

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WALLS, MATERIAL AND RHETORICAL
Past, Present, and Future

guest-edited
by Virginia R. Dominguez

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CAMPO DI FIORI, OR WALLS

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When Czesław Miłosz wrote his "Campo di Fiori" in Warsaw in 1943, he must have known that "human nature" (however we define it) is most resistant to change:

W Rzymie na Campo di Fiori
Kosze oliwek i cytryn,
Bruk opryskany winem
I odłamkami kwiatów.
Różowe owoce morza
Sypią na stoły przekupnie,
Naręcza ciemnych winogron
Padają na puch brzoskwini.

Tu na tym właśnie placu
Spalono Giordana Bruna,
Kat płomień stosu zażegnął
W kole ciekawej gawiedzi.
A ledwo płomień przygasnął,
Znów pełne były tawerny,
Kosze oliwek i cytryn
Nieśli przekupnie na głowach.

In Rome, on Campo dei Fiori,
baskets of olives and lemons
cobbles spattered with wine
and the wreckage of flowers.
Vendors cover the trestles
with rose-pink fish;
armfuls of dark grapes
heaped on peach-down.

On this same square
they burned Giordano Bruno.
Henchmen kindled the pyre
close-pressed by the mob.
Before the flames had died
the taverns were full again,
baskets of olives and lemons
again on the vendors' shoulders.

Life goes on, and things go back to normal: excitement, even if evoked by the suffering of a thinker, whose courage in questioning the dogmatics of the Roman Catholic church for the good of all those oppressed by it would not gain any support from those less courageous, will always die down. Awe, sympathy, glee, horror, or anger always eventually yield to what most of us, ordinary bread-eaters, value most: our "small stability," our own little peace. The cobbles, once spattered with the blood of the hapless convict, soon provide the riverbed for accidentally spilt wine; the "wreckage of flowers" readily replaces the broken remains of what used to be a human being, lost among the smoldering embers of the pyre. *Nihil novi*.

Wspomniałem Campo di Fiori W Warszawie przy karuzeli, W pogodny wieczór wiosenny, Przy dźwiękach skocznej muzyki, Salwy za murem getta Głuszyła skoczna melodia I wzlatywały pary Wysoko w pogodne niebo.	I thought of Campo dei Fiori in Warsaw by the sky-carrousel one clear spring evening to the strains of a carnival tune. The bright melody drowned the salvos from the ghetto wall, and couples were flying high in the blue sky.
Czasem wiatr z domów płonących Przynosił czarne latawce, Łapali płatki w powietrzu Jadący na karuzeli. Rozwiewał suknie dziewczynom Ten wiatr od domów płonących, Śmiały się tłumy wesołe W czas pięknej warszawskiej niedzieli.	At times wind from the burning would drift dark kites along and riders on the carrousel caught petals in midair. That same hot wind blew open the skirts of the girls and the crowds were laughing on the beautiful Warsaw Sunday.

Little has changed between Februrary 17th, 1600, and the Palm Sunday of April 19th, 1943. The metallic rattle of machine guns and thundering explosions–the obvious sounds of the desperate, almost month-long battle against the Nazi terror in the Warsaw ghetto–doubtlessly reach the rest of the city, which remains oblivious to the ongoing drama. The tall wall, separating the "small stability" of those who have (mis)lead themselves into believing that whatever happens behind the (artificial) divide is none of their business, from the tragedy of those whose choice is limited to death by the bullet in one last effort to retain their human dignity, or death by Zyklon B in the gas chambers of Auschwitz, is not impenetrable. People *know*: flying high, spinning on a tall merry-go-round, right above their heads they *do see* the "dark kites" of smoke from invisible, but raging, fires; black petals of soot could not be mistaken for flowers. And it is only when the misery strikes them directly, when suffering affects their families, that they will choose to act, expecting the world to see their struggle as its own. (S)laughter: the paranoid reality of the mad carrousel of indifference.

Morał ktoś może wyczyta, Że lud warszawski czy rzymski Handluje, bawi się, kocha Mijając męczeńskie stosy. Inny ktoś morał wyczyta O rzeczy ludzkich mijaniu, O zapomnieniu, co rośnie, Nim jeszcze płomień przygasnął.	Someone will read a moral that the people of Rome and Warsaw haggle, laugh, make love as they pass by martyrs' pyres. Someone else will read of the passing of things human, of the oblivion born before the flames have died.

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Passing moral judgments or philosophizing over a glass of wine by the fireplace is such a nice pastime: we enjoy feeling righteous and, if there is no superball on TV, we even will take part in a public demonstration (carefully avoiding the crowd control units) to post selfies on our Facebook walls to validate our "heroic story." But it is precisely the Facebook wall that separates us—petty, self-righteous "heroes"—from those who pay the price of their heroism every day.

Ja jednak wtedy myślałem	But that day I thought only
O samotności ginących.	of the loneliness of the dying,
O tym, że kiedy Giordano	of how, when Giordano
Wstępował na rusztowanie,	climbed to his burning
Nie znalazł w ludzkim języku	he could not find
Ani jednego wyrazu,	in any human tongue
Aby nim ludzkość pożegnać,	words for mankind,
Tę ludzkość, która zostaje.	mankind who live on.

Shot to death, wounded, beaten up by people in uniforms, arrested, tortured, deprived of rights, sent to camps, separated from their families, executed—those "behind the wall" will often remain anonymous to the world on the other side, alien both to those indifferent and those enjoying their "intimate revolt" sitting safe on the "right side of the wall," who do not speak their language, although they claim they do. Heroes are, and probably have always been, lonely: a truism, beyond doubt, but one gaining a new dimension in the age of the social media, alt-facts and post-truth. Yet, even today, once the burnt wreckage of the hero, whose truth is not "alternative," is cleared up from some modern Campo di Fiori, life ousts death again:

Już biegli wychylać wino,	Already they were back at their wine
Sprzedawać białe rozgwiazdy,	or peddled their white starfish,
Kosze oliwek i cytryn	baskets of olives and lemons
Nieśli w wesołym gwarze.	they had shouldered to the fair,
I był już od nich odległy,	and he already distanced
Jakby minęły wieki,	as if centuries had passed
A oni chwilę czekali	while they paused just a moment
Na jego odlot w pożarze.	for his flying in the fire.
I ci ginący, samotni,	Those dying here, the lonely
Już zapomniani od świata,	forgotten by the world,
Język ich stał się nam obcy	our tongue becomes for them
Jak język dawnej planety.	the language of an ancient planet.
Aż wszystko będzie legendą	Until, when all is legend
I wtedy po wielu latach	and many years have passed,
Na nowym Campo di Fiori	on a new Campo dei Fiori
Bunt wznieci słowo poety	rage will kindle at a poet's word.

One may only hope. Clearly, humankind cherishes legends, but learns little from history. Between 1600 and 1943, between 1943 and 2018 walls have efficienly been giving us all a sense of a most dangerously false sense of freedom, which Anaïs Mitchell makes very obvious in her simple, yet thought-provoking song "Why Do We Build the Wall" from her 2010 album *Hadestown*. In the song, Hades, modeled after the Greek god of the underworld, teaches his followers thus:

Why do we build the wall, my children, my children?
[...]
We build the wall to keep us free
[...]
How does the wall keep us free, my children, my children?
[...]
The wall keeps out the enemy
And we build the wall to keep us free
[...]
Who do we call the enemy, my children, my children?
[...]
The enemy is poverty
And the wall keeps out the enemy
And we build the wall to keep us free
[...]
Because we have and they have not, my children, my children
Because they want what we have got
[...]
Because we have and they have not
Because they want what we have got
The enemy is poverty
And the wall keeps out the enemy
And we build the wall to keep us free
[...]
What do we have that they should want, my children, my children?
[...]
We have a wall to work upon
We have work and they have none
And our work is never done
My children, my children
And the war is never won
The enemy is poverty

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And the wall keeps out the enemy
And we build the wall to keep us free
That's why we build the wall[1]

It is precisely this kind of circular argumentation that, quite literally, revolves around the walls offering those (temporarily) privileged protection from the realization of the uncomfortable fact that they stand by while others suffer and die. Unable to see beyond the wall, one finds it easier to retain his or her sense of morality. But the opacity of the wall does not make it sound-proof: like those on the misleadingly peaceful side of the wall of the struggling Warsaw ghetto, one can undeniably hear the sounds of the losing battle. And even though not even the heroes themselves can blame us for not wanting to go up in flames like Giordano Bruno or to sacrifice our lives like the insurgents of the ghetto, valuing our "small stability," our own little peace, we may still choose to take small-scale, unheroic action to help those on the other side. After all, as writers, teachers, public speakers and social activists, we can make others realize that their votes will count if they choose not to see themselves individually as "just another brick in the wall," helpless and unimportant.

Not all of us are brave enough to be capable of true heroism. But this issue of the *Review of International American Studies* is a step towards a change. Combining text and image (which, apparently is worth more than a thousand words), it grants the international academic community an insight into the dramas playing out beyond the many walls that, supposedly, are to "keep us free," although in fact they have become a prison of an illusion of safety and a weapon that may sooner or later be used against those who pretend not to hear the noise of the ongoing battle "on the other side."[2]

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RIAS Managing Editor

1. The quoted text comes from the following service: https://genius.com/Anais-mitchell-why-we-build-the-wall-lyrics (access 02.02.2018).
2. The text of Czesław Miłosz's poem "Campo di Fiori" and its English translation ("Campo dei Fiori) by Louis Irribarne and David Brooks have been quoted after the *Babel Web Anthology–The Multilingual Literature Portal*, http://www.babelmatrix.org/works/pl/Miłosz%2C_Czesław-1911/Campo_di_Fiori/en/6721-Campo_dei_Fiori (access 02.02.2018).

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INTRODUCTION

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This special issue of *RIAS* focuses on walls. It is motivated by Donald J. Trump's campaign promise and presidential rhetoric insisting on building a tall, strong, beautiful and effective wall between Mexico and the United States so as to keep undocumented Mexican (and Central American) people out of the United States. Of course, walls are also things used in building houses and other buildings, creating rooms within those houses and buildings, and demarcating the edges of property in both urban and rural areas. They may be tall or short, made of a multitude of materials (including wood, adobe, brick, mud, glass, and concrete), and painted or left unadorned. And they may be used to hang art or political posters. Walls have been used for thousands of years of human history, and it is often ruins of stone walls that we find in archaeological settings since they tend to survive better than roofs, wooden furniture, and textiles. But they are not the kind of walls that motivated me or the contributors of this issue of *RIAS*.

Clearly then, walls are not in themselves problematic. The issue is how we use them, how people and often their governments use them, and how people affected by their presence use them. In the case at hand, it is obviously the exclusionary nature of Trump's Wall that concerns me and this issue's contributors. Trump's campaign rhetoric was anti-immigration, but it specifically focused on the southern border of the United States, not its northern border with Canada, which is, of course, much longer. Trump has never proposed building a wall along the US-Canadian border,

although Canadian critics have in response proposed building a botanical fence all along that border. The end result, however, was that Trump's proposed wall came across as a wall to keep Mexicans and Central Americans out of the US and it has been perceived as deeply racist. With Trump's campaign and presidential rhetoric against allegedly untrustworthy Muslim refugees coming into the US, the proposed wall along the Rio Grande (known in Mexico as the Rio Bravo) has become a symbol of protectionism of only a part of the US population. "Make America Great Again" is and was a catchy slogan, but in practice it came across as assuming that "Americans" were neither Muslim nor Mexican or Central American in origin. Scholars and policymakers will debate whether Trump actually meant to exclude those people from the "America" he wanted to make great again, but the wall he wants to build along the southern border of the US has become symbolic of an exclusionary and particular notion of the US that many academics and US liberals decry (see the December 2017 issue of *Comparative American Studies*).

But Trump is not alone and that is of greater concern to me. US Trump supporters have been inspired by his rhetoric. Pew Research Center Surveys showed that "nearly 8 in 10 Trump supporters" in August 2016 favored "building a wall along the Mexican border." And "in an interview shortly after his [November 2016] election, he [Trump] again promised to build a wall on the southern border [of the US] and said his administration would seek to deport up to 3 million unauthorized immigrants with criminal records, leaving open the possibility of deporting others in the future" (Gramlich). While much talk during his first 100 days in office seemed to have focused on other things, his administration did issue a call in early February 2017 for proposals for such a wall and got a number of proposed designs in early March 2017. The official expected cost of building such a wall is $21 billion US dollars.

We can approach this matter from many perspectives, and we should, including why Trump and his supporters concentrate on the US-Mexico border and not the far longer international border the US has with Canada. But my own interest here—and in putting together this special issue of *RIAS* (and the double panel we had at the 2017 IASA 8th World Congress held in Laredo, Texas)

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is the power of this atavistic idea in an era of alleged globalization, when so much rhetorical energy focuses on cyberspace, the globalization of manufacturing and service jobs, and the technological advances that allow people to work from home, hold meetings for free with people in many different countries, and stay closely connected with family and friends regardless of location.

Interestingly this idea that building a wall will solve an important problem has a long history, as Darcy Eveleigh wrote in the *New York Times* in May 2016 (prior to Donald J. Trump's election in November 2016 as President of the United States, even if he did not win the popular vote and even if there remains some doubt that he ever won at all because of Russia's interference). Her piece, "What History Teaches Us about Walls," is still available online, and I highly recommend it. Her subtitle read, "Donald Trump may want to take note: World history is full of examples of engineering thwarted by goal-oriented rank amateurs" (May 27, 2016). Her article contains textual and visual references to most of the examples I had originally contemplated in putting together the July 2017 double-panel in Laredo and in putting together this special issue of *RIAS*, though it also mentions more "walls" than I had originally imagined. These include the Great Wall of China, the Berlin Wall, Hadrian's Wall, the Israeli Wall, the fence between Morocco and the Spanish enclave of Melilla, the walls of the Kremlin, Pope Leo IV's wall around the Vatican, the walls of the Warsaw Ghetto, the 2011 wall built by a mayor in Romania around a neighborhood full of Roma (Gypsies), the fence dividing North Korea from South Korea, the wall long dividing the Greek and Turkish parts of Cyprus, the fence erected by the Indian Security Services to keep Bangladeshis from crossing illegally into India, the walls/fences built in 1969 to separate Roman Catholic and Protestant areas of Belfast (in Northern Ireland), and the wall built by Morocco in the early 1980s to "keep out the Polisario Front guerillas, who sought to make the western Sahara an independent nation."

Yet why evoke walls when there is ample historical evidence that the great majority of past walls were ineffective at keeping people from moving? Tunnels, climbing, bribing, and many other strategies of containment are well-known, and, of course, history shows us that all empires have fallen and that they do so less

by invasion from outside than policies and actions taken within the empire. As Eveleigh puts it,

> It is lost to history whether Hadrian, Qin Shi Huang or Nikita Khrushchev ever uttered, 'I will build a wall.' But build they did, and what happened? The history of walls—to keep people out or in—is also the history of people managing to get around, over and under them. Some come tumbling down. The classic example is the Great Wall of China. Imposing and remarkably durable, yes, yet it didn't block various nomadic tribes from the north.

Here is where the contributors to this issue of *RIAS* may be most useful. I asked colleagues who work on walls and other forms of physical separation to put all this in perspective. I also asked colleagues who work on the US but live in places with a history of walls of various kinds to reflect on them, even if it meant stepping outside of their comfort zones. So here they are. Giorgio Mariani, who tends to work on 19th century US literature, became fascinated by the many walls in and around Rome where he teaches American Studies—walls Roman emperors built to keep out alleged outsiders, though in this article for *RIAS* he goes back and forth quite a bit as he thinks about walls and separation. Alejandro Lugo, who headed the School of Transborder Studies at Arizona State University in the Phoenix, Arizona (US) metropolitan area, but is a wonderful photographer as well, here offers his own photoessay on the US-Mexican wall. It is interesting to me that he chose to include this photoessay in this *RIAS* volume, a special contribution to the theme of this issue, although he has also become fascinated by Roman emperors and the ways Trump reminds him of Roman emperors. Amalia Sa'ar, who normally writes about neoliberalism and its effects on both Jews and Palestinians in Israel, reflects here (jointly with her Israeli colleagues) on Trump's proposed wall and lessons we might learn by looking at 'normalization' in Israel. Then there is Sangjun Jeong, who normally lives in Seoul, South Korea, where he teaches American Studies at Seoul National University, and who had never before written about the separation of North and South Korea, the ironically-called DMZ (demilitarized zone) that is heavily militarized and is just miles from his home in Seoul, nor the effect on so many Koreans of that physical separation that continues to exist between North

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and South Korea. Sangjun wanted to write about that separation in large part because of Trump's rhetoric and plans.

And there are Gabriela Vargas-Cetina and Steffan Igor Ayora--Díaz, coauthors of a paper they presented in Laredo, now much expanded here, who were trained as (social/cultural) anthropologists in Canada but live in Merida, Mexico, where they teach at the Autonomous University of the Yucatan, and who surprised people in Laredo (and probably again here) by not focusing on Trump's wall. They instead focus on physical, historical, and social barriers between the Yucatan and the rest of Mexico and, in so doing, they call into question many Americans' notions of Mexico, including Trump's and his supporters' idea of Mexico. And there is Éva Eszter Szabó, who normally lives in Budapest, Hungary, where she teaches American history at Eötvös Loránd University and has special interest in the Latino population of the US and in US' relationship with Latin America. This article of hers here, like her original and much shorter presentation in Laredo, Texas, actually focuses on the Iron Curtain not just as an ideological or political barrier but also as a physical barrier between the Soviet-controlled world and Western Europe. She tackles its history but also the history of its effect on Eastern Europe, and in so doing she reminds us of the effects of walls and enforced separation of the sort Trump and his supporters endorse.

Laura McAtackney was unable to join us in Laredo, Texas, in July 2017, but I am delighted that she was able to contribute to this special issue of *RIAS*. Laura, an archaeologist who is much concerned with the past and present physical barriers built in Belfast between Catholics and Protestants, raises issues of materiality, violence, social class, and hope here. And in so doing, she makes all of us think about hope, determination, and other border conflicts over time, and the violence that walls (material or rhetorical) represent.

In a photoessay on the use of walls in Israel/Palestine for a variety of reasons, Jasmin Habib raises similar issues, many of them about hope and determination. This works well with Laura McAtackney's explorations of walls in Belfast and Sangjun Jeong's concern about the DMZ and the state of war that continues to exist between North Korea and South Korea, as well as the many decades

of the Iron Curtain in the 20th century and its effects detailed by Éva Eszter Szabó.

The Epilogue we include here (carefully and thoughtfully crafted by György Tóth of the University of Stirling in Scotland) brings up important issues about rhetoric, power, intent, similarity and difference, and empires. Whether this mix of contributions sheds useful light on Trump's proposed wall and his focus on the southern border of the US will be up to readers to decide. But we do hope that it at least raises useful questions, including those not already anticipated by others.

In Laredo, at IASA's 8th World Congress, I stated something that many then present probably found surprising and that György Tóth bravely disagreed with. Because of that and because it is important to provoke discussion and not necessarily come across as all sharing one view, I want to end this introduction with mention of it and an argument for it. In Laredo, in July 2017, I said that I did not think that Trump would ever build the wall he frequently talks about but that he would continue to talk about it during his term as president of the United States. So far I have been proven correct, but who knows? Many readers and certainly probably most of this issue's contributors will disagree with me. I suspect that most people hearing Trump's speeches and rhetoric do assume that he will indeed build a wall between Mexico and the United States during his first term in office, and they are for the most part fiercely opposed to it.

But I wonder. The US-Mexico border is already heavily officiated and militarized, even if it is not all that effective. I remember telling IASA Congress participants who very much wanted to see Nuevo Laredo (the city in Mexico on the other side of the US-Mexico border at the Laredo, Texas, site) that they would be able to cross into Mexico quite easily but that crossing back into the US from Mexico would not be so easy, even if they had visas into the US. Many of them heeded my warning but not all, and those who did—had trouble with US passport and customs officials. I crossed into the US myself from Mexico in 1969 and remember the long lines. My parents and I were all US citizens by then, and we were neither Mexican nor Central American, but we still had to wait for a long time to cross into the US. This was before NAFTA

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and the Laredo and Nuevo Laredo mayors and officials we met at the IASA Congress who told us of the economic boon NAFTA has been for this border area. And yet the border patrol in 2017 in this border area remained highly unequal. Crossing into the US from Mexico is not at all like crossing into Mexico from the United States.

I was even reminded of this in an unexpected way as I was leaving the Laredo, Texas, airport on July 22, 2017, en route to Dallas-Forth Worth and eventually home to Champaign, Illinois. Just before going through the metal detectors and the security machines (but after already getting my boarding pass) I was asked by two men in military uniform standing next to the TSA (airport security) if I was a US citizen. I have never been asked that before at any airport in the US and I told them so. They did not ask for any proof of my US citizenship after I replied "absolutely," but the mere fact that they asked the question left me baffled. When I told them that I had never been asked that question before at any US airport, one of them said that the question is asked at any US airport that is less that 100 miles from the US-Mexico border.

So, the US already tries to keep people out along its southern border. Why would a wall itself keep people out? Let me reiterate what Eveleigh said in May 2016. "The history of walls—to keep people out or in—is also the history of people managing to get around, over and under them" (Eveleigh 2016).

My point in Laredo—and one I reiterate here—is that it is Trump's rhetoric that matters much more than Trump actually building a wall along the southern border of the US. The fact is that many Americans, and not just Trump's diehard supporters, want to keep Mexicans and Central Americans out of the United States. Do I have proof of this? Perhaps.

Many people—journalists and scholars alike—seem to focus on Trump's supporters voicing approval of Trump's idea of building a wall separating the United States from Mexico, with the hope that it would be effective in seriously reducing (if not totally eliminating) the entry into the US of undocumented Mexicans and Central Americans. But the fact remains that many supporters of Hillary Clinton also voiced approval when Pew Research Center asked them as well in 2016. Whereas "nearly 8 in 10 Trump supporters"

in August 2016 favored "building a wall along the Mexican border," 38% of Hillary Clinton's supporters said the same thing. That is not 3% or 2% or even 5%. That is a large percentage. It is over a third of Clinton's supporters, and not all that far from half of her supporters. What is that about?

Clearly many non-Latino, non-Mexican, non-Central American Americans think a wall between the US and Mexico is a good idea. Is this racist? Probably, as I said before, because it is not applied to the US-Canada border. But is this just a Trump view? I don't think so. Many Clinton supporters apparently support Trump's proposed wall, and clearly not all Trump supporters endorse his proposed wall.

There may then be much support among US citizens not of Mexican, Central American, or Latino background for Trump's proposed wall, but who indeed would pay for it at a current estimated cost of $21 billion US dollars? Trump has publicly said that Mexico would pay for the wall, but I don't think that many people on either side of the border believe him, so my point (no doubt a controversial point) is that the rhetoric is what is important, not the actual building of the wall he keeps talking about.

It would not be the first time that rhetoric mattered more than the materiality of a wall or even its social effects and tragic costs. We are all likely to remember how in 1989 the Berlin Wall came down, but I wonder how many of us know why it was erected in the first place. As the May 2016 *NYT* piece put it, in a caption under a black and white photo,

> Increasing the height on a section of the Berlin Wall on Oct. 9, 1961. The Communist East Germans built it to stem mass migrations into West Berlin. The wall accomplished that goal, but it also became an *enduring symbol* of the Cold War as people risked their lives to flee over and under it. Germans tore it down in 1989.

And I know that several other walls were built for similar reasons by empires and their heads, whether or not they were called emperors, but many of these have since become primarily tourist attractions. Consider the Great Wall of China, Hadrian's Wall in southern Scotland, the walls around the Vatican, and even many of the walls in Belfast. When their value becomes symbolic

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of past but failed efforts, what should any contemporary politician or policy-maker think? Perhaps the point is always rhetorical and symbolic, never a material one.

And yet the rhetoric is there and, unlike others in the US who oppose Trump and his planned wall, I remain interested in the fact that a decent number of Clinton supporters (over a third) said before the November 2016 US presidential election that they support the building of a wall along the entire US-Mexico border. And I also remain interested in the fact that not all supporters of Trump said in the same Pew survey that they supported such a wall. In fact, Pew reported that only 79% of Trump's supporters supported that part of Trump's plan. Clearly there are conflicting positions in the US with respect to immigration, but I wonder what to make of this rather widespread support for building a wall along the US-Mexican border.

The simple comment is that many non-Mexican origin US citizens are racist toward people in Mexico and do not worry about Canadians at all. That may well be true but is that all we can say about it? I don't think so, and I don't think the contributors to this issue of *RIAS* think so, and I don't think we should think so. Ironically the same Pew Research Center surveys showed much more complexity in responses to immigration—among both Clinton and Trump supporters in the US—highlighting for me Trump's emphasis on a likely-to-fail wall and what it might say about many people in the US, and not just Trump's right-wing base. For example, while 88% of Clinton supporters reported thinking that "undocumented immigrants are as honest and hard-working as American citizens," 57% of Trump supporters reported the same thing. And the same survey showed that 84% of Clinton's supporters reported thinking that "undocumented immigrants are no more likely than American citizens to commit serious crimes" which many of us might expect, but the same survey showed that nearly half (43%) of Trump supporters also agreed with that statement. And a later poll (October 20–25, 2016), much closer to the actual election day in 2016, showed that these August results were not unusual. Ninety-five (95) percent of Clinton supporters said that undocumented immigrants in the US who meet certain requirements should be allowed to stay, but so did

over half (60%) of Trump supporters. So, what is the proposed wall all about? It certainly does not look like just some people in the US want that wall, but it also does not look like building the wall is seen by most people in the US as the solution to the question of immigration to the US, not even as the solution to the issue of Mexican and Central American immigration to the United States.

So should we not ask why anyone should persist in talking about building a tall, strong, beautiful, and effective wall along the US-Mexican border when it does not take extensive research to learn that most societies that have built walls to keep people in or out have failed in their goals, and they were not even living in a world with the Internet and as extensive trading across international borders as we have now? My answer is that the wall has rhetorical power and galvanizing power—racist power and xenophobic power—but pretty much no other kind of power. That is why I suspect that Trump will keep talking about it but will never really get that wall built.

Readers and contributors may not be convinced, and Trump may indeed surprise me but, as I read and think about the contributions to this special issue of *RIAS*, I contemplate some of these other walls, barriers, fences, and their rationales, as well as what they have become.

Consider what we know of these walls. The *Great Wall of China* today functions primarily as a tourist attraction. It is "a series of fortifications made of stone, brick, tamped earth, wood, and other materials, generally built along an east-to-west line across the historical northern borders of China to protect the Chinese states and empires against the raids and invasions of the various nomadic groups of the Eurasian Steppe."

Several of these walls were built as early as the 7th century BCE. Others came later, joining the earlier ones together and making them bigger and presumably stronger. As Wikipedia puts it, "Especially famous is the wall built 220–206 BCE by Qin Shi Huang, the first Emperor of China." Yet even Wikipedia says that "little of that wall remains" and that "since then, the Great Wall has on and off been rebuilt, maintained, and enhanced; the majority of the existing wall is from the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644)."

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Watch towers, troop barracks, garrison stations, and signaling facilities were eventually added, but over the years other functions took hold—from the imposition of import duties along the "Silk Road" to the regulation or encouragement of trade, immigration, or emigration, the use of the wall(s) for transportation, and more recently money-making for the tourist industry.

Hadrian's Wall supposedly protected the Roman Empire from foreign invaders up north some 2000 years ago but, as Eveleigh put it, "invaders were never a real threat" and it stands now as a curiosity well worth visiting. Why Emperor Hadrian started it in 122 AD and why successors continued to build it probably said more about perceived weakness of the Roman Empire at the time than real strength, a point Trump and his avid supporters ought to contemplate and, if I am right, do at some level. Now regarded as a British cultural icon, not an Italian one, it was designated as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1987. Clearly a large portion of it still stands, allegedly the largest Roman artifact anywhere in the world, built with a stone base and turrets in between. Physically, it might (or might not) have mattered that it included a fort about every 5 miles, and it might (or might not) have mattered that there were ditches, fighting garrisons only at the forts, and that its gates may well have functions as customs sites.

The walls around the Vatican are much like the walls around many an ancient city, now of special interest to tourists and now also typically enclosing no one—with urban dwellers frequently living beyond those walls. And then there are the far more recent walls built to separate Catholics from Protestants in a particularly violent era of life in Belfast. Beneath a photo credited to Peter Kemp of the Associated Press, Eveleigh wrote:

> The[se] *fences* were built in 1969 in an effort to maintain peace. It didn't work. Today, with violence abated, parts of the city have become a thriving tourist hub, with trendy shops and restaurants. The walls remain, but open each day under the watchful eyes of the police.

Laura McAtackney agrees but only to a point. She says that the walls continue to be built today with very few coming down. Eight years ago, she says, people estimated that there were 18 in 1990 and 80 in 2010. They are now almost exclusively dividing

working class communities and very few, contra Kemp and Eveleigh, are in "tourist areas." Yes, there are tours but there are also lots of walls that are not visited by tourists. One wonders why and what they have to do with peace-making in Belfast.

In any case, failure and weakness and symbolic power all come to mind when thinking about walls—that and not interconnectedness, globalization, or actually efficacy, although readers of Giorgio Mariani's article here might think twice, and even readers of Sangjun Jeong's essay here might ponder the North/South Korea division, too. But I encourage all readers to wonder what Trump is doing when *he* talks about strengthening, raising, and beautifying the walls along this Mexican-US border. Surely, all this talk is and has been rhetorical, but it would be a mistake to undermine the importance of rhetoric itself. It is just ironic and paradoxical that this material thing intended to keep people out actually (or, in the case of the Iron Curtain, to keep people from getting out) evokes weakness and not strength, fear and not chutzpah (or hubris), failure and not success.

These problems may be well worth contemplating as you readers read the many wonderful contributions to this special issue of *RIAS*. Is Trump's proposed wall going to work when its predecessors have all eventually failed? Are readers fearful because they might at some level be exceptionalizing the US? Is there a normalization at work here, akin to the normalization that Amalia Sa'ar and her colleagues describe for Israel or arguably Sangjun Jeong describes for South Korea? Does it go further, as Gaby Vargas-Cetina and Steffan "Igor" Ayora-Díaz imply when thinking about the Yucatan, Mexico, and the US? Why is there support for Trump's idea of a wall along the US-Mexico border, or among whom is there support? Are we as scholars ignoring some evidence of dissent and hope, of the sort Jasmin Habib noted in her contribution to our double panel in Laredo, Texas, in July 2017 and does so here as well, or of fracture of the sort Vargas-Cetina and Ayora-Díaz note? Is rhetoric more important than actually building the wall Trump proposes, as I suggest? And is rhetoric more worrisome than a material wall Trump might in the end build and that, if György Tóth is correct, we will largely come to think of as Trump's Wall?

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Guest Editor

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PHOTO ESSAY: RE-MAPPING THE US-MEXICO BORDER/LANDS

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The United States-Mexico international border has been unilaterally re-mapped by the US government for almost three decades. In the early 1990s, during the presidency of Bill Clinton, "Operation Hold the Line" in El Paso, Texas (1993); "Operation Gatekeeper" in San Diego, California (1994); "Operation Rio Grande" in McAllen, Texas (1994); and "Operation Safeguard" in the Tucson, Arizona Sector, which covers most of southern New Mexico (1994) contributed to the increased militarization of the US-Mexico border—a militarization that served the purpose, at that time, to help deter unauthorized entries into the United States.

The deadly attacks on the United States by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 led to the passage of the USA Patriot Act of 2001. In December 2005, the Sensenbrenner Immigration Bill (H.R. 4437, "The Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005"), a response to terrorist threats that included the arbitrary criminalization of undocumented immigrants, was passed in the House of Representatives. Although H.R. 4437 failed in the Senate in the spring of 2006, the criminalization of Latino immigrants in this bill led to an extraordinary, well-organized reaction and mobilization on the part of the Latino community across the continental United States. It was in this highly politicized context that partly as a result of the Latino immigrant marches, on October 26, 2006, President George W. Bush signed the "Secure Fence Act of 2006" (Public Law 109–367). In addition to authorizing additional vehicle barriers, border inspection

stations as well as advanced technology to reinforce the border, the main goal of the Secure Fence Act was to 'protect' the nation by building 700 miles of physical barriers along the US-Mexico border. Congress approved $1.2 billion dollars for the Act's implementation. Although by 2009 the Department of Homeland Security had erected approximately 600 miles of barriers, by 2011, the US government cancelled the project's further implementation due to its unexpected and unplanned financial costs.

With respect to the security features related to the border areas covered by this essay's photographs, the Secure Fence Act states that "the Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide for…2 layers of reinforced fencing, the installation of additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors—(ii) extending from 10 miles west of Calexico, California, port of entry to 5 miles east of the Douglas, Arizona, port of entry; (iii) extending from 5 miles west of Columbus, New Mexico, port of entry to 10 miles east of El Paso, Texas."

Several of the photographs in this essay show sections of the current fence or wall at the US-Mexico border that resulted from the Secure Fence Act of 2006. The fence or wall images are then intended, on my part, to be juxtaposed with borderland images that capture the social and political relations that manifest the complex ways the borderlands are being remapped through walls and their consequences—all in the context of the still so-called 'American Dream.' The goal of the photo essay is to help identify the different ways the remapping of the US-Mexico border itself is being carried out, with or without the "great, beautiful wall" Donald Trump and his supporters are currently imagining and proposing.[1]

1. I would like to thank all the "Walls" panel participants at the IASA's 8th World Congress in Laredo, Texas, especially Virginia Dominguez, for organizing such a much-needed session and for inviting me to participate. I also would like to thank both Virginia and Giorgio Mariani, for considering this photo essay for this particular volume and for our intellectual conversation about world borders throughout the years. Lastly, I would like to thank Margaret Dorsey and Miguel Diaz-Barriga as well as Theresa Avila for their respective collaboration with me on the exhibition of several of my photos both in New York City and in Tempe, Arizona, respectively. The border photographs of Nogales, Arizona and Nogales, Sonora were exhibited in 2017 from April 6th to August 1st at Arizona State University's Hayden Library as part of the exhibit, "Greater

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In Search of the American Dream / Buscando del Sueño Americano (from Series: "Cruces: Crosses and Crossings"), 2004

Arizona: Mapping Place, History and Transformation", co-curated by Theresa Avila and myself. The photographs of the Statue of Liberty and the White House, as well the photographs that cover the Paso del Norte region, which include southern New Mexico and the El Paso, Texas-Ciudad Juarez, Mexico border, were exhibited in 2016 from June 2nd to July 30th at the Apexart Gallery in New York City as part of the exhibit, "Fencing in Democracy," organized and curated by Miguel Diaz-Barriga and Margaret Dorsey.

Statue of Liberty Turns Its Back on Mexican Immigrants
La Estatua de la Libertad le da la Espalda a Inmigrantes Mexicanos
(from Series: "De Espaldas/Seen From the Back"), 2008

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Fenced White House Welcomes Latino Immigrants (2006–2016)
La Casa Blanca Encerrada da Bienvenida a Inmigrantes Latinos (2006–2016)
(from Series: "Cruces: Crosses and Crossings"), 2008

Twenty-First Century Pioneers in Arizona
Pioneros del Siglo Veinte-y-Uno en Arizona
(from Series: "De Espaldas/Seen From the Back"), 2016

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Border Patrol Waiting
Patrulla Fronteriza Esperando
(from Series: "De Espaldas/Seen from the Back"), 2016

Crossing the Bridge: Welcome to the United States
Cruzando el Puente: Bienvenidos a los Estados Unidos
(from Series: "Cruces: Crosses and Crossings"), 2016

Border Wall at Paso del Norte
Muralla Fronteriza en Paso del Norte
(from Series: "Cruces: Crosses and Crossings"), 2016

Border wall between Gadsden, Arizona, and Baja California State, 2016

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Border wall between Nogales, Arizona and Nogales, Sonora (view from McDonalds), 2017

Border wall view from major street in Nogales, Arizona, 2017

Border wall view from the Mexican side in Nogales, Sonora, 2017

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

Border wall view from parking lot in Nogales, Arizona, 2017

Border wall between Calexico, California and Mexicali, Baja California, 2017

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

American Eagle at the Calexico-Mexicali wall, 2017

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THE MANY FORMS AND MEANINGS OF (PEACE) WALLS IN CONTEMPORARY NORTHERN IRELAND

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People have demarcated and bounded space for myriad reasons for millennia. They have dug ditches, used materials to create linear *limes* and built fences and walls to protect, separate, control, promote feelings of safety and / or promote difference. While this special edition is concerned with the impacts, roles, and intentions of walls in particular it is important to recognize that there are many ways to materialize separation and to attempt to do so is not a modern invention (although recent proliferation has accelerated and globalized to a degree that it is important to critically examine them now [see Oxley-Rice], especially given the prominence of Trump's proposed wall). Examining the history of wall building reveals how walls have both participated in, and have been altered by, cultural and technological change as they have been articulated as an answer to a variety of societal ills. It has been argued that longstanding, monumental walls act as enduring markers, materializing where identities clash and nations meet (Dey 1–2). However, not all walls are the same—not all walls are ideological—and in this respect it is important to gain an understanding of not only how modern wall building both reflects and differs from basic and long-standing human wants for security and belonging but also to consider how ideological walls operate at both a macro and micro level.

I have recently argued, with my colleague Randy McGuire, that ideological walls—i.e. those built with the intention to materialize power, domination, and protection to those inside (and conversely communicating insecurity, fear, and isolation) (following Marcuse 43)—are significant in how they are being imagined, materialized and used in the contemporary world (see McAtackney and McGuire). At the most basic level, the high visibility and solid physicality of walls has tangible effects on how people can negotiate and experience their surroundings. They direct and enable—or curtail and prevent—depending on which side of the wall you are on and with ideological walls there is always *the other side* of the wall. Ideological walls are built with the intention to separate and in doing so they project both belonging and exclusion. Ideological walls are built with specific intentions. They are constructed to limit agency by directing movement to interfaces where people can be monitored, surveyed, and even prevented from crossing if they are not the right type of people. In that respect, they are discriminatory. The recourse to wall building by Donald Trump, but also on a global scale, implies that walls are a modern necessity and a future-orientated answer to new problems of mass movement, but materialized divisions are an age-old answer to insecurity and fear (see Mieder)

Moving beyond walls as intentions, they are not straightforward as a material reality. They enable agency that the builders do not imagine and can communicate meanings that they did not intend. Walls materialize a challenge: those who wish to transgress continually create new ways to subvert the purposes of walls (see McWilliams on the Berlin Wall). Walls become the very canvasses to advertise protest against their existence (see McAtackney "Peace Maintenance" on Belfast's peace walls) and myriad interactions with walls can subvert and even undermine the builder's intentions. Walls are inherently mutable and ambiguous in their use and meaning. They are not the static obstacles that they are envisioned to be. In this respect they are simultaneously "face" and "barrier" (Baker), in that they try to control movement but they are usually not completely able to do so and while they are materialized as monumental structures they communicate meanings that are constantly in flux and uncontrollable. Taken together

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their materiality and meanings are significant: the transgression of walls becomes all the more powerful because of the symbolic loads that they bear. Their symbolic significance has been clear in Trump's rhetoric around his much publicized wall in which he has described a wall as "better than fencing and it's much more powerful" (see "Donald Trump's Mexico Wall"). However, while we currently focus on walls that materialize where borders are placed, where 'peoples' meet and with the intention to stop the mass-movement of large-scale "imagined communities" (Anderson) they also proliferate at the local level to separate in terms of socio-economic, ethnic, and religious differences. It is from the level of the micro scale that this article will focus.

WHY WALLS IN NORTHERN IRELAND?

While the focus of many wall studies is on the monumental and spectacular—and in particular, in terms of scale, on those walls that separate nation states—there are many types of walls that are proliferating and are catalyzed by, and in turn catalyze, more wallbuilding. The focus of this chapter will be so-called 'peace walls' in Northern Ireland. Peace walls are walls that have been located between working-class, urban areas in Northern Ireland with the intention of ensuring 'peace' through material separation of ghettoized ethnic communities, which are broadly conceived as being catholic / nationalist / republican on one side and protestant / unionist / loyalist on the other. They are a phenomenon that developed and grew alongside the recent ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland, parochially called 'the Troubles.' This is a conflict which is considered to have spanned a 30 year period from c. 968–c. 1998 (see Edwards and McGrattan) and is often presumed to be an anomaly in the Global North; a colonial remnant that has a lineage back to the plantations of Ulster in the early 17th century. However, the increasing use of walls to separate the haves from the have-nots as cities grow (see Oxley-Rice) has many points of connection with the seemingly historically-situated walls of Belfast. The enduring narrative of Northern Ireland is as a 'problem' that is unexplainable, illogical, and therefore unresolvable (see Vaughn-Williams), however, when one explores materialized segregation the issues of who lives alongside these walls ties

into the use of socio-economic walls located throughout the Global North. The peace walls in Belfast have a dual contemporary purpose as well as reflect the historical nature of conflict and should be read as a cautionary tale of the repercussions of attempting to materialize pre-existing divisions in cities.

Figure 1. Solid peace wall on the Falls Road side, West Belfast (L McAtackney, 2011)

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Peace walls are famously the only security infrastructure associated with the Troubles that not only continued into the peace process but have grown in scale, size, and number in the post-conflict context (see Jarman & O'Halloran; Community Relations Council). Peace walls first took permanent, material form during the early days of the Troubles in 1969 after confrontations in West Belfast resulted in an unofficial barricade—which were traditionally erected during the escalation of civil unrest in the city—being replaced with a more permanent feature (Leonard 227). Therefore, it can be argued that the creation of the first peace walls reflected official acceptance of not only a physical reality but of an ongoing desire to create barriers between the communities when relationships were at a low. What was not considered at the time was that the moving from temporary barriers to "walls of corrugated sheets of iron bolted to metal posts sunk in concrete" (Mulholland 73) marked a watershed moment when static walls rather than de facto barriers were used to more permanently separate and divide (even though they are officially categorized as temporary constructions). Materially, they are difficult to define due to their erection by a number of different bodies (including the city council, the housing executive, and the environment agency), in different places over many decades. It has been argued that most examples of peace walls have a "distinctive physical appearance" (Jarman and O'Halloran 5). However, there is a noticeable variation in materials, design, and construction in reality. Some peace-lines are solid constructions that completely visually obscure the neighboring areas [see Figure 1] but the majority have different horizontal planes of materials that have built up over time and become increasingly transparent at the top. These usually start with brick bases that continue into metal fencing or transparent partitions as they move towards the top [see Figure 2]. Some peace walls are simply metal fences or seemingly decorative, boundary walls. Their different material forms highlight that they are not homogenous but rather their materiality reflects numerous agencies reacting to a variety of circumstances that can reflect temporal preferences, political climate, class, geography, and demographics but also institutional frameworks and the impact of change [see Figure 3].

Figure 2. Peace wall with various degrees of transparent materials on the upper planes at Shankill Road side, West Belfast (L McAtackney, 2011)

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Figure 3. The peace wall at Falls Road / Shankill Road showing the joins where different phases of peace walls meet.

Divisions based on socio-economic models are common to many modern cities (Boal 30) and have proliferated in Global North countries in recent decades, including through the creation of gated communities to keep living spaces of the rich inaccessible to the poor (see Blakeley & Synder; Dinzey-Flores; Low). Factors that mark Belfast as peculiar include ethnic and sectarian aspects, the scale of the materialization of divisions and how that material form has evolved spatially and temporally. Using Belfast, the largest city in the province, as a case-study, this article argues that peace walls are multi-faceted and reflect global as well as local processes, but what it will reflect most on are the unforeseen repercussions of their enduring placement. They are not simply contemporary material partitions that serve as a crude means of 'keeping the peace' between antagonistic near neighbors. They are also not just materializing longstanding divisions based in entrenched historical identities and entwined religious and political affiliations that belong in the 17th century. These walls are spatially significant in dividing communities that were most impacted by the conflict at the time. Their placement strongly intersects with class and they reflect the class-based nature of not only the Troubles but the enduring divisions of the post-conflict state of Northern Ireland as being essentially a working-class experience (see Whyte). Peace walls are complicated and evolving material forms and the impact of their enduring nature is significant to examine in a world that is only now engaging with the political nature of contemporary wall building due to the very public intentions of Donald Trump. The walls of Belfast have longevity. They take a wide variety of forms that can incorporate the aesthetic, the transparent, and the moveable, and despite their seemingly static nature, their meanings have changed. This mutability is important—they can recede into a heavily graffitied backdrop at times of calm with the knowledge they can be reactivated when cyclical conflict demands—but they also can have an impact on memory and identity, which potentially has repercussions beyond their shadows.

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Before exploring the material forms of walls there is a need to engage with the terminology of division in Northern Ireland. Although 'peace walls' is in some respects preferable to its most used alternative—the more ephemeral 'peace lines'—the use of 'peace' in conjunction with 'walls' is still problematic. Of course, the use of material barriers to prevent violent conflict has significant distance from most conceptions of 'peace' and the positivity of this term belies the problematic nature of walls used in this way. Also, as noted above, many of the walls used to divide antagonistic communities are monumental in the real sense of the word—towering over their surroundings—but they do not all have the same presence or are entirely opaque. Furthermore, the use of 'peace lines' also has some relevance as barriers in a long-divided city like Belfast are often psychic as well as physical and divisions are not simply mirrored in monumental constructions. Dividing walls are infrequently complete, and most have doorways or openings (official or unofficial) that allow movement—albeit controlled—at particular points but one has to have insider knowledge to know what is acceptable and what is transgressing in terms of crossing from one side to another. In this respect, they do not affect everyone who physically experiences them equally. One has to come from the communities who live alongside them to know what the rules are to abide by or defy. This ambiguity means that although walls may have gateways, people who live alongside them do not often cross them. Due to their longevity, this means that generations have grown up with what Bryonie Reid has called, "a psychology of spatial confinement" (489).

While much attention has been placed on spectacular events around them—the "burning buses" rather than "building bridges" phenomenon associated with media interest (Douglas 1998: 171)—close examination of the material surrounding walls as well as the materials of the walls themselves shows there are more insidious and, in the context of post-conflict Northern Ireland, more problematic impacts in the long-term maintenance of walls. While they are intended to prevent flashpoint violence, for the majority of the time they act to prohibit more normative interactions that one would expect between neighboring communities. This in turn

inhibits the development of knowledge, understanding, and empathy between near neighbors, particularly as they try to make sense of their experiences of conflict as the state strives for "reconciliation and rapprochement" in the post-conflict context (Belfast Agreement 2–3). At an experiential level, peace walls literally visually block the experiences of similarly disadvantaged and conflict-torn communities from each other and they ensure that a disconnect is perpetuated between those who have been most adversely affected by the Troubles, albeit on opposite sides. This means that effectively, peace walls act to maintain and even strengthen segregation into a post-conflict context, especially given the lack of official engagement with their existence and lack of strategic policy to take them down (Community Relations Council). A major repercussion of this lack of insight into the experiences between near neighbors is physical and psychological isolation. Materially ghettoizing communities ensures that self-curated and one-sided projections of experiences of the conflict (most frequently found in murals and memorials) remain uncritiqued as they materialize on or alongside these walls. The bottom-up, unofficial memorials that have appeared within these communities in the post-conflict period tend to have very particular and skewed views of the past that, alongside the 'othering' of the community hidden from view, which allows misrepresentations of the past to be propagated within. These community memorials that reside alongside peace walls are an important means of 'reading' how communities engage with, and reproduce, their understandings of their identity and community—and who is included within it—on *their side* of the peace wall.

COMMUNITY MEMORIALS IN EAST AND WEST BELFAST

Unofficial community memorials commemorating the Troubles have proliferated in the shadows of peace walls in post-conflict Belfast. These memorials are designed and placed by the local communities, or more precisely those who hold power within them, and are most frequently found in working-class, urban areas of Northern Ireland. They can occur throughout the communities but as they are often placed in spatially meaningful places they are often found alongside or within visual access to peace walls simply

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because the spaces were zones of conflict that precipitated their erection. This phenomenon has been relatively under-researched in the context of the peace process (although see McDowell, "Commemorating"; Graham & Whelan; Viggiani). However, it is clear that the proliferation of memorials follows global as well as local trends in communities attempting to materialize memory. Erika Doss, writing about the contemporary United States, has noted how memorialization is increasingly being used to remember a wide variety of people, events, and occasions as a means of claiming political space as well as more personal connections to events considered worthy of remembering. She argues these memorials are important because of the potential for multiplicity of meanings and their ability to "evoke memories, sustain thoughts, constitute political conditions and conjure states of being" (Doss 71). This ability to "conjure states of being" is particularly evident in Northern Ireland as these community memorials clearly act as means of filling an official memory vacuum as more normative mechanisms of heritage creation associated with identity and memory—e.g. museums and heritage centers—continue to avoid contentious issues of "dealing with the past" (following the official decision to not include this issue in the Belfast Agreement, see McGrattan). Many of these unofficial community memorials are placed against peace walls or alongside them, both tacitly confirming their presence and reasons for existence. These community memorials may claim to represent the community experience of the Troubles but they are not attempting to articulate a broad or representative history of the conflict, sanitized for a post-conflict society as one would expect to find in a museum. Rather they aim to present very localized, very skewed, and often one-sided readings of the past. In doing this they are actively facilitated by the walls they reference, which demarcate and contain their community from *the other side*.

A close examination of community memorialization practices in contemporary Belfast reveals that complex and entangled narratives of place, identity, and conflict continue to exist twenty years post-conflict. This reality evidently relates to changing dynamics within those communities, including tensions within, as well as beyond, the walls that separate them from their

unseen neighbors. For example, the myriad elements contributing to place identity in East Belfast is particularly varied, as evidenced in a recent report on the role of curbstones, flags, and emblems in placemaking and how they are read by the wider public (Bryan et al.). The focus of the report explores the impact of a variety of flags (national, paramilitary, and sectional) as well as painted kerbstones (which are red, white, and blue for 'British' areas, replicating the colors of the Union flag) as well as explicitly paramilitary wall murals, which are particularly prominent in loyalist areas of East Belfast due to ongoing power struggles between various loyalist paramilitary factions within the community. However, the report does not venture into exploring the other manifestations of place identity that proliferate in varying degrees of visibility in the area that are not so explicitly paramilitary but are still problematic. Thus, the report does not consider how community memorials and council-funded public art initiatives interact with the more evidently negative aspects of materialized identity. A number of these memorials are placed against peace walls with brick structures and metal railings that allow visual access to the structure, but not physical interaction. They are exclusive spaces that only commemorate a handful of named men, generally only those who died from a particular group as active combatants. I have argued elsewhere (McAtackney "Differential Deindustrialization") that taken in totality, community memorials are an important aspect of the landscape of identity in working-class, urban areas of Northern Ireland as they are often strategically placed close to peace walls and are significant in mirroring the building materials and monumentality of the peace wall. Most importantly, the peace wall acts as not just a physical barrier but also a conceptual backdrop to reinforce meaning [see Figure 4].

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Figure 4. Image placed on peace wall at Bombay Street, Falls Road side, West Belfast, in 2011 which references the historic built environment of Bombay Street before peace walls were erected (the backdrop image of the streetscape had faded by 2013 and was replaced in 2014) (L. McAtackney 2012)

A more broadly-based investigation of the various forms that create place identity in East Belfast reveals the importance of memorials in being able to proliferate alongside other forms of memory making that are specific to that quarter of the city and are contained within it due to the role of peace walls. In this context, community memorials to the Troubles in East Belfast are almost always related to what Sara McDowell has called "dead men," which means that the plaques present the public memory of the conflict as being solely about (male) combatants who died in violent circumstances to the exclusion of non-combatants, especially women and children as those who also experience conflict ("Commemorating") The androcentric nature of community memory in East Belfast is only reinforced by official heritage agencies who have chosen to focus on celebrating industrialization (East Belfast was the traditional shipbuilding and engineering area of the city) as well as the experiences of World War I (significant numbers of men from the area died at the Battle of Somme in 1916), without

considering how representations of both these experiences are read in their environment as reaffirming the overwhelming male nature of public space in the community. While official reports and government initiatives concentrate on countering various forms of paramilitary wall murals and flags being placed by enduring paramilitary groups to project power *within* their walled communities, there is a lack of consideration as to the intersections of various forms of place identity and why these one-dimensional and negative place identities have been able to develop unchallenged.

In contrast, an example from Nationalist, West Belfast shows there are other dynamics at play in the particular significance attached to the peace walls at Bombay Street, in the Clonard area. This particular peace wall is significant as it directly relates to events that occurred on that street on 14–15 Aug. 1969, which led to the burning of the predominantly Catholic street by a Protestant mob and the creation of the first semi-permanent peace walls in the city. Due to the specificity of the event that resulted in the creation of peace walls there are enduring feelings of victimhood and insecurity attached to these barriers as they were erected at times of civil unrest and these precedents are important. From one side, the neighboring Protestant communities and the security forces felt that their aggressive actions had prevented an armed uprising orchestrated by republican paramilitaries. On the other side, Catholic communities felt abandoned by the security forces to face rampaging Protestant vigilantes which resulted in many houses being burnt, people injured and one death (Mulholland 74). The burning of the area around Bombay Street was psychologically a momentous event for the Catholic community. It came to represent the realized threat of the Protestant mob, the long-repressed desire by Catholics for social justice, and, through the remobilization of the IRA in response, the resurrection of the use of physical force by nationalists (Coogan 88).

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Figure 5. The back yards of houses at Bombay Street, Falls Road side of the peace wall in West Belfast (L McAtackney 2014)

This is an important and loaded place, which continues to host an increasingly monumental peace wall that long ago replaced the bollards and razor wire originally situated to prevent violent interactions. The current peace wall is not only more meaningful to one side of the wall but it is also more present. The houses on the Catholic side of the wall are positioned right beside the wall [Figure 5] whereas the Protestant side of the wall has a road and dead space for a substantial distance before houses appears. These differences in proximity to the wall reflect the impact of stifling movement at fixed points for generations. On one side of the peace wall the community of the late 1960s has grown, whereas on the other side it has contracted. At this point in West Belfast, the peace wall snakes continuously between the two communities of the Falls (Catholic) and the Shankill (Protestant) for over 1.5 miles. One can walk alongside it at certain points, and cross it at others, but it also frequently disappears into recently constructed housing cul-de-sacs (including at Bombay Street, where traditional terraced houses were replaced by more conflict-averting defensive cul-de-sacs). Some green landscaping and grey abandoned zones occur alongside the peace walls but it mostly

physically divides very closely situated former neighbors that have moved closer to the wall on the Falls Road side and further from the wall on the Shankill side. The division created by peace walls was not neat and easily constructed and it did not appear overnight. However, it has been in place so long that it is difficult for the community to remember the times when they used to cross over into each other's communities. They have little idea of how they are differentially projecting their stories of the conflict onto the walls on either side [see Figure 6 for a view of Protestant, unionist identity on *the other side* of the wall].

Figure 6. Belfast City Council re-imaged mural placed on the Shankill Road side of the peace wall in West Belfast depicting aspects of Protestant, Loyalist culture while the names on the margins reference international precedents for segregation walls such as Berlin and Nicosia (L McAtackney 2014)

On entering Bombay Street, the memorialization of the peace walls is the main focus of the street through the brick structure of the "Clonard Martyrs' Memorial Garden." This structure is framed by a number of wall murals commemorating those from the locale who were killed during the Troubles (including one that

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is attached to the peace wall). The memorial purports to remember the community but in reality it indicates that memory is selective and hierarchical. Those members of the community killed by their own side are absent and plaques are divided into civilians and active combatants. The narrative of the memorial situates the community on *this side* of the wall as unequivocal victims of aggression from the other community and the security forces by referencing what happened on the street in 1969. The origins of the garden tell a nuanced story of memory creation in post-conflict Belfast. It was created by the Greater Clonard ex-Prisoners Association in 2000, two years after the signing of the Belfast Agreement) and the associated plaques were added on 11 Mar. 2001. The perspective of the ex-prisoners is evident through "the Republican ex-prisoners of the Greater Clonard" being given most prominence in the memorial. This is confirmed in an associated pamphlet, which one can buy from a box within the memorial garden, as it includes such articles as "'C" Company, 2nd Battalion, Belfast Brigade Oglaigh na h-Eireann Roll of Honour." There is only one article that relates to non-combatants: "Lists of Civilians Murdered by Loyalists and Crown Forces."

Figure 7. "Clonard Martyrs' Memorial on Bombay Street in West Belfast (L McAtackney 2011)

As is fitting for its location, the memorial is monumental as it nestles alongside the peace wall [Figure 7]. It is a permanent, tripartite structure with gates that can be locked but are frequently left open. The central area of the brick-built memorial holds a free-standing Celtic cross in the form of a common Irish gravestone type with the words "Clonard Martyrs" inscribed on it. The walls of the structure contain numerous plaques dedicated to "The people of the Greater Clonard" and "Republican Prisoners from the Greater Clonard Area," dating from various periods after the formation of the state of Northern Ireland in 1921 up to the early years after the Belfast Agreement. Of the seven plaques located throughout the garden only one is reserved for 'civilians,' whereas the other six specifically reference Republican paramilitary deaths from the 1920s onwards (cf to memorials in loyalist East Belfast, which tend to only commemorate [male] members of paramilitary groups). A number of flags flank the central and side compartments of the structure, including an Irish tricolor and a number of socialist flags. This memorial was created to be interacted with: as well as the gates generally remaining unlocked during the day there are a number of benches in the two side compartments and terracotta holders have been placed to hold debris. The area is clean, tidy, and well-cared-for and is a frequent visitor attraction for the various "black taxi tours" that have developed in the post-conflict context (see McDowell "Selling Conflict"). It is especially active during ex-prisoner commemorative events associated with republican anniversaries such as the anniversary of the Easter Rising or the deaths of republican hunger strikers. Geography is important–while it is located down a side street, the Clonard Martyrs' Memorial Garden was specifically sited because of the symbolism of Bombay Street and the continued existence of the peace walls. Its implicit claims of victimhood, representing the community, and condemnation of "loyalist death squads" from the other community are allowed to proliferate without dispute due to its conceptual as well as physical inaccessibility to those on the *other side* of the peace walls.

DISCUSSION

This article has attempted to do a number of things in its exploration of peace walls in contemporary Belfast. First, it has provided

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a broader context to a place that is often considered an anomaly but may in fact may be an important case-study in revealing the long-term implications of using walls in an attempt to prevent the movement and interaction of people for ideological reasons. Second, it moves beyond exploring the material and spatial quality of peace walls to displaying the implications of containing communities behind walls and the impact this can have on materializations of public memory. Last, it has shown that when communities are isolated and physically separated, this circumstance can facilitate the creation of unhelpful and androcentric skewed narratives at best, and 'fake histories' at worst, to be propagated in memorialization practices with little to no contradiction.

While Northern Ireland is often considered a very singular case-study in the Global North, it does contain elements that are not unique to its locale and should be taken as warnings of what can happen when walls are used to oppress or block community interactions. Using the examples of place identity in East Belfast and Clonard Martyrs Memorial Garden in West Belfast, it is clear that in both cases there has been an unfettered ability to curate public memory that focuses on particular experiences of conflict as being naturalized around particular narratives. This means that in East Belfast place identity is unremittingly androcentric, both in who is remembered and how they are remembered, to the exclusion of women's experiences of conflict or peace. In West Belfast, Bombay Street is used to explicitly articulate narratives of victimhood that relate back to events that occurred that precipitated the creation of the peace wall at the very beginning of the conflict without any reflection as to what happened afterwards. Both of these narratives are unhelpful for different reasons but most particularly because they retain and reinforce segregation and have resulted in place identities that have remained unchallenged due to the materiality of peace walls, which allow them to be created, maintained, and uncritiqued by *the other side*.

This case-study potentially has wider implications. Living in a world where walls have increasingly been turned to as a first resort in order to deal with issues of security, especially given the pronouncements of Donald Trump, we can forget that ideological walls are not new and they are not all materially the same. Walls are articulated as being naturalized structures that date

back through the mists of time and as markers of protection, they are positive constructions for those who wish to be secured from those outside (see Dey). The desire to build material barriers to protect those inside and prohibit the movement of those outside is not a new one, but one must question the role of walls if they are proliferating with this express intention. Following Marcuse, walls should only be built if their aim is to "welcome and shelter," but not to "exclude and oppress, or isolate and confine" (50). Negative walls will ultimately become a symbol for subversion—be that covertly, through bypassing them, or overtly, through using them as a canvas for protest. Ultimately, they will follow the fate of all such walls through history—they will fall. In the meantime, the Belfast case-study reveals that the impact of walls is not straightforward and is not always predictable. Walls not only curtail negative interactions but they prevent everyday interactions that can lead to allowing public memory to become excessively localized and exclusionary of not just *the other side* but also substantial groups within their own community.

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WALLS THAT BRIDGE

Or, What We Can Learn from the Roman Walls

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THE AURELIAN WALLS AS "ANCHORAGE"

If you google the words "Aurelian walls," right after the customary Wikipedia entries in both Italian and English, and a third reference to the *A View on Cities* website, you will find a fourth listing titled "Aurelian Walls Taxi Question" with a link to a *TripAdvisor* page.[1] There you can read the following:

> Hi everyone,
> I am trying to find out which territory is considered to be within the Aurelian wall. According to the airports' website adr.it/web/aeroporti-di-roma-en-/pax-fco-taxi and Comune di Roma www.comune.roma.it/wps/portal/pcr... if you take a taxi from the airports (Fiumicino and Ciampino) to any address within the Aurelian walls the fee is fixed. So, I am trying to understand which parts of Rome are currently within the walls.

This may seem a trivial question, but in fact it discloses an interesting truth. Even though in their everyday life contemporary Romans are unlikely to devote much of their thinking to the majesty of a more-than-seventeen-centuries-old wall, two thirds of which are still intact, the Aurelian walls continue in many ways to be central to the identity of the Eternal City. In a fascinating study of what she describes as three nodes of the "Network of Global Cities"—*Città e Limes: Roma–Beijing–New York*—Italian architect Anna Irene Del Monaco argues that:

1. I wish to thank S. Masturah Alatas for her careful reading of a previous draft of this essay.

> the historical borders [*limes*] of cities are among the founding physical elements of all subsequent urban transformations. And therefore, urban walls, whether natural or artificial, having defined in the past the physical and symbolical shape of the city, and having sustained their identity, are the place of modern transformations that reverberate in any subsequent decision ("Introduzione," my translation).

Del Monaco is referring primarily to the way the urban development of what she describes as "anchored" cities (as opposed to the unanchored megalopolis of a more recent history) has been influenced by the shape designed by their original *limes*, but she also helps us make sense of such a "subsequent decision" as that of setting a fixed fee for taxis running between the airport and any location within the Aurelian walls. Regardless of the actual distance from the airport, if the address you are trying to reach is within the perimeter of the walls—within the old *centro storico* of Rome, that is—you will pay a set fee (at the time of this writing, 40 euros). The Aurelian walls may no longer defend Romans—if they ever did—from the barbarians' invasions, but they now defend both locals and tourists from being overcharged when they take a taxi from the airport to the city.[2]

Before I say something more on the continuing importance of the Aurelian walls to Rome's identity, let me offer some basic information about the history of the city's perimetral fortifications. The Roman walls that still stand today began to be built under Emperor Aurelian in 271 A.D., as he was concerned with the threat posed by Germanic tribes pushing along the borders of the Empire. For centuries, the military might of Rome had been such that no one felt the need for a protective wall. Imperial Rome had long outgrown the older, fourth century B.C. Republican Wall, also known as *Mura Serviane*, after the king Servio Tullio, the one who, according to tradition, erected the walls to replace the much older *Mura Romulee*, a quadrangular structure covering 285 hectars, named after Romulus, the mythical founder of Rome, in 753 B.C. As you can see from the map in fig. 1, though covering a much larger area, the Aurelian walls—the ones marked in black—are

2. Rome was sacked by the Visigoths in 410, by the Vandals in 455, and by the Goths in 472. Then was again invaded by the Normans under Robert Guiscard in 1084 and by the mutinous troops of Holy Roman Emperor Charles V in 1527. ("Sack of Rome").

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anchored (in del Monaco's terminology) to the older Servian walls (marked in red), and move the *limes* of the old Republican city a bit further, by and large following the physical features of the terrain, as for example, with the river Tiber, on the left of the map.



Figure 1: The Aurelian walls

As attested by Plutarch's description of the mythical founding of Rome by Romulus, the tracing of the city's *limes*—the borders that preceded the erection of walls or palisades—was a liturgical act. Here is a relevant passage from Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*:

> the founder, having shod a plough with a brazen ploughshare, and having yoked to it a bull and a cow, himself drove a deep furrow round the boundary lines, while those who followed after him had to turn the clods, which the plough threw up, inwards towards the city, and suffer no clod to lie turned outwards. With this line they mark out the course of the wall, and it is called, by contraction, "pomerium," that is, "post murum," *behind* or *next the wall.* And where they purposed to put in a gate, there they took the share out of the ground, lifted the plough over, and left a vacant space. And this is the reason why they regard all the wall as sacred except the gates; but if they held the gates sacred, it would not be possible, without religious scruples, to bring into and send out of the city things which are necessary, and yet unclean.

The *walls* marked a sacred line that could not be crossed, as opposed to the *gates*, those openings where things both clean and "unclean"

could go through without bringing disgrace to the city. It was forbidden to climb over the walls. The penalty for such an act, according to the jurist Pomponius, was capital punishment. Indeed, some sources suggest that Rhemus was killed precisely because he had dared *murum trascendere*: he had crossed the border traced by his brother Romulus (Rosada 366–68).

However, while the Republican walls initially drew "a boundary that separates different territories and designates the city as a completely distinct physical place, different from, or even inimical to, the space outside," later, "under the empire, the whole concept of separation began to lose its meaning with the massive expansion along the consular roads with their imperial and senatorial country estates" (Del Monaco, Abstract, English in the original). Even when the Aurelian walls were built and Rome had perhaps two million inhabitants,

> only a part lived within the circuit of the Aurelian walls; afterwards the city began to shrink until in the darkest days of the middle ages, the population numbered little more than fifteen thousand, clustered near the Tiber, at some distance from the imperial city walls, from which they were separated by ancient abandoned ruins, orchards and meadows (Del Monaco, Abstract, English in the original).

Though they could not always keep invaders at bay, the walls retained their primary defensive and military purpose until the Unification of Italy and the annexation of Rome, in 1870, to the newly founded Kingdom of Italy. Thus, over a brief period, the walls went

> from being a still-functional military structure to being romantically isolated from the modern context of the city, and very often desecrated as obstacles to the spread of the infrastructure of the modern city. Despite this, however, the role performed by the Roman city walls in the formation of the modern city has been significant and clearly visible .... In fact, during the urban development of Rome, the new road systems, such as the Great Outer Ring Road, the railways, the city bypasses, all re-echo the circuit of the original Aurelian walls; even when increasingly distant, their layout and routes follow the radiocentric pattern and geography of the territory of Rome. (Del Monaco, Abstract, English in the original)

Simply put, as Del Monaco insists, the city's *limites* are a place of both continuity and change. The identity of the city depends

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on them, but it also grows *out* of them, moving further on, just as the Roman consular roads, originating from the *Milliarium aureum*, a "monument, probably of marble or gilded bronze, erected by the Emperor Caesar Augustus near the Temple of Saturn in the central Forum of Ancient Rome" ("Milliarium"; see fig. 2), reached out to the provinces, thereby redefining the character of Roman civilization.

Figure 2: Milliarum Aureum

These roads were of course instrumental to the building of the empire, and made possible the erection of further walls, from Northern Italy all the way to Hadrian's Wall, to which I would like to come back at the end, as its history seems to support the idea that walls—viewed in a historical perspective—are about separating territories and peoples as much as they are about connecting them. This may not be so surprising if we think that the Latin word *limes* had a double meaning. On the one hand, it meant "border," "limit," "dividing line." On the other, it was a synonym for "road" or "way," as was the case with the Germanic-Augustan *limes* running along the Lippe river, instrumental to the creation of the new province of the Empire. The argument I wish to develop here, therefore, is that the lesson the *Mura Romane* can teach us

is a simple but very important one, especially today, when so many governments around the world wish to build or reinforce existing geopolitical borders. "Walls"—by which I mean both man-made structures and physical or even conceptual borders—can be seen as integral to the effort of constructing both individual and collective identities of various sorts, but this does not mean their function is simply exclusionary or protective. Walls and borders may be necessary to put some order in what William James famously described as the "one great blooming, buzzing confusion" (462) of the world, not so much because they are meant to keep out "others" but because they set the preconditions for setting up meaningful relations with them. Dividing lines between what we now call Mexico and the US, or Europe and Africa, have always existed (the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo and the Mediterranean Sea) but their role was not so much to exclude as to connect, which is also why all attempts to turn such borders into trenches (Trump's wall or Fortress Europe) are doomed to fail.

WALLS VERSUS BRIDGES

References to walls in current political discourse tend to emphasize only one meaning—that of walls as barriers erected to separate people. Even before the US election, Pope Francis stated that, "A person who thinks only about building walls, wherever they may be, and not building bridges, is not Christian. This is not in the gospel" (Bever). Francis has repeated this concept several times, thus echoing a metaphor that was a favorite with another illustrious Catholic, Giorgio La Pira, for many years the mayor of Florence and very active in promoting world peace during the nineteen-fifties and sixties. "Unify the world. That is the—sole—problem of today; to unify it building bridges everywhere and bringing down walls everywhere" (La Pira). Francis' words have been interpreted as a not-so-indirect critique of Trump's projected wall along the US-Mexico border, but they were also meant to call attention to that other water "wall" between Northern Africa and Southern Europe, where thousands have died and continue to die every day by trying to cross it. *Ponti. Non muri—Bridges. Not walls* has become the slogan of both religious and left-leaning organizations active

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in bringing assistance to political and economic refugees fleeing from war, hunger, and misery to Europe.

On the opposite side of the political spectrum, many of the same voices that a few decades ago celebrated the fall of the Berlin wall, today are clamoring for the need to protect Europe from being invaded by Africans, Arabs, Asians, and so forth. As the controversial young Italian philosopher Diego Fusaro has observed, however, one should be careful not to reify bridges as being always about connecting peoples in a good way. He refers in particular to Xerxes' famous pontoon bridges—mentioned by both Herodotus and Aeschylus—whose purpose was to lead the Persian army to the conquest of Greece, an act no one would describe as friendly. Though Fusaro can be criticized on many counts, I think it would be hard to deny that he is right when he writes that "bridges and walls are not inherently good or evil. There are historical periods and contexts in which walls may be necessary and others in which it is good to go over them" (Fusaro, my translation).[3]

A similar, though better articulated impatience with the conceptual and political simplifications of an otherwise worthy slogan have been expressed in an article by the Benedictine monk Giulio Meiattini. Walls, Meiattini writes, are too often used to discriminate and separate, but walls are also what our own homes are made of. Walls are about identity in both a conceptual and a very material sense. The image of the bridge to help people cross over is suggestive, no doubt, but once people have reached their destination, they too need homes, they too need to be protected from cold and heat, they too need a circumscribed space where they can lead their daily lives. Meiattini believes the *door* to be a more suggestive and flexible image for the kind of open, though always discerning connection between inside and outside, between "me" and "you," or "us" and "them."

Meiattini is by no means condoning the language of those xenophobes and right-wingers who argue that we are being "invaded" by refugees who wish to impose upon us "their" customs and lifestyles, and perhaps also their backward religious mores. He is,

3. Though Fusaro claims to be a Marxist and has written extensively on Marx and communism, he is also on record for endorsing or at the very least justifying various forms of right-wing "anti-capitalism."

however, reminding us that if "walls" stand for "borders," much as we would want to live in a borderless world with no passports and no checkpoints, we would not want to live in an *undifferentiated*, flat world emptied of local identities and histories.[4] His reasoning runs parallel to Del Monaco's emphasis on the significance of the Aurelian walls: even though the latter are no longer a defensive structure and they have been by and large merged into the landscape of Rome or reverberated, as she writes, onto other urban developments such as the Great Outer Ring Road or the railway circling the greater city of Rome, those borders continue to define the identity of the city.[5] The Aurelian walls

4. In his controversial *Against the Double Black Mail*, writing about the refugee crisis, Slavoj Žižek argues that while it is impossible for Europeans to "pull up the drawbridge and let Africans and Arabs solve their own problems," it is also impossible for Europe "to "open its door widely." I believe that while Žižek is by and large correct when he argues that an indiscriminate open-door policy "would trigger an instant populist revolt in Europe," he is in more than one way wrong to maintain that "The greatest hypocrites are those who advocate open borders.... They play the Beautiful Soul, which feels superior to the corrupted world while secretly participating it." Who are Žižek's "Beautiful Souls"? Certainly not the moderate or liberal parties he seems to have in mind when he castigates the "left," as these parties by no means "advocate open borders." To the contrary, "left" or "liberal" parties like the Italian Partito Democratico have very often taken a line that is only minimally different from that of openly right-wing formations. See, for example, the agreement that at the time of this writing (September 2017), the Italian government has signed with Libya—an agreement that even the U.N. has denounced as de facto permitting Libyan authorities to lock up migrants in detention centers where human rights violations are the norm (see "EU 'turning blind eye'"). This is not to say that Žižek is wrong in posing the problem of how to reconcile a public opinion whose xenophobic feelings can be easily whipped up by the media, with the pressing need to save lives (in the terms of this essay, how to reconcile bridges with walls). I agree with him that no lasting solution can be found under the current global geo-political and economic conditions, and that the only way to address the refugee and migration crisis is by rebuilding from the foundations up a more just world order, but the people who are drowning every single day in the Mediterranean must be saved *now*.

5. Another way in which the walls of Rome have become part of the city's biography is through the significance of some of their gates (*porte*), which besides being often architecturally and aesthetically interesting, are also markers of important historical events. One need only think of *Porta Pia*, where the Italian army clashed on September 20, 1870, with the Pope's soldiers,

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have long lost any significance as protective barriers, but they continue to provide a pattern around which the city's evolving identity can "anchor" itself. This is one of the reasons why I think that one of the most interesting recent filmic representations of the Eternal City is not so much Paolo Sorrentino's internationally acclaimed and Oscar-winning *Grande Bellezza*, but Gianfranco Rosi's *Sacro Gra*, the winner of the Golden Lion at the Venice Film Festival in 2013, a documentary that shows the lives of people living in the peripheries flanking the *Grande Raccordo Anulare* (Rome's main ring road)—that is, along what could very well be described as the new "walls" of Rome, where the lives of so many people living literally on the margins of the city unfold, far away from the postcard scenes punctuating Sorrentino's otherwise interesting film.

WALLS, BOUNDARIES, IDENTITIES

Before I proceed, however, I need to remind readers that my field of expertise is not Roman history but American literature, and it is perhaps mostly to my Americanist self that Meiattini's words of caution regarding the unconditional praise of bridges versus walls make a good deal of sense. As my colleague Alessandro Portelli wrote in a seminal essay published in the inaugural issue of Ácoma (the Italian journal of American studies I have been coediting for many years now), US culture and its literature are very much about the desire to overcome borders and confines of any kind, be they physical or conceptual. Portelli's essay uses as its first epigraph an exemplary quotation from Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay, "Circles": "Limitation is the only sin." This American enthusiasm for never-ending expansion, which may be traced from the early explorers to *Star Trek* ("Space, the final frontier," are the memorable lines that preceded all episodes chronicling the exploits of the spaceship *Enterprise*), is both admirable and troublesome. It is a source of inspiration for the bohemian

thus wresting Rome from the Vatican's control and making of it the capital of the new state. Another landmark event in recent history is the heroic resistance that the Italian military and civil volunteers put up at *Porta San Paolo* on September 10, 1943, as they tried to prevent the German army from occupying Rome.

lives on the road of Jack London, Woody Guthrie, and Jack Jerouac, but it also finds expression in the imperial expansion over the continent of the historical United States, in its limitless desire to impose its will (claiming it was for their own good, of course) on other peoples and other lands.

According to Portelli, this endless expansion of America has the paradoxical effect of loosening the borders of the country to such a point that the latter is at least imaginatively "invaded" by other expanding or resisting subjects. From the Puritans' witches to McCarthy's communists, from the fear of slave revolts or Indian uprisings to the anxiety generated by organizations such as the Black Panthers Party and the American Indian Movement, American history and culture is haunted by the fear of being assaulted by an internal enemy, by those who would erect "walls" to the unlimited extension of its imperial design. That is one of the reasons why, while for the most part I am all for bridges and very much against walls, when it comes to, say, American Indian reservations, I think some "walls" may be necessary to keep non-Indian intruders out. Visitors may be welcome, but they should enter through doors, not by smashing walls (as they often do, in the guise of corporations, real estate developers, oil companies, and so forth).

What I am trying to suggest may be further clarified by referring to two moments in American literature that Portelli does not mention but which, I think, could very well be assimilated into his argument. In his famous "quarterdeck speech" in Chapter 36 of *Moby-Dick*, Captain Ahab, after stating that "All visible objects, man, are but as pasteboard masks," goes on to add that "in each event—in the living act, the undoubted deed—there, some unknown but still reasoning thing puts forth the mouldings of its features from behind the unreasoning mask. If man will strike, strike through the mask! How can the prisoner reach outside except by thrusting through the wall? To me, the white whale is that wall, shoved near to me. Sometimes I think there's naught beyond. But 'tis enough" (159). One may describe Ahab's desire to smash the White-Whale-as-wall as a textbook illustration of the *Pequod* captain's imperialist desire to accept no limits to the expansion of his thirst for domination over the world of men and nature.

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But if Ahab may be considered, in Melville's own words, as "a Khan of the plank, and a king of the sea, and a great lord of Leviathans" (130), his refusal of limitations has at times appeared—for example to Jorge Luis Borges—as heroic as Dante's Ulysses' daring flight in search of *virtute e canoscenza* (virtue and knowledge). Melville himself, in "Bartleby, a story of *Wall* Street" (my emphasis), described the confinement behind walls as deadly and claustrophobic. Walls, in that story, threaten those who, like Bartleby, are forced to live *behind* them. Smashing them, in this case, does not so much suggest imperialist appropriation as an act of liberation. If, as in my example of American Indian reservations, or in Portelli's analogous reference to the idea that "Good is knowing when to stop" (words uttered by Baby Suggs in Toni Morrison's *Beloved*, which he uses as the article's second epigraph), "walls" are needed to sustain the sense of who we are—to shore up the "homes" of our own individual and collective selves—they can also turn our homes into prisons. Once again, the significance of walls both as reality and as symbol can only be assessed dialectically.

That this should be the case is effectively illustrated by the second example I wish to call attention to: the often quoted poem by Robert Frost, "Mending Wall," a text that critically interrogates the notion that "good fences make good neighbors," though it simultaneously sustains the cultural, psychological, and perhaps sociological value of "mending" walls rather than doing altogether away with them. As Richard Poirier has argued in his magisterial analysis of the poem,

> Though the speaker may or may not think that good neighbors are made by good fences, it is abundantly clear that he likes the yearly ritual "outdoor game" by which fences are made. Because if fences do not "make good neighbors" the "*making*" of fences can. More is "made" in this "outdoor game" than fences. The two men also "make" talk, or at least that is what the speaker tries to do as against the reiterated assertions of his companion, which are as heavily limited as the wall itself. (105)

Walls in this poem take on a completely different meaning from that assigned to them by contemporary political discourse. Rather than barriers for separating people, they are spaces where people meet and enter dialogue. Frost's wall is an impermanent construction requiring constant repair because "something there

is that doesn't love a wall" (Frost 33). Whatever that "something" might be—hunters, the forces of nature and time—it is an incentive to rethink the wall, and wonder what one is "walling in or walling out." Thus, for Poirier (and I agree with him), the "real significance" of "Mending Wall" "is that it suggests how much for Frost freedom is contingent upon some degree of restriction. More specifically, it can be said that restrictions, or forms, are a precondition for expression. Without them, even nature ceases to offer itself up for a reading" (104). That is why, perhaps, Ahab needs to conceptualize the White Whale as a wall, while Ishmael is overwhelmed with terror at the idea of the "indefiniteness" of whiteness, whose "dumb blankness" brings to his mind "the heartless voids and immensities of the universe" (Melville 184)

I realize that at this point one may begin to suspect that my argument so far may provide conceptual ammunition to those who warn us that while projects such as Trump's wall with Mexico may be both politically and ethically wrong, and doomed to fail as all other great or small walls have throughout history, doing away with borders is not a real option and some sort of "walls" must continue to exist. I want to state unambiguously that I strongly believe that borders should be open to welcome every single individual fleeing from human and natural catastrophes, or simply seeking a better life, and that I understand that migrations have been one of the defining features of the species *homo sapiens* since time immemorial. At the same time, however, individual and collective identities depend on boundaries that can and should be flexible, but cannot be done altogether away with. As Jacques Derrida (101–140) taught us a long time ago, even *naming* someone is to trace a boundary around an individual, but while, as Derrida insists, naming is a potentially violent act—a primary instance of the violence of the letter—it would be hard to imagine living in a world of nameless people. Moreover, as we move from individual to collective boundaries, we would do well to keep in mind that in our globalized world the destruction of collective identities is all too often the prelude to the triumph of the only logic that nowadays remains unchallenged: the logic of the market and of capitalist accumulation. Ignoring how globalization, wars, and mass migrations are often inextricably intertwined can only

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facilitate the rise of nationalistic, extremely xenophobic right-wing formations such as the French Front National or the Italian Northern League on the one hand, and the strengthening of Islamic and other fundamentalisms on the other.

Considering these concerns, I find Italian philosopher Roberto Esposito's work on the relationship between what he calls *communitas* versus *immunitas*, especially useful. In his exploration of "the origin and destiny of community," Esposito has called into question the belief that what holds a community together is "a property," or a "territory" that a specific people would guard and protect from the intrusions of outsiders. By calling attention to the etymology of the word *munus*—gift or debt—Esposito argues that what holds a *communitas* (*cum-munus*) together is the reciprocal indebtedness of individuals to each other.

> [T]he common is not characterized by what is proper but by what is improper, or even more drastically, by the other; by a voiding [*svuotamento*], be it partial or whole, of property into its negative.... In the community, subjects do not find a principle of identification nor an aseptic enclosure within which they can establish transparent communication or even a content to be communicated. They don't find anything else except that void, that distance, that extraneousness that constitutes them as being missing from themselves (*Communitas* 8).

While the term *communitas* has therefore a positive meaning, as it calls for gift-giving and mutual caring, immunity "implies the exemption from or the derogation of such a condition of gift-giving. He is immune who is safe from obligations or dangers that concern everyone else" (Interview 50).

In his work Esposito traces not only how this "immunitary paradigm" has traveled through disciplines as diverse as anthropology, theology, medicine, and legal studies, but has been extended also from the individual to larger collective bodies. "All societies, as well as all individuals, have been concerned with assuring their own survival with respect to the risk of environmental or inter-human contamination." In the language of the present essay, one could say that all societies have erected walls to "immunize" themselves from the threat of the outside but, as Esposito insists, "such a protection, when pushed beyond a certain limit, forces life into a sort of prison or armoring in which what we lose is not

only freedom, but also the real sense of individual and collective existence" (Interview 51). Paradoxically, what is meant to safeguard a community turns into the poison that risks infecting its water wells. If on the one hand some "walling in" is required to hold both individuals and societies together, we should beware that our "walling out" does not turn medicine into venom. If one thinks of how the EU has responded to the ongoing refugee crisis of the last few years, one is offered a virtual textbook illustration of the dangers Esposito mentions. Failure to respond effectively to what is perceived as a threat to the "health" of Europe has fueled desires of immunization whose net result is the coming apart of the European project of an open space of tolerance and integration. As Esposito himself has noted elsewhere, "a community that wishes to immunize itself in regard to its original openness, ends up closing in on itself, thus risking implosion" (Esposito and Bauman, November 11, 2014 letter).

WALL BLUES

Of late, in response to both Trump's projected wall and fantasies of a fortressed Europe, numerous historians have called attention to the failure of dividing walls throughout history. In an article in the *Washington Post*, for example, Cornell University archeologist Adam T. Smith has noted that attempts to block peoples' movements through the erection of walls, starting with the fortifications of the city of Ur at the end of the third millennium B.C. all the way to the Berlin wall, are records of spectacular practical failures, not to mention their often-enormous moral, economic, and political costs. According to Smith, what makes the case of a Roman wall especially interesting, I have not yet mentioned, is precisely the fact that "it was never intended to cease the everyday flow of people across the border." Hadrian's Wall,

> initiated by the Roman emperor Hadrian in A.D. 122 across the northern boundary of the province of Britannia [...] became an important entrepôt for trade and a funnel for population movement. The strategic objectives of Hadrian's 73-mile wall were to provide the military infrastructure for parrying violent attacks from the north and to define the symbolic limits of the Roman world.

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As another scholar has also noted, "Hadrian's Wall was not a defensive structure. The Roman army at the time did not fight behind fixed defences [...] the wall, like other great Roman frontier monuments was as much a propaganda statement as a functional facility" (Faulkner). Of course, propaganda is neither innocent nor necessarily harmless, but it is worth considering that the term derives from the Latin *propagare*, where *pro* is forward and *pagare* has its roots in *pagere* o *pangere*, which means *to fix*, *to consolidate*. The root of the verb is *pag*, deriving in turn from the Sanskrit *pac*, meaning *to tie*, *to bind*, as in *pact* or the Latin *pax* (peace). The peace we are speaking of may well be the Augustan Pax Romana—the peace imposed by the mighty—but whatever its limitations, it evokes a scenario where dialogue is possible and the human voice may be stronger than the iron of the centurions' swords and spears. If we are to believe what Smith writes, Hadrian's wall was meant to regulate and direct, but not to arrest the movements of peoples. It was a *limes* where, as the Roman world ended another one began blurring the lines between the Empire and its others.

Hadrian's wall has proven to be the occasion for what is probably the best-known poetic statements on a Roman wall in the English language, W. H. Auden's poem-song "Roman Wall Blues." Originally the text was part of a radio play commissioned in 1937 by the BBC, whose aim was to instruct listeners on the history of Roman Briton in general and of Hadrian's Wall, specifically. The transcript of the play, its only surviving trace, included, along with the narrator's, also the voices of modern-day tourists as well as those of actors impersonating Scottish rebels and Roman soldiers contemporaneous with the Wall's construction. What is nowadays mostly remembered as a poem, is the only part of the original screenplay that Auden chose to preserve and publish, but was originally a song, with a musical score by Benjamin Britten, which, long believed to be lost, has only recently been rediscovered.[6] Auden's text is briefly but incisively analyzed in an essay by Susannah Young-ah Gottlieb, but before I refer to her reading, the poem must be quoted in full:

6. The first minute of a modern recording by singer Mary Carewe and pianist Huw Watkins can now be listened to for free on the NMC Recordings website (https://www.nmcrec.co.uk/recording/britten-america).

Over the heather the wet wind blows,
I've lice in my tunic and a cold in my nose.

The rain comes pattering out of the sky,
I'm a Wall soldier, I don't know why.

The mist creeps over the hard grey stone,
My girl's in Tungria; I sleep alone.

Aulus goes hanging around her place,
I don't like his manners, I don't like his face.

Piso's a Christian, he worships a fish;
There'd be no kissing if he had his wish.

She gave me a ring but I diced it away;
I want my girl and I want my pay.

When I'm a veteran with only one eye
I shall do nothing but look at the sky. (Auden 94)

In her interpretation, Gottlieb perceptively underlines the way in which Auden undermines certain traditional distinctions (between inside and outside, friend an enemy) by focusing on other, to the poet more interesting ones, such as the division between the soldier's "eros-filled life and the absence of erotic pleasure in the life of his Christian acquaintance," as well as "the temporal difference between the period of enforced service … and the period of freedom" (Gottlieb 157). By shifting his attention from what the wall supposedly separates (civilization from savagery) to the right and left sides of the soldier's face, Gottlieb suggests, Auden calls into question which side of the wall stands for vision and which would represent blindness. The poem's "anti-wall" stance is effectively summed up in the final lines, pointing to "the ultimate object of the Wall soldier's desire: the sky, not as a place of heavenly rest but as a space without boundaries, especially those imposed by walls" (Gottlieb 157).

This reading of the poem is sustained by the fact that Auden's "Roman Wall Blues" often appears in lists of anti-war songs and poems. Still, one may want to observe that the metaphor of the sky as a wall-free space also implies that such a space would be one where humans may dwell only in the imagination. We can be completely free only in the sky, the very place, alas, where our earthly bodies cannot make their home. This is not to say that we should stop desiring to make, in the language of the poem, our

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earth resemble the sky as much as we possibly can. We may not be able to inhabit the sky, but looking at it the Wall soldier is able to express his uneasiness at the canonical divisions of the culture he belongs to. The poem's Wall is therefore a space where identities, rather than being mechanically restated, are interrogated and renegotiated –a "contact zone,"" to use Mary Louise Pratt's influential concept, where human relations should not be treated "in terms of separateness, but in terms of co-presence, interaction, interlocking understandings and practices" (8). Also in Auden's poem–as in Frost's–we are encouraged to wonder what we "are walling in or walling out," and *why*. Far from being simply a dividing or exclusionary line, the Wall provides the occasion for rethinking our identities: for asking ourselves what is the meaning of what we believe and do. We may erect walls or trace borders in order to cut ourselves away from others, but as we do so we also acknowledge our intimate connection to what or whom we wish to leave out.

There is a scene in the last episode of Nanni Moretti's film *Caro Diario*, which in my view provides a wonderfully compact allegory of what I am trying to get at, and I would like to conclude by turning to it also because the scene takes place along the Aurelian walls with which I began. Indeed, I believe that the scene is especially meaningful precisely because it is filmed in front of those Roman walls that should have ideally protected the cradle of civilization from the barbarians pressing at the gates. The film director and protagonist is riding gingerly on his blue Vespa when suddenly he sees actress Jennifer Beals and film director Alexander Rockwell taking a stroll along the Aurelian walls. He stops to ask the woman whether she is indeed Jennifer Beals of *Flashdance* fame, but he is no regular fan hunting for an autograph. As soon as he sees that Beals understands Italian, Moretti starts to pour out his regret for not having ever learned to dance, and then asks her whether the shoes she wears are as comfortable as they look. His behavior is so strange that Beals tells Rockwell that maybe the guy is "a feet maniac" but that in any case they should just stay calm as the fellow is not dangerous–he is just "off." In a surreal conversation where English and Italian are constantly mixed, Moretti asks whether by "off" they mean *pazzo*–crazy. Beals

reassures him that they don't think he is crazy—he's just "off," and at that point she enters a discussion with Rockwell about what "off" really means in English and how it might be best translated into a language of which she does not have a complete command.

The conversation diffuses what is initially perceived as a potential confrontation between people not only speaking different languages but also on completely different wavelengths (and by the way, here the potential aggressor is the local, the Roman, not the outsiders). Filmed against the background of the majestic walls, the scene seems to evoke the notion of separateness only to show that "walls" are places where people from diverse linguistic, emotional, and cultural backgrounds can gather to "translate" themselves by interrogating not only the other's language, but also their own. Paradoxically, while in the intention of those who construct them, walls are usually meant to separate, they can end up providing the occasion for bringing people together—if people, of course, are able to grasp the provisional nature of their individual and collective identities and are therefore willing to work against what Pratt identifies as the "radically asymmetrical relations of power" that have historically characterized the colonial "contact zones" (6–7).[7] It is only if those power relations are seriously and fundamentally challenged that walls and bridges may turn out to be not the opposite of each other, but two moments of a dialectical restructuring of the world we live in.

7 I suppose that another way of putting this would be to say that, so revised, Pratt's contact zone would begin to look more like Richard White's "middle ground": a terrain where "a process of mutual and creative misunderstandings" unfolds in a situation marked by "an inability of one side to commandeer enough force to compel the other to do what it desired" (xii).

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FENCE WALLS

From the Iron Curtain to the US and Hungarian Border Barriers and the Emergence of Global Walls

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INTRODUCTION

Good fences may make good neighbors, as the proverbial saying goes, but the building of a concrete wall along the entire length of the US–Mexican border proposed by Donald Trump upon officially announcing his candidacy for the presidency on June 16, 2015 led to widespread indignation in the US, Mexico, and Latin America at large, auguring badly for inter-American relations. The border barrier issue, however, has been poisoning US–Mexican and inter-American relations since 1993 when Democratic President Clinton ordered the construction of a 13-mile/21-km border wall between San Diego and Tijuana. Since then some 700 miles/1,100 km of border fence and wall sections have been built mostly during Democratic President Obama's administrations (2009–2017) in line with the 2006 Secure Fence Act as signed by Republican President George W. Bush and enjoying bipartisan support.[1] That still leaves two-thirds of the border unfenced. Republican President Trump's border wall would be the culmination of a process that has been going on for twenty-five years and has, in fact, shown more continuity than difference over the various administrations in the White House. Due to the increasing militarization of the Border Patrol and the growth in the number of unauthorized border crossing-related deaths,[2] domestic and international

1. "Latin American Reaction."
2. Reece Jones's *Violent Borders* offers a remarkable overview of developments on the US–Mexican border. The Border Patrol has found more than

opposition to the US border barrier have often made references to the 'Iron Curtain' in North America and its cutting a continent in half. But President Trump's border wall plans—to some a promise, to others a threat—have invited the most vociferous criticism and backlash so far,[3] and the Iron Curtain analogy got settled in the media without much questioning of the appropriateness of the comparison. The gross mistake of comparing the protective border fences against unauthorized entry with the prison wall-like border fences against unauthorized exit went unnoticed in the American and Western media.[4] Simultaneously, however, the Iron Curtain metaphor made an even bigger comeback in the region of its original location: the heart of Europe.

A METAPHOR AT WORK

While most of the world, and Europe in particular, was reading the news about the proposition of candidate Trump in disbelief, the very next day, on June 17, 2015, the Hungarian right-of-center government of Viktor Orbán announced the building of a border fence along Hungary's southern Schengen border with Serbia—where the Iron Curtain used to run—in response to the European migrant crisis going strong since 2014. The idea of a fence wall originated with László Toroczkai, then vice-president of the right-wing populist Jobbik Party and mayor of Ásotthalom, a village of 4,000 people

6,000 bodies since the 1990s, but estimates are two additional deaths for every recovered body. The continuous rise in border deaths is largely the result of the construction of the border wall and the massive border patrol presence that also involves the use of deadly force by agents. The latter caused the death of 33 migrants between 2010–2015. The first National Border Patrol Strategy document, released in 1994, predicted that "with traditional entry and smuggling routes disrupted, illegal traffic will be deterred, or forced over more hostile terrain, less suited for crossing and more suited for enforcement." Each year since the 1990s, the Tucson, Arizona coroner's office has reported a twentyfold increase in the number of migrant bodies recovered (*Violent Borders*, Ch. 2).

3. Silko 4; Schmidt; "Bush Signs"; "Fox dice"; Felbab-Brown; Andreas xi; Regal; "Trump Mexico Wall"; Jacobo and Marshall; Quinn; Huetlin.

4. Except for political science professor Paul G. Kengor's article, "America's 'Berlin Wall'?" on the incorrect use of the Iron Curtain/Berlin Wall metaphor in relation to the US–Mexican border fence, I could not trace writings addressing the issue either in English or in Spanish.

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just 6 mi/10 km from the border that was hard-hit by the chaotic and threatening influx of thousands of unauthorized migrants transiting through the village daily. Despite his aversion to fence walls, Toroczkai started lobbying for them in the fall of 2014 since he saw no other solution to restore law and order and to normalize the increasingly tense situation in the region. As examples of effective fence walls, he drew on the US–Mexico and Bulgarian–Turkish border barriers in place since the 1990s and 2013 respectively.[5] Domestic opposition and international critics immediately turned to the Iron Curtain metaphor in this case too.[6] From the moment Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán announced the border fence onwards, US President Donald Trump and Orbán have often been compared with regards to their views on border security and migration.[7] The parallels drawn between the two heads of state, one leading a global superpower and the other a regional small power, have marked a truly unprecedented moment of US–Hungarian relations. The protection of borders and national interests with walls and fences prompted many, nationally and internationally alike, to draw analogies with the Iron Curtain, which both powers—no matter how disparate they may be—had a historically intimate relation with.

The US faced the Iron Curtain on the inner-German border and in West Berlin. It assisted escapees from behind the Iron Curtain with generous refugee admissions, and its staunch anti-Communism contributed to tearing down the fences cutting through Europe. Hungary lived the life of captive nations behind the Iron Curtain

5. Serdült; Lengyel; Lyman; "The Indisputable Success."

6. "Vasfüggöny a szerb–magyar határon"; "Botka ismét"; Bershidsky; Karasz; "A New Iron Curtain in Europe"; "Successful Hungarian Border Fence"; Rodgers and Kallius; "Border Fence with Serbia and Croatia." Similarly to the case above, the distorted application of the Iron Curtain metaphor to the Eastern EU and its border fences was the topic of only two articles, both by Yuliya Komska (Dartmouth College), "What Red Deer Tell Us about" and "Iron Curtains." Regarding the Hungarian border barrier, historian Áron Máthé, vice president of the Committee of National Remembrance, has given various interviews refuting the application of the Iron Curtain metaphor to the current fence. See Máthé "Border Fence Equals Iron Curtain?" and Zoltán Veczán's article on the same in Hungarian.

7. Porter; Faiola, "How Do You Stop Migrants?" and "Hungary's Prime Minister"; Shattuck; Rachman.

and was the first country in the Eastern Bloc to open it in August 1989 thus contributing to the end of the Cold War. Yet by the mid-2010s both nations' governments had come to see walls and fences as necessary to handle unauthorized entry and national security issues. Recent opinion polls, however, attest to the fact that whereas about one third of Americans (35%) support the construction of the border wall and well over half of them oppose it (62%), in the case of Hungary more than three fourths of those polled (78%) approve of the border fence and less than a quarter oppose it (20%).[8] Interestingly, when the aggregate data for the 28 EU member states (39% approve–51% disapprove) are broken down to individual countries, we find a very strong East–West dichotomy in the support for tight border controls and migrant quota allocations ("Project 28"). When it comes to fortified borders, Eastern Europeans[9] have a special relationship to fences and walls with various generations living behind them for decades. Since 2015, Central and Eastern European countries have come to form a solid bloc in support of border controls just as they used to form a bloc behind the Iron Curtain. The legacy of the Iron Curtain may serve to explain the marked stance of the Eastern part of the EU against migration.

Critics on both sides of the Atlantic often emphasize that border barriers have never been effective (Porter; Tomlinson; Regal; Jones "Borders and Walls"). These critics employ the Iron Curtain metaphor in the same populist manner that they accuse the governments on the political Right of when its adherents refer to migration as a threat to national security, values, and identity. True, the issue of migration lends itself to easy politicization and political gains. The resurrection of the metaphor serves the purpose of discrediting the proponents of border barriers neces-

8. See Pew Research polls in Sul, and Project 28 poll results (Q9) by Századvég Foundation.

9. Consider that 'Eastern Europe' here is not a geographical, but a political and historical term. On the concept of Eastern and Central Europe see McElroy and Applebaum. Also note that Communist Albania and Yugoslavia were not considered as parts of the Eastern Bloc. The former aligned with China from 1960, while the latter—under the leadership of President Tito—was the initiator of the Non-Aligned Movement established in 1961 and was thus independent and neutral.

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sitated by the tidal waves of current migration. But apparently, the Iron Curtain left behind a very different imprint in the West and the East and on the two ends of the political spectrum. At the end of the Cold War few envisioned the rapid unfolding of the global migration crisis.[10] In fact, the tightly closed borders of the Cold War era—marked by the prison wall-like Iron Curtain in Europe and its 'affiliates' around the globe such as the Bamboo Curtain in East Asia, the Korean Demilitarized Zone, the Cactus Curtain in Cuba, and the Ice Curtain in the Bering Straits—kept one third of the global population off the global market and strictly limited in its international movement (Massey 5).

Even though in the post-Cold War world the age of globalization was expected to break down barriers of all kinds and to make borders largely symbolic, the global emergence of the national security state in our post-9/11 world, coupled with the intensifying global migration crisis, led to quite the contrary. We seem to have entered the era of global walls. Nearly three decades after the dismantling of the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall, one third of the countries of the world have some type of walls on their borders or border sections.[11] Yet in this world of walls, the erection of a border fence on the Schengen border section of Hungary with Serbia in 2015—deemed necessary to stop the massive and irregular influx of migrants from the Middle East and Africa heading mostly towards Germany, Sweden, and the UK—led to a major controversy and debate in Europe. But while the Hungarian government was heavily criticized internationally, especially in Western Europe, for constructing 'a new Iron Curtain', the very nations of Europe once living behind the Iron Curtain came to view the Hungarian border fence as a necessary evil to protect the European Union from the destabilizing effects of mass migration. For many, the fence wall on the southern Schengen border of the EU became the guarantor of the rule of law and social peace, and it was in no way comparable to the hated and feared Iron Curtain that locked

10. Except for international migration experts, such as Myron Weiner in his seminal book, *The Global Migration Crisis*.

11. After World War II four countries, at the end of the Cold War 12 countries, in 2014 65 countries, while by 2018 some 70 countries had border barriers (Vallet, "Introduction"; Jones "Borders and Walls").

up entire nations between 1948 and 1989 while protecting their oppressors' regimes. The Visegrád Group (V4) of Central Europe[12] especially turned into a united block in support of increased border controls and restrictions on migration. The fence walls of the spatially identical border sections reflect not only the changing concepts of walls, but also the distinct historical experiences with migration.

FENCES AND WALLS OF THE IRON CURTAIN

The Iron Curtain was a Soviet-style border barrier.[13] On the one hand, it was a geopolitical wall with the aim of protecting the Soviet buffer zone militarily against potential Western European threats after 1945. On the other hand, it was a migrant wall against emigration or rather flight from Communism. Prohibitive exit rules and closed borders were deemed necessary in order to prevent mass escape from the Soviet-occupied and puppet government-run Eastern European countries and to forestall the brain-drain phenomenon and labor shortages in times of heightened labor mobilization following the Second World War. Between 1945 and 1950, some 15 million emigrants—mainly ethnic Germans—fled from the Soviet-occupied Eastern European countries creating a major refugee crisis in Western Europe that in fact ended only with the erection of the Iron Curtain (Fassmann 207, 209).

Konrad Jarausch points out that the border barrier definitely had a stabilizing effect on Western Europe (9). Yuliya Komska expresses the same view by saying that "citizens of the adjacent Western-bloc countries, eager to keep out communism and atheism, were often just as interested in maintaining the physical borders as were the authorities in the Eastern bloc" ("Iron Curtains"). As a matter of fact, the construction of the Berlin section of the Iron Curtain, for example, was partly received with a degree of relief in the Western world as a means to avoid war (Taylor; Smyser Ch. 7). Upon receiving the news about the construction of walls in Berlin, US President Kennedy expressed the following to top

12. The V4 includes Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary.
13. In the Soviet Union the possibility of legal emigration was terminated in 1922 and unauthorized exit was severely controlled following the 1928 establishment of heavily guarded borders. On Iron Curtain crossings to the West see Wright 1–8.

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aide Kenneth O'Donnell: "It's not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war. […] This is the end of the Berlin crisis. The other side panicked—not we. We're going to do nothing now because there is no alternative except war" (qtd. in Smyser 106). The Wall was also expected to stop the flow of escapees not only by the East Germans and the Soviets. In the US State Department, Foy David Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs commented on the constructions as follows: "[T]he East Germans have done us a favor. That refugee flow was becoming embarrassing" (qtd. in Beschloss).

It is important to emphasize that the Iron Curtain was imposed upon Eastern Europe by an invading power. The Soviet Union had the most vested interests in the fortified borders, and the Soviet know-how and military advisers were instrumental in the construction, maintenance, and upgrading of the Iron Curtain border throughout its entire existence of more than 40 years. Its costs, however, burdened predominantly the satellite countries' budgets, constituting a major drain on their economies (Kramer; Léka).

The entire length of the Iron Curtain stretched over 4,220 mi (6,800 km) through Europe from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea and divided the continent into East and West. In comparison, it was twice as long as the US–Mexican border of 1,933mi/3,110km, and it was even longer than the 3,987 mi / 6,416 km US–Canadian border (discounting the Alaskan–Canadian border 1,538 mi / 2,475 km).[14] Until its fall in 1989, it was a physical and ideological border between two hostile blocs. Physically, it emerged gradually. Next to the Soviet–Norwegian and Soviet–Finnish sections in place since 1928, the new Finnish and Baltic sections were established by 1945. Following their annexation, Eastern Finland (Karelia) and the Baltic States lost their sovereignty and were integrated into the Soviet Union. In the satellite states the Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian sections started to be erected and organized in 1948–1949. By 1952, with the construction of the inner-German border (IGB), the Iron Curtain was ready in its entire length except for the Berlin section where the Wall,

14. Source of data: US Census Bureau. *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2011*. Geography and Environment, Table 359, US–Canada and US–Mexico Border Lengths, p. 223.

the most famous part of the Iron Curtain[15], was erected around West Berlin in various stages between 1961–1975.[16]

Today, the European Green Belt or the Iron Curtain Trail natural conservation areas, running from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, follow the corridor of the former Iron Curtain. Map source: Public Domain, <upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/be/EuGB_solid_labels_web.png>.

15. For the seminal photographic documentation of the Iron Curtain corridor see Rose. The Baltic coastal region, including that of Poland, was dotted by large, inaccessible military areas.

16. The Berlin Wall divided into two sections: a 69.5mi/111.9km portion between East Germany (GDR) and West Berlin and a 26.8mi/43.1km portion between East Berlin and West Berlin. It was not one solid line of concrete but a combination of different types of double physical border barriers that consisted of various types of fortified fences (expanded metal, metal mesh, limit signal, and barrier fences) and of walls (wall-shaped front walls and concrete walls). The most well-known, 26.8mi/43.1km long section consisted of double concrete walls (with the 160yd/146m 'death strip' in between) stretching across the city center between East and West Berlin. With sections also reaching into residential East Berlin, the complete length of the Berlin Wall was 96mi/156km encircling entire West Berlin (See "Die Berliner Mauer. Stand 31. Juli 1989"; Rottmann 4).

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The border defense works along the Iron Curtain were highly complex and heavily militarized areas. Next to the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), its sections of the IGB and the Berlin Wall were the most guarded of the world (Rottman 4–5; 14–22). Each section had its own development and history, but in general terms they included the following:

a) a border zone, 2–15 km wide, in which the local population was issued special documentation and strictly controlled in their movement in and out. Unreliable elements were not allowed to work or reside in the zone and were forcefully relocated;

b) regular patrols to prevent escape attempts. They included cars and mounted units. Guards and dog patrol units watched the border 24/7 and were authorized to use their weapons to stop escapees;

c) watchtowers and flood lights at regular distances;

d) anti-vehicle ditches and roadblocks;

e) raked sand strips to track border violations;

f) two lines of barbed wire fences (on the outer and inner borders) with landmines and booby traps in between. Typically in rural areas the border was marked by double fences made of steel mesh (expanded metal) with sharp edges, while near urban areas a high concrete barrier similar to the Berlin Wall was built. A later development of the mid-1960s was the electric signal fence as designed in the SU (Rottman 14–28; Léka; Berki).



The third-generation inner German border fortification system, c. 1984. Source: Public Domain, <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fortifications_of_the_inner_German_border#/media/File:System_of_gdr_border_fortification.jpg>.

In addition to the East German sections, the other highly effective section was the 560mi/900km long Czechoslovak border with West Germany and Austria where, apart from the minefields, high voltage electric fences of 4,000–6,000 V were installed between 1951–65.[17] Martin Pulec from the Office for the Documentation and Investigation of the Crimes of Communism commented as follows: "The fact [that] there were electric fences was a secret in Czechoslovakia, but some people knew about it from foreign radio stations like Radio Free Europe and Voice of America" (Willoughby). Between 1948–1989, there were 282 certified cases of death out of which 91 escapees got electrocuted; most of them, however, were shot (145 escapees), while the rest were killed by mines, drowned, or were savaged by guard dogs (Willoughby). In general, minefields proved very effective deterrents. For instance, on the 221 mi/357 km long Hungarian–Austrian border alone, there were more than 1.1 million landmines deployed in 4–5 lines, first between 1948–1956 and then between 1957–1970, when the mines were finally replaced by an electric signaling system alarming the guards directly. In fact, in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1956 the exodus of some 200,000 Hungarian refugees between October 1956 and January 1957 was made possible by the May 1956 joint decision of the Political Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party (MDP) and the Defense Council to clear the minefields on the complete 632mi/1,081km long Hungarian–Austrian and Hungarian–Yugoslav border.[18] Clearance of the border sections was completed by September 1956, and after the Revolution the redeployment of mines was effected on the Austrian border only (Berki; Zsiga 43, 45, 54; "A nyugati és a déli határövezet"). When asked about the effectiveness of the physical barriers and the contemporary high-tech solutions, however, Axel Klausmeier, director of the Berlin Wall Foundation,

17. The high voltage electric fences did not stretch over the entire length of the 560mi/900km long border as it did not follow each and every turn in the border (Willoughby).

18. The relaxation of the western and southern borders of Hungary in mid-1956 was due to the improvement of bilateral relations with both neighboring countries after Stalin's death in 1953 and the declaration of Austria's neutrality following the termination of its four-power occupation in 1955 ("A nyugati és a déli határövezet").

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emphasized that the single most effective aspect of the Iron Curtain was that guards were given the order to shoot trespassers. "It was the biggest possible deterrent. Everyone knew: if you tried to cross over to the West, you had to count on dying in a hail of bullets" (qtd. in Huetlin).

Many underline that the Iron Curtain was not impregnable. Some sections of it were porous, and despite all the effort and money invested in it, thousands managed to cross over, under, or above it.[19] Still, successful crossings were the exception rather than the rule. For example, in the 1970s, only 1 in 20 escapees (5%) managed to cross the IGB; in the 1980s, only 1% of escapees reached the other side (Jarausch 17). The cruel "death strip" represented by the Iron Curtain proved a highly successful deterrent. It made unauthorized crossing extremely dangerous since the attempt rarely went undetected. The fences and walls stood as powerful symbols of control and their message was unmistakably clear: emigration by illegal means was practically impossible or way too risky at best. The fence wall reinforced by a human wall of guards patrolling 24/7 was almost impenetrable and very effective. The numbers of those who died while crossing, who were caught in the act and were imprisoned or were even executed are still not known. The most researched sections of the Iron Curtain from this aspect are the IGB and Berlin, where the total current estimates are at 75,000 failed attempts and about 1,300 dead.[20] The overwhelming majority of the 13.3 million emigrants from Eastern Europe between 1950–1990 left legally, having been granted official exit permits. Seventy-five percent left under bilateral agreements for "ethnic migration," ransomed by the receiving government, under lengthy family reunification procedures (for children and the elderly), or fled via third countries (Jarausch 17–19).

With this background in mind it is clear to see that the application of the Iron Curtain metaphor to the current border fences,

19. Silko 4; Komska "Iron Curtains."

20. Hooper; Connolly; "More Than 1,100 Berlin Wall Victims." Numbers, however, can vary considerably depending on what is meant by "border-related deaths" by different researchers. In Berlin alone, the official number was 138 in 2015, while researchers at Checkpoint Charlie Museum found 483 dead related to border crossing (Bensch).

and the Hungarian border fence in particular, is a serious mistake despite the fact that both constitute fence walls running along the spatially identical southern border sections of Hungary with Serbia and Croatia. The border sections may be the same, but the two fences are definitely not when we consider the purpose, message, and popular support behind them, and not only because today in Hungary—unlike in the United States[21]—the use of deadly force is not authorized against border crossers, nor are the landmines and high voltage fences of the Cold War years. As Áron Máthé analyzes it in "Border Fence Equals Iron Curtain?", the Cold War analogy is wrong for various reasons. First, the Iron Curtain stood as a wall of separation between totalitarian dictatorships and the free world. It protected the Communist regimes and forced the captive nations into submission, whereas today, free nations aim to keep up law and order through their elected governments. Therefore, Máthé argues, "modern-day border fences protect Western-style rule of law." Second, while both border fences are meant to prevent unauthorized crossings, the direction of the population movements they are expected to control is distinct. The Iron Curtain aimed to prevent unlawful exit, that is, "flight from the enslaved nations," while today's border fences are meant to control unauthorized entry. In addition, I find it crucial to highlight that in the Iron Curtain era, authorized exit opportunities were very limited. Legal emigration was discouraged through endless legal hurdles, humiliation, intimidation, loss of jobs, and confiscation of property. Finally, as Máthé specifies it, whereas today's border fences emerged as a result of open political debates with a clear objective, the Iron Curtain was erected

21. The use of deadly force resulted in the death of 33 migrants on the US–Mexican border between 2010–2015 (Jones *Violent Borders*, Ch. 2). In the meantime assaults on Border Patrol agents have more than doubled since the early 2000s with 384 attacks in 2004 and 786 attacks in 2017. The record year was 2007 with 987 assaults. Most attacks have been registered in the Arizona Tucson Sector, known as the nation's busiest smuggling area. Although most attacks have involved rock throwing, more dangerous ones have been continuously on the rise (Conze; also see Nelsen). For the policy on the use of deadly force see US Customs and Border Protection (2014). For deaths on the border consult Reece Jones's *Border Walls*, 26–52, 102–125 and *Violent Borders*, Ch. 2.

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undercover and mendaciously, exemplified by the Berlin Wall being called the "Anti-Fascist Protective Wall" or by the high voltage electric fences of the Czechoslovak–German section.

The use of the Iron Curtain metaphor predominantly by the Western media and political elite in this new setting holds the danger of driving a wedge between the East and West of the EU amidst the global migration crisis that is not expected to subside in the near future. As Komska puts it in "Iron Curtains," many Western "[media] outlets have dusted off the term to charge Eastern European countries with sealing their borders, Cold War-style. We should retire the metaphor before it plays a part in fracturing Europe once again." The challenges facing the EU call for converging instead of diverging policies of border controls and migration. The finding of a common voice, however, could be effectively impeded by the invocation of Cold War terminology when EU politicians and the media lash out against the 'Iron Curtain mentality' of Central and Eastern Europeans and their governments in relation to migration. Walls have two sides, however, and it seems the 'mental wall' that the Germans used to call "the wall in the head" to describe the psychological impact of the four decades long separation between the East and the West continues to limit Western European thinking as well. This is especially worrisome since the legacy of the Iron Curtain is still strong and can be clearly documented in statistics from life expectancy to economy and prosperity, from the gross average wage to the perceived corruption index or the percentage of the foreign-born ("Twenty Maps"). The line of the Iron Curtain looms even in the 2017 EU scandal regarding the different quality of foodstuffs produced by multinational companies for consumers in the eastern and western parts of the EU (Boffey).

THE HUNGARIAN BORDER FENCE

The East–West dichotomy within the EU has become very marked in relation to the European migration crisis of 2014–2015 and its aftermath. In my view the distinct migration-related experiences on the two sides of the Iron Curtain do contribute to the current marked differences in pro- and anti-immigration policies and attitudes in Western and Eastern European countries amidst the migration crisis. Hungary is a case in point. It was

the first Eastern bloc country to dismantle the hated and feared Iron Curtain in August 1989 when it opened the border fences to East German migrants on their way to West Germany. In November that year the Berlin Wall was torn down. Today Hungary is located on the outlying Schengen borders of the EU. At the height of the migration crisis, in the summer of 2015, Hungary became the first EU country within the Schengen zone to erect a border fence. This phenomenon has been looked at especially critically in the case of a nation that tore down the Iron Curtain and has now 'replaced' it ("France"; Bershidsky; Rodgers and Kallius). Strangely enough, the same border fence building on the Bulgarian–Turkish border starting in 2013 by EU member, but non-Schengen zone member, Bulgaria did not create such tidal waves of criticism, even though—ironically—both countries' barriers run along identical lines of the Iron Curtain (Lyman "Bulgaria"; Sergueva; Charlton).

The decision to build what was conceived as a temporary border barrier or border fence was made for compelling reasons. The number of asylum applications skyrocketed to 46,720 in August of 2015—a world record at the time—overburdening the country's immigration system and infrastructure.[22] The number of asylum applications per year grew by 97% in Hungary from 2012 to 2015 (4,676 persons–177,135 persons).[23] In most cases, migrants were not willing to cooperate with the Hungarian authorities but aimed to pour through the country illegally either by not waiting for the adjudication of their asylum applications—as it happened in 90% of the cases (Janik 19)—or through bypassing the screening process altogether on their way to Germany, Sweden, and the UK. Unknown numbers failed to register and apply for asylum in Hungary before entering the borderless Schengen zone despite the efforts of the authorities; most did not comply with or wait for the results of their medical examinations either. The massive irregular entry thus defied the rule of law and order,

22. Upon examining statistical data on asylum applications per month between 2013 and 2017, we find that the Hungarian world record at the time was soon outdone by Germany, itself reaching an all-time high of 92,105 in August of 2016. In comparison, the highest number of asylum applications per month in the US as of June 2016 was 11,050 ("Hungary Asylum Applications and Asylum Applications by Country").

23. Immigration and Asylum Office; "Hungary Asylum Applications."

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and created utter chaos along the route between Hungary's southern and western borders (Janik 15–19). It led to traffic safety violations with masses walking along the motorways. It constituted a major health hazard with several migrants diagnosed with infectious diseases,[24] and it posed a national and international security threat as it would turn out later. In October 2016, Hungary's Counter-Terrorism Center revealed that seven ISIS terrorists had entered the EU via Hungary over the summer of 2015 by taking advantage of migrant crowds and they set up a "logistics hub" in the country where they planned and prepared the November 2015 Paris attacks, which claimed 130 lives, and the March 2016 Brussels attacks, killing 32 people (Gordon).

To normalize the chaotic situation and restore the rule of law, first an emergency razor wire coil fence, then a concertina wire fence was built on the most critical 109mi/175 km Hungarian–Serbian border by September 2015, and by October, it was extended to the 213mi/345km Hungarian–Croatian border too, thus sealing off the country's entire 322mi/520km long southern Schengen border. By April 2017, the Hungarian–Serbian section was further reinforced and upgraded with high-tech border defenses (intelligent fence) in addition to the 24/7 human wall of guards. The guarded border fence has proved highly effective from the beginning, with monthly apprehensions dropping by 99% between September and November 2015 (from 138,369 to 315). Asylum applications reached a record low of 175 persons in December of 2015, with annual statistics showing an 83% decrease between 2015 and 2016 (from 177,135 to 29,432).[25]

Having experienced the chaos and the national security risks involved in irregular mass migration first hand, there has been overwhelming support for the border fence in Hungary (78%) and in the V4 countries that also participate in the operation and control of the border barrier ("Project 28"; "V4"). As *The New York Times* notes, "Mr. Orban's tougher new policy has taken the migra-

24. Several registered migrants were diagnosed with syphilis, hepatitis B and C, HIV, typhoid, paratyphoid fever, and tuberculosis ("Hungary: Migrants Diagnosed").

25. Marton; Montgomery; for the statistical data see "Elfogott migránsok"; "Hungary Asylum Applications."

tory pressure off his European Union partners, while allowing them to condemn him anyway" (Lyman "Already Unwelcoming"). Indeed, international criticism of the Orbán government's border practices has continued strong in Western Europe (Sandford). Hungarian Minister of the Interior, Sándor Pintér, emphasized "that a number of EU politicians have mixed up illegal migration and asylum policy," and pointed out that in 2015–2016 "migrants have arrived in Hungary from some 104 countries crossing the green border illegally. There is no war or catastrophic situation in so many countries, therefore the arrival of so many people without any valid visas and bypassing legal routes has been unjustified" ("V4").

But even though critics have kept reminding us that "given its history behind the Iron Curtain, Hungary should know better than to erect a fence" (Rodgers and Kallius), they have also come to acknowledge the effectiveness of the Hungarian border fence (Janik 16; Montgomery; Perez; Jones "Borders and Walls"). And strangely enough, the Hungarian border fence—which was partly inspired by the border fences between the US and Mexico and not by the Iron Curtain—is now sometimes used by the media as an example of a successful border barrier for the US. As *The Washington Post* noted, "Donald Trump may want a wall, but Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—a vocal fan of Trump's immigration plan—has built one [and put up a] formidable migrant blockade, turning Hungary into a global model of how to prevent even the most determined asylum seeker from slipping through. One thing is relatively clear: Hungary's migrant blockade seems to be working. From a peak of more than 13,000 migrants a day, Hungary has more or less snuffed out illegal migration" (Faiola "How Do You Stop Migrants?"). In October 2017, the prototypes for the American border wall were unveiled in San Diego, California, but the final version, or combination of versions, and technologies applicable in the different types of terrain remain to be seen, as does the funding of the construction and the handling of privately owned land along the border, for example, in Texas (Nixon).

FROM LOCAL WALLS TO GLOBAL WALLS

Once construction of the US–Mexican border wall begins in earnest, however, it will definitely contribute to the emergence

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of the era of global walls in our post 9/11 world, and it will speed up the construction of many more. But the Iron Curtain metaphor serves as a poor reference for this new era of global migration controls that the world has entered. The legacy of the Cold War may still be strong but our multipolar world of unprecedented degrees of globalization moves to different drummers. Even though the setting up of border barriers may seem to contradict globalization, they might as well be seen instead as the very products of the globalization of securitization, a multibillion dollar business with great potentials for job creation and the channeling and managing of human labor as that of products and services. The emergence of global walls will require new ways of tackling old problems while giving rise to new problems at the same time. But while for some border barriers are unacceptable as limitations of liberty and as threats to social peace and the rule of law, for others they are part of a new reality and are seen as necessary evils in order to preserve social peace and the rule of law. Border barriers—whether they are fence walls or concrete walls—have two sides and two interpretations, and differing interpretations of the same walls will depend on our own traditions and experiences with migration.

In line with the above, I suggest that the root of the so very different assessment of border fences and the current European migrant crisis in the Eastern and Western parts of the EU can be partially found in their Iron Curtain-related experiences with migration and border controls. Western Europe saw continuous, but sporadic arrivals from behind the Iron Curtain. Escapees and refugees entered in very limited numbers since migration was kept under check by the very Iron Curtain itself. Their reception was a success story since the border-crossers were most often highly educated (academics, artists, professionals, university students) or skilled workers willing to cooperate and integrate. Another contingent consisted of fellow ethnic groups (e.g. ethnic Germans) who arrived in an organized, controlled manner, ransomed by the mother country as part of bilateral agreements. The migration of both groups enjoyed the sympathy of the receiving society. Their positive reception and willingness to cooperate guaranteed that their integration would be successful, which led

to the Western European tendency to view migration positively. The conclusion from this migration experience was that people did manage to defy the Iron Curtain and crossed the death strip despite the heavily guarded fence walls, so border fences and migration restrictions did not work!

Eastern Europe was largely closed to both immigration and emigration throughout the Cold War; even intraregional movement was limited. Instead of migration, Eastern Europeans experienced invasion and long-term occupation by the Soviets. Escapees were considered traitors by the ruling regimes and were severely punished if caught. The Iron Curtain was imposed upon them and was perceived as a prison wall. Those few emigrants that left and foreign visitors that entered were looked upon as potential spies. In fact, international visitors were only allowed to move about under strictly controlled circumstances by reporting to the local police. All in all, the result was a negative view of migration. Since few managed to defy the Iron Curtain and leave, the Eastern Europeans concluded that border fences and migration restrictions did work! The West may have prevailed finally, showing that people and ideas cannot be locked up behind fence walls, but in the Eastern European experience the Iron Curtain effectively did so along 4,220 mi / 6,800 km for over 40 years.

CONCLUSION

Yet perhaps the most significant experience and lesson from the Iron Curtain for Eastern Europeans was that it was taken down out of their own initiative, and that the spirit of freedom not only survived, but evolved further even behind 'prison walls.' As a result, unlike in the West, Eastern Europeans do not feel threatened and limited by the border fences they set up themselves, out of their own volition, since they know walls are temporary, necessary evils until another era of better alternatives sets in. And until then maybe the best way to look at the emerging global walls of migration is to make sure their gates open in both directions—of course, national security advisors might prefer the gates to be security revolving doors, security turnstiles or interlocks.

In my capacity as the organizer of the American Studies Guest Speaker Series at Eötvös Loránd University, I hosted Gregory Shaf-

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fer, Supervisory Special Agent and FBI Legal Attaché in Central and Eastern Europe, in December 2012. To students' and colleagues' great surprise, the Attaché drew parallels between the national security significance of the southern US and Hungarian borders. As his audience was listening in disbelief, he pointed out the need for stepped-up immigration and border controls and border security on the Schengen borders of Hungary in order to safeguard the EU from the challenges posed by organized crime groups and terrorists that could take advantage of migrant routes and loosely checked, irregular flows. The 2015–2016 experiences proved him right. His audience today would not consider the comparison between Hungarian and US borders exaggerated. In fact the majority in that audience would agree that the 24/7 guarded border fence has proved effective in stopping unauthorized entry and safeguarding the country behind it without tampering with legal cross-border movement in either direction. This is no Iron Curtain.

The question regarding the US border wall should not be framed as whether the Trump administration is going to build it[26] but rather which sections are going to be scheduled for when, and which technologies fit best the different terrains. Since it has been an ongoing project spanning over all the different administrations of the past twenty-five years, it can only be expected to continue during and beyond the Trump administration. As architecture critic Christopher Hawthorne aptly expresses, the current wall prototypes,

> [the] eight slabs and seven spaces-between-slabs [...] enact, with surprising precision, the southern border wall that we already have and probably always will, the one we're eternally displeased with and yet condemned to keep building. That what we're producing is a strange hybrid of wall and tunnel, [...] something that both frustrates and enables connection, that makes plain that a border is at once the place where we're

26. "Excerpts from Trump's Interview"; Ballesteros. Consider that just as the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act doing away with the anachronistic national origins quota system came at the price of the introduction of Western Hemisphere immigration quotas, Congressional support and funding for the construction of the border wall may come at the price of continuing DACA, the Obama-era Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program that has protected some 700,000 'Dreamers' from deportation and is set to expire in March 2018.

separated from another country and where we're joined to it. A barrier made of alternating bands of substance and absence, aspiration and impossibility. Here wall, here no wall. Here something, here nothing. And on and on across the desert.

The US–Mexican border wall has inspired many similar protective migrant walls—such as the Hungarian border fence—and will continue to serve as an example for similar rising walls around the globe. However, these fences and walls with their gates or revolving doors open to all types of legal cross-border movement at all times are not those of the Iron Curtain, and in our Global Era this Cold War metaphor should definitely be withdrawn from circulation on both sides of the Atlantic.

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FENCING IN AND OUT

Israel's Separation Wall and the Whitewashing of State Violence

"Walls work. Just ask Israel."
US President Donald Trump

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This article documents Israeli Jews who live next to the barrier, down the center of the country that Jews call the seamline and Palestinians the Triangle[1]. This relatively small group of some 40,000 Jews—mostly middle-class and secular—live among some 300,000 Palestinians, who like them are located west of the separation barrier and holders of Israeli IDs. With generous subsidies, given in the early 1990s, the state encouraged them to Judaize this region, yet they differ from West Bank Jewish settlers in being motivated primarily by a quest for "quality of life" (*eichut hayim* in Hebrew) within Israel proper. Still, the reality of being surrounded by Palestinians, inside and outside what they call "the fence," brings the Israeli-Palestinian conflict close to home permanently, although they persist in not framing their reactions to the situation as political.

The article is based on a segment of multi-disciplinary, multi-sited research on the security concerns of Jewish and Palestinian Israeli citizens, and their ethical positions regarding asymmetrical war conducted in 2015–2017. We explore the substance and patterns of conflict as everyday life among Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel. Our study follows previous observations about

1. This article draws on a collaborative, inter-disciplinary project among the three authors. The research was made possible thanks to the generous support from the Israel Science Foundation (grant#1092/15).

Israeli security rituals (opening bags, security checkups etc.) as bodily practices of "feeling normal" (Ochs), the prevalence of political apathy or active disengagement among Jewish Israelis, and the selective practice of retreating into "small worlds," intimate sites, and communities (Natanel). In keeping with feminist security theory, we have been guided by a focus on the anti-heroes of the conflict, exploring its varied effects on people differently located within the ethno-national-gender order, particularly those living near the borders. Incidentally, we found that all of them, including the Palestinian citizens who are susceptible to manifold political and class insecurities, attempt to live normal lives and to strike the best liberal bargain (Sa'ar) that they can, by making the most of their consumer affluence, freedom of movement, and whatever political rights Israel offers them. The region we focus on in this article is a 60-odd kilometer strip along the Green Line in the center of the country, from Rosh Ha'ayin/Kafer Kassem in the south to Um al-Fahem in the north. We did research with members of both national groups living there, but here we focus on Jews.

A graffiti mural on a segment of the Israeli-Palestine wall depicting US President Donald Trump stroking the Israeli wall admiringly. Printed with permission from a video by Angela Tripp.

Trump's affinity for walls as part of a politics of fear and segregation is hardly unique. It resonates with growing agitation in many rich countries now facing the repercussions of their excessive extractions of the planet's natural and human resources: huge differences in income and living conditions, and influxes of migrants fleeing globalization's more severe effects, including global armament, climate change,

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and over-production/consumption. Gated communities have proliferated with the emergence of "fortress cities" (Low) that police and enforce social and class divisions. Yet refortification of states is still relatively under-conceptualized. In this rapidly expanding global security theater, Israel as a fortress state has high symbolic capital, as it is seen as a counter-terrorism success story and a breeding ground for top security technologies and expertise. On closer inspection, Israel seems also to be a good case for understanding the more mundane effects of walls, fences, and security scares.

As shown in our ethnography, the Jewish residents' attitudes to living in close proximity to Palestinians range from dislike/suspicion, fueled by a belief that it brings down the value of their properties and the overall level of their safety, through disinterest, which occasionally slides into irritation at hazards and nuisances that they ascribe to Palestinians (notably noise, air pollution, and bad driving), to proactive initiatives to engage in Jewish-Arab dialogue. Yet across the board they *refuse* to engage in discussions about what Israelis typically regard as "political issues," namely the occupation, the West Bank settlements project, or the separation barrier's infringement on Palestinian Authority (PA) territory. Whether they identify as politically right, center, or left, they share a vigorous Zionist identity, strong identification with the state, and a solid sense of entitlement to their privileged lifestyle. They enjoy clear superiority in all civil and social parameters: living conditions, personal safety, community services, authorities' responsiveness, etc., yet tend to be unaware of the power mechanisms underlying the disparities between their communities and the Palestinians. Alternatively, those who do notice the gaps typically tend to ascribe the poor conditions in the neighboring communities to a mixture of traditional Arab culture and unfortunate discriminatory policies, which they deem correctible.

We argue that the separation barrier plays a role in numbing the political consciousness of Israeli Jews living beside it, and in preserving the cognitive structure that denies the violence underlying their comfortable suburban lives. It creates a dual effect of reassurance and ambivalence, which is grounded in the state's long-standing policy of ambiguity concerning its eastern border. On the one hand, the robust materiality of the barrier

creates a clear visual marker of a border. On the other hand, the fact that it runs along the Green Line—the old armistice line that ended the 1948 war—but frequently trespasses eastward onto the West Bank to accommodate Jewish settlements, gives a confusing message. It is unclear whether the barrier, in its present location, is a temporary security device or a milestone on a road to a future political settlement with the Palestinians. This duality is emblematic of a deep aspect of Israeli Jewish perception of the 1967 occupation of West Bank Palestinian territories, which combines acknowledgement and denial.

THE BARRIER

Israel's separation barrier, whose construction started in 2002 following the second Palestinian uprising (*Intifada*), is said to run along the Green Line (the 1949 Armistice Agreement). In practice, though, more than 80 percent of it runs *east* of the Green Line, encroaching on Palestinian Authority territory. Thus Israel uses the barrier to incorporate many Jewish settlements east of the border, de facto annexing some 8.5 percent of Palestinian Authority lands (Busbridge).

The Israel-Palestinian barrier as it appears from one of the Stars villages on the Israeli side, with a Palestinian village in the distance. Photo courtesy of Amalia Sa'ar.

The barrier, which encircles the larger part of Israel's borders, is a multi-layered obstacle. In some places, primarily in Jerusalem and on the rim of other Palestinian communities, it consists of

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high concrete walls. But mostly, rather than a wall, the barrier is a 150 to 300-foot-wide zone comprised of fences, roads, and trenches, replete with cameras, sensors, and other electronic surveillance devices. Israelis can cross it freely back and forth, whereas non-citizen Palestinians need pre-arranged permits and are forced to queue in checkpoints and crowded gates at specific hours, and submit to intrusive searches. This spatial-social manifestation of the prevailing separation regime involves a simultaneous effort to project power by using a visible and massive military-architectural complex (Weizman) *and* by concealing, erasing, and controlling what can be seen behind the barrier (Hochberg).

For Israeli Jews, who are the focus of this article, the separation barrier reflects deep ambivalence regarding the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, more specifically regarding Israel's occupation of and massive settlement project in the West Bank. This ambivalence is reflected in the discourses and representations of the barrier. The findings presented below echo familiar disagreements among Israelis on whether to call it a wall or a fence (Wills), whether or not to draw it on the map (Leuenberger), or whether to treat it as a temporary security device to be removed as part of a future settlement or as a step toward settling the Green Line as the final border. Israelis likewise tend to project onto the barrier a range of undecided issues, including identity, security, territory, and borders (Simonneau).

The idea of building a barrier was first promoted by the center-left Rabin government in the mid-1990s, soon after the signing of the Oslo Accords, which were meant to achieve a Final Status Agreement. Initially it drew much resistance from left and right. Supporters of the right-wing Greater Israel camp, who aim to annex the entire or much of the West Bank to Israel, objected to any idea of separation and were concerned that the barrier would reinforce the Green Line as the state's border. By contrast, members of the left-wing peace camp saw it as yet another act of unilateral aggressive imposition, a displacement of the discourse of political dialogue into a discourse of security.

Since the actual construction of the barrier in 2002, the opposing voices from the left have assumed clearer pro-Palestinian undertones, condemning the expropriation of Palestinian lands,

the severe disruption of Palestinian life in the communities near the barrier, and the overall constraints it entails for Palestinian movement. At the same time, right wing opposition to the barrier has become quieter, as the actual construction was conducted by successive right-wing governments, which concomitantly continued to expand the West Bank settlements and to underscore the barrier's security benefits. Lastly, Israelis from the political center have also largely supported the barrier, primarily because they believe that it increases security. Members of this camp have largely remained silent on the toll it has had on Palestinians' living conditions and movement, on territorial annexation, and on the question of the occupation. While in the initial stages of the erection of the barrier, there was debate that explicitly linked the barrier to the Occupation, the barrier itself has fallen out of political debate among Israeli Jews (even those who oppose the Occupation and settlement project), under the pretext that it's simply about security (Simonneau).

JEWS LIVING ALONG THE BARRIER

There are about 23 Jewish communities along the separation barrier in the area of our study, ranging from very small kibbutzim of less than 500 residents, through villages of some 5,000 residents, to three larger suburban towns with 9,000–10,000 inhabitants each. Together, these communities are home to approximately 40,000 people, excluding the city of Rosh Ha'ayin at the southern end of the stretch, with another 40,000.[2] Some of these communities date to the 1940s and 1950s, while others were built as recently as the mid-1990s as part of then Housing Minister Ariel Sharon's Seven Stars Plan to thicken the Jewish settlement along the Green Line, where Palestinians form a clear majority. Palestinians in the Triangle region number approximately 300,000 people. They are primarily Muslims living in 30 or so different communities. The six largest are now nominally defined as cities, although they strikingly still lack the infrastructure, planning, and usual features of urban landscapes. The rest are villages, each with several thousand residents.

2. Rosh Ha'ayin is not included in this ethnography.

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Back to the Jewish communities: some kibbutzim and villages along the seamline still farm, but mostly these are suburban communities, whose main attraction is that they are located 30–40 minutes' drive from Tel Aviv—the economic and cultural center of Israel—yet still allow middle-income families to own private homes. Typically, the smaller communities tend to be quite homogeneous in their demographic composition. By and large, the residents are of rather narrow class background, ranging from middle class to upper middle class, often also with a shared social background. For example, Anat,[3] a resident of one of the community villages and a real-estate agent, said: "Ours is a village of 'securitists.' Many senior people in the security apparatus live here. I brought them. I am the realtor for the Ministry of Defense and the Prime Minister's Office. So I brought here many senior functionaries." In the larger communities, the range is somewhat wider. Still, the majority live in private houses, either small cottages or fancier villas, with the larger communities also including high quality apartment buildings. The kibbutzim typically feature rather simple looking, small private houses, but the ample, well-groomed green lawns and public spaces, and the high quality educational and recreational services, indicate much coveted upper middle class living standards.

As can be deduced from the respective numbers of Jews and Palestinians in the area, the Jews there are grossly outnumbered by Palestinians. Some of these, those located east of the separation barrier, are part of the Palestinian Authority, therefore classified as Palestinians. Osnat, secretary of one of the long-standing kibbutzim, said as she pointed east to the Palestinian village beyond the separation barrier, barely 500 yards from the kibbutz, "When I was in kindergarten the teacher would walk us over there to watch the olive pressing. They were friends then; now they are terrorists." Yet the 300,000 Palestinians mentioned above are classified as *Israeli Arabs* and their communities lie a few minutes' drive from their Jewish neighbors. The Jewish communities along the seamline are gated and guarded by local residents, private security companies, civil guards or military units. The massive

3. The names of all persons and communities have been changed. All quotes are translated from Hebrew.

separation barrier to the east is complemented by barbed wire fences that encircle the entire village or kibbutz, electric gates at the entrance, with cameras, patrols, and related surveillance mechanisms as described below. By contrast, their neighboring Israeli-Arab communities have no gates or fences. These communities lie completely open, with neither physical nor symbolic 'defense' against outside intruders. Jews frequent them to dine or shop. Most of these communities have cheap weekend food markets. Jews also drive there to get their cars fixed or buy building materials. Palestinians, by contrast, go over to the Jewish communities almost solely as day laborers. They are the cleaners, gardeners, cashiers, and builders. Occasionally there is a Palestinian pharmacist or nurse. Oddly enough, Israeli Arabs are also the hired security guards at some of the gates.

Indeed, as our research project reveals in no uncertain terms, the safety levels in these communities are diametrically opposed. The Israeli-Palestinian villages and cities endure soaring levels of insecurity. They have very high crime rates and a huge proliferation of illegal arms, along with an array of environmental hazards and numerous forms of state aggression that range from demolition of homes that are deemed illegal, through regular police raids, to police frisking and other forms of violence, including death by police.[4] By contrast, the Jewish communities, thanks to the combination of physical fences and elaborate collaborations between the state and the communities, comprise serene and distinctly safe residential landscapes. As one of our interviewees, Hezi, put it: "My daughter, now 21, says she never wants to live anywhere else than in this region," adding emphatically when asked to explain, "It's so safe!"

THE BARRIER(S) AS MITIGATING THE PRESENCE OF THE PALESTINIAN OTHER

With this sharp focus on the tranquil, bourgeois lifestyle, we set out to explore the effects of the separation barrier on Israeli Jews who live beside it. We found that the separation barrier relaxes the landscape by making it safer and by rendering the border

4. Regarding over- and under-policing in the Arab communities, see Ilani; Tibi and Sayid; Ben-Porat et al.

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somewhat less ambivalent. This is in stark contrast to its effect on the Palestinians living on its eastern side, who experience the wall as a significant peak in the ongoing Israeli destruction of the material, visual, and abstract Palestinian landscapes (Abu Hatoum; Usher). By significantly bringing down rates of theft, assaults, and explosions, and simultaneously reducing the number of Palestinians walking on the streets of the enclaved communities, the barrier to the east together with the encircling fence, electric gate, the regular patrols of the local civil security officer and the confidence that in case of emergency "the state" will be there for them, make the Jewish residents feel personally safe and the landscape appear peaceful to them.

Without exception, all the smaller communities have regular patrols by motorized security officers, whose salaries are paid through a special municipal tax[5] or directly by the army. Aiding them are the community secretaries and village chairpersons, who head Local Emergency Units (LEU) of 10–20 volunteers, each in charge of particular institutional spheres (education, health, contact with ministerial bureaucracies, etc.). Together, LEU members form a dense sieve that in times of emergency can effectively locate all the residents, issue orders and directions, identify needs, and activate the relevant services. The teams participate in periodic training and are mobilized in civil emergencies also (people described how the LEUs operated in cases of suicide, fire, and flooding). The heads of the LEUs, together with the security officers and the village secretaries, maintain direct contact with the army. They are notified when the sensors on the fence detect suspicious movement, and relay the residents' security concerns. By army decision, some of the communities also have civilian weapons-bearing emergency units. Due to this apparatus, Jewish residents along the seamline generally share a sense of a safe and cohesive social environment. No less than on their trust in the state and army authorities, their sense of security rests on a sense of belonging and community, as well as on the utility of having well connected individuals in their local networks.

5. Local Municipalities Law, Guarding Regulation 1961

That said, as we shall see shortly the Jews' sense of relaxed tranquility is somewhat fragile, readily changeable into a sense of siege sparked by the region's historical frontier legacy (pre-1967) and their being surrounded by Palestinians. This instills in the daily experiences of suburban lifestyle along the seamline a strong sense of ambivalence, which resonates with a deeper *political* or *ideological* ambivalence of middle-class, center-left secular Israelis regarding the occupation and the political reality *behind* the barrier.

Notably, in keeping with Knesset election results in these communities,[6] most people we talked to were the traditional constituency of the liberal, secular center-left. They therefore were prepared to consider territorial concessions and to end the settlements project in the West Bank as part of a future political resolution. In contrast to the hard right, which has been in government now for several successive terms, they do not deny the existence of the Green Line. People we talked to were typically aware of the exact location of the Green Line and of the fact that in some places, within or near their residential communities, "the fence," as most of them called the separation barrier, encroached on the West Bank. Nevertheless, they conveniently regarded these lands as de-facto Israeli. "The Green Line has moved," as one interviewee put it. And another, referring to going to visit her cousin in a West Bank settlement in a different region said, "I know it's PA territory, but it's within the fence, so I pretend it's Israeli." Moreover, most of them also tended to endorse the initial political logic that underlined the establishment of their communities: to erect buffers between existing Palestinian communities, preventing them from spreading and creating territorial contiguity.

For the most part though, people were in semi-denial of the political context of their communities' location. The following excerpt is taken from our interview with Hezi, who has been deeply involved in three community villages in the area, all lying right next to the separation barrier. A thirteen year-long resident of Gavish, he was the secretary of Karkom (a neighboring village east

6. Central election committee for the 20th Knesset. votes20.gov.il/cityresults?cityID=1224

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of the Green Line but within the barrier) for seven years, and was the secretary of Narkis at the time of the interview.

Sarai Aharoni: Do you treat this [the separation barrier] as a border?

Hezi: No.

S.A.: No?

Hezi: I haven't heard anybody say the word border, never heard this term.

S.A.: Really? So how do you call the…?

Hezi: A fence.

S.A.: A fence? A wall?

Hezi: A separation fence, a peace fence… Listen, it's known… Not to say it, but it's known that at some point this will be the future border. It will be the border. And to your question about Karkom, since the fence is on the east side of Karkom then this is a political statement. It's a political statement, Karkom [being included inside the barrier,] because we talk about the Borders of the Division [*gvulot hahaluka*.[7]] and Karkom is already… beyond.

S.A.: But people don't use the term border?

Hezi: I've never heard anybody in Karkom or in Narkis or in Gavish. This is the first time I've heard the word border. I've never thought about it.

S.A.: And *Gavish* [where Hezi lives] is also not a border community?

Hezi: No, no… I've never heard… I don't use this term either.

S.A.: Does the term "fence-adjacent community" [*Yishuv smuch gader*] make sense?

Hezi: Yes, *yishuv smuch gader* yes. Fence-adjacent or fence-side, that yes. But not border. Not border. No one uses this term. No politicians, not from the right or the left. Also in the army they don't use this term… you know, it's the first time [I've given it a thought]. I'm intrigued.

When we asked Anat, the realtor, if people talked about the occupation, she exclaimed, "The only thing people talk about is the value of their homes." She was exaggerating of course. Also, as a realtor, where *she* thought prices were hovering was what people wanted to hear. She was, however, accurate in describing the mood of families whose major motivation for settling in the area was the search for a suburban lifestyle rather than

7. Hezi here invokes a term used to talk about the pre-1948 UN sanctioned division between the anticipated Jewish and Palestinian states.

a mission to Judaize the land. She, by contrast, was socially conscious and ideological. True, in certain respects she too personified the Zionist ethos: living in one of the Seven Stars Plan villages; enjoying personal connections in the security and state systems; having sons who volunteered for elite combat units; and more. Nevertheless, her activism focused on improving Jewish-Arab relations. A self-declared "leftie," she invited us to interview her at her "favorite restaurant" in the neighboring Palestinian city of Beit Furiq, not a common choice for a Jewish Israeli woman (for example, another woman we interviewed earlier that day had actually warned us not to drive back through *her* neighboring Arab town). During the interview, it was clear that Anat held her relations with Arabs dear. She told us admiringly about the Arab butcher from Beit Furiq, where "all the Jews shop for meat," who donated money to finance a trip abroad for Narkis's children's football club. She talked at length about her teaching Hebrew at an Arab school. At one point in her interview she made a wide gesture to indicate her frequenting Beit Furiq and said, animatedly, "This is Zionism." At another point she said:

> Anat: During Tzuk Eitan [the 2014 violent confrontation between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, which included intense missile launching from Gaza and massive bombardments and a land invasion by Israel] we had here an anti-missile station, so we would prepare food for the soldiers. And the ones who made up the packages were Abed [the butcher] and Khalil [the pharmacist, both Palestinians with primarily Jewish customers]. Khalil sent shampoo and soap and Abed sent the meat. Yes, the soldiers received packages from Abed and Khalil during Tzuk Eitan.
>
> Amalia Sa'ar: But is this common here? Such relationships between Arabs and Jews?
>
> Anat: No, it's rare. You know what? I'll give you an example, every so often… our offspring, my own as well as other kids in our village, are all from elite units in the army. We have no defaulters. Zero defaulters. So every so often they [the soliders] come with their entire unit, if they have a training session. So we [the Jewish villagers], we host them in our homes, bake cakes for them, pamper them… You don't get that in Kefar Saba or in Tel Aviv.

There is a seeming disjunction in this excerpt, where in response to our question about the relations between Arabs and Jews Anat started talking about her Jewish neighbors' generous embrace of the soldiers. To an outside listener the two topics may seem

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counter-intuitive. Not only are the Palestinian citizens [including Abed the butcher and Khalil the pharmacist] categorically excluded from Anat's "securitists" elite group, but its prerogatives—notably the power generated by belonging to the security apparatus and the benefit of getting boutique villages built especially for them—arguably come directly at their expense.

Yet this is not how Anat saw it. Throughout her interview Anat consistently collapsed two themes that emerged as key in her narrative: community cohesion and the "high quality" [*anashim eichutiyim*] of her Jewish neighbors on the one hand, and her good personal relations with Arabs on the other. She shared the former with most of the Jewish residents we talked to, whereas the latter was largely regarded as a more "radical" or "leftie" position. Still, she insisted on integrating the two; hence her statement "This is Zionism" about her good Arab connections. She was a proud Zionist who belonged to the well-connected secular, liberal left. She was not apologetic about her privileges. In fact, she perceived her neighbors' volunteer spirit, including their volunteering for army combat units, as altruism. At the same time, it was precisely this framing that gave legitimacy to her friendships with Arabs, to her being a "leftie." Clearly, *her* national loyalty was above suspicion. For Anat, Hezi, and others we spoke with, the incongruity lay not between the Palestinian and the Zionist perspective but between two intra-Zionist ones: pro-peace and territorial concessions vs. pro-annexation and the inevitability of war. This was the core debate that they were referring to in their narratives. Anat was seemingly oblivious to the potentially offensive significance of her loud declaration, "This is Zionism," with respect to the Arabs among whom we were conversing. She did volunteer work with Arabs. Her husband was among the founders of the *Jewish-Arab Partnership* movement, and she was a member of *Women Wage Peace.* She had even lost a few potential real-estate sales with home-owners in her village who disliked her activism and "Told me so explicitly." Other people we spoke to were more attuned than Anat to the possible contradictions. Hezi, for example, who indicated, albeit more subtly, that he supported territorial concessions and who also reported frequenting Palestinian villages, was nevertheless less romantic than Anat. "The Arab villages, if they

decide one day to rise up against us, and all of them come and just walk through our villages in the middle of the night… it won't be… they'll have casualties but so will we. God forbid it could do us a lot of damage. It can happen." Admittedly, Hezi's was the only blunt expression of this sort we came upon. Mostly, we heard more subtle expressions of fear, resentment, or hostility toward the Palestinian neighbors, particularly in response to encounters with other elements of the landscape that cannot be fenced off.

ELEMENTS THAT SEEP PASSED THE BARRIERS

The barriers indeed block or strictly regulate the passage of people, but they cannot do so with other elements, notably sound, smell, water, fire, and air pollution. These came up repeatedly in our conversations with the Jewish residents along the seamline. First and most frequent were complaints about the Muezzin, whose calls five times a day to the Muslim prayer many find irritating, to put it mildly. In fact, there was not a single person who did not mention the Muezzin—and never with any prompting from us. Most of our interviewees resented these sounds, which they experienced as aggressive ("Imagine the distress of the kids who wake up at 4 am to the sound of the Muezzin"). Some said they were convinced that the loudspeakers were turned up to spite them. One woman mentioned "incitement," and when we asked if she understood the Arabic she admitted she didn't but said she was convinced that she could discern the words "Jews" and "Allahu Akbar." In one long interview with two women in one of the kibbutzim they mapped for us the terrain of insecurity marked by the different Muezzins, each talking about "my Muezzin" as they lived in different neighborhoods and so would get the calls to prayer from different mosques. The friendliest attitudes we heard were spoken by one or two men, who said, "The Muezzin—I've gotten so used to it that I hardly hear it"—again, without our ever asking them directly. And when Anat told us that the houses closest to the barrier were selling for 20% lower than other houses in the same community and still taking longer to sell, she said, "There's a psychological gap. When I bring clients to look at houses [who lie next to the barrier], some will not even get out of the car… Would you like to live next to a fence and a Muezzin?"

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Fires and air pollution are other major concerns. The Arabs, the Jewish residents told us in dismay, are in the habit of burning garbage and agricultural cuttings. That means frequent smell hazards, thick polluting smoke, and not rarely, depending on the wind, fire that breaks out in the bushes and even near the houses in the adjacent Jewish villages. When we asked Osnat, who complained about the fires, if she knew why her neighbors burned waste, she rolled her eyes and said, with a dismissive smile, "Mentality." Indeed, garbage or gleanings are habitually burned in the Palestinian communities, whose residents of course suffer the consequences no less than their Jewish neighbors. One major reason is the poor waste removal infrastructure. With over 20 years' delay in approving the master plans for these expanding communities, many of the newer neighborhoods there lack proper infrastructure of sewerage, water, electricity, roads, and garbage collection, which forces residents to rely on makeshift and unsafe solutions. For example, Hasan, a psychotherapist from Dayr al-Na'im who lives with his wife and children above his parents' apartment in a relatively new neighborhood, said that when they first moved into their new house they would make a pile and burn the waste. After they grasped the damage caused, they invested in two large containers and hired someone to tow them to the public dump. A while later though, a new construction next door demolished the provisional road they had paved and made it impossible for the truck to reach their house. So now Hasan takes the garbage bags with him in the car every morning to dump them in the container on the main street. However, when he is late for work he forgets, and then, particularly on hot days, he returns in the afternoon to a stinking car. "Life's garbage," he said. When recently his father asked the newer neighbors not to burn their waste, they retorted that it was *their* land and they were free to do whatever they wanted. Other, and in fact much more severe sources of air-polluting fires are the regional garbage dumps, legal and illegal, which are invariably located inside the Arab cities even though they serve the entire area. Here, frequent fires caused by chemical reactions are mostly left burning until they die out. A fire investigator from the National Firefighters explained:

> Water cannot douse the fires in mountains of garbage. It takes sand. And we, unlike the local municipalities, don't have tractors and bulldozers… We always come when we're called… [Yet] after we make sure that the fire won't spread, and when by the means at our disposal there's no chance of putting it out, we just let it burn until everything is turned into cinder, even if it takes days… Especially when we're talking about lost debts [reference to the Arab municipalities' endemic deficit], no one's going to pay for us putting the fire out.[8]

A third major source of polluting fires is regulated and unregulated industrial plants of Jewish and Palestinian owners, which again are located inside or right on the outskirts of Palestinian communities. One such area, located *east* of the separation barrier and called, poetically, Buds of Peace, accommodates about 13 production plants that use highly poisonous and inflammable chemical substances. This industrial area benefits simultaneously from the cheap labor of West Bank Palestinians and the poor regulation in the liminal space between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.[9] Many more polluting industries, again owned by Jews and Arabs alike, are scattered throughout the Palestinian communities also on the Israeli side of the barrier.

Lastly, water: one of the communities we visited suffered severe flooding in 2013 (which incidentally also hit the neighboring Palestinian community), when a stream overflowed because the separation barrier had left insufficient draining space in the event of exceptionally strong rainfall. There were no casualties but the damage to properties was enormous, and it took many families months, or in some cases years, to recover. Four years later, people still talked to us about it as a traumatic event.

DISCUSSION: PARTIAL SEPARATION, PARTIAL MISRECOGNITION

The ambivalence of Israeli Jews and their unclear perception of the separation barrier are hardly coincidental. They are the corollary of a long-standing state policy of blurring the nature

8. Shalita, Chen. "A nightmare in the village: How the pirate fires are making the residents of the Sharon miserable." *Globes*, 26 Sept, 2010. www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000589556. Translated from the Hebrew by Amalia Sa'ar.
9. Landau, Idan. "A polluting plant" The Hottest Place in Hell, 23 Sept. 2014. https://www.ha-makom.co.il/article/idan-landau-nitzaney-shalom.

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of its domination in the West Bank, and of keeping its borders with the Palestinians obscure: dropping them entirely at times, making them seem formidable at others, and ultimately keeping them porous by maintaining an asymmetrical crossings regime (Garb). The separation barrier, despite its tangible materiality, has not changed this policy, as it retains the unclear distinction between an Israeli territory and a Palestinian territory (Simonneau). As Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michaeli argue, Israel's indeterminacy as to the nature of its control over the West Bank—whether or not it is an occupation and whether or not expropriating lands means territorial annexation—has allowed it to pursue the policies of "Greater Israel" in the West Bank without jeopardizing its Jewish majority, while evading accountability in the international community. Inwardly, the state's obfuscating the nature of its domination over Palestinians has been very effective in deflecting political discussion, so that even Israelis who support territorial concessions and a two-state solution often lack the language and the clarity to take a practical stand on matters such as the separation barrier's ample encroachments east of the Green Line.

As shown in the ethnography, the Jewish residents along the seamline experience the separation barrier and complementary fences as seemingly reassuring devices that allow them to conduct their daily lives *as if* the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been settled, although they remain keenly aware that it has not. A similar ambivalence is expressed at the level of political discussions, as residents typically opt to avoid thinking about the barrier in political terms. Instead they think of it as unpleasant ("Would you like to live next to a fence?" as Anat asked) but effective ("We had a thefts' epidemic here before the fence was built and now it has stopped completely," Hezi told us).

Still, like the clouds of polluted air constantly hanging over their heads, politics and power refuse to disappear from cognition. The following excerpt from a newspaper interview with a resident of Nirit (original name), a community village at the southern end of the stretch, captures well the sense of entitlement and the depoliticized emphasis on "quality of life," which recurred also throughout our interviews. A woman that the article calls "A" tells her interviewer:

We moved to [Nirit] a year ago because we fell in love with the place's pastoral character. Everyone here are people who were looking for quality of life but couldn't afford to live on a moshav. We built our home with love, invested everything we had… We never imagined that we would be forced to shut all the windows from the afternoon onwards… The air here is poisoned.

The interviewer asks A, "Did you consider leaving?" A replies:

Why would I leave? I served in the army, I've always worked and never asked for anything from the state. After so many rented apartments I finally managed to build a home. Why would I give it up just because people are saving on garbage removal? When I was building, I had to pay to have the waste removed. The small businesses that burn their waste instead of removing it properly are saving tens of thousands of shekels a year, and nobody's telling them anything.[10]

Like most of our interviewees, A was attracted to the peacefulness of the gated community. She did not see the environmental situation in the neighboring Palestinian communities on either side of the barrier, let alone the structural and political violence that belied their chaotic and neglected state on the one hand, and the tranquil appearance of villages such as hers, on the other. However, politics does not remain entirely beyond her and her neighbors' horizon. The cognitive structure that forms their sense of entitlement combines social class ("Couldn't afford to live on a moshav… I've always worked and never asked for anything from the state") and being part of the national majority ("I've served in the army"). According to Bourdieu (*Pascalian*), cognitive structures are not forms of consciousness but dispositions of the body, which are formed and transformed through practice. Like Hezi's daughter's statement that she cannot imagine a safer place to live, A and others were attracted to a space that made them feel at ease. For them the fences, walls, gates and patrols, and the sight of soldiers and armed residents, create a sense of reassurance and serenity.[11] They complement the green

10. Shalita, "A nightmare in the village."

11. In a survey we conducted with a representative sample of 721 Jewish and Arab Israelis, 72% of Jewish respondents felt that the presence of weapon-bearing soldiers in public spaces was *very reassuring*. Only 3% of Arab respondents felt the same. When asked about the presence

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lawns and red roofs in producing a space that appears beautiful and feels safe. Through these and other practices, such as baking cakes for soldiers stationed nearby, "the law of the social body is converted into the law of the body" (Bourdieu, *Pascalian* 181). Concomitantly, the violence that has made it possible is misrecognized. Yet somatization is multi-directional, and as sounds, smells, water, flames, and smoke cross the fences and walls, it inevitably reinserts violence into residents' practical consciousness.

Of course, there are varying degrees of misrecognition. Hezi was quite frank both in sharing his fearful scenario of Palestinians rising up against his village and in admitting that the barrier was used as a political and not merely a security tool. Anat told us about her and her husband's activity for peace and coexistence. By contrast, others, like Osnat, were unapologetic about wanting as little contact with Palestinians as possible. Almost all of them cherished their close affinity with the Israeli security forces. They typically thought that having small arms in their own communities enhanced their security, but that the same was clearly illegal and extremely dangerous in the neighboring Palestinian communities. In other words, people we talked to were quite aware of politics and of their privileged position within the ethno-national power order. At the same time, they evaded our attempts to engage them in explicit discussions about the politics of the separation barrier or about the occupation of the West Bank. Apparently, most were also not in the habit of discussing such topics among themselves.

CONCLUSION

For most of the people we talked to, most of the time, the presence of the border is semi-acknowledged and semi-denied. Borrowing Bourdieu's ideas on forms of capital and the workings of power ("The Forms"), we may say that the Jewish Israelis living next to the barrier misrecognize power. They detach their social and civil capital—notably their being privileged citizens of the state that controls the natural resources—from the power

of weapon-bearing *civilians*, 26% of Jewish respondents, compared to 13% of Arab respondents, felt that it was very reassuring.

dynamics inherent in their economic capital and sense of security. At the same time, this collective denial of the workings of power is not hermetic. Differently from Bourdieu's analysis of class distinction ("The Forms"), in which power sophisticatedly disguises itself as culture and historical dispossession are watered down into "personal taste," in the case described here the seams, as it were, appear much looser, so actors readily discern the underlying operation of state power even as they deny some of its political implications, particularly the gap between their liberal self-image and the harsh repercussions of their comfortable lifestyle for the Palestinians. The whitewashing of the occupation of Palestine in Israeli Jews' political consciousness has been extraordinarily effective, as reflected in the intransigence of Israeli public opinion. The separation barrier has certainly played a part in this, although it has been merely one part of a much larger state apparatus designed to produce and upkeep misrecognition.

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TO BUILD A WALL

Imaginaries of Identity in Yucatan, Mexico

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IMAGINING A WALL

The two of us (Steffan Igor Ayora-Diaz, publishing on food in Yucatan, and Gabriela Vargas-Cetina, publishing on music in Yucatan) have written before about how some Yucatecans have expressed a wish for a wall that would encircle the Yucatan peninsula, to keep *Mexicans* at bay and stop them from "corrupting" Yucatecan culture and values.[1] In recent months, the discussions and press items about a larger wall between the United States and Mexico have fostered much thinking and pondering on border walls and their effects. Whether this wall would cover the entire border between Mexico and the United States or only parts of it, as the US President recently accepted (see Rascoe's report on the US President's change of heart). From the point of view of the 45th US President and his administration, the wall would have magical powers, in that it would stop illegal immigration into the United States for good. Somehow stopping this flow will help make the United States a better country.

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From past, historical experience, we see that walls, as great as they can be, such as the walls in Maya cities of the past and in Feudal cities in Europe, or even as in The Great Wall of China, have not been able to either contain the flow of immigration, nor the military attacks they were designed to resist. Neither have they held the formidable powers necessary to stop the decay of empires. Seen from the angle of their materiality, walls are always penetrable, so it is uncertain what their actual use could be, beyond their symbolism. Walls have to have doors, or bridges, or both, lest they become a permanent liability not only for those outside of them but also for those they are expected to protect within them. Walls may be thwarted by going over them, as a 2016 advertisement for *Aeromexico* highlighted in response to then-candidate for US president Donald Trump's rhetoric (https://youtu.be/-8vDwiwlnml). They can also be overcome by going under them, through tunnels. A cartoon by Barcelona-based animation company *Casi Creativo* which circulated via social network applications, also in response to Donald Trump's declarations about the Mexico-US border wall, showed a group of Latino bricklayers working above ground singing "we are building Trump's wall," and then working underground, singing "we are building Trump's tunnel" (https://youtu.be/decgtRdNNaw). But whatever lighthearted fun may be made of border walls on cartoons and clever videos, these walls are an aggressive, violent gesture toward those they are expected to bar from entry, and have characterized many imperial cities and nations, as the papers in this collection show.

Here we reflect on ideas related to walls, roads, bridges, doors and tunnels, especially because most of these have been associated with the discourse on the wall currently espoused by the US administration, and because theoreticians and the public also have tended to see these types of structures as related. We use these concepts and the materialities they name as a general frame of reference to reflect on the manifold relations between imagined *insides* and *outsides* generally implied when discussing the wall already splitting Mexico and the US, but also regarding Yucatecan identity.

WALLS, ROADS, DOORS, BRIDGES AND TUNNELS

Georg Simmel (in Frisby and Featherstone, 170–174) saw walls as related to roads, doors and bridges. The wall, he thought,

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is a mute, non-communicative structure that separates one space from another. Since the two spaces are contiguous, the wall is also a point of union between an *inside* and an *outside*, but the stress is on separation. The road and the bridge, he argued, are momentous expressions of the human spirit, since they direct movement. The door makes it possible for an inside to open into the unlimited wealth of possibilities in direction, purpose, and travel that are outside, and for the outside to be shut out of domestic space. Today we know that doors, besides the happy instances of Simmel's world of infinite possibilities of direction, can also be *loci* of violence, since those who get to control a door may decide they are going to stop others, or at least certain others, from going through.

In our societies of the twenty-first century, doors and their opening and closing qualities have figuratively extended into highly regulated spaces, such as immigration offices and document check wickets at airports, train, and bus stops at most points of international departure and arrival, and control posts at long-distance public transport stations. The recent and ongoing refugee crises of the world also show how governments are intent on creating walls and closing doors to people whose only hope is to escape the conditions of violence and despair in which they are living in their countries of origin. We also see that, although borders between nation-states can be, in some instances and by some people, traversed without difficulty, walls and their regulated doors create an environment of violence on both sides, and this violence often extends to all individuals wanting to pass through the existing doors. At all airports, for example, the violence exerted over most every passenger, even if they have all their documents in order, is now considered a normal part of air travel. At the immigration posts along the Mexico–US border there are regular reports of symbolic violence being exerted on those wishing to cross from one country to another, on both sides, and physical violence is also common. The border between Israel and Palestine, which is crossed every day by hundreds of people, is also known as a locus of quotidian violence. Following Ariela Azoulay and Adi Ophir, who write on the situation along the Israel–Palestine border, Wendy Brown (30–31) surmises that these walls and doors separating national

borders create along them a status of permanent suspended law whereby state of emergency measures and violence override political solutions.

The imaginary of the wall as demarcating the boundary between an *us* and a *them* lends itself to the constant play between two poles that Azoulay and Ophir identify as "spectacular violence" and "suspended violence." These authors propose that spectacular violence is visible and kills many innocent people, and that suspended violence is less visible but it is there to exercise control through menace. Brown (83–90) also describes the ways in which the state has surrendered to at least some civilians the responsibility for guarding the border, often through the exercise of actual violence, along the Mexico-US border wall, as part of the permanent state of exception. She discusses the role of the Minuteman Project, a group of civilians who have taken in their own hands the vigilance of sections of the US-Mexico border. Formed in 2004, the Minuteman Project patrols the border and conducts, as its President Jim Gilchrist explains on their website (http://baesic.net/minuteman-project), "very aggressive Citizen Activism" campaigns regarding immigration issues. Brown also mentions (85) the *Angels*, groups of US citizens who leave water and maps along the paths known to be frequented by migrants, with, if not the support, at least the tolerance of border authorities, who thus share with civilians the responsibility of both enforcing and palliating the worse effects of the border fence and its surrounding imaginaries and legal issues. This results in a blurring of boundaries between legality and illegality that surrounds not only the migrants, their human rights, and their bodies, but also those of the civilians who have undertaken either to humanely help or to aggressively attack those trying to cross the border wall. Suspended violence, as Azolulay and Ophir define them, is ever present, along with its constant transformation into incidents of more or less spectacular violence.

While the road demarcates the space of human movement from the rest of space, and points at the start and the end of traffic, the bridge unites two spaces into a single conceptual match: we only build bridges, Simmel suggested, between two spaces that we have already seen together in our minds. This is clearly the case in the US-Mexico border, where the geographical limits

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between the two nation-states have been mobile and subject to negotiation and military force since the beginning of their existence as colonial spaces. Vazquez-Lozano and River describe how thanks to military and economic might, during the nineteenth century the US administration was able to displace the border southwards, encompassing larger territories and groups of people with Mexican ancestry who then became placed in a perilous position. Throughout history, despite disagreements, authorities and citizens of both countries have built structures of separation and communication, including gates, bridges, and tunnels.

Conceptually related to walls, roads, bridges, and doors, is the idea of the tunnel. Although somewhat similar to caves, tunnels are in fact underground roads and bridges that connect two separate spaces, at least in theory. In this sense, Simmel's ruminations about roads and bridges would apply, with the added undertones of secrecy and trespass if the tunnel is made to bypass illegally one or more walls, and of subversion, as when it is used for hiding from people and the state(s) above.

Today, as Cohan, McKernan and Taille have documented, many people around the world live inside tunnels, in countries such as the United States, New York, China, Romania and Australia. Inhabited tunnels, in popular imagination, are dark places where the morals and the law regulating life on the surface are relaxed and those who choose to inhabit them have an unlimited freedom to do as they please. However, Marc Singer's documentary *Dark Days* and Matt O'Brien's book *Beneath the Neon* about life in the flood drains beneath Las Vegas have shown that people who live in tunnels establish communities with unwritten but equally recognizable rules, making life more predictable in the dark. In some cities, tunnels connect city buildings and are widely used by urban dwellers. In Montreal, for example, an extensive underground city provides shelter from the heat of summer and the cold of winter, with stores, restaurants, movie theaters, and food stands offering most services that can be found above ground. In other cities, as in Washington D.C., extensive systems of tunnels help people move between different government buildings and city sections. Tunnels, then, are part of the regular life of many people who either inhabit them or use them every day to get from one place

to another without having to face the cold, the extreme heat, or the regular city traffic.

Tunnels, then, are not necessarily places of surreptitious crime and debauchery. Singer and O'Brien, however, have shown that people living in them have found themselves unfit for living with dignity elsewhere in society and often suffer from addictions and disease. With regards to the U.S.-Mexico border, and at most international borders marked by walls, all tunnels are treated as suspicious, because people most often construct them in order to overcome the barrier that the border wall represents, often for the displacement of people or illegalized commodities. We are interested in the idea and the image of the tunnel because it not only bypasses walls and connects spaces, but also because, even when people use them as their home and establish underground communities in them, they represent spaces where people can hide and where things can be hidden from view, but still offer the traffic advantages of roads and bridges, as well as the domestic qualities afforded, as Simmel points out, by walls that demarcate and doors that communicate. Here we will use the idea of the tunnel to discuss the flows of secret things within the channels of illegal and para-legal circuits. Certainly, the image of the tunnel in this context relates to those illegal tunnels that have been built along the Mexican border in order to cross underneath the wall, but we will also draw from research on tunnel inhabitants' ideas of subversion, order, and escape.

REGIONAL IDENTITY

Up until the 1970s, the state of Yucatan was often seen as a region closed within itself. Anthropologists, including Moseley and Terry, wrote about it as "A World Apart," and most Yucatecans could certainly speak of their region and their culture as very distinctive and different from all other regional cultural complexes in Mexico. A single Maya language, Yucatecan Maya, was spoken by the majority of the population every day, in both the countryside and the cities. Yucatecan Spanish, spoken mainly in the cities, was heavily marked by Maya syntax and vocabulary. The colonial province of Yucatan, which then comprised the states of Campeche and Yucatan and the Federal Territory of Quintana

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Roo, had lived through great economic wealth and the growth of regional elites supported by a system of haciendas growing sisal for export to the United States and Europe. As Morrison shows, between 1870 and 1920, the export economy had produced a regional system of railroads which, at 4500 Km, was then one of the most extensive in the world, completely owned and controlled by regional entrepreneurs. Communication with the island of Cuba, with the south of the United States, with Europe, and with Veracruz in Mexico took place by boat and, as of 1928, by plane. The first railroad connecting the Peninsula's *Ferrocarriles del Sureste* with the state of Veracruz was built in the 1930s, and finally connected with others beyond the peninsula in 1958, when the railroad stretch from Coatzacoalcos to Campeche was inaugurated (Domínguez Valencia, 24). Then, as Vargas-Cetina describes, in 1968, just in time for Yucatecans to travel to the Olympic Games in Mexico City, the first road allowing commercial traffic finally connected Yucatan to the rest of Mexico, through a bridge crossing the Grijalba river. The Mexican Revolution and synthetic fibers had ended the Sisal plantation era, but Yucatecans produced corn and cattle in the countryside and retained the control of most industrial and commercial ventures within the peninsula, and, save those overtaken by Televisa and by the national government, of most of the television and radio stations broadcasting from within.

The 1970s brought, through the road and through new mass media broadcasts originating elsewhere in Mexico, new cultural changes that began to make themselves noticeable. Until the 1970s the production of most everyday necessities purchased by the Yucatecan population either took place in Yucatan or was handled by Yucatecan entrepreneurs in *Casas de Importación* (Import Business Houses). Yucatecan companies manufactured regional bread, sweets, beer, soda drinks, clothing, rugs and hammocks, clothes, plastic goods, and leather bags and shoes. Local power plants, using gas, powered electric appliances, as well as record players and radio and television sets. The appliances themselves, as well as radios and TV sets, cars, boats, and motors of different types, were imported by local entrepreneurs who had built wide distribution networks across the cities and towns. As of the 1970s, however, national and international capital began to take hold

of local industry, and national television finally took over local TV stations and viewers' selection of channels. National bureaucracy also replaced most regional offices, and "*escuelas federales*" (Federal schools) began to take over regional education. The full Mexicanization of Yucatan accelerated in the 1990s, when Governor Victor Cervera Pacheco helped national and international corporations take over Yucatecan industry and expand their franchises throughout Yucatan state. It was precisely at the end of the 1990s, probably partly because of the increased connection between Yucatan and the rest of Mexico, that Yucatecans began to migrate to the United States in larger numbers than before. Cornejo Portugal and Fortuny Loret de Mola explain:

> Yucatecans began to leave [for the United States] with the Bracero program (1942 to 1964). However, it was not until the 1990s that migration became more visible not only at an international but also an interstate scale. In 2000, 5,839 Yucatecans left for the United States. At that time, the average national [Mexican] rate of emigration to the United States was 1.6%, but in Yucatan it was only 0.4%. Between 2000 and 2005 [Yucatecan] migration to the United States increased by 450%, from 0.4% to 1.8% of the total population.

However, while encouraging Mexican businesses to take control of Yucatecan factories and distribution outlets, Governor Cervera Pacheco fueled Yucatecan regionalism. During his tenure, he even declared Yucatecan congress' independence from central Mexico. Since his economic policies had brought Yucatan close to full and perhaps even surplus employment, people in the state began to dream again of a politically independent Yucatan peninsula, forgetting to acknowledge that economic dependence on Mexico and on multinational corporations was complete at that point.

One of the most important ways in which the Yucatan peninsula has become part of a system of international "tunnels" in the form of hidden traffic, has been through the Peninsula's geographical entanglements first with pirates' routes during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and then with the smuggling of food and appliances coming in via the Free Trade Zone in the Federal Territory, and later state, of Quintana Roo in the 1970s and 1980s. More recently, as Hernandez describes, the Peninsula has been a stop-over location for drugs smuggled from South and Central

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America to the United States with the help of the United States' Drug Enforcement Administration. Now Mexican drug cartels are increasingly operating, with great violence, in the state of Quintana Roo, and especially in the cities of Cancun, Playa del Carmen, and the area known as *Riviera Maya*.

Captain George Spurre is one of the earlier pirates whose name has been associated with the Yucatan peninsula. Spurre operated within the Caribbean, with docking points in Jamaica, Cuba, and the Yucatan peninsula, first assaulting Campeche in 1678 and, five years later, the Mexican port of Veracruz (Marley 365–368). Davis and Marley point to Henry Morgan, Jean Laffite, and Lorezillo as pirates known to have kept their ships in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, and used Isla Mujeres and Cozumel as base camps in the 1800's. Laffite, in particular, was well-regarded by the locals in Isla Mujeres. Nineteenth century explorer John Lloyd Stephens (243) reported that "Monsieur Laffita, as our skipper called him, bore a good character in these parts; he was always good to the fishermen, and paid them well for all he took from them." In 1902 the section of the Yucatan peninsula that is today the State of Quintana Roo was made into a Federal Territory by President Porfirio Diaz, and it remained as such until 1974. In the 1970s it began to be promoted as a tourist paradise. Since it was a frontier state, local entrepreneurs were allowed to import goods from Belize, the United States, and Europe. Appliances, stereo sets and, in particular, foreign foods were freely imported into Quintana Roo and, through what people in Yucatan called "contrabando hormiga" (ant-like smuggling), imported edam cheese continued to feed the regional appetites for Queso Relleno (stuffed cheese), a dish that required the family to carve away at the wheel of cheese over many weeks and then stuff the hollowed out wheel with meat, capers, raisins, and olives, and cook it in a white maize or wheat flour broth.

Journalist Anabel Hernández, who has won several national awards for her investigative reporting, places Yucatan within the circuits for drug smuggling between Colombia and the United States during the 1980s. The US government assigned Ernest Jacob, a pilot who worked as a double agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration and Medellin Cartels, the mission to set

up an airstrip corridor with a base in Yucatan state between 1984 and 1986. Jacob apparently asked the U.S. government for bigger planes, which he wanted in order to expand the Medellin Cartel's operations in the United States. The U.S. provided him with a Fairchild C-123K plane dubbed "The Fat Lady," which he used to fly cocaine from Colombia to Yucatan, and then to the United States. It is unclear whether the Colombian drug traffic has continued through the same routes, but now in the twenty-first century the state of Quintana Roo has certainly become, at least on the regional news, an area controlled by Mexican drug cartels and gangs that are killing the tourist industry through repeated and very publicized incidents of violence. The violence, however, seems to follow pre-established patterns already described by Pino Arlacchi and others in the ethnography about the regional and international mafia in Italy, and particularly the *families* originating in Sicily and Calabria.

YUCATÁN: WALLS AND BRIDGES

In addition to the lack of efficient transport between the Yucatán peninsula and the rest of Mexico, during the nineteenth century Yucatecans attempted to secede from Mexico on three different occasions. In retaliation, the Mexican Government imposed a marine wall: a navy blockade of trade between the peninsula and central Mexico. During this time, Campos García and Careaga Vilesid tell us, Yucatecans built bridges that connected local entrepreneurs and politicians in the cities of Yucatan with Texas, Louisiana, and Florida in the US, and strengthened their ties with Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Colombia in the Caribbean. According to Evans, Yucatecan economic connections reached the Canadian plains as well.

One effect of these ties is a more receptive disposition toward English in the everyday life of middle and upper class urban Yucatecans, in contrast to other Mexican regions where people resist English as a form of imperialism. Many visitors have noted that English is common in street signs and businesses' names, such as car dealers that are called "centers" instead of *centros*, the Spanish word. There is, for example, a *Restaurant Week* (branded and advertised in English) in which restaurants across

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the city offer special discounts. Words like garage, porch, clutch, and other Anglicisms are part of everyday Yucatecan Spanish. And everyday language also builds a wall *vis-à-vis* other Mexicans. While Spanish in much of Mexico has incorporated Nahuatl words, in Yucatán it is Maya words, syntax, and speech intonation that characterize local Spanish, making communication with other Mexicans sometimes difficult and misunderstandings common. The differences are continuously emphasized so as to symbolically separate Yucatecans from Mexicans. Some of the clearest examples of this are showcased on t-shirts with legends in Yucatecan Spanish contrasting them with their Mexican counterparts. Some of these t-shirts also sport either an explicit refusal of the status of "sister republic," a phrase many Mexicans use to refer to Yucatán, or announce in large letters "República de Yucatán" (Republic of Yucatan).

In our own research we have found that Yucatecan food is all the time contrasted and its identity differentiated from Mexican cuisine, whereas cookbook writers, cultural brokers, and journalists readily recognize Lebanese, Caribbean, and European influences. The same happens with Music. Yucatecan Trova is presented as the creation of Yucatecan and Cuban artists, with the help of other Caribbean composers, and the French and Iberian romantic traditions are also recognized as influential in regional songs. Despite the fact that Yucatecan food and music have a national presence in Mexico today, and they have often been appropriated in other regions, they remain distinct from other Mexican traditions.

WALL FANTASIES

Wendy Brown posits that nation state sovereignty is on the wane, and it is the attending effects of their crumbling that bring up fantasies around what a border wall could accomplish, re-instating "fantasies of national purity and national innocence" (115). Brown identifies four distinct types of fantasies that are expected to be fulfilled by border walls (115–123): "The fantasy of the dangerous alien in an increasingly borderless world, the fantasies of containment, the fantasies of impermeability, and the fantasies of purity, innocence and goodness." We see that these fantasies are all applied repeatedly to the border wall between Mexico

and the United States, especially now during the tenure of the 45th President of the United States. The wall between the United States and Mexico is now being imagined by its proponents and supporters as having magical properties to stop unwanted lawless aliens, mark the limits of a territory under siege by foreign menaces of many types, protect the United States against the forces of globalization, and uphold the virtues of a chosen, "good" people against the failings of others who are to be kept outside (especially "bad hombres"). These kinds of fantasies have also played a part when Yucatecans desired that a wall be built around the three states of the peninsula, namely Campeche, Yucatan and Quintana Roo.

It was precisely the idea that the specificity of Yucatecan culture and "Yucatecan values" were waning that people in Yucatan began to speak of walling the peninsula. Brown makes the point that the figure of the "dangerous alien" takes on specific contours, as someone who is radically different and can pose a threat to locals. In Yucatan this is commonly expressed, still today, in the local newspapers. When a major theft or a crime is committed, the journalists report that witnesses saw "a foreign-looking person" in the area. When convicted felons are from outside the state, and especially if they are from outside the Yucatan peninsula, journalists keep referring to their out-of-state origins, while local thieves and murderers are often given the benefit of the doubt and even declared innocent by the local press. This has the specific effect of creating an illusion of safety when in the presence of Yucatecan-born people, who nonetheless are part, judging from the everyday news, of the population engaged in felonies and criminal acts, from sex offenses to theft and murder.

Regarding the fantasies of containment, Brown (118) believes that the image of the border wall extends the image of the household. A wall would limit the horizon of the household and provide an imagined finite terrain for fantasies of borders, where there are no possible internal borders any more. Along with a fantasy of impermeability or impenetrability, these constructs of imagined or actual walls call on the nation or, in this case, the region, as a representative of a religious or religious-like entity manifested

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as a chosen people, who hold the right to determine who is part of the chosen and who is not. These two particular fantasies are already untenable in the case of Yucatan, even in the local imagination of possibly contained horizons. There are hypotheses among many locals and outsiders that the low criminality in Yucatan is the result of the money from drug cartels being laundered in the state, and/or that the families of the drug cartel bosses all live in Yucatan, so the state is protected by all the major criminals themselves. None of these two hypotheses can be proven, and the state police proudly and constantly announce that many drug *capos* have been caught as soon as they entered Yucatecan territory. However, even in the local imagination, the very conditions of endemic criminality obtaining elsewhere in Mexico could be directly related to the very peaceful life we enjoy in Merida and elsewhere in the state of Yucatan. A wall would not and could not change the flows of migrants, the flows of national and international culture, or the regional impact of the social conditions for the configurations of drug traffic and other forms of organized or disorganized criminality in Mexico.

The fourth fantasy, that of the purity, innocence, and goodness of those inside the imagined or actual wall brings the set of related fantasies full circle: In this view, Yucatecans, as already explained above, would be purer, more innocent, and better than non-Yucatecans. It is very easy to debunk this pretense. In recent memory, at least one serial killer was from a local village family. As the online publication Radio Motul reported, he died in jail after having been convicted of killing at least three young women along the coast of Yucatan between 2007 and 2008. Also, in 2014 two local psychiatrists were accused, and one of them convicted in 2016, for killing a third psychiatrist; and as Diario de Yucatan reports, the one who was released in 2016 because of "reasonable doubt" has now been indicted as the "intellectual author" of the murder and is sought by the Mexican and the International police. All three were Yucatecans, including the two accused of murder. There is very little evidence to support the view that Yucatecans are better, less evil, or less lethal in any way than other Mexicans.

As we have discussed in *Cocina, música y comunicación*, the contemporary transformations of Yucatán related to larger numbers of immigrants from other Mexican regions and abroad, as well as the availability of newly arriving commodities used in the kitchen and in music composition, recording, and interpretation, are gradually eroding the walls of Yucatecan culture. For example, the neoliberal transformation of education has allowed the proliferation of private universities and the multiplications of schools of gastronomy. The oldest of these schools for chefs are situated in Mexico City and the state of Mexico, both in the central highlands. Chefs teaching at schools are introducing ingredients, techniques, and technologies proper to Mexican cuisine and until recently alien to Yucatecan gastronomy. New restaurants of Yucatecan food opened by non-Yucatecans, and Yucatecans trained as chefs, are changing recipes that have been long considered part of the regional "tradition."

Although trova music continues to be the source of lyrics and music, the introduction of and access to new technologies in the regional-global market and new musical curricula at schools of arts are introducing rhythms, musical genres, and sounds from other Mexican regions. For example, norteño band music, until relatively recently confined to the north of the country, now has a foothold in some rural areas of the state. The same has happened with rap, hip-hop, salsa, and what in orientalist terms is called "tribal" music and dance (used both to describe belly dance done in stereotypical Middle Eastern costume but also a specific, very different type of digitally-generated music that emerged in the north of Mexico and is associated with the norteño fashions of *botas picudas* [pointy boots], big belt buckles, and Texan cowboy hats).

To conclude, walls, doors, tunnels, and bridges, are conceptual instruments that can be materialized and highlight the unity of what they aim to divide. Their violent consequences are becoming more frequent, as exemplified by both rhetoric and facts surrounding not only the Mexico–US border, but also the state

of Yucatan and its surroundings. However, learning from history, it is possible to affirm that these and other walls, including those Yucatecans have tried to build around themselves, will fall, and that the imagination sustaining them will fail.

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MENDING WALL?

The War over History in South Korea

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This article comes at a particularly difficult time for the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and its relations with the United States of America, the People's Republic of China (China), and Japan. Time and again, North Korea has threatened to make South Korea "a sea of fire" and to launch its nuclear warheads not only toward Japan and Guam but also to cities all over the US. US President Donald Trump has made it clear to the government of North Korea that it will not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea, whether aimed at the US itself or at its allies, including South Korea, and will obliterate the country, if necessary, to defend itself and its allies. China, whose relationship with North Korea is oftentimes described by the Chinese as "lips and teeth," meaning the teeth get cold without lips, declares that it opposes the use of force and nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula. South Korea, an ally of the US for two-thirds of a century, is siding with China and does not want to participate in the combined military exercise with the US and Japan or join the US plan to surround China together with Japan and India. Readers might wonder about the presence of the US on the Korean peninsula and even why the US has been so involved in both defending South Korea and demonizing the North Korean regime. They might also wonder why the current government of South Korea is attempting to move away from the US and get closer to China. The simple answer is that it all began during the height of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United

States and things have changed since its end, but the history is far deeper and more complex.

The title of this article is from Robert Frost's well known eponymous poem. The narrator of the poem meets with his neighbor every spring to repair any damages to the stone wall that runs between their properties. He sees no reason to keep the wall between them, though, and suggests as much. His neighbor remains unconvinced and just repeats, "Good fences make good neighbors." In his mind, the narrator scorns his neighbor, who he thinks resembles "an old-stone savage armed." What is interesting in the poem is the fact that the narrator's behavior contradicts his rhetoric. Frost's poem pokes fun at the contradictory mind of the narrator who ridicules his neighbor who believes in the wall, while at the same time he keeps mending the wall and maintaining it every year. Frost seems to say that the narrator is no different from his neighbor—i.e. he himself is an old-stone savage armed, but one perhaps more snobbish than his neighbor, and shows the ironic coexistence of the impulse in his mind to both build and break the wall.

By taking Frost's poem primarily as a satire of the narrator's complex mind on the wall, and taking mending to mean both restoring or strengthening and lowering or eliminating, in the initial proposal of this article, I wanted to examine the physical wall in the Korean peninsula that divides it into North and South. I planned to look into the recent attempts at mending the wall: symbolic acts performed along the wall, for example, Women Cross DMZ (the demilitarized zone, which is the 4 km wide strip of land stretching 250 km along the wall), and innovative plans to make this land into a peace park as a symbol of ideological reconciliation and ecological paradise, with hotels, casinos, and facilities that would provide visitors entertainment and pleasure. I also wanted to examine the impact of the wall's presence on South Koreans around the sentiment of *han*, a Korean word loosely defined as frustration, anger, and sadness, something that has been shaped by centuries of suffering from wars, invasions, colonization, injustice and exploitation by dominant people at home, because in the mind of a significant number of Koreans, the zone is still inscribed as a wall permanently bisecting the peninsula not only physically but also culturally.

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The Fence by the DMZ Train 49 from Seoul Station to Dorasan Station. Photo by Jeon Han, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism Korean Culture and Information. commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Korea_DMZ_Train_49_(14246308552).jpg

The development of events in South Korea since I sent the abstract have made me realize that the wall between North and South Korea is as strong as ever, even insurmountable. This is not really a surprise; many South Koreans, I believe, knew it all the while. The South and the North have been in a struggle with life and death at stake for the past seventy years. Few Koreans, both in the South and North, believe that they could co-exist with their respective systems intact. Eventually, one would absorb the other either by force or by relatively peaceful means. What is newly disturbing is the wall that is rising between Koreans in the South. It seemed much higher and stronger than I had imagined, with no possibility of lowering it, or mending the divide. For conservatives in South Korea, the past seventy years are the proud history of success. South Korea has achieved both industrialization and democratization at a pace and scale that is unprecedented. South Korean progressives do not agree. To them, it is the history of failure and accumulated injustice to be purged now by the light of the candle revolution.[1] Both sides see

1. Coherent ideas and programs are hard to find that would distinguish conservatives and progressives in South Korea. There seems to be only one

the other as armed savages, if not from the Paleolithic era. It is not simply a political division between conservatives and progressives or between Right and Left. The struggle between North and South somehow metonymically underwrites every political battle within the South. It is the total power struggle for legitimacy in the writing of Korean history for the past hundred years and over what is and should be the Korean way of life. I'll focus on the war over history being waged in South Korea during the past several months, and the place of the US therein.

US PRESENCE IN SOUTH KOREA

Korea was not always a unified country in its territory, but until it was divided into North and South in 1945, it had maintained its territorial unity on the Korean peninsula for well over 1,000 years. There was talk between Japan and China in the late 16th century to divide and rule Korea between them, and the Secretary of State of the UK offered a similar idea to Russia and Japan before the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, but neither idea was realized. In 1945, two young US officers, Colonel Dean Rusk, who later became the Secretary of State under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and Charles Bonesteel, who served as commander of US Forces in Korea, drew a line along the 38th parallel merely for military convenience, using a map from *National Geographic* magazine, because no better map was available. Neither colonel knew much about Korea and just thought if they could divide the country along the 38thparallel, Seoul would belong to the South. When to their surprise the Soviet Union accepted that division, only a few could have predicted that the division would have lasted for the next several decades. No one then seemed to have thought it would develop into the most heavily militarized zone only several years later after the Korean War between 1950 and 1953. The buffer zone, which is ironically called the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ),

meaningful line dividing them: their attitude and practice toward North Korea. Progressives are more prone to understanding the North on its own terms, accommodating or following them, and accepting its legitimacy. I'll use the terms 'conservatives' and 'the Right,' or 'progressives' and 'the Left' in accordance with the context.

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has become one of the most popular destinations for travelers visiting South Korea since the Berlin Wall was dismantled in 1989.

The Korean railroad Donghae-bukbu line on the Korean DMZ, taken from the Goseong Tongil-Jeonmangdae (Unification Observatory), South Korea. commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Donghae-bukbu_line_on_Korean_DMZ.JPG

The role of the US in the recent Korean history since the late 19th century is one of the core issues in a ferocious war over history in South Korea. The US has been involved in the Pacific since long before World War II. In 1882, the Korean-American Treaty was signed, and thereafter the first American minister arrived in Korea. The next year, the Korean government sent its first official delegates to Washington, DC. In the same year, articles on the US appeared in a Korean newspaper, and an English training school was set up to produce English interpreters. Kil-chun Yu, the first Korean student in the US, published his experience in *Observations on Travels in the West* (1895). Yu, who always thought China was the center of the world, was shocked at what he saw in the States. In the early 20th century, the wave of immigration started, and by 1905 seven thousand Korean workers were working at plantations in Hawai'i. In the same year, the US made a secret agreement with Japan. Japan could occupy Korea with the understanding and support by the US government in exchange

for Japan's acceptance of the US occupation of the Philippines. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the US fought a long and hard war against the Empire of Japan in the 1940s, and the Korean peninsula was then part of the Empire of Japan. The US helped establish the Republic of Korea in 1948, after World War II and the defeat of the Empire of Japan. Of course, Koreans established their own independent country at the time, but it is widely thought that the US played a big part in establishing South Korea as a US-oriented, capitalist, and anti-Communist society in the period shortly after WWII.

The US government has long thought of South Korea as its ally, and has promoted this narrative. A partnership between the US and South Korea has been sought, even preferred, for years—both on the South Korean side and on the US side. The US was a major player on the then-new United Nations side of the Korean War between 1950 and 1953. Other countries fought, too, but the US government, US media, and US educational institutions promoted the Korean War as a US war against Communist North Korea. The United States has taken pride in South Korea's tremendous economic, political, and educational growth. Many in the US have been relieved at the significant reduction in US aid to South Korea as a result of South Korea's great economic growth. Only more recently, in the 1980s, the South Korean government became completely independent financially. Despite occasional strains on both sides, US presidents since the 1950s have continued to see South Korea as a great and important ally of the US. In fact, US President Trump made a point of visiting South Korea and speaking at its General Assembly as recently as November 2017, and his predecessor (and in many ways arch-enemy) Barack Obama called South Korea "one of America's closest allies and greatest friends" at the 2009 G20 summit in London. The US has also made a point of designating South Korea a major non-NATO ally. To support all of this, the US has long maintained a major military presence in South Korea and has been present both in the Demilitarized Zone just sixty kilometers north of Seoul, South Korea, the capital of the Republic of Korea, and in Seoul itself. The US for decades had a full-fledged military base right in Seoul.

Not surprisingly, then, there is in South Korea a very split view regarding the United States. In 2014, according to a BBC World

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Service Poll, 58% of South Koreans said they viewed United States influence positively, while 28% said they viewed it negatively. In the same poll, 55% of people polled in the US said they viewed South Korea's influence positively, and 34% said they viewed it negatively. While there are some other countries in the world with polls showing regularly high positive views of the US (including, for example, Poland and Kenya), South Korea is, according to this poll, one of the most pro-US nations in the world.

Contrary to the BBC poll, Koreans' attitudes towards the US have become more complicated of late. The change may have something to do with a decline in interest in the US. If you had asked Koreans "Do you like the US?" in the 1960s or 1970s most of them would have answered in the positive without a moment's hesitation. Attitudes started to change in the early 1980s, and now it's almost meaningless to categorize Korean sentiment as either pro-American or anti-American. According to a recent study by a Korean sociologist, Hyun Song Lee, Koreans nowadays think that the US is very important to them, but this does not necessarily mean they like the US or trust the US. Koreans on average have favorable attitudes towards the US but their preference is only minimal. They evaluate the US highly in the areas of economy and technology, but not in politics or society or education. The younger and the more highly educated a Korean is, the less likely he or she is to speak favorably of the US or to trust it. More experience or knowledge of the US does not have a significant effect on their level of trust. In brief, for most Koreans, Lee concludes, the US is an important country for Koreans' economy and security, but their feelings are almost neutral and they do not particularly trust or distrust it. The US is no better or no worse than Korea as a state—with similar weaknesses and strengths, problems and potentials. Lee's study is not conclusive, with a very limited number of questions and sample size, but its conclusion is suggestive of the changes detectable in Koreans' perception of the US. The democratization of Korean society, expansion and progress in the Korean economy, conflicts of interests in the process, historical experience with the US from the 19th century—these are the main factors that have brought about such changes in Koreans opinions of the US.

The Korean War was brutal and fiercely fought. More than 600,000 South and North Korean soldiers were killed or went missing in action. It is estimated that more than 1.6 million civilians died. The total population of Korea at the time was 25 million (with 16 million in the South and 9 million in the North). American casualties were over 50,000, while Chinese casualties were estimated to have reached 600,000. As shown in the classified documents from Russia released after the dismantling of the Soviet Union, Kim Il-Sung, the leader of North Korea, invaded the South with approval and support from Stalin and Mao. The War was a tragedy, but some Koreans now want to believe that from that tragedy has emerged the great narrative of Korea. The narrative goes something like this. Koreans, awakened from the illusion of socialism, came to realize the value of freedom, escaped from the fetters and bondage of premodernity out of which most countries were liberated after World War II, and marched toward the road of liberal democracy and market economy. Out of poverty and tragedy, South Korea has become one of the great economic powers. Its people have made the most dramatic economic achievements and now live all over the world. Those who deny this fact are deceiving themselves and suffering from the collective depression.

From this perspective, the Korean War set the foundation for great success. It completed the demographic revolution which had started in the Japanese occupation, disrupting a strict class system of a few aristocrats, a majority of commoners, and a significant number of slaves. In the chaos and maelstrom of the war, survival, not class, was all that counted. The war also put an end to the social unrest and instability that South Korea had suffered for five years before the war when South Koreans were divided between Right and Left and fiercely fought in a series of acts of terror, riots, revolts, and uprisings. During the war, both South and North Koreans could move to the part of the country where they wanted to live. Some hundred thousand South Koreans, mostly socialists, idealists, and daydreamers opted for the North. South Korea became ideologically unified against socialism and Communism until the 1980s when a new generation of Leftist activists and students emerged against the military dictatorship.

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In addition, it spurred some 1.5 million Koreans to migrate from North to South, many of whom were Christians, were educated, owned property, and later became leaders in the South Korean army, business, and politics. Their migration was a brain drain for North Korea. The increase in the population catalyzed the drastic urbanization and industrialization of South Korea. In 1945, only 15% of Koreans lived in the city. Now, 90% do. The war also gave birth to a new elite group, the military, which learned the most advanced management and administration skills and a rational approach to combat and order from the American military which trained and educated it. Led by Chung-hee Park, then Major General, the military eventually seized political power through the military revolution in 1961. Park and his followers played a crucial role in modernizing South Korea, together with adventurous and patriotic entrepreneurs, competent bureaucrats, and hard-working Koreans. Equipped with a competitive spirit, especially against North Korea, which at that time was much better off than the South, and rivalry with and jealousy of Japan, they drove the country into modernization, concentrating on the development of heavy and chemical industry. At the time, this project seemed suicidal, but is now called the Miracle on the Han River. From a global historical perspective, the Korean War stopped the global advance of communism from eastern Europe, through the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea since World War II. The economic miracle and subsequent democratization of South Korea provide the living evidence of the victory of liberal democracy and free market systems over the communism.

An increasing number of Koreans takes pride in the fact that Korea is one of only two countries in the world (the other being Japan) that, since World War II, have achieved both industrialization and democratization. Its economy is the 13th largest in the world, and its GDP per capita is around US $30,000 today. This is an astounding achievement, considering that in the mid-1950s half of the Korean government's budget came from US aid, and that the GDP per capita was far less than $100 in 1960, much lower than those of the Philippines, Malaysia, Ethiopia, and North Korea, to name only a few. Moreover, if unified, many Koreans believe their country will be as powerful as Germany, France, and the UK.

If united, its population size would be equal to Germany, its physical size similar to the UK, and its economy would be almost identical in size to that of France. The country has been on the right track to more mature democracy until the recent events surrounding the impeachment of the president. It remains to be seen whether the impeachment will turn out to be a significant setback, an irrevocable disaster, or a stumbling block on the way to more advanced democracy.

This is a narrative many conservative Koreans have constructed and cherished for the past 10 or 20 years. Central in this narrative are achievements made by Syngman Rhee, the first South Korean president (1948–1960), and Chung-hee Park, an authoritarian dictator and revolutionary who ruled the country with an iron fist from 1961 through 1979. Born in 1875, Rhee was imprisoned for over five years for his involvement in an attempt to dethrone the Korean emperor before he moved to the US in 1905. He was educated at Georgetown (BA 1907), Harvard (MA 1908), and Princeton (Ph.D 1910) where his supervisor was Woodrow Wilson. Staying in the US, Rhee tried to help liberate Korea by means of diplomacy, believing that its liberation would be possible only with the agreement by the powers surrounding the Korean peninsula just like the annexation of Korea into Japan in 1910.[2] Rhee became widely known in the US diplomatic circle, particularly for the prediction he published before the Pearl Harbor attack occurred in his book *Japan Inside Out* (1941) that Japan would attack the US. He returned to South Korea in 1945 and was elected President three years later. He was a shrewd politician, called General McArthur a son, and President Nixon in his memoir recollects his meeting with Rhee over several pages. The vice president of the Eisenhower administration wrote that he learned a valuable lesson from this old politician of a small country about how to deal with a communist.

Among other things, Rhee educated Koreans about freedom, democracy, and individualism, of which Koreans had no idea when they were liberated in 1945. One Korean historian, Younghoon

2. Japan succeeded in colonizing Korea by means of diplomacy and war. It obtained approvals from the US and UK in exchange for its approval of their respective privileges in the Philippines and India; and it won wars against China and Russia which had territorial ambitions in the Korean peninsula.

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Rhee, considers Rhee's contribution to South Korean society equivalent to the Copernican revolution, for in the late 1940s three quarters of South Koreans preferred socialism. Rhee also persuaded the reluctant US to sign an alliance treaty with South Korea in 1953 after the Korean War. The assistance provided by the US has been essential for the development of South Korea since then. Rhee also paved the way for South Korea's economic and technological developments. President Rhee was not pro-US but knew how to deal with the US government. His contributions to South Korea overshadow his wrongdoings and mistakes.

President Park, once a Japanese military officer who graduated from the Imperial Japanese Army Academy, then a suspected Communist party member sentenced in the late 1940s to life imprisonment, survived thanks to his naming names of the Communists in the Korean Army, help from his superiors in the army, and the outbreak of the Korean War. He was promoted to Major General, becoming the deputy commander-in-chief of the 2nd Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, and seized power through the military revolution in 1961. He is said to have made maximum achievements on behalf of his country with minimum sacrifice during the shortest period of time. Under his administration, Koreans emerged from poverty for the first time in thousands of years. His leadership was unprecedented in the history of underdeveloped countries and without it, the economic development of South Korea is believed to have been simply impossible. For 18 years under his administration, the annual rate of economic development was approaching 9%, whereas the per capita income increased from $82 in 1961 to $1,660 in 1980. Park's frugal way of life still moves South Koreans. He used a fan instead of an air conditioner at the Blue House to save energy and asked his wife to mend his clothes. The doctor, who examined him right after he was shot in 1979, could not believe his eyes because the president was wearing a worn out wrist watch and belt. Bricks were found after his death in the water tank of the toilets at his residence for saving water.

But more important than the economic achievements under Park was the awakening of the national spirit from a long slumber of defeatism, resignation, and hopelessness, especially through

Park's New Village Movement, the ethos of which was "we can do it" and which a number of developing countries still try to emulate. His determination and leadership helped South Korea reach the threshold of advanced nationhood. Believing that a certain level of economic abundance is a necessary condition for democracy, he helped modernize the country. In the face of criticism and opposition to his dictatorial style of leadership, he maintained that dictatorship was sometimes necessary for efficient development. He is known to have said "Spit on my grave!", meaning he would do whatever was good for the country and leave the judgement of him to history. He knew how to inspire people and get things done. In brief, Park was a hero.

THE LEFT'S NARRATIVE OF PROTEST AND PURGE

The South Korean Left is opposed to this narrative in every detail. The history of South Korea since 1945 is a history of injustice and exploitation. South Korea did not purify the remnants of the imperialist Japanese rule. The descendants of the collaborators with Japan still benefit from their ancestors' treacherous activities, occupying the leadership positions in Korean society. President Park's service as an officer in the Japanese Army before rising to power is evidence of this. Basic human rights were violated by President Rhee and the military regime later. Its economic achievements would have been achieved in a more just and egalitarian fashion under democratic leadership. The so-called miracle on the Han River was accomplished by the sacrifice of hard-working blue-collar laborers. The fruits of economic growth have not been shared. The descendants of the collaborators of the Japanese colonial rule, big business, and corrupt politicians have monopolized them. South Korea belongs to the lowest echelon in the world in terms of equality between poor and rich. In brief, the history of South Korea is one of shame and disgrace.

The legitimacy of Korean history lies in North Korea. Its leader Kim Il-sung fought for Korea's independence against the Japanese army during the colonized era, whereas President Rhee divided the independence movement and his diplomatic efforts were dubious at best. The North has maintained its national pride and dignity despite pressures from the Soviet Union and China

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whereas South Korea was something of a US colony. Moreover, it has maintained its national integrity with the *juche* idea—the idea of political independence, economic self-reliance, and self-defense—which forms the foundation of the North. Its difficulties are mostly caused by the anti-North Korea policies of the US.

The Korean War in this narrative is a not a war of invasion by the North nor a defensive war on the part of the South with the assistance of the UN troops of sixteen countries. It was a civil war, as President Moon Jae-in claimed in his address to the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 2017. Thus both South and North Koreas are responsible for the war, and the intervention of the UN with the leadership of the US is not justified. Often, the war is presented as a proxy war in the Cold War era. Korea, both South and North, was a sacrificial lamb in the struggle of the neighboring powers with the US, the strongest axis of evil. Thus it is the US which is responsible for the war. It was not the Korean War but the American War in Korea, just like the American War in Afghanistan or Iraq.

President Rhee is held responsible for the current state of the country—the division between North and South. Out of his greed for power he maneuvered to establish a single government below the 38th parallel, repressing those who tried to set up a unified government of North and South. He also revised the Constitution again and again so that he could be president until he died. Under his leadership, democracy in South Korea regressed for several decades. This narrative highlights the fact that his presidency ended after twelve years when he resigned and went into exile in Hawaii in 1960. In addition, he made no effort to purge pro-Japanese collaborators who he hired as high-ranking government officials. Their descendants, in turn, have unjustly constituted the dominant class in Korean society. The Left dates the beginning of the Republic of Korea to 1919 when the provisional Korean government was established in Shanghai, China, while the conservatives believe, along with the United Nations, that the ROK was founded through the national Constitutional Assembly election of 1948.

As for President Chung-hee Park, he also dealt a fatal blow to Korean democracy with his coup d'état in 1961. His critics

on the Left were not impressed by his leadership. He was a former Japanese military officer with a Japanese name and, above all, a dictator, arresting dissidents without habeas corpus, torturing them, and putting them in jail. His economic policy helped a few large corporations prevail, in no small part through exploitation of the workers. These workers are hailed as the pillar of economic development, while any role Park, the entrepreneurs, and bureaucrats may have played is not acknowledged by the Left. His policy made the rich richer and the poor poorer. Its legacy made South Korea the most unequal country in the world today, as evidenced in the phrase now popular among the young, "Hell Chosun"—which means Korea is a hell.

The Left is dubious of Park's reputation for living as a common man. They point out that Park was being served by two young women, a popular singer and model, at a party with his chief of staff, chief of guards and the director of the Korean CIA when he was shot by the director. Today, South Korea is a country where evil and greedy big business governs together with corrupt politicians and the political establishment. The accumulated evil should be purged and burned down by torches in the hands of the people. Modern Korean history should be written around the spirit of the independence movement's struggle against Japanese rule, which is now realized again in the candlelight revolution in 2017.

NUCLEAR CRISIS, TRUMP, AND THE IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT PARK

The escalating tension in the Korean peninsula further complicates views on the US. For the South Korean Right who take a realistic approach to international politics, the US, like China, Russia, and Japan, is a villain that imposes its will upon other countries either by talk or force whenever needed. But it at least maintains the appearance of a relationship between equals in its dealing with South Korea. More importantly, it is the only country that has no territorial ambition in the peninsula in East Asia. When President Truman decided to send troops to South Korea in 1950, his decision must primarily have been based on the considerations of the US interests rather than saving South Korean people; yet he could have decided differently. The Right believes that Koreans should appreciate his decision, without which South

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Korea would have been under the rule of the Kim family, which is not really a Communist regime but a dynasty. The presence of the US Army in South Korea along with the alliance treaty between the two countries has guaranteed the security and stability of the peninsula, the foundation upon which South Korea has built its economic development. The Right understands that the US military bases were needed to protect US interests against the Soviet Union until its dismantlement and now, China. The bases are good for South Korea as well. Their presence helped lessen military spending on the part of the South Korean government and invite foreign investments without the risk of a war. Without the US presence, the Miracle on the Han River would have been impossible. Fortunately for South Koreans, the interests of both countries have been identical. In addition, freedom and democracy, values cherished by the US, are worthwhile to pursue, however illusory they may be. What values do the Chinese even attempt to realize, the South Korean Right often asks. They believe China has nothing except for the realization of the Chinese hegemony—that is what the Chinese Dream, as suggested by Xi Jinping recently, is all about, in rhetoric as well in practice.

The Right believes that South Korea should take sides with the winner in the struggle to become a hegemon between the US and China. If China has a better chance, South Korea should be an ally of China. But the Right thinks China has little chance. Talk of the rise of China was typical American hyperbole, verbalized by some American scholars, politicians, and journalists like similar discourse about Japan in the 1980s. The Right is upset about the pro-Chinese stance of the current South Korean regime which follows the Chinese policies of so-called double halts and double tracks: the simultaneous halt in the further development of nuclear weapons by North Korea and the combined military exercises by South Korea and the US; and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the peace treaty between the North and the US. From the Right's view, the aims of the current Korean government should be clear: the peace treaty between the US and North Korea, the subsequent withdrawal of the US troops from the peninsula, and the establishment of one federal government between North and South. Eventually South Korea will be like South Vietnam after

the Paris Peace Accords in 1973. Although the size of economy is beyond comparison between North and South, the North is likely to win without the intervention of the US, especially considering that the North has nuclear weapons which it will never give up and that South Koreans have no will to fight to protect themselves—they want peace but they never understand that peace and freedom have never been free and that war is often the means to attain its goal, peace.

The South Korean Right is also concerned about potential changes in US policies in case the pro-Chinese stance of Moon's regime continues. The US might engage in direct talks with North Korea, without the South, or the US might attack the North without consultation with the South or consideration of its casualties, which are estimated to reach well over 200,0000. The Right is especially worried about the possibility that the US will make a deal with North Korea. The US government does not really care about which Korea unifies the peninsula insofar as it remains on the US side. The US could be an ally with the unified Korea, North or South, against China, its primary enemy now, just as it is with Vietnam. Kim Jong-il, the father of Kim Jong-un, already made such an offer to the US government. The Kim family hates China more than the US. When the North unifies the South, according to Kim Jong-il, 10 million South Koreans will leave the country, 20 million will be purged, and the remaining 20 million South Koreans and 20 million North Koreans will live together on the peninsula.

The South Korean Right hailed President Trump's address in the Korean National Assembly. They lamented that the speech should have been made by South Korean President Moon. In essence, Trump emphasized that South Korea's economic development was possible thanks to American blood and sweat. North Korea is a cruel regime which exploits, oppresses, and tortures its people. The goal of developing nuclear weapons is to rule the South. The US will pressure and sanction the North until it completely abandons its nuclear weapons to uphold the values of freedom, democracy, and human rights. He urged other countries, especially South Korea and China, to join these endeavors. There will be no negotiation between the US and the North until the complete and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear weapon system. North Korea

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should not test the will of the US. It was a warning to South Korea against leaning towards China as well as a warning to North Korea and China. Jin Kim, a political commentator, described Trump's speech as lightning hitting the Blue House. It affirmed US rights in the affairs on the Korean peninsula.

The South Korean Left are very critical of the presence of the US troops stationed in South Korea. They lament the role the US has played since the late 19th century. They believe that Japan could occupy Korea with the understanding and support of the US government; that the US is responsible for the division of the Korean peninsula and the subsequent Korean War; that the US government supported, legitimized, and sustained the dictatorship of the military regimes for more than a quarter of a century; that the US government is the major threat to the reunification of two Koreas; and that South Korea is like a colony of the US. And now the US, with Trump's bellicose rhetoric, is threatening the tenuous peace in the peninsula. Trump is a war monger and arms dealer. He came to South Korea to sell American weapons by escalating tensions, as anti-Trump signs announced in the protest against his visit.

A column published in the *New York Times* in October 2017 by Han Kang clearly shows the ethos of the Left. Han was the recipient of the international Man Booker Prize in 2016 for her novel *The Vegetarian* and hailed and admired by both Left and Right regardless of their political predilections. In "While the US Talks of War South Korea Shudders" Han claims the American War in Korea was a proxy war imposed on the Korean peninsula by the US and Russia, in which millions of people were "butchered" including hundreds of "innocent South Korean citizens" massacred by the American soldiers at No Gun Ri. Although South Koreans look "unusually calm," they feel "the terror, the unease, the impotence, the nervousness" due to escalated tensions. The experience and trauma of war has been burrowed for over sixty years deep inside their minds. They understand only one thing, she said ironizing one of Trump's tweets: "any solution that is not peace is meaningless and the 'victory' is just an empty slogan, absurd and impossible." According to Han, along with President Moon and the South Korean Left, peace could be achieved by means of "the quiet and peaceful tool of candlelight"—dialogue and negotiations.

At the center of this war over history stands the former President Geun-hye Park, the first female president of South Korea whose impeachment was decided in March 2017 and who was arrested and put into prison and is now being tried. She did several things that the Left oppose. Her government dismissed a progressive labor party and imprisoned its leader for conspiracy to incite civil war, to subvert the liberal democratic system in South Korea and pursue the socialist system of North Korea. It closed down a South Korean industrial park in North Korea. It outlawed a teachers' union. It put a leader of a 'progressive' labor union in jail for an illegal and violent demonstration. It tried to create an alternative Korean history textbook written by a team of historians appointed by the Ministry of Education and let each school determine which textbook it will use. Finally, it stood on the side of the US despite its initial wavering between the US and China.

The South Korean Right believes her impeachment is a typical witch hunt made possible by one-sided and distorted media coverage, fake news, skillful manipulation of the mass of people by the Leftist cultural workers, and the overall Leftization of every important sector of Korean society for the past 30 years, including the court, government, academia, and media. Those students and particularly their leaders who spent their formative years in the 1970s and 1980s by protesting against the military regimes have worked hard for the past thirty years to change and seize the mind of the youngsters and eventually succeeded in occupying the Blue House. They run the country according to their ideology—pro-North Korea, pro-China, anti-US, pro-labor, anti-business. The cabinet members, even the President perhaps, are just a facade. They are managers and experts in demagoguery, propaganda, and manipulation but lacking in mentality, experience, and skills with which to construct something new. They are protesters, critics, and splitters. Park did nothing legally wrong to be impeached. Her impeachment was a devastating blow to the rule of law in South Korea. She denies all the charges against her and eventually decided not to appear in court, which she concluded has conducted a mock trial. It is ironic to watch a former president, who did not allow even her sister and brother to visit the Blue House to prevent the improper exercise of power by them, now facing (potential) life imprisonment

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for bribery. The Left sees Park's trial as part of the candlelight revolution which should be continued until all injustice is purged by its light.

The inner civil war is being ferociously fought for the identity and legitimacy of South Korea which is in an official state of war with North Korea under the Korean War Armistice Agreement. The wall dividing South Koreans seems as invincible as the chain link fence with barbed wire that separates North and South. No wall shows more dramatically the division between South Koreans than the wall of buses which were lined up between two opposing demonstrations, one in support of the impeachment of the president, the other supporting her, to prevent the potential violence between their participants. Participants of the one carry candlelight, whereas those of the latter raise the Korean national flag together with the US' Stars and Stripes. To reflect on the inner civil war in South Korea is then in a powerful way to reflect on the US and to put into a broader and more historical context the relationship between South Korea and the US.

"A symbol of the efforts to re-unify the Korean peninsula is seen near the Demilitarized Zone in the Republic of Korea, Aug. 13, 2014. The site is one of many stops on a tour of the DMZ, and is also where visitors can walk through a portion of the third tunnel discovered to have been dug by members of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in an attempt to invade the ROK." (U.S. Air Force photo/Airman 1st Class Ashley J. Thum) www.osan.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/640348/photos-dmz-tour-offers-trip-through-history/

In the urgency of events in South Korea, it is entertaining but not enough to ironize the co-existence of the impulse to maintain the wall at the very moment one wants to destroy it. There seems no realistic option available to eliminate, even to lower, the wall in the Korean peninsula, no option that would somehow satisfy all the parties with their incommensurable interests and goals. To reverse Frost's irony, however, there may exist the impulse, dormant or hidden, to lower or eliminate the wall at the moment of strengthening it. Few could imagine the collapse of the Berlin Wall when it actually collapsed.

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WALL ART AND THE PRESENCE OF ABSENCE

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> *It is striking … that the places people live in are like the presences of diverse absences. What can be seen designates what is no longer there: "you see, here there used to be…," but it can no longer be seen. Demonstratives indicate the invisible identities of the visible: it is the very definition of a place, in fact, that it is composed by a series of displacements and effects among the strata that form it and that it plays on these moving layers.*
>
> *–Michel de Certeau (108)*

It was difficult to know where to begin this paper because it is both ethnographic and autobiographical—and the autobiographical emerged in the course of the ethnographic research that led to its emergence.[1] In this paper, I take the reader on a walking tour through Wadi Nisnas, Haifa, Israel, where art appears on walls and where walls become art. Using de Certeau, I reflect on the way that these pieces represent the political and cultural histories of Palestinian displacement and belonging. I will also

1. This paper is dedicated to my father, Noman Habib, whose grandparents' home once was in Wadi Nisnas, to Haya Toma who always made her home my own, and to my mother, Amit Habib, whose incredible delight in seeing the photographs that I took on these walks inspired this work. My thanks to Virginia Dominguez, Giorgio Mariani, and Jane Desmond for encouraging me to participate in the exciting IASA panel at Laredo, Texas, where this paper was first presented. To Emily Metzner who so carefully edited my first draft. And especially to Amalia Sa'ar for her critical engagement on the topics of walls, Israel, Palestine—and wonderful companionship as we tried to make sense of Laredo, which never seemed to have a center but whose borders were abundantly clear.

discuss how an imaginary of coexistence emerges in the course of these reflections for those with whom I traveled through these spaces. Writing this essay has taken many twists and turns. It was conceived as a piece that I hoped would speak to an unexpected phenomenon, and especially in these times; it is a piece that asks us to think about how some walls may be used not to keep people out but as spaces that might open up opportunities for discussion and engagement.

We live in a time of great anxiety but I remain convinced that it is in these spaces and on these walls that one may experience the politics of what's possible. It will no doubt sound naïve to those who come to the Israel/Palestine conflict through a discussion about walls—when most can think only of *the* wall that meanders across the Israeli and Palestinian landscapes fracturing communities, securitizing and immobilizing at the same time. It is that wall that rightfully dominates nearly every discussion about walls and borders in Israel (and I have discussed it in the past as well, see Habib, "B'tselem" and "On the matter") but it's not those walls that I'm interested in here. It could not go unnoticed that we initially took up this study of walls and borders at a conference in Laredo, Texas, the future site of the US wall that will be built to keep out Central and Latin Americans. But what might the study of walls that are not borders lead to?

I have not been at all satisfied with the direction or parameters that have been set by the so-called *new* debates on borders and migration in Sociology, International Relations and Politics, nor Anthropology for that matter. Too often the focus of disciplinary attention has been at the level of policy—for example, how immigration policies must be reassembled or rewritten in order to better care for those left behind; or on the limits of multiculturalism, alerting us to the rise of ethnonationalist parties or recurring racism; or even detailed descriptions about the rise of populism and the political leaders that promote wall-building and securitization of borders, especially those that are meant to block those in the Global South from entering the Global North.

Perhaps what I have been searching for can only be more fully exposed through art and literature and perhaps this desire expresses my own skepticism about all the limitations of the Global North's

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political and sociological wordsmiths and even their intentions. Would another policy paper really push us to consider the nature of a world whose every official border has been securitized and which, in all senses of the word, *protects* our own very privileged places within it? By literally drawing attention to the creativity of artists, and their meaning-making practices, in an unexpected place where borders may be crossed, I set out to expose a history of displacement, an ongoing political and creative process, and what's possible in Israeli politics, while also recognizing the need for a reflexive and critical understanding of Israeli and Palestinian identities.

I am interested in engaging with wall art as a way of thinking differently and critically about what is always and already represented as a seemingly impossible 21st century political conflict. It has an assortment of recognizable labels: the Israel-Palestine conflict; the Arab-Israeli conflict; the Zionist occupation of Palestine; settler colonialism. I hope to push the work on coexistence along a different trajectory from that taken by international relations scholars and their ilk; away from the political table where 'peace' seems to be interpreted through the frameworks of permanent war (with its attention to border security, markers of identity, and boundaries for exchange, etc.).

One cannot understand the conflict without appreciating the contexts within which it emerged, among them: the decline of two empires, Ottoman and British, and the rise of another, American; the emergence of modernist forms of death and destruction and the organized, institutionalized, bureaucratized, securitized, and militarized responses to them (in the form of such things as identity cards, passports, customs agents, and refugee camps); and with the move to decolonization, and the ascendancy of new nations and states, came the increase in the number of humanitarian organizations needed to support those who were literally if not figuratively out of place (e.g., refugees, migrant workers, etc.).

But there is another reason for putting together these ideas about art and experience. While this paper is concerned with Israel Palestine, and in particular the way one might find to account for the radical dis/placement of Palestinians, it is also engaged with the epistemological panorama in which mass migrations of war-affected populations are occurring across the Middle East

and Europe; and in which Israel's official politics have shifted drastically to the Right on nearly every measure, but particularly on the Israel/Palestine fronts (and here I use the plural). In order to believe in any new futures for Israel/Palestine, we also need to understand how the politics of displacement and belonging have forced a radical shift in our understandings of politics.

That is, I argue that by looking at these walls, experiencing their surroundings, considering the artists whose practices made these expressions of resistance and co-existence possible, we may solve critical analytical problems. How are we to rethink the symbols of nation, state, and identity? How do we refine or redefine contemporary multicultural politics so that they embrace rather than displace? What is it that our nationalist frameworks—the very borders that bound and separate an 'us' from a 'them'—also reproduce as frames of analysis that we so casually adopt in our scholarly discussions about the world's conflicts and political challenges? By sketching out as well as posing these questions—and their answers are myriad and layered, I understand—my approach and my intention is to further the Israeli and Palestinian artists' project of envisaging alternative world orders and concomitant post-national/post-political/post-international relations.

The walls of Wadi Nisnas have, for more than the last decade or so, been spaces for Palestinian, Druze, and Jewish artists to express themselves; to share their perspectives on what Israel and Palestine have become, as well as what's possible. Walking through the neighbourhood, it would be difficult for many to reconcile the degree to which so much of this art was created by Israeli Jewish and Palestinian citizens of the state who would also be identified as among its most politically radical. The art works throughout Wadi Nisnas offer symbolic representations of coexistence, return, and a peaceable future at the same time that they also *disguise* the wide range of activities that are necessary in order to resist nationalist identifications, state enclosures, and models of militarized security, so as to survive the ever present and everyday experiences of violence.

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AMERICAN STUDIES

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I went on my first walk through the Wadi Nisnas as part of a group of Israel Studies scholars at a conference in 2012. It was an entirely chance opportunity. I had spent much of my time in 2012 conducting research in another part of Israel as well as meeting with family, friends, and colleagues. Many if not most of those with whom I traveled were of Jewish descent and many if not most had traveled to Israel from the US. A couple of us had been born in Israel but were now ensconced in academic positions outside the state. The conference was the event that capped off my visit but, truth be told, I wasn't exactly looking forward to it. I wasn't sure what an Israel Studies conference would offer although I had been encouraged to attend by an Israeli scholar who promised there was going to be room for what he called "other voices" and, fortunately, he turned out to be right about that (but I won't digress).

In the end, I decided I would make the most of this experience and take up the ethnographic mantle that had led to my first book (Habib, *Israel*). Finding out how Israel was represented to others had been the core of my doctoral and ongoing research. I thought this particular tour of Haifa would offer me the opportunity to listen and to see how Israel would be represented to those interested in Israel from a scholarly (not necessarily personal) perspective.

My excitement lay in the fact that the tour was of Haifa, the city where I had been born and that I most identify with as 'home.' Since I was a child, nearly all of my trips to Israel have included a visit. Prior to the Israel Studies conference, and the tour that I took, I had never heard of the Art Walk, the Museum without Walls, the Festival of Festivals. Nor did I know that my family's home was in the midst of the Wadi Nisnas. My father's family home is situated just a few hundred feet from one of entrances to the Museum without Walls in the Wadi Nisnas.

Let's begin our walk. The photos I have selected to share with you were taken in the years 2012, 2013, 2015, and 2016.

"Rain on Borders" by Francoise Schein, and "Palm Tree" by Dan Zaretsky, at entrance to Beit Hagefen, Haifa. Photo courtesy Jasmin Habib.

One begins the tour with a stop at the Beit Hagefen Community Centre—which promotes coexistence between the Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities of Haifa. Most telling is the artwork that one immediately encounters at its entrance: ironworks adorn the entrance symbolizing the crescent, cross, and star of the three faiths.

Further along, on a wall near the entrance is a large tiled mural titled "Rain on Borders" as well as a tall palm tree without the palm fronds. Constructed of iron, it is no longer labeled but its starkness set against the soft limestone and lush gardens cannot be overlooked.

Rather than attempting to draw boundaries around their neighborhood—and to draw themselves in – and one could easily imagine both the desire as well as the fear that might prompt Palestinians living in Israel to do so, boundedness does not appear to be the goal. With art walks bringing new people through their alleyways and gates, one experiences an open air political environment unlike any other in Israel.

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Artist and title unknown, posted at the entrance to Wadi Nisnas. Photo courtesy Jasmin Habib.

Take a look at the humour in the statement of a simple but now faded poster, framed and found (if one searches carefully) near the entrance to the neighbourhood. A rough translation: "With a delay of 30 years we finally got the street asphalt paved, but in the manner of co-existence. Visitors and Jews walk in the asphalt paved street, the neighbourhood residents walk on the unpaved margins. We thank the mayor and the authorities." I interpret this as a statement that speaks to the experience of all of the neighbourhood's residents! Powerful in its very simplicity, this announcement speaks both

to the frustrations of those living their day to day lives in a marginalized setting while also poking fun at the administrative authorities who promote the very production of the walk. Here the author or artist remain unknown.

"Window to a Dream" by Lela Wydra Yanor. Photo courtesy Jasmin Habib.

"Impression" by Natalya Diatlov. Photo courtesy of Jasmin Habib.

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Not surprisingly, perhaps, there are several representations of windows and doors throughout the neighbourhood (see above). Diatolov's piece is particularly interesting for what looks like a window is a window on a wall—the perfect representation of the presence of an absence.

Art as a part of everyday life. Artists and titles unknown, Wadi Nisnas. Photo courtesy Jasmin Habib.

"The Tree of Life," by Haya Toma, quoting Deuteronomy. Photo courtesy Jasmin Habib.

"Family Album," Haya Toma's mural depicting her two sons. Photo courtesy Jasmin Habib.

Compare this poster with the poetic elements of a work of sculptor Haya Toma, one that reaches out through sculpture as well as scripture, pointing to the destruction of the olive trees in the West Bank. Toma quotes from Deuteronomy, 20: 19–20: "When you besiege a city for many days to wage war against it to capture it, you shall not destroy its trees by wielding an ax against them, for you may eat from them, but you shall not cut them down." Toma became a fairly well-known Jewish-Israeli sculptor later in her life. She was married to Dr. Emil Toma, a well-known Palestinian member of Israel's Communist Party. Her work speaks to questions of identity, displacement, and war, as well as what it means to be a family. In another piece, her two sons, one Jewish and the other Jewish and Palestinian are shown together, prompting one to consider how each of their lives is affected by these identities in a space where being Jewish is dominant and freeing, while being both Palestinian and Jewish remains a rarity.

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Boarded windows painted sky blue, reflecting on the possibility that one day, its inhabitants will return to look out upon the sea. Artist and Title Unknown. Photo courtesy Jasmin Habib.

As one walks around this neighbourhood, it is hard to find signs of the violence that displaced its inhabitants in 1948. One finds instead representations of a future. Boarded windows of long-uninhabited buildings are now painted a sky blue, recognized as a hopeful sign. On another wall (not pictured here), you'll find a door without a keyhole, signifying the absence of a way in, or way back for those refugees. And look up and there's a wedding photo, signifying belonging.

This very space and its open alleyways speak to a form of coexistence and a form of welcoming that is not easily found elsewhere in the city or the state. It is not that Jews and Palestinians do not live in mixed cities (as they've been called) such as Haifa, Acco, Jaffa, among others. But it is quite rare for Israeli Jews, Muslims, and Christians to promote coexistence and of course extremely rare for any Jewish Israelis to be exposed to narratives of the return of Palestinians. Artistic renderings that focus on relationships within and between 'national' communities (already recognized as not being spatially determined or defined) allows for the consideration of a multi-cultural future with the resources assembled by understandings of politics that do *not* assume a linear and bounded temporality and spatiality.

"Eye-Level Monument" by Hassan Khater, Sculptures and mural emerging from the ground up, with dove symbolizing peace, life, and possibility. Photo by Jasmin Habib.

The artists' and of course also Wadi Nisnas' residents' aspirations for peaceful inter-cultural and communal relations counterpose any nationalist sentiments and policies that have historically been imposed by the state. Instead, images of past and future open up a sense of what's possible.

While the artists' and the organizers' of the Museum without Walls approach to politics is muted (there are no political slogans, for example), it is useful for identifying contradictions and for prompting reflection and perhaps also engagement. Just walking through is a form of participation (and there's more to walking than simply putting one step in front of another, as we learn from de Certeau, among many others). Occupying this space in the everyday is both evidence and symbol of survivance (Vizenor) and resistance.

BEYOND THE WALLS OF WADI NISNAS

The rise of fascist ideologies and the re-emergence of stark nationalisms within Israel (and across Europe and the United

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States) doesn't just pose a problem for activists who are immersed or engaged in challenging the State for its vision of the present and future Israel/Palestine. I believe that what seem to be new surges must be thought through or understood as symptomatic of much broader political and social processes that have been emergent since the establishment of the state. Returning to the originary sites of displacement, or what I would call the living ruins, helps us to appreciate not only the military and social destruction that followed the establishment of the new state but what might have been possible as well.

As we entered a new military century, with the rise of a militarized UN system that transformed peacekeeping practices and foci into Orwellian versions of 'responsibility' which took only the form of military interventionism, the region's enduring crises only intensified. An analysis of oil politics, petrodollar financing, or the geopolitical maneuvering that protect ever-expanding corporate interests and their comprador classes rarely make it into the analyses of our televisualized spokespersons and think-tank experts. But it is these very practices that have made the ravages of the wars of the Middle East and the experiences of so many war-affected refugees so disastrously inclusive. If our politicians and humanitarians are guided by militaristic sensibilities, our collective political imaginations will forever be constrained; the boundaries of what are considered political projects will continue to shift ever more to the extreme.

Given the dangers as we already know them, debates and actions about migration should no longer be made on grounds that assume the legitimacy of nation-state arrangements. That is, nationalist arrangements must not be taken as the parameters for those debates. If anything new is to come in response to the *new old fascist nationalist* political ecologies, it is that the very bases on which we can meaningfully resist and engage must shift. The very grounds on which we might build new alliances may mean we also turn back to what might (in 2017 anyway) be considered archaic notions of human security, peacebuilding, recognition, and coexistence.

As one wanders through the narrow streets of Wadi Nisnas, I suggest it is impossible not to appreciate the political significance

of its artistic renditions of displacement and resilience. It is a space that remains autonomous but which symbolizes an outcome of change that is not strictly rendered with reference to the original displacement of the Palestinians. In other words, in their utopian renditions of a future, the artists as a collective suggest there will be more to look forward to with a return to and for Palestinians and Israelis *together*.

As such, and instead of trying to envision Wadi Nisnas literally and figuratively as a ghetto, these residents and the artists rethink a common ground at a time when their own social and political coordinates are constantly in peril. Marking these spaces with art and poetry, and with the rise of a radical Israeli right, this is nothing short of remarkable.

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EPILOGUE: TURNING TO THE WALL

Concepts across Space and Time

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This special issue of the *Review of International American Studies* has grappled with the power of walls as idea, rhetoric, policy, and embodied experience. Moving beyond the question of whether walls 'work,' our authors have probed what walls *do*, and what *people do with walls* in history, politics, culture, and everyday life.

THE WALL AS RHETORIC AND POLICY

In her incisive introduction to this issue, Virginia Dominguez probes the power of the wall—a seemingly illogical idea, a solution proven ineffective by plenty of historical cases, yet enjoying support across party lines in the United States. She is fascinated with the potency "of this atavistic idea in an era of alleged globalization, when so much rhetorical energy focuses on cyberspace, the globalization of manufacturing and service jobs, and the technological advances that allow people to work from home, hold meetings for free with people in many different countries, and stay closely connected with family and friends regardless of location" (Dominguez, this issue). Yet, I venture to ask, how much of candidate and President Trump's idea of building a Mexican border wall has to do not with logic and binaries, but with offering a tangible, *producerist* entity to the American people? When globalization and cybersecurity are abstract worlds, a wall is solid, created, put in place, mended and maintained—something to produce, erect

and hold on to, a concrete and specific expression of anxiety, identity, and border.

Dominguez recognizes that "the wall has rhetorical power and galvanizing power—racist power and xenophobic power," but boldly predicts that President Trump's wall will not be built. She may prove to be right precisely because an actual wall would be tested against the president's claims, and Trump's rhetoric relies on intangible, extra-factual images and assertions. Yet I believe that this prediction may prove to be wrong. If there will be any tangible legacy left behind by a president who does not care about facts or logic or conditions on the ground, it will be a big and beautiful wall. Donald Trump is a businessman of real estate and building: he deals in constructing and profiting from hotels, casinos, and golf courses. What he may leave behind may be a wall—not a legacy of any coherent policy—but a wall (and later, a "tremendous," "beautiful" presidential library). Only posterity will get to appreciate the bizarre irony of this—we in the here and now are too busy struggling over President Trump's politics and policies.

THE WALL AS A STATE OF MIND

Several articles in this issue grapple with the complexities of what walls 'give' the populations they are supposed to protect. As Gabriela Vargas-Cetina and Steffan Igor Ayora-Díaz (this issue) explain, the historical dynamic of peninsular smuggling, Mexican blockades, isolation and secessionism powerfully shaped Yucatecan identity and lifeways. Their description of the role of these relations in the Yucatan peninsula's connections to Anglo-North America and the Caribbean echoed my own impression of the history of Scotland: Scottish reassertions of independence developed that nation's connections with continental Europe as against the 'colonizing' efforts of the English. These are instances when actual and more general walls and passages shape the identity, or at least foreign relations, of a country or region. Yet it is not necessarily inevitable that the influence of globalization will erode the traditional 'walls' of Yucatecan identity. Like the Scots, young Yucatecans may also update their traditions to a global world and upgrade it, in a sense 'glocalizing' their identity walls, roads, and tunnels.

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In her turn, Éva Szabó (this issue) deconstructs the Western European (liberal) historical analogy that the recent Hungarian and other Eastern and Southern European border fence, erected at the height of the migrant crisis, is nothing but a new Iron Curtain. Szabó historicizes and contextualizes European attitudes towards walls by recovering the original function of the Iron Curtain as a wall built by Communist governments against emigration from within their own Eastern Bloc—of keeping people in, not out. According to Szabó, Western Europe's historical experience with migration developed a welcoming attitude precisely partly because of the Iron Curtain: in general, the resulting migrants and refugees were similar to them (Europeans or colonial subjects), willing to integrate, often highly skilled, and during the Cold War came in controlled bursts. The wall eventually came down in what was regarded as a triumph for democracy, and this has been taken as a lesson against wall-building that Western Europeans and liberals falsely apply to the defensive border fence built by governments in Eastern Europe during the migrant crisis of the 2010s. Thus, the very societies who were once protected by the Iron Curtain now do not understand why those historically on the other side have decided to build their own defensive wall.

Beyond its astute historical argument, Szabó's piece can also challenge us to think about what walls do to people they are supposed to protect—how such communities are shaped by their barriers, and what they lose by living on the 'safe' side of the wall. In what ways do the walls of Fortress Britain, Fortress Europe, Fortress Israel, or Fortress America lock their own people in, while—or instead of—keeping them safe? Is there a 'wall mentality' among border populations, in a good or a bad sense?

As Sangjun Jeong's article (this issue) argues, the people of South Korea cultivate—in Robert Frost's words, 'mend'—their own mental walls even as many of them want to reunite their country with the North. According to Jeong, starting as a casually drawn line on a *National Geographic* map, the Demilitarized Zone not only became one of the world's most heavily armed buffer zones, but it has been the symbol of at least two competing histories within South Korean society. One of these is patriotic, anti-North and pro-US; the other is fervently pro-democratic, leftist, anti-US,

and for re-unification. As Jeong shows, South Koreans, the very people whom the 'wall' of the DMZ is supposed to protect, are still politically and culturally waging the Korean War amongst themselves—over six decades after that conflict putatively ended.

THE WALL AS SOCIO-POLITICAL METAPHOR: A FORTRESS UNDER SIEGE

What if we thought about what walls are a part of—the larger thing? My own Hungarian conceptual heritage tells me that walls are part of a fortress. A central image of Hungarian historical memory is the early modern fort, defended by a small garrison of Magyars against the invaders, usually the Ottoman Turks. In our public school canon is Géza Gárdonyi's fin-de-siécle romantic historical novel set during the 1552 siege of Eger (Gárdonyi). In elementary school we were required to memorize the oath that the Hungarian commander made the whole garrison take to defend the fort at all costs.[1] This scenario posited that the fort was the only thing standing between the ruthless Turkish invaders and the rest of Hungary, which was defenseless against this kind of an army. This was an apocalyptic scene.

I dwell on this because if we understand walls as metonymy—the part standing for the whole—we may see the rest of the concept that they invoke: a fort under siege. A siege is not only a discrete event—it is also a mindset. Think of the slogan "No surrender" used in a variety of cultural contexts and regional geographies. The scarf worn and the song sung at the Glasgow Rangers football (soccer) games bearing the words "No Surrender" refer not only to the specific game or even necessarily to the team's sports values, but to the historic siege of cities in the Ulster province of Northern Ireland by 'Catholic' forces, and defended by the Ulster Scots—all in the 17th century.[2] In the Glasgow football subculture

1. Administered to the defenders by Captain István Dobó, the oath read, "I swear to the one living God that I consecrate my life to the defense of the fortress of Eger, for king and homeland. Neither force nor trickery will intimidate me. Neither money nor promises will make me falter. I will neither talk nor listen to talk about giving up the fort. I will not surrender to the enemy alive inside or outside this fortress. From beginning to end of the defense, I will obey the orders of my superiors. May God so help me." Translation from Hungarian by Tóth. (Gárdonyi, *Egri Csillagok* 304).
2. For more on Scottish football's sectarian songs, see Taylor.

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of Celtics versus Rangers, this historical memory evokes sectarian and ethnic (Protestant vs. Catholic, Scots vs. Irish) hatred. Along with the seasonal marches of the members of Glasgow's Orange Lodges in some parts of the city, these rituals are more symbolic and subcultural[3] than the dangerous and explosive annual marching season in Northern Ireland.

The siege as socio-political metaphor (which, I posit, may be the logical extension of the wall) functions not only in Northern Ireland, but in other epochs and geographies. The ideological and physical walls of that region discussed in this issue by Laura McAtackney date back to the time when the Crown encouraged Scots to populate what became the Ulster province of (Northern) Ireland in the 17th century. These people were often Protestant, and those later migrating to colonial America became known as the Scots Irish. However, in Northern Ireland they knew themselves as "The Plantation."[4] Their enclaves supported by the metropole and its regional elite, but surrounded by a sea of Irish Catholic communities, some of the very identity of the Plantation Scots came to be rooted in their experiences of the sieges and other confrontations between these ethnicities and denominations under recurring royal power plays. But if I as a historian can take the liberty to be ahistorical, how much is this conceptually different from the historical memory of the Anglo-Texan US population? What London/Derry city was for the Scots-Irish in the 17th century and has been since, the Alamo was for Anglo-Texans in the mid-19th century and has been since.[5]

3. For more on sectarianism in Scotland, see "Scottish Football 'a Cause of Sectarianism'" and Bruce.

4. For more on the Ulster Plantation and its legacy, see Montgomery.

5. The historical memory of the conflict between the Anglo settlers and the Mexican government in the territory of Texas in 1835–36 has been enshrined by and for the dominant Euro-American population of the United States as a war of independence for Texas. One episode of this conflict was the defense of the Alamo mission building by Anglo-Texans against Mexican government troops in 1836, where all of the defenders were killed. The immediate understanding of the siege as martyrdom by patriotic Texans for their cause helped them win their war against Mexico later that year. The Alamo continues to be a place of pilgrimage for Texans and other US Americans. For the differences between the historical memory of the past of Texas between US Americans of different ethnicities and Mexicans, see Kozák.

"No Surrender" may also apply to the siege mentality of the Russians in Kaliningrad[6]—and of the Russian ethnics in other parts of the Baltics,[7] or to Mother Russia's historical memory of World War Two.[8]

The insidious thing about the siege as mental image is that it securitizes thinking, erases or suppresses diversity and internal dissent, and mobilizes people in a logic to 'hold the wall.' This is what makes it so appealing: it gives one something to do, while it simplifies one's thinking. 'Man' the wall, mount a defense, make a stand—this is its message. When we struggle to understand, much less to combat the impersonal forces of globalization, deindustrialization, and the random horrendous strikes of terrorism, the wall offers us, in the words of *West Wing* writer Aaron Sorkin, "an enemy I can kill."[9]

Other authors have discussed the entities beyond the wall in the minds of those who think of themselves as defenders of the fortress. Tom Englehardt's 1995 book *The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation* is only one such example (Englehardt). Even without knowing his cultural history of 'the last stand' scene in US culture, we can imagine that on the other side of the wall are the faceless multitudes, hordes of barbarians attacking Rome, bloodthirsty savage Indians trying to overrun the emigrant train or Custer's beleaguered troopers, criminal evildoers (candidate Trump's "bad hombres") (Jacobo), the terrorists hiding among Syrian and Afghan refugees (as for the Hungarian government), or like in the 2016

6. Kaliningrad has been a non-contiguous part of the Russian Federation and its predecessors since 1945, surrounded by populations of Lithuanians, Polish, and Germans.

7. Russian-speaking ethnics comprise ca. 6% of the population in Lithuania, 27% in Latvia, and 25% in Estonia. "Baltic States Concerned About Large Russian Minority."

8. Russian historical memory of World War Two frames the conflict as "The Great Patriotic War / in Defense of the Homeland," and in its postwar version drew lessons from it that call for greater security, a stronger military—measures to prevent another similar in-depth invasion of Russia by a foreign power. For more on the historical memory of the Second World War in Russia, see Bernstein.

9. Admiral Fitzwallace to Leo McGarry in "We Killed Yamamoto." *The West Wing*.

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movie *The Great Wall*, which depicts Matt Damon as a European mercenary patrolling the Great Wall of China not the Huns or other nomadic tribes, but multitudes of computer-generated monsters unleashed from some seventh hell of Hollywood's ancient world. Our supreme challenge as critical thinkers is to make of those on the other side of the wall anything other than infernal, sub-human creatures to be kept out at all costs.

Also worthy of discussion is the gendered nature of the wall—the fortress, and the siege—as concepts. Gárdonyi's novel features a strong Hungarian female character, Éva Cecey, whose agency is expressed in transgressing her gender role by entering the besieged fort with assistance, cooking and feeding the fort's defenders, donning a soldier's armor, and fighting against the Turks during their final assault (Gárdonyi, Part Five). An iconic 19th century painting about the same siege depicts women in similar roles in this last scene—'manning' the wall (Székely). In other words, the women in the fort can transgress their gender role, but only temporarily, and only in the defense of the fort—as part of the war effort. As Susan Faludi's 2007 book *The Terror Dream: What 9/11 Revealed About America* documented, such a national/community emergency constricts and regresses not only democratic exchange but also gender roles, suppressing dissent and free expression by women, and forcing them into socio-political roles prescribed by conservative social and historical memory: the damsel in distress, the grieving widow/mother/sister/daughter, the supportive female family member, or the maiden looking for safety and security in marriage.

"GATED COMMUNITIES" BUILT BY WALLS, INC.

But if in our mental structures, historical memory, and political rhetoric walls are built and guarded by nation states or empires, are they so in reality? In their investigation of how Israel's Separation Wall is perceived by Palestinians on one side and Jews on the other, Amalia Sa'ar, Sarai B. Aharoni, and Alisa Lewin (this issue) discuss Jewish "gated communities" nestled along the wall. This case of privately developed real estate being in a symbiotic relationship with the nation state's security structure challenges us to probe our concepts of the *private*—not only as in private vs. public, but also in national security. In the state's

public projects versus the private, for-profit security and building contractors work on government contracts—in Israel, as in the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as on the US-Mexico border. Are government and national security bleeding into privatized security and infrastructure? Whose national security is protecting whose gated communities—and against/from whom? More, are such transfers of power and control from national to private a characteristic feature of our globalized world, where borders are (sub)contracted by the state to Walls, Inc.?

OPENING WHAT IS CLOSED DOWN: THE WALL AS GATEWAY

As of this writing (January 2018), President of the United States Donald J. Trump is again turning to the wall in his policy. The president is in discussions with Congressional leaders about the United States budget, which for him revolves around his plan to build the border wall with Mexico ("President Meets with Congressional Leaders"). Yet not only, as it has been pointed out, do walls not fully 'work' as they are supposed to—they do not always fulfil the purposes or functions they were originally built for. Walls condition the region around them, but they do not fully, or exclusively, seal off communication and circulation. Discussing the ancient walls of Rome, Giorgio Mariani reminds us that "the Latin word *limes* had a double meaning. On the one hand, it meant 'border,' 'limit,' 'dividing line.' On the other, it was a synonym for 'road' or 'way,' as was the case with the Germanic-Augustan limes running along the Lippe river, instrumental to the creation of the new province of the Empire' (Mariani, this issue). If we expand our concepts from the specificity of walls to the bigger category of *limes* that includes other natural and human-made landscapes, such as mountain ridges and rivers, this concept opens us up to more diverse interpretations. In this sense of walls and wall-ness as border-ness, *limes* is also *liminality*, which could also mean in-between-ness, but has the potential to straddle borders, to transcend them, struggle with them, go above, under, and beyond them. In this sense, trans-wall can be trans-border, and even trans-national. This leads us back to the recovery and re-examination of trans-border economies, societies, and flows, along with their continuities and interruptions by the walls in their midst.

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Once we start seeing walls as tools of connection (such as traffic on or along the wall as much as across it), then we can also understand some functions of border rivers. Thus, these constructions or contour features may serve to facilitate communication, commerce, and transfers of culture, goods, ideas, as well as bodies. Whether as a wall's original functions, its evolved functions over time, or the active subversion of its original functions, these are all there at least potentially, 'built into' the wall.

If some artists claim that they only 'liberate' a statue's figure from the surrounding stone, clay or wood, Jasmin Habib may have captured a similar creative practice in her essay (this issue) about art and culture along the walls of the Wadi Nisnas neighborhood of Haifa, Israel. Habib shows how through humor and art, the residents and activists have 'opened' walls up to messages that are only obliquely political, and reflect on their struggles to coexist in a landscape riven by nationalist and sectarian structures. The art that recognizes and sublimates histories of displacement and Israeli and Palestinian identities includes a humorous panel commentary regarding the street's paved asphalt, olive tree imagery 'growing out' of a wall, figures of an Israeli and a Palestinian child 'opening' a window on the side of a building, and a dove taking flight on yet another wall surface. Out of what is regarded as one of the most intractable conflicts of the early 21st century, this wall art reimagines the dividing lines as a 'soft/ening' border, or a springboard for future peace.

According to Mariani, the Benedictine monk Giulio Meiattini "believes the door to be a more suggestive and flexible image for the kind of open, though always discerning connection between inside and outside, between 'us' and 'them'" (Mariani, this issue). Vargas-Cetina and Ayora-Díaz likewise pointed out that "Walls have to have doors, and also may be overcome by going above them, by air or by bridges, or going under them, by tunnels" (this issue). They discussed various concepts that connect instead of only separating sides: roads, bridges, and tunnels. Indeed, the concept that literally splits the wall and breaks through it conceptually is not the bastion of the fortress; it is the gate. While each gate may be guarded and closed, what begins as deterrence and checkpoint may end up becoming an opening in the wall—such as Checkpoint

Charlie did in the Berlin section of the Iron Curtain. One of the reasons that the wall came down in Berlin was that in November 1989 the border guards had no clear instructions on how to respond to people's attempts to transcend the Cold War border that had been inscribed in stone, steel, barbed wire, and lead. This new vacuum of political power was exposed in a matter of hours, and the system of the wall subsequently collapsed.

The national/istic building of walls in the United States may be more vulnerable to criticism than elsewhere because of that nation state's myths of origin. Alejandro Lugo's photo-essay pays particular attention to US national iconography and mythology as encoded around and reinterpreted by the existing parts of the US-Mexican border fence. For him, the nondescript figures standing by the wall and looking out into the distance stretching from the US flag waving above them are "In Search of the American Dream/Buscando del Sueño Americano"; the couple in ethnic Latino festival clothing walking towards a relief monument depicting a 19th century settler family are "Twenty-First Century Pioneers in Arizona/Pioneros del Siglo Veinte-y-Uno en Arizona"; and he makes a point of capturing what seems to the viewer the accusatory gaze of a mural of an "American Eagle at the Calexico-Mexicali Wall." Extrapolating from the US defensive border fence, Lugo's photographs assert that the "Fenced White House Welcomes Latino Immigrants (2006–2016) / La Casa Blanca Encerrada da Bienvenida a Inmigrantes Latinos (2006–2016)," and even more pointedly, that the "Statue of Liberty Turns Its Back on Mexican Immigrants/ La Estatua de la Libertad le da la Espalda a Inmigrantes Mexicanos" (Lugo, this issue).

This last shot of Lugo's explicitly criticizes the border fence for contradicting one of the United States' foundational tenets: that it is 'a nation of immigrants.' In this, Lugo invokes a tradition of art for social reform. Emma Lazarus' poem about the Statue of Liberty which was originally gifted to the US by the French in the 1880s, depicted the statue as the latter-day incarnation of the giant figure that had formed a gate to the port of ancient Rhodes. Lazarus' "modern colossus" now marked one major European entry point into the United States. "Holding a flame at the golden door" ever

since the late 19th century,[10] Lady Liberty has been actively inviting and greeting the world's immigrants and exiles—even as US immigration regulations have tried to restrict them by ethnicity, country, and ideology.

There is much that is powerful in the wall as an idea and mental image in rhetoric, policy, landscape, and embodied experience. Fences and walls divide, sort out and categorize complexity into two sides whose meeting they control. They also homogenize diversity by forcing human beings, their ideas, cultures and practices to conform to those of either this or that side. This is most often what they are built to do. Walls may not always or fully 'work' for the purposes they are designed; yet they work in other, sometimes oblique, but powerful, insidious, sad, or delightful ways. The real struggle over their meaning lies in their interaction with their human environment; and this may change over time. Even when our politics and societies are 'turning to the wall,' our walls may retain some openness to meaning and exchange. Unlocking these may help change both the understanding and the enactment of the walls of our world.

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10. For one interpretation of Lazarus' poem in the context of post-9/11 US civil liberties and immigration policy, see Cavitch.

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AMERICA UNBOUND

Encyclopedic Literature and Hemispheric Studies
by Antonio Barrenechea
(A Book Review)



Juliana Nalerio
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In the spring of 2017, I was on research with the pioneering American Studies program at Sapienza University of Rome. The day before I left the city, I took the metro to the *Re di Roma* stop. Walking south towards *Garbatella*, Fiats and motos lurched along in bottleneck following the curves of the *Via Appia*, the oldest of Roman highways. Meanwhile for pedestrians the city here undid itself and became an array of parks and gardens enclosed by the tangerine-colored walls of the Republic's southern border. The battered gates seemed to gesture towards the central idea of the volume I lugged in hand, Antonio Barrenechea's *America Unbound*. Both suggested thinking beyond them, beyond the walls and national boundaries that kept neighbors and histories apart, where in reality unities could be found.

Barrenechea's comparatist reading of American literature is literally and figuratively such a boundary-breaking epitome. Through a literary-historicist analytic, he explores the encyclopedic novel of the Americas as a mode for imagining an American shared history. Following Herbert Bolton, whom Barrenechea claims as the founder of comparative American studies, reading different national texts together is a way to rewrite the exclusionary tenets of the imperial documents that established the boundaries

dividing the American continent. If such a claim sounds grandiose and ambitious—it is. However, Barrenechea succeeds at taking to task the politics of the colonial archive by tracing its development alongside the Renaissance encyclopedia. Barrenechea then argues that both genres embody and even project the totalizing trajectory used to legitimate the 'conquer and divide' mentality that remains at the cosmographical and epistemological core of American modernity. Barrenechea explicates an unabridged America that, importantly, harkens back as much to Amerindian texts like the as to Melville's *Moby-Dick* for its legitimation.

In a rich introductory and concluding chapter, Barrenechea mounts his argumentative frame, revealing and debunking the ideology that underpins the current tendency to read American literature through a nationalist lens. Following González Echevarría's Hispanist argument, Barrenechea calls on the notion of the "New World Archive" to reveal how New World encyclopedism began with the *Conquista* and the Spanish viceroyalties' practice of cataloging the New World—everything from its flora and fauna to *las castas*. This practice provided Spain with the legal premises to divide, conquer, and pillage the Americas. The first of one of Barrenechea's many remarkable moves is to link Herman Melville's *Moby-Dick* with this textual genealogy. Since he reads the classic as an extension of the macroscopic and encyclopedic view of America initiated by the Spanish documentation of the New World, it becomes more a mindful critique of such a worldview than mere literary annex to it. Barrenechea even connects the giant whale with the geographic typology of America—a so-called 'loose fish' during colonial times, thereby asserting that Melville's America is the Western Hemisphere borne via the Spanish expansion into the Caribbean rather than in the founding of New England or the United States.

In the three chapters framed by this boundary breaking argument, Barrenechea performs a clos(er) reading of the three encyclopedic novels that serve as case studies for this approach. Readings of Carlos Fuentes's *Terra Nostra*, Quebecois writer Jaques Poulin's *Volkswagen Blues*, and Indigenous author Leslie Marmon Silko's *Almanac of the Dead*, bring the United States, Mexico, Quebec, and Native America into clearer relational focus. His remarkable reading of *Terra Nostra* realigns the 700-plus page

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novel with the neo-baroque tradition of the Americas, relating this to the cataloging tradition of the encyclopedic, and placing the work in a facinating comparison with Diego Riviera's (neo-baroque) murals. Barrenechea places the novel in a hemispheric as well as transatlantic axis that he calls 'Boltonian' but is perhaps in equal measure 'Barrenechean' to us future readers.

Continuing in comparatist fashion, chapter three analyzes a recently declared Canadian masterpiece, the French-language novel *Volkswagen Blues* as a form of the discovery chronicle recast as a road novel. The Quebecois language is also newly introduced into the fray, enriching Barrenechea's hemispheric agenda by increasing its complexity at the linguistic level. (Generalizing here, Barrenechea makes an important move, as some Inter-Americanists have been critiqued for neglecting their Canadian brethren.) Broadly, Berrenchea's argument is that Poulin's novel retraces the European contact with indigenous America via the Oregon Trail, which this time around rather than leading to US nation building, culminates in the establishment of American hybridity. Since this maneuver is negotiated across a well-known and well-traversed pathway of America, which leads to San Francisco but begins in Gaspé, it arguably renews contemporary understandings of border crossings. They are now transplanted from the age of globalization to the Age of Discovery and vice versa—and this within the confines of a Quebecois novel.

The last of the three New World Encyclopedic fictions that Barrenechea analyzes is Native American writer Leslie Marmon Silko's *The Almanac of the Dead*. He argues that the author stays close to the American telluric, the land itself, shedding light on the possibilities for a hemispheric tribalism that could overcome the pitfalls of the nation-based indigenous movements of the Americas, and harken back to the full scope the pre-European lines of contact, including the written texts part and parcel to such a heritage. The notion of the ancestral is as important here as connecting and tapping into the contemporary struggles of indigenous groups against settler capitalism and the corporate destruction of natural life in the Americas. Barrenechea also makes an interesting move here, connecting the novel's formal or textual aspect with

pre-Columbian visual forms, and in general providing an added richness by focusing on visual culture here, as well.

In fact, of the many strengths of *America Unbound* is its unique interface with visual culture, for example in the form it takes early on in the volume: a unique analysis of the neobaroque in the murals of Diego Rivera as a visual metaphor for the encyclopedic. This adds to readers' understanding of Barrenechea's key term. Another strength is Barrenechea's use of the notion of archive, at once literal and theoretical. This is also has the added benefit of enriching his notion of 'the encyclopedic' by comparing it to the conquistadores' documentation and partitioning of America. Finally, the last chapter provides something of great interest to Barrenechea's' colleagues in Inter-American and Hemispheric Studies: three complete syllabi with five to six units each, complete with the literary and historical texts Barrenechea deems appropriate for teaching within a Hemispheric context. The recommended compendium of texts is fashioned together in a common sense way that reveals the unique depth and scope of Barrenechea's comparatist preparation. The syllabi follow a diachronic approach and are organized into "New World Writing in the Colonial Period" which feeds into "Literature and Nation-Building in the Americas," culminating with "Hemispheric Fiction of the Global Age." This chapter provides an important connection between theory and praxis for those interested in establishing hemispheric and Inter-American approaches in the academy and its classrooms. It also has the added benefit of combating one of the possible weaknesses of Barrenechea's volume and ultimately of his approach, (in that) that in an attempt to see the Americas in such a large scale, some of the nuance of more niche-based approaches would be lost. In the end, Barrenechea undertakes a nearly impossible task, after all, to stich together an American mosaic, an entire hemisphere through a reading of only three novels; thus, including the wide array of texts via the syllabi in the final chapter is a way of combating the doubts Barrenechea's colleagues might have about such a limited and yet large-scale approach.

Not to fall into book review cliché, but *America Unbound* is truly a significant contribution to not only the burgeoning fields of Inter-American and Hemispheric approaches to American

Studies and American Literature but also to World Literature and Comparative Literature more broadly. As a scholar, he has also positioned the volume uniquely as one of the first to be validated by its peers, that sees a legitimate comparative approach in the American literary axis, without the need to establish such a comparison by looking askew at another literary tradition, one from outside of the Americas.

The impetus to observe the Americas from the large-scale historical view afforded by Barrenechea's volume was one of many gifts my time on research at La Sapienza provided. From the heights of the ancient walls of a city like Rome, which feels to have lived and relived the cycles of history, the American project of archival reconstruction looms large, urgent and pressing. *America Unbound* offers one such entryway into such a reconciliation with the past and the present: a mending wall that might lead outside itself and the national boundaries that perpetuate violence among neighbors in academia and beyond.

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ABSTRACTS
AND NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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Walls, Material and Rhetorical: Past, Present, and Future
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Introduction

An introduction to this special issue of *RIAS* on walls, in light of President Trump's proposal to build a tall and beautiful wall along the US-Mexico border and the multiple concerns it raises, this essay, like this issue of *RIAS* as a whole, provides comparative background on walls built at different times in the past and in different locations around the world, exploring their intended efficacy and questionable results, their transformation over time into sites of tourism, uncertain peace, and unstable truces. Raising questions about both rhetoric and materiality, it suggests that the matter does not just concern Trump's views and policies but, rather, much more general views in the US toward Mexico and Mexicans. The essay raises the specters of both racism and imperialism in the rhetoric and proposals coming from the White House, and it seeks to use contributions from scholars in Italy, Israel, Mexico, the U.S., Hungary, South Korea, Denmark, and Canada to put it all in broader perspective.

Keywords: Trump's proposed wall, Introduction, Rhetoric, Polls, Comparisons.

Virginia R. Dominguez (Ph.D. 1979 Yale U.) is Edward William and Jane Marr Gutgsell Professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Co-Founder and Consulting Director of the International Forum for US Studies (established in 1995) and co-editor of its book series, *Global Studies of the United States*, her most recent books are the coedited *America Observed: On an International Anthropology of the United States* (Berghahn Books, 2017) and *Global Perspectives on the US* (U of Illinois Press, 2017). A political and legal anthropologist, she was president of the American

Anthropological Association from 2009 to 2011, editor of American Ethnologist from 2002 to 2007, and president of the AAA's Society for Cultural Anthropology from 1999 to 2001.

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Photo Essay: Re-Mapping the US-Mexico Border/lands

The United States-Mexico international border has been unilaterally remapped by the US government for almost three decades. A series of US congressional acts have intensified efforts to secure the border, inlcuding by building fences and walls. This photo essay presents images of the border barriers as well as borderland images. The fence or wall images are then intended, on my part, to be juxtaposed with borderland images that capture the social and political relations that manifest the complex ways the borderlands are being remapped through walls and their consequences—all in the context of the still so-called 'American Dream.' The goal of the photo essay is to help identify the different ways the remapping of the U.S.-Mexico border itself is being carried out, with or without the "great, beautiful wall" Donald Trump and his supporters are currently imagining and proposing.

Keywords: photography, US-Mexico border, imperialism, the everyday, photoessay

Alejandro Lugo is a former Professor and Director of the School of Transborder Studies at Arizona State University. Lugo is a cultural anthropologist and photographer of the US-Mexico borderlands and beyond. Some of his photographs on border violence belong to the permanent collection of the Mexican Museum of Art in Chicago and his photographic essays on the border wall and on border life have been exhibited in museums and galleries. His award-winning book about the border, *Fragmented Lives, Assembled Parts: Culture, Capitalism, and Conquest at the US-Mexico Border* (U of Texas Press), was published in 2008. He previously taught at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania, and at the University of Texas at El Paso.

LAURA MCATACKNEY
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The Many Forms and Meanings of (Peace) Walls in Contemporary Northern Ireland

Peace walls are a longstanding materialization of the conflict in Northern Ireland, known as the Troubles c.1968–c.1998. The walls have been one of the only security infrastructural forms associated with the violence to have continued and grown into the post-conflict context. They have often been a forgotten materialization of conflict due to their 'temporary'

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nature and their restriction to working-class, urban areas. While there are increasing moves to have these walls removed, or at least to put policies in place to allow them to be taken down in consultation with the communities beside them, there has been little consideration of the long-term impacts on public memory of material segregation. This article uses peace walls in Belfast as a case-study of the unforeseen repercussions of long-term segregation of divided communities. It offers a warning to the current generation of politicians regarding not only the role of what ideological walls are intended to do, but also the impacts they can have that were not intended.

Keywords: Belfast; segregation; peace walls; memorials; gender; victimhood

Laura McAtackney is an Associate Professor in the Department of Archaeology and Heritage at Aarhus University in Denmark. She is an archaeologist by training and has worked on various materializations of conflict in Ireland, South Africa, and the Caribbean, including two long-term studies of historic political prisons. .

GIORGIO MARIANI
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Walls that Bridge; or, What We Can Learn from the Roman Walls

When, during the latest US electoral campaign, Pope Francis criticized Trump's idea of building a wall between Mexico and the US, reiterating his favorite point that "we do not need to build walls, but bridges," the Trump camp retorted that the Pope lives in a city state surrounded by walls, in a city itself surrounded by other walls dating back to ancient Roman times. Why wasn't he concerned with those walls? As one can see, even though Roman walls have completely lost their original function and survive mainly as tourist sites, they also remain powerful political and cultural symbols. The scope of this essay is to offer, from the perspective of an Americanist who was born and raised in Rome, some comparative reflections on what we can learn today from the history of Roman walls, as well as from their symbolic afterlives.

Keywords: Roman walls, walls as rhetoric, US literature, walls as bridges, walls as dividers

Giorgio Mariani teaches American literature at the Sapienza University of Rome, where he directs the doctoral program in Sciences of the Text. The immediate past president of IASA, his research interests have focused on nineteenth century American literature, on contemporary American Indian literature, on the literary representation of war and peace. He is a co-editor of the Italian journal of American studies, *Ácoma*, and was recently appointed editor-in-chief of *RIAS*, *The Review of International American Studies*. He is the author, editor, and co-editor of several volumes. His most recent book is *Waging War on War. Peacefighting in American Literature* (U of Illinois Press, 2015).

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Fence Walls:
From the Iron Curtain to the US and Hungarian Border Barriers and the Emergence of Global Walls

This paper considers the resurgence of the Iron Curtain metaphor and its appropriateness in relation to the current border barriers in the US and the EU. It addresses the impact of the Iron Curtain both on Eastern Europe and on Western Europe, and it explores the legacy of this nearly hermetically sealed off borderland in the different border security and migration control approaches within the EU in the current era of emerging global walls. In my view, while the Iron Curtain metaphor is mistakenly applied to the current border barriers in the US and the EU alike, its legacy does contribute to the marked difference between Eastern and Western European attitudes and policies to the massive influx of migrants. From the Iron Curtain to the Hungarian border fence, the fence walls of the spatially identical border sections reflect not only the changing concepts of walls, but also the distinct historical experiences with migration. The current border barriers in Hungary and the EU, however, draw on the US–Mexican border barrier that aims to stop unauthorized entry while keeping the gates open in both directions for legal cross-border movement in contrast with the prison walls of the Iron Curtain.

Keywords: US–Mexican border barrier; Hungarian border fence; unauthorized migration; Eastern Europe; Cold War; Iron Curtain; border walls

Éva Eszter Szabó, historian, Americanist and Latin Americanist, is Assistant Professor at the Department of American Studies, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, and editor of *Hungarian Review–A Bimonthly Journal from Central Europe*. She is a member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), the International American Studies Association (IASA), the Latin American Studies Association (LASA), and the Hungarian Association of American Studies (HAAS). She is an International Forum for US Studies Residential Research Fellow (2018). Her courses and research have focused on inter-American relations, US immigration history and policies, and global migration issues. Her book, *US Foreign and Immigration Policies in the Caribbean Basin*, was published by Savaria University Press in 2007.

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Fencing In and Out:
Israel's Separation Wall and the Whitewashing of State Violence

This essay uses the case of Israel's Separation Wall to address the role of walls in the articulation of security, violence, vulnerability, and danger. In Israel, "security" refers exclusively to the Jewish citizens, whether they are fenced in (residing within the Green Line) or outside it (such as West

Bank settlers). For the Palestinians, by contrast, the wall is yet another instrument of structural and symbolic violence. While Israeli Jews are vaguely aware of "the occupation," they largely remain blissfully unaware of the violent under-side of everyday civil security, which the wall represents. Tracing the ways in which Jewish citizens living inside the Green Line experience and accommodate the wall, this essay analyzes its role in whitewashing state violence and in the ongoing construction of subject positions with respect to the security-violence complex.

Keywords: security, state violence, gated communities, misrecognition, the political, Israel-Palestine, separation wall

Amalia Sa'ar is a Senior Lecturer and Chair of the Deptartment of Anthropology at the University of Haifa. Amalia's topics of interest include gender and feminist theory including feminist security theory, urban anthropology, women, work, and citizenship, generational relations in the feminist movement, and action research. She has done extensive fieldwork with Palestinian citizens of Israel, as well as with low-income women of diverse backgrounds. Her recent book, *Economic Citizenship: Neoliberal Paradoxes of Empowerment*, was published by Berghahn Books in 2016.

Alisa C. Lewin is a Senior Lecturer at the Deptartment of Sociology at the University of Haifa and is affiliated with the Center for the Study of Poverty and Social Exclusion. She joined the University of Haifa after completing her PhD at UCLA. Her primary research interests are in demography of the family, poverty, and inequality. Much of her research focuses on the link between gender, family and poverty. Alisa Lewin has recently published papers in the *European Journal of Population, the Journal of Family Issues*, and *Social Indicators Research*.

Sarai B. Aharoni is a lecturer in the Gender Studies Program, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, and one of the founding members of the Haifa Feminist Institute (HFI). Previously, she was a researcher at the Center for Research on Peace Education (CERPE) at the University of Haifa, the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University and the Frankel Center for Judaic Studies at the University of Michigan. Her recent work on gender, peace and conflict in Israel has been published in *Social Politics*, *Security Dialogue* and the *International Feminist Journal of Politics*.

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To Build a Wall: Imaginaries of Identity in Yucatan, Mexico

Here we consider ideas related to walls, roads, bridges, doors and tunnels and the materialities they name as a general frame of reference, to reflect on the manifold relations between imagined *insides* and *outsides* generally implied when discussing the wall already splitting Mexico and the US, but also regarding Yucatecan identity. We explain the ways in which Yucatecans have often seen themselves as different from "Mexicans" and why. Yucatecans have sometimes expressed the wish to build a wall around the Yucatan peninsula. We propose that such a wish is based

on an erroneous perception of Yucatecans as intrinsically better people than non-Yucatecans, upholding ideals of "peacefulness" and "goodness," and on the rhetorical inclusion of all inhabitants of the Yucatan peninsula within an imagined single "Yucatan." Yet the wished-for Yucatecan unity is impeded by the current political and identity divisions within the Yucatan peninsula, which comprises three different states, each with its own economy, specific regional identities, and its own internal problems. We believe that to make Yucatan more inclusive, Yucatecans ought to start imagining more and better roads and bridges.

Keywords: Yucatan-Mexico relations, history, space, Yucatan, the border

Gabriela Vargas-Cetina (PhD McGill 1994) is a Researcher and Professor of Anthropology at the Autonomous University of Yucatan. Her recent book *Beautiful Politics of Music: Trova in Yucatan, Mexico* (U of Alabama Press, 2017) is an ethnography of Yucatecan trova music, through the lens of regional and local politics. Her current work deals with music, technology and performance.

Steffan Igor Ayora-Diaz (PhD McGill 1993) is a Researcher and Professor of Anthropology at the Autonomous University of Yucatan. His book *Foodscapes, Foodfields, and Identities in Yucatan* (Bherghan 2012) looks at the food, identity, history and politics in Yucatan, Mexico. He currently studies the importance of technology, taste and emotions as they relate to food.

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Mending Wall? The War over History in South Korea

Until Korea was divided into North and South in 1945, it had maintained its territorial unity on the Korean peninsula for well over 1,000 years. Then, two young US officers drew an arbitrary line along the 38th parallel. Developing into a heavily militarized zone only several years later, ironically called the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ), that division has lasted for decades and into the present. Recently, several symbolic acts were performed in the zone and innovative plans were suggested to make the land strip into a peace park as a symbol of ideological reconciliation and ecological paradise. Yet to many Koreans, the zone is still inscribed as a wall permanently bisecting the peninsula not only physically but also culturally. Through an analysis of Robert Frost's poem "Mending Wall," this article contemplates the divisions within South Korean society over the North-South divide as a war over the telling of history. This history, however told, must be understood alongside the sentiment of *han*, a Korean word loosely defined as frustration, anger, and sadness, something that has

been shaped by centuries of suffering from wars, invasions, colonization, injustice, and exploitation.

Keywords: Korean Peninsula; Political Divisions; History; War; Demilitarized Zone

Sangjun Jeong teaches American literature and cultural history at Seoul National University in South Korea. His current research interests lie in New England Puritanism, American democracy, and the tradition of political novels in the United States. Jeong was recently a visiting scholar at Duke University and at Harvard University's Harvard-Yenching Institute, and a Fellow at the International Forum for US Studies at the University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign. He has served as the Director of the American Studies Institute at SNU, Executive Director of the Language Education Institute at SNU, and President of the American Studies Association of Korea. His book, *Representing the Rosenberg Case: Coover, Doctorow, and the Consequences of Postmodernism*, was published by Seoul National University Press (1994).

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Wall Art and the Presence of Absence

This photoessay takes the reader on a walking tour through Wadi Nisnas, Haifa, Israel, where art appears on walls and where walls become art. Using de Certeau, Jasmin Habib reflects on the way that these pieces represent the political and cultural histories of Palestinian displacement, a politics of belonging as well as their return. The artists' imaginary of coexistence is set in stark contrast to the nativism that marks the world outside of these walls.

Keywords: Palestinians; wall art; photoessay; coexistence, de Certeau; Haifa

Jasmin Habib, Director of the Global Engagement Program, is a cultural anthropologist teaching in the Political Science Department and Global Governance program at the University of Waterloo. She completed her MA in International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana, USA, and her PhD in Cultural Anthropology at McMaster University in Ontario, Canada. She recently co-edited, *America Observed: on the International Anthropology of the United States* with Virginia Dominguez. She is also the Editor-in-Chief and Anglophone Editor of *Anthropologica*, the journal of the Canadian Anthropology Society (CASCA), and author of *Israel, Diaspora, and the National Routes of Belonging*. She frequently writes about the politics of displacement and dissident practices in the US, Canada, and Israel.

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Epilogue: Turning to the Wall Concepts across Space and Time

The epilogue to this journal issue interrogates a variety of aspects of walls as mental structures and tropes of historical memory. Engaging with the issue's contributing authors, Tóth argues that the idea of the wall functions as metonymy, activating a siege mentality and mobilizing its target audience—hence its rhetorical power and attraction as policy. Discussing the wall's symbology as a border of the nation state but also pointing out its increasing privatization, the piece concludes with an exploration of the potential that walls may have for the creative subversion of their original function to seal off, categorize and divide humans. .

Keywords: commentary, Trump, historical memory, metonymy, art

György Tóth holds degrees from Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary (MAs in English Language & Lit and American Studies) and the University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, USA (PhD in American Studies). In his academic specializations, György combines US cultural and social history with Transnational American Studies, Performance Studies and Memory Studies to yield interdisciplinary insights into the politics of US social and cultural movements in post-1945 Europe. Since December 2014 György has been serving as Lecturer in post-1945 US History and Transatlantic Relations at the Division of History and Politics of the University of Stirling, Scotland, UK. His book *From Wounded Knee to Checkpoint Charlie* was published by SUNY Press in 2016. http://www.sunypress.edu/p-6245-from-wounded-knee-to-checkpoint.aspx.

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