implicitly agrees with Gaddis's history as a description of the present in one of the conclusions to their report:

> 9/11 has taught us that terrorism against American interests 'over there' should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against American 'over here.' In this same sense, the American homeland is the planet. (National Commission, 2004: 362)

Terrorism, according to the commission, has taught a lesson Gaddis claims as second nature to Americans: global expansion and domination offers the only secure security. Historically, the National Security Act of 1947 was in part about sorting out the difference between domestic and foreign spheres to divide up the work among specific agencies in its establishment of the CIA for foreign intelligence. Bush's security statements and the idea and practice of homeland security involves eradicating this distinction. 'The American homeland is the planet'. If the homeland is everywhere, however, threats and insecurities must be omnipresent, never contained beyond a border, or kept at bay by walls or armies. Global expansion means the corresponding expansion of security systems everywhere, through surveillance, military intervention, incarceration. There are home security systems against criminals, border security against illegal aliens, and homeland security against 'terrorists' and these threats merge in the specter of racialized bodies. If the American homeland is the planet, Americans are never at home, and locations like Guantánamo all over the planet, the 'American homeland', emerge at the intersection of these movements of preemptive expansion and confinement.

FUTURITY AND SECURITY

The idea of security as expansion has a strong temporal as well as territorial dimension. According to Jeremy Bentham in the late 18th century, among the objects of the law that contribute to happiness of the body politic, 'security is the only one which necessarily embraces the future: subsistence, abundance, equality, may be regarded for a moment only; but security implies extension in point of time, with respect to all the benefits to which it is applied' (Bentham, 1843). We have seen this preoccupation of security with the future in several of the quotations cited above (e.g., Franklin Roosevelt and David Brooks).

Today securing the future justifies preemptive warfare as well as indefinite detention. In the Military Order of November 13, 2001, in which the Bush declared a state of emergency, he claimed the right to incarcerate any non-citizen without due process to prevent future acts of terrorism. While Guantánamo is the best known of these

prisons, the US is holding an estimated 27,000 secret prisoners in undisclosed locations, (Goodman, 2008). Immigration detention centers in the US treat detainees as if they were criminals for indefinite periods of time while they are awaiting administrative hearings. Incarceration in the criminal justice system also marks a person's future after release, by denying felons the vote and restricting employment. 'Sexual predators' are being held in prison past sentence in the anticipation that they might continue to molest children. In these cases, people are being incarcerated—and denied their own futures—not for acts they have committed or for legal convictions, but for acts they might perform in the indefinite future, in the name of security.

If homeland security is about ensuring a national future free from threats and dangers, what kind of future does security envision? It is a future that is strangely nostalgic—for an imagined stable past—a future that militates against the possibilities of social change, because change itself becomes threatening. The language of security posits that if things don't remain the same, that if America stops expanding to encompass the planet and stops erecting barriers throughout the planet to control which people are in and out, the only alternative is catastrophe, apocalypse or the end of the world. As neoconservatives David Frum and Richard Perle write, 'There is no middle way for Americans: it is victory or holocaust' (Frum & Perle, 2003: 7). If security implies the need for protection from the lurking threat of extinction, then security thrives by generating insecurity, and it can only be pursued at the violent expense of the security of others.

In conclusion, does viewing the future through the lens of security make it impossible to address problems that urgently confront us now through visions of social change and collective action? Or can security be radically redefined in the name of change to include a broader sense of human safety, global cooperation, and collective human needs and well being?

WORKS CITED

— Bentham, J. (1843) *Principles of the Civil Code*, Part I, ch. 2. Classical utilitarianism Web Site. http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/poltheory/bentham/pcc/index.html.

— Brooks, D. (2007) 'No U-Turns,' *New York Times*. March 29. Op-Ed page.

— Bush, G. (2007) 'President Bush Discusses Fourth Anniversary of Operation Iraqi Freedom' The White House Web Site. March 19. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/03/20070319.html

— Foehl, T. (2005) 'What Kind of Freedom? An Interview with Christian Parenti', *Mother Jones* (January 26). http://www.motherjones.com/news/qa/2005/01/parenti.html

— Frum, D. and Perle, R. (2003) *An End To Evil: How to Win the War on Terror.* New York: Random House.

— Gaddis, J.L. (2004*) Surprise, Security and the American Experience*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

— Goodman, A. (2008, May 19) 'Clive Stafford Smith: US Holding 27,000 in Secret Overseas Prisons; Transporting Prisoners to Iraqi Jails to Avoid Media & Legal Scrutiny'. *Democracy Now*. http://www.democracynow.org/2008/5/19/clive_stafford_smith

— Gonzales, A.R. (2007) 'Nothing Improper', *Washington Post*. April 15. B07.

— Grewal, I. (2006) 'Security Moms' in the early twentieth-century United States: The Gender of Security in Neo-liberalism,' *Women's Studies Quarterly: The Global and the Intimate*, 34 (1/2): 25/39.

— Harvey, D. (2005) *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

— Holmes, S. (2008) 'Free Marketeering; Review of *The Shock Doctrine* by Naomi Klein'. *London Review of Books*, 30 (9): 7/9.

— Loughlin, S. (2003), 'Rumsfeld on looting in Iraq: "Stuff happens"'. CNN Website. April 12. http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/04/11/sprj.irq.pentagon/

— National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) *The 9/11 Commission Report*. New York: Norton.

— Roosevelt, F.D. (1944) 'State of the Union Message to Congress', January 11th, 1944, *The American Presidency Project*. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16518

— Sen, A. (2000) 'Why Human Security', Text of presentation at the 'International Symposium on Human Security', Tokyo, 28 July, 2000. http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/outreach/Sen2000.pdf

— Turse, N. (2005) 'Bringing It All Back Home: The Emergence of the Homeland Security State,' *TomDispatch.Com*. http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/2152/nick_turse_on_the_homeland_security_state_part_i_

MOBILIZING FEAR: U.S. POLITICS BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11[1]

Scott Lucas
University of Birmingham

The chief costs of terrorism derive not from the damage inflicted by the terrorists, but what those attacked do to themselves and others in response. That is, the harm of terrorism mostly arises from the fear and from the often hasty, ill-considered, and overwrought reaction (or overreaction) it characteristically, and often calculatedly, inspires in its victims.

John Mueller (Mueller, 2006: 29)

In 2007 my mother, who for more than twenty years has been concerned that I am cut off in Britain from what is going on in the United States, forwarded a letter to me that has been widely circulated on the Internet. Purportedly written by a Ms. Pam Foster to a family member in Iraq but (no doubt unknown to my mother) composed in 2005 by a former speechwriter for Republican Party candidates, it countered allegations of abuse of prisoners held in Camp X-Ray at Guantanamo Bay with the refrain, 'I don't care!'. After all, the letter continued:

Are we fighting a war on terror or aren't we? Was it or was it not started by Islamic people who brought it to our shores on September 11, 2001?

Were people from all over the world, mostly Americans, not brutally murdered that day, in downtown Manhattan, across the Potomac from ourtion's capitol and in a field in Pennsylvania?

Did nearly three thousand men, women and children die a horrible, burning or crushing death that day, or didn't they? [2]

With its dismissal of 'I don't care' to incidents from the desecration of the Koran, the 'roughing up' and even shooting in the head of terrorist suspects, and the treatment of 'naked Iraqi prisoners'—'no more than a college-hazing incident' (Patton, 2008)—the letter might seem to be founded on hatred. However, I doubt that the author, and

[1] My thanks to The Leverhulme Trust for financial support of research for this essay.

[2] The letter originally appeared on the website www.gopusa.com on 6 June 2005 and can be seen in its entirety at http://www.americandaily.com/article/8987. The version from 'Ms Foster' omitted the first three paragraphs, converting it from specific responses to *Newsweek*'s expose of the desecration of prisoners' Korans at Camp X-Ray into a general reaction to accusations of misbehavior by the U.S. military.

I am certain that my mother, would agree. Instead, the letter's invocation of Americans decapitated by kidnappers, U.S. soldiers slain by insurgents, and innocents jailed for possession of the Bible converts the author's position into one of defense rather than aggression, based upon rather than animosity. Indeed, it is through that adoption of a defensive position that the authors convert anger into an 'I do care' position to disseminate their views.

Whether or not my mother, or the author of the letter, recognized it, their thoughts fit into a discourse with a longer historical resonance. Moreover, although I have no evidence that either has ever worked with the U.S. Government, the sentiments and the manner in which they are expressed tap into a mobilizing of emotion by the State. This is a mobilization designed to serve political interests, objectives, and strategies at home and abroad, all the time positioning those interests in the defensive language of national security rather than the offensive language of conquest and control. Put bluntly, it is the hypothesis of this essay that the projections of both 'radical Muslims', aided and abetted by the 'media', and the Americans—blown up, beheaded, or simply overworked—who suffer at their hands are constructions of a far-from-benign 'culture of fear'.

There have been a series of valuable considerations of politics and the 'culture of fear' in the last decade. Barry Glassner brought term to prominence in the United States with his book and then his appearance in Michael Moore's *Bowling for Columbine* (Glassner, 2000). Frank Furedi developed and dissected the concept, concluding that 'the absence of real choice is the message that is implicit in the many anxieties stimulated by society's obsession with risk', with governments 'treat[ing] their citizens as vulnerable subjects who tend not to know what is in their best of interest' (Furedi, 2002: 169; Furedi, 2007: 142). David Altheide has examined the construction and projection of 'terrorism' as part of a 'politics of fear' (Altheide, 2006).

I think they can be applied effectively to the reconsideration of policymaking, specifically the making of U.S. foreign policy, in both historical and contemporary cases. Although the 'culture of fear' was not specifically invoked, the concept underlay Richard Freeland's provocative 1971 study of the Truman Administration (Freeland, 1971). It is engrained in Herman and Chomsky's 'manufacturing consent' (which in turn builds upon Lippmann and Bernays) as well as Qualter's 'opinion control' in democracies (Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Bernays, 1955; Lippmann, 1922; Qualter, 1985). Building upon this scholarship, I would suggest two general hypotheses:

1. Scholarly study of U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War has been so focused on objective explanations of strategy, geopolitics, and, most important, 'national security' that it has ignored the subjective construction and projection of that policy. Provocatively stated, the Soviet Union served not so much as an actual nightmare than as a constructed nightmare to justify the projection of American power around the world.

2. Contemporary U.S. foreign policy, like the political strategy of the 1950s, does not respond to fear with plans for 'security'; rather, it has sought to channel and even stoke fear to bolster implementation of a predetermined policy. Specifically and provocatively stated, the Bush administration did not stage the tragedy of 11 September 2001, but within hours of the event it began to consider how to use a War on Terror to implement plans for regime change in Iraq.

Sixty years before my mother took advantage of the Internet to send her message, when the foes of America were not radical Islamists but Communists, President Harry Truman hosted a meeting with Congressional representatives. The Truman administration, having been told by Britain that London could no longer provide aid to Greece or Turkey, faced a challenge: how could it persuade the American public and Congress to send hundreds of millions of dollars to those two Mediterranean countries? The advice to the Democratic president from Arthur Vandenberg, the Republican leader in the Senate, was blunt: make a speech to 'scare the hell' out of the American people (Jones, 1955). Two weeks later, the president went before a joint session of Congress and issued what would become known as the Truman Doctrine: 'I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures' (Truman, 1947).

Truman's initiative was that of an 'official' executive political network, using the method of formal communication to justify policy rather than a private individual taking advantage of technological shift and acceleration to disseminate an urgent political message. Ironically, however, the role of the Executive would be eclipsed in favor of a representation based on catalytic individuals whipping up a public fervor that overtook Government policy.

On 9 February 1950 a then little-known senator from Wisconsin named Joseph McCarthy addressed a Republican women's club in Wheeling, West Virginia, and declared that he had a list of 205 Communists who worked in the State Department (McCarthy, 1950).The number on the list fluctuated wildly, but McCarthy's persistent message of infiltration and subversion encouraged a climate of fear and domestic repression. Thus, in the narrative set out not only by contemporary observers but by historians, the US Government merely followed—willingly or unwillingly—a path laid by the Senator.

The problem with this storyline is that it inverts cause and effect. By the time McCarthy made his Wheeling speech, the U.S. government was already well advanced in its projection mobilization of the threat within and without. Nine days after Truman set out his doctrine, the government issued an executive order requiring that any federal employee not only pass a security vetting but also sign a loyalty oath ('Executive Order 9835', 1947). Truman issued other high-profile declarations about dangerous groups within American society, notably a speech on St. Patrick's Day in 1948 in which he asserted the following: 'I do not want and I will not accept the political support of Henry Wallace and his Communists. If joining them or permitting them to join me is the price of victory, I recommend defeat' (Truman, 1948).

The domestic mobilization of fear was connected to the government's foreign policy through its guidelines on 'U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security', first adopted in November 1948 (NSC 20/4, 1948). In its most famous incarnation, NSC 68 of April 1950, the policy sanctioned not only development of the hydrogen bomb but also substantial increases in conventional forces, economic and military aid to 'friendly' governments, information programs, and covert operations. All of this depended upon congressional authorization of expenditure, however, and that in turn rested upon an intensive campaign to persuade the American public: 'The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on recognition

by this Government, the American people, and all free peoples, that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake' (NSC 68, 1950).

On 20 April 1950 President Truman, addressing the American Society of Newspaper Editors, launched the Campaign of Truth: 'We must pool our efforts with those of the other free peoples in a sustained, intensified program to promote the cause of freedom against the propaganda of slavery. We must make ourselves heard round the world in a great campaign of truth' (Truman, 1950). Truman may have emphasized the 'positive' dimension of the American way of life but, in the Manichaean construction of the Cold War, that political culture could only exist in tandem with the projection of the Soviet menace:

> Unwillingly our free society finds itself mortally challenged by the Soviet system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerous and divisive trends in our own society, no other so skillfully and powerfully evokes the elements of irrationality in human nature everywhere, and no other has the support of a great and growing center of military power. (NSC 68, 1950)

Thus two months later, the incursion of North Korean troops across the 38th parallel marked a global showdown with Stalinist and Maoist Communism rather than a post-colonial civil war. And two years later, with that war turned into stalemate, the anti-Communist mobilization would rebound upon the Truman administration when presidential candidate Dwight Eisenhower accused the Democrats of 'the negative, futile, and immoral policy of "containment"' ('Republican Party Platform', 1952).

It could be contended that, for all its damaging virulence, the climate of fear had receded by 1954. In an extensive national survey conducted by Samuel Stouffer that year, less than one percent of Americans listed Communism as their primary concern. In contrast, more than eighty percent cited 'personal and family problems', forty-three percent focusing on business or financial issues (Stouffer, 1954).

That, however, is too simple a reading. If the Communist menace was far from the explicit priority for most in the United States and if its most 'extreme' proponents such as McCarthy had fallen from grace, the threat could always be invoked. Thus, when the Cold War moved beyond the European theater to 'peripheries' such as Asia and Latin America, Chinese and Cuban evils circulated from White House press conferences to Hollywood films to weekly television series.[3] The specter of Communism would not be vanquished by military victory or by recognition of its 'realities' but by the collapse of political culture—at home and abroad—over Vietnam. Fear had not been met by a positive projection of 'freedom' but by tensions and even contradictions in the representation of that freedom, embodied in the famous (perhaps apocryphal) remark of an American officer in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive: 'It became necessary to destroy this village in order to save it' ('Beginning of the End', 1971).

It would be foolish beyond simplicity to attribute fear solely to the machinations of Government official. Individual and community insecurity, be it fear of the known over what has occurred or fear of the unknown over what might happen, be it fear of the natural disaster or the man-made one, has a history long before 1945. The salient

[3] See, for example, J.F. MacDonald (1985) *Television and the Red Menace*. New York: Praeger.

point is not that the U.S. Government manufactured fear. Rather, having just emerged from a period of global fear amidst war, genocide, and turmoil, it could mobilize fear, using and contributing to the new structure of the 'national security state' and channeling anxieties in a public confrontation with Moscow.

What relevance does this historical background have when, for some, our dilemmas and challenges began on 11 September 2001? At one level, I would respond that the simplistic assertion that a society conditioned in part by the fear of the 'other', a fear re-stoked by Ronald Reagan's declaration in 1982 of the American confrontation with an 'evil empire', did not put that fear to rest just because the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. To the contrary, other villains had emerged before and during those supposedly climactic events—Iran's 'mullahs', Nicaragua's Sandinistas, Libya's crazed Colonel Qaddafi in the mid-1980s, Panama's Manuel Noriega in 1989; and in 1990 Iraq's Saddam Hussein (complete with photographically altered Hitleresque moustache).[4]

More importantly, these worries were not just a context for political activity; they were stoked and used by the American executive pursuing its foreign policy agenda. To be sure, this was not a process that was always consistent—another lengthy essay would be needed to explain how the Reagan administration was trying to sell aircraft parts and missiles to the same ayatollahs that they were publicly denouncing[5]—but it was ever-present. Furthermore in 1992, in an unprecedented effort, White House officials tried to link that mobilization to a new strategy seeking a 'preponderance of power' throughout the world. In a document innocuously called the Defense Planning Guidance, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz[6] proposed that

> [The administration's] first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia. ('Defense Planning Guidance', 1992)

Pursuit of the strategy was deferred because of the defeat of the first President Bush by Bill Clinton, but it continued to color American political discourse. Former Government officials such as Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Elliot Abrams (many of whom would later re-emerge in the current Bush administration) pressed their case for an American quest for 'preponderance of power' in think tanks and Government commissions.[7] In one notable case, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, chaired by Rumsfeld, dismissed intel-

---

[4] The *New Republic*'s cover of 3 September 1990 put the altered image of Saddam above the giant caption 'Fuhrer in the Gulf'.

[5] In the 'Iran-contra' episode, exposed in 1986, the Reagan Administration tried to fund the efforts of the Nicaraguan contras to overthrow the Sandinista Government through revenues from the sale of arms to the Iranian Government, then fighting a protracted war against Iraq.

[6] The document was written by Wolfowitz's aide Zalmay Khalilzad, who would become George W. Bush's Ambassador to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, Ambassador to Iraq after the toppling of Saddam Hussein, and Ambassador to the United Nations.

[7] For one now well-known example, see the documents of the Project for a New American Century at http://www.newamericancentury.org.

ligence from agencies like the CIA to declare that Iran, Iraq, and North Korea would pose missile threats within the next five to ten years ('Rumsfeld Commission, 1998'). Perhaps more important, the Clinton administration contributed to the ongoing projection of those threats with their identification of 'rogue states'. Consider, for example, the words of National Security Advisor Anthony Lake in 1994:

> Our policy must face the reality of recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family but also assault its basic values. There are few 'backlash' states: Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya. For now they lack the resources of a superpower, which would enable them to seriously threaten the democratic order being created around them. Nevertheless, their behavior is often aggressive and defiant. The ties between them are growing as they seek to thwart or quarantine themselves from a global trend to which they seem incapable of adapting. (Lake, 1994)

None of this is to suggest that 9/11 was a mere incident in a chain of events dating back to the start of the Cold War (I hasten to add that I am not arguing that 9/11 was 'manufactured' to implement a plan for American dominance.) That tragedy, however, was not the *ab initio* foundation for a new U.S. foreign policy or for a new construction of 'fear' in American culture. Rather, it acted upon—indeed, served as a catalyst for—both government planning and the context in which that planning was projected and developed.

On 31 January 2001, less than two weeks after the inauguration of George W. Bush, the president's National Security Council met for the first time. The lead item on the agenda was 'Regime Change in Iraq'. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld asked his colleagues to 'imagine what the region would look like without Saddam and with a regime that is aligned with U.S. interests. It would change everything in the region and beyond. It would demonstrate what U.S. policy is all about' (Suskind, 2004). In effect, Iraq was going to be a demonstration case both of American power and the U.S. quest for preponderance in the Middle East and beyond.

That quest was frustrated, in the short term, by other foreign policy issues and crises, such as the recurrence of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the downing of an American reconnaissance plane by China in April 2001. The deferral of the quest did not mean, however, that the 'threat' had dissipated. Saddam continued to be held up as a menace to regional stability, and U.S. warplanes periodically bombed Iraqi anti-aircraft positions. Other challenges to American 'security' were ever-present, and indeed, in the aftermath of the incident with the U.S. spy plane, there was the prospect of a showdown with the Chinese.

September 11, of course, was more than an abstract threat. It was a far too real, unprecedented illustration of how terrorism could be waged on the U.S. mainland. Even more daunting, it was an act carried out not by an identifiable enemy state but by a trans-national organization with no clear center that could be attacked in response. So, on one level, the threat was met with the imagery of a 'War on Terror': the posters of Osama bin Laden—'Wanted Dead or Alive'—and photographs of his acolytes, the institution of a color-coded measure of the level of danger, the declarations that these enemies 'follow in the path of fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism'. At another, however, the challenge had to be made tangible by giving the United States someone or

something to attack—in this case, the Taliban regime of Afghanistan that was allegedly giving shelter to bin Laden.[8]

But September 11 was far more than a manifestation of how 'fear' would be met by an ongoing battle for 'security'. What it offered to the Bush administration, tragically, was the opportunity to re-frame that battle in the service of its long-term foreign policy goals. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice asked her staff, 'How do we capitalize on these opportunities [presented by 9/11]?' (cited in Lemann, 2002). Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld offered the answer in instructions to his staff: 'Best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit S.H. [Saddam Hussein] at same time. Not only UBL [Osama bin Laden]. Go massive. Sweep it all up. Things related and not'.[9] While Bush and his advisors deferred an immediate attack on Iraq, which some in the administration supported, notably Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, the president made it clear that 'if we could prove that we could be successful in [the Afghanistan] theater, then the rest of the task would be easier' (cited in Woodward, 2002: 84).

This is not to deny that the upsurge in fear, accompanied by grief, anger, and displays of patriotism, was not heartfelt. The government, however, did not stand aside from those emotions. To the contrary, the mobilization of those emotions could defer if not resolve, tensions and contradictions raised by the implementation of long-standing Government plans. Fear, rather than evidence, could offer the foundation for the Bush Administration to move from Kabul to other targets.

Consider, for example, the 'Campaign for Freedom' of the Advertising Council—the non-profit service organization through which ad agencies produce government campaigns. In one television spot, a young man attempts to check out a book from a local library. His request is not only met by hostility by the librarian; as he turns, with some trepidation, from the counter, he is met by two dark-suited gentlemen who escort him from the building. Those who saw the commercial, run through the autumn and winter of 2001/2, may have been unaware of the irony that at that time the FBI was demanding that librarians hand over lists of readers who had checked out books on subjects such as Islam (or that more than 1,000 people in the United States had been detained without charge after 9/11). [10]

Consider, in the 'foreign policy' complement to this domestic projection, the mistaken but persistent linkage of Saddam Hussein with Al Qa'eda and 9/11 by a major-

---

[8] I deliberately use the modifier 'allegedly' for, on 20 September 2001 and again on 13 October 2001, the Taliban offered to negotiate the handover of Osama bin Laden for trial in an Islamic court. See John Burns (2001) 'Afghans Coaxing Bin Laden, but U.S. Rejects Bid', *New York Times*. 21 September. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9400E5DC1E3BF932A1575AC0A9679C8B63&scp=2&sq=+bin+laden&st=nyt; (2001) 'Bush Rejects Taliban Offer to Hand Bin Laden Over', *The Guardian*. 13 October. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/14/Afghanistan.terrorism5.

[9] (2002) 'Plans for Attack Began on 9/11', *CBS News*. 4 September. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/04/september11/main520830.shtml.

[10] The 'Campaign for Freedom' no longer survives on the Advertising Council's website (www.adcouncil.org), although a related campaign, 'I am an American', can be found at http://www.adcouncil.org/default.aspx?id=61. A good summary of the Campaign for Freedom, including the contradictions of the 'Library' spot, is in Peter Norman (2002) 'The Ad Council's Campaign for Freedom', *Flak Magazine*. 9 July. http://www.flakmag.com/tv/freedom.html. On the detentions after 11 September, see Andrew Gumbel (2001) 'U.S. Detaining Foreign Nationals Without Charge and Legal Advice', *The Independent*. 12 November. http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/article143675.ece.

ity of the American public and the encouragement of that linkage by government statements, including those by President Bush.[11] It is also worth noticing related 'public diplomacy' efforts: as Vice President Cheney was proposing to Tony Blair in March 2002 that planning move from Afghanistan towards an invasion of Iraq, Lynne Cheney, his wife, was opening at the Museum of London an exhibit of twenty-eight photographs of 9/11's 'Ground Zero' by Joel Meyerowitz. To heighten the message, the photographs were displayed in the room next to the permanent exhibit on the Blitz of World War II.[12]

We are now entering in the seventh year of the war in Iraq. It can easily be argued that, far from fulfilling the global blueprint set out by the Bush administration with the president standing on U.S. warships declaring, 'Mission Accomplished' (Bumiller, 2003), the venture has clearly marked the downfall of the quest for a 'preponderance of power'. Perhaps more provocatively, it could be contended that there has been an assimilation of 'fear' similar to that of the mid-1950s, a duality holding together the menace of the 'other' with the immediately relevant challenges of family, finance, and well-being. The threat level continuously scrolls at 'Elevated: Orange' on Fox's news ticker, hundreds of detainees remain in Camp X-Ray and other prisons around the world, Osama bin Laden sits (probably in the northwest frontier of Pakistan) beyond the reach of American forces, and Saddam's execution fades before everyday terror, political turmoil, and civil war in Iraq. These issues, however, are no longer quite as prominent in American discourse, be it Page 1 of the *New York Times* or (more cogently) *The Huntsville (Alabama) Times*. If you can forgive a personal assertion for this point, my mother may send me e-mails such as the one that I used to open this essay, but her concerns—and those of my father, my sisters, and other relatives in the United States—are usually closer to the bank balance than they are to the purported 'clash of civilizations'.

Still, as in the Cold War, fear may be re-mobilized against new enemies or old enemies restored. It remains to be seen whether the current denunciations of Iran will lead to military action or whether we have reached a 'tipping point' where the images cannot be translated into another campaign. It remains to be seen whether another theater of conflict—for example, Israel/Palestine or Israel/Lebanon—becomes a stage for wider intervention, whether there is a re-configuration of the old tensions with Russia or China, or whether another unexpected 'terrorist' atrocity turns the international kaleidoscope once more. For, unlike the Cold War, there is no symbolic marker—no fall of the Wall, no end to an enemy system such as Communism—that can offer

[11] Consider, for example, Bush's speech of 1 May 2003: 'The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11th, 2001' [transcript at http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/05/01/bush.transcript]. Two years after 9-11, almost 70 percent of Americans still believed that 'Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the Sept. 11 attacks' [Associated Press, 2003, quoted in '69% of Americans Believe Saddam Linked to 9/11: Poll', *Arab News*. 7 September. http://www.arabnews.com/?page=4&section=0&article=31530&d=7&m=9&y=2003].

[12] The photographs are exhibited at 'After September 11: Images from Ground Zero', http://www.museumoflondon.org.uk/archive/exhibits/sept11/index.htm. A report on the opening of the exhibition at the Museum of London is at http://london.usembassy.gov/sept11/myrwtz.html. See also Liam Kennedy (2003) 'Remembering September 11: Photography as Cultural Diplomacy', *International Affairs*: 315–326.

long-term absolution of the fear that has been cultivated in past generations and, in particular, in the first years of this century.

WORKS CITED

— Altheide, D. (2006) *Terrorism and the Politics of Fear*. Walnut Creek, CA: Rowman Altamira.

— 'Beginning of the End' (1971) *Time*. 8 November. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,877412,00.html.

— Bernays, E. (1955) *The Engineering of Consent*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

— Bumiller, E. (2003) 'Keepers of Bush Image Lift Stagecraft to New Heights', *New York Times*. 16 May. http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/05/16/nyt.bumiller/.

— 'Defense Planning Guidance' (1992)

— *Public Broadcasting System, Frontline: The War Behind Closed Doors,* http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html.

— 'Executive Order 9835' (1947) *Documents of American History II*. 21 March. http://tucnak.fsv.cuni.cz/~calda/Documents/1940s/Truman%20Loyalty%20Oath,%201947.html.

— Freeland, R. (1971) *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*. New York: Knopf.

— Furedi, F. (2002) *Culture of Fear*. London: Continuum.

— [—] (2007) *Politics of Fear*. London: Continuum.

— Glassner, B. (2000) *The Culture of Fear: Why Americans Are Afraid of the Wrong Things*. New York: Basic.

— Herman, E. and Chomsky, N. (1988) *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon.

— Jones, Joseph (1955) *The Fifteen Weeks*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.

— Kennedy, L. (2003) 'Remembering September 11: Photography as Cultural

— Diplomacy', *International Affairs*: 315/326.

— Lake, A. (1994) 'Confronting Backlash States', *Foreign Affairs* (March/April). http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19940301faessay5095/anthony-lake/confronting-backlash-states.html.

— Lemann, N. (2002) 'The Next World Order', *The New Yorker*. 1 April.

— Lippmann, W. (1922) *Public Opinion*. New York: Macmillan.

— MacDonald, J.F. (1985) *Television and the Red Menace*. New York: Praeger.

— McCarthy, J. (1950) Speech: 9 February. Reprinted at "'Enemies from Within': Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's Accusations of Disloyalty", History Matters,

— http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6456 (accessed 27 October 2008)

— Mueller, J. (2006) *Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them. New York: Free Press.*

— NSC 20/4 (1948) 'U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security'. 23 November. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/coldwar/nsc20/4.htm.

— NSC 68 (1950) 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security'. 14 April. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm.

— Patton, D. (2008) 'I Don´t care', *American Daily*. 8 March. http://www.americandaily.com/article/8987.

— Qualter, Terence (1985) *Opinion Control in the Democracies*. New York: Macmillan.

— 'Republican Party Platform' (1952) *The American Presidency Project*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=R1952.

— 'Rumsfeld Commission' (1998) *Executive Summary Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States*. 15 July. http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/.

— Stouffer, S. (1992 [1954]) *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

— Suskind, R. (2004) *The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, The White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

— Truman, H. (1947) 'Speech to Congress', transcript at The Avalon Project, Yale Law School. 12 March. http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm.

— [—] (1948) 'Address to the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick, New York City'. 17 March. http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1452.

— [—] (1950) 'Truth as a Weapon in Cold War', *The Times*. 21 April

— Woodward, B. (2002) *Bush at War*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

'THE LONG WAR': WHO IS WINNING THE BATTLE FOR IDEAS?

Frank Furedi
University of Kent

From the outset this has been a very confusing conflict. For over seven years western leaders have never tired of telling the world that the War against Terrorism is principally an 'ideological struggle' or a 'battle of ideas'. But the concept of a 'battle of idea' is rarely elaborated. In official proceedings the term has a uniquely shallow and rhetorical character. Official statements self-consciously avoid spelling out the ideology that they are tackling. Recycled historical allusions to Nazism, totalitarianism and Stalinist Russia serve as a substitute for clarity about the ideological character of the contemporary threat.[1] Other than denouncing it as 'extremist', 'totalitarian' or 'fanatical' there is a studied silence about the content of the ideological threat facing Western democratic societies. This remarkable reluctance to spell out the issues at stake betrays a sense of defensiveness and hesitancy toward the conduct of the battle of ideas.

The most striking symptom of this defensiveness is the linguistic confusion shown in official communications. Policy makers appear to lack a language through which they can give meaning to contemporary realities. Indeed they appear to devote more energy toward lecturing people what words not to use than to offer a clear explanation of their objectives. Jonathan Evans in his first public speech in November 2007 as head of MI5 pleaded with newspaper editors to avoid words that help the enemy. He insisted that we must 'pay close attention to our use of language' and avoid words that encourages the association of terrorism with Islam since that would undermine the Government's ability to win the hearts and minds of Britain's Muslim communities (Evans, 2007). Soon after this statement reports were circulated indicating that officials were 'rethinking' their approach and 'abandoning what they admit has been offensive and inappropriate language'. The acknowledgement that UK officials expressed themselves in a language that was offensive and inappropriate betrays a palpable sense of disorientation in Whitehall. According to reports the term 'war on terror' will no longer be heard from ministers and the threat will not be described as a 'Muslim Problem' (Norton-Taylor, 2007). It is as if the 'Careless Talk Costs Lives' campaign of 2nd World

[1] This point is developed in 'Introduction' to Frank Furedi, *Invitation To Terror: The Expanding Empire of the Unknown*, London: Continuum Press, 2007.

War has been rehabilitated –only this time there is confusion about who the enemy is and what to call it.

Unlike their opponents Western officials are continually correcting the language they use to describe what is now euphemistically called the *Long War*. 'We strongly urge the government to abandon talk of a "War on Terror"' demands a report on the issue of home-grown terrorism in the UK (Blick, Chouduri and Weir, 2007:11). The British Broadcasting Corporation appears to be at a loss to know when the usage of the word 'terrorist' or 'terrorism' is appropriate. 'The value judgements frequently implicit in the use of the words "terrorist" or "terrorist groups" can create inconsistency in their use or, to audiences, raise doubts about our impartiality', states the BBC's editorial guidelines ('Editorial Guidelines', 2007). The EU is obsessed with not using words that could give the slightest hint of implicating Islam with terrorism. Take the guidelines issued by EU officials in April 2006 on the difficult question of what to call the enemy. The guidelines counselled avoiding the term 'Islamic terrorism' in favour of the Orwellian-sounding phrase 'terrorists who abusively invoke Islam'. The invention of this term was part of the project of constructing a 'non-emotive lexicon for discussing radicalisation' ('Islamic terrorism is too emotive a phrase, says EU', 2006).

Linguistic uncertainty afflicts proceedings on both sides of the Atlantic. Even supporters of the war on terror have reservations about using this term. Former U.S. Senator Rick Santorum has remarked that to say 'we are fighting a War on Terror' is 'like saying World War II was a war on blitzkrieg'. He added that terror like blitzkrieg is a tactic used by our enemy, not the enemy itself' (Santorum, 2006). Occasionally even the architects of the war on terror concede that they got their lines mixed up. 'We actually misnamed the war on terror' conceded President Bush in August 2004. Without a hint of irony he added that 'it ought to be the struggle against ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies who happen to use terror as a weapon to try to shake the conscience of the free world' ('Campaign snapshots', 2004). In the very attempt to rectify the 'misnaming' of a war, Bush exposes the poverty of the intellectual resources with which the battle against terror is fought. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the confusion lies not just with the occasional word but the entire script.

President Bush's acknowledgment that 'we actually misnamed the war on terror' should not be seen as proof of the White House's lack of rhetorical skills. Confusion about terminology expresses a wider mood of disorientation about the very meaning of the war. One of the clearest manifestations of this problem is the constant display of verbal acrobatics shown by officials in London and Washington in their attempt to explain the significance of this conflict. Sometimes they struggle to find the right words. At times they even attempt to distance themselves from the term 'war on terror' and give the impression that they are uncomfortable with the rhetorical idioms that they invented. In December 2006 it was reported that the Foreign Office had advised Government ministers, ambassadors and officials to stop using the term 'war on terror' and similar provocative terms as 'they risk angering British Muslims and generating tensions in the wider Islamic world' ('Christmas Terror', 2006). A year later official sources indicated that the term war on terror would no longer be heard from ministers. Apparently they will use a 'less emotive language' that would focus on the criminal character of terrorist plots (Norton-Taylor, 2007). That the name designated to define this glob-

al conflict could be perceived as too 'emotive' and a liability and so easily dispensed with is symptomatic of a mood of unease about progress in the war.

But of course the problems are not so much linguistic as ideological and political.

As one report on the state of British public diplomacy noted 'effective policies for dealing with these new security challenges are quite different from those of the Cold War, and publics require much more active persuasion'. It added that 'responses to the threat of nuclear war or Russian invasion had much broader and less questioning support than do responses to the threat of terrorist attack, which are coloured by deep popular scepticism about pre-emptive wars and about the principle of regime change for "terrorism-sponsoring' states' (Leonard, Small and Rose, 2005: 11). The relatively ambiguous public support for the war against terrorism suggests that for a variety of reasons this conflict has not encouraged national solidarity. The inability of the Western elites, particularly in the EU to give meaning to their global policies means that it is not winning the battle of ideas with its own public. This development is most evident in relation to its estrangement from the Muslim population that inhabit western societies.

Surveys continually highlight the feeble influence of secular and liberal values on significant sections of Europe's Muslim population. Despite the numerous initiatives at 'dialogue' and 'multiculturalism', a global survey indicates that Muslims in Britain are the most anti-western in Europe. Back in June 2007 Gordon Brown pledged to wage a cultural war on terrorism similar to that used against communism during the cold war. 'We must work across society to isolate the extremists from society to protect and advance the British way of life' argued Brown (Laville, 2007). A month later he developed this theme and told his American hosts that in the fight against terrorism what was at stake is a 'struggle for the soul of the 21st Century' ('Brown Talks of Terror Struggle', 2007). His sentiments are widely shared throughout the EU. As one well known analyst observed 'the larger part of this struggle, and the more important in the long term, is the battle for the hearts and minds of young European Muslims—usually men—who are not yet fanatically violent jihadists, but could become so' (Ash, 2007).

A NEW TYPE OF IDEOLOGICAL THREAT

Official anxiety about the growing threat of home-grown extremism represents a radical departure from the way that terrorism was conceptualised in the past. Today terrorism is understood as not merely a physical threat. It is not simply the capacity of the terrorist to wreak mass destruction that worries society. Terrorism is also endowed with moral and ideological power that it is able to exercise over significant sections of the domestic population. The influence that the cause of the terrorist is able to exercise over the minds of sections of the public endows this threat with unparalleled danger. Sir David Omand, the former UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator goes as far as to state that 'the most effective weapon of the terrorist at present is their ideology' (Omand, 2005:109). The model of a terrorist as an effective purveyor of ideas represents a significant departure from the way this threat was perceived in the past. Indeed the idea that a terrorist can appeal to people's heart and minds and not just merely scare the public is fundamentally inconsistent with traditional definitions of this threat. Until

recent times the danger of terrorism was interpreted through its capacity to inflict fear on its target population. It is only in recent times that terrorism is conceptualised as an effective ideological competitor.

Increasingly an important dimension of the war against terrorism is the battle for moral authority. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the political and cultural elites of Western societies feel less than confident about conducting a successful campaign on the battlefield of ideas. Their apprehension about the powerful attraction of radical ideas on sections of the domestic population in the West often betrays the belief that they can not convince others of the superiority of their own way of life.

Western analysts are intensely apprehensive about the likely outcome of the battle of ideas with terrorism. They appear at a loss to explain what they refer to as the 'radicalization process'. One U.S. intelligence survey published in April 2006 observed that 'the radicalization process is occurring more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to pinpoint'. But blaming communication technology for promoting radicalisation can not entirely distract attention from a far more fundamental problem—which is that the US is not winning the battle for ideas. As this report concedes the *Jihadists* have increased their influence and numbers ('Declassified Key Judgments ´, 2006).

British intelligence analysts are if anything more anxious about the appeal of radicalism than their American counterparts. Ian Blair, Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, has drawn attention to the fact that young British Muslims are 'willing to die for an idea' and 'this is a phenomenon we have not seen en masse, since the Spanish Civil War and the battle against fascism'. Idealism seems to be monopolised by the wrong side of this conflict. Of particular concern for Ian Blair is the fact that the appeal of their 'coherent narrative of oppressions, war and jihad' seems 'very potent':

> One of the truly shocking things — in addition to their intent — about the recent alleged plot to blow up airliners is the apparent speed with which young, reasonably affluent, some reasonably well-educated, British born people were converted from what appeared to be ordinary lives — in a matter of some weeks and months, not years — to a position where some were allegedly prepared to commit suicide and murder thousands of people at the same time. (Blair, 2006)

It is likely that Blair's shock at the speed of radicalisation expresses a belated recognition of a problem that the British Government failed to recognise for a very long time. The response towards the problem of home grown terrorism has been confused to say the least. Until the 7/7 J London bombings the Government tended to act as if this problem did not exist. It has yet to take on board the possibility that as matters stand—it may lack the intellectual and political resources to project an attractive credible alternative

Insofar as there is a hint of strategy about tackling radicalisation it has a fantasy like character. Often the official discourse on radicalisation projects an infantilized version of child protection attitudes. It warns that 'vulnerable' and 'impressionable' young people may be targeted on internet sites, campuses and social venues and 'groomed' by cynical operators. Back in November 2007 it was reported that the UK Government's Research, Information and Communication Unit would draw up "counter-nar-

ratives" to the anti-Western messages on websites 'designed to influence vulnerable and impressionable audiences here' (Norton-Taylor, 2007). The same point was reiterated a year previously. In November 2006 Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former head of MI5 observed that 'it is the youth who are being actively targeted, groomed, radicalised and set on a path that frighteningly quickly could end in their involvement in mass murder of their fellow UK citizens' (ctd in Norton-Taylor, 2006).

Unfortunately the dramatic framing of the threat — 'sudden radicalisation'—allows extremism to be seen as a kind of psychological virus that suddenly afflicts the vulnerable and those suffering psychological deficits. Yet the depiction of radicalisation as a symptom of vulnerability overlooks the fact that frequently it expresses confidence and self belief. Indeed as Ian Blair pointed out above what is striking is the activism and idealism of these so-called brainwashed. Moreover the people who embrace radicalism are rarely brainwashed by manipulative operatives –often they have sought out jihadist web-sites and on-line networks. In other words they may have made a self-conscious and active choice.[2]

WHAT IF THEY ARE US?

Apprehensions about the problem of the home-grown threat endows the question 'why do they hate us' with a new meaning. The very posing of the question by Bush and others conveys a sense of genuine surprise and bewilderment. The question also expresses frustration and distress about the discovery that not everyone loves us. It resembles the kind of gesture that children make when they discover that they are not the centre of everyone's undivided attention. Even in its slightly less infantilised form this query hints at a sense of disappointment about being betrayed by someone close. The implicit premise of this question is that they ought to be really like us. This is not a sentiment that one directs at clearly acknowledged enemies. Neither President Roosevelt nor Churchill needed to ask why the Nazis hate us. Nor was this the type of question that western leaders directed at the Kremlin. So the anxiety expressed by this question semi-consciously refers to the concern that they might be uncomfortably close to us. Worse still since the apparent emergence of 'home grown terrorism' there is great concern that 'they' might be one of 'us'.

When this question was originally formulated by President Bush it was based on the premise that the enemy came from somewhere far way. The problem and sources of terrorism was conceptualised as one that is external to Western societies. Many of the theories about Muslim rage or clash of civilisations have as their focus distant and exotic places such as Afghanistan or Iran. Ironically many of the critics of American and European foreign policy also offer an externalist perspective and argue that what provokes terrorism is the oppression of Palestine and Western domination of the Middle East. Radical critics of the West also locate the problem of terrorism as the consequence of developments in the Middle East (see Gary Younge, 2007).[3] In Britain the

[2] This point is confirmed by research into the motivation and character of suicide bombers. See for example Scott Atran, 'The Moral Logic of Suicide Terrorism', *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring, 2006.

[3] See for example Gary Younge 'We must be honest about our past to be truly hopeful about our future', *The Guardian*: 16 April 2007.

Oxford Research Group regularly publishes reports that condemn the war in Iraq for encouraging global terrorism (See 'Iraq Policy´, 2007).

Since September 11 it has become increasingly difficult to ignore the fact that the threat of terrorism is not just an external but a domestic problem. The difficulties that political leaders have in spelling out 'our' way of life acquire momentous significance in relation to the flourishing of anti-western movements in the domestic front. With the rise of so-called home grown terrorism the question of why do they hate us is linked to queries about why are they repelled by us and why don't they want to be like us. British officials and analysts have been shocked by the discovery that a significant section of its Muslim youth has become sympathetic to a radical Islamic outlook. Press reports frequently draw attention to the way in which young people who apparently lived a life of English born westernised teenagers can become suddenly radicalised and turn into bitter enemies of their country. Take the following account of the life Hasib Hussain, one of the suicide bombers responsible for the carnage of the 7 July bombings in London:

> He liked playing cricket and hockey, then one day he came into school and had undergone a complete transformation almost overnight. . .He started wearing a topi hat from the mosque, grew a beard and wore robes. Before that he was always in jeans ('Suicide Bomber Profile: The Teenager', 2006).

Here is a young man who is apparently just like us but who incomprehensibly has a sudden character transformation and turns against his neighbours and country! Like the perpetrators of the Madrid bombings, he lived and worked amongst the people he chose to target.

The realisation that they are not like us, do not want to be like us and hate us render this threat an all too intimate status. It is not just in Britain that people have discovered that their neighbours were not who they thought they were. Holland Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Germany, Belgium, Canada, the U.S.A. are some of the countries who have discovered that some their young people have developed extreme hatred for the western way of life.

The discovery of home-grown radicalisation implicitly calls into question the conventional portrayal of the war on terror. Not only has the distinction between them and us become more confused the conflict increasingly points to tension within the western society itself. It is recognised that in recent years 'the majority of terrorist activities inside the West come from independent, homogeneous networks' (Vidino, 2006:119). It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that that at least for some people living in the West, their society's way of life appears repulsive. This development poses the question of 'who is next'? The problem posed by the ascendancy of the homo-grown radical is that it can be anybody. In Europe security analyst concede that it is proving impossible to make a profile of the terrorist.

From time to time analysts compare today's home grown terrorists with those of the past. 'From the Ku Klux Klan to the Weather Underground, American society has reaped its share of violent dissident groups' notes one reporter (Jonsson, 2006). However the threat of today's home-grown Islamic radical is not experienced as that posed by a small isolated fringe group. On the contrary they are perceived as part of a global revolt against the Western way of life. That anti-western sentiment can serve as a focus

for the radicalisation of young people living in Europe and America exposes the problem that these societies have in inspiring enthusiasm and loyalty. On the contrary. The emergence of home-grown anti-western radicalism indicates that at least for some, rather than possessing any positive meaning, 'our way of life' provokes hatred and disgust.

In a different world terrorism could be dismissed as an episodic threat posed by a handful of malcontents whose heinous deeds repelled the vast majority of ordinary citizens. When Governments sought to crack down on terrorists they could invariably count on public support. This was a threat that could be swiftly criminalised and isolated as an illegitimate threat. Acts of terror directed at members of the political elites were successfully presented by governments as threats to anyone. The battle lines were clear with a small group of extremists on one side and the rest of society on the other.

At a time when home grown and external threats appear so confusing the elevation of terrorism as the enemy provides little obvious meaning. Increasingly it is recognised that this conflict is not so much about weapons of mass destruction as they are about ideas. At present the predominant tendency is to interpret the problem as that of disgruntled people becoming radicalised and drawn to a movement with mass appeal. One important analyst of this process writes how Jihad has 'become a millenarian movement with mass appeal' and about the need to counter the 'terrorist narrative—and draw potential recruits away from the lure of jihad' (Stern, 2006). However it is unclear just what constitutes the lure of jihad. Young people who are attracted by jihadist videos rarely adopt a new world view. Their response is not all that different to the numerous non-Muslim Westerners who visit nihilistic web sites and become fascinated by destructive themes and image. Those who visit jihadist sites opt for a fad rather than a coherent worldview. It is worth noting that some radicals who have been arrested for terrorist activities in Europe do not fit the image of the religious zealot. According to one report on members of the Mujahedon network—a Swedish internet forum, their knowledge of Islam was 'virtually non-extent' and their 'fascination with jihad seems to be dictated by their rebellious nature rather than a deep ideological conviction' (Vidino, 2006:6). In other words the dominant influence appears to be estrangement from society rather than the pull of a vibrant and dynamic alternative.

What's often overlooked is that it is not so much the lure of radicalism but the unravelling of meaning that is predominantly responsible for the emergence of a home-grown threat in the West. It appears that at least since the end of the Cold War, western political ideals have become exhausted and their capacity to endow experience with meaning has become significantly diminished.[4] As Laidi noted 'to define oneself by contrast with communism no longer has any meaning' (Laidi, 1998: 172). At the same time the West has become uncomfortable about its own tradition and its intellectual, scientific and moral inheritance rarely succeeds in providing a positive sense of meaning. Bin Laden himself attempts to incorporate into his statements many of the

[4] This problem is discussed in Frank Furedi, *The Politics Of Fear; Beyond Left and Right*, London; Continuum Press, 2005.

doubts that Westerners have about their legacy. In his October 2002 message to the Americans he wrote:

> You are a nation that exploits women like consumer products or advertising tools, calling upon customers to purchase them. You use women to serve passengers, visitors, and strangers to increase your profit margins. You then rant that you support the liberation of women…

You have destroyed nature with your industrial waste and gases, more than any other nation in history. Despite this, you refuse to sign the Kyoto agreement so that you can secure the profit of your greedy companies and industries (ctd in Lawrence, 2005: 168).

The ease with which conventional anti-consumerist, environmentalist themes merge with radical jihadist ones is testimony to the confluence of internally driven anti-modernism with externally inspired anti-western ones. In such circumstances it is not surprising that western governments find it difficult to give a name to the enemy.

Within the West there are formidable cultural influences that disparage its historical achievements and belief in progress and enlightenment. Some commentators take the view that the West faces a moral crisis and finds it difficult to believe in itself. The authors of *Suicide of the West* believe that 'most Westerners no longer believe in the ideas that have made the West so successful' (Koch and Smith, 2006:2). Others argue that even the police force and intelligence gathering agencies are influenced by a mood of 'Western self-loathing' which undermines their operational judgment (Newman and Smith, 2005:100). Those who look and find a home on a jihadist web site may well represent but a variant of such a response to the crisis of belief afflicting the West.

One reason why the war on terror has failed to consolidate a sense of solidarity against the enemy is because of the crisis of meaning afflicting the West. Uncontained by a robust system of meaning the threats have been far more effective in producing fears than in encouraging the emergence of new solidarities. Sadly shared meaning for most people is confined to fearing being a target rather being inspired to stand up for a way of life.

A crisis of meaning

It is evident that the reconceptualisation of terrorism as an ideological competitor is linked to the apparent decline in the self-belief of the West. Even before 9/11 there was more than a hint of defensiveness about the capacity of western values to prevail over those of hostile opponents. One conservative American contributor gave voice to this sentiment and concluded that 'protecting Western culture from foreign assault requires domestic revival'. A decade before 9/11 he warned that 'the twenty-first century could once again find Islam at the gates of Vienna, as immigrants or terrorists if not armies' (Lind, 1991:45). Today there is little evidence of a domestic revival. Indeed Western governments are sensitive about their very limited capacity for inspiring their own public. The problem of engaging the public and gaining its support is strikingly evident in relation to the post 9/11 political landscape.

Almost imperceptibly the threat of terrorism has been reinterpreted as predominantly an ideological one. Joseph Nye a leading American foreign relations expert places an emphasis on what he calls the *soft power* of terrorist organisation. Soft pow-

er, which Nye describes as 'the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments' seems to directly contradict the conventional representation of terrorism with its focus on realising objectives through inflicting fear (Nye, 2004: 34). Official concern about the influence of jihadist web sites, videos and other forms of communications indicates the seriousness with which the soft power is taken. 'Terrorism depends crucially on soft power for its ultimate victory' states Nye who also believes that 'it depends on its ability to attract support from the crowd at least as much as its ability to destroy the enemy's will to fight' (Nye, 2004:51).

Nye's shift in focus from mass casualty and weapons of mass destruction terrorism to the danger of soft power parallels an important shift in official thinking. In effect concern about ideas rather than just physical force shapes elite perceptions of the problems. Terrorism is feared as an ideological competitor for the allegiance of the very same publics that western governments are attempting to influence. Anxiety about the capacity of terrorists' organisations to succeed in the battle of ideas exposes a crisis of confidence that haunts western political elites. This is why the war on terror is frequently described in extravagant terms as a battle to defend a way of life.

The very fact that governments perceive relatively incoherent jihadist opponents as representing a serious ideological challenge to the western way of life draws attention to their feeble sense of self-belief. Paradoxically while they continually inflate the physical threat of weapons of mass destruction terrorism governments are reluctant to fully acknowledge their concern about winning the hearts and minds of sections of its own public. The deliberations about the problem of home-grown terrorism tend to focus on the problem of 'radicalisation'. This challenge is interpreted as a consequence of the external influence of global jihadist forces rather than what it may well be—a rejection of the western way of life. So one American intelligence report indicates that home-grown terrorism in the U.S. and Europe is likely to become a growing problem without posing the question of why young people growing up in these places come to hate their countries way of life (see 'Declassified Key Judgments', 2006).

The tendency to associate the problem of radicalisation with the influence of external global forces peddling anti-western sentiments serves to distract attention from the crisis of elite authority on the home front. It is important to note that the growth of 'anti-US and anti-globalization sentiment' recorded by U.S. intelligence sources is often fuelled by cultural forces closer to home ('Declassified Key Judgments', 2006). Anti- Americanism and contempt for aspects of the so-called western way of life exercise widespread influence in many European countries. These sentiments are most systematically expressed through cultural critiques of consumerism, capitalist selfishness, greed and ambition—ideas that also resonate with sections of America's cultural elite. Ideas that denounce Western arrogance and its belief in science and progress are actually generated from within the societies of Europe and America. The crisis of the West 'is *internally* generated' and it 'lies in Western heads' (Koch and Smith, 2006:1). Often this internally generated critique of the West overlaps on many points with those mounted by jihadist movements.

Instead of focusing on the external influences driving radicalisation, the UK based analyst Bill Durodie believes that it is more profitable to explore developments closer at home: 'It may prove more productive to ask why it is that a small element of Asian

youth, and quite a few others as well, fail to find any sense of solidarity or purpose within Western society' (Durodie, 2005:2). Numerous observers have drawn to the fact that a significant proportion of the individuals linked to terrorist outrages have grown up in the societies that they have learned to hate and want to destroy. Scott Atran that 'arguably the greatest potential threat in the world today lies with uprooted and egalitarian Muslim young adults in European cities, who provided the manpower for both the 9/11 and Madrid train-bombing attacks' (Atran, 2006: 269). Yet there is little attempt to discuss why it is that a significant minority of young people have developed such intense hostility towards their own society. The same commentators who exaggerate the threat of WMD terrorism appear to ignore or pay only a fleeting attention to a threat which is far too close to home. This response is entirely understandable for it is through this threat that the political elites are painfully reminded of the crisis of their authority. The widely observed rule of silence on this subject stands in sharp contrast to the shrill rhetoric surrounding the perils posed by jihadist websites. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that what we need is not rhetoric about a struggle for idea but a more scrupulous attention to the content of what constitutes a way of life worth defending.

WORKS CITED

— Ash, T. G. (2007) 'Wake Up, the invisible front line runs right through your back yard' *The Guardian*; 13 September. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/sep/13/comment.terrorism

— Atran, S. (2006) 'Commentary: A Failure of Imagination (Intelligence, WMDs and 'Virtual Jihad'). Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29:263/278

— Blair, I. (2006) 'Speech for Urban Age Summit' *The Metropolitan Police Website,* Berlin, 11 November, http://cms.met.police.uk/news/policy_organisational_news_and_general_information/cmsr_s_urban_age_summit_speech

— Blick, A., Choudhury, T. and Weir, S. (2007) *The Rules of the Game: Terrorism, Community and Human Rights.* London: Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust

— 'Brown Talks of Terror Struggle.' (2007) *BBC News Online*. 1 August, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6924843.stm.

— 'Campaign Snapshots' (2004) *Online NewsHour*. 6 August, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec04/snapshot_8/6.html

— 'Christmas Terror strike "highly likely"', *The Daily Telegraph*. 11 December 2006, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1536574/Christmas-terror-strike-%27highly-likely%27.html

— 'Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States" ' (2006) *Global Security.Org.* April. http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2006/nie_global-terror-trends_apr2006.htm

— Durodie, B. (2005) 'Cultural Precursors and Psychological Consequences of Contemporary Western Responses to Acts of Terror' in S.Wessely & Krasnov, V.N. (eds.) *Psychological Responses to the New Terrorism: A NATO-Russia Dialogue*, IOS Press.

— 'Editorial Guidelines: Terrorism, Use of Language When Reporting' (2007) *BBC website*, March,http://www.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/advice/terrorismlanguage/index.shtml

— Evans, J. (2007) 'Speech: counter-terrorism and public trust.' Text of the address by the Director-General of MI5, to the Society of Editors conference in Manchester, *The Times Online*; 5 Novemberhttp://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article2810794.ece

— Furedi, F. (2005) *The Politics Of Fear: Beyond Left and Right*, London; Continuum Press.

— [—] (2007) *Invitation To Terror: The Expanding Empire of the Unknown*, London: Continuum Press.

— 'Iraq policy "Spawned New Terror."' (2007) *BBC Politics* 11 April 2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6542567.stm

— 'Islamic terrorism is too emotive a phrase, says EU' (2006) *Daily Telegraph*; 12 April, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/1515541/%27Islamic-terrorism%27-is-too-emotive-a-phrase,-says-EU.html

— Jonsson, P. (2006) 'New profile of the home-grown terrorist emerges', *The Christian Science Monitor*; 26 June, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0626/p01s01-ussc.html

— Koch, Richard & Smith, Chris (2006) *Suicide of the West*, Continuum: London.

— Laidi, Z. (1998) *A World Without Meaning: The Crisis Of Meaning In International Politics*, Routledge: London.

— Laville, S. (2007) 'Brown pledges a cultural war on terrorism', *The Guardian*. 20 June 2007

— Leonard, M, Small, A, with Rose, M. (2005) *British Public Diplomacy In The 'Age of Schism',* London: The Foreign Policy Centre.

— Lawrence, B. (2005) (ed.) *Messages To The World; The Statements Of Osama Bin Laden*, Verso; London

— Lind, W.S. (1991) 'Defending Western Culture', *Foreign Policy* 84, Fall, 40/50.

— Neumann, Peter & Smith, Michael (2005) 'Missing the Plot? Intelligence and Discourse Failure', *Orbis*, Winter, 95/107.

— Norton-Taylor, R. (2007) 'Counter-terrorism officials rethink stance on Muslims', *The Guardian*; 20 November, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/nov/20/terrorism.religion

— [—] (2006) 'MI5: 30 plots being planned in UK' *The Guardian*; 10 November 2006. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/nov/10/politics.topstories3

— Nye, J. (2004) 'Soft Power and Higher Education' *The Internet and the University: Forum,* www.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/ffpiu043.pdf.

— Omand, D. (2005) 'Countering International Terrorism: The Use of Strategy', *Survival* 47 (4): 106/117.

— Santorum, R (2006) 'Speech at the National Press Club' *Daily Briefing on Iran*. 20 July. http://regimechangeiran.blogspot.com/2006/07/senator-santorum-delivers-speech-at.html

— Stern, J. (2006) 'Jihad—a global fad', The Boston Globe; 1 August, http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2006/08/01/jihad____a_global_fad/

— 'Suicide Bomber Profile: The Teenager' (2005) *The Mail* on Sunday; 13 July 2005.

— Vidino, L. (2006) 'The Danger of Homegrown Terrorism to Scandinavia' *Terrorism Monitor* 4 (20): 5/7. http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370169

— Younge, G. (2007) 'We must be honest about our past to be truly hopeful about our future', *The Guardian*: 16 April, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/apr/16/comment.homeaffairs

CAN A SCANNER SEE THE SOUL? PHILIP K. DICK AGAINST THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY

David Murakami Wood
Global Urban Urban Research Unit, Newcastle University

INTRODUCTION

In the post-9/11 climate, the claim that we live in a surveillance society has become a commonplace. However, surveillance, like any other form of governmentality, does not proceed in a linear way, but ebbs and flows, and when particular events, socio-technical developments and a generalized climate of fear come together it can produce periods of 'surveillance surge' (Murakami Wood, 2009).The post-9/11 period is such a time, but it is far from the first. This paper aims to examine a previous period of surveillance surge in the late 1960s, by considering the science fiction work of Philip K. Dick, and in particular his bleakest tour-de-force, *A Scanner Darkly*.

A Scanner Darkly is generally thought of as being Dick's anti-drugs book, which it is (see Youngquist, 2000), but it is also one of his most interesting, amongst many others, on the subject of surveillance—indeed the importance of this theme is reflected in the title. It is the story of an undercover police operative known as 'Fred' who as 'Bob Arctor' is tasked with infiltrating a group of hippies in a near-future / alternate late 1960s / early 1970s Los Angeles, in order to find the source of a mysterious and dangerous psychotic drug, known as 'Substance D' (for 'death'). In his 'Fred' incarnation he has at all times to wear a 'scramble suit', which in order to defeat any attempt at identification makes him appear as a blur of constantly changing images of people.

As his identity is unknown even to other officers, he has also to report on himself as Bob Arctor, and eventually perhaps because he is playing the part too well buying more and more Substance D and taking more of it himself, is asked to make Arctor the focus of his investigation, wiring up his house with visual scanners and audio recording devices to monitor everything that happens there. The intense self-monitoring combined with addiction to Substance D flips Fred / Bob into a state of schizoid psychosis, unable any longer to appreciate that he is both of these people. Apparently worried by his erratic behavior, the police take him off the job. Under yet another name, 'Bruce', Fred / Bob is taken to a bizarre, cult-like rehabilitation organization, 'New Path'. Here the truth of his manipulation begins to unravel, though the book ends without any firm conclusion.

The paper will be divided into three parts: the first briefly considers the surveillance within the genre of science fiction writing; the second provides a surveillance studies reading of *A Scanner Darkly*; and the third places Dick's work within both a spatial and a historical context. It is argued that Dick's work not only reflects darkly a reality of the US state of the time, but also presages the kinds of changes to the Southern Californian landscape that would lead to the identification of a new neo-liberal type of (sub)urbanism of private gated communities and public space video surveillance. I conclude by asserting that Dick provides a much more radical critique and opposition to the surveillance society than the limited contemporary concern with privacy.

SCIENCE FICTION AND SURVEILLANCE [1]

Science Fiction can be defined as a creative response to the multiple possibilities offered by scientific discovery and technological development since the Industrial Revolution. Despite the various attempts to locate precursors of SF, contemporary SF is more specifically a product of the acceleration of socio-technical change in the Twentieth Century and indeed J.G. Ballard famously argued that Science Fiction is 'the strongest literary tradition of the twentieth century, and may well be its authentic literature' (Ballard, 1996: 193). SF has not gone unnoticed by researchers into surveillance. Despite the predominance of obvious examples like George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, source of the ubiquitous 'Big Brother' metaphor and a concentration on (popular) film, there have been some attempts to integrate SF fiction starting with Gary Marx's 1996 paper *Electronic Eye in the Sky*. Gary Marx has gone further than most by not simply analysing but also producing some quite amusing and interesting hybrid analysis-fiction, particularly in his 'Tom Voyeur' pieces (Marx, 2003), and Mike Nellis (2003; 2005) has begun a more extensive and systematic series of surveys.

Whilst there are a multitude of short stories and novels that have surveillance aspects or contain passing references to surveillance technologies and practices, or deal with areas that touch on surveillance, for example espionage, crime and policing, oppressive societies, identity and psi-powers to name but a few, there were until recently relatively few American works dealing directly with the topic. None of the 'holy trinity' of surveillance dystopias—George Orwell's *1984*, Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*, and Yevgeny Zamiatin's *We* (to which one might add Kafka's *The Trial*)—are from an American SF tradition, however their influence on US popular surveillance discourse is undoubted (see: Marks, 2005). Surveillance was a concern of a major group of progressive US genre sf authors based in New York, the Futurians: in particular, Isaac Asimov, Poul Anderson and Damon Knight. In his 1956 short story, 'The Dead Past', Asimov portrays naďve university researchers acting for academic freedom against perceived stifling state control unwittingly unleashing a device, the 'chronoscope', on the world that will end personal privacy. Knight later responded with 'I See You' (1976), in which the ubiquity of surveillance leads not to social ruin, but to a safe, enlightened and trans-

[1] 'sf' (in lower case letters) is the generally accepted critical abbreviation for the genre amongst genre literary critics, with 'SF' (upper case) used particularly by non-genre critics and academics. 'Sci-Fi' is generally considered to be a mildly derogatory term. I use 'SF' simply because it is easier to see on the page.

parent society in which privacy is thankfully forgotten. Anderson's, 'The Tunnel Under the World' (1955), tackles corporate rather than state control. In this highly effective satire, the characters are revealed as being tiny parts of a marketing experiment, whose every movement and reaction is recorded by corporations. Around the same time, Philip K. Dick too was already dealing with themes of surveillance and control. For example, in one of the best of his 'pulp' period novels, *Eye in the Sky* (1957), eight characters who are caught in a bizarre accident at a nuclear establishment are trapped in worlds in which each in turn gains total omniscience and whose rules reflect their own morality and capricious and arbitrary fears, worlds of the id.

Eye in the Sky and 'The Tunnel Under the World' can be seen as a precursor of the way that the 1960s 'New Wave' of SF literature that flourished mainly in the UK, but to a lesser extent though not with a lesser intensity in the USA, from the early 1960s into the 1970s. The New Wave intensified this interest in advertising, mass media synopticism and/or computer-facilitated state control. Key American examples include Norman Spinrad's *Bug Jack Barron*, a powerful satire of television; and Alfred Bester's psychedelic screwball comedy, *The Computer Connection*, which features a monstrous computer-human hybrid, whose omnipresence through modern telematics infrastructures creates a global web of surveillance.

Although Philip K. Dick is often considered part of the New Wave, he was more an influence and a fellow traveller rather than an actual member. However the commonalities are strong. One major weakness of social science consideration of SF has been its focus either on 'classic' mainstream SF, or on 'cyberpunk' (and after) and its neglect of almost everything else in the genre. Following analysts like Jameson (1991) it has become almost received wisdom that cyberpunk is exceptional because of its understanding of late capitalism and postmodernity. In the Encyclopedia of Science Fiction (ESF), Peter Nicholls makes it very clear that New Wave writers have far more in common with what is generally recognized as postmodernist within literary criticism (Nicholls, 1999). If one is to accept Brian McHale's view that postmodernist fiction is fundamentally about the move from epistemology to ontology, from knowing to being (McHale, 1987), then the New Wave writers were the vanguard of postmodern writing in SF.

The New Wave however was also genuinely bleak and often profoundly ironic in a way that cyberpunk generally was not. New Wave SF literature anticipates many of the themes later credited to cyberpunk and does so with far more overt and cynical politics. Arguably this reaches its apogee in British writer, John Brunner's *The Sheep Look Up* (1974) in which the lightest moment, as memorably described by SF critic David Langford, is provided by the English protagonists' realization that they can smell America burning! However several novels condemn the human race to a miserable and pathetic end, for example, Thomas M. Disch's *The Genocides* (1965) in which the last remaining humans (as well as all other large animal life) are exterminated as pests by aliens for whom the Earth has become simply a monocultural plantation. Dick shares this thoroughly bitter view of the world, indeed most of his books are concerned with (self) deception.

It seems more plausible that actually what cyberpunk represented was a synthesis, a recombination of postmodern SF writing and its concern with 'inner space' (Ballard, 1962) with the continuing legacy of modernist SF with its focus on technological progress. However here again, Dick was there first. His novels are pulp (sub)urban meta-

physics. They blend the outer—technology, surveillance, and spatial transformation—with the inner—identity, absurdity and delusion. They are also both highly spatially and temporally located, as I shall show, and yet anachronistic. It is no accident that Dick's *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep* was so readily able to be transformed into the original cinematic expression of cyberpunk, Ridley Scott's *Bladerunner*, or indeed that Richard Linklater's film version of *A Scanner Darkly* needed only minor changes to be an exemplary post-9/11 cultural artifact.

SURVEILLANCE AND PARANOIA IN THE 1960S AND 1970S

But Dick was both of and apart from the New Wave. His early pulp works predated this movement and he remained largely separate from it as he also was connected to but apart from the Beats. He was a creature of the 1950s rather than the 1960s however his themes were perhaps archetypical of the New Wave: drugs, reality, and increasingly unusual forms of apocalypse and technological apotheosis. The 1950s and 1960s saw growing surveillance by the US government of more of the world and greater numbers of its own people. The premise was laid out in a secret memorandum, National Security Council 68, written in April 1950. The Soviet Union was the 'slave state', a global threat, and this necessitated dominance of a 'Grand Area' worldwide by the American state to prevent the spread of communism (Chomsky, 1992). Within the USA, an ideologically homogenous internal political structure would support this project.[2] Dick grew as a writer in an increasingly paranoid society of the 1950s when McCarthyism meant that a writer with progressive social attitudes was regarded as automatically suspect (Garber and Walkowitz, 1995). The 1960s merely extended this. For the US ruling class, the 'threats' of communism, civil rights and black radical activism and anti-Vietnam protests, as well as the more diffuse threats to moral order of the 'sexual revolution' and feminism mean a kind of moral panic, and the gradually growing sense of the end of the post-war economic boom and Fordist capitalism. California, and Los Angeles were at the centre of this panic, especially after the Watts Riots (see Loo and Grimes 2004), which led to fears of an uprising of the excluded. This generated three main responses by the authorities, all of which we see reflected and extended in *A Scanner Darkly*.

PADDING THE BUNKER

The first was new defensive architecture and urban design with the idea that crime was something that could be 'designed out' whether positively or repressively (c.f.: Newman 1972). The geography of Dick's worlds are often absurd and, as with his technological vision, anachronistic. Dick's worlds are not our own, but imaginary parallels containing both recognizable and bizarre elements, and which often lack internal consistency, shifting and changing within stories or behaving differently for particular characters. It is for this reason that I argue that Dick's work is predominantly metaphysical. However, at the

[2] This, of course, does not suggest that such a project was in fact possible, nor that the surveillance state in the USA was internally particularly intrusive or controlling by global standards of the time. The pervasive culture of detailed personal files, informers and denouncement in the Soviet Union and satellite states, particularly the former German Democratic Republic were perhaps the nadir of state surveillance.

same time some, Dick has a distinctive spatial vision which involves a particular landscape and spatial characteristics. Despite the towering cityscapes of the film versions of his work in *Blade Runner*, *Total Recall* and *Minority Report*, the worlds in Dick's original novels and stories are more frequently suburban. At least some of the nightmarish quality derives from the endless, hyper-real bright suburbs that began to sprawl around Los Angeles and other US cities, dominated by large bungalows or split-level houses in lawned lots, massive shopping malls and acres of car parking. It is a landscape of anomie and ennui, and the declining utopian dreams of the 1950s golden age of consumerism, of humanity at its most alienated from itself and from its environment.

However *A Scanner Darkly* also exists in what Lianos and Douglas (2000) call a thoroughly 'dangerized' world, where categories of dangerous persons and places are reinforced by Automated Socio-Technical Environments (ASTEs). The fears that spark surveillance are the fears of escape and deviancy from this consumer utopia—the 'bad' consumption of drugs, petty theft and the minor threat of long hair and dirty clothes. The surveilled are those who do not or cannot buy into this utopia, but instead like George, near the start of the novel, wonder at the up-market malls with their clean white pharmacies full of legal drugs and the gated apartment complexes, but into which he cannot enter, lacking the necessary smart identification, and afraid of surveillance by "uniformed armed guards at the mall gate checking out each person. Seeing that the man or woman matched his or her credit card and that it hadn't been ripped off, sold, bought, used fraudulently", or "ready to open fire on any and every doper who scales the walls" (6).[3]

Dick here anticipates the analysis of Los Angeles in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly by Mike Davis in *City of Quartz* (1990), but also Ed Soja, Mike Dear, Steve Flusty and others in the 'LA school' of Geography. Los Angeles in many ways was seen as exemplary because of its contradictions: a massive modern metropolis faced with the permanent threat of a devastating earthquake that could wipe it out completely; a city of the global north, with a massive immigrant population from the global south; a playground for neoliberal capitalism with massive inequalities. Davis identified the key middle class activity in this frontier example of neoliberal urbanism as 'padding the bunker' (Davis, 1998: 364), a paranoid securitizing reflex, characterized by the privatization of public urban space through commercial management, public space video surveillance (CCTV), private security and gated communities. Driven by a bourgeois moral panic (see Cohen, 1972), this generalized sense of insecurity expressed itself in things that were felt to be controllable (personal safety) even though the fundamental causes were psychic insecurities generated by the real threat of total devastation. Macro-insecurity expresses itself in obsessive and personalized micro-security.

POETIC TECHNOLOGIES OF EXPOSURE AND CONCEALMENT

The second response of the US authorities was the intensification of the technological underpinnings of surveillance, to create new 'dataveillance' systems (Clarke, 1988). This is the basis of the contemporary 'control society' (Deleuze 1990) with the database as its exemplary mechanism. The first attempt to create a new US central state data-

[3] For further consideration of the spatiality of *A Scanner Darkly*, see Bertrand (n.d.).

base of personal information was made in the 1960s by President Lyndon B. Johnson, and this was followed again in the 1970s by President Gerald Ford (Solove et al, 2006). The potential of the database saw critiques from academics like Arthur Miller (1971), and James Rule (1973).

A distinction can be drawn between SF works like 'The Dead Past', which are based around an entirely imaginary, even poetic, technology; and 'harder' SF works, which feature technologies that are plausible developmental possibilities. Dick's technologies, like his worlds more generally, are an unorthodox and anachronistic mixture of old, new, and yet-to-come; existing, possible and imagined. For example his identity-concealing scramble-suits are entirely imaginary, yet his scanner and audio recorders are no more advanced than anything that could have existed at the time he wrote *A Scanner Darkly* in the early 1970s, with the exception of the holographic playback device. The scramble suit serves as poetic as well as narrative device: while it is a counter-surveillance technology designed to conceal, and to defeat surveillance—scrambling others' view of Fred / Bob Arctor—at the same time he is himself undergoing a breakdown of his own sense of identity and personhood. Similarly the scanners are a central source of metaphysical speculation for Fred / Bob, a theme to which I shall return below.

A Scanner Darkly outlines a highly complex relationship between the notion of humanity and the technological or the non-human, the living and the dead. Dick is constantly testing the boundaries of the human and non-human, revealing the micro-technopolitical interplay, the limitations of each. This is not in the manner of the 'cyborg' concept so beloved of extropians and cultural studies academics alike and that offers some hope of transcendence, rather it is a kind of dehumanization. Technologies in Dicks' novels do not extend humanity in the way that Dick's contemporary, Marshal Mcluhan, argued, rather they limit, confuse and even replace them. This complex relationship is at its most extreme and revealing when after his breakdown, Fred / Bob (now known as Bruce) takes part in some group therapy at the New Path treatment centre. 'The game' as the therapy is known, consists largely of abuse by staff and other patients:

'Bruce,' Mike said, 'what's the matter? What brought you here? What do you want tell us? Can you tell us anything about yourself at all?'
'Pimp!' George screamed, bouncing up and down like a rubber ball. 'What were you, pimp?'
The Chinese girl leaped up, shrieking, 'Tell us, you cocksucking fairy whore pimp, you ass-kisser, you fuck!'
He said, 'I am an eye.' (200)

This is the organ without a body rather than the body without organs. Fred / Bob / Bruce has become by this stage in his view, not exactly a machine, not exactly a human, but only the mechanical watching components of a human being. He has been both reduced to a function—watching, but no longer possesses the ability to determine what this watching means or what purpose it serves. As Fred / Bob remarks earlier when considering the surveillance of his home, 'Whatever it is that's watching, it is not a human. Not by my standards, anyhow. Not what I'd recognize.' (145). As well as machines taking the place of humans, in *A Scanner Darkly* humans become machines. Fred/Bob/Bruce is still part of what Haggerty and Ericson (2000) adapting Deleuze and Guattari, called the 'surveillant assemblage', a shifting set of components which are

aligned towards a particular surveillant end. However, as a commentary by an agent, Mike, who has been charged with taking Bruce to the 'farm' an outdoor section of New Path, reflects:

> The living, he thought, should never be used to serve the purposes of the dead. But the dead—he glanced at Bruce, the empty shape beside him—should if possible, serve the purposes of the living. That, he reasoned, is the law of life.
> And the dead, if they could feel, might feel better doing so.
> The dead, Mike thought, who can still see, even if they can't understand: they are our camera. (210)

Mike clearly accentuates the understanding that Fred / Bob / Bruce no longer counts as a living human. He is a dead person, a thing, but still an operational one: he has become a mechanism, as he himself acutely realized. As such his purpose is to observe, to become a component in the surveillant assemblage.

At a simple level, the equation of camera with eye is commonplace in public and academic discourse of surveillance, and there are many examples. For Dick however, the visual is metaphysical: the concept of seeing raises fundamental questions of the nature of human existence. In one long section containing the quotation with which I prefaced this paper, Fred / Bob is reflecting on whether the scanners that have been installed in his house will enable him to understand his increasingly disordered and disassociative life.

> What does a scanner see? he asked himself. I mean, really see? Into the head? Down into the heart? Does a passive infrared scanner like they used to use or a cube-type holo-scanner like they use these days, the latest thing, see into me—into us—clearly or darkly? I hope it does, he thought, see clearly, because I can't any longer these days see into myself. I see only murk. Murk outside, murk inside. I hope, for everyone's sake the scanners do better. Because, he thought, if the scanner sees only darkly, the way I myself do, then we are cursed, cursed again and like we have been continually, and we'll wind up dead this way, knowing very little and getting that little fragment wrong too. (146)

Can the scanners 'do better', will they enable Fred / Bob to see clearly and make sense of a world that seems to his eyes increasingly devoid of sense and purpose?

This purpose is vital. Dick's works can be seen as a series of constantly rewritten attempts to approach an understanding of the nature of reality. Obsessed with St Paul, Dick however tended towards the opponents of Pauline Christianity, the Gnostics. The title of *A Scanner Darkly* is derived from St Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians (13, 12), usually quoted for its references to faith, hope and charity (or love) in which Paul argues that human perceptions cannot hope to know the self as God can know it: "for now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known.' In the Gnostic view, our entire existence and appearance is a form of deception: our true selves are in fact a worm-like being created by the Rex Mundi (the false god), and only veneered with consciousness and beauty by a briefly sympathetic but usually distant true deity. Thus God is neither omnipresent nor all-seeing but in fact uncaring—a fact that in Dick's Gnosticism accounts for the surreal pain of his worlds. It is the lack of caring divine surveillance (see: Smidt-Burkhardt 2001) that makes human life absurd and demeaning. This use of surveillance technologies for caring social interaction is something emphasized by David Lyon in arguing

that Foucault's panopticism is altogether too cynical and too pessimistic (Lyon, 1994). Many surveillance technologies have a positive purpose whether in public safety, in providing for medical and social security needs, or indeed, increasingly, for sociability or pleasure (McGrath, 2004).

Any subversion of the panoptic impulse of what Dick refers to as 'the authorities' is tempered by a dose or two of political economic reality in the form of a message from his superiors that Fred / Bob is not in a position in the hierarchy to understand the complete situation:

'What we think isn't of any importance in your work,' Hank said. 'We evaluate; you report with your own limited conclusions. This is not a put-down of you, but we have information, lots of it, not available to you. The broad picture. The computerized picture.' (83)

The purpose of surveillance is to assert some kind of control, however in order to do this one has to establish the categories within which one is working: identity has to be certain; and behaviors, actual or potential, have to be defined. The establishment of categories and identity is therefore crucial to all surveillance practices and technologies, as for the surveilled, is the performance of those identities.

The issue of identity, behavior and performance under surveillance is central in *A Scanner Darkly*. Even Bob Arctor's name reflects being undercover, his pretence, his 'posing as a nark', as he confusedly puts it. This aspect of his identity becomes clearer to him when the scanners are installed in his home, and he realizes he is going to have to somehow creatively edit the scans of himself without revealing his identity as a Special Agent, 'In the script being filmed, he would at all times have to be the star actor. Actor, Arctor, he thought. Bob the Actor who is hunted; he who is El Primo huntee.' (105).

One of the most strange and powerful passages in the novel is one in which Fred / Bob speculates at length about what surveillance might reveal about the secret lives of ordinary people he knows:

A nightmare, a weird other world beyond the mirror, a terror city reverse thing, with unrecognisable entities creeping about; Donna crawling on all fours, eating from the animals' dishes… any kind of psychedelic wild trip, unfathomable and horrid.

Hell, he thought; for that matter, maybe Bob Arctor rises up from deep sleep and does trips like that. Has sexual relations with the wall. Or mysterious freaks show up who he's never seen before, a whole bunch of them, with special heads that swivel all the way around, like owls'. (103/104).

Surveillance then for Bob / Fred is not about establishing trust but about just how far he is unable to trust anyone, himself included. The fantastic imaginings of Fred / Bob are about as far away from the concept of surveillance as banality or the trivialization of reality TV. However what the surveillance does reveal is indeed banal although terrible enough: his suspect flatmate, Barris, is not a spy but a sociopath who is quite prepared to let their mutual friend, Luckman, suffer or even die instead of saving him from choking. Nevertheless, Fred considers that Barris might be aware of the scanners and is simply performing for them, 'He's building up his act, Fred realized. He's getting his panic-and-discovery act together. Like he just came onto the scene' (111). Bob Arctor, not surprisingly for the reader, appears to be trying to hide something. Fred

by this stage is becoming increasingly disassociated from his undercover alter-ego, and is confused by the drifting behavior of Arctor, 'What is Arctor doing? Fred wondered, and noted the ident code for these sections. He's becoming more and more strange. I can see now what the informant who phoned in about him meant' (151). Of course, what he is doing is wandering the front room reflecting on the experience of being surveilled and performing for the scanners:

> Immediately, he felt something watching: the holo-scanners on him. As soon as he crossed his own threshold. Alone—no one but him in the house. Untrue. Him and his scanners, insidious and invisible, that watched him and recorded. Everything he did. Everything he uttered.
>
> Like the scrawls on the wall when you're in a public urinal, he thought. SMILE! YOU'RE ON CANDID CAMERA! I am, he thought, as soon as I enter this house. It's eerie. He did not like it. He felt self-conscious. (145)

This sense of profound unease under the gaze, and the complex relationship between voyeurism and surveillance has been examined in several recent sociological works on surveillance, particularly Gary Marx's 'Tom Voyeur' pieces (2003). It also reminds us that the connection between surveillance, performance and entertainment (McGrath, 2004) is also nothing new.

TARGETING SURVEILLANCE

The third major response of the US state to the perceived threats of internal subversion was exactly the kind of targeted, informer-centered surveillance of *A Scanner Darkly*. Whilst the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were already well-known, new and more shadowy organizations and operations were created. These included what became the largest and most well-funded US intelligence organization, the National Security Agency (NSA), founded in 1952, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in 1961 (Richelson, 2007), and the multi-agency (but FBI-led) COINTELPRO operations against internal political opponents throughout the 1960s and beyond (Davis, 1992; Churchill and VanderWall, 2002).

In *A Scanner Darkly*, Fred / Bob when calling his dealer and paramour, Donna, reflects on the fact that, as a Special Agent, he knows the telephone is monitored, but that he is also aware of the incompleteness, of the shortcomings of this monitoring:

> Every payphone in the world was tapped. Or if it wasn't, some crew somewhere just hadn't gotten around to it. The taps fed electronically onto storage reels at a central point, and about once every second day a print-out was obtained by an officer who listened to many phones without having to leave his office. He merely rang up the storage drums and, on signal, they played back, skipping all dead tape. Most calls were harmless. The officer could identify ones that weren't fairly readily. That was his skill. Some officers were better at it than others.
>
> As he and Donna talked, therefore, no-one was listening. The playback would come maybe the next day at the earliest. If they discussed anything strikingly illegal, and the monitoring officer caught it, then voiceprints would be made. (24)

By the time that Dick was writing *A Scanner Darkly*, there had been a gradual drip-feed of information about these secret organizations. Information about the NSA began to emerge almost immediately after its creation. Particularly embarrassing was a spy

scandal in 1960, when two of its employees William Martin and Bernon Mitchell, defected to the Soviet Union and appeared on TV from Moscow to denounce their former employer. However it was not until the 1970s that the extent of the US secret state became more widely known among researchers, journalists and activists. A series of articles in the *New York Times* in 1971 threatened to reveal, amongst other revelations in 'the Washington Papers' about the Vietnam conflict, the ability of the NSA to listen in on the scrambled telephone conversations of Soviet officials. The US government took various forms of legal and intimidatory action and managed to prevent publication of the offending aspects (Bamford, 1983). This was followed by an article in the radical magazine, *Ramparts*, in August 1972, which purported to be the revelations of one 'Winslow Peck,'[4] and supported by another anonymous ex-NSA whistle-blower in an interview with the Australian magazine, the *Nation Review,* the next year. (*Nation Review*, 1973).

By 1975, when *A Scanner Darkly* was being rewritten by Dick, the concern caused by the various reports was such that it led to a number of official investigations, over a period termed the 'Season of Inquiry' by American intelligence researcher Loch Johnson (1988). The Pike Committee in the House of Representatives led to CIA Director, William Colby, accidentally making reference to international telephone tapping operations, the first such public revelation. The most important was perhaps the *Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities*, convened by the United States Senate and known after its Chairman, Senator Frank Church of Idaho, as the Church Committee. The Committee investigated abuses by the various American intelligence services, particularly the establishment of 'Watch Lists' of individuals who were thought to be a threat to national security, including anti-Vietnam War and civil rights activists. The NSA had established such lists at the request of the FBI and other internal agencies, from 1969, in an operation known as "Sensitive SIGINT Operation Project MINARET":

> established for the purpose of providing more restrictive control and security of sensitive information derived from communications as processed [blank----------] which contain (a) information on foreign governments, organizations or individuals who are attempting to influence, coordinate or control U.S. organizations or individuals who may foment civil disturbances or otherwise undermine the national security of the U.S. (b) information on U.S. organizations or individuals who are engaged in activities which may result in civil disturbances or otherwise subvert the national security of the U.S. (US Senate, 1976: 149/150)

The people on the Watch Lists covered a wide range of dissenters including Dr Benjamin Spock, parenting expert and prominent spokesperson against US involvement in Vietnam, actress Jane Fonda, known to right-wing politicians and media as 'Hanoi Jane', and many others. It was a combination of factors that had inspired the original motion to the Senate: articles like the *Ramparts* piece; complaints by people who had experienced intelligence service harassment: and finally the existence of NSA/FBI

[4] Despite the identification of Peck with a Washington lobbyist with the equally colourful real name of Perry Fellwock, there has been doubt cast on the authenticity of his testimony (Forwarded message to *Cryptome* from 'Gomez', available on-line at: http://jya.com/nsa-debunk.htm).

Watch Lists coming to the attention of the Attorney General, who was worried about the potential conflict with the US Constitution of mass telephone tapping.

Loch Johnson, in his study of the CIA, mentions that FBI watch lists in the early 1970s were compiled on a sweeping basis, for example all black student union members regardless of their involvement in actual activity or protest, and more generally, any student activist. This is sometimes attributed to a particular climate of lawlessness typified by Tom Charles Huston, a White House Official in the Nixon administration, who wrote of a report for the President advocating the removal of legal restraints on the intelligence services. However, with or without his knowledge, most of the activities he advocated were already going on. The Huston Plan, and the other actions revealed by the Church Committee were not so much isolated incidents of 'abuse', rather they were a rare glimpse into the workings of the core of the secret state. As Johnson (1989, 149) argues in remarkably Dickian terms, the Church Committee and related investigations revealed that "the nation's chief executive may as well have been a mannikin in a storefront display… the President was irrelevant".

The whole notion of an informer society had an important intersection with Dick's personal life. Around the time that he was preparing and writing *A Scanner Darkly*, he was involved in curious series of exchanges with both other SF authors and editors and the FBI over the possibility that he was being conspired against (Philmus 1991; see also Sutin, 1991). The usual interpretations of this is that he was experiencing drug-induced or another form of paranoia. However the possibility that Dick was actually playing a role, experimenting at the edges of America's surveillant assemblage in order to derive material for *ASD* has not, so far as I know, been considered. This view is perhaps supported by the fact that *ASD* contains passages that can be seen as apologies to those involved (he never apologized in real life).

CONCLUSION

Dick's vision in *A Scanner Darkly* remains remarkable for four main reasons. Firstly, he provides not only a perceptive commentary on the contemporary politics and practice of surveillance in the USA, but also anticipates many of the key themes of surveillance studies. As Mark Poster (1989) argued, digital surveillance results in the creation of data subjects in databases. Deleuze (1990) termed these 'dividuals' — divided individuals. They are not simple replicas, but new and selves which may be acted upon (or increasingly, act) without the knowledge of the original. Lyon (2001) has argued convincingly that data subjects are now often more important in terms of social identity and life-chances than bodily selves (Lyon, 2001; c.f.: Graham and Wood, 2003). In his consideration of the multiple roles and the breakdown of personality experienced by Fred / Bob / Bruce, Dick provides us with a dramatized version of this new situation of subjects as multiple material and virtual bodies under surveillance.

Secondly, and related to this, Dick makes it clear that there is no clear dividing line between a clear-eyed and objective understanding of surveillance, and paranoia. As Harper (2008) has pointed out, surveillance and paranoia are intimately linked in psychological terms as well as in popular culture. It is very easy when studying surveillance to lose solid ground and step into the more unstable territory of paranoid

speculation; however at the same time, the accusation of paranoia can also be an easy way to dismiss what TS Elliot, in *The Four Quartets*, called "too much reality". Thirdly, in his consideration of the space of surveillance, Dick could also be argued to have anticipated the fortified, surveillant landscapes that have come to typify the neo-liberal urbanism identified by Mike Davis. To bowdlerize the title of a recent collection on this theme by Davis (Davis and Monk, 2007), Dick recognized the quotidian 'evil' of these supposed paradises, the hyper-consumer heterotopia, a long time before many more mainstream commentators.

Dick's politics connects all of these together. The conventional politics of surveillance is rooted in concepts of the integrity of the person and privacy: this conventional view, reflected in stories like Azimov's 'The Dead Past' is that surveillance equals intrusion and that boundaries must be set, either technological and/or political to prevent personal privacy from being eroded too much. However, Dick's politics, bound up as they are in his mystical search, seem to regard surveillance much more strongly as both inevitable and destructive of attempts to create integrated, whole personalities, cohesive communities or caring technologies. In this, he goes far beyond simply an argument for surveillance with privacy, to stand against the surveillance society entirely.

WORKS CITED

— Ballard, J.G. (1962) "Which Way to Inner Space?" Guest editorial in *New Worlds* 118: 2/3.

— [—] (1996) *A User's Guide to the Millennium*. London: HarperCollins.

— Bamford, J. (1983) *The Puzzle Palace*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

— Bertrand, F.C. (n.d.) 'The Use of Setting in P.K. Dick's *A Scanner Darkly*', http://www.philipkdick.com/frank/digressi.htm

— Chomsky, N. (1992) *Deterring Democracy (Second Edition)*, New York: Hill and Wang.

— Churchill, W. and VanderWall, J. (2002) *The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents From the FBI's Secret Wars Against Dissent in the United States*. Boston MA: South End Press.

— Clarke, R.A. (1988) 'Information Technology and Dataveillance', *Communications of the ACM*, 31(5): 498/512.

— Cohen, S. (1972) *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*. London: MacGibbon and Kee.

— Davis, J.K. (1992) *Spying on America: the FBI's Domestic Counterintelligence Program*. Westport CT: Praeger.

— Davis, M. (1990) *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles*. London: Verso.

— [—] (1998) *Ecology of Fear: Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster*. New York: Metropolitan Books.

— Davis, M. and Monk, D.B. (eds) (2007) *Evil Paradises: Dreamworlds of Neoliberalism*. New York: The New Press.

— Deleuze, G. (1990) 'Post-scriptum sur les sociétés de contrôle', *L'autre journal* 1, mai.

— Garber, M. and Walkowitz, R. (eds) (1995) *Secret Agents: The Rosenberg Case, McCarthyism and Fifties America*. New York: Routledge.

— Graham, S. and Wood, D. (2003) 'Digitising surveillance: categorisation, space, inequality', *Critical Social Policy*, 23(2): 227/248.

— Haggerty, K.D. and Ericson, R.V. (2000) 'The surveillant assemblage', *British Journal of Sociology* 51(4), 605/622.

— Harper, D. (2008) 'The Politics of Paranoia: Paranoid Positioning and Conspiratorial Narratives in the Surveillance Society', Surveillance & Society 5(2): 1/32.

— Jameson, F. (1991) *Postmodernism, or, the Logic of Late Capitalism*, Durham NC: Duke University Press.

— Johnson, L. K. (1988) *A Season of Inquiry: Congress and Intelligence (2nd Edition)*. Chicago: Dorsay.

— [—] (1989) *America's Secret Power: the CIA in a Democratic Society*. New York: Oxford University Press.

— Lianos, M. and Douglas, M. (2000), 'Dangerization and the End of Deviance: The Institutional Environment', in R. Sparks and D. Garland (eds) *Criminology and Social Theory*, Clarendon Studies in Criminology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

— Loo, D. and Grimes, R. (2004) 'Polls, politics, and crime: the "law and order" issue of the 1960s', *Western Criminology Review* 5, 50/67.

— Lyon, D. (1994) *The Electronic Eye: the Rise of the Surveillance Society*, Cambridge: Polity Press / Blackwell.

— [—] (2001) *Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life*, Buckingham: Open University Press.

— McGrath, J. (2004) *Loving Big Brother: Surveillance Culture and Performance Space*. London: Routledge.

— McHale, B. (1987) *Postmodernist Fiction*. London: Routledge.

— Marks, P. (2005) Imagining Surveillance: Utopian Visions and Surveillance Studies. *Surveillance & Society* 3(2/3): 222/239.

— Marx, G.T. (1996) Electronic eye in the sky: some reflections on the new surveillance and popular culture, in David Lyon and Elia Zureik (eds) *Computers, Surveillance and Privacy*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 193/233.

— [—] (2003) 'Technology and Gender: Thomas I. Voire and the Case of the Peeping Tom', *The Sociological Quarterly*, 43(3): 407/433.

— Miller, A.R. (1971) *The Assault on Privacy: Computers, Data Banks, and Dossiers*. University of Michigan Press.

— Murakami Wood, D. (2009) "The 'Surveillance Society': questions of history, place and culture". *European Journal of Criminology*. 6(2): 179/194.

— *Nation Review* (Aus) (1973) 'Uncle Sam and his 40,000 Snoopers.' http://jya.com/nsa-40k.htm

— Nellis, M. (2003) 'New Media, popular culture and the electronic monitoring of offenders in England and Wales', *Howard Journal of Criminal Justice*, 42: 1/31.

— [—] (2005) 'Future punishment in American science fiction movies', In P. Mason (ed) *Captured by the media: Prison discourse and popular culture*, 210/228. Cullompton: Willan.

— Newman, O. (1972) *Defensible Space: Crime Prevention through Urban Design*. New York: Macmillan.

— Nicholls, P. (1999) 'New Wave' in J. Clute and P. Nicholls (eds.) *The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction*. London: Orbit, 865/7.

— Philmus, R.M. (1991) 'The two faces of Philip K. Dick', *Science Fiction Studies* 18: 91/103.

— *Ramparts* (1972) 'U.S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir', 11(2) August 1972, 35/50. http://jya.com/nsa-elint.htm

— Richelson, J. T. (2007) *The U.S. Intelligence Community (5th Edition)*, Boulder CO: Westview Press.

— Rule, J.B. (1973) *Private Lives, Public Surveillance: Social Control in the Information Age*. London: Allen Lane.

— Solove, D.J., Rotenberg, M. and Schwartz, P.M. (2006) *Privacy, Information, and Technology*. Aspen Publishers Online.

— Sutin, L. (1991) *Divine Invasions: A Life of Philip K. Dick*. London: Paladin.

— Suvin, D. (1979) *Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre*. Yale University Press.

— US Senate (1976) *Hearings before the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate*. Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session, Volume 5: The National Security Agency And Fourth Amendment Rights, October 29 And November 6, 1975, Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 149/150. Available on-line at: http://cryptome.org/nsa-4th.htm

— Youngquist, P. (2000) 'Score, scan, schiz: Dick on drugs', *Cultural Critique* 44, 84/110.

BUREAUCRACY, COERCIVE FORCE AND INDIVIDUAL AGENCY: THE GENDERED PROTAGONIST IN THE 'WAR ON TERROR'

Stuart Price
De Montfort University

INTRODUCTION: THE FAILURES OF 'REAL WORLD' AUTHORITY

The 9/11 Commission noted that the institutions 'charged with protecting [US] borders, civil aviation and national security' had failed to appreciate the gravity of the threat posed to the United States by a 'sophisticated, patient, disciplined and lethal' enemy (9/11 Commission Report, 2004: xvi). This censure of official agencies may suggest a powerful bi-partisan assault on the incompetence of the US security apparatus, but the extent of the critique is limited by the Commission's remit, which was to investigate the 'facts and circumstances' of the September 11th attacks (xv). The final Report, therefore, did not attempt to 'assign individual blame' but to provide 'the fullest possible account' of the events of September 11th (xvi). The ultimate goal, it claimed, was to help prevent another such operation achieving success on American soil.

The Commission's explicit refusal to determine individual responsibility, was entirely appropriate to the role it had been assigned (and presumably useful in securing the cooperation of witnesses). Another clear advantage in using *structure* (rather than individual activity) as the preferred frame of reference, was that it met the need to appear objective. Within the narrative of the Report, however, the formal concentration on systemic problems conflicts with the inevitable appearance of active, culpable human agents. In its assessment of political manoeuvring in the post-9/11 world, for example, it clearly implicates individuals. Paul Wolfowitz, in particular, appears as an early enthusiast for military action against Iraq (9/11 Report, 2004: 352). Initially resisted by some within the Bush administration, this immodest proposal eventually hardened into formal policy.

Despite its declared limitations, the Commission's work provides a revealing insight into the internal mechanisms of state bureaucracy and the role of individual actors in attempting to mobilise resources: it is packed with incidents that reveal the inability of senior officials to make the chain of command effective, to overcome communication breakdowns, and thus to gain an accurate picture of the perils they faced. A sal-

utary example of procedural failure may be found in the confusion surrounding the decision, made on September 11th itself, to shoot down civilian aircraft should they fail to 'divert' from a suspicious course (40). Based on a telephone conversation with President Bush, Vice President Cheney had authorised fighter planes to engage the hijacked passenger jet United 93, unaware that it had already crashed in Pennsylvania. However, the order to 'take out' rogue aircraft was not, according to the Commission, passed to the first set of fighter pilots circling New York and Washington—who were told to 'ID type and tail' (44)—but was communicated to a second group which was scrambled from Andrews Airforce Base (44). The Report's authors, commenting on this state of disorder, noted out that officials 'struggled … to improvise a homeland defense against an unprecedented challenge' (45).

Calls for the punishment of public servants, however, lay beyond the powers of the Commission. Together with the reluctance of the Bush administration to accept its own mistakes, this meant there was little visible evidence at the time of the Report's appearance, in July 2004, of any significant protagonist having to pay the price for a number of very grave shortcomings. The eventual indictment in October 2005 of Cheney's chief of staff, I. Lewis 'Scooter' Libby, on perjury charges related to the Administration's decision to leak the name of a CIA official (Woodward, 2006: 419; McClellan, 2008: 305), did little to contradict this perception. What remained, therefore, was a sense of general disorder and confusion both during the September 11th attacks, and in the years that followed. The belief that serious deficiencies existed within the US system of government included a negative assessment of its executive leadership, linked to the increasingly poor reputation of the President.

The Commission's refusal to apportion blame might have had a beneficial effect, in the sense that it prevented an unnecessary diversion from the more urgent study of systemic problems, but the fact that no one was called to account (especially during the Iraq debacle) could encourage the rather abstract conviction that 'government' in general was at fault. The plethora of conspiracy theories which followed September 11th, may attest to this sense of disaffection with the political system. When, for example, the PR company Ogilvy ran an exercise called 'Topoff' for the Department of Homeland Security, in which it tried to prepare senior officials for the possibility of a fresh terrorist assault on US infrastructure, it encountered 'a number of serious challenges', particularly the fact that 'some members of the target audience were suspicious of possible government involvement in 9/11' (Ogilvy, accessed: 1/03/2006).[1]

POWER, DISSENT AND REPRESENTATION

Besides the growth of political scepticism and disengagement, the public registration of dissent can make itself evident in more formal ways, such as demonstrations, petitions, and campaigns of civil disobedience. However, citizens can only secure what Dahlgren calls 'consumer choice in the rotation of elites' (Dahlgren, 1995: 3) when an electoral opportunity presents itself. The most significant defeat of neo-conservative dominance in America had to wait for the Congressional, Senate and Presidential Elec-

[1] Since the date accessed this reference has been removed from the website. The website now presents a brief overview of the exercise: www.ogilvypr.com.

tions of 2008. Rather than a complete revolution in political values, the Democratic resurgence may represent a degree of exhaustion with one form of authoritarian culture. On both the international and domestic stages, the Bush administration had served its purpose and run its course. It had reminded its rivals of US military strength but had overplayed its hand, wasting the economic vitality upon which armed might depends. Barack Obama's reconstruction of US power on a more 'rational' basis, especially the decision to make Afghanistan the main focus of America's 'anti-terror' enterprise, will demand the focussed application of those instruments of coercion that his predecessor had divided between two theatres of war, and which had produced in turn yet more violence against US interests.

The degradation of public trust may be attributed, therefore, to the failure of the US political executive to substantiate one of the central alibis which formal authority uses to defend its own existence: the need to preserve the lives of its citizens. This value is projected as one of the foremost requirements for the exercise of stable governance, an essential element in the reproduction of existing social relations. Not only, however, is public safety impossible to guarantee, but the behaviour of the principle actors in 'neo-liberal' states suggests that the attempt to concentrate executive power, pursued in tandem with the diffusion of political responsibility (Price, 2009), is the primary goal. The political class attempts to insulate itself from the 'popular will', taking decisions without public approval, while allowing influential delinquents to escape lasting retribution.

The projection of certain themes by a powerful elite, such as the importance of public security, represents one of the necessary elements of successful rule. Such concepts circulate within a larger process of public narration, in which many significant institutions participate. Corporate citizenship, for instance, is a form of story-telling about the virtues of private intervention, while cultural formations like the cinema are particularly effective in making narrative and emblematic sense of common experience. Therefore, if governance represents the attempt to establish the 'rational' control of subjects, then one might expect to encounter references to this process in mainstream narrative forms. In other words, the everyday endeavour to achieve consistent political effects within institutional constraints offers material which can be re-worked in film.

Although specific allusions are indeed made to the operational exercise of social control within the police or espionage genre, and television series like *CSI* devote time to a glamorised version of investigative procedure, the representation of institutional forces within the 'story world' (Branigan, 1993: 33) is chiefly undertaken when the condition can be sensationalised. So, for example, a number of genres (like the courtroom drama) will present heightened but superficial dramatisations of bureaucratic procedure. In such cases, an analysis of structure is usually limited to a background sketch upon which heroic identity can be projected. Although real police activity may be described as largely procedural, cinematic narratives show life in the office as a jumping-off point for interrogations, confrontations with authority, rapid departures for crime-scenes and contests with other agencies over the meaning of the law.

NARRATIVE, BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC VALUES

Responses to the ubiquitous appearance of hierarchical power within political life could be based upon a variety of attitudes, yet some currents seem to predominate within cinematic representation. Individualism and anti-federal sentiment, useful in feigning a vehement objection to the exercise of authority, seems for example to be animated with greater conviction, than the more complex but tentative liberal analysis of power. While Redford's *Lions for Lambs* (2007), for example, presents a convincing study of right-wing Republican intransigence, its attempt to offer a counter-narrative produces a tortuous account of alternative values, an uneasy dramatisation of sincere but misguided patriotic sacrifice, and middle-class liberal principle. The transposition of either 'proto-political' traits or more developed opinions to film, does not of course generate an exact correspondence between models of the real and fictional representation, nor does it necessarily produce a successful address to an audience.

Public understanding of political events is, however, already reproduced in a fabular structure, and new occurrences are marked by expectations created from established narratives found in a multitude of sources, including press and TV reportage. There exists therefore, a great deal of recycled thematic material which moves across generic forms, most of it based on conventional interpretations of the social order. Powerful institutions, responsible for the dissemination and reproduction of meaning, make reference to the various arrangements that make up our perception of reality. The discursive realm, in which narrative circulates, draws from events and activities produced within all three spheres of human experience: the natural, practical and social worlds (Archer, 2000). Cinema is capable of presenting a convincing amalgam of these spheres of existence, but in so doing can confuse the ontological character of events, making mythical/discursive material from practical exigencies like the prosecution of a war.

When the police, secret service and espionage movie is examined, it seems that the cinematic critique of state power emerges as an attack on fragmented parts of the structure: on corrupt officials, 'parallel' or illicit authority, factional conspiracy, and most commonly of all, on 'rule-bound' bureaucracy. In other words, the state must receive due prominence in the narrative, but an over-emphasis on the importance or even usefulness of structure would diminish the celebration of individual agency. The hero/heroine is shown overcoming established constraints through force of will, yet these are structural procedures which would in real circumstances *enable* the legitimate production of effect. Aligning the protagonist ('first actor' in Greek) with officialdom is, however, anathema to narratives which are driven by the desire to highlight heroic agency; the attainment of results must therefore be shown to be made 'against the grain'. This 'anti-bureaucratic' perspective strives to demonstrate and validate the heroic agency of the professional specialist, an individual trained within, but often abandoned by, the coercive apparatus of the military and/or national security agencies. Agency is thus re-cast in fictional form as the attempt by a charismatic individual both to maintain personal integrity and to escape the restrictions of an overbearing and often anonymous structure. As the power of individuals is clearly limited by the attribution of certain capabilities to masculine and feminine characters, the

performance of gendered identity and its imagined relation to the exercise of authority is a central aspect of narrative composition.

Authority, generally understood as the 'right' of an established power to expect or enforce compliance, does not necessarily refer to the production of commands and obedience, but rather indicates an individual or group associated with the origins of a policy or enterprise (Watt, 1982: 11). In sum, the effectiveness of this form of influence should be distinguished from the operative character of power, because it resides in a general acknowledgement of eminence or distinction. Different forms of authority, such as coercive, moral or normative, can be used therefore in the accomplishment of tasks, and are also made apparent within the structure of film. It is, however, the distribution of such qualities to different types of individual (righteous coercion to the protagonist, normative conformity to the bureaucrat) that actually reveals the values espoused within each narrative.

REFERENCES TO THE REAL

The simple assignation of character traits and behaviour to individuals is insufficient, however, to determine the political trajectory of narrative forms. So, for example, narratives that maintain a distinction between the pathological aggression of the villain and the morally justified violence of the protagonist, must demonstrate these attributes through an event which confirms their relative positions. This is often an initiating act in which a criminal or terrorist offence is committed. In the case of *The Kingdom* (2007), this is a bomb attack on US civilians living in Saudi Arabia, which kills over a hundred people. The event is therefore intended to create resonance in an audience that might interpret this attack in the light of other supposedly unprovoked assaults on US interests. The particular nastiness of the scenario is apparent in its representation of the slaughter of innocent people of all ages, while they are engaged in playing a baseball game. This event, the plausibility of which is reinforced through the typical use of TV reports to suggest an authentic social reality separate from the narrative, is received with shock by the authorities in the US. The response of American officials is, however, constrained by diplomatic considerations. Frustrated by a State Department edict preventing the immediate use of the FBI at the Saudi crime-scene, the hero of the movie, Ronald Fleury, declares 'I'm gonna get us access'. He then confronts the Attorney General, a character called Gideon Young, in a meeting which sets out the difference between the complacent bureaucrat and the man of action. In attempting to persuade Young to send his team of investigators to Saudi Arabia, Fleury refers to a number of actual locations that contextualise his argument, including Yemen and Iraq. In this way, the necessity for action becomes a material principle, a notion that offers a logical transference from the fictional environment to a wider social universe of political meaning.

One important reason for the use of extensive reference to the external world is the simple need to achieve currency, or in other words to confirm the social relevance of a tale. A closely related requirement is the 'heritage of realism' (Leishman and Mason, 2003: 2), which fulfils a perceived demand for authenticity. Where violent action is portrayed, for example, the current requirement (set out within the *Bourne* trilogy and

taken up by the *Bond* franchise) is for accurate reproductions of hardware and a convincing presentation of martial skills. Productions call on the talents of a host of physical trainers, ex-special forces personnel, weapons handlers, and other experts. Actors, tasked with mimicking the established conception of the skilled field operative, speak of their devotion to real-life exercises as they prepare for their roles. Matt Damon, star of the *Bourne* trilogy, described in an interview of 2002 how he strove for realism in his characterisation of the agent:

'Say … I picked up the gun and it looked like I didn't even know what I was doing, the audience would pick up on it. So I had to spend hour after hour loading and shooting pistols' (Morris, 2002)

The desire for authenticity is attributed here to the demands of the audience. Mamet, describing his production of the script for *Spartan* (2003), described how his perusal of the book *Inside Delta Force* by Eric Haney (2002) led to his use of the author as a technical advisor for the film. In this case, the 'war on terror' is not made into an explicit frame of reference, as it is in *The Kingdom*, but is based instead on another related theme, the trafficking of women by foreign criminals. The state mobilises its most effective operatives in order to rescue the President's daughter, abducted by gangsters who do not realise the identity of their victim. 'Real world' references once again underpin the general proposition of the movie. Disillusion with formal authority, referred to in the material on 9/11 (see above) is represented by a deep and pervasive cynicism, applied to a host of representative characters (a college professor, an inept agent, the President himself) who are corrupted by their sexual weaknesses. It is the emphasis on this particular theme that distinguishes Mamet's overall position from the perspective taken within *The Kingdom*, which is predicated more firmly on the simple representation of violent retribution, meted out by a 'rainbow' coalition of determined agents.

THE REPRESENTATION OF BEHAVIOUR AND GENDERED IDENTITY

Mamet's reproduction of the heterosexist values of a military elite is not assigned to the stoical protagonist, who stays aloof from such casual expressions of disdain. While a corrupt internal faction attempts to protect their immoral Commander in Chief from scrutiny (even to the extent of planning to kill his daughter), the principal agent, Scott, delves beneath the surface to establish the truth and retrieve the kidnapped woman. His superficial purity enables him to act against subordinated social groups (criminals, students, traffickers, brothel keepers) who possess the information he needs. In this, it is possible to discern the application of extreme measures associated with the US prosecution of the 'war on terror', but the explicit message seems to be the necessity of acting beyond the bureaucratic confines of the law. In one particularly telling scene the hero, played by Val Kilmer, is shown first threatening to kill and then nearly choking a woman called Nadya Tellich. Since it has been established that this hero does not reproduce the sexist utterances and behaviours of his colleagues, the action is not presented as deviant but as no more than the necessary application of force in the service of a greater justice. The departure from legality is clearly signalled in the conversation that precedes this event, when another agent confronts Tellich. Tellich, a Serb working in the US on a green card, runs an escort service (in effect a brothel),

and thus provides a crude means of proving the unscrupulous character of those who evoke the law in order to frustrate the progress of an urgent investigation:

Nadia Tellich: I'm entitled to my lawyer.
Agent: You're entitled to shit. You're entitled to tell me what you know.

While such discussions of power, agency and ideology, applied to the realm of film and television narrative, suggest the deployment of various forms of textual and cultural analysis (semiological, psychoanalytic and genre-based approaches have provided major paradigms) it is also important to recognise the distinctive quality of film and TV texts that moves *beyond* their role as a means of exposition. Movies and television programmes are effective where they offer a convincing visual and auditory experience, one that reproduces aspects of human sociability, speech and gesture, allowing audiences to interpret quite subtle behavioural signals. These 'naturalistic' aspects of the repertoire of film and television may express or contradict the explicit meanings presented within single narratives but, irrespective of such tendencies, help to confirm the viewer's sense of access to an intimate social universe.

Crossley, writing from a sociological perspective, draws attention to bodily 'techniques' which are 'oriented to social situations' and which may therefore be classified as a form of 'social action' (Crossley, 1995: 135). The on-screen appearance of such *performances* is of course planned (scripted) in advance, but can only be given life through the process of direction in which real individuals reproduce the types of activity which audiences can accept as legitimate, including intonation, gesture, and facial expression. So, for example, scripted utterance in film parodies everyday exchange, revealing an awareness of the 'design' of conversational strategies, in which apparently minor interactions achieve important tasks. In film, these tasks are not, unlike examples of real exchange, practical (designed to advance a real project or desire), but narrative and explanatory. Yet, to be convincing, they must be more than didactic; they must be represented by persons and 'clothed' in behaviour. As Horton and Whol, point out, when this is achieved, the audience may be 'subtly insinuated' into the text's 'action and internal social relationships' (cited Tolson, 2006: 14). The reproduction of a naturalistic environment, including the imitation of natural speech and everyday conduct, may however create conflict with larger narrative purposes.

So, for instance, the arrival of Bourne and Kreutz at Bourne's Paris flat (in *The Bourne Identity*, Liman, 2002) begins as a fairly delicate study of anticipation and tension, as two individuals who know they may enter into a relationship examine the contents and arrangement of this living-space, and what it reveals about its occupant; both need to gather information because Kreutz is assessing Bourne's character and social status, while Bourne has no recollection of his own personal history (see below). These characters are clearly not 'autonomous subjects', but the point here is their presentation as such, secured by their embodiment in the persons of professional actors.

The tentative nature of this exploration symbolises the early stages of a mutual attraction, initiated in the first instance by Kreutz. As the scene develops, however, certain things occur. The naturalistic exchange is not developed in its own right and the larger narrative trajectory intrudes as Bourne discovers that he is under threat. The ten-

sion focuses, at this point, on his anticipation of an attack. As a choreographed fight sequence begins, the brief glimpse we have of Kreutz as *protagonist* disappears. In shock after the struggle, she becomes incapable of action and speech and must rely on Bourne's dynamic and 'automatic' reversion to the skilled production of agency. The original problem of 'attribution' and agency manifests itself in a much repeated strategy; the appearance of challenges to the protagonist's ascendancy.

AGENCY AND 'INNOCENCE'

In many films and series, the values and behaviours of the protagonist are called into question. Ostensibly, the point of any such contested exchange is to 'test' the quality and accuracy of his/her perceptions and assertions ('truth claims', in linguistic terms). Bourne is, for example, taken to task over his methods and attitudes at more than one point in the narrative. His actions, however, prove appropriate to the extremity of the situation in which he and Kreutz find themselves. In fact, the point of the disagreement is to validate the social role of the male hero. The introduction of material that interrogates heroic status remains, however, an underdeveloped counter-point to the dominant course of the narrative. There are places, therefore, where Kreutz questions the story (or alibi) that Bourne produces as an explanation for his conduct. The audience is, perhaps, most willing to give credence to Bourne's perspective, because it has been prepared in advance by the opening sequences. Kreutz, meanwhile, has already been portrayed as confused and inefficient.

During an early conversation, as Kreutz drives Bourne to Paris, the 'master narrative' is preoccupied with establishing the hero's calibre and lack of guile. In the following passage, the 'rational' explanation for Kreutz's verbosity, that she is nervous, competes with another perspective; that this is a *gendered* account of behaviour which refers to female volubility and male *inexpressiveness*:

Bourne: And what?
Kreutz: What do you mean what? Listen to me. I've — I've been speed-talking for about 60 kilometres now. I talk when I'm nervous. I mean, I talk like *this* when I'm nervous. I'm gonna shut up now.
Bourne: No. Don't do that. I haven't talked to anybody in a while.
Kreutz: Yeah, but *we're* not talking. I'm talking. You've said, like, ten words since we left Zurich.

This exchange reveals certain features that can be attributed to the roles each character enacts; Kreutz produces an *expressive* utterance, revealing aspects of her psychological state, while Bourne responds with an *invitation* to her to continue talking. Significantly, in the light of later developments, this invitation assumes the form of a *directive*, a form of utterance that can be read as a request or a command (Price, 1996: 153). In her reply, Kreutz points out the difference between talking as the production of conversation and talking as monologue. Here, too, it may be possible to discern the recursion of stereotypical speech-behaviours and the assignation of distinct traits to gendered individuals. Bourne goes on to provide his companion with a *physiological* explanation for his preference that she continue speaking; he has a headache and listening to her speak is helping to make it fade away:

Bourne: Well, listening to you, um, it's relaxing.
I haven't slept in a while and — and I've had this headache.

Kreutz then agrees to continue talking but the next exchange becomes uncomfortable because, instead of telling a story, she interprets Bourne's request as an opportunity to make a conversational opening:

Kreutz: What kind of music do you like?
Huh? What do you like? Come on. Um -
[turns on radio]
Bourne: You know what, never mind.
Kreutz: No. It's fine. Tell me [switching channels]. What do you want to listen to?
Bourne: I don't know.
Kreutz: Come on. It's not that hard. What do you like?
Tell me.
Bourne: I don't know.

In contrast to the tale of sociability, adventure, friendship and risk that Kreutz produces at the beginning of this scene, in which she reminisces about her dissatisfaction with Amsterdam and her move to begin a new venture with friends in Biarritz, Bourne has nothing to offer. His heroic individuality is protected by his memory loss. His lack of family, friends, and complete absence of any interesting tales, even his inability to name the kind of music he likes, presents the viewer with another insight into gendered behaviour. This is the suggestion that Bourne is the unsocialised male, whose recourse is to *pathological* and neurotic behaviour, devoted to detailed planning, violence and unceasing activity, all of which are used to constrain Kreutz's personal trajectory of random but productive encounters.

Once again, the narrative or ideological 'project' insists on a simple explanation; Bourne has no identity, only abilities and thus cannot be held responsible for his instinctive responses to events. His 'paranoia' is legitimate; 'they' are indeed out to get him. Increasingly, therefore, he begins to exert discipline over Kreutz, beginning with the initial act of bribery that buys the escape from Geneva and which, in effect, becomes the down payment that 'purchases' the relationship.

Kreutz's question, 'Who pays $20,000 for a ride to Paris?' is eventually answered when they discover Bourne's combined occupation and identity, that of assassin. Even before the discovery, the 'unknowing' Bourne is allowed to exert pressure on the disorganized Kreutz, always apparently for her own benefit ('I'm trying to do the right thing for you', he says). Returning from his mission to secure the money from the deposit box in a station locker, he finds that she is not waiting in her assigned place and remonstrates with her:

Bourne: Hey. I told you to stay in the car.
Jesus Christ. I told you to stay in the car.
Kreutz: I needed a drink. I didn't think you would come back.

In effect, what an audience witnesses is the odd proposition that training, ability, and worldly insight are not the detritus which covers an essential identity, but the true components of masculine character. In contemporary society, however, with its formal adherence to notions of equality and opportunity, the unabashed promotion of the retrogres-

sive male, without qualification or irony, can only take place where the protagonist is fundamentally innocent, and when he faces an enemy that threatens his destruction.

Throughout the movie, even during the most traumatic episodes, Bourne must remain an *innocent*, presented in some essential way as a decent person, at whom an *undeserved* evil is directed. He does not initiate violence and his response is, given the situation, proportionate. Yet, once again, the reservations expressed by Kreutz provide an alternative point of view. Bourne's amnesia, for instance, is all along an excuse for the reappearance of an unreconstructed masculinity, a justification provided by the narrative but not attributed to the character:

Bourne: Fuck it. I can't remember anything that happened before two weeks ago.
Kreutz: Lucky you.

Kreutz's reply reveals the deviant perspective which may already have occurred to the viewer; Bourne is provided with all the necessities for a highly mobile contemporary lifestyle, including a large supply of currency (disposable income), multiple nationalities (alternative identities), fashionable surroundings and a high level of physical and mental aptitude. He has shed, again in all *innocence*, the social constraints which many might gladly abandon in return for mobility and freedom. Bourne's loss of identity can be interpreted by the unscrupulous commentator as nothing less than an immense *relief*: 'Lucky you', as his companion says. What, however, does this say about the moral universe inhabited by the characters and, by implication, the enterprise of self-preservation in a real world of agents and operatives?

AGENTS AND OUTCOMES, FICTIONS AND FACTS

Writing about the reproduction of role identity in *Courage Under Fire*, Tasker notes that the 'prevailing stereotype' of the veteran soldier has been 'an alienated, violent male' whose physical and mental scars 'operate as marks of (masculine) character' (Tasker, 2004: 95). In certain respects, the central character in *The Bourne Identity* inherits this persona. He carries both kinds of disfigurement, but is removed from responsibility (see above) by the narrative device of memory loss. He becomes, therefore, an *innocent*, capable of (but not culpable for) immoral activities. His *limited* verbal interventions return the hero to the classic period of authoritative, muscular masculinity, as opposed to the period in which uncertainty produced a *rhetorical* variant. Isolated from the alibi provided by amnesia, and read at the level of the individual scene, Bourne engages in bribery, assault, manslaughter (in self-defence), destruction of property, illegal surveillance, theft, and dangerous driving!

These transgressions may be valued as essential ingredients of the 'thriller' genre, but it is their production *in opposition to social forces portrayed as less trustworthy,* which secures Bourne's position as the centre of heroic agency. Tasker notes in her analysis of military masculinity, that it is defined not primarily against 'the enemy', but in opposition to 'the insubstantial world of politicians and the domestic media' (Tasker, 2004: 96). Similarly, the most significant threat in *The Bourne Identity* is the power of bureaucracy and the *coercive* apparatus of the 'secret state'. The Bourne character does not, initially

at least, take a principled stand against this coercive authority; he responds to its attacks without understanding their motivation.

CONCLUSION

The concentration of emotional and narrative resource on the perpetrators rather than the victims of violence, allows the military in general (the armed forces operating in the real world), to evade the charge of criminality. This, I would argue, is why the appearance of such narratives in the story-world matters; not because they produce definite ideological outcomes in audiences *at the time of circulation*, but because they act as preparatory models for other excursions into public consciousness. My contention here is that narrative forms of meaning are not confined to fictional scenarios but are reproduced in other contexts. These include, most significantly, news stories, in which the public is often placed in the moral and executive position of individual state operatives (police, military, secret agents) when they carry out armed or aggressive actions against (in many cases) civilian opponents.

Within the espionage drama, issues of power and effect are presented within a context that displays antagonism between distinct forms of contemporary agency. In essence, the free activity of individuals like Kreutz who appear to create, in a haphazard way, their own destiny, is set against the deep, hidden structures of the government 'agency'. In the embassy scene, Kreutz encounters obdurate reality in the form of bureaucratic procedure and rules, together with their accompanying mentality. The film does not, however, choose to develop the dilemma of this particular 'refugee', nor does it make a real attempt to examine the repressive character of everyday bureaucracy.

Instead, it chooses to assign all illicit and oppressive activity to a secret condition; the existence of a parallel state which works through surveillance and the application of ruthless force. The apparatus of this shadowy institution can be 'shut down' and its operatives disowned. Just as any unofficial programme within the security state is useful because of its deniability, so its fictional counterpart is equally valuable; it too can take the blame for a situation that might otherwise be assigned to the 'democratic' order itself. An objective analysis of effective agency depends, therefore, on understanding the true character of the institutional structures that human beings inherit. Bourne and Kreutz are shown acting within situations and structures which are, in common with most institutional settings encountered in everyday life, not of their making.

A study of the gendered inflection of agency in narrative forms, provides a useful insight into the difference in operational power assigned to characters that are meant to be fighting on the same side. In effect, however, the gendered protagonist in the protected space of the adventure genre remains an essentially masculine figure: despite the limited critique of formal power offered in movies like the *Bourne Identity,* traditional gender roles seem to remain largely undisturbed. Addressing the question of gender and the state, Wendy Brown makes the argument that both state activity and masculine performance have much in common. In recent years, she believes, both have offered an insincere repudiation of their power, in an attempt to disguise political dominance and social privilege. Therefore, according to Brown, the 'central paradox of the late modern state … resembles the central paradox of late modern masculinity' (cited in Murphy and Whitty, 2000: 18). Perhaps, however, as Susan Faludi has noted (Faludi, 2008), the situation after '9/11' has changed, in the

sense that few of those in positions of power attempt to offer excuses for the concentration of authority and the narrative dramatisation of coercive force.

WORKS CITED

— Ahearn, L. (2001) 'Language & Agency', *Annual Review Anthropology* 30: 109/137.

— Archer, M. (2000) *Being Human: the problem of agency* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

— Branigan, E. (1993) *Narrative Comprehension and Film* London, New York: Routledge.

— '9/11 Commission Report' (2004). http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf: accessed 10/10/08.

— Crossley, N. (1995) 'Body Techniques, Agency and Intercorporeality: on Goffman's *Relations in Public*' in *Sociology* February 1995 29: 1 133/149.

— Dahlgren, P. (1995) *Television and the Public Sphere.* London: New Delhi; Thousand Oaks: Sage.

— Faludi, S. (2008) *The Terror Dream* London: Atlantic Books

— Feury, P. (2000) *New Developments in Film Theory.* London: Macmillan; London, New Delhi: Sage.

— Haney, E. (2002) *Inside Delta Force: The Story of America's Elite Counterterrorist Unit.* New York: Delacorte Press.

— McClellan, S (2008) *What Happened.* New York: Public Affairs.

— Leishman, F and Mason, P (2003) *Policing and the Media.* Abingdon: Lawrence & Erlbaum.

— Morris, Clint (2002) 'Interview with Matt Damon', accessed 6/09/08, www.webwombat.com.au/entertainment/movies/bourne_int.htm

— Murphy, T. and Whitty, N. (2000) 'Crowning Glory: Public Law, Power and the Monarchy' Social Legal Studies issue 7/27/

— Ogilvy 'Topoff' Exercise for Department of Homeland Security, www.ogilvypr.com. 'Case Studies': accessed 1/03/06.

— Price, S. (1996) *Communication Studies.* London: Longman.

— [—] (2007) *Discourse Power Address.* Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate.

— [—] (2009) 'The Mediation of 'Terror': Authority, Journalism and the

— Stockwell Shooting' in S. Morton and E. Boehmer(eds) *Terror and the Postcolonial*. Oxford: Blackwell.

— Tasker, Y (2004) 'Women and Military Masculinities in *Courage Under Fire*' in Schubart, R. and Gjelsvik, A. (eds) *Femme Fatalities*. Goteburg: Nordicom.

— Tolson, A. (2006) *Media Talk: Spoken Discourse on TV and Radio.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

— Watt, E.D. (1982) *Authority.* London: Croom Helm.

— Woodward, B (2006) *State of Denial.* London, Sydney: Simon & Schuster.

FILM REFERENCES

— *The Kingdom* (Berg, 2007)

— *Spartan* (Mamet, 2003)

— *The Bourne Identity* (Liman, 2002)

— *Lions for Lambs* (Redford, 2007)

'THE DAYS AFTER' AND 'THE ORDINARY RUN OF HOURS': COUNTERNARRATIVES AND DOUBLE VISION IN DON DELILLO'S *FALLING MAN*

David Brauner
The University of Reading

The publication in 2007 of Don DeLillo's fourteenth novel, *Falling Man*, was keenly anticipated and then indifferently received. As many reviewers observed, DeLillo had already dealt in previous novels with the issues that 9/11 seemed to crystallize: international terrorism, the global impact of American politics and culture, the relationship between the media television—in particular—and the events on which it reports. Citing a number of examples (the Happy Valley Farm Commune in *Great Jones Street* (1973), the Radical Matrix in *Running Dog* (1978), Ta Onómata in *The Names* (1982)), John Leonard points out that terrorist groups are ubiquitous in DeLillo and argues that 'some kind of 9/11 was always implicit' in his work (Leonard, 2007: 1). Similarly, Andrew O'Hagan suggests that DeLillo's 'interest in the conjunction of visual technology and terrorism … put him on the road to having September 11 as his subject long before the events of that day happened' (O'Hagan, 2007: 1). However, for O'Hagan the arrival of the event itself, rather than giving DeLillo the material he had been waiting for, has rendered him redundant. O'Hagan sees DeLillo as the victim of his own prescience, asking rhetorically: ' "What is a prophet once his fiery word becomes deed?" What does he have to say? What is left of the paranoid style when all its suspicions come true?' (O'Hagan, 2007: 5, 6). This notion that DeLillo had somehow scooped himself is also implicit in the comments of Toby Litt, who announces that '[i]n *Mao II*, DeLillo had already written his great 9/11 novel, long before the specific date and the event happened to come around' (Litt, 2007: 1) and of David Cowart, who writes that 'DeLillo has already produced, in *Mao II*, the definitive novelistic treatment of terrorism centered in and emanating from the Near or Middle East' (Cowart, 2003: 217).

Unlike the others, Cowart's remarks—in the concluding chapter of his book *Don DeLillo: The Physics of Language* (2003)—were made before the appearance of *Falling Man*. So convinced is Cowart that anything DeLillo publishes after September 11th, 2001, must be a response to the events of that day, that he presses *Cosmopolis* (2003), the predecessor in DeLillo's oeuvre to *Falling Man* and his first book to be published after the attacks on the towers, into service as an oblique 9/11 novel. He refers in his discussion of the novel to its ' 9/11-tinged atmospherics' (211), claiming that '[a]lthough

the action of *Cosmopolis* takes place in Manhattan a year and a half before the 9/11 terrorist attack, DeLillo depicts a city over which, as he and the reader know, a terrible event looms' (210). Undaunted by the absence of any concrete allusions to 9/11, Cowart discovers in the narrative trajectory of *Cosmopolis* an implicit precognition of 9/11, so that the novel becomes a 'brilliant … explor[ation]' of 'a proximate past from the never explicitly stated vantage point of post-9/11', an 'engagement', with 'studied indirection', of 'the anxieties moiling in [the] wake' of the 9/11 attacks' (213, 217). With this weight of expectation, DeLillo was damned if he did write a 9/11 novel and damned if he didn't: if he did, then it was bound to be compared unfavourably—to seem in fact like a belated footnote — to novels like *The Names* and *Mao II*; if he didn't, then its shadow would loom over his fiction, with each new novel likely to be read as a sort of encrypted comment on 9/11 or as the precursor to a future 9/11 magnum opus.

The two short pieces that DeLillo published after 9/11 but before *Cosmopolis* did little to discourage the view that a DeLillo 9/11 novel was probable, if not inevitable. The second of these, a short story called 'Looking at Meinhof', deals elliptically with a chance encounter between two unemployed New Yorkers at an exhibition of paintings depicting members of the notorious German terrorist group the Baader-Meinhof Gang. The subject of the paintings aside, the story seems on the face of it to have no connection with the events of 9/11, but Cowart characteristically sees in it an attempt 'to capture some domestic precipitate of terrorism' (Cowart, 2003: 212) and it does contain two seeds that germinate in *Falling Man*. The first is that the interest in the Baader-Meinhof Gang extends from the story into the novel, in that there is a character in the latter who might have been connected with the terrorist group. The second is that the story ends with the unnamed protagonist, having narrowly averted a potential rape (she escapes by locking herself in her bathroom, after which her assailant masturbates silently on her bed and then leaves), seeing 'everything twice now', with 'a double effect—what it was and the association it carried in her mind' (DeLillo, 2002: 7). This doubling of perception as a response to trauma—what I will refer to as 'double vision'—becomes something of a leitmotif in *Falling Man*.

The other post-9/11 piece, an essay entitled 'In the Ruins of the Future: Reflections on Terror and Loss in the Shadow of September', published three months after the attacks, begins by reiterating the belief first expressed in *Mao II* that 'the world narrative belongs to terrorists', before offering the possibility of resistance: 'The narrative ends in the rubble and it is left to us to create the counternarrative' (DeLillo, 2001: 1, 2). The first-person plural pronoun here is ambiguous (does it refer to all those who are not terrorists, to the world-wide witnesses of the event, Americans, New Yorkers, writers?), but what is clear is that DeLillo feels some sort of response to these events is necessary—and that this response should take narrative form. Later in the piece, DeLillo elaborates, insisting that:

> We need them ['the smaller objects and more marginal stories sifted in the ruins of the day'], even the common tools of the terrorists, to set against the massive spectacle that continues to seem unmanageable, too powerful a thing to set into our frame of practised response. (DeLillo, 2001: 3)

The implication seems to be that the best—perhaps the only—way of responding to the 'massive spectacle' that was 9/11 is microcosmically, by constructing a counter-narrative out of small objects and marginal stories, rather than focusing on the towers themselves.

Certainly, this is the approach that DeLillo takes in *Falling Man*. Although it does eventually take us into one of the towers in the aftermath of the impact of the first plane, most of the novel deals with the emotional and psychological fall-out, in the ensuing days, weeks, months and years, on a survivor from one of the Towers, Keith Neudecker, and his estranged wife, Lianne, rather than with the events of 9/11 itself. Indeed, the metonym '9/11' is conspicuous by its absence from the novel and there is no mention either of George Bush, al-Quaida, the 'War on Terror', or Osama Bin Laden. Indeed, the novel draws attention to this last omission through the title of its first section, 'Bill Lawton', which is the name a group of children (mishearing 'Bin Laden') give to the mysterious entity that they ceaselessly scan the skies for in the post-9/11 period. Similarly, the falling man of the novel's title turns out to be not the iconic image from Richard Drew's photograph, but a performance artist, David Janiak, who, in the weeks after the collapse of the World Trade Center, stages a number of falls from high buildings with the aid of a safety harness that arrests his descent. As he refuses to be interviewed, Janiak's motives remain obscure, and his obituary (he dies, mysteriously, of natural causes at the age of thirty-nine) notes that '[t]here is some dispute over the issue of [whether Janiak] intended to reflect the body posture of a particular man who was photographed falling from the north tower of the World Trade Center, headfirst, arms at his sides, one leg bent, a man set forever in free fall against the looming background of the column panels in the tower' (DeLillo, 2007: 221). Whether wittingly or not, however, Janiak's act provides a series of distorted replays of the men and women who chose to leap from the Towers rather than being burnt or suffocated inside.

It is tempting to view Janiak as a surrogate for DeLillo himself, or at least as a portrait of the artist who, faced with what DeLillo described as an event 'so vast and terrible that it was outside imagining even as it happened', can only produce a pale imitation of it (DeLillo 2001: 5). As Alfred Hickling puts it, in a brief, scathing review of the paperback edition of the book, Janiak functions as 'a convenient metaphor for a writer adding to the heap of unrevealing 9/11 commentary' (Hickling, 2008: 20). Andrew O'Hagan similarly argues that '[t]he Falling Man, the artist, can do no better than constitute some figurative account of the author himself, suspended in freefall, frozen in time, subject to both the threat of gravity and the indwelling disbelief of the spectators below' (O'Hagan 2007: 8). For O'Hagan, Janiak's interrupted dives (which must always fall short of the trajectory described by the jumpers from the towers) are a metaphor for DeLillo's 'failure … to imagine September 11' (O'Hagan, 2007: 5). There are two problems with this view: firstly, it is unclear whether Hickling and O'Hagan regard the analogy between the author and the performance artist as intentional (a deliberate self-critique) or unintentional (an unconscious self-indictment); secondly, Janiak's performances, though ethically questionable, are undeniably powerful, so that even if the analogy is valid, it may not be as damning to DeLillo as they suggest.

Near the end of the novel, when Lianne witnesses one of Janiak's unannounced falls, she is bewildered both by Janiak's purpose and by her own compulsion to observe

his performance: 'Because what was he doing finally? But why was she standing here watching?' (167). She gets an implicit answer to the second of her questions when she notices someone else—a 'derelict', 'old, threadbare man'—equally enthralled, 'seeing something elaborately different from what he encountered step by step in the ordinary run of hours' (168). Looking at the man looking at Janiak, Lianne intuitively understands that he is trying 'to learn how to see it correctly, find a crack in the world where it might fit' (168). This episode, it seems to me, provides a possible key to what DeLillo is up to in *Falling Man*. For the novel insistently explores how the 'ordinary run of hours' that constitutes daily life after 9/11 both differs radically from, and at the same time closely resembles, the quotidian structure that preceded it, creating a curious double vision like that experienced by the protagonist of 'Looking at Meinhof'; how 9/11 has, as DeLillo put it in 'In the Ruins of the Future', 'changed the grain of the most routine moment' (DeLillo 2001: 6), while at the same time it has been subsumed by a series of such moments; how we have struggled 'to see it [9/11] correctly', while maintaining our focus on the immediate concerns of every day.

It has become a commonplace that 9/11 marked a paradigm shift in global geopolitics. Though radically different in terms of scale, duration and almost every other measure, in this respect it can be compared to the Holocaust. Just as the Holocaust became the defining event of the twentieth century—the watershed that altered perceptions of humanity so fundamentally that the history not only of that century but of Western civilization as a whole became divided into the pre- and post-Holocaust eras—so it has become customary to refer to events in the twenty-first century as having occurred either pre- or post- 9/11. In 'In the Ruins of the Future', DeLillo insists that the attacks on the towers are *sui generis* — 'In its desertion of every basis for comparison, the event asserts its singularity' (DeLillo 2001: 6) — yet this very claim for the unprecedented nature of 9/11 is couched in terms that inevitably recall the heated historical debates over whether or not the Holocaust should be regarded as unique. In *Falling Man*, too, DeLillo at times represents reactions to the trauma of 9/11 that echo those experienced by Holocaust survivors, real and fictional.

In 1987 the Jewish-American author Norma Rosen published an essay, entitled 'The Second Life of Holocaust Imagery', in which she argued that one of the consequences of the Holocaust has been to alter forever, in the sensitized minds of survivors and others, the associations of everyday phenomena:

> For a mind engraved with the Holocaust, gas is always *that* gas. Shower means their shower. Ovens are those ovens. A train is a freight car crammed with suffocating children: it arrives at the suburban station in a burst of power and noise, there is a moment of hideous hallucination that is really only remembering, and then one steps onto the train and opens the newspaper. Of course this does not always happen. Some days the sky is simply blue and we do not wonder how a blue sky looked to those on their way to the crematoria. (Rosen, 1992: 52)

Something similar happens in *Falling Man* to those whose minds are engraved with the experience of 9/11. To give three examples: firstly Lianne and Martin, her mother's lover, see the towers in 'two dark objects, too obscure to name' in a Morandi still life painting that hangs in her kitchen (49); secondly, Lianne's and Keith's son, Justin, keeps a constant vigil, together with two friends referred to as 'the sibllings', staring at the

Manhattan skyline, which now shimmers with spectral planes; and thirdly, when Keith has a rendezvous with Florence (a fellow survivor with whom he has a brief affair), in the mattress department at Macy's, where the customers are trying out the beds, it is described suggestively as 'a tryst without whisper or touch, set among strangers falling down' (133). The awed silence of the lovers, and the fact that they are brought together by the events of 9/11, lends the imagery of 'strangers falling down' a second life. To put it another way, for Keith and Florence, even the innocent falls of these customers onto the cushioned mattresses becomes charged with post-9/11 meaning: they view it with the same traumatized 'double vision' with which the protagonist of 'Looking at Meinhof' stares at her soiled bed. Falling post-9/11 is never simply falling and indeed DeLillo's novel plays repeatedly on the multiple meanings of the word 'fall' and its derivatives, meanings that multiply further after the fall of the twin towers.

Falling Man opens with an initially unnamed man (who turns out to be Keith), his body embedded with tiny shards of glass and covered in ash and blood, staggering out of one of the towers into an apocalyptic scene: 'It was not a street anymore but a world, a time and space of falling ash and near night' (DeLillo, 2007: 3). In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, it is not simply Keith's physical surroundings that alter radically, but his perception of the world around him. By the time he hears 'the sound of the second [tower's] fall' Keith has 'beg[u]n to see things, somehow, differently' (5). The phrase 'second fall' here has a biblical resonance, partly because the fall of the towers seemed to symbolize the end of an era of American innocence (in the sense of naivety if not of moral purity), and to demonstrate, as surely as the collapse of the Tower of Babel, the essential fragility (if not vanity) of even the most monumental of mortal constructions. More profoundly, in the same way as much of the power of the most famous literary account of the first fall—Milton's *Paradise Lost*—derives from the poignant sense that in the postlapsarian era it is not just the world itself but the words used to describe it that have been denuded, in *Falling Man* too language itself seems to disintegrate, along with the most prominent icons of the Manhattan skyline. Keith feels that '[t]here was something critically missing from the things around him. They were unfinished, whatever that means. They were unseen, whatever that means' (5). The repetition here of the phrase 'whatever that means' draws attention to the fact that Keith's trauma has precipitated a crisis of signification—words no longer seem to make sense—and indeed the novel ends by returning to these post-traumatic moments, with Keith suffering from a kind of aphasia, staring 'into the stunned distance … where everything was … falling away … things he could not name' (246). If there is something literally 'missing from the things around him' (the towers themselves leaving what DeLillo in 'In the Ruins of the Future' calls a 'howling space' (DeLillo, 2001: 6)), then there is also something metaphorically missing from Keith's diction. Familiar words now seem elusive; familiar sights now seem strange, so that when Keith, in a trance-like state, returns briefly to his apartment (where he has been living alone since his separation from Lianne), he 's[ees] the place differently now' (26). It is perhaps in order to try to retrieve the things that seem to be 'falling away'—to recover a literal sense of familiarity — that Keith decides to return to life with Lianne and his children, but in fact this simply reinforces his sense of alienation: 'Nothing seemed familiar, being here, in a family again, and he felt strange to himself, or always had, but it was different now because he was watching' (65).

On the other hand, as this passage makes clear, Keith has always lived a semi-detached existence, so that it is difficult to know how much of his post-9/11 behaviour to attribute to post-traumatic stress. After an initial period of reconciliation and renewed intimacy with Lianne, he begins to drift away from her again, conducting a clandestine affair with Florence, a fellow survivor of the attacks whose briefcase he had absent-mindedly walked away with, and then increasingly spending his time participating in professional poker tournaments in foreign countries. When Lianne seeks clarification about Keith's post-9/11 plans, he tells her that his 'job wasn't much different from the job I had before all this happened. But that was before, this is after' (215). This is a note that is struck repeatedly in the novel, by Keith and by the narrator of the novel (the voices of the two are often conflated in the form of free indirect speech), who is given to portentous declarations such as 'These are the days after. Everything now is measured by after'; (138); 'These were the people he knew … the ones he could stand with in the days after' (143); 'These three years past, since that day in September, all life had become public' (182). Yet, for all this emphasis on what Keith thinks of as 'these long strange days and still nights, these after-days' (137), there is a powerful counternarrative in the novel that suggests that if life after 9/11 is in some respects extraordinary, in other ways, as the narrator puts it, 'things were ordinary as well. Things were ordinary in all the ways they were always ordinary' (67).

If 'fall, 'falling', 'fallen' and other words connoting change and flux are conspicuous in *Falling Man*, then equally central are two terms that denote stability and equilibrium: 'normal' and 'ordinary'. Early on in the novel, we are told that Lianne 'stepped into the street thinking ordinary thoughts' (22), which, given the context, might seem to have a proleptic irony: she is just going about her daily business, but little does she know that soon her life will be altered irrevocably. However, it soon becomes clear that this episode is taking place after the attacks, as her thoughts turn towards the symbolic sight of Keith, inaccessible as ever, 'standing numbly in the flow [of the shower], a dim figure far away inside plexiglass' (23). At this point we might imagine that Lianne's 'ordinary' thoughts represent a willed effort on her part to continue with her life and to cope with the predicament of having to cohabit once more with her possibly traumatized, certainly emotionally distant former partner; to continue with the routines of life in a context that is anything but routine; to be, as Martin (the possibly erstwhile German terrorist) puts it, 'equal to the situation' (23). In other words, her thoughts may be 'ordinary' only insofar as they distract her from what is really on her mind—the extraordinary events of 9/11. Initially, Lianne is comforted by her conviction that after 9/11 '[w]hat was ordinary was not more ordinary than usual, or less' (105) — a conviction that she actively seeks to reinforce by listening to 'the things everybody said, ordinary things' (61) — but this proves to be a short-lived consolation. As Lianne subjects the term 'ordinary' to intense semantic pressure, it fragments and her earlier sense of security gives way to radical ontological doubts:

> But then she might be wrong about what was ordinary. Maybe nothing was. Maybe there was a deep fold in the grain of things, the way things pass through the mind, the way time swings in the mind, which is the only place it meaningfully exists. (105)

If nothing is ordinary, then the implication is that everything is extraordinary, but of course that is a contradiction in terms. This contradiction is one that Keith also encounters as he walks away from ground zero: 'The ordinariness, so normally unnoticeable, fell upon him oddly, with almost dreamlike effect' (51). Struck by the very things that are usually invisible precisely because of their familiarity, the disorientation that Keith experiences here—the sensation that ordinary reality has become surreal—leads to a recognition that ordinariness can, paradoxically, become a sign of peculiarity or even extremity, as in the case of his colleague Rumsey, whose lifeless body he tries in vain to revive after the impact of the first plane: 'He was ordinary in many ways, Rumsey … but he took his ordinariness to the deep end at times' (121).

Both Keith and Lianne struggle to create a normality that will insulate them against the abnormality of the catastrophe of 9/11, but both come to realize that normality is always relative and contingent. Retreating into a twilight world of poker tournaments for reasons that remain obscure, perhaps even to himself, Keith, surveying the neon lights of Las Vegas through the window of a rented car he drives through the desert, has an epiphany of sorts: 'He hadn't known until now … how strange a life he was living. But only from here, out away from it. In the thing itself, down close, in the tight eyes around the table, there was nothing that was not normal' (227). There is a kind of double vision operating here — Keith surveys Las Vegas both from the outside, 'away from it', and 'down close', with the 'tight eyes' of the professional poker player — and this dual perspective undermines the stability of the language that defines experience. If there is nothing that is not normal, then there is nothing that is normal either, since normality must always be defined by that which is abnormal or anomalous; if normality becomes strange when viewed from a distance then the foundations of consistency and consensus on which the term rests collapse. Keith's realisation that his solitary life on the poker circuit, strange though it seems from the outside, has become the norm to him, is, by implication, also a realisation that he cannot, after all, become the person 'of clear and distinct definition, husband and father, finally, occupying a room in three dimensions in the manner of his parents' he had briefly believed he might be (157). Lianne, fortified by the 'unremarkable' results of a thorough medical examination which reveals that she has 'normal morphology' (206, 232)—she dwells with satisfaction on these phrases, repeating them to Keith and to herself — comes to the same conclusion, deciding that her post-9/11 reunion with Keith is temporary, and that now she is 'ready to be alone, in reliable calm, she and the kid, the way they were before the planes appeared that day, silver crossing blue' (236).

The other character in the novel for whom the interpretation of normality becomes a pressing issue is DeLillo's fictional terrorist, Hammad. Whereas Keith and Lianne strive to create a normative physical and psychological space in which to recuperate from the shock, and shelter from the after-shocks, of 9/11, Hammad 'ha[s] to fight against the need to be normal' (83) in order to create the conditions that will allow him to help carry out the 9/11 plot. In 'In the Ruins of the Future', DeLillo marvels at the years prior to 9/11 which the terrorists spent 'making the routine gestures of community and home' (DeLillo, 2001: 2) and in *Falling Man*, in the figure of Hammad, he dramatizes the tension between the imperative to seem unexceptional—to conform outwardly to the normative values of the U.S.—and the necessity for cultivating a hatred for those val-

ues so implacable that it overcomes not only the normal taboo against murder but the fundamental human instinct for self-preservation. DeLillo splices into the main, post-9/11 narrative, sections that track the progress of Hammad towards the culmination of the terrorist plot on that day. In the last of these sections, Hammad, sitting in the cockpit of one of the hijacked planes, the air 'thick with the Mace he'd sprayed and … his blood, draining through the cuff of his long-sleeved shirt' (237), reassures himself that '[i]f other things were normal, in his understanding of the plan, the aircraft was headed toward the Hudson corridor' (237). Given the context, the word 'normal' here inevitably seems ironic, as well as ambiguous (what are the 'other things' to which Hammad refers? flight plans? environmental conditions? life outside the plane in general?). It also amounts to a confession that the situation that he has brought about on this plane — the things that are not the 'other things'—and, by extension, his own behaviour, is not normal. It is only through constant reiteration of the mantras he has been taught—'Forget the world', 'Recite the sacred words' etc.—that he is able to suppress this recognition that what he is doing is aberrant, perverse, inhuman (238). In other words, Hammad develops a kind of double vision, whereby he views the events of 9/11 and those that precede it from the radical perspective inculcated in him by the ringleader of his cell, Amir, as well as from the 'normal' point of view that he has had to maintain in his everyday routines, his daily interactions with the people around him.

This double vision manifests itself elsewhere in the novel, notably in the recurring sensation—shared by Keith and Lianne—that their lives are being—or will be—(re)enacted on celluloid. On 9/11, when Keith packs his bags in the deserted apartment block before making his way to Lianne, he imagines how this scene might be recreated on film: 'In the movie version, someone would be in the building, an emotionally damaged woman or a homeless old man, and there would be dialogue and close-ups' (27). Later in the novel, Lianne, looking at her reflection, experiences a moment of heightened self-consciousness: 'The moment seemed false to her, a scene in a movie when a character tries to understand what is going on in her life by looking in the mirror' (47), a feeling that recurs when she and Keith find themselves 'in a taxi going downtown and began to clutch each other, kissing and groping' (104). Rather than giving herself up to the moment, she keeps repeating: '*It's a movie, it's a movie*' (104). This sense of two realities co-existing is conspicuous in two related episodes late in the novel, when first Keith and then Lianne become unsure of the temporal status of events they are watching on television. In Lianne's case, she watches coverage of a poker game, not knowing 'where this was taking place, or when', half expecting to see the camera pan over to Keith, who, in present time, is 'in the next room' (213). Just prior to this scene, Keith is sitting in a betting shop, when he realizes that he 'wasn't sure whether he was seeing a fragment of live action or of slow-motion replay' (211). Whereas Lianne feels exposed by her uncertainty, imagining herself 'in cartoon format, a total fool, hurrying into Justin's room, hair flying, and dragging him out of bed … so he could see his father', Keith is unfazed by his, deciding that it was all 'a matter of false distinctions, fast, slow, now, then' (211).

In one sense, then, the attacks on the towers might be said to have created a radical dislocation of time and space, a sense of impending apocalypse: the collapse of the twin towers has left a 'howling space' in the firmament; the 'ordinary run of hours' has been displaced by 'the days after'; actual events feel recorded and recorded events

seem to be taking place in 'real time'. Keith's lover, Florence, feels compelled to replay the footage of the attacks repeatedly, but reconciling herself to the reality of what happened doesn't seem to get any easier:

> Every time she saw a videotape of the planes she moved a finger toward the power button on the remote. Then she kept on watching. The second plane coming out of that ice blue sky, this was the footage that entered the body, that seemed to run beneath her skin, the fleeting sprint that carried lives and histories, theirs and hers, everyone's, into some other distance, out beyond the towers. (134)

The appearance of the second plane (confirming that the impact of the first plane was no accident) seems to mark the beginning of a new epoch, 'carr[ying] lives and histories' into a post-9/11 universe fundamentally different from the one in which the towers stood proud. No matter how many times Florence watches the events unfold, the outcome is the same: 'The narrative ends in the rubble', as DeLillo put it in 'In the Ruins of the Future' (DeLillo, 2001: 1, 2).

However, there is a counternarrative, or rather a number of counternarratives, offered by *Falling Man*: there is the narrative of Keith being reconciled with his wife and son, which is, however, soon compromised by his affair with Florence and eventually fatally undermined by his commitment to poker; there is the series of performances by David Janiak, each one a mini-drama that revives and revises the images of the 'jumpers' of 9/11; and then there are the literal narratives written at Lianne's 'storyline sessions', a weekly 'gathering of five or six or seven men and women in the early stages of Alzheimer's Disease' who, 'strictly for morale', write on topics assigned by Lianne and then read their stories out loud to the assembled company. Ordinarily, they write about their personal experiences and memories, but in the wake of 9/11 '[t]here was one subject the members wanted to write about, insistently … They wanted to write about the planes' (31). Finally, there is Justin's perverse prophecy, which he claims has been relayed to him by 'Bill Lawton', that 'the planes … [a]re coming' and 'this time the towers will fall' (102). Lianne is particularly disturbed by Justin's insistence on this version of events:

> His repositioning of events frightened her in an unaccountable way. He was making something better than it really was, the towers still standing, but the time reversal, the darkness of the final thrust, how better becomes worse, these were the elements of a failed fairy tale, eerie enough but without coherence. It was the fairy tale children tell, not the one they listen to, devised by adults, and she changed the subject … (102)

Justin's 'time reversal' is reminiscent of the ending of another 9/11 novel, Jonathan Safran Foer's *Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close* (2005), but whereas Foer's child-prodigy protagonist, Oskar, flicks backwards through a series of photographs of a man (whom he believes to be his father) falling from one of the towers, thereby creating the illusion that 'the man was floating up through the sky' (Foer 2005: 325), as part of a redemptive counternarrative that will reverse the sequence of events leading up to 9/11, thus restoring his own father to him, Justin's inversion of chronology reinstates the towers only in order for them definitively to be destroyed: 'this time the towers will fall … they'll really come down', he tells Lianne (DeLillo, 2007: 102).

In a sense, this is a trick that the novel itself plays, since it begins at ground zero, moves away from it to explore the days, weeks, months and years after, but then returns to it

in the final pages. The final lines of the novel—'Then he saw a shirt come down out of the sky. He walked and saw it fall, arms waving like nothing in this life' (246)—perform their own 'time reversal' and again enact a double vision. This actual falling man (or woman—the gender and all other markers of identity are obscured by the use of the synecdoche 'shirt' to stand in for the human being who wears the shirt), appearing as he does only at the end of the novel, now recalls the staged falls of the performance artist known as 'falling man' that have been narrated earlier in the novel, though of course Janiak's falls, in terms of conventional chronology, actually re-enact the spectacle of those, like this symbolic figure, who leaped to their deaths from the towers. In this respect, these final lines are a microcosm of the novel as a whole; the description of this anonymous falling figure, like *Falling Man* itself, both directly confronts and subtly averts its gaze from, the horrors of 9/11, providing its readers with a double vision of events that paradoxically articulates their ineffability.

NOTES

Originally published in the *New Yorker* under the title 'Baader-Meinhof', but reprinted with this title in *The Guardian*. It is this latter version that I will refer to in this article.

WORKS CITED

— Cowart, D. (2003) *Don DeLillo: The Physics of Language*. Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia.

— DeLillo, D. (2001) 'In the Ruins of the Future: Reflections on Terror and Loss in the Shadow of September'. *The Guardian*, December 22: 1/7.

— [—] (2002) 'Looking at Meinhof'. *The Guardian*, August 17: 1/7. http://books.guardian.co.uk

— [—] (2007) *Falling Man*. London: Picador.

— Foer, Jonathan Safran. 2005. *Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close*. Bath: QPD.

— Hickling, A. (2008) Untitled review of *Falling Man*. *The Guardian* (*Saturday Review*), June 21: 20.

— Leonard, J. (2007) 'The Dread Zone' (review of *Falling Man*). *The Nation*, May 28: 1/6. http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070528/leonard

— Litt, T. (2007) 'The Trembling Air' (review of *Falling Man*). *The Guardian*, May 26: 1/4. http://books.guardian.co.uk/reviews/generalfiction

— O'Hagan, A. (2007) 'Racing Against Reality' (review of *Falling Man*). *The New York Review of Books* 54 (11), June 28: 1/8. http://www.nybooks.com/articles

— Rosen, N. (1992) *Accidents of Influence: Writing as a Woman and a Jew in America*. New York: State University of New York Press.

— [—] (1992) [1987]. 'The Second Life of Holocaust Imagery'. In Rosen 1992a: 47/54.

THE END OF INNOCENCE: TALES OF TERROR AFTER 9/11

Catherine Morley
University of Leicester

Al-Qaeda's attacks on New York's World Trade Center on 11th September 2001 sent seismic reverberations through the geopolitical bedrock of the nascent twenty-first century. Within a month, the White House had established the Office of Homeland Security. In July 2002, President Bush proposed the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a department which would bring together 22 entities with critical homeland security missions, and just four months later, in November, the DHS was established. According to the first *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (2002), the strategic objectives of this new Department (and, indeed, of the United States government) were the prevention of terrorist attacks within the United States, the reduction of America's vulnerability to terrorism, and the minimizing of damage incurred in, and maximizing of recovery from, attacks that actually occur.[1] Indeed, within just ten months of the attacks, more than 60,000 American troops had been deployed around the globe in the war on terrorism; security on American borders and in airports had been tightened considerably; vast quantities of resources had been pumped into the development and stockpiling of drugs to combat bioterrorism; and the United States had taken enormous measures in its campaign against the development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. According to a report by a group at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, one of the ways of successfully organizing against terrorism is with a 'national security paradigm [which] fosters aggressive, proactive intelligence gathering, presuming the threat before it arises, planning preventative action against suspected targets and taking anticipatory action'.[2] Clearly, such a paradigm has been instituted since the events of September 2001. The attacks, it seems, engendered a new world order and inaugurated a system of governance based on the pre-emption, prevention and anticipation of further terrorist plots.

Alongside this, the impact of the attacks on the literary imagination was, and continues to be, momentous. Despite Norman Mailer's recommendation to Jay McInerney

[1] *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (July 2002), pp. 3–5. Available online, www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_hls.pdf.

[2] A.B. Carter, J.M. Deutch, and P. Zelikow (1998) 'Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of a National Policy', http://www.hks.harvard.edu/visions/publication/terrorism.htm.

to 'wait 10 years … It will take that long for you to make sense of it' (ctd in Gray 2006), recent years have begun to see the creative reflex being exercised with increased confidence and self-assurance. Ignoring Mailer's advice, McInerney published his novel *The Good Life* in 2006, and it joined fictional treatments of the events such as Frédéric Beigbeder's *Windows on the World* (2004), Jonathan Safran Foer's *Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close* (2005), Ken Kalfus's *A Disorder Peculiar to the Country* (2005), Patrick McGrath's *Ghost Town* (2005), Claire Messud's *The Emperor's Children* (2006) and, more recently, Joseph O'Neill's *Netherland* (2008). And although 9/11 novels and stories have begun to form a sub-genre of their own, they follow a pathway of literary response that can be traced back to the immediate aftermath of the World Trade Center's destruction. On 12th September the British writer Ian McEwan wrote of the confused but compelling horror of the events as they unfolded on the television in front of him. But even he was a late starter, for Paul Auster was only one of many writers who recorded their impressions on the day itself. Indeed, in the week after the attacks so many literary figures contributed commentary, consolatory, inflammatory or diagnostic pieces that by 20th September Sam Leith in London's *Daily Telegraph* could provide a summative overview of the literati's collective effort which not only included Auster, McEwan and McInerney but also quoted Martin Amis, Blake Morrison and Jeanette Winterson. And by 30th September John Dugdale recorded in the *Times* that 'among the literary authors to have written about the World Trade Center bombing so far are Martin Amis, Peter Carey, Amitav Ghosh, David Grossman, Ian McEwan, Jay McInerney, Susan Sontag, John Updike and Jeanette Winterson', as well as Tom Clancy, Frederick Forsyth, Jonathan Franzen, Robert Harris, Philip Hensher and Rick Moody (Dugdale, 2001: 37).

While many of the initial reactions to the events of 11th September were notable for their uniquely subjective emphasis, with writers discussing what the attacks meant to them, to their art and to their writing, what many writers have also been integrating into their fiction has been the American response to the attacks: the perceived infringement of civil liberties, surveillance, the institution of a climate of fear, the renewed Cold War rhetoric of good versus evil, and the seemingly overnight proliferation of acronyms and governmental institutions and bodies with the primary strategic aim of waging a war on terror. For a number of writers, one of the most pressing issues to emerge from the terrorist attacks has not been the presiding impression of vulnerability to attack but the sense that the post-9/11 global environment is permeated by a sense of government-fanned fear. This is not necessarily a figment of the literary imagination. After all, one of the first (and much derided) announcements on the DHS's Ready.Gov website advised citizens to use duct tape and plastic sheeting to construct a home-made bunker in the event of a chemical terrorist attack.[3] This came in the week before the United States invaded Iraq in a quest to disinter ever-evasive weapons of mass destruction.

Sifting through the endless run of Homeland Security documents issued by the State Department and the Congressional Research Department, what is immediately striking is the extraordinarily pervasive rhetoric of fear. The *National Strategy for Homeland Security* lists its critical mission areas as intelligence and warning; border and trans-

[3] See www.ready.gov/america/other/faqs.html.

portation security; domestic counterterrorism; defence against catastrophic terrorism; and emergency preparedness and response. The word 'vulnerability' appears frequently throughout the document, concurrent with lists of possible terrorist methods ranging from kidnaps, hijackings, shootings and 'conventional' bombing to biological, radiological, nuclear or cyber attacks.[4] That such rhetoric occurs in a strategy document is somewhat understandable, although it would not be remiss to describe it as alarmist. But this kind of language, this thinking infected by fear, is something which has seeped into the socio-cultural landscape. Indeed, it has done so to such an extent that the raised terror alerts which are regularly announced by the global media seem to have engendered a heightened sense of reality, a reality so real that it borders on the surreal in its bamboozling capacity for inspiring terror. Thus the terror with which we are regularly confronted is not solely inspired by the militant acts of angry jihadists, but is also propagated by a global media machine and a network not of terrorist cells but governmental intelligence systems which file reams of individual data and track our every move with the omnipotent powers of surveillance. While the outgoing US administration and the DHS wage their war on the fuzzy, metaphorical target of 'terror', global citizens find themselves entrapped by another form of terror, gripped by the paranoia of those under constant surveillance.

This essay will examine three different literary responses to this culture of fear and the so-called 'war on terror'. It will also explore how various writers present the means whereby the rhetoric and the principles of pre-emption and anticipatory action have penetrated the global consciousness. Focusing primarily on Richard Flanagan's controversial novel, *The Unknown Terrorist* (2006), I will address the author's treatment of government surveillance and the infringement of civil liberties. I will discuss the role of the media in the new global environment of distrust and examine the means whereby he shows the media to distort reality to the extent that it becomes surreal. This is represented in the style of *The Unknown Terrorist*, which assumes a filmic aspect in its shifting perspectives, characterization, cutting and tracking. From here, the essay will move on to consider briefly John Updike's *Terrorist* (2006), which infiltrates the mind of a homegrown, would-be Islamic terrorist, Ahmad Ashmawy Mulloy, and explore Updike's fictional treatment of the DHS. Finally, I will turn my attention to Mohsin Hamid's *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* (2007), discussing the formal arrangement of this psychological thriller and the allegorical symmetries it presents in a narrative plotline which moves along in increasingly urgent anticipation of catastrophe.

While these three novels are but a nationally disparate sample of post 9/11 writing, they differ from the usual fare in that they are not steeped in the domestic, inward-looking dramas which many writers have emphasized in their treatment of the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York.[5] Instead, each of these writers takes up the political rhetoric of homeland security and examines the effects of constitutionally-sanctioned surveillance and pre-emptive action upon the individual. Moreover, each of these novels is forth-

[4] *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (July 2002), pp. 3–5. Available online, www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_hls.pdf.

[5] For a discussion of such texts see C. Morley (2008) 'Writing in the Wake of 9/11', in M. Halliwell and C. Morley (eds) *American Thought and Culture in the 21st Century*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 245–259.

right in its didacticism, offering either angry rebukes to systems that stoke flames of paranoia and infringe civil liberties or, as in the case of Updike, biting parodies of agencies that seem cowardly and ineffectual in their countenance of possible attack. Finally, I will discuss how each of the novels deliberately plays with the genre of the suspense thriller, thereby moving away from the realism which has mostly characterized post 9/11 fiction, as a suitable alarmist narrative form for our paranoid, terror-infested global landscape.

The Australian writer Richard Flanagan makes fear of the state and its powers one of the central conceits of *The Unknown Terrorist*. Provocative from the outset, the novel is dedicated to David Hicks, the first Australian to be detained at Guantánamo Bay, and it centers on the story of a female stripper, hunted by the state and by the media for alleged terrorist offences. The novel opens in the wake of unsubstantiated reports of an attempted bombing at Sydney's Olympic Stadium, reports that are recycled on a continual news loop such that they become conflated with fact in spite of their possibly spurious source. Gina Davis, or 'The Doll' as she is known, finds herself the prey of a media and government hunt for an alleged terrorist after a one-night-stand with a stranger named Tariq. Caught on CCTV in the lobby of Tariq's apartment building, Davis is instantaneously catapulted into the public limelight as Tariq is suspected of being behind the possible bombing at the Homebush Stadium. In this way, presumed a threat before any threat has arisen, in the click of a button the Doll becomes an accomplice and her image proliferates across every aspect of the national media. Flanagan's novel is willfully polemical, warning of the exploitative capacities of a centrally controlled media, yet at the same time it skillfully demonstrates the means whereby the rhetoric of terror has infiltrated the everyday lives of ordinary individuals to the extent that reality takes the shape of a suspense film. Thus the novel is rooted in the mundane yet at times it seems to career into the realms of the hallucinatory surreal.

This dizzying aspect of the novel, whereby it moves quickly from a depiction of ordinary life to a pacey manhunt is, of course, designed to reflect the technological apparatuses that shadow the characters' existences. In this regard, the novel assumes the filmic qualities remarked upon by numerous reviewers.[6] Moreover, as one moves from chapter to chapter, the novel offers the effect of moving from screen to screen, as if the reader were someone implicated in the voyeuristic activities described therein. With this in mind, Flanagan first offers a kind of scrambled preview of what is to come in a two-page overview which introduces the themes and foretells the death of the heroine. Thus Flanagan presents Christ as the first suicide bomber in his willing embrace of death to enable the future of the world to come; he unpicks Nietzsche's description of the dreamer as reality-inducing dynamite; and he describes Chopin's Nocturnes as the soundtrack which portends the Doll's demise. We then oversee a series of retrospective scenes from the Doll's life before moving into her present-day Saturday as she makes her way to the Chairman's Lounge, the strip joint at which she performs. From here, the camera eye focuses upon Richard Cody, a down-on-his-luck TV news

[6] See, among many others, S. Kerr (2007) 'In the Terror House of Mirrors', New York Review of Books, 11 October; and Peter Conrad's review for *The Observer*, 'Days of Thunder Erupt Down Under', http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2007/apr/08/crimebooks.features.

reporter, and offers the same retrospective-type scenes before bringing him into the present and to his first encounter with the Doll. This back-and-forth-between-screens technique continues for the rest of the novel, with the introduction of secondary characters, and at times we are offered zoom shots, crane shots, flashbacks and flashforwards, and sometimes several camera angles spliced together at once to achieve the effect of experiencing multiple strands of visual and auditory information simultaneously.

The meshing of lives in this manner, flickering from one camera angle to another, is deliberately disorientating, with stories and frames of reference tumbling over into one another in messy entanglements. Shortly after we are first introduced to Cody, we find ourselves in a fly-on-the-wall position at a dinner party where he holds court on the subject of international terrorism and the question of the mandatory detainment of refugees. In his excitement and desire to attract the attentions of a female graphic designer at the party, Cody consciously begins 'inflating several stories he had heard of "dangerous Islamic types" who had been allowed into the country' (Flanagan, 2006: 28). When the subject moves on to terrorism, he finds himself

> speaking about the end of innocence and the destruction of ordinary lives of good people, and somehow the fate of people killed by terrorist bombs and his demotion by Jerry Mendes and his rejection by the graphic designer were all one and the same, and all the wounds of the world were his. (Flanagan, 2006: 30)

The effect here is to present, in microcosm, the means whereby real stories and events become conflated with misinformation, personal hostilities and untruths. The implicit irony in Cody's speech is that these are the mechanisms which undo the lives of ordinary people, and this is the very method by which he will bring about a national witch hunt.

The parallels Flanagan implies are all too apparent and draw directly on ASIO (Australian Security Intelligence Office) directives, DHS press releases and the speeches of George W. Bush which both precede and defend military action in Afghanistan and Iraq.[7] For instance, Cody's insistence that there is an 'irrational evil lurking out there' and his 'dark tales of terrible plots foiled, of the mass poisonings and bombings and gassings planned and, through vigilance, averted' (Flanagan, 2006: 32) mirror Bush's remarks in 2000:

[7] The Sydney-based Flanagan clearly has in mind the Australian Security Intelligence Office in his critique of the various governmental institutions which fan the flames of fear, not least because of a series of very highly publicized scandals associated with the office. For instance, shortly after the September 11 attacks the ASIO mistakenly raided the home of Bilal Daye and his wife, later admitting that the warrant on Daye was for a different address. The Kim Beazley and Ratih Hardjono investigation followed in 2004. And in 2005, visiting US citizen and peace activist Scott Parkin was detained and removed from Australia by the ASIO and later billed in excess of $AU11,000 for the cost of his detention and removal. Similar negative assessments by the ASIO of Iraqi refugees Mohammed Sagar and Muhammad Faisal brought about their indefinite detention on the island of Nauru. More recently the office has been involved with the controversial case of Izhar ul-Haque, a suspected terror-camp trainee. The 2007 case collapsed when it was revealed that ASIO officers had engaged in improper conduct amounting to false imprisonment and kidnap during the investigation. It is widely speculated (though unproven) that the ASIO acted under pressure from the DHS in the case of Parkin who had given talks on the role of the US contractor Halliburton in the Iraq War.

> When I was coming up, with what was a dangerous world, we knew exactly who they were. It was us versus them, and it was clear who the them were. Today we're not so sure who the they are, but we know they're there. (cited in Fitzgerald, 2002: 84)

After 9/11 the 'they' outlined here became cultural caricatures as the President went on to list what 'they' wished to attack, these again comprising a conflation of history and American ideology neatly packaged as freedom, civil democracy and the American way of life. In fact, Flanagan even has Cody discuss a lurking irrational evil as threatening Australian values. The list of potential disasters that might befall the ordinary Australian, according to Cody, reads much like the litany of possible strikes outlined in the DHS's *National Strategy for Homeland Security* and which are mentioned earlier in this essay. Cody's argument for the necessity of torture and the need for a new Geneva Convention paving the way for torture in a 'civilized fashion' is directly comparable to Donald Rumsfeld's remarks to reporters on 7th February 2002 in defence of the assertion of executive presidential power on the issue of torture at Guantánamo Bay: 'The reality is the set of facts that exist today with the Al Qaeda and the Taliban were not necessarily the set of facts that were considered when the Geneva Convention was fashioned' (cited in Cockburn, 2007).

The merging of this American military rhetoric with that of the Sydney media man is clearly not coincidental. Flanagan has in mind the most powerful Australian media mogul of them all in his depiction of the exploitative powers of print and TV news media and in Cody's self-appointed moral mission to reveal the true identity and motivations of terror-suspect number one, Gina Davis.[8] At the heart of Flanagan's critique, however, as evidenced by the dedication of the novel and the claustrophobic surveillance effects of the narrative, is the collusion of government and media in their attrition of the privacy and civil liberties of the individual. From the moment that we encounter the Doll, she is undressed, probed and catalogued. As hazy video footage of her is unearthed, a narrative of her life is pieced together by the newsman anxious for a story and hell-bent on his moral mission to protect the nation. Similarly, the narrative trajectory progresses by offering the reader the story of the Doll's life, presenting a series of flashbacks that yield insights into her manifold identities. The great irony of Cody's rhetoric is that he ultimately obliterates the very thing he claims that he wants to protect: his exposé reveals the details of a woman's life to the national presses, simple and innocent actions and errors are inflated into monumentally dangerous exploits indicative of latent evil intent, and freedom and innocence are denied the terror suspect. In a resounding echo of Rumsfeld's description of the Guantánamo Bay inmates, the Doll 'does not have any rights' (cited in Cockburn, 2007).

While government- and media-fanned states of fear are key to the novel, Flanagan suggests that this is not necessarily something that is new and attributable to the post 9/11, post-Bali world. Rather, he sets his heroine in a long line of female victims—likening her to a suspected French female collaborator with the Germans in the Second World War and a bog woman drowned on suspicion of witchcraft—all of whom

[8] The Australian-born press baron and owner of Fox News, Rupert Murdoch, was of course an ardent admirer of Rumsfeld and a supporter of the Bush Administration's direct response to terror threat.

are ritually shorn of their hair and exposed for public ridicule.[9] In each case, the woman's punishment is seen as necessary for public self-affirmation. And in *The Unknown Terrorist*, Gina Davis, or the Black Widow as she is known because of her strip performances with a veil, comes to realize that she needs to be a martyr so that society has something to measure itself against. The plot hatched by Cody and his terrorist-expert collaborators, therefore, is not the pursuit of truth but the construction of a narrative of fear. And so, in a meeting with the ASIO's counter-terrorism delegate, when a minor character confronts the officer with the possibility of error, he is quickly reprimanded:

> Let's suppose we're wrong. … And you know what? It's still important that the public know these bastards are out there. That this is going to happen here. And that they need people like us to stop it. It's important that the public know they have people like us looking over them. That's very important. I'm sure you can understand that. How bad would it look if we were wrong? What a victory for bin Laden's bastards that would be. People out there don't understand all the threats, all the issues, how we can have a war between good and evil happening here. … The terrorists want to turn all our cities into Baghdad. It's bloody frightening, Tony, and people need to be frightened. And that's part of our job, too. (Flanagan, 2007: 271)

Flanagan claims that the inspiration for the novel came to him from 'everywhere … the grabs of politicians and the sermons of shock jocks' (Flanagan, 2007: 325). Certainly the novel and its blatant critique of the ASIO and DHS is rooted in a deep anger against the manipulation of cultural consciousness by discourses of fear, evil and terror promulgated by such government offices and by global media corporations. Just as the fictional news channels juxtapose images of the 'evil' Davis in her Black Widow costume with shots of the blazing World Trade Center, the Bali bombings and Osama bin Laden to gather support for their own existence (especially so in the case of the various scandals associated with the ASIO), so the American media juxtaposed images of a severely damaged Ground Zero with report after report on the evil of bin Laden and his brainwashed band of terrorists.[10] Alongside this were the recurrent tropes of the Bush administration, with the repetition of the word 'evil' (utilized to great effect by Flanagan) in his televised response to the attacks, and in later addresses his promise to capture bin Laden 'dead or alive' and to 'smoke out and pursue … evil doers, those barbaric people'.[11] With its hyper-real CCTV-format narrative and its cast of innocent victims and cynical bureaucrats, Flanagan's angry, polemical novel is a warning that the global landscape may have changed but that this altered world in which we live is as much the product of those who supposedly watch over us with benign intent as it is of those who do not.

Flanagan's hyper-stimulated world of strippers and surveillance is something which John Updike addresses in his novel *Terrorist*, which takes us into the mind of a poten-

[9] Indeed, in this regard the novel much resembles its declared influence, Heinrich Böll's *The Lost Honour of Katharina Blum* (1974).

[10] See Douglas Kellner's *From 9/11 to Terror War: The Dangers of the Bush Legacy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), pp. 66–70, which makes the case that the public's sympathies were manipulated with the edited images in order to gain widespread support for the US's incursions into Afghanistan.

[11] 'Statement by the President in his Address to the Nation', http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html.

tial suicide bomber. Updike's young terrorist, Ahmad, rages against a world where sex is freely available and in which the common standards of decency have eroded:

> *Devils*, Ahmad thinks. *These devils seek to take away my God.* All day long, at Central High School, girls sway and sneer and expose their soft bodies and alluring hair. Their bare bellies, adorned with shining navel studs and low-down purple tattoos, ask, *What else is there to see?* … (Updike, 2006: 3)

Despite the negative critical commentary Updike has received regarding his depiction of the young Muslim, what is most interesting about the novel is the affinity Updike sketches between the terrorist 'other' and the American citizen.[12] Ahmad's voyeuristic disgust at perceived sexual flamboyance is not so different from the distaste of his antagonist—a sixty-something white male American school-teacher. Indeed, Updike goes one further by depicting a home-grown US-born potential terrorist. And, as Jonathan Raban has noted, by setting his novel in New Prospect, New Jersey, Updike observes that the cradle of jihad rests not in the Middle East but in the crumbling, peripheral and immigrant-laden cities of the West (Raban, 2006).

While certainly not as directly censorious as Flanagan, Updike seems to be making a rather deliberate, if subtle, point which acknowledges the complicity of the West in the propagation of the current state of fear which has engulfed the occidental consciousness. In this regard his depiction of the DHS throughout the novel is uncompromising. His beleaguered Secretary for Homeland Security, Secretary Haffenreffer, is clearly a reworked version of the first US Secretary for Homeland Security, Tom Ridge. After leaving the department, Ridge's proudest boast was that there were no attacks on American soil during his watch, and in Updike's book his fictional equivalent worries that a disaster on his patch will mean 'there'll be no sitting on fat-cat boards for me. No speaker's fees. No million-dollar advances on my memoirs' (Updike, 2006: 261). Similarly, while Haffenreffer is seen anxiously planning to raise the security code of the Mid-Atlantic region to the Orange level of alert, Ridge in fact raised it to Orange five times during his short two-year tenure. All in all, in fact, Updike presents the DHS as an utterly shambolic bureaucracy with little power or effect and wholly reliant on its informants in the prevention of terrorist activities. Indeed, Haffenreffer's adoring aide, the spinster Undersecretary for Women's Purses, Hermione Fogel, describes his day-to-day work as comprised mainly of thinking up 'worst-case scenarios' (Updike, 2006: 132). Whether lost in a nostalgic drift of Judy Garland and Kirk Douglas movies or preoccupied with his moderate earnings, the Secretary himself seems more worried about his image and the negative portrayal of his office in the national media than he does about the possibility of a terrorist attack in New Jersey. When faced with the proposition that the majority of the populace do not know what a color change in alert levels means, he is nonplussed but unwilling to address the issue. The DHS Secretary, it seems, is as much in the dark regarding codes and alerts as the wider populace. Similarly, when considering the loopholes at airports and other ports of entry, the Secretary admits defeat in the face of the terrorists' will and can only charge his underlings

[12] See, for instance, S. Abell (2006) 'John Updike's Simplifications', *The Times Literary Supplement*, http://tls.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,25339-2286503,00.html; and Michiko Kakutani (2006) 'John Updike's "Terrorist" Imagines a Homegrown Threat to Homeland Security', *New York Times* 8.

to reprimand the 'underpaid watchdogs' who are 'defending democracy' in their daily vigilance of suitcase interiors. It is, after all, important that the Department is seen to be doing something.

Just as Flanagan draws comparisons between those who engage with terrorist activities and those who claim to defend the public from such atrocities, Updike outlines similarities between the followers of militant Islam and some of the actors in American ideology. For instance, Ahmad engages in a lengthy conversation on the nature of jihad and his heavenly rewards with the Lebanese-American (and possible CIA mole) Charlie Chehab in which the latter likens Osama bin Laden to George Washington and the mujahideen to the 1776 American revolutionaries. He attends a Christian service to hear a high-school friend sing and listens to an effusive pastor sermonize on salvation and Moses who led the chosen people out of slavery and yet was denied himself admission to the Promised Land. Later still, Jack Levy (the man who thwarts the terrorist plot) likens many of Ahmad's beliefs lifted from the Qur'an with the 'repulsive and ridiculous stuff in the Torah' (Updike, 2006: 295). When they discuss Sayyid Qutub's concept of *j-a hilliyya*, Levy describes it as 'sensible': 'I'll assign him as optional reading, if I live. I've signed up to teach a course in civics this semester' (Updike, 2006: 302). Throughout the book, Ahmad's faith in the Qur'an and his faith in God is set comparatively alongside American patriotism, secularism, Christianity and Judaism. This alignment seems deliberately designed to highlight the comparative elements of the American and the Muslim 'other', to show us how closely aligned both really are. Levy's pronouncement that he'll assign Qutub's *Milestones* as optional reading on his civics course reinforces the sense, impressed at the outset by the mundane American setting, that this is now the reality of American identity; it is against this that post-Cold War Americans define themselves. And by choosing a jihadi foot-soldier born and raised in New Jersey, Updike seeks to make his terrorist a knowable and recognizable entity, an enemy of the state conceived and bred within it and who is not so unlike his adversaries.

This sense of a recognizable yet indeterminate enemy is the major strategy of Mohsin Hamid's *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* which plays with the traditional understanding of the term 'fundamentalism'. Narrated from the perspective of the Princeton-educated, Pakistan-born Changez, the novel deals with the fundamentals of management consultancy with its mesmerizing promise of rich rewards in return for the expediting of employee casualties in the pursuit of Mammon. Hamid turns the post-9/11 novel on its head, presenting us with a day-long monologue which relates the impact of the attacks on a non-American Muslim who has dedicated himself to an American way of life. Upon meeting an American stranger in a Lahore café, Changez (an apt name given his change of heart) engages the man in conversation and relates his experiences as a brilliant Ivy Leaguer in New Jersey, his time in Manhattan at Underwood Samson, and his love for an inscrutable American woman before his return to Pakistan after the attacks. The American is given neither name nor voice, he is silent throughout and his motivations (or those of Changez) are entirely unclear. If the loquacious Changez's intentions are unclear, then those of the quiet American are even more so. Why does he spend a day drinking tea in the company of a stranger? And why does he follow him down a dark alley after he learns that his guide is a mentor for dissident students who advocate anti-Western causes? Hamid elects for a pervasive indeterminacy in his

characterization. The novel refuses the clarity of clearly defined 'good' guys and 'bad' guys sought by the West in the wake of 9/11. It offers only ambiguity.

As well as its evident didacticism, the novel is an exploration of the nature of symbolism and its implications for individuals.[13] In relating his reaction to the September 11 attacks, Changez confesses to the American that he was overcome with the urge to smile, not because of any sympathies for the attackers but by the audacity of the symbolism—the strike of the militant East against the most powerful symbols of the West.

> But at that moment, my thoughts were not with the *victims* of the attack—death on television moves me most when it is fictitious and happens to characters with whom I have built up relationships over multiple episodes—no, I was caught up in the *symbolism* of it all, the fact that someone had so visible brought America to her knees. (Hamid, 2007: 83)

The novel abounds with variations on this theme: Changez and the voiceless American are each symbols, the idealistic Erica (whose idealism which is truncated—like her name—in the face of disaster) is a symbol of her nation, and even the site of Changez's and Erica's coupling, Athens, is a symbol of the meeting of Eastern and Western cultures. Later in the novel, Changez eloquently observes the heightened symbolism in the wake of the attacks—the profusion of American flags throughout New York, the sudden sense of a national homeland, the uniformed generals addressing cameras in war rooms—and the invasion of words like 'duty' and 'honor' into media headlines. Indeed, the novel succeeds on a much more subtle level than *Terrorist* or *The Unknown Terrorist* insofar as it inhabits the consequences of 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq and the US's changed relationship with the East. It offers no overt diatribes against government or parodies of its agencies but delicately illuminates the landscape of the new world order and its effects on global citizens.

Changez's description of the September 11th attacks as a clash of symbols is far from unique. One of the most interesting early responses, for example, came from Martin Amis, who commented upon the figurative nature of the acts:

> The Pentagon is a symbol, and the World Trade Center is, or was, a symbol, and an American passenger jet is also a symbol—of indigenous mobility and zest, and of the galaxy of glittering destinations … It was well understood that an edifice so demonstrably comprised of concrete and steel would also become an unforgettable metaphor. (Amis, 2001: 4)

---

[13] Though suffused with ambiguity, the novel is clearly didactic in terms of Hamid is intent upon offering a worldview from the East. For instance, his protagonists consider the injurious consequences of the US's failure to support Pakistan in the face of Indian aggression (indeed, this is analogous to Changez's relationship with Erica in terms of the pain she has the capacity to inflict when she withdraws her affections); Changez entreats the American to consider the fate of the nation constantly on the cusp of war and in which terrorist attacks are the norm. Changez even offers a mini tutorial on Pakistani customs and history. He reminds his companion of the beatings enduring by Pakistani cabdrivers in New York, the FBI raids on mosques and the detention of Muslim men throughout the nation after September 11. Indeed, this didacticism extends as far as a clunky injunction against stereotypes: 'It seems an obvious thing to say but you should not imagine that we Pakistanis are all potential terrorists, just as we should not imagine that you Americans are all undercover assassins' (Hamid, 2007: 209).

Furthermore, this emphasis on language and symbolism was not confined to the West. As Alex Houen has pointed out in *Terrorism and Modern Literature* (2002), Osama bin Laden also read the 11th September attacks figuratively. In extracted interviews and transcripts of television messages Bin Laden described the attacks as targeted at the 'icons of military and economic power' (Mir, 2001: 2); stating that it is 'thanks … to God that what America is tasting now is only a copy of what we have tasted' (Gillan, 2001: 1). Indeed, according to Houen, on many levels September 11th 'amounted … to a monumental collision of symbols, metaphors and shadowy figures' (Houen, 2002: 4).

In conclusion, one might argue that this invasion of symbols and metaphors, the stuff of fiction and nightmares, across contemporary global relations seems to have necessitated a change in narrative mode whereby a certain kind of surrealism has taken the place of a more traditional narrative realism. In December 2001, Don DeLillo wrote a piece for *Harpers* in which he described the events of the previous September. Noting that many people had described the attacks as 'unreal' or as akin to the stuff of Hollywood movies, he observed that when people describe something as 'unreal' what they really mean is that it is 'too real', a reality which is too visceral to be cogitated (DeLillo, 2001: 33). Reflecting Slavoj Žižek's thoughts on the changed nature of reality in the wake of the attacks, DeLillo identified an element of surrealism to the day, whereby many experienced the attacks in both real time and in TV time on the televisual news loop. According to Žižek, the reality that settles into cultural consciousness in the aftermath of terrible trauma is of a different nature to that which preceded it and formulated our sense of identity and understanding of the world. He observes that 'the Real which returns has the status of a(nother) semblance: precisely because it is real, that is, on account of its excessive / traumatic character, we are unable to integrate into it our reality, and are therefore compelled to experience it as a nightmarish apparition' (Žižek, 2002: 19).

Each of the novels explored throughout this short essay deviates from the rules of realistic portrayal, and each, in different ways, is suffused with elements of the surreal. Each textual landscape is a space of impending doom, the imminent catastrophe that leapt out from newspaper headlines in the autumn of 2001. Flanagan's novel offers a filmic suspense thriller, with an innocent woman on the run from the ASIO and from the media. Her reality is presented in the fragments one might catch on a CCTV camera, her life a feverish montage. Updike, meanwhile, deviates from his usual narrative realism to indulge in some heavy plotting. *Terrorist* is the stuff of a seedy spy-thriller, saturated with sex, intrigue and insights into governmental offices. But it veers from the straight path of realism in its abundance of coincidences and improbabilities: the hero's wife happens to be the sister of a DHS Undersecretary, the would-be terrorist just happens to be in the right place to coincidentally bump into his resistor, and so on. And finally *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*, a psychological thriller, offers a hallucinatory day in Lahore in the company of an enchantingly pedantic storyteller and his American companion, both of whom seem poised to attack. In different ways, each of these writers has absorbed the rhetoric and the mechanisms of an ideologically construed notion of 'homeland' with its accompanying language of vulnerability, hijack, terror and prevention and channeled this into surreal fictions which feel oddly real. The final irony,

therefore, is that Flanagan, Updike and Hamid experiment with formal realism precisely to reflect a very real post-traumatic cultural consciousness of paranoia and fear.[14]

WORKS CITED

— Abell, S. (2006) 'John Updike's Simplifications', *The Times Literary Supplement*. 26 July. http://tls.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,25339/2286503,00.html.

— Amis, M. (2001) 'Fear and Loathing,' *The Guardian G2*. 18 September. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/sep/18/september11.politicsphilosophyandsociety

— Carter, A. B., J. M. Deutch, and P. Zelikow (1998) 'Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of a National Policy'. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/visions/publication/terrorism.htm.

— Cockburn, A. (2007) 'How Rumsfeld Micromanaged Torture', *counterpunch*. 30 April. http://www.counterpunch.org/andrew05012007.html.

— Conrad, P. (2007) 'Days of Thunder Erupt Down Under', *The Observer*. 8 April. http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2007/apr/08/crimebooks.features.

— DeLillo, D. (2001) 'In the Ruins of the Future', *The Guardian*, 22 December. http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4324579,00.html).

— Dugdale, J. (2001) 'World Trade Center Bombing', *Sunday Times*. 30 September.

— Flanagan, R. (2006) *The Unknown Terrorist*. London: Atlantic.

— Fitzgerald, F. (2002) 'George Bush and the World', *New York Review of Books*. 26 September. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15698.

— Gillan, A. (2001) 'Bin Laden Appears on Video to Threaten US', *The Guardian*. 8 October.

— Gray, J. (2006) 'Collateral Damage', *The New York Times* (Sunday Book Review), 19 February. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/books/review/19gray.html

— Hamid, M. (2007) *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*. London: Penguin.

— Houen, A. (2002) *Terrorism and Modern Literature, from Joseph Conrad to Ciaran Carson*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

— Kakutani, M. (2006) 'John Updike's "Terrorist" Imagines a Homegrown Threat to Homeland Security', *New York Times*. 6 June.

— Kellner, D. (2003) *From 9/11 to Terror War: The Dangers of the Bush Legacy*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

— Kerr, Sarah (2007) 'In the Terror House of Mirrors', *New York Review of Books*. 11 October.

— Mir, H. (2001) Interview with Osama Bin Laden, 'Muslims Have the Right to Attack America', *The Observer*. 11 November.

— Morley, C. (2008) 'Writing in the Wake of 9/11', in M. Halliwell and C. Morley (eds) *American Thought and Culture in the 21st Century*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 245/259.

— *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (July 2002), www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_hls.pdf.

— 'Statement by the President in his Address to the Nation' (2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911/16.html.

— Raban, J. (2006) 'The Good Soldier', *New York Review of Books*. 13 July. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/article-preview?article_id=19132.

— Updike, J. (2006) *Terrorist*. London: Hamish Hamilton.

— Žižek, S. (2002) *Welcome to the Desert of the Real*. London: Verso.

[14] The competition between the visual and the written, and the challenge to the author's imagination, were noted by authors and critics alike. See McInerney, McEwan, Houen and Lea.

AILING AUTHORS: PAUL AUSTER'S *TRAVELS IN THE SCRIPTORIUM* AND PHILIP ROTH'S *EXIT GHOST*

Aliki Varvogli
University of Dundee

Seven years after the attacks of 9/11 it is still unclear how, and to what extent, American literature has been or will be altered by the events and their aftermath. The scholar of contemporary literature may speak of 'the 9/11 novel' to refer to books dealing directly with the events of the day, but there is also a wider category of 'the post-9/11 novel' which not only denotes the self-explanatory date of publication, but more crucially carries the implication that all contemporary American literature can and should be read in the light of what happened and its consequences. The two novels under discussion here show that the distinction between the 9/11 and the post-9/11 novel is not always clear. Whereas Roth's novel is set in New York after 9/11, refers specifically to the event and its effect on New Yorkers, and contains important references to politics and world affairs, Auster's book is set in a primarily *textual* chronotope: an unidentifiable, non-realist time and place devoid of external referents. Yet Roth's novel is not in any obvious way 'about' 9/11 and New York, whereas Auster's novel, upon closer scrutiny, turns out to be a lot less 'timeless' than a first reading might suggest. What the two books have in common is a preoccupation with the role of the American author in contemporary society, and the place of the novel in today's culture. There are of course a myriad good reasons why an American author may be asking these questions now, and indeed these are questions that have preoccupied authors throughout literary history. What these books help us to understand is how the question of authorship has now arisen as a response to the new realities precipitated by the attacks, and how these two authors have addressed the question in ways that seem strikingly dissimilar and yet have a lot in common. Roth and Auster have made different aesthetic, structural and narrative choices, and yet studying their books in tandem can prove fruitful and illuminating.

When Paul Auster's *Travels in the Scriptorium* came out in 2006, it seemed that even though there was poignancy and depth in the central premise of the author tormented by his fictional characters, it was a curiously self-indulgent book to publish in 2006, and a strange follow-up to *The Brooklyn Follies* (2005), which had seen the author venture further out of his room than even before. Whereas *The Brooklyn Follies* had been a strangely upbeat 9/11 novel about the real, lived world, this one, as the blurb sug-

gested, represented a 'return to more metaphysical territory'. In other words, Auster appeared to be playing the same kind of metafictional game he had been playing since the beginning of his novelistic career in the 1980s, and it seemed for that reason that *Travels* was not only somewhat slight but also an unnecessary novel. Most reviewers seemed to share this assessment. The book was described as a puzzle, a maze, or a magician's trick (Smith, Marx, Barra). In *The New York Times Book Review*, Sophie Harrison complained that the reader couldn't care about the characters, and likened the book to a masterclass in postmodernist fiction. Deborah Friedell, reviewing for the *Times Literary Supplement*, also gave the book a cool reception, but she came closer than others to acknowledging its complexity by arguing that the central question was 'not to do with today's political situation, but about the morality of fiction-writing'.

A year and a half later Philip Roth published *Exit Ghost* (2007), and that book altered my critical perception of Auster's novel. In fact, reading these two novels alongside one another can help to illuminate the relations between the two novelists' thematic concerns, as well as their textual strategies. Auster and Roth had both written pre-9/11 novels that linked the figure of the author with that of terrorist (*Leviathan* and *American Pastoral*), and now with these books both were returning to the idea of the author's role and responsibility, examined through multi-layered, elaborately constructed texts. *Exit Ghost* can help us to find a new and more meaningful context for *Travels in the Scriptorium*, and it is this relationship between the two books that this article will explore while attempting to draw some conclusions about the role of the American author in post-9/11 culture. These two novels ask important questions about what it means to be an American writer at the beginning of the twenty-first century, and what it means to be a New York writer after 9/11 (of course, Roth is not a New York writer in the same way that Auster is, but the New York setting is crucial). Both writers address the meaning and importance of authorship by exploring the lived world by means of the invented world, and both use the central trope of the ailing author to aid their investigations into contemporary authorship.

Paul Auster's novel tells the story of Mr Blank: a frail man with a failing memory who sits alone in a room, looking at piles of photographs, reading a manuscript, and occasionally receiving visitors who may or may not be trying to harm him. The reader already familiar with Auster's *œuvre* soon realizes that the people in the photographs and the visitors are all characters from previous novels who are now coming to call the author into account. It is important that the author, Mr Blank, cannot remember creating them and finds it hard to accept responsibility for their fate. His stance recalls the observation made by Peter Aaron in *Leviathan*: 'A book is a mysterious object, I said, and once it floats out into the world, anything can happen. … For better or worse, it's completely out of your control' (Auster, 1992: 4). Mr Blank's loss of control and authority is reflected in his physical weakness. When we first meet him, he is wearing pyjamas and slippers, and he feels tired and infirm. He speaks to himself in a weary voice, he groans in pain, and he is losing his memory. In one of the early scenes in the book, he is shown using the bathroom, and being unable either to bend or to crouch to pull up his pyjama bottoms from around his ankles, while later in the day he takes a fall and wets himself. These scenes have a two-fold effect: they highlight the author's helplessness, while they also call attention to his physical existence, or what Umberto Eco

has called the 'empirical author' (Eco, 1992: 69). By calling attention to the author's frail nature, Auster is perhaps reflecting on his own role, as his books become more political than the early metafictional ones in a culture that seems to have a diminishing capacity for literary introspection. Meanwhile, the question raised by the emphasis on the author's body is whether the 'real', living, breathing author should be inferred from the textual representation of a writer by the same name. Auster and Roth have explored in much of their writing the wider question of the blurring of the real and the imagined, and they have often done this through the creation of author characters provocatively and deceptively called Paul Auster, Peter Aaron, John Trause, Philip Roth, and of course Nathan Zuckerman.

Roth's novel continues to chronicle Zuckerman's physical decline. As we have known for some time, he is impotent and incontinent, and it is his desire to alleviate some of his physical suffering that brings him to New York and sets the events of the plot in motion. Zuckerman is 71; like Mr Blank, he is by no means an old person by today's standards, but he is depicted as an older person, both through his physical infirmity and through his withdrawal from the world of current affairs and technological progress. About halfway through the novel Zuckerman admits in a parenthetical aside that his memory is failing him, and that he has to work fast before he loses the ability to recall words:

> nothing is certain any longer expect that this will likely be my last attempt to persist in groping for words to combine into the sentences and paragraphs of a book. Because permanent groping is what it is now, a groping that goes well beyond the anxious groping for fluency that writing is to begin with (159).

He goes on to link his physical incontinence with this loss of recall, stating that 'the leakage I'd been experiencing wasn't just from my penis, nor was the failure restricted to the bladder's sphincter … This time it was my mind' (162). Against this gradual degeneration of body and mind, he feels helpless; he speaks of 'the imp of amnesia, the demon of forgetfulness', and in one of the novel's most poignant passages he confesses his powerlessness, feeling

> as though something diabolical residing in my brain … against whose powers of destruction I could bring no effective counterforce were prompting me to suffer these lapses solely for the fun of watching me degenerate, the ultimate gleeful goal to turn someone whose acuity as a writer was sustained by memory and verbal passion into a pointless man (159).

It is this fear of becoming a pointless man that describes what Auster and Roth are saying about the author in their novels; the weak, impotent, leaking body is an apt image for the fate of the American writer at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Of course, in terms of American literary history the connection between the figure of the author and the body politic is not new, nor is the notion of the physically ailing author a new phenomenon. It is however telling that both Auster and Roth have written novels that revisit earlier fictional characters and reconsider older thematic concerns. It is this revisiting that has prompted me to consider whether these two novels can be read in any meaningful way as post-9/11 investigations into authorship. The attacks on New York were also an event that put the novelist's imagination to shame;

a visual spectacle that has competed with the written word, and ultimately a traumatic event whose full impact may yet not be apparent . In wider terms, the media event that 9/11 and its aftermath have become, the military action that followed the attacks, Bush's rhetoric and actions, and generally America's role in world affairs have all created a new context in which American authorship needs to be considered.

It is significant that in order to explore authorship both books, in different ways, create levels or layers of reality and fiction, and both novels show the writer as isolated from the world. Mr Blank is imprisoned in a room where he is kept under constant surveillance. There are some hints that his condition is self-imposed, and that it is part of an experiment, which would make his incarceration an extreme version of the familiar Auster trope of the writer alone in his room. Yet Mr Blank cannot remember asking to be put away in this room, nor is he entirely certain whether he is a prisoner or whether his door is unlocked and he is free to leave when he wants to. The writer's room is thus transformed from a place of contemplation to an ambiguous prison. More to the point, this is also a textual prison in several ways. Near the end of the book, we find out that everything we have been reading takes place within another manuscript that Mr Blank starts to read; when he comes to the end, he will have to pick up a manuscript and start reading again, in a mise-en-abyme that recalls Auster's much earlier textual experimentations. The room is also a textual prison in the sense that there is as much emphasis on the words as there is on the objects it contains. We learn early on that nearly every object in the room has a label attached to it, giving its name: 'desk', 'lamp', 'wall' and so on. This could suggest that the author is suffering from leakage similar to Zuckerman's: he needs the labels because he can no longer recall the words for things. At the same time, though, the labels stuck on objects are also reminiscent of Peter Stillman's project in *City of Glass* to reunite words with things, signifiers with signifieds. In the post-9/11 context, where George W. Bush's rhetoric has proved so powerful, and so powerfully destructive, the earlier philosophical investigation into the meaning of words acquires a new significance here because it can be understood as more politicized. Elsewhere, Roth has spoken of the 'written' and 'unwritten' worlds,[1] and both authors have throughout their careers played with that distinction and challenged readers to consider how the world of the text relates to the 'outside' world. Auster and Roth are not overtly political writers, nor are they happy for their books to be discussed for their thematic concerns if that means paying little or no attention to their elaborate formal construction. Both novelists continue to foreground the primacy of the novel as discursive and aesthetic construct rather than a medium for social commentary or action. A lamp in the novel that comes with a label attached to it calling it a lamp reminds us that for Auster, as indeed for Roth, the message is not be separated from the medium, and content does not exist irrespective of form.

Much of Roth's recent fiction has shown a new, or at least a much greater interest in history and the real, lived world. *The Plot Against America* (2004) was seen by many as a thinly disguised novel about Bush's presidency, while there can be little doubt that *American Pastoral* (1998) offered one of the most powerful depictions of postwar America. Yet he was keen to point out that *American Pastoral* was not 'a report card about

[1] The terms are Roth's own, but I am indebted to Simon Stow's exploration of them.

America', but rather 'a work of *fiction* about America' (McGrath, 2000; added emphasis), and with *Exit Ghost* similar care is taken to place sufficient distance between Zuckerman, the author character, and the real world of America in 2004. Zuckerman announces on the first page that he has lost the impulse to be in and of the present moment. He says he hasn't listened to the news or looked at a newspaper since 9/11; he doesn't use the internet, doesn't have a DVD or a VCR or a cell phone; he doesn't vote because he doesn't wish to register an opinion (36/7). 'Having lived enthralled by America for nearly three-quarters of a century, I had decided no longer to be overtaken every four years by the emotions of a child … and the pain of an adult' (69). Zuckerman is also keen to stress that his return to New York does not symbolise any real desire to reconnect with the world he 'pulled the plug' on, to use his own words (69). Upon his arrival in the city, he makes for the subway to visit Ground Zero, but instead finds himself heading for the 'familiar rooms of the Metropolitan Museum' (15). This gesture indicates a desire to escape into the past, and into the realm of the aesthetic, rather than engage with contemporary world affairs. The reason Zuckerman gives for his change of mind is that he's 'withdrawn as witness and participant both' (15). There he is then, ageing, ailing, withdrawn, unwilling to register an opinion, unwilling to be witness or participant; not at all different, in other words, from Auster's bare bones of a fictional writer, his Mr Blank.

Mr Blank spends a large part of the novel reading a manuscript, while a manuscript is also at the heart of *Exit Ghost*. The manuscript that Mr Blank reads appears to be a work of fantasy or alternative history. The main character works for the Bureau of Internal Affairs of the vaguely defined but sinister-sounding Confederation, and he is sent on a dangerous mission into the Alien Territories. The allegorical overtones of this manuscript within the manuscript are reminiscent of Coetzee's *Waiting for the Barbarians* (1980), and it soon becomes clear that this narrative promises to be an allegory about the US fighting their various alien enemies. Yet the story remains incomplete, as the emphasis shifts away from what happens to the question of who wrote it. Mr Blank discovers that the unfinished MS was written by John Trause (anagram of Auster), who was a character in Auster's 2004 novel *Oracle Night*. Trause mentions the story to Sidney Orr, the narrator of *Oracle Night*, and describes it as a 'political parable' (168). 'The idea is that governments always need enemies, even when they're not at war. If you don't have an enemy, you make one up and spread the word' (168). To claim that a country's enemy is a discursive construct as Trause does here is to suggest also that Auster's brand of self-reflexive metafiction is not an aesthetic game, a puzzle or a curiosity, but rather a means of interrogating the immediate, lived world of politics and power. Further weight is added to this parable as it moves from *Oracle Night* to *Travels in the Scriptorium*: being vaguely aware of the fact that he is the creator of Trause, Mr Blank is able to imagine or tell the rest of the story. In it, the protagonist turns out to have been duped: his entire investigation has been arranged by government forces to lead to his written confession which can then help to start a war. He realises he has been made a 'false witness' and kills himself. The story of the MS within the MS in other words also deals with the writer's impotence, and the fear of being duped by someone else's plot. It explores the fear that the author may become a patsy, an unwilling and unsuspecting accomplice who is absorbed by the culture he is trying to interro-

gate or expose. Mr Blank's only form of power and control is to complete a story once attributed to one of his creations, but that's before the reader finds out that he is himself the figment of one of his creation, a character in someone else's manuscript. As Zuckerman put it in *The Counterlife*, 'we are all the inventions of each other, everybody a conjuration conjuring up everyone else' (145).

A manuscript is also at the heart of *Exit Ghost*, where Zuckerman attempts to block the writing and publication of the biography of his literary hero, E.I. Lonoff. Richard Kliman proposes to expose a scandalous story of incest in Lonoff's early life, believing that this holds the key to his literary output. Zuckerman is horrified at the thought that a man's life can be used in this way to explain his fiction, finding such biographical explications both simplistic and insulting to the author's imaginative powers. Zuckerman thinks that biographical explanations of literature 'make matters worse' (47), and Amy Belette, who was once Lonoff's lover, calls the literary biography 'a second death' (154). Near the end of the novel, Zuckerman delivers his most powerful defence of his craft: 'Writers can be shattered by writing', he says. 'The primacy of the imaginative life can do that, and more' (267). The book ends with an instruction on how not to read: 'the man in control of the words, the man making up the stories all his life, winds up, after death, remembered, if at all, for a story made up about him' (275). This is Roth's warning against biographical readings of his fiction, and also against contextual readings that seek to separate the content from the form.

In 1961, Philip Roth famously complained that American actuality was outdoing the writer's talent (Roth, 2001: 167). In 1984, he told Hermione Lee that

> writing novels is not the road to power. I don't believe that, in my society, novels effect serious changes in anyone other than the handful of people who are writers. … If you ask if I *want* my fiction to change anything in the culture, the answer is still no' (Roth, 2001: 147, emphasis in the original).

The events of 9/11 and their consequences created a spectacle and a media event that took Roth's complaint that actuality is outdoing the writer's talent to an entirely different level. Roth and Auster, who in previous novels saw the author as linked to the terrorist in their capacity to become what Sacvan Bercovitch has called 'agents of change' (Bercovitch, 1978: 203) and in expressing rage against their country, are now considering the possibility that the author is more marginalized than ever before: a ghost, or a blank. Another novelist, Benjamin Kunkel, wrote on the fourth anniversary of 9/11 that there is 'a need to break things: to imaginatively break real things, to do intense symbolic violence to all manner of public and private clichés, to write as if your words had the revolutionary power they can never posses.' Zuckerman and Mr Blank may be too weak to break anything, but ultimately both novels end with the persistence rather than the demise of fiction. Mr Blank will have to continue reading every time he comes to the end of the narrative that imagines him as author; he will persist. Not only that, but Auster's latest novel, *Man in the Dark* (2008) can in many ways be read as a continuation of *Travels*. Here, the seventy-two-year-old protagonist is recovering from an accident and passes the time by creating a story in which 9/11 never happened, but the US was torn apart by civil war. The political parable and the metafictional puzzles provide thematic and structural links between the books, suggesting

that Auster may have found a way to reconcile his interest in metaphysical and ontological questions with his need to speak out about the post-9/11 political climate. *Exit Ghost* also ends with the persistence of the ailing author. This is best exemplified in the novel's two endings: the book ends with the words 'Gone for good', but this is in fact the fiction within the fiction that Zuckerman has created. Zuckerman's narrative ends twelve pages earlier with the defiant realization that 'I would die too, though not before I sat down at the desk by the window … and, from that safe haven, … wrote the final scene of *He and She*' (280). The subtlety of this ending draws attention to authorship: the novel that received so much attention because it dealt with Zuckerman's retirement actually ends with the author character refusing to die until he has finished writing. The author may be ailing, but it seems he is not yet dead.

WORKS CITED

— Auster, P. (1992) *Leviathan*. London: Faber.

— [—]. (2004) *Oracle Night*. London: Faber.

— [—] (2006) *Travels in the Scriptorium*. London: Faber.

— [—] (2008) *Man in the Dark*. London: Faber.

— Barra, A. (2007) 'Travels in the Scriptorium'. *Salon*. http://www.salon.com/books/review/2007/02/07/auster/index.html

— Bercovitch, S. (1978) *The American Jeremiad*. Madison: U. of Wisconsin P.

— Eco, U. (1992) *Interpretation and Overinterpretation*. Cambridge: Cambridge U. P.

— Friedell, D. (2006) 'Mr Writer Man'. *The Times Literary Supplement*. http://tls.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,25339/2399052,00.html

— Harrison, S. (2007) 'The Content of His Characters'. *The New York Times Book Review*. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/books/review/Harrison-Sophie.html

— Houen, A. (2004) 'Novel Spaces and taking Place(s) in the Wake of September 11', *Studies in the Novel* 36 (3): 419/437.

— Kunkel, B. (2005) 'Dangerous Chracters'. *The New York Times*. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/11/books/review/11kunkel.html?pagewanted=print

— Lea, D. (2007) 'Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Anglo-American Writers' Responses to 9/11', *Symbiosis* 11 (2): 3/26.

— Marx, J. (2006) 'Travels in the Scriptorium'. *The Sydney Morning Herald*. http://www.smh.com.au/news/book-reviews/travels-in-the-scriptorium/2006/12/01/1164777781229.html

— McEwan, I. (2001) 'Beyond Belief', *The Guardian*. http://books.guardian.co.uk/departments/politicsphilosophyandsociety/story/0,,555275,00.html

— McGrath, C. (2000) 'Interview with Philip Roth'. *The New York Times*. http://www.nytimes.com/books/00/05/07/reviews/000507.07mcgrat.html

— McInerney, J. (2005) 'The Uses of Invention'. *The Guardian*. http://books.guardian.co.uk/departments/generalfiction/story/0,,1571852,00.html

— Roth, P. (1986) *The Counterlife*. New York: Farrar.

— [—] (1998) *American Pastoral*. London: Vintage.

— [—] (2001) *Reading Myself and Others*. New York: Vintage.

— [—] (2004) *The Plot Against America*. London: Jonathan Cape.

— [—] (2007) *Exit Ghost*. London: Jonathan Cape.

— Smith, E. (2006) 'Not All Puzzles Are Worth Working Out'. *The Daily Telegraph*. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/arts/main.jhtml;jsessionid=CFNBKZNR0FCSXQFIQMGSFFWAVCBQWIV0?xml=/arts/2006/10/22/boaus222.xml&sSheet=/arts/2006/10/22/bomain.html

— Stow, S. (2004) 'Written and Unwritten America: Roth on Reading, Politics, and Theory', *Studies in American Jewish Literature* 23: 77/85.

BOOKS

1

Laura Lomas, *Translating Empire: Jose Marti, Migrant Latino Subjects and American Modernities (New Americanists)* will be released on November 1, 2008.

Translating Empire claims a role for late nineteenth-century Latino migrant writers in the formation of today's comparative, transnational, and multilingual American Studies. Recovering neglected, untranslated, and uncollected prose and poetry by the Cuban José Martí and by other Latino residents with whom he associated in New York, this book traces inaugural experiments in modernist literary form in the Americas to these writers' perspectives as cultural translators. Nineteenth-century renderings of North American literary and cultural texts into stunning Spanish versions convey Latino reactions to U.S. individualism, politics and culture, both literary and popular. Bringing to light century-old precursors to recent criticism of Emerson, Whitman, and Helen Hunt Jackson's relation to a U.S.imperial project, this book introduces some neglected texts and reinterprets Martí's major essays. Illustrating parallels to later Latin American, Caribbean, post-colonial, modernist, and migration studies that have pushed American Studies in new directions, Translating Empire documents Martí's provincializing of the United States as a subculture within America. Lomas shows that Latino migrant writing of the 1880s and 1890s does nothing less than stake a claim to define another American modernity.

2

Ertler Klaus-Dieter and Martin Loeschnigg (eds.), *Inventing Canada—Inventer le Canada* (Frankfurt am Main: Pete Lang, 2008).

3

Jean Pfaelzer, *Driven Out: The Forgotten War Against Chinese Americans* (Professor of English, E. Asian Studies, Women's Studies University of Delaware). Published in paperback by U.C. Press, 2008. It has won the NY Times Notable Book Award, Asian American ALA Best Book Award, San Francisco Chronicle Best History Books Award, Globalist Top 10, Choice Magazine etc. Driven Out [hardback Random House] is the history

of the over 300 roundups of the first Chinese Americans in the Pacific Northwest, and their formidable resistance through strikes, boycotts, buying arms, bringing criminal actions against the vigilantes, and filing the first law suits in the US for reparations.

www.udel.edu/PR/drivenout/
pfaelzer@udel.edu

5

We are happy to announce the release of the latest two-part issue of *Atlantic Studies: "New Orleans in the Atlantic World"* (Volume 5, Issues 2 and 3). Part One of this special double issue is immediately available for download at the journal's website: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/14788810.asp. Please take note of the following contents of the issue: New Orleans in the Atlantic World.

Part 1 (*Atlantic Studies* issue 5.2).

Editorial: William Boelhower, New Orleans in the Atlantic World, I

Feature Articles:

— Jay D. Edwards, Unheralded Contributions across the Atlantic World;

— Craig E. Colten, Meaning of Water in the American South: Transatlantic Encounters

— Kent Mathewson, Greater Louisiana Connections and Conjunctures: Placing New Orleans in an Atlantic Time-Geographic Perspective

— Walter Johnson, White lies: Human Property and Domestic Slavery Aboard the Slave Ship Creole

— Adam Rothman, Lafcadio Hearn in New Orleans and the Caribbean

— Marcus Rediker, History from Below the Water Line: Sharks and the Atlantic Slave Trade New Orleans in the Atlantic World,

Part 2 (Atlantic Studies issue 5.3)

Editorial: William Boelhower, New Orleans in the Atlantic World, II

Feature Articles:

— Mark L. Thompson, Locating the Isle of Orleans: Atlantic and American Historiographical Perspectives

— Douglas B. Chambers, Slave Trade Merchants of Spanish New Orleans, 1763–1803: Clarifying the Colonial Slave Trade to Louisiana in Atlantic Perspective

— Dorothea Fischer-Hornung, "Keep alive the powers of Africa": Katherine Dunham, Zora Neale Hurston, Maya Deren, and the Circum-Caribbean Culture of Vodoun

— Alexander B. Murphy, Placing Louisiana in the Francophone World: Opportunities and Challenges

— Andrew Sluyter, (Post-)K New Orleans and the Hispanic Atlantic: Geographic Method and Meaning

The publisher is NeWest Press; www.newestpress.com

5

William A. Nericcio: *The Hurt Business: Oliver Mayer's Early Works [+] PLUS, A Portfolio of Plays, Essays, Interviews, Souvenirs, Ephemera, and Photography* (San Diego: Hyperbole Books, 2008).

6

Tex[t]-Mex: Seductive Hallucination of the "Mexican" in America (Austin: U of Texas P, 2007).

7

Kerstin Knopf (ed.), *Aboriginal Canada Revisited*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008). *Aboriginal Canada Revisited* examines the current political and cultural position of Canada's Aboriginal peoples in a series of interdisciplinary essays. The contributors to this volume explore Aboriginal politics, representation, health, education and other social issues, and look at how contemporary Aboriginals find voice in literature, art, print media, and film. While acknowledging the vibrancy and diversity of Aboriginal cultural expression and the developing dialogue between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people this book also draws attention to areas where the colonial legacy is still taking its toll and to the systemic problems that continue to marginalize Aboriginal people within Canadian society.



8

Barbara Godard: *Canadian Literature at the Crossroads of Language and Culture* (Edmonton: NeWest Press, 2008).



Canadian Literature at the Crossroads of Language and Culture is the first book to gather together essays by Barbara Godard, one of the leading and most prolific figures in the field of Canadian studies.

Godard has long been one of the most influential readers of Canadian literature. Much of the force of her work comes from her meticulous and relentless attention to the networks that produce both the texts and events we study and the methods through which we read them. Whether she writes about feminist theory, orality and Native women writers, or the exigencies of the cultural field, she has been instrumental in interrogating, time and time again, the normative ways in which we think about Canadian culture. From the function of literature to the materiality of institutions and periodicals, from the theory and practice of translation to the interrelations between English and French Canadian literatures, her critical interventions have drastically reconceptualized our inherited understandings of Canadian culture as it relates to the world at large.

Edited by Smaro Kamboureli, and with an interview published here for the first time that offers a detailed look at the trajectories of Barbara Godards writing and teaching career, Canadian Literature at the Crossroads of Language and Culture is a groundbreaking collection of essays, spanning the period 1987–2003, that will continue to be necessary reading for years to come.

9

Thomas O. Beebee has just published *Millennial Literatures of the Americas, 1492/2002* (New York: Oxford UP).

This book compares modern literary treatments of the theme of millennium—stories of the "end of the world," conceived as the ultimate battle between good and evil resulting in the institution of an utterly new social order. The book compares fiction, plays, poetry, and other works written in English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish, representing a wide spectrum of communities across the Americas, from the colonial origins to the present, from the letters of Columbus to the Left Behind series of novels. The goal is to better understand a thematic that has defined the Americas since the arrival of Europeans, as a "technology of the self" that furthers national and imperial agendas,

but also as a discourse of resistance used by native populations, and that has provided an inexhaustible source of literary plots and tropes. This study brings together historical, literary, and ethnographic records to show that the repeated eruptions of millenarian conflict in the Americas have been both acts of resistance to the eradication of traditional ways of life in the process of nationalization and globalization, and also important sources in the search for origins and foundations. Americans tend to understand their origins by narrating their End. Since this End is always imagined rather than experienced, literature becomes a vital element in its propagation.

10

Theo D'HAEN & Hans BERTENS, *Amerikaanse literatuur: een geschiedenis,* Leuven: ACCO, 2008, 516pp. (? 39) A detailed history, in Dutch, of American literature from its very beginnings through 2007, in the context of social, economic and political developments. Available in bookstores throughout The Netherlands and Belgium, and online from ACCO (http://www.acco.be/) and all major online booksellers. For more details on the book, go to http://www.acco.be/acco_publishing/book/book_detail.php?qs_book_id=121802

11

Szmańko, Klara. *Invisibility in African American and Asian American Literature: A Comparative Study* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 2008).

The book is a comparative study of the invisibility trope in African American and Asian American literature, distinguishing between various kinds of invisibility and offering the genealogy of the term, while also providing a theoretical dissection of the invisibility trope itself. Apart from investigating the very concept of invisibility and various ways of striving for visibility, the author develops such critical terms as "performativity," "mimicry," "slippage," and identity politics, placing special emphasis on the need for transformational identity politics consisting in cooperation between various racial groups. While the book explores invisibility in a variety of African American and Asian American literary texts, the main focus falls on four novels: Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man*, Sam Greenlee's *The Spook Who Sat by the Door*, Maxine Hong Kingston's *Tripmaster Monkey* and Chang-rae Lee's *Native Speaker*. The book not only sheds light on the oppressed but also exposes the structures of oppression and the apparatus of power, which often renders itself invisible. Throughout the study the author emphasizes that power is multi-directional, never flowing only in one direction. The book brings to light mechanisms of oppression within the dominant society as well as within and between marginalized racial groups.

12

Medina, José Toribio
Biblioteca Chilena de Traductores (1820-1925)
Segunda edición, corregida y aumentada, con estudio preliminar de Gertrudis Payàs, y la colaboración de Claudia Tirado, DIBAM- Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana, Santiago de Chile, 2007, 443 p.

La *Biblioteca chilena de traductores* es un texto aparentemente de poca consistencia dentro de la vasta y significativa obra de D. José Toribio Medina. Sin embargo, constituye un valioso testimonio de los contactos intelectuales que Chile estableció con el exterior a partir de la llegada de la imprenta, registra las obras que se consideró necesario importar para construir la cultura nacional y nos da nombre y apellidos de los agentes mediadores en esta importación: los traductores. Además, en este registro de traductores, que ilustra la relación que Chile tuvo con las lenguas extranjeras, se entreteje el discurso de la relación, a veces incómoda, del traductor americano con la lengua castellana, lengua heredada de los conquistadores y misioneros. Éstos son los aspectos que aborda el estudio preliminar de la reedición, titulado "La *Biblioteca chilena de traductores,* o el sentido de una colección". La pasión de Medina por registrar abre una ventana nueva sobre un aspecto poco conocido de la actividad intelectual del Chile post-independencia.

En esta reedición se normaliza la información de la primera edición, se aporta información nueva sobre las obras originales y sus autores, y se completa el registro con los índices necesarios para facilitar la consulta.

Gertrudis Payŕs se doctoró en traductología en la Universidad de Ottawa. Ha orientado sus intereses de investigación hacia la historia de la mediación lingüística y cultural, especialmente en el México colonial y en Chile. Miembro de IASA, COTICH y AIIC.

CONFERENCES AND CALLS FOR PAPERS

1

INTERNATIONAL AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION FOURTH WORLD CONGRESS

Decoding American Cultures in the Global Context

SEPTEMBER 18/20, 2009

HOSTED BY

Beijing Foreign Studies University, Beijing, China

The International American Studies Association (IASA) and the American Studies Center (ASC) at Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU) cordially invite scholars from all disciplines to participate in the 4th congress of the IASA, to be held from September 18th to 20th (Friday to Sunday), 2009 at BFSU, Beijing, China.

CONGRESS THEME AND SUB-THEMES

Recent changes in the flows of finances, people, and cultural products, often termed 'globalization', have provided a new context for understanding the Americas, hence the theme of the 4th World Congress, "Decoding American Cultures in the Global Context". We invite contributions addressing the following sub-themes with reference to the U.S. and the Americas more broadly.

a) Critical understanding and reception of American cultures abroad
b) Impact of North/South American cultures on world cultures
c) Comparative studies of the Americas
d) "Globalization" vs. "Americanization"
e) American studies abroad
f) "American exceptionalism": myth or reality?
g) Myths that Americans live by: literature, history, and culture

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION AND PRESENTATION

Proposals may be submitted in English for an individual presentation, or for a pre-constituted panel, by January 31, 2009. Proposals for workshops to be developed into pre-constituted panels must be submitted by Dec. 1st to be posted on the website (see below).

- For an individual paper, the organizer should submit the following: contact information of the organizer including email address, 3 keywords, and an abstract of no more than 300 words. Note any audio/visual equipment required.
- For a pre-constituted panel, the organizer should submit contact information of the organizer, 3 keywords describing the panel, and an abstract of no more than 300 words for the panel as a whole articulating how the papers go together PLUS contact information for each participant, and a brief abstract of no more than 300 words for each of those papers, along with 3 keywords for each. Indicate any audio visual equipment needed please.
- If you desire to submit a preconsituted panel, but need to find colleagues from other institutions and countries to participate in your panel, we offer the following option of proposing a WORKSHOP TITLE AND ABSTRACT. Send this, along with your contact information to the conference organizers (Prof. LiQikeng, below) BY DEC. 1ST. to be posted on the conference website. Individual scholars should then send proposals and contact information directly to you for your consideration. Once you have selected your panel members, submit as described above for pre-constituted panels, AND, in addition, send all non-selected papers along with their contact information, keywords, etc. to the conference committee for further consideration by the cut off date of January 31st. Those papers will then be considered for inclusion on the program as part of other panels if appropriate.
- Each proposal should indicate any audio visual needs at the time of submission. No panel should have more than four paper presenters, or three presenters and a commentator. For pre-constituted panels, priority will be given to those which include presenters from a variety of institutions/ geographical locations. The academic committee of the congress will evaluate the proposal on the basis of the quality of the abstract, its scholarly cogency, as well as its relevance to the congress theme, and notify the submitter of its acceptance by February 28, 2009. If the submission is accepted, an extended summary (about 800/1,000 words) shall be sent to the conference coordinators by May 31, 2009.

Each participant will be given 15 minutes to present the paper, followed by 5 minutes for questions and answers. The conference will provide the necessary multimedia for presentations. When submitting the extended summary, please also indicate whether you will need to use multimedia, and if so, specify your exact requirements. We also welcome proposals for presentations that do not fit the standard spoken paper format, such as films/videos/performances, etc.

POST-CONGRESS PUBLICATION

If you would like the congress comittee to consider your paper for publication, please submit your full paper within one month after the conclusion of the congress to the organizers. The academic committee of the congress will review all the papers submitted and have the selected papers published by a reputable publisher in China. All papers are preferably around 8,000 words in length, complete with footnotes and a bibliography. For paper format, CMS is recommended.

IMPORTANT DATES

- January 31, 2009: Proposal due (Dec. 1st workshop proposals due for posting)
- February 28, 2009: Notification of acceptance
- May 31, 2009: Extended summary due
- Fall, 2009: Conference Sept. 18/20. (registration opens Sept. 17 on site).

CONGRESS FEES

Participants are expected to pay a conference fee of USD 150, which covers the academic program, congress documentation (final program and book of abstracts), all meals on conference days, and coffee breaks. The student rate is $75 U.S.

If not paid in advance, fees are higher, but may be paid on-site, in which case regular participants pay $200 USD and students pay $100 USD. Hotels, meals on non-conference days, optional tours, etc are the responsibility of the participants themselves. Presenters must be members of IASA.

HOTEL AND TOURS

Special hotel rates for congress participants are being negotiated, and some on-campus student housing in dormitories will also be available at very reduced fees. Details will be posted on the congress website. Optional night-time activities such as attendance at performances and post-congress tours will also be available.

CONTACT INFORMATION

All proposals, summaries and other correspondence should be directed to congress coordinator Li Qikeng.

Email: liqikeng@gmail.com, liqikeng@hotmail.com; Phone: 0086/10/8256/5621, 1352/184/7279; Fax: 0086/10/8881/6282

Postal address: School of English and International Studies, Beijing Foreign Studies University, Beijing 100089, China.

2

APPEL DE PROPOSITIONS DE COMMUNICATIONS

22e COLLOQUE CEFCO, 5/7 novembre 2009
Campus Saint-Jean, Edmonton, Alberta

Le Centre d'études franco-canadiennes de l'Ouest est un organisme multidisciplinaire qui cherche à promouvoir la recherche sur la vie francophone dans l'Ouest canadien. Le colloque 2009 vise toujours à atteindre ce but, mais en dialogue avec toutes les francophonies du Canada. Ainsi, le Comité scientifique du colloque CEFCO 2009 invite des soumissions de proposition de communications et de tables rondes en vue du colloque qui se tiendra à Edmonton, en Alberta, du 5 au 7 novembre 2009 autour du thème « *Impenser* la francophonie : recherches, réflexions, renouvellements ».

Le vocable impenser vient de l'usage qu'en fait Mourad Ali-Khodja dans un article où, au lieu de 'repenser' son objet en fonction des nouvelles réalités, il propose plutôt une « interrogation et une remise en question radicales des principes épistémologiques à partir desquels elle s'est constituée[1] ».

En se référant aux travaux sur les « petites littératures » de François Paré, Ali-Khodja remet en cause la pratique consistant à penser les savoirs minoritaires en les subordonnant aux Grandes Traditions qui ont émergé dans le cadre de l'État nation et de la société moderne. À force de présenter ces dernières comme des modèles exclusifs, on produit une représentation caricaturale et infériorisante de l'excentration sociétale dans laquelle se trouvent les communautés minoritaires et leurs savoirs. Non seulement cette pratique empêche d'expliquer les conditions d'émergence et d'existence de ces communautés, mais de plus, la reproduction des représentations propres aux institutions dominantes, bien que faite avec les meilleures intentions, prive les savoirs minoritaires de toute légitimité. Ali-Khodja propose la réappropriation des 'pratiques de soi'.

Nous vous invitons non seulement à penser la remise en question de la francophonie telle que nous la connaissons actuellement et les instruments qui nous permettent de l'appréhender, mais aussi, à réfléchir sur les recherches, perspectives, visions et problématiques dans votre discipline, que celle-ci touche à l'anthropologie, aux arts (visuels et de la scène), à l'éducation, à la géographie, à l'histoire, à la littérature, à la philosophie, aux sciences politiques, à la sociologie ou à la technologie.

Veuillez faire parvenir vos propositions, avec un titre provisoire, un résumé de 150-200 mots, votre nom, votre affiliation et vos coordonnées par courrier électronique à pamela.sing@ualberta.ca avant le 15 juin 2009.

[1] Pour une *science sociale de l'exiguïté* : bilans et enjeux de la connaissance en milieu minoritaire », *Francophonies d'Amérique*. No. 15, 2003, p. 7–23.

3

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MEDIA, CULTURE AND IDEOLOGY

29/31 January, 2009

Osmania University Centre for International Programs
Osmania University, Hyderabad—500 007

This conference proposes to deliberate on how media—print and electronic—mediates cultural configurations and influences ideological formations. We invite papers, from across disciplines, that examine in contemporary or historical context the uses made of visual, verbal & written language in sections of the mass media (television & print, primarily) with a particular focus on the relationship between these cultural forms, conventional understandings of the world & social power.

In the last century, from colonial through anti-colonial and post colonial to the contemporary global phase, media has played a significant role in shaping culture and ideology and this phenomenon warrants critical analyses. Besides, media functions in the public sphere, a realm which exists between the State machinery and its formal authority and the private domain which comprises of the civil society and family unit and constantly negotiates the intermediary space between the public and the private and influences both the domains. This crucial function of the Media as the creator and communicator of alternate Culture and Ideology in contemporary societies shall be the main focus of this Conference.

This conference will also focus in particular on how films, and later television in India and elsewhere, have had a massive impact in creating and circulating images of the nation and of a "national culture'. Both film and television have sought to define, forge and popularise images of a coherent, cohesive and organic national community. Conversely the media have also offered alternative, dissenting and even oppositional visions of the nation and of a national culture, questioning 'Establishment' values, or responding sympathetically to the socially disadvantaged and disenfranchised. A part of the task of this conference is to explore these issues of ideology and representation. Some of the issues that this conference wishes to address include:

1. Representations of nation and nationness in media including counter discourses of nation

2. Revisionist /Alternate Historio: Portrayal of historical incidents of the past from new and different perspectives.

3. Caste/ Class/ Gender issues in media representation

4. Media and Globalization

5. Representation of Violence and Terrorism

6. Media and ideology

7. Other Related Issues

Proposals for either (a) individual papers or (b) preconstituted panels should include the following: (1) a title, (2) an abstract NOT TO EXCEED 300 WORDS, and (3) a brief one-paragraph biographical statement about the presenter, including academic affiliation and email address. Proposals may be sent by email to vijaya_chaganti@yahoo.com before 20th November, 2008.

Conference Directors:
Prof. C.Vijayasree Director OUCIP, vijaya_chaganti@yahoo.com
Prof. Kousar J. Azam,Advisor, OUCIP; kousarjabeen@yahoo.com

NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

Susana Araújo is a researcher at CEC, the Centre of Comparative Studies at the University of Lisbon. She has written widely on the relations between contemporary literature, visual culture and politics. Her current research project examines the ways anxieties about security, exacerbated by the "war on terror" are exchanged transatlantically and articulated visually in literary texts.

David Brauner David Brauner is Senior Lecturer in English and American Literature. He has published widely in the fields of post-war Jewish literature, contemporary American fiction and Holocaust fiction. His first monograph, *Post-War Jewish Fiction: Ambivalence, Self-Explanation and Transatlantic Connections* was published by Palgrave/Macmillan in 2001 and his second, *Philip Roth*, was published by Manchester University Press in 2007. He is currently working on his third book, *Contemporary American Fiction*, to be published by Edinburgh University Press in 2009.

Frank Furedi is Professor of Sociology at the University of Kent in Canterbury. During the past decade Furedi's writings have addressed the culture of fear and disorientation that dominates public life. His *Therapy Culture; Cultivating Vulnerability In an Uncertain Age* (March 2004) explores the ascendancy of the therapeutic imagination. It develops the arguments contained in two previous books *The Culture of Fear* (2003) and *Paranoid Parenting* (2001) about the problem that society has in dealing with risk and uncertainty. Furedi's research is oriented towards the study of the impact of precautionary culture and risk aversion on Western societies. In his books he has explored controversies and panics over issues such as health, children, food, new technology and terrorism. Since 9/11 he has been carrying out research on the way society engages with catastrophes and disasters. His findings are published in *Invitation to Terror: The Expanding Empire of the Unknown* (Continuum Press 2007). His interest is particularly focused on the intellectual/ideological dimensions of the post 9/11 conflict. At present he is engaged in a research project exploring the changing meaning of security in the era of global recession.

Amy Kaplan is the Edward W. Kane Professor of English at the University of Pennsylvania. She is author of *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture* (2003). In 2003, she was elected President of the American Studies Association. Recently she has been writing about the contemporary language and culture of empire, including "Where is Guantánamo?" (2005); "Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today" (2003); "Homeland Insecurities: Transformations of Language and Space"; and

op-eds on Iraq and Guantanamo in the Los Angeles Times and the International Herald Tribune.

Scott Lucas is Professor of American Studies at the University of Birmingham, the Director of Libertas: The Centre for US Foreign Policy, and the creator of the Enduring America website (www.enduringamerica.com). A specialist in US and British foreign policy, he has written and edited seven books, more than 30 major articles, and a radio documentary and has co-directed the 2007 film Laban!

Catherine Morley is Lecturer in American Literature at the University of Leicester and Secretary of the British Association for American Studies. She is the author of *The Quest for Epic in Contemporary American Fiction* (Routledge, 2008) and *Modern American Literature* (Edinburgh University Press, forthcoming 2009). She is also the co-editor of *American Thought and Culture in the 21st Century* (Edinburgh University Press, 2008) and *American Modernism: Cultural Transactions* (Cambridge Scholars' Press, 2009). She has also published numerous scholarly chapters and articles. These have appeared in various edited collections and in journals such as *English, Journal of American Studies, Comparative American Studies, Literature Compass, Philip Roth Studies, Gramma* and the *European Journal of American Culture*. She is currently working on a new monograph on the American modernist Willa Cather.

David Murakami Wood is an interdisciplinary social scientist who specialises in the study of surveillance, based at the Global Urban Research Unit at Newcastle University, UK. He is a co-founder and Managing Editor of the journal, *Surveillance & Society* and a Director of the Surveillance Studies Network (SSN), the new charitable global association for surveillance studies, http://www.surveillance-studies.net. He co-ordinated and edited the acclaimed Report on the Surveillance Society, for the Office of the Information Commissioner and is currently leading a series of ESRC Seminars, "The Everyday Life of Surveillance". He has been published in a wide range of academic journals including *Urban Studies*, *International Relations* and *Society & Space* and has a new book out with Jon Coaffee and Peter Rogers, *The Everyday Resilience of the City,* published by Palgrave. He is currently an ESRC Research Fellow, studying 'Cultures of Urban Surveillance' in four World Cities: London, Rio de Janeiro, Tokyo and Toronto; and a Visiting Professor at the Catholic University of Parana in Brazil. He is working on two new books, *Global Surveillance Societies*, and *The Watched World*, both of which will be published in 2010.

Stuart Price is Principal Lecturer in Media, Film and Journalism at De Montfort university, UK, and the author of *Discourse Power Address* (2007). Other recent work includes an article on public security and the representation of terrorism, entitled 'Missiles in Athens, Tanks at Heathrow' (Social Semiotics, 18/1, 2008), and a piece on the Stockwell shooting, 'The Mediation of 'Terror'', which appears in Boehmer and Morton (eds) 'Terror and the Postcolonial' (2009). He is currently engaged in writing a study of structure and representation in the 'war on terror', called *Brute Reality*, for Pluto Press (2009).

Aliki Varvogli is a lecturer in English at the University of Dundee. She has published the books The *World That is the Book: Paul Auster's Fiction* and *Annie Proulx's The Shipping News: A Reader's Guide*, as well as articles on Philip Roth, Saul Bellow, Ian McEwan, Jonathan Safran Foer and other contemporary authors. She is working on a book on the theme of travel in contemporary American fiction to be published by Routledge.

AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This volume could not have happened without the expertise and cooperation of the above contributors. I thank them for their fine work, for their patience and for responding promptly to my emails. I would also like to thank Kristian Van Haesendonck, Manuela Carvalho, Marta Pinto and Felipe Cammaert for their generous help and sharp editing eye in the revision of some of the articles in this special issue. A special thanks to Michael Boyden for encouraging and supporting this project.

Lisbon, January 2009,
Susana Araújo

RIAS welcomes submissions from all disciplines and approaches
and from all parts of the world, provided that they pertain to 'America'
in the broadest implications of that term.

— *RIAS* is primarily intended for members of IASA, who have total access to the journal. All other users have limited access.

— Submissions can be sent to the editor, Michael Boyden, via *RIAS* web-based submission form at www.iasa-rias.org.

— *RIAS* appears three times a year, in September, January, and May. Copy deadlines for unsolicited submissions are mid-July, mid-November, and mid-March respectively.

— *RIAS* specializes in short position papers (approximately 1,000 to 2,000 words) that deal with topical issues in the international arena of American Studies.

— We also post calls for papers or contributions, notices, conference reports, news from IASA members, as well as book reviews.

— Longer articles (up to 5,000 words) may also be accepted. Such articles should be of general interest to the international American Studies community. If you have a proposal for an article, please contact the editor with a brief synopsis.

— Suggestions for special issues, forum topics, or similar initiatives should be addressed to the editor.

— Every submission should be accompanied by the author's name and institutional affiliation. Articles should also include an abstract of no more than ten lines.

— In principle, we accept contributions in all 'American' languages (i.e. English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, etc.). Accompanying abstracts should be in English (and, if appropriate, in the language of the article's composition).

— Authors retain the copyright to their contributions. This means that texts can be republished elsewhere on the condition that acknowledgment is made to *RIAS*.

— Authors who wish to reproduce materials already published elsewhere should get permission from the copyright holder(s).

Stylesheet for contributors

Please observe the following editorial guidelines when sending in a text for publication in *RIAS*.

— Send your document in RTF format.

— Start with your name, followed by your current affiliation between brackets, and the full title on the next line.

— Preformat your text with Times New Roman or Unicode font typeface, 12 point and 1,5 lines spacing. All text should be justified with last line aligned left, without kerning or any special text formatting.

— For page setup, use borders of 2,5 cm or one inch at all sides, format A4.

— Ear in mind that many readers will want to read your text from the screen. Write economically, use indents, not blank lines between paragraphs.

— Those writing in English should use American spelling (but quotes should remain as they are in the original spelling).

— Those writing in languages other than English should observe the stylistic conventions (capitalization, alphabetical listing of personal names, etc.) linked to these languages.

— Quotes from other languages should be either in translation or appear both in the original and in translation.

— Cited publications are referred to in the text as follows: ' … ' (Surname, date: page reference).

— Use double quotation marks for quotations within quotations.

— Longer quotations exceeding three lines should be indented and single-spaced.

— Use single quotation marks around words used in a special sense.

— All punctuation marks should appear outside the quotation marks.

— As to abbreviations, use neither periods nor spaces after and between letters, except for initials of personal names.

— Use em dashes without spaces before and after.

— Footnotes should be numbered automatically 1, 2, 3, …

— Please enlist your references in alphabetical order of authors' names (type: Works Cited) at the end of your document and format them as follows:

Book
Surname, Initials and Surname, Initials (year) Title: Subtitle. Place of publication: Publisher.

Article in book
Surname, Initials (year) 'Title of Chapter', in Initals Surname and Initials Surname (eds) Title of Book. Place: Publisher, page number(s) of contribution.

Article in journal
Surname, Initials (year) 'Title of Article', Title of Journal volume number (issue number): page number(s) of contribution.

Website
Surname, Initials (year) Title. Place of publication, Publisher (if ascertainable). http://xxx.xxxx.xx/xxx

Article in e-journal
Surname, Initials (year) 'Title of Article', Name of Journal volume number (issue number) http://xxx.xxxx.xx/xxx

Mailbase List
Surname, Initials (day month year). 'Subject of Message', Discussion List LISTSERV@xxx.xxx

RIAS