# Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis

Tom 30
2020

UNIWERSYTET ŚLĄSKI
WYDAWNICTWO

# Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis

## Tom 30

pod redakcją

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Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego • Katowice 2020

**Kwartalnik recenzowany**, wydawany przez Instytut Nauk Politycznych Uniwersytetu Śląskiego w Katowicach / **Peer-reviewed quarterly**, published by the Institute of Political Scienees of the University of Silesia in Katowice

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Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis 2020, T. 30, s. 7—32
ISSN 2353-9747 (electronic version)
www.studiapoliticae.us.edu.pl
Date of receipt: 12.07.2020; date of acceptance: 12.09.2020
DOI: http://doi.org/10.31261/SPUS.11379

# Confederacy — the polish new right wing between tradition and modernity

# Konfederacja — polska nowa prawica między tradycją a nowoczesnością

Jarosław Tomasiewicz*

**Abstract**

Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość (Confederacy for Freedom and Independence) is new, far-right force in Poland. Success of the KWiN broke political monopoly of the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) party on the right wing. The paper examines structure, strategy, ideology and social basis of the Confederacy. This new formation amalgamating cultural conservatism and economic liberalism is similar rather to American Trumpism and alt-right than the protest movements of Western-European right wing populism.

**Key words:** Confederacy for Freedom and Independence, populism, conservatism, far-right, alt-right

**Abstrakt**

Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość jest nową siłą na polskiej scenie politycznej, sytuującą się na radykalnej prawicy. Sukces KWiN przełamał długotrwały monopol Prawa i Sprawiedliwości na prawicy. Artykuł analizuje strukturę organizacyjną, strategię, ideologię i bazę społeczną Konfederacji. Nowa formacja łącząc kulturowy konserwatyzm z ekonomicznym liberalizmem przypomina raczej fenomen Trumpa i amerykańskiej alt-right, niż prawicowo-populistyczne ruchy protestu w Europie Zachodniej.

**Słowa kluczowe:** Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość, populizm, konserwatyzm, skrajna prawica, nowa prawica

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## Introduction

The anti-system right wing during the Third Republic of Poland remained on the political fringe (apart from the parliamentary presence of Liga Polskich Rodzin — the League of Polish Families — in 2001-2007), which was in sharp contrast to the power of its pre-war counterpart. The reasons for this state of affairs, as I demonstrated in my work "Ugrupowania neoendeckie w Trzeciej Rzeczypospolitej", lay in the anachronism of doctrine and program, dug up right from the interwar period (Tomasiewicz, 2003: 365-367). The modern radical right, however, has undergone a transformation and modernization, which fuelled its expansion. The aim of this paper is to investigate the circumstances that allowed the Confederacy for Freedom and Independence to succeed.

The author will attempt to answer the questions about: / 1 / the genesis of the Confederacy, / 2 / its structure, / 3 / strategy and tactics, / 4 / ideology and program, / 5 / social base. The hypothesis which will be verified is that the shape of the present embodiment of the Polish radical right is a product of its historical traditions and contemporary social context. The analysis will be based on media coverage created by the political environment associated with the KWiN. Established in 2019, the Confederacy is so recent phenomenon that there are no scientific studies to be cross-checked at the time of submitting the text.

## Origins

The Confederacy for Freedom and Independence is a new political group, but it is deeply rooted in the history of the Third Republic of Poland. The inception of this formation is very complicated, but a brief sketch of it is necessary to understand its character. The Confederacy was created out of the intertwining of two different political trends: conservative-liberal and national-democratic.

The movement describing itself as "conservative-liberal" is in fact a transfer of American paleolibertarianism to Poland. It has only loose ties with Polish conservative traditions, but it can be hypothesized that it arises from the individualistic psychology of native Sarmatism. Janusz Korwin-Mikke has been the flagship figure of this movement for many years. In 1987, he founded the Real Politics Movement, which gave rise to the Real Politics Union party (Unia Polityki Realnej). For decades, the UPR languished on the margins of Polish politics, treated in terms of political folklore (the best result: 3.2% in 1993) (*Unia*: 165—166; B.S. 1996: 55—58; B.S. 2000: 33-38). The lack of success resulted in dissention, and finally, in 2009, the founder left the UPR, creating the Wolność i Praworządność party (Freedom and Rule of Law) (soon transformed into the Kongres Nowej Prawicy (New Right Congress)). In 2015, Korwin-Mikke lost the chairmanship of the KNP, to which he reacted by creating the Koalicję Odnowy Rzeczypospolitej Wolność i Nadzieja (Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic of Poland, Freedom and Hope — temporarily using the name Freedom). The election results showed that the strength of "conservative liberalism" was the eccentric personality of Korwin-Mikke; the marginalized UPR was first associated with the National Movement, and then — similarly to the KNP — with the Kukiz'15 formation (B.K.-G., 2017: 126—132; A.P. 2017: 133—134).

The National Democratic movement revived disintegrated after 1989: its moderate wing was represented by Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe (Christian-National Union), while the orthodox wing was represented by a few conflicted National Parties. In 2001, as a result of the consolidation of orthodox groups, the Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families) was established, the youth branch of which was Młodzież Wszechpolska (Tomasiewicz, 2002). The LPR under the leadership of Roman Giertych achieved significant success (7.87% in 2001) and participated in the government of Jarosław Kaczyński in 2006—2007, but the 2007 elections wiped it out of the political scene (K.Z., 2017: 163). The Młodzież Wszechpolska (All-Polish Youth) had gained independence earlier, with which the authorities of the parent party had severed relations as part of Giertych's policy of improving the image of the LPR (*Młodzież Wszechpolska: zerwanie*). However, the All-Polish Youth managed to survive, and this break-up led to a permanent break with the older generation of National Democrats. MW, on the other hand, started cooperation with Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny — a political camp formed on the basis of local skinhead groups (more about ONR: Tomasiewicz, 2010). The March of Independence, initiated by the ONR in 2006, became a joint action of both organizations. The march, expressing the dissatisfaction of the youth community (including football fans) with the PO government, grew in strength from year to year (Szymanik, 2012).

Young nationalists decided to capitalize on the success of the Independence March. On November 11, 2012, a coalition of nationalist as well as conservative-liberal social organizations and political groups was established under the name of the Ruch Narodowy (National Movement), which on December 10, 2014 was transformed into a political party. After so-called Holochergate (disclosure of the confidential correspondence of the ONR leader Przemysław Holocher) in 2013, the leadership of the National Movement was in fact dominated by the MW headed by Robert Winnicki (Baliszewski, 2013; cf. *Index*). Spectacular failures in the 2014-15 European, local government and presidential elections prompted nationalists to conclude an election alliance with Kukiz'15 (*List*). This decision was the reason for a split — the ONR withdrew from the National Movement, and the group of Marian Kowalski (Narodowcy RP — the National Democrats of the Republic of Poland) (*Powstaje*) has also left. From the Kukiz's list, the nationalists introduced 5 deputies. However, when Winnicki tried to form a group of the National Movement in April 2016, it turned out that he was left alone — his colleagues founded an association of the National Democrats that competed with the National Movement and remained in the Kukiz'15 club or evolved towards the PiS (*Reorganization*).

A long series of failures prompted these two forces on the far right of the Poland's party system — nationalists and conservative liberals — to conclude an alliance. It was not an easy decision, as the contractors were critical of each other: Korwin-Mikke often accused nationalists of "socialism" and tried to organize a competitive independence march on October 7 (Korwin-Mikke, 2012), Winnicki replied that Korwin was not a serious politician (Winnicki, 2012). The Kukiz'15 breakdown, however, opened the door to action. On December 6, 2018, the KORWiN and the RN announced the formation of a coalition (*Ruch Narodowy i Wolność*), which in January 2019 was joined by the associations "Pobudka" of Grzegorz Braun and Skuteczni of Piotr Marzec, and the pro-life community represented by Kaja Godek (Czuma, 2019). The formation created in this way initially used the name of the Koalicja Propolska, but on February 27, 2019, it identified itself as the confederacy of KORWiN Braun Liroy Narodowcy (*Konfederacja KORWIN Braun Liroy Narodowcy łączy*). In March, a parliamentary group of the Confederacy was formed (Winnicki, Marzec, Jacek Wilk, Robert Kulesza and Marek Jakubiak, then also Paweł Skutecki, temporarily Robert Majka) (*W Sejmie; Nowy poseł; Poseł Robert*).

## Structure

The way the Confederacy is organized reflects its complicated origins. Initially, it was a coalition of a number of entities — apart from those mentioned, there was also the Federation for the Republic of Poland of Marek Jakubiak (*Sensacyjna*), Eastern Borderland circles represented, among others by Władysław Osadczy and Andrzej Zapałowski (*Konfederacja KORWiN Braun Liroy Narodowcy powiększa*), some regional structures of Kukiz'15 (e.g., in Silesia) (*Działacze; Kandydat*), the Party of Drivers and the Polish Association of Knowledge about Vaccinations (Lewicki, 2019). The defeat in the May European elections meant that a month later Jakubiak and Marzec (Federation of Jakubiak-Liroy) (*Rozłam;* cf. *Federacja; Głos*) left the coalition, and Godek in August (*Trzy*). On the other hand, the Union of Christian Families (*Kolejna partia*), agricultural circles (Wojciech Mojzesowicz and Krzysztof Tołwiński) (Pokora-Kalinowska, 2019) and the National League (founded by former activists of the LPR and Samoobrona) joined the coalition. On July 26, 2019, a political party called

Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość was registered, which ensured inclusion in the polls, facilitated access to the media and opened the way to an election subsidy *(#KONFEDERACJA zarejestrowana*)

The new party is federal. As Bosak said, "it is based on two experienced party structures, the KORWiN party and the National Movement, the third is being built" (Bosak, 2019). The third important component is the Konfederacja Korony Polskiej (Confederacy of Polish Crown) — a party of Catholic Integrists founded in September 2019 by Braun (*Wystartowała*). The three-fold structure of KWiN is reflected in the composition of the parliamentary group: five Korwinists (Korwin-Mikke, Konrad Szczepan Berkowicz, Artur Erwin Dziambor, Jakub Kulesza, Dobromir Sośnierz), five nationalists (Bosak, Krystian Kamiński, Krzysztof Tuduj, Michał Piotr Urbaniak, Winnicki) and a "traditionalist" Braun (*Nacjonaliści*). The discrepancies within it appeared so deep that Korwin-Mikke initially planned to divide it into two separate parliamentary groups — national and libertarian (*Konfederacja ostatecznie*). Ultimately, there was one group, whose chairman was Kulesza and Bosak became a vice-chairman and spokesman (*Pierwsze*).

An analyst sympathizing with the Confederacy attempted to determine the strength of individual political trends on the basis of votes cast in the European elections. According to these calculations, the candidates for KORWiN received 49.8% of the votes, RN 22.9%, Skuteczni 6.5%, FdR 6.3%, Braun 5.3%, anti-vaccineers 3.7%, pro-life 3, 5%, Drivers 1.9% (although one can have reservations about the methodology, this analysis roughly corresponds to the ratio of forces between Korwin's supporters and nationalists in earlier polls of voting preferences) (Lewicki, 2019). However, it should be remembered that the situation is even more complicated, as the National Movement itself was created as an amalgamation of several dozen of groups of very different nature.[1]

[1] These were: Młodzież Wszechpolska, Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny, Związek Żołnierzy Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych, Stowarzyszenie Marsz Niepodległości, UPR, Ruch Wolności, Fundacja im. Bolesława Chrobrego, Grupy Rekonstrukcji Historycznych Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych, „Myśl.pl", Fundacja Inicjatyw Polskich, „Polityka Narodowa", Towarzystwo Wszechpolskie „Sztafeta", Klub Narodowej Myśli Politycznej „Votum", Kobiety dla Narodu, Ruch Narodowy - Sekcja Kobiet, Stowarzyszenie na Rzecz Tradycji i Kultury „Niklot", Akademicki Klub Myśli Społeczno-Politycznych „Vade Mecum", Fundacja „Optima", Fundacja Dziedzictwa Narodowego, „Magna Polonia", Narodowcy.net, Stowarzyszenie „Przymierze Narodu", Stowarzyszenie „Fides et Ratio", Instytut im. Romana Rybarskiego, Towarzystwo Torunium im. Antoniego Bolta, Stowarzyszenie „Dolina Sanu", Stowarzyszenie „Duma i Nowoczesność", Katolickie Stowarzyszenie „Civitas Christiana" Kraków, Stowarzyszenie „Stop Korupcji", Katolicki Klub im. św. Wojciecha, Towarzystwo Gimnastyczne „Sokół" w Lublinie, Wielkopolscy Patrioci, Narodowy Koszalin, Dębiccy Patrioci, Narodowa Łódź, ONR Podhale, Patriae Fidelis (the United Kingdom). *Ruch Narodowy*. The neo-pagan "Niklot" and the "Duma i Nowoczesność" associated with neo-Nazis draw attention in this group.

From the very beginning, the Confederacy focused on building a "broad anti-system movement" while maintaining the ideological identity of its components. The KWiN leaders are aware of the heterogeneity of the formation. Bosak said "We are not a single leader movement, none of us says what to say on command, none of us thinks on command," (Szymański, 2019). He admitted that "it will be necessary to talk to each other, establish a position, on the one hand, respecting differences of opinion, which of course exist, and on the other, look for common points that are possible to be found" (Bosak, 2019). This internal pluralism is even presented as an asset because — according to Wilk — "each of our voters will easily find a candidate who is very close to them in their worldview" (Wilk, 2019).

Nevertheless, the Confederacy remains internally incoherent. Factional infighting emerged during the primary election. "Wolnościowcy" (Libertarians) put forward as many as four candidates (K. Berkowicz, A. Dziambor, J. Korwin-Mikke, J. Wilk) intending to support the strongest of them in the last phase. However, when it turned out that in minority but disciplined nationalists managed to recruit the largest number of electors for their candidate Bosak, Korwin's supporters decided to back Braun instead of — according to the agreement — Dziambor. As a result, the Dzambor's supporters threw their votes to Bosak, ensuring him victory (Sitnicka, 2020). Bosak, who based his campaign on economic issues, provided the Confederacy with program consistency.[2] Disagreements, however, still appear, at least on the tactic level — as it seems, "libertarians" are more ill-disposed towards to PiS (*Polityk*).

## Strategy and tactics

The KWiN positions itself in opposition to all other political forces (so-called "gang of four:" PiS, PO, PSL, SLD). Paradoxically, it pays the least attention to the opponent who is ideologically most distant, i.e., the left wing, although the party sees the main enemy in "cultural Marxism" (Bosak, 2019) and its goal is "to stop comrades of Biedroń and Czarzasty" (*Winnicki ostro: "Polacy*). In principle, the KWiN equally rejects the possibility of cooperation with the Koalicja Obywatelska (Civic Coalition) (despite the conciliatory gesture made by Sławomir Neumann after the elections) (*Winnicki odpowiada*). In relation to the Law and Justice, the attitude of KWiN was more balanced. On the one hand,

[2] Warcholiński, Tomanek 2020. At this point, it is worth giving consideration to the evolution of the socio-economic views of Bosak, who in 2017 was the "economic centrist" (the ratio of "equality" to "market": 50.6:49.4). Nowak 2020

the PiS was attacked as a pseudo-right-wing and pseudo-patriotic political party that deceived its voters ("Marxists are not only our enemy. Our enemy is the so-called right wing, which is in agreement with big business," Bosak called) (*Naszym; see Fenomenalny; Winnicki ostro o Sakiewiczu; #Konfederacja proponuje*). On the other, however, the United Right was assessed better than the liberal-left opposition (Skupień, 2019) and the possibility of conditional cooperation was allowed (Dziambor: "There are many projects in which we can support the government. These include ideological matters in which we share a similar opinion") (*Dziambor;* cf. *Winnicki o warunkach*). They even declared readiness to accept right-wing PiS politicians (*Krystyna*). The only political party with which an alliance was allowed in July 2019 was Kukiz'15, but the leader of this formation being in conflict with the Korwin supporters chose the PSL (*Konfedracja i Kukiz'15*).

The KWiN leaders are aware of the fact that they compete with the PiS for the right-wing electorate (which was openly admitted by Sławomir Mentzen) (*Fenomenalny*). This prompts them to present themselves as a more radical and consistent version of PiS, not questioning the ideological foundations of the United Right and open to dialogue (such a line was prompted to the confederates by Rafał Ziemkiewicz before the break-up took place) (*Ziemkiewicz*; cf. *Robert*). "We are a Catholic-national remorse for the PIS," said Tuduj (Tuduj, 2019). A different concept is promoted by Adam Wielomski, who says that "The Confederacy must remain in opposition no matter what, because Kaczyński will drain it out as he once did with the LPR and Samoobrona" (Wielomski, 2019d). He demands that "in the minds of voters, we carefully demote our [...] ideological world from PiS."[3] This resonates with the postulate of Tomasz Kalinowski that the KWiN should create its own institutional infrastructure enabling permanent rooting in the social background, because "otherwise we will have the same end as Kukiz'15" (Kalinowski, 2019b).

While the strategic line of KWiN is not yet finally clarified, the tactics can be assessed as well-thought-out and consistent. Considering the genesis of the Confederacy as an electoral alliance, it is not surprising that its actions oscillated around elections. The challenge was to collect signatures necessary to register the electoral roll, which was successfully carried out (*Konfedracja ogólnopolskim*). Some effort was taken to make the candidates' presentations a media spectacle, introducing such people as a Miss World runner-up Roksana Oraniec (*Kandydatka*). The priorities emphasized in the campaign were defined on the basis of focus research of the potential electorate (*Fenomenalny*). Postulates were publicized with the help of various types of actions, the most important

[3] Wielomski 2019a. His wife (and the candidate of KWiN) Magdalena Ziętek-Wielomska even considers the division into left- and right-wing to be secondary and irrelevant (Ziętek-Wielomska, 2019).

criterion of which was media coverage, i.e., the content carrying capacity and the spectacular form.

The main task of the Confederacy was to break through to the public with the name and program. The desire to attract media attention was also behind other actions of KWiN: lawsuits against the media (Godek, 2019b; *Telewizja; Początek*), disclosure of recordings from ARiMA (*Minister*), participation in debates (*Skandal!; Dzisiaj; Debata*), "happenings" such as Konrad Berkowicz with a kippah (*Piotr*) or Wilk with a flag (*Pracownicy*). Intra-party events — such as the National Women's Congress in May (*Narodowy*) or the election convention in September — were strived for to make them more attractive in the media; as Bosak said, "We should perfect their formula so that they are not a rigid academic lecture, but a *show" (Krzysztof Bosak podsumowuje*). The faint echo of KWiN's voice reverberated in the parliament due to the small size of the parliamentary group. Nevertheless, one can note here, e.g., the formulation of a motion to dismiss the Ombudsman (*Konfedracja składa*) or the recognition of the last session of the Sejm of the 8th term as illegal (*Szok!*). The street activity played a greater role, above all the demonstrations: the March of Sovereignty on May 1 (*Marsz*) and the March against Jewish claims on May 11 (*Dziesiątki*) in Warsaw, the Normality March in Bydgoszcz (*Setki*), the happening "Spring wind rips the flags of the European Union" (*Wiosenny*) and others (e.g., *Rzeszów*).

The problem of KWiN remains, however, the boycott by the majority of the media — both pro-government and opposition (*Krzysztof Bosak podsumowuje*; cf. *Czerwona; Cenzura*). Attempts were made to avoid this obstacle by expanding the Internet media system, including the portals Media Narodowe, wRealu24, eMisja, wPrawo (*Bosak: "Media*). As a party supporter wrote: "The Confederacy communicates with its electorate exclusively via the Internet, social media, and Internet television. The party created a cheap and decentralized media network independent of the regime, a social communication network" (*Prof. Wielomski*). A large role was attached to social media (*Kampania*), complaining about the blockade from Facebook (*Kolejna blokada*). Attempts were made to use advertising spots and music to the maximum (e.g., *Nowy spot*). Nevertheless, Winnicki lamented: "We have a huge problem with communicating with elderly people who do not use the Internet. This is the result of a TV blockade"(*R. Winnicki*).

Task number two, in turn, was to consolidate and mobilize voters, for example, the campaign # NieDlaRoszczeń consisting in collecting signatures on a letter to Donald Trump (*Cejrowski*). This was also, as it seems, the genesis of the project of presidential primary elections in the Confederacy, which on the one hand, are to activate the potential electorate, and on the other, to attract the attention of the media (*Konfederacja organizuje; Korwin, Braun*). The Confederacy also tried to take up local issues (such as in Pruchnik or Szczecin) (*Konfederacja broni; Szczecin*) in order to reach the inhabitants of the outlying regions.

In the presidential campaign, the main target of the Confederacy became small businesses frustrated by economic restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Bosak, as a candidate of the Confederacy, adapted to the requirements of conservative-liberal voters, taking care of the image of a well-balanced technocrat. For example, he spoke more about water management, than about property claims by Jewish organizations (*Krzysztof Bosak: musimy*), he avoided verbal aggression (e.g., he described the A. Duda's attack on the "LGBT ideology" as "a kind of provocation" and cynicism) (*Krzysztof Bosak : jestem*), he took exceptional care of his impeccable image (a characteristic fragment about clothes in an interview with Robert Mazurek on RMF) (*Bosak: Wiara*).

## Ideology and program

The Confederacy does not have a uniform ideology or a coherent view of the world. Although Wielomski promotes the concept of "national liberalism" or "market nationalism" (Wielomski, 2019b), in practice it remains in the sphere of distant forecasts (if not pious wishes). Some refer to conservative liberalism (Wilk, 2019), others to Dmowski's doctrine (Ziętek-Wielomska, 2019). When one of the candidates put forward in the election says "I am a libertarian, not a conservative" (Bartyzel, 2019), the other replies: "I define my views as national, conservative, deeply anti-liberal" (Smuniewski, 2019). For some, the model is the right wing of the US Republican Party (*Konfederacja zaprezentowała*), for others the National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen (*Konwencja wyborcza*). "Let's not delude ourselves [...] that libertarians and nationalists are groups that can be dovetailed with each other — this is not the case," says one of the female candidates of KWiN (Trela, 2019). Most of all, a negative program — a common enemy — brings them together. "We don't want Jews, homosexuals, abortions, taxes and the European Union!" — Mentzen announced (*Fenomenalny*). Islamists and "leftists" should be added to this list too.

One of the most important positive values uniting the Confederates is the sovereign state. For most, the ideal is the national state — the political organization of the Polish nation (Ziętek-Wielomska, 2019) — but there are also those who refer to the Jagiellonian tradition of a multinational state (Sajna, 2019) and contrast "extreme nationalism" with a "sober national attitude" (Drozdowski, 2019). The principle of the nation state, in which "almost all inhabitants constitute one nation" (Trela, 2019), results in the resistance of KWiN to immigration, the criticism of which is used against the PiS government. "We will stop the flood of immigrants from Ukraine and Asia," Winnicki called (*Konwencja wyborcza*), "We must stop this madness!" (*Winnicki o słowach*). "National security means a responsible migration policy. Stop migration!" added Tumanowicz (*Konwencja*). However, even in this matter, the KWiN did not develop a uniform position. As an alternative solution, "an immigration filter that eliminates the influx of people who threaten security, culture and social norms, but also leaves the door open for those migrants who want to work for the benefit of Polish economic development" (Bartyzel 2019; cf *Ekonomiczny*). One of the candidates even put up Qatar as a role model, "in which the native Qataris have many benefits, and the main workforce is immigrants from other countries" (Sajna, 2019).

The second pillar of the Confederate worldview is religion. The role of Catholicism, however, is understood very differently — when some activists (mainly Braun's supporters and nationalists) stand in the position of Catholic Integrism, for most libertarians, Christianity is only an element of the cultural tradition. Krzysztof Szymański from the National Movement is a representative of the former group, who says: "The only way to ensure God's order in Poland is to return Catholic entities to their ideological foundations, articulate an uncompromising, Catholic program [...], and above all, give oneself and all activities to the Immaculate Heart of Mary, Queen of Poland!" (Szymański, 2019).

Other nationalist, Michał Wawer, demands to prosecute the blasphemy (Wawer, 2019). On the other hand, Cyprian Sajna emphasizes his commitment to the secular nature of the state, and writes that in the KWiN "there is a place for atheists, dissenters, and free-thinkers," he points out that Korwin-Mikke "cannot be viewed as a Catholic model" (Sajna, 2019). In the ranks of the Confederacy there was initially even a former activist of the Palikot Movement, Jacek Władysław Bartyzel, known for his anti-clerical happenings, who declared himself "an unbelieving but patriotic liberal" (Bartyzel 2019; cf. *Szydził*).

Despite the ambivalent attitude towards religion, the KWiN unanimously proclaims an extremely conservative cultural program. It primarily means support for the traditional family model (Trela, 2019), although there are attempts among nationalists to find an answer to the challenge of feminism (Bryłka, 2019). The defense of the family takes shape primarily in the form of a fight against the LGBT ideology (Partia_KORWiN 2019), in which the Confederacy is trying to outbid the PiS (*Konfederacja ostro o Emilewicz*). Confederates drafted a bill forbidding the promotion of homosexual attitudes and blocked parades of equality (*Konfederacja obiecuje*), Korwin said that "All those elites that support deviations must be slaughtered" (*Korwin ostro*), and Godek that "pederasty is the introduction to pedophilia."[4] However, one can also (less often though) come across voices stressing that "this what concerns those two people and only them should be subject to the rules of freedom" (Bartyzel, 2019) and Sośnierz joined the working party for LGBT equality (*Poseł Konfederacji*). The KWiN

[4] GodekKaja, 2019a. Braun even spoke of "penalizing homosexuality." Wielomski, 2019c

also raises the postulate of an absolute ban on abortion in order to distinguish it from the compromise policy of the United Right (*Prezes Trybunału*).

Apart from the national-religious Tradition, the idea of Freedom is a component of the KWiN ideology. While in the symbolic sphere, jingoistic traditionalism prevails, the influence of liberal and anti-statist solutions is visible in a number of program proposals. In the field of education, this means the development of home education (Mentzen, 2019) and the educational and cultural voucher, shifting the focus to the family (Wieczorek, 2019). In terms of security, the Confederacy proposes to facilitate citizens' access to weapons and shooting training (*Polska dla*).

The liberal element stamped its imprint on the KWiN's economic agenda the strongest. According to Wilk, "there is a need to create the best conditions for the development of Polish business, [and] the government as well as officials should interfere as little as possible with the growth and enrichment of domestic enterprises, especially family ones" (Wilk, 2019). Characteristically, the Bosak presidential program — as the only one — received a positive assessment of ING Bank Śląski experts in terms of fiscal balance (Benecki, Kasek, 2020). Confederates agree in the pursuit of deregulation limiting the influence of the state on the economy. "As much of the state as it is necessary, as much freedom as it is possible," says Mentzen (Mentzen, 2019). They prepared, modeled on the so-called the Wilczek Act, "Polish Entrepreneur Package" containing, among others, Act on small scale street trading (*Polska dla*). Nevertheless, a limited participation of the state in economic life (e.g., arms industry, critical infrastructure) is allowed (Bala, 2019). To quote Mentzen once more "in the 21st century, the free market is the right answer less often than I would like, but still much more often than the statists would like" (Mentzen, 2019).

In addition to eliminating bureaucratic barriers, the activity of Polish entrepreneurs is to be facilitated by a significant reduction and simplification of taxes. Income tax would be completely abolished ("1000 plus for every working person. We will stop punishing Poles for working!") (*Takiej*), the tax system would be based on VAT (Mentzen 2019). Social security contributions would be voluntary (*Takiej*).

The savings necessary in view of reducing the state's income were to be sought by KWiN in reducing social expenditure. The Confederacy criticizes the "irresponsible policy of living at the expense of future generations" (Szymański, 2019). Criticism also applies to the "500+" program — as an alternative formula of a policy to boost the birth rate, progressive tax breaks for children are proposed, and a zero VAT rate for products purchased in relation to bringing up children (Skupień, 2019). At the same time, however, the confederates recognize the need to maintain certain elements of social policy (Drozdowski, 2019a), noticeably in the national wing of KWiN, the so-called "national solidarists" (Łobodzinski, 2019).

Confederates do not make secret of their discrepancies on economic issues (according to Mentzen, "the subject of economy is something I do not fully agree with, but we do not have to be unanimous on every issue," says the candidate) (Trela, 2019). Nationalists present protectionist views, sometimes they are close to the idea of the "third way" (Sowiński, 2019). According to Wilk, however, "In fact, the only significant difference concerns the assessment of foreign capital. Nationalists claim that capital has nationality, we — libertarians — that it has interests" (Wilk, 2019).

Economic liberalism does not go hand in hand with political liberalism. The KWiN is the only major political party in which criticism of democracy is articulated. Dominik Cwikła (an editor of the nczas.com website) writes, for example, that in a democratic system "one cannot […] create something unambiguously good, just and good, because […] the 'people' […] are […] mostly the rabble" (Cwikła, 2019; cf. *Wystartowała*). Sympathies for the monarchy are openly articulated (Sajna, 2019; cf. Wilk, 2019). Democracy is treated not as a value but at best as an objective reality (Drozdowski, 2019a). However, the practical systemic proposals of KWiN are an inconsistent mixture of authoritarian postulates (increasing penalties, including the reintroduction of the death penalty) (Mentzen, 2019) and libertarian demands (liquidation of public media, limiting the powers of law enforcement agencies) (*Liroy; Dość; Liderzy*). In addition, the Confederacy proposes to streamline the state through the parameterization of the work of courts and prosecutor's offices, as well as the introduction of e-voting (*Konfederacja zapowiada; Polska dla*).

The Confederacy is trying to work out an alternative program of foreign policy. Its main distinguishing feature is to be "multidirectional policy." "A multidirectional policy is a basic postulate […] in the field of foreign policy. That is, fragmented cooperation with various powers without a clear and permanent focus on one country," said Tuduj (Tuduj, 2019; cf. Wilk, 2019). In practice, this would mean a dramatic shift in Poland's foreign policy.

The idea of a sovereign state conflicts the Confederates with the European Union (*Młodzież Wszechpolska pocięła*). Korwin-Mikke stated: "We have only one joint point (of our program), but a strong one — 'to hell with the Union' (*Ruch Narodowy i Wolność*). The allegations against the EU are threefold — it is perceived as a tool of Germany (a threat to national interests), a carrier of "cultural Marxism" (a threat to Latin civilization), and a bureaucratic behemoth (a threat to civil and economic freedom) (*Prezes Ruchu*; cf. Ziętek-Wielomska, 2019; Wawer, 2019; Tuduj, 2019). The last aspect draws attention to the negative effects of EU regulations on the Poland's energy sector (climate commitments) and agriculture (Wilk, 2019; *Konfederacja: Nie*), and warnings were issued against adopting the common currency (*Konfederacja zaprezentowała*; *Konfederacja odpowiada*).

Nevertheless, the Confederates make it clear that they are "union skeptics" and not euroskeptics (Kalinowski, 2019a). "We are not against Europe and its great civilizational heritage," said Tuduj (Tuduj, 2019), "We are, we were and we will be in Europe" (*Wiceprezes*). They identify themselves with the idea of "Europe of free nations and nation states" (Tuduj, 2019). However, this idea is vague. The radical wing (mainly — but not only — nationalists) wants "Polexit," although they intend to keep Poland in the Schengen area and the European Economic Area (*Konfederacja: Wyprowadzimy*; cf. *Wiceprezes*). The moderate wing considers it unrealistic and pointless, proposing instead the slogan of "return to the roots of Robert Schuman's United Europe" (Drozdowski, 2019b), which supposed to mean a profound reform of the EU, dismantling the "bureaucratic superstructure" (Dziambor, 2019; cf. Bartyzel, 2019).

At the same time, the Confederacy clearly distances itself from the USA. Bosak criticized "servile subordination to America" (*Krzysztof Bosak: rząd*), he said that "Poland did not get up from its knees, but only changed the kneeler from the EU to the USA" (*Polska nie*). Korwin-Mikke accuses PiS of being an "American agency" (*Korwin-Mikke: PiS jest*; cf. *Korwin-Mikke: PiS zależy;* Marciniuk, 2019). Polish-American relations are considered unequal and unfavorable for Poland (e.g., the issue of digital tax) (*Krzysztof Bosak: rząd*; *Konfederacja ostro o wpisach*), the United States is considered an uncertain ally (*Winnicki dla*). Nationalists wanted to greet President Trump with a picket line (*Trump*).

The aversion to the United States is to some extent a derivative of antagonism with the US allies — Israel and Ukraine. The leading issue is the claims to Jewish heirless property and the related so-called Act 447 (*Winnicki o roszczeniach*; *Krzysztof Bosak: rząd*), but this is only a small part of the entire body of problems arising from Polish-Jewish relations (e.g., accusing Poles of complicity in the Holocaust, participation of Jews in the communist apparatus).[5] The Confederates warn against the influence of the Jewish lobby, for example, Braun said that "Today's ministers and bishops are at the Jewish press beck and call" (*Konfederacja wzywa*). The attitude of the national right wing towards Ukraine is also characterized by long-standing aversion. The historical conflict, which culminated in the Volhynian slaughter, is projected onto contemporary Ukrainian politics, suspected of expansionist attempts towards Poland. The Confederates believe that "ad hoc politics, often incompatible with our national interest, is prioritized over the memory of Polish martyrdom" (Marciniuk, 2019). Therefore, in their opinion, unconditional support for Ukraine is contrary to the Polish "*raison d'État*," although they do not question the role of the inde-

[5] Sowiński 2019; *Konfederacja broni*; *Skandaliczny*. Even the member of the liberal faction of the Confederacy J.W. Bartyzel protested against the excessively broad use of the term "anti-Semitism". Bartyzel 2019

pendent Ukrainian state as a buffer separating Poland from Russia (*Krzysztof Bosak: rząd*).

However, the KWiN did not clearly formulate alternative "vectors" of Polish foreign policy. In principle, the Confederacy does not question Poland's membership in NATO (*Krzysztof Bosak: rząd*), although the party emphasizes the development of own defense capabilities (Zapałowski, 2019). Korwin-Mikke allowed for the possibility of a military alliance with Russia, but he came in for criticism even in his parent political camp (*Korwin-Mikke: Polska; Korwin-Mikke: Obydwaj; Korwin-Mikke w studiu*). Other Confederacy politicians speak of Russia without sentiment. "Russia is a large country, a country pursuing a brutal, arrogant policy, with which we have tense relations," said Bosak (Sasin). At the same time, however, the confrontational policy towards Russia was opposed, considering it unfavorable for Poland (*Winnicki dla*). "I do not see any reason why we should annoy our neighbor. It is in our interest to have peace and trade with all neighbors," stated Tuduj (Tuduj, 2019). Poland's participation in the Chinese New Silk Road program is also taken into account (Ziętek-Wielomska, 2019; Bartyzel, 2019; Wilk, 2019), but again the opinions are divided (Drozdowski, 2019a).

## Social base

In the May elections to the European Parliament, the Confederates won 4.55% of votes (*Wybory do parlamentu*). In the parliamentary elections in October, 1,256,953 voters voted for the KWiN, which constituted 6.81% of votes (*Wyniki wyborów*). Importantly, crossing the election threshold resulted in strengthening the position of KWiN, as 8.3% of respondents expressed the will to vote for this party in November and in December — 12% (*W nowym*).

The KWiN electorate is based on young educated men from big cities. 9 percent of men and 4.1 percent of women voted for the Confederacy. Among people aged 18-29, the Confederacy received as much as 20.2% of votes, the age group 30-39 (8.2%) also voted above average, while not many votes were received from the older generation. In terms of occupations, the Confederates are most popular among students (17.9%), business owners (8.8%) and management (8.1%), the average proportion of votes was cast among workers (7.4%), the unemployed (6.9%) as well as administration and service employees (6.6%), and the lowest among farmers (3.4%), old age and disability pensioners (1.1%). The Confederacy's electorate is dominated by voters with higher (43.6%) or secondary (41.2%) education (Zaborowska 2019). In terms of geography, the KWiN achieved the highest results in the following districts: średzki (13.5%), bieszczadzki (7.52%), Stalowa Wola (7.10%) and Rzeszów (7.09%) (*Wybory europejskie*).

The presidential election strengthened the position of the Confederacy. Under the conditions of sharp polarization, obtaining the result of 6.78% in the first round of the elections should be considered a success (for comparison — most of the voters of the parliamentary Left handed over their votes to Rafał Trzaskowski). This success was even greater because Bosak's campaign was relatively cheap — it cost less than PLN 2 million (*Bosak: Życzę*). Moreover, the Confederacy candidate managed to win over a significant proportion of young people, including first-time voters: 21.7% of voters aged 18-29.

As in the parliamentary elections, the average Bosak voter is a young (more than half are under 30) male (2/3 of the electorate) with secondary or higher education (84.9%), studying (19.1%) or working in services (18%). Considering the cross-section of society, the KWiN candidate turned out to be the most popular among high school students and university students (20.4%). He was also overrepresented in the circles of entrepreneurs (8.5%), managerial staff (8.4%), workers (8.0%) and even unemployed (7.3%) (*Wyniki głosowania*). In the spatial aspect, Bosak gained the greatest support — over 10% — in the following districts: Łęczna (10.66), Rzeszów (10.18) and Rzeszów (10.02), and among the crews of sea-going vessels (19.51%) (*Wybory Prezydenta*).

It is visible that the voters of KWiN and Bosak have a clear sociological profile. This is the strength of the formation as it ensures its cohesion, but at the same time, it is its weakness as it hinders further expansion. The Confederacy faces the difficult task of gaining a different electorate — in the first place PiS voters: older, less educated people, rather socially oriented. Without this, the Confederates will remain a party balancing on the verge of the election threshold.

## Conclusions

The analysis of Confederate ideology and *modus operandi* reveals their multifaceted inconsistency. There are a number of contradictions, the most important of which are: /1/ the contradiction between the traditionalist and the modernizing element (including — between the modern form and conservative content), /2/ the contradiction between the conservative (conservative-liberal) and the national-democratic tradition, /3/ contradiction between native and "imported" patterns. From the rich ideological heritage of the Poland's right wing, the Confederates try to select elements /a/ common to the trends that co-create the KWiN, /b/ compatible with the contemporary social environment. Although consolidation is difficult, the plane of consensus is cultural Catholicism and economic liberalism.

The success of KWiN is in line with the general Western trend of the right-wing backlash. The Polish mutation of this phenomenon, however, retains its specific character. Compared to the Western European new populist right, the traditionalist component in the Confederacy is stronger, while there is no social populism (characteristic of, for example, Front National or Sverigedemokraterna), and the issue of immigration is also of little importance (cf. Tomasiewicz 2019: 71-86). It seems that the Polish radical right is closer to the American model: Tea Party, Trumpizm, alt-right (cf. Anglin, 2016; Langman, 2011; Post, 2017).

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Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis 2020, T. 30, s. 33—58
ISSN 2353-9747 (electronic version)
www.studiapoliticae.us.edu.pl
Date of receipt: 12.07.2020; date of acceptance: 12.09.2020
DOI: http://doi.org/10.31261/SPUS.1180

# From refugee integration to the theory of change for integration. The evolution of the approach to social integration in the UK at the beginning of the 21st century

# Od integracji uchodźców do teorii zmiany na rzecz integracji. Ewolucja podejścia do integracji społecznej w Wielkiej Brytanii na początku XXI wieku

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**Abstract**

The need and willingness to change motivates decision-makers and practitioners in the UK to take decisive integration-oriented measures. The country has never succeeded in developing its own original policy in this area. The first steps were taken in 2004 with the publication of the Indicators of Integration, but it was only in recent years that work on integration management has been intensified. There is a clear departure from focusing on individual aspects of integration and implementing a problem management system in a broader context. This is reflected in

**Abstrakt**

Potrzeba i chęć zmiany motywuje decydentów i praktyków w Wielkiej Brytanii do podejmowania zdecydowanych działań integracyjnych. Kraj ten nigdy nie wypracował własnej oryginalnej polityki w tej dziedzinie. W 2004 roku podjęto pierwsze kroki wraz z publikacją Wskaźników Integracji, ale dopiero w ostatnich latach zintensyfikowano prace nad zarządzaniem integracją. Istnieje wyraźne odejście od skupiania się na poszczególnych aspektach integracji na rzecz wdrażania systemu zarządzania integracją w szerszym kontekście. Znajduje to odzwierciedlenie w publi-

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the publication of the Home Office Indicators for Integration framework (2019). The document is based on the 2004 version, but presents it in terms of the Theory of Change, which was adopted as the basis for designing and verifying the integration process in the UK. The aim of the paper is to compare the Integration Indicators of 2004 with the new version in order to identify the progress of work on the integration system and the change in the approach to the problem.

**Key words**: social integration, social integration in Great Britain, Theory of Change, Theory of Change for Integration, Theory of Change for Integration in Great Britain

kacji Ramowych wskaźników Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych dla integracji (2019).
Dokument ten bazuje na wersji z 2004 roku, ale przedstawia ją w ujęciu Teorii Zmiany, która została przyjęta jako podstawa do projektowania i weryfikacji procesu integracji w Wielkiej Brytanii. Celem artykułu jest porównanie Wskaźników Integracji z 2004 roku z nową wersją by określić zakres postępu prac nad systemem integracji oraz zmiany w podejściu do tego zagadnienia.

**Słowa klucze:** integracja społeczna, integracja społeczna w Wielkiej Brytanii, Teoria Zmiany, Teoria Zmiany dla integracji, Teoria Zmiany dla integracji w Wielkiej Brytanii

## Introduction

As globalization has made the inequalities in the political, social and economic situations of entire societies all too clear and intensified migration is observed all over the world, there is a growing need to act in this matter. Individuals and groups migrate, join the already existing communities with all their diversified specificity, thus creating a completely new social situation.

One of the countries facing a significant influx of immigrants is the United Kingdom. It is an extremely popular destination because the country is perceived as a very good place to live (Integrated Communities Strategy, 2018), a democratic country with rich traditions, the essence of multiculturalism and tolerance towards otherness. However, this picture of a generally well-integrated society in which people live without conflicts and participate in civic life without obstacles has been verified by research. It shows that communities tend to live parallel lives and conflicts are commonplace, as are segregation, isolation, discrimination, and violence. Significantly, the issue of immigration was also the main theme of the referendum campaign on the UK's exit from the European Union in 2016.

Meanwhile, the UK has no single coherent integration policy. From the very beginning, the activities of the authorities were focused on migration, asylum or anti-discrimination policies, mainly through legislation. Due to the constant balancing between the need to reduce immigration and the integration of immigrants, no significant success has been achieved in any of these areas. Paradoxically, attempts to put a stop to immigration are matched by an increase in numbers of immigrants and immigration intensity.

Measures to manage integration were taken at the beginning of this century, but it was only in recent years that the activities have been intensified. Nowadays a change in the approach to integration can be observed. This is reflected in the publication of the framework document, the Home Office Indicators for Integration (Framework) (2019). The document is based on the 2004 Indicators for Integration, but presents them in terms of the Theory of Change, which was adopted as the basis for designing and verifying the integration process in the UK.

The aim of the paper is to compare the Integration Indicators of 2004 with the new version in order to identify the progress of work on the integration system and the change in the approach to the problem.

Change is the key element here. Its necessity implies the process of integration, motivates and directs actions. Integration is a whole process of changes on different levels, with consequences varying in scope and time. Observation of changes makes it possible to draw conclusions about positive or negative results of actions taken and to modify them, if necessary (also in the context of change). The need and willingness to change motivate decision-makers and practitioners in the UK to take decisive integration-oriented measures. The new document is based on the Theory of Change with its specific retroactive approach to the problem. The new solutions, appropriately promoted, can be applied on a broader scale than migration or refuge-seeking. This is a good step towards an integration policy that is coherently integrated despite its extensive contextuality.

## Definition of social integration

The concept of social integration turns out to be ambiguous and multidimensional, therefore it is difficult to expect a single generally accepted definition (Rytter, 2018). C. Ferguson (2008: 1) proposes to define it as "a process of building values, relations and institutions that enable all people to participate in the social, economic and political life on the basis of equal rights and opportunities, justice and dignity." It is also "a state or process occurring in society, consisting in the fact that its individual elements tend to merge into a harmonious, coordinated, and functional whole […]" (Olechnicki, Załęcki 1997: 85—86).

From the British perspective, according to the Social Integration Commission (2015: 7), social integration is "a degree of interaction among people in the UK of different ages, social classes, and ethnic backgrounds." In 2018, the definition was extended and in the Integrated Communities Strategy (2018: 10) it is described as “communities where people, whatever their background, live, work, learn and socialise together, based on shared rights, responsibilities and opportunities […]. Communities where many religions, cultures and opinions are celebrated, underpinned by a shared set of British values that champion tolerance, freedom and equality of opportunity […].”

According to another definition, “social integration refers to interacting processes, personal and social changes between individuals and institutions in interrelated areas of life” (Charsley, Spencer, 2019), and the 2019 Report on Integration Indicators treats integration as “a multi-directional process involving multiple changes from both incoming and diverse host communities” (Home Office Indicators, 2019: 11). This is how integration, with emphasis on the word “change,” will be understood in this paper, of course, with all the awareness of the fact that this definition does not exhaust the characteristics of the phenomenon.

## Selected aspects of the theoretical perspective on social integration

The lack of a clear definition of integration means the lack of clear attributes of integration and its purpose(s), and without them the observation, measurement and execution of the processes and the verification of the achieved results will encounter considerable difficulties. For this reason, it is necessary to present the problem in a manner facilitating its comprehension. According to scholars, the approach can vary depending on the perspective, interests, assumptions and values (Phillimore, 2012). Furthermore, the term is strongly rooted in social contexts and “no matter how many parameters are introduced in the diagnosis of integration, enough is never enough” (Rytter, 2018). This extremely vague concept also involves a specific perspective of the nation, immigration, and the relationship between minority and majority (Framework), which clearly dominates in the understanding of social integration.

A number of approaches to the problem analyzing social integration from different perspectives are highlighted in the academic discussion. Of the numerous academic proposals, the distinction of integration dimensions made by A. Ager and S. Strang (2004) is more useful, or actually fundamental, for these deliberations because, slightly modified, it is one of the elements of the Theory of Change for the integration process in the UK. The authors identified ten key areas of integration: the first four of them: labor market participation, housing, education, and health were singled out as “means and markers.” The next three — intra-group links, relations with members of the dominant group and contacts with the host community institutions — belong to social connections. Language and cultural knowledge, stability and safety were identified as facilitators in the process. Finally, rights and citizenship were seen as the foundation of integration (Home Office, 2004).

Processes in these areas can occur on their own or interact with each other, at different speeds, or even take the opposite direction, e.g., from employment to unemployment (Charsley, Spencer, 2019). If integration is considered in terms of mutual relations, from the perspective of the immigrant, the host community, and the state, the question of all these actors' co-responsibility for their contribution to integration becomes significant. Moreover, integration is context-dependent and must be understood and planned in relation to the specificity of a particular place, time, individuals and their groups (Home Office Indicators of Integration framework, 2019:7).

## Change and the theory of change in the design and evaluation of integration policy

The concept of integration in a social context, with all its complexity, makes one clearly aware of the problems that practitioners have to face measuring and implementing it.

Integration — the process between exclusion and inclusion, and social cohesion (Ganowicz, 2018) — should be seen as part of changes taking place in society, individual communities, individuals, and groups. The lack of integration is manifested in isolation, alienation, segregation. They are social problems, i.e., according to J. Sztumski (1977), "they result from a particular situation, they cannot be reconciled with norms, standards or values commonly recognized in a given society, which are believed to be possible to be solved or overcome by social activity." This activity is aimed at making changes. According to J. Sobczak (2008:24), "social change" must be understood as "the emergence of a new state of affairs within a functioning social system, or its transformation may result from conscious actions taken by humans, but it may also be an effect of the endogenous development of the system or its adaptation to changes in the environment. The need for change is associated with the desire or necessity to "fix" something that does not function properly. Hence some corrective actions (Framework, 2008:25) aimed at solving the existing problem.

In the integration process, change is an inherent element, aimed at the transformation of a dysfunctional situation in which not all actors are involved in the system. It is not just about their inclusion, which will mean a change in their position, but about multidimensional and multidirectional modifications covering all elements of the structure. As a result, the whole society, the community undergoes a change to some extent.

Today, to a greater extent than ever before, change is permanent, fast and usually takes place on a larger scale. As many processes change can and should be subject to planning, organization, control. Change needs management (Mastyk, 1978; Zarębska, 2002). It is about both promoting positive and preventing negative transformations. Change can be a measure of progression or regression and as such must be an element of organizational processes in terms of the purpose of the latter, its existence and development. It is management for change and by change.

In the analysis and planning of organizational changes, it is interventions that are of particular importance because, as E. Mastyk (1978) states, they refer "to the use of correct ways of structuring people's activities in organizations, i.e., the structuring of activities that leads to the improvement of organization's performance."

Because it is permanently embedded in social processes, change is an ideal tool for managing them. This is no different in the case of integration management, where the design of change and its evaluation are not inconsiderable. There is even a Theory of Change (ToC), which puts change at the heart of any strategic action.

The conducted literature review shows that there is no consensus with regard to defining the Theory of Change (ToC). It is commonly understood as an articulation of how and why a given intervention will lead to a specific change (Stein, Walters 2012) or "(...) how and why an intervention in a particular situation or context can work" (Collins, Clark, 2013). According to Anderson (2020), at its most basic sense, the theory of change explains how a group of early and intermediate accomplishments sets the stage for producing long-range results.

I. Vogel (2012) observes that the Theory of Change is "(...) a dialogue-based process intended to generate a description of a sequence of events that is expected to lead to a particular desired outcome." It consists in formulating a number of basic assumptions concerning the change that will take place in the program (Framework), and how all required early and intermediate results related to achieving the desired long-term change will be triggered and documented when they occur (Anderson, 2020).

According to more developed definitions, such as the one presented by the Center for the Theory of Change (2020), the Theory of Change is a comprehensive description and illustration of how and why a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context. D.H. Taplin, H. Clark, E. Collins, D.C. Colby, (2013) explain that the Theory of Change "defines long-term goals and then maps backward to identify changes that need to happen earlier (preconditions). The identified changes are mapped graphically in causal pathways of outcomes, showing each outcome in logical relationship to all the others. Interventions, which are activities and outputs of any sort, are mapped to the outcomes pathway to show what stakeholders think it will take to effect the changes, and when."

The Theory of Change provides a working model against which testing hypotheses and assumptions about what actions will best bring about the intended outcomes (Brest, 2010). Certain stages are distinguished in the theory: a problem, barriers, interventions and strategies, outputs, assumptions, outcomes, impacts (Indicators of Integration framework, 2019a). They are illustrated in the table below.

Table 1

Stages of integration process in context of Theory of Change

| Stage | Content |
|---|---|
| Problem | It is necessary to identify the fact that the lack of integration of certain groups in society is real and limits their ability to access resources, services and being part of the society. |
| Barriers | present the key obstacles to effective integration practices |
| Interventions and strategies | divided into two categories: those that are taken into account at all levels and that are aimed at promoting specific aspects of integration or at eliminating specific shortcomings in integration |
| Outputs | Each block of domain-related outputs is affected by each of the interventions leading to them. |
| Assumptions | The theory of change is based on research-based assumptions about how results can be achieved and how contextual and environmental factors can affect the achievement of results. The assumptions of each intervention explain why an organization believes that an intervention can work. ToC as a whole explains why the intervention can be effective. |
| The outcomes | Each outcome represents the integration domain proposed in the Integration Indicators structure. The complex interrelationships between the outcomes are further defined by systematic data collection with the use of Integration Indicators. |
| Impact | All outcomes in ToC, supported and interacting, lead to impact - proper integration of all members of the society, regardless of their background, who live, work, learn and socialize together, based on shared rights, responsibilities and opportunities. |

Source: Home Office (2019a:8)

Through specific actions within the above-mentioned stages, starting from the end (the Impact), objectives of a different scope and assumptions of the intervention are defined, and interventions that are to lead to subsequent changes are adjusted. The theory allows their design and monitoring, which will be presented in the subsequent part of the paper.

## The conditions for an integration policy in the UK

The British integration model has never been clearly defined (Saggar, Somerville, 2012). Despite extensive experience related to problems resulting from large-scale immigration and refuge-seeking, no formal integration program has been developed yet. The presentation of potential solutions should be preceded by a few remarks on the factors determining the specificity of the adopted model.

Quite early, in comparison with other countries (as early as in the 19th century), the country had to face problems related to the influx of immigrants on a larger scale than ever before (Castles, Miller 2003). However, the number of immigrants increased significantly after World War II. Changes occurred in all countries, but the United Kingdom experienced them in a special way, which was not without influence on its integration policy.

Almost immediately after the Second World War and with a new migration, tensions and even open hostility between the local population and ethnically different immigrants appeared (Problems of integration of immigrants, 2008). Discriminatory practices and violence were widespread, and attempts were made to deal with them by focusing on combating discrimination and incitement to racial hatred, and on the mechanisms of managing relations with the community (Policy Primer, Integration, 2020). The impulse for more decisive action was provided by the racial riots in 1958 and 1959 (Commonwealth immigrants in the Modern Era, 2020). Until the end of the 1990s, actions were limited to the development of legal regulations rather than integration-oriented activities, and the legal and political moves of that time determined the shape of the British integration model. It seems to constantly balance between the need to limit the inflow of immigrants on the one hand, and to implement certain integration measures on the other, which is reflected in the well-known statement by R. Hattersley (Hattersley, 1965) in a parliamentary debate on 23 March 1965: *Without integration, limitation is inexcusable; Without limitation, integration is impossible*. These two pillars have been shaping the British policy in this area until today. At that time, integration was also perceived as a process that meant "equal opportunities accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance" (Marwick, 2003). The rejection of the assimilation approach, and concentration on actions to ensure equality between different social groups while preserving social cohesion (Spencer and Rudiger, 2003), which determines the specificity of integration policy in the UK, is clear.

At the beginning of the integration policy formation process, the practice of integration oriented towards preventing discrimination did not bring the desired results (Fiałkowska, Wiśniewski, 2009). The British became aware of the necessity to develop strategic solutions at the end of 20th century and beginning of 21st century. A meaningful statement concerning integration was made by

T. Blair (2006): "Integration isn't about what defines us as people, but as citizens, the rights and duties that go with being a member of our society." This view marks the British perspective of the ultimate goal of integration.

To date, there is no national framework for integration policy across the UK. The Home Office is responsible for refugee integration and settlement, and citizenship policies, while the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG[1]) deals with community cohesion in England. Other departments have been running initiatives in their policy areas since 2011 (Migrant Integration, 2017); in the Localism Act of 2011 the United Kingdom abandoned the top-down approach and encouraged local authorities and decentralized administrations to set their own priorities in this area. However, the responsibility for migration policy lies with the Home Office (Migration Observatory, 2020).

The uniqueness of the British model compared to other European countries lies in the fact that it separates the issues of immigration, refuge-seeking and integration (Problems of integration of immigrants, 2008). There is no integration policy in the UK, no separate law on integration (Governance of Migrant Integration in the UK, former Member State, 2017). This approach presents the British attitude towards society as it considers diversity to be a natural phenomenon, an inherent feature of society, not necessarily a consequence of immigration alone, and the principle of equal opportunities as something obvious, and the participation of all groups in the social life as an unquestionable right (Problems of integration of immigrants, 2008). However, the lack of an integration policy in the changing conditions and the growing number of immigrants — despite efforts to limit immigration — is a certain weakness of the British model (Framework).

The need for change became urgent in 2004, when, after the enlargement of the European Union, immigrants from the new Member States arrived in the United Kingdom, settling down not only in large cities, but also in areas with little or no experience of diversity in communities (Fiałkowska K., Wiśniewski, J., 2009). It became clear then, and was reflected in the report of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion ("Our shared future") in 2007 (CIC 2007), that local communities and their authorities must also be involved in integration policy measures.

In 2012, the strategic document "Creating the Conditions for Integration" was published (CCI, 2012), which argued that integration could be achieved through cooperation at the neighborhood level. Meanwhile, tension in communities was increasing. Despite the general image of integrated communities, more in-depth research proved that groups within communities lived parallel lives and there was segregation (Cantle, 2020; Cantle, Kaufmann, 2016). A review by Dame L. Casey of 2016 highlighted segregation and "cultural and religious prac-

[1] Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government

tices in communities that (...) are contrary to British values and sometimes to […] the regulations" (Casey 2016:5). Casey suggested that the integration policy program had not been consistently implemented (Casey 2016: item 70). The following problems were identified in the report: the level and pace of migration, school segregation, housing segregation, an unfavorable situation on the labor market, a lack of command of English, personal, religious and cultural standards, values and attitudes, a lack of meaningful social mixing.

In response, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) published the Integrated Communities Strategy Green Book in 2018 (Integrated Communities, 2018). The document defines integration as "communities in which people, regardless of their background, live, work, learn and socialise together, based on shared rights, responsibilities and opportunities." It identifies areas for the development of integration policy, such as boosting English language skills, enhancing economic opportunities and promoting meaningful social contacts. It provides a change of focus from the previous programs for equality and community cohesion to support for newcomers and residents. In addition to the Green Paper, a number of national policy changes supporting integration have been developed, such as a set of integration indicators published by the Home Office (2019) referred to in this paper.

It should also be added that immigration was a key issue in the referendum of June 2016 on EU membership and largely contributed to the outcome that determined the UK's exit from EU structures (Bulman, 2017). It is currently unknown what shape the integration and immigration policy will take (The Migration Observatory, 2016). The existing documents date back to 2016 Immigration & integration after brexit a policy exchange agenda (Goodhard, 2016). The author believes that "the vote on Brexit is an opportunity to re-launch political thinking in many areas, especially immigration and integration, one of the main factors that inspired the vote in the first place."

## The approach to integration in the UK

The approach to integration in the UK is best illustrated by comparing two documents with the same name: Integration Indicators, issued in 2004 and 2019 by and on behalf of the Home Office, i.e., the Ministry responsible for all matters related to integration.

In 2004, the document entitled *Indicators of Integration. The final report* by Alastair Ager and Alison Strang of Queen Margaret University College Edinburgh was published. It was commissioned by the Home Office to pursue the policy direction set out in the Home Office report "Full and Equal Citizens"

(2001). The Indicators of Integration study first of all aimed at helping people understand what the integration of refugees means in the specific UK context and then to direct the future work of the Home Office in this area (Home Office, 2004). It should be noted that the report deals with the integration of refugees and was intended as a starting point for action in this context.

Among the general objectives pursued by the authors of the study, in addition to exploring integration as a concept that was not commonly understood, there was a need to create a framework that would allow those working in the field of refugee integration in the UK to use the concept of "integration" in the same way, and a framework to help those involved in local projects as well as policy makers to plan and verify services for refugees (Home Office, 2004).

On 24 pages, the document explains what the Integration Indicators are and what they are used for. The document comprises three sections: from the structure, through the methods of using this "guide," to an explanation of the context of the work and indication of the research that made up the final result. This general framework of the Indicators of Integration is addressed to practitioners. It explains how and why, based on research results, changes can be made and better practices can be developed in the areas concerned.

The document is structured around 10 domains grouped in 4 dimensions: *Means and markers*, *Social connections*, *Facilitators* and *Foundation* (Fig. 1). For each of them, the document suggests a number of indicators (with the recommendation that there should be about 10) to assess integration in relation to this particular field. These are the key areas which, as proved by the evidence collected to prepare the report, are the most relevant for refugee integration.




**Fig.1.** Domains of key importance for integration (2004)
Source: Indicators of Integration final report (2004), Home Office UK

It is not difficult to notice that this is the concept of integration presented by the authors of the report, Ager and Strang. It was adapted as a central point of the Integration Indicators in 2004.

In the first dimension, Means and Markers, there are four domains: employment, housing, education and health. They were identified as the major areas of attainment that are widely recognized as critical to the integration process. This was inspired by the areas of public activity in which integration can be assessed, which were identified when the Council of Europe established the categories of integration indicators (Council of Europe, 1997). They illustrate the "outcome" of integration, but at the same time serve equally clearly as a "means" for this purpose. By analyzing them, progress towards integration can be demonstrated, but they can also be used as means to support achievements in other areas. Thus, success/failure in these domains indicates positive/negative results of integration, which makes them markers. They are means because success in these domains usually translates into success in other areas and thus helps to expand the integration process.

There are three domains in the social connections framework: "social bridges", "social bonds" and "social links" (Home Office, 2004:3-4). They were included there because of the need to present the aspect of relations in order to understand the integration process as a whole, since the domains considered as markers and means, referred to as the "public face" of integration by the authors, do not fully illustrate what integration is about. It is necessary to present the process from the perspective of participants. It is the relations between people (and their groups and institutions) that are the key to both defining and achieving integration. Based on the concept of social capital, three forms of social relationships illustrate connections, with members of other communities, the closest connections within a particular type of community, and connections with institutions, including authorities at various levels, respectively.

Facilitators were identified as factors necessary for integration with the community, for establishing relationships and for gaining access to the main resources that determine the degree of integration. Two domains were identified here, namely "language and culture knowledge" and "safety and stability." These are key factors facilitating the integration process, "key areas of cultural competence that are necessary for people to effectively integrate into the community" (Home Office, 2004). The knowledge of both language and culture was presented together as equally necessary for the processes and results of integration. The document stresses the need for some cultural reciprocity and respect for the knowledge of another language. Safety and stability were identified as crucial as well. Freedom from the experience of racial persecution, discrimination and crime in general allows people to develop a sense of belonging, sustainability, continuity, and to develop relationships in many directions and to integrate.

The final domain, "Rights and Citizenship," is the content of the *Foundation* part of the framework for the Integration Indicators. It is an expression of the conviction, based on the research into the concept of integration and qualitative studies, that rights and responsibilities are extremely important in the integration process and there is a similarity of attitudes among all participants. This is the basis for determining the expectations and responsibilities related to the integration process. Ideas of citizenship and nationality, and the associated rights and obligations, fundamentally shape the degree of integration. The acquisition of citizenship or the right of permanent residence is an important measure of how integrated a person is, presupposes the use of language, knowledge and acceptance of norms, legal values, culture, a certain degree of multi-directional social connections and access to and use of resources according to individual needs and possibilities.

There are multiple links between the domains and, as a result, actions in any of them can potentially affect the others. It is assumed that, although graphically presented in a specific way, they are all equally important. Moreover, there is no model of the integration process in the form of consecutive stages in a specific order. The authors recommend looking at the domains from the perspective of numbers and ways in which they can be linked.

Around ten or so indicators were selected for each area to measure the phenomenon, with a view to using them as identifiers of the issues to be taken into account or as a means of verifying the outcomes, i.e., progress in the integration process, both individually and collectively, and in quantitative or qualitative terms (Home Office, 2004:5).

The indicators are located at the level of policy and practice. The former, relevant and available for the verification of regional or national integration trends, may be different from those to be used to assess the results of a specific project at the local level. The sets of indicators are different for practice and policy, but the structure of the domains remains common for both in order to ensure a coherent picture of integration as a whole and a possibility to use the Guide of Integration Indicators at all levels. According to the authors of the document (Home Office, 2004:5), this approach makes it possible to understand what integration is, how it can be achieved, how to measure progress (policy), and help in planning activities and providing services to integration stakeholders (practice).

In addition, at the policy level, there is a distinction between *core* indicators considered to be the key to measuring integration — two within each domain — and other, additional indicators. In order to facilitate potential comparative studies, it is recommended to reduce the set of indicators.

Four issues were taken into consideration when selecting indicators from each domain: comprehensiveness, flexibility, comparability, and feasibility. The list of indicators is not enumerative, and users are offered the possibility to identify additional indicators that better reflect the specific needs of their projects or programs, with a recommendation to stick to the general approach outlined in the work on Integration Indicators, which will allow for potential comparability with other actors in the field of integration.

The structure of the integration process outlined above leads to the conclusion that an individual or a group is integrated into society when they participate in the areas of employment, housing, education, health in a manner comparable to that of the members of the receiving community, establish social relations with members of the community with which they identify, with other communities and with relevant state institutions, and have language competence, cultural knowledge, a sense of security and stability sufficient to become involved in the society "in a manner consistent with the common concepts of nationality and citizenship" (Home Office, 2004: 5). This is by no means a proposed definition, but an illustration of the main ideas of the concept of integration.

After reviewing dozens of interpretations of the term and the related concepts, together with the default definitions offered by refugees and other relevant stakeholders, it was concluded that, while no single definition would be adequate for the purposes of the Integration Indicators project, a number of distinct issues were clearly outlined. Finally, it was found that operational definition includes external signs of integration, social connections supporting integration activities understood as potentially involving all members of the community, and explains the final degree of civic involvement needed for full integration. Rights and citizenship are at the heart of the presented structure of the integration process. As the authors of the document observe, it is clear in the UK that there are many discussions going on about the idea of "common concepts of nationality and citizenship" (Home Office, 2004: 6). The acquisition of citizenship formally guarantees access to resources and implies the existence of bonds and competences necessary to function in society.

Among the principles that define the structure of the Integration Indicators and are intended to enable their effective use, it is possible to distinguish the following: ease of use, flexibility, availability of relevant data and availability of information (guidance) in this respect. The main areas of application of the Integration Indicators are: a review of the principles, assistance in local consultations, monitoring and evaluation of services and benchmarking.

The presentation of integration in the form of a structure with domains helps organize consultations concerning the dimensions of integration at the local level. It helps to frame the discussion at the verification and joint planning stage by identifying appropriate domains and relevant indicators.

This approach to integration enables decision-makers and practitioners to reflect on the objectives they want to achieve in the field of integration and helps to identify the indicators for monitoring results. Integration indicators can be useful in the comparison of the work of those involved in integration processes in different environments, at different levels, to identify areas for potential improvement. They can also be used for measurements in a wider context. Although the focus of the structure of Integration Indicators is on refugee integration, the use of selected indicators can be extended to the communities in which refugees settle, or (with some modifications, of course) to the presentation of the experiences of asylum seekers, economic migrants and other groups. This structure can therefore have a potential impact on social cohesion issues and thus improve the quality of integration.

Integration indicators also prove to be an incentive for government actions to increase the cohesion of integration-related data collection by determining strategies for action in this area. The potential for initiatives in this area, the possibility of developing comprehensive data sets on issues concerning dispute settlement, integration and social cohesion was recognized.

The document also points to the need to consult all the participants of integration processes, both at the level of local practices and more extensive policies. It was also important to review the importance and usefulness of such an integration management framework for potential users (practitioners of local integration activities and decision-makers in integration policy processes in a wider context).

In the final part of the document, the indicators for each domain are also listed quite concisely, with a description of their relevance for the level of practice and for the level of policies (the main and other indicators). They were accompanied by potential data sources.

The document represented a breakthrough in the UK integration policy, paving the way for its significant transformation.

It took almost 15 years for the next specific actions to be implemented. The Home Office Indicators of Integration framework of 2019 (Home Office, 2019) presents the Theory of Change for Integration, its structure, basic principles, the manner of using the indicators, and the very integration indicators. It is based on the Integration Indicators of 2004.

It is an extensive 60-page document consisting of 8 sections. Additional documents were also published: The Home Office Indicators of Integration Framework 2019, The Theory of Change Guide notes Part A (2019a), The Home Office Indicators of Integration framework 2019. Applying Theory of Change Guide notes Part B (2019b), Indicators of Integration Toolkit (IoIT, 2019). An interesting addition is an interactive diagram of the Theory of Change for Integration (IC 2019), which simplifies this rather complex problem.

A clear change in the approach to integration is evident here. Activities in this regard are not concentrated on refugees only, but, as had already been implied in 2004, the scope of application of the *Indicators* was extended to other actors who may be in a position justifying the need for integration. The document states that "the Indicators of Integration framework helps to identify the practical processes and changes that contribute to the integration of individuals and communities." The aim of this report is to provide guidance and tools to identify and measure the key factors that contribute to integration processes, and thereby help organizations design more effective strategies."

Unlike in 2004, the issue of the meaning of the concept of integration is actually mentioned at the very beginning of the document. It is referred to in the foreword: "Successful integration helps people to realise their full potential. It makes it easier for them to access services, reduces educational and health inequalities, helps them to find jobs and, fundamentally, underpins social cohesion and community empowerment. Although integration is difficult to define, its absence can be all too apparent." The definition included in the Government's Integrated Communities Strategy, which describes integration as "Communities in which people, regardless of their background, live, work, learn and socialise, based on shared rights, responsibilities and opportunities," was adapted. It was stressed that the term has many meanings in different contexts. For the purposes of the Integration Indicators, it should be considered as "a multi-directional process involving many changes from both the incoming (communities) and diverse receiving communities."

This approach to integration is based on its four characteristics, which at the same time constitute the principles for action in this field: multidimensionality, multidirectionality, co-responsibility and contextualization.

The framework of integration indicators aims at providing a comprehensive understanding of the integration experience. Integration cannot be measured by means of indicators from one domain, just as a successful integration strategy or plan cannot focus only on activity in one domain. Indicators from different domains need to be used to measure integration. Understanding the relationship between them and the complexity of the domains requires a structural approach using aspects of all domains, including systematic data collection by means of the proposed indicators.

Multidimensionality of integration is accompanied by multidirectionality. It implies adjustments by everyone in society since integration has to be seen in the context of diversity and recognition of existing differences. The British model is far from assimilation. It treats integration as a process of "mixing" through interaction between people who are diverse in many ways, not just because of their ethnicity or countries of origin. Integration requires adaptation and change of all those involved, without undermining their original identity. Diversity (especially in the context of multidimensionality) makes it difficult to determine what needs to be achieved to conclude that society is well integrated. For integration to succeed, migrants, members of the receiving communities, practitioners and decision-makers must facilitate the process of change by meeting each other. This entails the shared responsibility of all integration process participants for its success.

Finally, integration can only be measured in relation to specific populations in a specific context and time. Therefore, universal targets cannot be set as indicators of "successful" integration that can be relevant for all communities or at all times.

Change is a key factor here that must be constantly taken into account in all social integration-related activities. In 2019, the use of the Theory of Change (ToC) was proposed for integration.

As in the previous document, the structure of the ToC Integration Indicators is determined by the key domains, 14 instead of 10. They are presented in the following figure. The structure of Markers and Means, Social Connections, Facilitators, and Foundation was preserved, but changes were made within the mentioned areas. It is important to note that the first headline was redrafted, it is not Means and Markers but the other way round. This is essential, and points out that domains are first of all the markers of integration, and then the means potentially extending integration.


**Fig. 2.** Domains in ToC Integration Indicators document in 2019

Source: Home Office Indicators of Integration framework 2019 third edition, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/835573/home-office-indicators-of-integration-framework-2019-horr109.pdf

Another domain was added to the four "Markers and means": work, housing, education, health and social care, plus leisure. It was stated that leisure activities can be helpful in learning more about the culture of a country or local area, as well as provide opportunities to make social contacts, practice language skills and improve the overall health and well-being of individuals. This includes, for example, using libraries, sports facilities, participating in groups with specific interests (hobbies).

The latest version of the Integration Indicators describes the domains in detail. Employment provides a mechanism for income generation and economic independence, and possibly advancement; as such, it is a key factor supporting integration (Home Office, 2019: 28). Access to, and progress within, the education system serves as a significant integration marker, and as a major means of achieving this goal. Education creates significant employment opportunities and wider social connections (Framework: 30). Housing has an impact on many individual integration experiences; affects the sense of security and stability, opportunities for social connection, and access to health care, education and employment (Framework: 32). Equal access to healthcare and social services and responsiveness of such services to the specific needs of the individual are also key issues here. Good health enables greater social participation and engagement in employment and education activities (Framework: 34).

Success in these areas illustrates the progress of integration and potentially its strengthening (expansion), which results in a certain social mix, since everyone has equal opportunities to participate in every area of social life. This involves a sense of belonging, mental and emotional well-being. They are still considered fundamental for all aspects of integration.

The Social Connections covering the three domains: social bonds, social bridges and social links remain unchanged. Still, a description of each domain was included, as in the case of Markers and Means.

Social bonds, supportive relationships with people who share many values and expectations about life (norms), are crucial for mental health and well-being and therefore underpin integration. Such relationships are generally — but not always — formed with family members and people from the same cultural background (Framework: 38). The absence of such relationships results in isolation.

Social bridges are somewhat looser connections between people (and their groups) of different origin. The level of trust, although not as high as in bonds, is sufficient for interaction and exchange of resources, despite differences. Establishing social connections with people perceived to be of other backgrounds, such as language, ethnicity, religion and sexuality, is essential to establish a "two-way" interaction at the heart of many definitions of integration. Interaction builds trust and reciprocity by preventing social segregation (Framework: 40).

Social links refer to engagement with the institutions of society, such as local governmental and non-governmental services, civic duties and political processes, and demonstrates a further set of social connections supporting integration. They exist when an individual is able to both receive benefits provided by the institutions of society and to contribute to decision-making and delivery. Linkage into such activities provides a further dimension of social connection. These are vertical relations between people and institutions of the society in which they live. A lack of such relations may cause the feeling of alienation.

Social relationships of all types do not necessarily increase access to resources. Within the ToC, they should be measured separately and in addition to access to other key resources (Home Office, 2019).

The Facilitators were changed significantly. The category now comprises five instead of two domains. The components of the existing domains — language and culture, as well as security and stability — were separated and digital skills were added. It is clear that social change in the context of technology has a significant impact on the functioning of elements of each community.

Language and culture were separated in the new document as areas that must be measured separately. Digital skills were added as a facilitator because familiarity with and confidence in using information communication technology can help facilitate social connections and is increasingly crucial in accessing rights and services (Framework:48). A sense of personal safety and social stability is also important. Like language and culture, they are included as individual domains, although they are inseparable (Framework: 50).

The domain of rights and responsibilities under the heading "Foundation" remained unchanged. It concerns the extent to which members of minority groups are provided with the basis for full and equal engagement in UK society (which may lead to a formal application for citizenship). It assesses the existence and awareness of rights and responsibilities, as well as the enablement of these rights and fulfillment of responsibilities. The current approach to integration clarifies the understanding of this area. Previously, a debate on this issue was recommended and questions were asked. The 2019 document underlines that the domain of "rights and responsibilities" illustrates the issue of mutual expectations and obligations supporting the integration process. This concerns the relationship between the system and the individual (group) or the receiving community (majority) and the newcomers (minority). Acquisition of citizenship and a possibility to take advantage of the related rights (e.g., participation in elections) is a significant foundation for a successful integration of each individual in the society. Obeying the law and fulfilling obligations is equally important. This shapes the attitudes of all participants towards each other and towards integration itself. This area clearly requires responsibilities and entitlements to be combined and measured from the perspective of all actors. It is worth noting that in the integration process communities are places of change with layers of migration from recently arrived migrant populations and longer settled minority populations resulting in diverse receiving communities (Framework: 18).

The 2019 Integration Indicators comprise a whole chapter on how to use the Guide, including: outcome indicators and good practices, choosing what to measure, measuring change(s), making comparisons and identifying barriers to integration. The most developed part is the chapter that presents the indicators. The number of indicators is quite significant, and, unlike in 2004, it is not the level of practice and policy, but good practice at the local and national level that is distinguished. A section on the use of the Indicators of Integration Toolkit was published separately (Indicators of Integration Toolkit 2019) in an MS Excel spreadsheet. The toolkit contains more detailed information on the use of measurements to collect data concerning a specific population, comparable with data available in the public domain for larger representative samples. It consists of six major elements: Overview of sources in the UK, Questions and data information (UK), Comparison of international indicators, International data sources, Monetary value, Reporting own notes.

The *Integration Indicators. Theory of Change. Part A* explains the concept of the Theory of Change and its application in the context of integration in the United Kingdom, and encourages the development of a deeper understanding of the concept by referring to relevant information. Furthermore, it promotes continuous consultation, review and evaluation by civil society institutions. There are certain important stages of the ToC: problem, barriers, interventions and strategies, outputs, assumptions, outcomes, impacts (Indicators of Integration framework, 2019a), which need to be kept in mind constantly.

Part B provides guidance for practitioners to use the Theory of Change for Integration and to develop their own theories of change in various programs and strategies. The document also explains how to collect data and interpret the results so that they provide a reliable basis for the evaluation of actions.

This document presents the application of the ToC in the design and evaluation of social interventions. It is worth examining this specific process, which occurs in the opposite way than other processes. It opens with a reflection on the final step mentioned above, i.e., Impact. It defines the overall objective of a specific program and the specificity of the actors to whom it is to be addressed. The domains of integration are helpful in defining the area and therefore also the desired goal of the program. The specification of the desired impact should describe the expected difference in the long term. There are no obstacles to linking it to broader priorities.

The next stage is Outcomes. Thinking about the changes that need to be made to achieve a goal one cannot set a long-term goal. Outcomes are changes that take place as a result of some work. They describe the medium-term changes to be made, not the work to be done. These changes lead to the final result, or impact.

In this phase, it is important to define the Assumptions used to formulate a conviction concerning the manner of implementing a change. Assumptions are intended to help identify some critical success factors that should influence the way services are delivered in the integration process. It is recommended that the assumptions should be based on existing literature, practice and expertise. They are also extremely important for the evaluation of the project, especially in the changing conditions of interventions.

Once the outcomes and assumptions have been established, it should be considered what change, as an output, would be needed before an outcome is possible. This refers to the direct result of activities, services and products that are undertaken or delivered. These are short-term outcomes, leading to medium-term ones.

In order to achieve project outcomes, project initiatives should be formulated that are relevant to them and the defined project indicators. The question is what initiatives would have to be taken to help achieve the intended outcomes. Initiatives will lead to outputs and those to medium-term outcomes.

The final step is to decide on actions and relevant tasks necessary to implement the planned initiatives and the method of their implementation.

In other words, in the Theory of Change, long-term changes (impact) are supported by medium-term changes (outcomes), and these are supported by short-term changes (outputs), usually resulting from actions taken.

The role of assumptions is crucial in the whole process. They explain how initiatives, medium-term outcomes and the final impact of a project are combined. They need to be as clear as possible because the ToC explains why integration can work, while the assumptions of each intervention explain why the organization itself believes that the intervention has the potential to deliver the desired effects. It is important that the hypotheses are supported by high quality research. The Theory of Change hypotheses are hypotheses of change. The hypotheses of change are based on the Theory of Change hypotheses, and design and monitor them in a continuous process of change in communities.

This document is the result of more than a decade of intensive work to improve the integration process in the UK. It shows the enormous amount of efforts made to lay foundations for an integration system designed for a wide range of entities rather than a narrow group of them. The main principles were developed, the understanding of integration was clarified, the domain area was developed and adapted to contemporary requirements, and new factors influencing the integration process were identified and taken into account. What is also important is that the indicators were further specified and practical guidelines were developed to design and evaluate the integration process. It was based on a proven scientific method, the Theory of Change, which was found to be helpful in creating and improving integration policies. By promoting this model of the process, coherent documents were developed as a guide allowing all participants to work independently in this direction.

## Conclusions

The intensification of work on the Integration Indicators in 2019 resulted in a mature outcome, laying foundations for a truly coherent integration management system. It is clearly based on the Integration Indicators of 2004, but the difference between the documents can be seen at first glance. The former document was a pioneering work. Its task was to outline the issue and make the general public aware of the importance and complexity of social integration as a process of change in a changing environment, especially when it comes to planning and evaluation. The integration indicators of 2004 are narrow in scope and refer to refugees. However, the authors clearly underlined the possibility of extending the application of the document.

The approach here is more pragmatic, illustrating the logical process of its creation. Therefore, the explanation of the structure on which the analysis of the integration process was based, with the domains and their corresponding indicators, preceded the arrangements concerning the definition of integration itself. It is not a concise and exhaustive interpretation; it points to some important features in the context in question. The 2019 Integration Indicators start with a definition taken from the Green Paper on Integration and the Strategy for Coherent Communities, stressing that the concept is still blurred and the term must be interpreted in a context. It is in the explanation that the factor of change is again emphasized.

The structure of the domain is transformed by adding a few domains adequate to modern reality and separating others, which should be measured separately for better results. The document is significantly based on scientific research in this area, which should be considered important for the reliability of the whole process.

A huge effort put into constructing and explaining the indicators is also evident. Their presentation was also modified: from practical and political to local and national.

The differences are visible in the respective volumes of the documents. The newer one is not only more extensive, but is also accompanied by other documents, i.e., guides to strategy development. Most importantly, however, the Theory of Change was adapted in 2019 for the design and evaluation of integration processes. This is a specific way of acting, ideal for integration, which is supposed to bring about changes in an ever-changing environment. The intensive promotion of this approach, involving all participants — from the civil society to authorities at every level — already creates a community in action for integration. It makes it possible to consult problems and to benefit from experiences from many perspectives. It can be said that the United Kingdom is on a good way to create a system of integration, which could not be developed for decades.

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Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis 2020, T. 30, s. 59—71
ISSN 2353-9747 (electronic version)
www.studiapoliticae.us.edu.pl
Date of receipt: 12.07.2020; date of acceptance: 12.09.2020
DOI: http://doi.org/10.31261/SPUS.11381

# Strengthening the ecological security of Poland on the example of initiatives limiting the phenomenon of smog

## Wzmocnienie bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego Polski na przykładzie działań ograniczających zjawisko smogu

Michał Czuba*

**Abstract**

Humans and their existence depend on the natural system. Maintaining balance in this system requires proper management of natural resources and taking actions aimed at limiting and preventing negative effects of the economic activity as well as rational use of natural resources available in a given time. The effects of the intensive development of the economy with the uncontrolled use of natural resources were felt by developed countries already in the first, and much stronger in the second half of the 20th century. One of them is air pollution contributing to the formation of smog. This problem is so important in Polish conditions that measures are taken by the government and its authorities to limit the effects and scope of this phenomenon. These activities serve to increase the ecological security.

**Abstrakt**

Człowiek i jego egzystencja jest uzależniona od systemu przyrodniczego. Zachowanie równowagi w tym systemie wymaga właściwego zarządzania zasobami naturalnymi oraz podejmowania działań zmierzających do ograniczenia i zapobiegania negatywnym skutkom działalności gospodarczej a także racjonalnego wykorzystania dostępnych w określonym czasie zasobów przyrodniczych. Skutki intensywnego rozwoju gospodarki przy niekontrolowanym korzystaniu z zasobów naturalnych odczuły kraje wysoko rozwinięte już w pierwszej, a znacznie mocniej w drugiej połowie XX wieku. Jednym z nich jest zanieczyszczenie powietrza przyczyniające się do powstawania smogu. Problem ten jest na tyle istotny w warunkach polskich, że podejmowane są przez rząd i jego organy działania służące

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Over the past dozen or so years, there has been a significant evolution of environmental policy in Poland, new regulations have been created in the field of environmental law. The paper analyzes the issues of Poland's environmental policy up to 2030 and the "Clean Air" program implemented under this policy. It also attempts to indicate the positive social effects resulting from its implementation.

**Keywords:** ecological policy, ecological security, smog, governmental program

ograniczeniu skutków i zasięgu tego zjawiska. Działania te służą zwiększeniu bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego.

W ciągu ostatnich kilkunastu lat nastąpiła znaczna ewolucja polityki ekologicznej prowadzonej w Polsce, powstały nowe regulacje w zakresie prawa ochrony środowiska. Powyższy artykuł analizuje kwestie polityki ekologicznej Polski do roku 2030 i realizowany w jej ramach program ''Czyste powietrze ''.Próbuje on także wskazać pozytywne skutki społeczne wynikające z jego realizacji.

**Słowa kluczowe:** polityka ekologiczna, bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne, smog, program rządowy

## Introduction

The appropriate state of the natural environment is an element conditioning the life of urban residents. In Polish conditions, the smog is the problem of many cities, which has a negative impact on human health. Therefore, measures are taken to limit the scale of this phenomenon. They are inscribed in the current ecological policy of Poland and expressed in specific activities of Polish municipalities in this area. This paper attempts to present an outline of Poland's environmental policy until 2030 with its references to the issue of air pollution. It presents the assumption of the "Clean Air" program currently being implemented by the Polish government.

The theoretical aim of this paper is to visualize the political perspective in the field of environmental protection. Its cognitive goal is to present the scope of Poland's environmental policy until 2030 and the "Clean Air" program that is being currently implemented by the government, while the utilitarian purpose is to try to identify positive social effects related to the above-mentioned program accompanying the issue of air pollution.

Referring to methodological issues, it should be stated that political and administrative sciences use research methods which belong to social sciences and humanities. Therefore, they use to a large extent the examination of documents (e.g., legal acts), comparative methods (expert opinions, legal opinions, analyzes resulting from linguistic, grammatical and historical interpretation) and case studies (cases). As the basic research method, the paper adopted the method of document examination and expert opinions related to the issues raised in this publication. Induction was used as the main inference method for the purposes of this study. It consists in deriving general conclusions or establishing regularities based on the analysis of empirically confirmed phenomena and processes. It is based on inference founded on the details of the general properties of a phenomenon or object. The application of this method rests on the belief that only observable facts can form the basis of scientific inference. These facts are real situations (e.g., economic and legal).

## Ecological security — essence of the issue

Climate changes that have occurred in recent years set a new style of thinking. They cause negative consequences that may affect people and the environment. The ecological safety category has different perspectives.

First, ecological security is related to protection and use of the most important basis, the origin of human living — external environment, which does not have any administrative, national, or state borders. Second, solving the problems of ecology and providing ecological security is an important and necessary precondition for solving economic, social, political, and other problems of the state. Third, ecological crisis can be much more dangerous — as to its scale and consequences — than, for example, political, military, economic, financial crunch. Fourth, multidimensionality, complexity, large scale, and depth of ecological problems make ecological security one of the most important issues in modern conditions of the development of state (Skiter, Rogachev, Mazeva, 2015).

There is no single definition reflecting the sense term ''ecological security.'' Some definitions treat ecological security as a state of protection of human, society, and environment from harmful influences of anthropogenous factors, natural hazards, and catastrophes(Taylor, 2014). Others describe ecological security as an element of environmental protection (Xie, 2014). Still others equate ecological security and environmental protection (Bucagu, Vanlauwe, Wijk, Giller, 2014). There are also those who use the notion of "ecological security" to denote not only environmental protection but also rational use of natural resources, their reproduction, and quality improvement (Yin, Xu, Chen, Wu, 2014).

According to S. Śladkowski, ecological security can be considered a state of counteracting social effects of transformations of the surrounding environment. An analogical definition characterizes ecological safety as a condition of an ecosystem in which the risk of disturbances of its components is small( Śladkowski, 2004).

Ecological security can also be understood as a balance between humans and the earth. All threats that are possible to occur should be analyzed from an ecological perspective because each of them will have a negative impact on the environment, which is also created by human beings (Górska-Rożej, 2013).

Ecological security is related to the social perspective. J. Kukułka claims that society can prevent deficiencies that arise in the environment and the harmful changes that occur in it. Developing this approach, it can be said that ecological threats are created by humans who threaten the environment with their actions, sometimes unconscious and ill-conceived. As a consequence, they also threaten themselves because they are forced to exist in a failing ecosystem, thus destroying peace and safety (Kukułka, 1995).

Ecological security in the common understanding is treated as a permanent and unsanctioned process that leads to the desired ecological state, while protecting the healthy and peaceful existence of all components of the ecosystem, using measures in accordance with the principles of internal coexistence of the state and international society (Geneza bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego).

The lack of ecological security results from the existence of threats that may occur individually or collectively, to engage and to induce interactions.

To analyze the environmental hazards, it is necessary to locate their causes. In this respects, hazards of a subjective and objective nature can be distinguished (Śladkowski, 2004).

Subjective hazards — are the result of actions that by changing the natural relationship of a human to biocenoses and biotopes, which can lead to the population being destroyed.

Their sources are mainly:

- breakdown of natural balance as a consequence of excessive exploitation of environmental resources,
- pollution of the spheres of land and the environment by substances of industrial, transport and municipal origin,
- progressive degradation of ecosystems due to pollution of toxic waste and ecological disasters.

The subjective threats are the result of events caused by natural forces and economic activity perceived as:

- natural — consequences of natural disasters and catastrophes,
- civilizational — material pollution of various types and kinds introduced into the environment in the course of human activity (Kłodziński, 2008).

The threats mentioned violate ecological security. Concerning the issue of smog and air pollution, the subjective threats of the industrial, transport and municipal origin as well as subjective threats, especially the civilizational threats, are of significant importance.

Nowadays the whole world is tracking the information about subsequent COVID-19 incidents with increasing concern. In addition to health issues, the economic consequences of its prolonged duration will be of particular concern.

The impact of a coronavirus pandemic on the state of the environment can be considered positive. Reducing economic activity, air and car transport significantly reduced the negative impact of human activities on the natural environment. This fact is confirmed by satellite images taken in China in December 2019 and February 2020. Especially in this second period, China was basically a clean state, which is not a common phenomenon for them (Walka o środowisko… 2020).

Coronavirus has had a positive effect on the environment. Its effect is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and return animals to their natural habitats. The isolation order for citizens has resulted in significantly lower emissions of dust and harmful greenhouse gases (especially NO2 and CO2) in Europe. Nitrogen dioxide amount decreased over Italy and New York. This trend is visible in virtually all pandemic countries. The same applies to carbon dioxide (Tollefson, 2020).

## Ecological issues in the political science

The changes that took place in the 20th century caused that the issue of environmental protection gained importance, not only in the social context but also in a political perspective. In this dimension, the care for the environment became the subject of politics and the problem of biological survival, among others, of the human species emerged. The result of this approach was the creation of a pro-ecological social movement, which in many countries adopted the institutional form — a party with a pro-ecological attitude. In addition, environmental protection and the accompanying so-called green policy has become one of the three foundations for sustainable development since the middle of the last century (outside the economic and social sphere). Caring for the natural environment has become a sphere that should be taken into account when making political, social and economic decisions.

Nowadays, in the field of political science, there are at least two approaches to the problem of environmental protection in building political capital — program and declarative. The program approach treats ecology as one of the essential components of party and electoral programs, and at the same time, an important area of state activity. This approach is consistent with international policy, where environmental protection becomes one of the most important public issues. The declarative approach treats environmental policy as actions aimed at exercising power and as an area to reconcile particular group interests. In this sense, environmental policy can be part of a political game that leads to the perception of environmental protection as a component of short-term political or electoral alliances in order to build or enlarge political capital (Gamczewska et al., 2017).

The second half of the 20$^{th}$ century is also the time of the emergence of pro-environmental movements in Europe and North America. In the political thought up to the second half of the 20th century, the anthropocentric approach became apparent. According to it, a human being was the central element of all ideas and considerations. Along with the transformations initiated by the industrial revolution and its consequences for the environment that came with it, the slogans of ecocentrism appeared as a holistic approach to social reality. According to this concept, an individual and society are an element of a larger system and at the same time constitute the greatest threat to its functioning. Intense economic development causes degradation of the natural environment. The basic factors that disrupt them are: excessive exploitation of non-renewable natural resources, pollution of the atmosphere with industrial gases or industrialization. The ideas presented constitute a broad current of contemporary political thought, combining a broad current of contemporary political thought, combining the issues of environmental protection with the slogans of other philosophical orientations. Ecopolitics combines the assumptions of other ideologies: socialist, liberal, feminist and anarchist, based on four basic areas: ecological responsibility, social justice, democracy and pacifism. The main assumption of environmentalism is to prevent the destruction of the natural environment by means of tools that counteract excessive growth of the economic development rate and put nature above the individual's needs (Heywood, 2007). The pro-ecological ideas very quickly began to be represented institutionally by the associations, followed by political parties.

In addition to the issues outlined, political scientists are interested in the issues of international, regional and national environmental policy. They conduct and analyze facts about the activities of the United Nations, the European Union, individual states, and inter-state cooperation for the protection of the environment. They note all resolutions, conventions and statements of prominent politicians for this purpose. They explore the issue of the place of environmental protection in the activities of individual state authorities, in the programs and activities of political parties, movements and social organizations. They study the relationship between the strength and activity of non-governmental ecological organizations and the development of civil society. They characterize the activities of environmental leaders. They undertake theoretical issues such as sustainable development, ecological safety, and environmental policy instruments (Papuziński, 2006).

## The problem of smog in Poland

For many years of the 20th century, the concentration of air pollutants remained in Poland — mainly in the Upper Silesia and other heavily industrialized areas — on a permanent and high level. The political, economic and social change after 1989 — the collapse of industries, closure of factories, plants and mines contributed to the systematic decrease in the level of air pollution which has remained at a similar level in Poland since the beginning of the 21st century. This is despite the fact that in other European Union countries the average emission of basic air pollutants is systematically decreasing (Kuchcik, Milewski, 2018).

Smog is made up of primary pollutants (dust, gases and vapors emitted by industrial plants, power plants, combustion engines of motor vehicles) and products of their photochemical and chemical transformations arising in the inversion of temperature under windless weather. Its creation is also facilitated by the location of areas threatened by it in depressions. Smog, due to the high concentration of aggressive chemical agents, poses a threat to human and animal health, causes plant diseases, and contributes to the destruction of materials" (PWN Encyclopedia.).

The phenomenon of smog is associated with a high concentration of PM10 suspended dust (dust with aerodynamic diameter of grains up to 10 μm ) in the air and PM2,5 (dust with a particle aerodynamic diameter of up to 2.5 μm) (*Regulation of the Ministry of Environment of September 13, 2012*)

According to the European Environment Agency's Report, the most important problem of Europe for the sanitary state of air, understood as the overall composition of the atmosphere with admixtures in a given place and time, is the contamination with suspended dust (PM10 and PM2,5), tropospheric ozone ($O_3$) and nitrogen dioxide ($NO_2$), and nearly half a million people living in the EU die prematurely over the air pollution, of which over 47 thousand people a year in Poland (*EEA*, 2016, Air quality in Europe — report).

In recent years, air quality standards have been exceeded almost all over Poland. Exceeding standards for the concentration of suspended dust PM10 occur in 91% of measurement zones — especially in the Silesian, Lesser Poland and Lodz municipalities, with the exception of northern areas of the country. Exceeding norms for concentration of highly carcinogenic benzo(a)pyrene took place in all zones. In comparison with other EU countries, Poland ranks poorly in terms of air pollution with PM10 dust, finder dust PM2,5, as well as polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (including benzo(a)pyrene). The concentrations of PM10 and PM2.5 dust as well as benzo(a)pyrene registered in Poland are among the highest in the European Union (GIOŚ, 2014),.

Their most important sources are:

- low emissions, i.e., exhaust gases from boilers and solid fuel stoves in households;
- industry;
- road transport;
- energy.

## Ecological policy of poland and its references to the smog phenomenon

On February 14, 2017, the Council of Ministers adopted a new medium-term strategy for the development of the country — the Strategy for Responsible Development until 2020 (with a prospect until 2030) — SOR. The objectives, directions of intervention, activities and strategic projects indicated in the SOR should be reflected in all strategic documents of Poland. Therefore, SOR is the basis for the preparation of new sectoral strategies, including the environmental strategy. Work on the environmental strategy was coordinated by the Ministry of the Environment with the support of members of the inter-ministerial team. The document was entitled the Ecological Policy of the State 2030 (PEP). It takes into account the problem of air pollution in Poland and its causes. The PEP assumptions include the references to the issue of air quality and the need to protect it.

The construction of an innovative economy while maintaining the principles of sustainable development is to be the priority of the new ecological policy of Poland, which is the requirement of the modern state policy. It is an individual who is the supreme value in the Ecological Policy of the State 2030 by drawing attention to such issues as the quality of life, health and well-being of the Poles. The role of ecological policy is to ensure the ecological safety of the state. This should be reflected in appropriate state management structures at the national, provincial and local levels. Furthermore, the division of competences and tasks should allow targets at each level to be determined based on the recognition of needs, and the means to achieve them are selected taking into account criteria for ecological and economic efficiency. The proper use of the environment at the local government level is crucial for achieving the environmental policy objectives, especially through rational planning of spatial development that helps protect the population from air pollution and noise and nature from excessive pressure of human activity.

The striving to improve the quality of life causes a constant need for development, which can only be achieved through the sustainable use of natural resources. None of the forms of human activity can cause permanent deterioration of the state of natural resources. Therefore, the development process will be monitored by means of appropriate indicators that enable the assessment of such aspects as: improvement of water and air quality, reduction of impact on climate change, and preservation of the full species composition of native fauna and flora.

Measures aimed at improving the air quality by limiting low emissions are to be implemented as part of the Environmental Policy of the State 2030. At the government level, they mean the preparation of appropriate regulations and financial support instruments for investments, as well as the coordination of their implementation in the regions.

In Poland, starting from 1990, the pollution of air, water and soil has been decreasing as a result of structural changes in the economy, the implementation of the state's environmental policy and its executive programs with pro-environmental investments and tightening of legal provisions,. Effective management of industrial emissions, especially in the energy sector, significantly reduced their share in exceeding air quality standards in Poland and allowed for a significant reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. However, effective climate protection requires further emission reduction, using the constantly improved technical and natural methods.

The most important challenges in this regard include the elimination of the so-called low emission, which is the result of the use solid fuels (including low-quality coal) and waste in the municipal-utility sector, most of all for individual heating of buildings, exploitation and technological maladjustment of heating stoves and small local boiler houses, as well as low energy standard of buildings. In urbanized areas and along commuting routes, a significant contribution of emissions from transport has a significant impact on air quality. Currently, regulations regarding car emission standards are adopted at the EU level, and actions in the field of electric transport are promoted at the national level (Polityka ekologiczna państwa 2030-projekt).

## Social benefits of the "clean air" governemnt program

In September 2018, the government priority program "Clean Air" entered into force, which will last until 2029. Its most important goal is to reduce emissions of harmful substances to the atmosphere that arise from heating single-family houses with low-quality fuel in outdated domestic heating stoves.

The program makes it possible to obtain co-financing for exchanging old and inefficient heat sources for solid fuel with modern heat sources that meet the highest standards: heat distribution, heat pump, condensing gas boiler, condensing oil boiler, electric heating, solid fuel boiler (coal, biomass), as well as carrying out the necessary thermo-modernization works of the building.

The program provides for co-financing, among others, of:

- replacement of old heat sources (heating stoves and boilers for solid fuels) and purchase and installation of new heat sources that meet the program's requirements,
- insulation of building partitions,
- replacement of window and door joinery,

- installation of renewable energy sources (solar collectors and photovoltaic installations),
- assembly of mechanical ventilation with heat recovery.

The government program being analyzed tries to limit the main reason for the problem of smog in our country, which is low emission, i.e., the release of harmful substances from domestic coal-fired stoves into the atmosphere. As it turns out, the exchange of the heating system itself is not enough. Without proper insulation of the house, all heat can quickly penetrate outside. Many houses in Poland were built in times when a solution with thermal insulation has not yet been applied, which leads to energy waste and large heat losses, as well as higher heating bills. That is why home thermo-modernization is so important, which will additionally affect savings in the home budget. Real estate insulation combined with replacement of windows allows the reduction of annual heating expenses by up to 40%.

Currently, the owners or co-owners of a single-family residential building or an apartment separated in a single-family building with a separate land and mortgage register and persons who have obtained permission to start a single-family residential building and the building has not yet been handed over or declared for use are the addressees of the "Clean Air" program.

They can apply for subsidies or loans for the exchange of heat and works related to thermal-modernization. Participating in the program allowes for some of the costs incurred to be refunded. The maximum possible cost from which the subsidy is calculated is PLN53,000. The minimum eligible cost of the project is PLN7,000. Depending on the monthly income per person in the household, beneficiaries of the program will receive co-financing to cover up to 90 percent of eligible investment costs (O programie Czyste powietrze).

The "Clean Air" program implemented will ensure the achievement of social benefits, especially related to the health issues of our society. People who are most exposed to negative effects are children, also in the prenatal period, the elderly, as well as people suffering from cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, diabetes or obesity problems.

Every year, 40,000-45,000 people die in Poland due to complications caused by polluted air. The improvement of air quality in Poland may extend the average life expectancy of the Poles by 6-12 months. Improving the cleanliness of the environment and, above all, reducing dustiness and concentrations of harmful gases should translate into a decrease in diseases such as bronchial asthma, respiratory infections, tumours (of lungs, brain, bladder or even cervix), or cardiovascular and nervous system diseases.

Combating phenomena that cause smog can also contribute to the improved comfort of living in cities, especially in their centers. To this end, activities are currently carried out to limit the movement of motor vehicles in the city centers and are replaced by electric vehicles. These measures should also reduce noise levels, which in many city centers far exceed the permissible standards.

Limiting the phenomenon of smog, there would also be no need to close windows, leave the elderly, the sick and children at home, and people going to work or school would not have to put on uncomfortable masks with a filter. In addition, people who suffer from respiratory problems on days with smog often have to take larger amounts of medication or supplements to avoid breathing problems.

Investments financed under the “Clean Air” program contribute to the comfort of living. Its beneficiaries can increase it by replacing the heating stove with a modern one, with a feeder, which does not require frequent visits to the boiler room and gives more time to its owner, who can devote it to other matters (Strona internetowa *Środowisko Życiem: Stop Smog*).

## Conclusions

This paper deals with the state’s pro-ecological policy with regard to the issue of air cleanliness and the phenomenon of smog arising in Poland. It outlines the political perspective of these issues, translating into the environmental policy of the state. Analyzing the current ecological policy of Poland in the perspective of 2030, its assumptions and approach to shaping the natural environment in Poland coincides in large part with the assumption of the governing party’s program approach to the environmental protection. It results from, to a large extent, Poland’s membership in the European Union and the necessity for it to meet certain standards in the field of environmental protection, which arise from the directives of the European Commission and international conventions in this area. In order to meet these requirements, the “Clean Air” program is currently being implemented by the government. It makes it possible to obtain subsidies and loans for private individuals who want to make investments that limit the consumption of thermal energy and replace the existing coal stoves with modern heating devices that contribute to the reduction of air pollution. The analyzed program offers social benefits in the area of improving the health of the Poles and reducing the number of diseases caused by polluted air. It also contributes to the improvement of the quality of life of the Poles in cities by limiting the nuisance of closing windows due to smog, wearing anti-smog masks, the necessity of people with respiratory diseases to stay at home and using additional medicines, which also has a positive effect for this group of people.

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Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis 2020, T. 30, s. 73—89
ISSN 2353-9747 (electronic version)
www.studiapoliticae.us.edu.pl
Date of receipt: 12.07.2020; date of acceptance: 12.09.2020
DOI: http://doi.org/10.31261/SPUS.11382

# Virtual space used in the communication activities of local governments on the example provided by the communes of the Upper Silesia and Zagłębie Metropolis

## Przestrzeń wirtualna wykorzystywana w działaniach komunikacyjnych samorządów na przykładzie gmin Górnego Śląska i Zagłębia

Dariusz Krawczyk*

**Abstract**

The aim of the paper is to identify the scope of social media application in communication activities of local governments. The research field is a statutorily separated metropolitan area in the Silesia Province, established from 41 communes. The applied research methods included the analysis of the Internet sources and the academic literature. The conclusions were obtained concerning the activity of local government units in social media, contributing to the organization of the state of knowledge on the objectives, expenditure

**Abstrakt**

Celem artykułu jest określenie zakresu wykorzystania mediów społecznościowych w działaniach komunikacyjnych samorządów. Przedmiotem badań jest wyodrębniony statutowo obszar metropolitalny województwa śląskiego, składający się z 41 gmin. Zastosowane metody badawcze obejmowały analizę Internetu, źródeł internetowych oraz literatury przedmiotu. Stąd wyciągnięto wnioski dotyczące działalności jednostek samorządu terytorialnego w sferze mediów społecznościowych, przyczyniając się do uporządkowania stanu

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and effects of local administration activities in the studied part of cyberspace.

**Key words:** municipality, information policy, Facebook, promotion, digital accessibility

wiedzy w odniesieniu do celów, wydatków i efektów działań administracji samorządowej w badanej części cyberprzestrzeni.

**Słowa klucze:** gmina miejska, polityka informacyjna, Facebook, reklama, dostępność cyfrowa

## 1. Introduction

The reactivation of territorial self-government in Poland initiated a public debate on the legitimacy and form of publishing activities of local administration. The dispute about the communes' participation in the functioning of the press market has been going on for three decades, and the subject still raises much controversy. The respondents emphasize, e.g., spending public funds on promoting local decision makers, unfair competition against commercial periodicals, threat to freedom of speech. On the other hand, the need to conduct an information policy in order to integrate and activate the local community or the necessity to carry out the commune's own tasks (e.g., promotion) is indicated. Apart from their involvement in the sphere of traditional media, local governments are also important entities operating in a virtual environment, where, in addition to their own communication activities, they also perform statutory duties, e.g., in the field of access to public information. The changes in the contact formula between local government units and the social environment make the use of tools based on the cyber resources increasingly common. Furthermore, it does not only refer to the authorities or the institutionalized so-called commune support apparatus. Currently, "Facebook or YouTube type portals are becoming channels of media content distribution, in which information duties of the office intersect with promotional or self-presentation functions of commune authorities. This raises both doubts about the responsibility for the content published in the municipal online media as well as about the compliance of the citizens' constitutional and statutory rights to information with the rules of social networking sites regarding freedom of expression and the use of profile data for advertising purposes."(Kowalik, 2018: 446) Taking into account the widespread use of Facebook by local government units in maintaining communication relations with residents, a study was conducted on the form and effects of using this service.

## 2. Research on communication activity of local administration with the use of social media

An analysis of Internet sources was carried out in order to obtain up-to-date information on the use of Facebook in the communication activities of municipalities. The study covered local government units, which form the first legally distinct metropolitan area in Poland (Journal of Laws of 2017, item 730), in the Silesia Province.

The Upper Silesian — Zagłębie Metropolis (GZM) was established on January 1, 2018 in the area of about 2.55 thousand square kilometers, which was inhabited by about 2.3 million people[1] who were residents of 41 communes.

The research procedure determined the need to identify the Facebook official profile of the local government unit that is part of the GZM, determine the number of users, determine the number of published posts in the unit of time, and verify the number of communication interactions. The data obtained were compared with the number of inhabitants in order to gain knowledge about the social scope and communication range of local administration using social media, as well as the amount of expenditure on promotion incurred in consecutive years by the surveyed local governments to determine the role of these activities for decision makers.

At the beginning, it should be stated that in 2018, when collecting data for analysis, in the national surveys on the presence of local government administration on Facebook, it was established that "in the case of cities, 96.99% of offices have Facebook accounts"(Romanowski, Szymkowiak, 2018: 453). Such a high level of social media use in maintaining contact with recipients on a national scale justified the formulation of a statement that they are commonly used by local governments.

Social media should be an important element in the communication activities of local government units as a source of information and advertising content as well as a tool for feedback communication,. Therefore, one of the research questions formulated in 2019 was whether small communes aspire to the indicated standard. For this reason, it was necessary to determine the percentage of communes using Facebook in the entire statutory metropolitan area of the Upper Silesian conurbation.

[1] In 2018, the Upper Silesian-Zagłębie Metropolis was comprised of: Będzin, Bieruń, Bobrowniki, Bojszowy, Bytom, Chełm Śląski, Chorzów, Czeladź, Dąbrowa Górnicza, Gierałtowice, Gliwice, Imielin, Katowice, Knurów, Kobiór, Lędziny, Łaziska Górne, Mierzęcice, Mikołów, Mysłowice, Ożarowice, Piekary Śląskie, Pilchowice, Psary, Pyskowice, Radzionków, Ruda Śląska, Rudziniec, Siemianowice Śląskie, Siewierz, Sławków, Sosnowiec, Sośnicowice, Świerklaniec, Świętochłowice, Tarnowskie Góry, Tychy, Wojkowice, Wyry, Zabrze, Zbrosławice.

It turned out that in the research field composed not only of cities but also smaller towns, the ratio of communes conducting communication activities using the official Facebook profile is 87.8%. Each city-district used social media, and all local government units which at the time of the survey did not use such a communication tool (i.e., about 12% of towns and cities within the area of GZM) actually belonged to the group of small communes whose number of inhabitants ranged from 4.8 thousand to slightly more than 9 thousand people.

## 2.1 Form of content management and social scope of self-government profiles

A study of the scale of communication activity using official Facebook accounts was carried out to illustrate the level of social media use in the implementation of the information and promotion policy of local government units. The analysis covered the social scope of profiles documented by the number of so-called likes, the number of posts published within seven consecutive days[2] and the number of users' reactions.

The obtained results show quite obvious conclusion that the largest social reach in absolute numbers is achieved by large cities (particularly city-districts), which have at their disposal adequate funds, organizational and logistic potential, and human resources. They include Katowice as well as Bytom, Chorzów, Dąbrowa Górnicza, Ruda Śląska, Sosnowiec, Tarnowskie Góry, Tychy, and Zabrze.

People responsible for running Facebook profiles of particular communities showed varied activity, measured by the number of disseminated posts, which probably resulted from the implementation of individually adopted communication strategy assumptions. Some broadcasters, through the daily provision of an "information and promotion package" consisting of numerous messages, implemented a model of adapting a communication tool such as Facebook to the tasks of a medium equivalent to traditional media. To a certain extent, they even mapped the role of local agency services, publishing many posts every day. The intensification of information activities understood in this way was observed, among others, in the case of profiles of Bieruń, Dąbrowa Górnicza, Mysłowice, Tarnowskie Góry or Zabrze,[3] where local governments' social media could be

[2] The author's own research was carried out from 3 to 10 October 2019, using official Facebook profiles of the communes forming the Upper Silesian - Zagłębie Metropolis.

[3] The broadcasters in these municipalities made between 26 and 31 posts per week available on FB profiles.

a source of event announcements for journalists, at the same time fulfilling the function of media relations modules. On average, for the entire metropolitan area, it can be assumed that the communes published about 11 posts per week,[4] although broadcasters were reported to transmit both a considerably lower and a significantly higher number of messages. The average number of responses to each post was about 32 for the surveyed communities, but in some cases they were considerably larger due to the competitions for Internet users, which took place during the analysis and required interaction.

What is important, the survey allowed to determine the level of reaching stakeholder groups of local government units, i.e., inhabitants deciding on the composition of municipality authorities in elections, which is important, and even the most important from the standpoint of broadcasters' communication activities (Journal of Laws of 1990 No. 16, item 95). Through Facebook, the largest — in the percentage terms — reach of recipients in relation to the number of people living in a given commune was more often achieved by small towns than by city-districts. Apart from the capital of the region, i.e., Katowice, which maintains its leading position in each of the categories, a comparison of the social range of the profile in relation to the number of inhabitants indicates the leading position of such communes as Bobrowniki, Pyskowice, Radzionków, Świerklaniec, Wojkowice or Wyry.

The analysis showed that the total social reach of Facebook profiles managed directly by local governments covers only 16.5% of the population living in the analyzed area. Of course, when formulating conclusions concerning the communication effectiveness of social media, one should take into account the criterion of interaction between accounts administered by other broadcasters who are dependent on or affiliated with local government units. Apart from the profile of the commune, the citizens are also addressed by the broadcasts distributed by cultural institutions, commune companies or companies with commune capital participation, sports facilities, entities conducting recreational activities, commune health care institutions, and other units providing services to the residents for or under the authority of the local government. The multiplication of content sources, which are disseminated, may result in the phenomenon of communication synergy.

It is also worth including in this description personal profiles of single-person commune authorities (i.e., commune heads, mayors or presidents) and individuals involved in local governance. Formally, the social media notion of local governments cannot be used in this case, but the thematic orientation of the content disseminated by this method of distribution will not contradict the official media program line of local administration. Furthermore, the inclusion of personal ac-

[4] The study covered the profiles of GZM local government units from 3 to 10 October 2019.

counts of local politicians or local government activists in the information policy may ensure that the social reach of the public content will be broadened.

## 2.2 Expenditure on promotion of the commune in relation to social media activities

In accordance with the classification of budget expenditure, the budget expenditure reported by the GZM communes was also examined. The budget expenditure included in section 750 - "public administration," chapter 75075 — "promotion of territorial self-government units" in the subsequent years from 2016 to 2018.

While analyzing the amount of public funds spent on promotion of local government units, it was found that 41.4% of municipalities in the metropolitan area were systematically increasing their expenditure. A consistent annual reduction of funds allocated to promotion was noted in the case of 14.6% of communes. However, fluctuations in the level of outlays in subsequent years were revealed in the budgets of 43.9% of communes. These values illustrate the importance of promotional activities in development strategies of local government units. At the same time, they show that the role of shaping the assumed image of a commune through persuasive communication, implemented by means of various marketing and advertising tools, is very important for the majority of the surveyed local governments. Such a conclusion can be reached considering not so high percentage of communes that constantly increase their expenditure on promotion, but first of all, a relatively small number of local government units that reduce this expenditure (less than 15%). Fluctuations in the scale of funds in subsequent years justify, among others, differences in income or an increase in burdens related to tasks delegated to their implementation without allocating appropriate funds.

However, when comparing the obtained results with the effectiveness of communication activities via Facebook, measured by the social reach of the self-government profile, it turned out that the total amount of funds allocated to the promotion of localities is practically irrelevant. In the group of communes which successfully use social media in contacts with inhabitants and gain the highest social reach,[5] about 35% of them constantly increase their promotional budgets and 33% regularly decrease them.

[5] The list includes municipalities with a social coverage of about 20% and more (including broadcasters with 19.3% and 19.8% coverage).

The survey also revealed that some communes dedicate their presence in social media to separate legal regulations. For example, “In order to determine the rules and conditions of using the official municipal fanpage of the Municipality of Sośnicowice on the social networking site Facebook,” the Mayor’s regulation (Ordinance No. 19/2018) issued the “Internal Regulations.” The document specifies the rules of using the commune profile on Facebook, stating that the fanpage “is a place to discuss and exchange opinions on the commune of Sośnicowice, activities undertaken by the Municipal Office in Sośnicowice, and organizational units of the commune,” while stating that it does not constitute “an official way of communication with the Municipal Office in Sośnicowice.” Interestingly, the regulations sanctioned the freedom to present opinions and express opinions by emphasizing: “the fanpage of the Municipality of Sośnicowice is allowed to post any comments on the activities of the Municipality, including critical ones.” By the decision of the mayor, it was forbidden to publish entries incompatible with the law and good manners, as well as “materials of advertising or promotional character of companies or brands without the prior consent of the Moderator.” This should be understood as allowing to publish advertising content after obtaining appropriate approval. It seems that in this way, the possibility of raising funds from potential advertisers interested in publishing paid advertisements on the local government’s Facebook profile has been opened.

## 3. The development directions of communication activities by local governments in a virtual environment

The authors of the study on the use of media in local government communication, which was completed in 2015, stated that “the multitude of tasks imposed on local authorities by both legislators and NGOs, as well as the diversity of stakeholders, force managers to use various forms and contents of the message. Social media, by their very nature, offer a wide range of possibilities for adapting the message to the requirements of particular groups.” (Szymkowiak, Scheibe, 2016: 309). At the same time, they distinguished the criteria for dividing information published on Facebook taking into account: recipients (individual and institutional), stakeholder groups (local community, tourists, investors/entrepreneurs), time of described events (past, current, future), news and significance of information (urgent and important for the recipient, general), nature of information (information, image) and scope of information (institutional, spatial). There are still many areas that can be appropriated by electronic content carriers of the local government. For example, the transmission of decisions, resolutions or other types of official correspondence to the residents is still carried out primarily by traditional mail or by delivery service providers employed by the local administration. At present, such a solution seems to be more effective than publication of announcements by local government websites or social media, which are not perceived by recipients as a carrier of "official" content. But actually, now a hybrid method of interaction may be considered in some cases, "in which the office informs the residents about the decision with a short justification, and detailed comments are posted on the decision-maker's website. Such a method, supported by sending an e-mail and information in local television, radio and the press, is very effective" (Balicki, Dryja, Korłub, Tyszka, 2017: 165). The use of websites and mobile applications of local government units in contacts with the social environment can also be increased in this way. Moreover, social media have a constantly growing potential that can be used by local government units not only in the sphere of information policy, but also in the implementation of the concept that smart cities should fulfill. It should be remembered, however, that "all currently applied innovative solutions in public administration, not only in the area of city management or smart cities, are a huge challenge in the context of local lawmaking, but also in the area of creating legal acts regulating the issue of new technologies" (Kidyba, Makowski, 2017: 70). In this context, it is worth mentioning the legislative conditions, including those enforcing the digital availability of Internet presentations and mobile applications.

## 4. Legislative standards for digital accessibility of public sector entities

Technological development makes it necessary for public sector entities to face challenges connected with modern forms of communication. These include, among others, making mobile applications available. In linguistic terms, these are "computer-aided applications"[6] that are intended for mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets. The Polish public administration at the central level offers numerous applications such as "mObywatel,"[7] "KNF Alert,"[8] "Granica,"[9]

[6] Definition behind the Internet version of the PWN Dictionary of Polish Language at https://sjp.pwn.pl [accessed 1 October 2019].

[7] Allows to activate and use „mDocuments" via smartphone.

[8] The application enables, among others, access to entries on the list of public warnings of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority.

[9] It also provides up-to-date information on the situation at border crossings through a smartwatch or watch in six languages. Status as of October 2019.

“Geoportal Mobile,”[10] “Regionalny System Ostrzegania,”[11] “Jakość powietrza w Polsce.”[12] Individually developed communication tools, based on the use of the potential of cyberspace, are also being used more and more commonly by local governments, enabling access to various types of data, and also promoting their tourist attractions, investment offers, activities in the field of municipal economy, cultural events or recreational undertakings. The communication activity of local government units in the virtual environment is not subject to restrictions due to the assessment of its legitimacy, effectiveness or incurred costs. However, it should be based on technical criteria and recommendations enabling wider access to disseminated content, minimizing the risk of exclusion due to the age or disability of users. Thus, online information strategies, as well as eGovernment activities, must take into account the standards of existing legislation. In this context, it should be recalled that the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union in 2016 adopted a directive [Directive (EU) 2016/2102 of the European Parliament and the Council dated 26 October 2016 on the accessibility of websites and mobile applications of public sector bodies (OJ EU L 327/9 of 2 December 2016)] on websites and mobile applications managed by public sector bodies stating, *inter alia*, that these bodies “increasingly use the internet to develop, collect and provide a wide range of information and online services of fundamental importance for society,” which should be “more accessible to users, especially disabled people,” and this is to be guaranteed “on the basis of common accessibility requirements” aimed at ensuring that services can be used regardless of the users’ abilities, age, equipment or software. Interestingly, the document also gave a definition of mobile apps, since according to the directive, “a mobile app means application software designed and developed by or on behalf of public sector bodies for use by the general public on mobile devices - such as smartphones and tablets. It does not cover software that controls these devices (mobile operating systems) or the hardware itself .”[13]

The implementation of the Directive into the Polish legal system was preceded by consultations, during which attention was also drawn to the definition of mobile applications. It was stressed that, among others, “an application downloaded from the Internet and running on a mobile device is subject to the WCAG[14] guideline if it exchanges information with the network. An application downloaded from the

[10] Access to spatial data provided by the Central Office of Geodesy and Cartography.

[11] Emergency warnings on meteorology, hydrology, road events, etc.

[12] Information of the Chief Inspectorate of Environmental Protection on air pollution concentrations.

[13] Article 3, point 2. of Directive (EU) 2016/2102 of the European Parliament and the Council dated 26 October 2016.

[14] The Web Content Accessibility Guidelines, a set of recommendations for the creation of websites that take into account the needs, expectations and capabilities of people with disabilities, has been included in WCAG version 2.0 as the international standard ISO/IEC 40500:2012 since 2012.

web and launched offline is no longer ‚web content' and as such is not subject to the WCAG guideline. This was also the case for desktop applications" (Opinion of the Visible Foundation). It referred to the guidelines aimed at improving the accessibility for people with disabilities, which had already been introduced by the Interoperability Law (Journal of Laws of 2017, item 2247) that explicitly required public authorities to present information resources in order to ensure that ICT systems comply with the "Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.0)." The regulation announced on May 16, 2012 defined the National Interoperability Framework, i.e., the ways of proceeding in the area of ICT systems to ensure, among others, the availability of electronic services, improvement of their effectiveness, rationalization of costs and more effective customer service. Using the concept of interoperability at the organizational[15], semantic[16] and technological[17] levels, the standards and procedures in this area are indicated. The National Interoperability Frameworks, as specified in the regulations, have been composed of: (1) the ways of achieving interoperability, (2) the architecture of ICT systems of entities performing public tasks, and (3) the interoperability repository on ePUAP,[18] i.e., a nationwide ICT platform enabling citizens to communicate with public entities. It should be noted that under the regulation (Journal of Laws of 2017, item 2247), interoperability has been achieved through standardization,[19] interchangeability[20] or compatibility.[21]

[15] According to the regulations, „operational interoperability" refers, among others, to the formula of informing by entities performing public tasks about the way of accessing and using the services, standardization and unification of procedures, taking into account the need to ensure proper cooperation of these entities or publishing and updating in the Public Information Bulletin the descriptions of procedures applicable to the electronic handling of matters.

[16] The semantic level of interoperability as indicated in the regulation is achieved, inter alia, through the appropriate use of data structures and the meaning of the data contained in those structures and their proper publication in the interoperability repository, and the use in the registers of references to registers containing reference data to the extent necessary to carry out the tasks.

[17] ‚Technological interoperability' under the quoted regulation requires the application of minimum requirements for ICT systems and regulations contained in separate regulations, and in the absence of specific regulations indicates the need to take into account the provisions of relevant Polish Standards, international standards or standards recognized by international organizations as good practice.

[18] Electronic Platform for Public Administration Services (ePUAP) „provides citizens and businesses access to electronic communication services with public administration. Thanks to the ePUAP, public administration entities and other entities performing public tasks can make their services available free of charge in electronic form, they do not have to build their own IT system". Source: Department of the Ministry of Digitization in the Internet Service of the Republic of Poland at https://www.gov.pl [accessed 22 October 2019].

[19] The codification is understood as: ‚the application of compatible standards, norms and procedures by various bodies carrying out public tasks'.

[20] Interchangeability is: ‚the ability to replace a product, process or service without disrupting information exchange' while ‚meeting all requirements'.

[21] Compatibility is: ‚suitability of products, processes or services intended for shared use' for ‚meeting essential requirements' and assuming ‚no adverse effects'.

Finally, the law announced on  May 8, 2019, implementing the principles of the EU directive, defined a mobile application as "‘publicly available software with a touch interface designed for use on portable electronic devices, excluding applications intended for use on portable personal computers" (Journal of Laws of 2018, item 848). The digital accessibility of a website and a mobile application described in the act is based on ensuring its functionality, compatibility, visibility and comprehensibility (Journal of Laws of 2018, item 848). The legislator has clarified the concept of functionality used as properties that enable the user to take advantage of all the functions offered by websites or mobile applications. Compatibility, within the meaning of the cited act, is a feature that allows cooperation with as many programs as possible, but with the emphasis on the fact that this group includes tools and programs that support people with disabilities. The property that allows a user to use a mobile application or a website by hearing, sight or touch is, in turn, perceivability. The last criterion of digital accessibility is comprehensibility, i.e., the ability to make the recipient aware of the content meaning and to identify the way it is presented.

In accordance with the act in question (Journal of Laws of 2018, item 848), the public entity is to ensure digital accessibility: the subjective website of the Public Information Bulletin and the following elements and functions of the website or mobile application: (a) contact details (as well as a link to the subject side of the BIP of this institution, if under separate provisions it is obliged to run it), (b) tools for contact with the public entity, (c) navigation, (d) the so-called "declaration of availability," (e) information concerning a crisis situation and public security, (f) official documents, templates of contracts, and other documents intended for incurring civil law obligations. However, the act obliges public institutions to conduct communication activities ensuring digital accessibility of websites or mobile applications, provided that this does not involve ",excessive costs." The signaled technological, logistic and formal conditions should be taken into account by the communication services of local government units already at the stage of designing communication activities carried out with the use of tools such as a website or a mobile application.

## 5. Conclusions

The research described above confirmed that social media are commonly used by local government units, although smaller municipalities still ignore the existence of social media in their information policy. However, more and more often, small towns and cities use Facebook's potential more effectively than large cities in terms of developing a certain percentage of social coverage in relation to the total population. Moreover, the communication activity is also a source of messages from separate entities or characters acting for the benefit of local administration. From the broadcasters' point of view, the process is beneficial, but for the recipients it may mean isolation from information which is incompatible with the local government's program line.

Municipalities, when focusing on social media, should take into account the fact that they constitute a highly individualized communication tool. As a consequence, a user identified on a local government profile usually means no more than one person remaining within the commune's communication activities. All the more so because Internet identities are often multiplied, which means further lowering the real social range of social media. The situation is different in the traditional press market, where there is a phenomenon of shared readership of periodicals offered to the recipients (more often in the case of copy sales, but also in the free distribution network). However, unlike the increasingly popular online media, the conventional printed press is perceived as an archaic tool. At the same time, it requires constant and often high financial outlays on activities not directly related to the preparation of content dedicated to recipients, such as printing services or distribution.

According to the research completed in 2018,[22] the content disseminated by the local community in social media was categorized by the author as "announcing" posts (encouraging participation in interesting events), "informative" (local government news), "provocative" (persuasive content ",encouraging online action for a town or event") and "participative" (community activating).

After the analysis, it came to light at the end of the study that the provocative posts "already constituted the vast majority as a category and dominated the reactions of profile users. The moderator of the official profile, seeing a significant increase in the number of posts, comments and accesses, was somewhat encouraged to prefer these types of posts. The message was therefore profiled as «distribution of emotions»" (Kowalik, 2018: 23). This is a great opportunity for the local government to activate the residents, but also a potential weakness of social media due to the possibility of communication abuse.

Thus, websites and mobile applications, as well as social media managed by the local government, can contribute to the effective dissemination of information, integration of local communities, implementation of innovations and increase the level of civic participation. However, they are not an area free from the dangers of manipulating information, giving messages containing persuasive messages or even disseminating the *fake news*.

[22] The study by Krzysztof Kowalik from the University of Warsaw, combining quantitative and qualitative analysis was carried out ,in two periods: in February 2017 and February 2018', in the first stage observing 66 cities with district rights.

**Determination of the trend in the municipality's budget expenditure on promotion.**




**Figure 1.** Determination of the trend in the municipality's budget expenditure on promotion from 2016 to 2018.

**Communication activities of GZM municipalities using Facebook in relation to the structure of promotion expenditure.**

| Municipality | Social coverage | Number of inhabitants[a)] | Percentage share | Promotional budget[b)] | Trend W/S/Z[c)] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| **Będzin** | 11 380 | 57 343 | **19.8** | 1 163 359.89 | W |
| **Bieruń** | 4 438 | 19 639 | **22.5** | 342 670.52 | S |
| **Bobrowniki** | 3 196 | 11 921 | **26.8** | 128 250.94 | Z |
| **Bojszowy** | 1 195 | 7 795 | **15.3** | 65 123.84 | W |
| **Bytom** | 20 424 | 168 394 | **12.1** | 192 069.21 | S |
| **Chełm Śląski** | 283 | 6 245 | **4.5** | 78 702.90 | Z |
| **Chorzów** | 15 402 | 109 021 | **14.1** | 1 589 715.19 | Z |
| **Czeladź** | 7 587 | 31 901 | **23.7** | 245 543.57 | W |
| **Dąbrowa Górnicza** | 18 545 | 121 121 | **15.3** | 7 528 876.40 | Z |
| **Gierałtowice** | 479 | 12 009 | **3.9** | 129 475.31 | Z |
| **Gliwice** | 31 882 | 181 309 | **17.5** | 7 824 466.88 | W |
| **Imielin** | – | 9 052 | – | 90 043.69 | Z |
| **Katowice** | 101 627 | 296 262 | **34.3** | 26 265 476.03 | W |
| **Knurów** | 1 962 | 38 594 | **5.0** | 164 789.59 | W |
| **Kobiór** | – | 4 898 | – | 11 880.81 | S |
| **Lędziny** | 3 262 | 16 819 | **19.3** | 204 617.49 | W |

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Łaziska Górne** | 3 211 | 22 390 | **14.3** | 119 750.63 | Z |
| **Mierzęcice** | – | 7 691 | – | 36 746.05 | Z |
| **Mikołów** | 4 168 | 40 423 | **10.3** | 698 959.61 | W |
| **Mysłowice** | 8 003 | 74 647 | **10.7** | 679 553.10 | S |
| **Ożarowice** | – | 5 715 | – | 139 878.93 | W |
| **Piekary Śląskie** | 11 202 | 55 652 | **20.1** | 603 839.19 | Z |
| **Pilchowice** | 1 543 | 11 838 | **13.0** | 119 139.43 | Z |
| **Psary** | 1 555 | 12 046 | **12.9** | 175 931.31 | S |
| **Pyskowice** | 4 682 | 18 417 | **25.4** | 161 408.88 | W |
| **Radzionków** | 4 712 | 16 798 | **28.0** | 223 908.11 | Z |
| **Ruda Śląska** | 17 358 | 138 578 | **12.5** | 815 150.12 | W |
| **Rudziniec** | 1 493 | 10 655 | **14.0** | 46 798.66 | Z |
| **Siemianowice Śl.** | 10 677 | 67 523 | **15.8** | 681 574.30 | W |
| **Siewierz** | 1 847 | 12 390 | **14.9** | 412 823.56 | W |
| **Sławków** | – | 7 040 | – | 80 308.09 | Z |
| **Sosnowiec** | 21 516 | 204 013 | **10.5** | 946 663.57 | W |
| **Sośnicowice** | 1 110 | 8 821 | **12.5** | 230 916.20 | Z |
| **Świerklaniec** | 3 000 | 12 069 | **24.8** | 147 373.98 | Z |
| **Świętochłowice** | 3 643 | 50 385 | **7.2** | 596 456.55 | Z |
| **Tarnowskie Góry** | 16 124 | 61 262 | **26.3** | 1 701 220.00 | W |
| **Tychy** | 17 256 | 128 211 | **13.4** | 1 609 496.00 | Z |
| **Wojkowice** | 3 172 | 8 984 | **35.3** | 97 193.52 | Z |
| **Wyry** | 2 244 | 8 087 | **27.7** | 59 967.38 | S |
| **Zabrze** | 13 213 | 174 349 | **7.5** | 1 642 402.51 | W |
| **Zbrosławice** | 2 201 | 16 001 | **13.7** | 255 292.43 | W |

Table 1. Ratio of reaching recipients with the use of official accounts created by local government units forming GZM on Facebook.

a) Based on the Local Data Bank of the Central Statistical Office. State as of December 2016.

b) The data in PLN concerning the expenditure of municipalities in the area covered by the survey concern the year 2018.

c) Determination of the trend in the municipality's budget expenditure on promotion: W - consistent increase from 2016 to 2018; S - systematic decrease in the surveyed period; Z — variability of expenditures in the years covered by the survey.

**Budget expenditure on the promotion of local government.**

| Municipality | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| **Będzin** | 819 955.35 | 960 094.70 | 1 163 359.89 |
| **Bieruń** | 223 096.85 | 274 442.74 | 342 670.52 |
| **Bobrowniki** | 88 158.89 | 53 495.29 | 128 250.94 |
| **Bojszowy** | 36 288.53 | 54 058.24 | 65 123.84 |
| **Bytom** | 672 929.91 | 353 630.74 | 192 069.21 |
| **Chełm Śląski** | 29 869.55 | 18 013.48 | 78 702.90 |
| **Chorzów** | 3 658 208.76 | 1 470 924.33 | 1 589 715.19 |
| **Czeladź** | unseparated section 75075 | 222 247.48 | 245 543.57 |
| **Dąbrowa Górnicza** | 7 916 868.93 | 8 471 745.57 | 7 528 876.40 |
| **Gierałtowice** | 117 202.96 | 195 759.08 | 129 475.31 |
| **Gliwice** | 2 749 472.94 | 2 445 416.04 | 7 824 466.88 |
| **Imielin** | 60 910.50 | 60 296.29 | 90 043.69 |
| **Katowice** | 17 762 991.65 | 20 986 223.87 | 26 265 476.03 |
| **Knurów** | 108 090.52 | 127 424.82 | 164 789.59 |
| **Kobiór** | 12 950.33 | 12 098.25 | 11 880.81 |
| **Lędziny** | 122 489.52 | 184 393.45 | 204 617.49 |
| **Łaziska Górne** | 135 949.50 | 94 434.79 | 119 750.63 |
| **Mierzęcice** | 25 490.81 | 20 772.76 | 36 746.05 |
| **Mikołów** | 481 145.56 | 500 582.16 | 698 959.61 |
| **Mysłowice** | 945 998.33 | 722 897.54 | 679 553.10 |
| **Ożarowice** | 74 924.10 | 89 347.24 | 139 878.93 |
| **Piekary Śląskie** | 504 576.34 | 615 057.05 | 603 839.19 |
| **Pilchowice** | 118 486.67 | 95 216.87 | 119 139.43 |
| **Psary** | 201 366.26 | 190 123.83 | 175 931.31 |
| **Pyskowice** | 109 977.51 | 119 717.23 | 161 408.88 |
| **Radzionków** | 260 652.52 | 165 682.04 | 223 908.11 |
| **Ruda Śląska** | 732 163.17 | 801 135.82 | 815 150.12 |
| **Rudziniec** | 56 004.82 | 73 828.75 | 46 798.66 |
| **Siemianowice Śląskie** | 536 091.01 | 554 509.77 | 681 574.30 |
| **Siewierz** | 232 185.36 | 266 922.60 | 412 823.56 |
| **Sławków** | 81 074.56 | 60 698.86 | 80 308.09 |
| **Sosnowiec** | 728 447.40 | 811 094.40 | 946 663.57 |
| **Sośnicowice** | 286 357.65 | 173 720.25 | 230 916.20 |

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Świerklaniec** | 111 395.16 | 258 041.31 | 147 373.98 |
| **Świętochłowice** | 621 862.81 | 894 741.91 | 596 456.55 |
| **Tarnowskie Góry** | 1 105 092.00 | 1 247 377.00 | 1 701 220.00 |
| **Tychy** | 703 268.00 | 622 635.00 | 1 609 496.00 |
| **Wojkowice** | 103 884.88 | 92 960.09 | 97 193.52 |
| **Wyry** | 191 446.02 | 68 387.57 | 59 967.38 |
| **Zabrze** | 1 248 767.72 | 1 412 400.81 | 1 642 402.51 |
| **Zbrosławice** | 240 418.29 | 246 680.54 | 255 292.43 |

Tables 2. The amount of expenditure on promotion in the years 2016—2018 in the municipalities currently making up the Upper Silesian- Zagłebie Metropolis (in PLN) is presented according to the budget classification in chapter 75075.

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Verification and Translation/Weryfikacja i Tłumaczenie
Ewa Grzelewska-Jędryka

Cover Design/Projekt okładki
Beata Klyta

Typeset/Łamanie
Bogusław Chruściński

**ISSN 2353-9747**
electronic version/wersja elektroniczna

The reference version of the journal is the electronic version, which appears on the platforms/ Wersją referencyjną czasopisma, począwszy od 2018 roku, jest wersja elektroniczna, ukazująca się na platformach:

Central and Eastern European Online Library **www.ceeol.com**

University of Silesia Press — Open Journal System **www.journals.us.edu.pl**

The journal had been previously printed with number ISSN 1895-3492



Publishing Office/Wydawca
**Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego**
**ul. Bankowa 12B, 40-007 Katowice**
www.wydawnictwo.us.edu.pl
e-mail:wydawnictwo@us.edu.pl

Ark. druk. 5,75. Ark. wyd. 7,0.

About this book

Free copy

ISSN 2353-9747