

Studia
Politicae Tom 34
Universitatis 2022
Silesiensis



UNIWERSYTET ŚLĄSKI
WYDAWNICTWO

Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis

Tom 34

pod redakcją

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Półrocznik recenzowany, wydawany przez Instytut Nauk Politycznych Uniwersytetu Śląskiego w Katowicach / **Peer-reviewed semi-annual**, published by the Institute of Political Sciences of the University of Silesia in Katowice



Social Science Knowledge Commercialization: The Case Study of Social Sciences at Tbilisi State University

Warunki komercjalizacji wiedzy w Gruzji:
studium przypadku nauk społecznych
na Tbiliskim Uniwersytecie Państwowym

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Abstract

Nowadays, deep cooperation between universities, research centres, and industry is seen as a stimulus for economic growth. Yet, it is still unclear how the knowledge commercialization process works in the countries with an experience of the highly centralized economy and education. Tbilisi State University is seen as the optimistic catalyst for further commercialization, mainly due to its international ties, though the issue of social science knowledge commercialization is still mostly neglected. In our research, the case of the oldest, the largest, and the most internationalized uni-

Abstrakt

W dzisiejszych czasach głęboka współpraca między uczelniami, ośrodkami badawczymi i przemysłowymi jest ważnym bodźcem wzrostu gospodarczego. Jednak nadal nie jest jasne, jak przebiega proces komercjalizacji wiedzy w krajach, które mają doświadczenie wysoce scentralizowanej gospodarki i edukacji. Tbiliski Uniwersytet Państwowy jest postrzegany jako ośrodek przyspieszający proces rozwoju komercjalizacji wiedzy, głównie ze względu na swoje powiązania międzynarodowe, choć kwestia komercjalizacji wiedzy z zakresu nauk społecznych jest

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versity in Georgia is analyzed. The comprehensive study aims to determine the macro and micro factors that make knowledge commercialization in social sciences successful or a failure. Results show that some university society representatives believe commercialization is mainly based on natural and exact sciences. In contrast, others claim that human development contribution is the most significant knowledge transfer that can be done.

Keywords: social science, knowledge commercialization, higher education institutions, Tbilisi State University, new institutionalism

nadal w większości pomijana. Niniejsze badania analizują przypadek najstarszej, największej i najbardziej umiędzynarodowionej uczelni w Gruzji. Kompleksowe badanie ma na celu określenie czynników makro i mikro, które sprawiają, że komercjalizacja wiedzy w naukach społecznych kończy się powodzeniem lub porażką. Wyniki pokazują, że niektórzy przedstawiciele społeczności uniwersyteckiej uważają, że komercjalizacja opiera się głównie na naukach przyrodniczych i ścisłych. Inni natomiast twierdzą, że wkład w rozwój społeczny jest najważniejszym możliwym transferem wiedzy.

Słowa klucze: nauki społeczne, komercjalizacja wiedzy, uczelnie wyższe, Tbiliski Uniwersytet Państwowy, nowy instytucjonalizm

1. Introduction

The higher education institutions of today are faced with the necessity to change their functions, which results from global trends. On the one hand, the shifting objectives of education driven by “knowledge society” transformed responsibilities of universities. On the other hand, the ongoing process of knowledge commercialization shapes the higher education system in an ever more significant ways. Changes relating to the content of curriculum are influenced by the logic behind the knowledge economy (Ponds, Oort, & Frenken, 2009). From this point of view, universities attempt to offer a new and valuable product to society and position themselves as service providers not only for students, but also for market forces. The trend is especially developed in countries where education is an integral part of economic development. And so, in those countries the commercialization of university-based research is already a well-established practice, particularly in the natural and exact sciences, though the same cannot be said about humanities or social studies.

The issue in question is further complicated by the fact that there is no universal model for implementing the process. It stems from different economic and education policies across the world (Gans & Stern, 2003). Indeed, societies with an experience of cooperation between industry, research centres, and universities have much more effective practices when it comes to knowledge commercialization (Siegel, Veugelers, & Wright, 2007). However, the situa-

tion is quite different in “inexperienced” states. In formerly communist, and especially former Soviet republics, characterized by highly centralized educational systems, social sciences and economics had been essentially isolated from western disciplinary researchers and societies (Tarnopolsky, 1988; Umland, 2005). The real and appropriate case to consider in this respect is Georgia, a country in the South Caucasus with an education background that had been strictly centralized in Soviet times, and the present challenges under the country’s ongoing Europeanization and democratization processes (Tabatadze, 2021). Like other former Soviet republics, Georgia has a small and fragile economy, and higher education institutions are trying to readjust to changing agendas. Nevertheless the oldest, the biggest, and the most internationalized one – Tbilisi State University (hereafter: TSU) declared the importance of knowledge commercialization.

By determining the degree of knowledge commercialization process at TSU, the article aims to focus particularly on social and political sciences, as there are many unanswered questions regarding their further perspectives. Accordingly, our research question can be formulated as follows: Is it possible for social and political sciences (hereafter in the text – SPSs) to carry out knowledge commercialization, and what challenges does this process face? From the centralized state education system of the Soviet period, almost all the former republics switched to Western-style education systems. The given transformation meant the creation of a non-state sector in the education system, the introduction of unified national examination tests, decentralization, etc. The transformation process of higher education systems in post-communist countries is in the interest of researchers from different Western and non-Western countries (Huisman, Smolentseva, & Froumin, 2018; Suprun, 2018; von Berg, 2018; Vekua, 2018; Azimbayeva, 2017; Yegorov, 2009). However, academic works focusing primarily on knowledge commercialization in the former Soviet republics are rare – Georgia’s case is no exception. Hence, our research becomes more interesting as it is one of the first attempts to analyze the issue. Therefore, it could open quite exciting prospects for further investigation. At the same time, we reckon the study will enrich the academic literature on identifying reasons for the success/failure of the process in Georgia and other post-communist countries. Most of them, in many aspects, have been through the same or very similar socio-political and economic path. Also, the research highlights the importance of social science knowledge commercialization issues in general.

2. Literature review and research methodology

Despite the experience of successful practices, the definition of “knowledge commercialization” is still disputed. Some authors emphasize its transformative character: converting research-based knowledge into the market process (Salter & Martin, 2001; Astebro, 2004) when interactions between universities, research centres, entrepreneurs, and financial organizations are getting crucial (Etzkowits & Leydesdorff, 2000). At the same time, others define the term as a business development process that creates a negotiable product (Jolly, 1997; Rosa & Rose, 2007). The opposite understandings are consolidated by Mehrabi et al. (2013). They present three main ways to define the concept, namely as: 1) the process of bringing an innovative idea to market, that reveals economic efficacy; 2) a transfer that makes a simple link between industries and research centres, and 3) merely the final phase of a new product development process. Despite differences, we reckon all these explanations focus on the business and neglect the education facet of the concept. Although “commercialization” undoubtedly is linked to business/administrative studies, the same cannot be assumed regarding “knowledge” that has different societal importance.

As the purpose of the study, we use the following definition of knowledge commercialization: “[...] academic scientific research [...] performed increasingly for-profit with results modified through primarily patents, copyrights and licensing” (Irzik, 2013, pp. 23–77). According to the explanation, academic science commercialization promotes academic modification by selling university-based research products and services to ensure profit (Radder, 2010). This definition is not broad enough to cover several streams of the process, yet at the same time not narrow to the point of neglecting the main focus – university-based knowledge.

One of the most common theories of knowledge commercialization, called the Triple Helix, involves the interrelationship of three components – university, industry, and government. The Triple Helix model is related to the concept of a knowledge-based economy, which implies a close connection between all three components. Even proponents of this model believe that cooperation between these three segments alone is not enough to succeed. The role to be played by universities is crucial, but the leading industry is still vital. Consequently, this model may only work in economically viable and manufacturing countries (Carayannis & Campbell, 2010). Some authors also focus on the role of so-called middle organizations in this model (Etzkowits & Leydesdorff, 2000). The Quadruple Helix model, in turn, includes also the media (Carayannis & Campbell, 2009).

For a long time, however, the main focus was on research and development (the linear innovation model). It meant that universities focused mainly on basic

research while corporations focused on conducting experimental research. The universities' knowledge sector remains the leading actor within the Triple Helix model. However, "[l]ess research-intensive regions are by now well aware that science, applied to local resources, is the basis of much of their future potential for economic and social development" (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000, pp. 116–117). At the same time, in post-communist countries with less historical experience of democracy and pluralism, what is still dominant are the statist models. Therefore, also in the case of implementing the Triple Helix model, in contrast to countries with free-market experience, where all three sectors are interdependent, the state is a dominant actor (Carayannis & Campbell, 2010). According to Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000), "natural environment" should also be included in the Quintuple Helix model. Thus, as noted, the Quadruple Helix contextualizes the Triple Helix, and the Quintuple Helix – the Quadruple Helix (Carayannis & Campbell, 2011). According to some authors, in this model, there is a close connection between innovative knowledge and the high degree of democracy (Plasser & Plasser, 2002; Carayannis & Campbell, 2009; Carmines & Stimson, 1980).

Among the many possibilities to describe the mechanisms of the ongoing process of knowledge commercialization in higher education institutions is also a new institutional theory. It links the tendency of standardization and professionalization to adopt business sector structures and practices (Palmer, Biggard, & Dick, 2008). According to the framework, universities actively communicate with different economic and political systems to expand their influence and size. Political institutions are seen as sets of "rules" that guide and constrain the behaviour of individual actors (Lowndes, 2018), and institutional changes (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010) are pretty standard in the institutional contexts (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). So, universities with their rules attempt to be considered legitimate and to act in concert with other institutional actors (Koelble, 1995, p. 232).

Scholars outline two stages of the the knowledge commercialization process, both of them connected to universities. From the 1980s onwards, the first primarily had a conspicuous effect: universities started to implement the technology transfer process. The "science parks" may be seen as echoes of the period in question. At the end of the 20th century, the second stage began. The license protections, creating and supporting university-based innovations were in focus. In some universities, even knowledge commercialization departments and advisory boards were established (Rasmussen, Moen, & Gulbrandsen, 2006). While some universities remain traditional, trends show that higher education institutions seek entrepreneurial and innovative leadership (Audretsch, 2007). Universities improve their technical knowledge to solve local and regional problems (Miller & Acs, 2018). Generally, knowledge is seen as a stimulus for economic growth, and therefore, science products are preconditions for further

industrial development (Martin, 2003; Mansfield & Lee, 1996). If traditionally the central role of universities was seen in research and studying, nowadays they are also expected to play an essential role in the “development of their economic, social and cultural surroundings” (Arbo & Benneworth, 2007, p. 6). Even more, according to some researches, among the results of cooperation of academia and industry can also be enumerated an improvement in teaching (Wang et al., 2016), access for universities to different resources (Perkmann et al., 2013), and a rising amount of qualitative research (Breschi, Lissoni, & Montobbio, 2007).

All these changes promoted the discussion about the role of the universities in the process. Wissema’s (2009) typology of universities’ three generations, that is, combining the concepts of studying, research, and connection with the environment in present literature, is broadened with the idea of fourth-generation universities. According to Pawłowski (2009), the essential feature of an entrepreneurial university and that of the fourth-generation university is the managerial model. The most significant difference is that the fourth-generation universities have a unique strategic approach. They can shape their environment (Lukovics & Zuti, 2013). While some authors stress the importance of entrepreneurial culture, including staff organization support and increasing students’ motivation (Henderson & Rosenberg, 2001), others suggest that only motivated individuals can make entrepreneurship an essential part of daily university life (Chrisman, Hynes, & Fraser, 1995). The disagreement pertains to the top-down and bottom-up approach. Who should implement entrepreneurial and innovative universities – motivated individuals (bottom-up) or management (top-down)? The examples of top-down approach include: establishing knowledge transfer departments, organizing meetings between industry and academic staff, curriculum planning, and funding spin-offs of research. Though we believe the controversy is more practical than fundamental, higher education institutions’ role is to strengthen the knowledge commercialization process by specifying its contribution to economic development (Martin & Etzkowitz, 2001).

However, not all higher education institutions and researchers are always attracted by the idea of knowledge commercialization, fearing the research might be surreptitiously driven towards obtaining economic benefits (Blumenthal et al., 1996). Even though science “is not a marketable product” (Palo-oja, Kivi-järvi, & Aromaa, 2017, p. 3), it needs to be adjusted for business and different companies’ problems.

Also, several criticisms are manifested by some authors. Firstly, the issue of academic autonomy is questioned. While state funding declines, universities are trying to get more non-governmental funds to satisfy their needs. Thus, commercialization becomes an equivalent source of financing for higher education institutions (whose current social function is to create innovation for the market) (Florida & Cohen, 1999). Secondly, generating new ideas for large corporations

weakens the fundamental research that could have improved their economic conditions (Nelson, 2004). Therefore, university-based knowledge is getting captured and framed by market forces.

The final argument, usually neglected even upon criticizing the knowledge commercialization process, pertains to the issue of social sciences and humanities. The vast majority of successful practices of knowledge commercialization is generated in the fields of technology and natural sciences. Hence, some questions arise: Should the processes relating to the knowledge commercialization work the same way in the research fields of history, political science, sociology, and media studies?

There are some controversial points. First of all, the idea of knowledge commercialization is not attractive to some universities. In a way, this reluctance echoes the difference between traditional and modern approaches of higher education institutions. Second of all, there is no consensus about the definition of the term in question. Can knowledge commercialization be understood as a part of the product development process, or is it a result-oriented, independent industry-backed scheme? Thirdly, the lack of clearly defined success/failure factors for the knowledge commercialization process, particularly in social sciences.

As noted in our research, we will determine factors affecting SPS knowledge commercialization process/reality at TSU. Analyzing various subject literature and theories on knowledge commercialization, we think of a new institutional perspective, which helps determine how the national context (state policy and other institutional actors) shapes higher education system actions. Focusing on the commercialization issue is the most appropriate one for our case. There are several determinants of preference for the given theory in our case. First of all, in the light of the fragile economy and underdeveloped industry, we consider it less appropriate to speak about the relevance of the triple or quadruple helix models to the Georgian example. At the same time, as the research focuses on the case of Georgia – the post-Soviet country with strong statist and weak democratic experience, we think a fresh institutional perspective will be helpful. It will help us determine which factors or institutions on the international or national level (the state and other institutional actors) shape higher education system operation, in the facet of commercialization, and how they do it.

As we already mentioned, according to a new institutional approach, the policies of the higher education institutions are shaped mainly by the external actors and contexts. Since “the new institutionalism is not an approach that is ‘about institutions’; rather, it focuses on the role of institutions in explaining [away] politics” (Lowndes, 2018, p. 57), in academic literature it is also suggested to analyze the role and particular actions of the universities. Therefore, we divide the factors in question into two categories: macro- (historical experience and current state policy, funding issues, demands from market and business sector) and mezzo-level factors (university and faculty policies, curriculum,

academic staff, and students' involvement). This distinction allows us to identify factors that affect the process positively or/and negatively. When studying the issue, scholars usually use a case study design. For instance, Boehm and Hogan (2013) analyzed the role of the public sector stakeholders in the formation of the research-commercialization-science relationship. Based on the examples of Germany and the Republic of Ireland, they conducted in-depth interviews and analyzed documents. Rasmussen et al. (2006) researched commercialization initiatives, including entrepreneurship support. They used semi-structured interviews with university managers, faculty, and department representatives. Also, focusing research on a particular field is not unusual among the scholars (Sternitzke, 2010).

Interestingly enough, a survey of social scientists shows that the licensing and start-ups creation were the least frequently mentioned activities upon describing the knowledge commercialization process. On the contrary, the community-based and problem-solving activities the social sciences scholars took part in are much more essential in this respect. Indeed, those representatives of the academic staff are among the least willing to cooperate with the private business sector when their daily activities include public lectures, training, charities, and curriculum development (Bullock & Hughes, 2016).

3. Research methods

We use the case study method, which is one of the several new institutionalist strands (Lowndes, Pratchett, & Stoker, 2018) to achieve the goals of our study. Studying economic factors and policy development trends (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010) helps us analyze macro factors that affect knowledge commercialization in the case in question. At the same time, we attempt to arrive at an answer by collecting micro-level data via interviews and focus groups (Lowndes et al., 2006) and combining it with mezzo-level factors. Thus, we reviewed the experience and current institutional context of Georgia and TSU, studied major legislative frameworks, funding issues, and mission and curriculum of the university and faculty (BA, MA, and PhD programmes – 35 in total). To this end, we used the document analysis method, using keywords: “knowledge,” “commercialization,” “transfer,” “innovation,” “market,” and “entrepreneur.” Apart from this, 10 semi-structured in-depth interviews and 3 focus groups were conducted. We have selected faculty decision-makers and academic (staff) for semi-structured interviews due to their leading positions and different departments. In terms of age, all of them were between 35 and 50, in terms of gender – 6 women and 4 men.

The in-depth interviews covered the following issues: 1) positions toward the general idea of knowledge commercialization; 2) prospects/challenges for social and political science commercialization; 3) the roles of the university and faculty during the commercialization. Focus groups were conducted with students selected by proportionate stratified random sampling (using faculty department as a strata). Each focus group contained 9 students from different departments but the same academic level (a total of 27 students). Descriptive statistics: sex/gender (12 men, 15 women); age (from 18 to 31); departments (4 from political science, 4 from international relations, 4 from sociology, 4 from social work, 4 from journalism, 4 from human geography, 3 from interdisciplinary studies). All the focus groups and interviews were conducted from December to January 2020. The participants were encouraged to express their opinions freely and therefore they were ensured to remain anonymous.

The data from interviews and focus groups were analyzed using NVivo. The major categories and keywords include the following: TSU, university-based knowledge, positive/negative actor in knowledge commercialization, the role of market demands, industry, university, faculty, social science knowledge commercialization, and the practice of knowledge commercialization. After systematic and structural analysis, the findings are outlined in the following sections.

4. The institutional context

4.1. State policy and funding

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and regaining its independence in 1991, Georgia faced a complex social, economic, and political situation, which was accompanied by a tense international (confrontation with Russia) and domestic situation (civil war, ethnic conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia). It took more than a decade to establish and strengthen state institutions, and in general, to overcome the crisis of statehood. Naturally, the institutional crisis affected all spheres in the state. The education system was no exception. The comprehensive reforms of the higher education system began only in 2004 (after the Rose Revolution). At the same time, in 2005 the country joined the Bologna Process. Involvement in the Bologna Process meant a fundamental transformation of the education system and necessarily bringing it in line with international standards. One of the most visible and successful examples of the implemented reforms is the creation of a National Assessment and Examinations Centre (NAEC). As a result, the decentralized (at the higher education institution level), inefficient, and often corrupt admission system to HEI, which had been in op-

eration since the Soviet era, was replaced by centralized at the state level and unified national exams.

Nevertheless, the reforms undertaken in the education system, which is the most fragile sphere, did not leave the impression of a long-term and consistent policy. The frequent change of ministers of education/higher education – up to the present as many as 11 ministries have held the office since 2004, and 17 – since 1991 (Ministers, n.d.). Consequently, the various reforms, visions, opinions, and legislative frameworks are what results from this uncoordinated process.

Among the institutional and non-institutional problems in the sphere of education, one of the most critical and problematic remains funding. In the case of Georgia, funding is mainly based on fees paid by students and their parents (The International Institute for Education Policy, Planning, and Management, 2013). At state universities, the lowest tuition fee equals 17% of the 2020 years GDP per capita of Georgia (<https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/georgia/gdp-per-capita>). State funding is much less at the MA level than at the BA level, and PhD programmes are financed neither by state nor universities. Moreover, the state funding for science is at a very low level (not more than 1% of Georgia's GDP annually, so much less than in the European Union countries). Only 56 research institutions in Georgia can carry out independent research work. Education and science employees amount to only 4.5% of the employed population (National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2019a, b, c).

Therefore, we can assume that an independent or a university-affiliated researcher has only two chances to obtain funding. The first is state-based Shota Rustaveli National Science Foundation with a limited budget of nearly 27 million dollars for all types of research activities in all fields of study (Shota Rustaveli National Science Foundation of Georgia Budget 2021, n.d.) with research grants as follows: supporting the high-quality research in Georgia (basic, applied, etc.), supporting Georgian studies, science popularization, grants for young researchers, and the like (Calls and Programmes, 2019). From the given research grants, the most substantial are basic and applied grants within which during 2019 were funded – 67 projects in basic research and 36 projects in applied research categories (Winning Projects, 2019). Usually, the maximum amount for a research project does not exceed 19,000 dollars per year in social sciences and humanities and about 27,000 per year in natural sciences, engineering and technology, medicine and health sciences as well as in agricultural sciences (Terms of Reference of the Grant Call for “Fundamental Research”, 2018). The second possibility for funding research is international grants with more significant funding for each project but also very limited number of projects to be funded.

At the same time, the higher education system of Georgia focuses on the authorization and accreditation procedures relating to: material, technical, and human resources, curriculum goals, learning outcomes, and self-assessment (The

International Institute for Education Policy, Planning, and Management, 2013). Thus, the current unenviable policy may be assessed as criteria-oriented and less supportive.

4.2. Tbilisi State University

There are currently 63 higher education institutions in Georgia. Nineteen of them are state-owned, while 44 privately-owned. TSU is formally state-based. Out of the 148,000 students in Georgia altogether, 22,000 (the most significant proportion) studied at TSU (National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2019d). It was founded in 1918 under the influence of Georgian scientists educated in various European universities. It classified among the high performing universities by international university ranking systems. In *Times Higher Education World University Rankings*, it ranked 398th and among the top 5% of universities in Europe (TSU among Best Global Universities, n.d.), in 2020. The annual budget of the TSU equals 30 million dollars, and only 25% of it is state-funding based. The primary source of funding for the university are the tuition fees.

As for the factors that affect the knowledge commercialization process at TSU, the comprehensive document analysis was conducted on three (state, university, and faculty) levels. It helped us understand how institutional framework and policy practices meet the knowledge commercialization idea. Law of Georgia on Higher Education (2019) states that tertiary education goals are academic staff training and establishing further research and development conditions. The regulation does not necessarily cover the knowledge commercialization idea. More relevant findings can be pointed out in the Law of Georgia on Science, Technology and their Development (2018). It declares the strong will and importance of developing science and new technologies, supporting entrepreneurship and competition in technologies, and implementing joint educational programmes between universities and research centres. From this point of view, it can be said that state-declared policy is to create new technologies and to support entrepreneurship. Both of these statements cover the idea of knowledge transfer, but the funding issue remains neglected. Lastly, the Law of Georgia on Innovations (2016) states establishing stimulating national ecosystems for a knowledge-based economy and exporting the local intellectual property.

Nevertheless, there is no (at least declared) supportive scheme for the policy implementation. Finally, we can conclude that state-level legislation is mainly a non-specific one. Also, the lack of long-term state strategic schemes and policy documents shows that the knowledge commercialization issue has a minor role in the state education and science policy agenda.

Unlike in case of the state legislation, the analysis of the mission and strategic plan of TSU yields different results. Firstly, it should be mentioned that it

aims to enrich university traditions with research and innovation and to harmonize education programmes with the labour market. This statement shows the link between university knowledge and innovative research that echoes the idea of knowledge commercialization. Also, in the strategic plan, research and innovation activities are presented as the independent sections. There are phrases like: “promoting applied and technological research with commercialization perspective” or “commercialization of the scientific products – ways to protect patents and copyrights” (TSU Mission and Strategic Plan (2018-2024), 2018, pp. 10–11). Moreover, the importance of innovative activities (promoting start-up and spin-off companies) is highlighted.

Interestingly, the Knowledge Transfer and Innovation Centre (similar to the knowledge commercialization office) opened at TSU in 2018. It aims to discover researchers with original ideas and develop entrepreneurial, start-up skills. The centre uses non-formal education activities: training and seminars (TSU Knowledge Transfer and Innovation Center, n.d.). We can argue that a newly-emerged centre positions itself as an information and supportive hub between university-affiliated innovative researchers and public/private sectors. Thus, we can conclude that unlike in the case of the declared state policy, TSU acknowledges the idea of knowledge commercialization and carries out relevant activities. This reality can be explained by a close and active relationship with other international universities – up to 200 partner universities and 56 research centres worldwide (Information, n.d.). On the other hand, along with teaching, research, research influence, and international outlook, one of the criteria of the evaluation methodology in the universities global ranking systems is also knowledge transfer. With the help of this criteria, research income from industry and commerce are evaluated (World University Rankings: methodology, 2021).

4.3. Faculty of Social and Political Sciences

In accordance with our research goal we investigated the faculty of SPS at TSU in terms of knowledge commercialization. At first glance, the only thing that can be linked to the issue is the statement at the faculty’s strategic plan that research products commercialization should be promoted (TSU, Mission and Strategy of the Faculty, n.d.) Also, Scientific Research and Development office has responsibility for managing and carrying out research activities. Yet, these results are not sufficient to understand the entire picture. Therefore, we studied the faculty curriculum: 35 educational programmes concentrating on objectives, learning outcomes, and content. Before presenting the results, some details are essential to be mentioned. The SPS faculty was established in 2005 and currently has 7 BA, 17 MA, and 11 PhD programmes, which adds up to a total of almost 3,000 students. It consists of the following departments: Politi-

cal Science, International Relations, Human Geography, Sociology, and Social Work, Journalism and Mass Communication, Interdisciplinary Studies (TSU about faculty, n.d.).

After analyzing the faculty curriculum, several conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, BA and MA level programmes focus on preparing competitive personnel for the labour market, while PhD programme(s) declare the necessity of contributing to the study of social sciences. However, the above does not necessarily meet the knowledge commercialization criteria. Secondly, learning outcomes are presented in three parts: knowledge, skills, and responsibilities. The only thing that can be linked with the issue is that graduates will demonstrate their ability to the labour market independently. Thirdly, it is manifested that two administrative units (Geographic Information System Laboratory and Multimedia Centre) of the faculty are essential during the teaching process. The laboratory plays a crucial role in developing the vital competencies for future human geographers, while the said centre is a versatile (TV, radio, audio, etc.) platform for future media workers. However, there are no similar structural units in political science, international relations, sociology, and social work. Thus, the practical component is reduced to the 5 ECTS courses that mostly mean internships in the public or NGO sector. And, for sure, we cannot conclude that the faculty curriculum has any actual supportive scheme for knowledge commercialization issues.

We can conclude that the legislative framework neither explains the concept in question at the state level nor presents the supportive policy for knowledge commercialization. Lack of financial support and experience of centralized, planned education policy are proxies for less readiness to implement the knowledge commercialization process. On the one hand, research institutions do not try to be connected to market forces despite low funding. On the other hand, industry actors do not believe in its possibilities. At the same time, the most prominent and most internationalized university of Georgia supports the idea of knowledge commercialization, opens the Transfer and Innovation Centre, and tries to fund start-up projects. If we consider the state policy, the confusing situation of TSU can be explained by a high degree of internationalization and university administration's strong will to stay abreast the global trends. However, significant progress in knowledge commercialization has not been manifested at the faculty level yet. That is why the question still arises: Is knowledge commercialization essential for social sciences?

5. Possibilities of knowledge transfer/commercialization in social sciences: Perceptions of interviewees

As we already mentioned, the focus groups were conducted with the randomly selected BA, MA, and PhD students. The three main discussion issues can be outlined. The first is how students understand knowledge commercialization and the significant constraints of the process? The second: Is social science knowledge commercialization possible at all? And the third: Who can play a positive role in this process and how? Aggregated results show that most respondents believe that knowledge commercialization means gaining the competencies that adequately respond to the market demands and deliver the material benefits. However, the students recognize that this course of events cannot be guaranteed by formal education. During the discussion about “knowledge commercialization,” BA and MA students mention practical courses, while PhD candidates focus on funding their scientific projects.

Interestingly, respondents do not link business, research, and industry to one another. Their positions are more generalized. Yet, one issue seems clear: none of the respondents defines the concept as TSU does.

During the discussion about implementing the process, students point out several obstacles. First and foremost, it is the lack of will of the state. In their opinion, Georgian educational policymakers do not care about improving the education quality and funding innovative research; therefore, public universities carry the burden of responsibility. They meet with the problem of private-business sector volatility. They argue that the candidate selection in the private sector is arbitrary. Also, applying the social and political sciences is quite rare: “[...] the only way to start a job with your profession is in the NGO sector that is financially supported from international grants” (student of BA focus group). The third barrier is linked to transferring the same university-based knowledge over the years, as PhD students believe that university has a minor role in supporting young researchers. Hence, we can identify three major obstacles that students face during the process: the state’s unwillingness to help, the unpredictability of the business sector, and less support from the university.

There is a difference of opinion between the representatives of faculty administration and professors regarding the acceptance of knowledge commercialization ideas by TSU and the evaluation of the steps taken in this direction. Integrating the concept of knowledge commercialization into the TSU mission is logical as means to keep pace with the global trend – getting more and more finances (Interviewers 1 and 2). However, others have different positions: “Frankly speaking, the idea of commercialization has been copied from the missions of foreign higher education institutions as nowadays it is so popular, and we

have to be in this frame” (Interviewer 3). Similar positions are manifested by other interviewers, too: knowledge commercialization is not an issue to worry about (Interviewers 9 and 10). During the interviews, the reservations towards the process were also mentioned. Firstly, the Georgian business sector is quite limited to providing an effective supply-demand curve. Secondly, TSU creates pointless challenges and complicates the information exchange process. Thirdly, faculty curriculum problems are highlighted: “[...] transmission of the same theories for many years is quite problematic, teaching activities should be more practical, soon there will be no more option” (Interviewer 6).

Nevertheless, the positions are divided on the prospects of SPS-based knowledge commercialization. Some students, especially PhD candidates, are pessimistic (mainly due to lack of demand from market forces), while others give us some examples from practice. As the faculty consists of several departments, we will present the positions accordingly. For political science students, formulating a new public policy course or writing a policy paper or political blog are appropriate examples for knowledge commercialization in their academic field. For sociologists, desk/market research reports or establishing a supporting centre for any vulnerable social group can be similar. Human geographers use GIS technology to create urban/architectural companies or economic advisory bodies. Some examples are presented from Journalism and Mass Communication programmes students too. These include creating online media, radio shows, blogs, internet channels. For instance, an MA student said the following:

Our faculty graduates have opened a new political pub – the platform for public lectures and political meetings. Food and drinks are named after famous politicians and political events. The issue of occupation is also well-sold: on bags, wallets, and passports, the inscription that Russia occupies 20% of our territory has gained popularity in Georgia and outside the country. (Student from an MA focus group)

Our respondents mostly agree that natural or exact sciences have better experiences and prospects in the field, though social sciences can also provide appropriate products or services for the market. Research made in western countries shows that knowledge transfer in social sciences involves partners such as government agencies, firms, non-profit organizations, think tanks, or other non-governmental organizations (Olmos-Peñuela, Benneworth, & Castro-Martínez, 2013). During our research, respondents from the faculty administration and staff members also specified some fields, organizations, or jobs where social science knowledge could be used: joint housing for elderly and children, online media platform, tourism, and urban services, political analytics in governmental and non-governmental organizations. Knowledge commercialization and

transfer in the exact and technological sciences are more visible and effective. However, the role of the social sciences is also essential (The British Academy, 2010). According to the European Commission Report of the Expert Group on Humanities (2007), the contribution of SSH (Socioeconomic Sciences and Humanities) research to society consists of the provision of contents and the promotion of self-reflection, critical and conceptual thinking.

In contrast, the provision of technologies is more typical for engineering and experimental science fields (Olmos-Peñuela, Castro-Martínez, & D'Estea, 2014). A similar opinion was expressed by one of our respondents from a faculty staff, who claims: "The major product of our faculty refers to the human resources that promote all processes, including commercialization. While others make visible, computable, and observable products, we create ideas that reproduce the whole society" (Interviewer 7).

It should be noted that BA and MA students see social science knowledge commercialization as realistic as the same process in remaining fields (considering: skills can be highly paid). In contrast, PhD students think differently: they tend to focus on the lack of experience and state policy.

Graduates can't find jobs within their professions. There is no demand from the market, as we don't have tradition and culture of it. We all know that social sciences are not the priority for this country. Financial grants are primarily for natural sciences, like math or physics. (Student from a BA focus group)

The last topic deals with the potential positive actor in the process. Despite worries, the university is indicated here by the majority of respondents. It is somehow connected to the top-down approach that stresses the responsibility of higher education institutions to create an active communication platform for the business sector and university-based researchers. Interestingly enough, the university and business are pointed out as positive catalysts for further commercialization: "[...] if demand exists, innovative research will determine the outcome" (Student from a PhD focus group). Waiting for state support is the least desirable for students. Legislative regulations should not complicate cooperation between research and industry, they believe. Finally, it should be noted that during the discussion about positive roles, respondents stressed mostly macro-level factors (business openness and state policy).

Unlike other issues, the most significant differences are outlined about the role of the faculty and the university. It shows that even on the faculty level, there is no consensus about the functions of the key actors. We can outline some of the significant points that challenge the process: a) academic staff should have more responsibility while researching with students, but the university should operate as an active hub between the business and academi-

cians; b) curriculum transformation and renewed academic staff is urgently needed; c) macro-level factors: “ingrained nepotism” in business/industry and the post-Soviet experience when the government and society unconsciously support kinships and clans; d) limitations relating to funding research which prevents the faculty from becoming the forerunner for the fundamental changes (Interviewees 7, 10, 5, 3).

As a result, the knowledge commercialization agenda is ambivalent for the management and staff members of the SPS faculty. Some of them see the process as aimless, while others stress the challenges in the field. Yet, two major findings may be mentioned. Firstly, shifting responsibility from the faculty to the university and neglecting “student” as a participant and stakeholder of the process. Secondly, the positions are divided and unanswered regarding the question: Who can play a positive role in the process – the state, university, faculty, academic staff, or young researchers?

6. Conclusions

The article is one of the first attempts to study empirically the knowledge commercialization process that has been ongoing in Georgia. We aimed at determining the macro- and micro-level factors impacting the process. Also, we specifically stress the commercialization of social studies. The new institutional theoretical approach explains the results of the study. We used both macro- (post-Soviet experience, state’s economic and education policy) and mezzo-level factors (university and faculty actions) in order to explain the influence of institutional actors.

The case of TSU shows that the national institutional context negatively affects the process, while the opposite is true for the international context. The post-Soviet reality of Georgia can be the reason for a fragile economy and weak industrial actors that pay no attention to the university-based knowledge perspectives, while academic staff also do not welcome the commercialization of their “knowledge.” Moreover, the legislative framework and the state policy, particularly funding, cannot be assessed as supportive of further commercialization. Thus, neither state nor business sector and higher education institutions show deep readiness for cooperation.

However, TSU declares the importance of knowledge commercialization, both in terms of the university’s mission and its strategy. Majority of our respondents define knowledge commercialization as a practical utilization of knowledge, while the proposed explanation by TSU is quite different. The said

discrepancy may only be explained by the high level of internationalization of the university and the strong desire of its top management to keep pace with the global trends. Therefore, TSU acts to gain its legitimacy with its international partners. As Pietila (2014) mentions, when positions of university management and state policymakers differ, higher education institutions can merely symbolically respond to the global demand to strengthen its corporate image. However, disseminating it through the university is another exciting issue.

What is more, in the case of TSU the faculty curriculum is incommensurate with the declared commercialization policy despite establishing the Centre for Knowledge Transfer and Innovation. Indeed, SPSs need to formulate a different approach. Having analyzed interviews and focus group results, we were able to outline some exciting findings. Most of all, it should be noted that students (especially those enrolled in BA and MA programmes) see the process more positively than the faculty administration members do. The skepticism of PhD students and management stems from the national institutional context – a minor attention for social sciences from the public as well as from business sectors. The main focus of the state policy in terms of commercialization and knowledge transfer is the technical sciences, while the social sciences (along with humanities) are paid relatively little attention, which is corroborated by different Western researchers. Even in some countries with highly developed economies, social sciences (and humanities) are excluded from the research funding in interdisciplinary research (Olmos-Peñuela et al., 2014; Crossick, 2009; Holm & Liinason, 2005, pp. 38; Krebs & Wenk, 2005). Data obtained in our study including on positions regarding the SPS knowledge commercialization confirm the above.

The significant challenges indicated by our respondents are ignorance of education policymakers and industry compounded by the nepotism, the frustration of academic staff, students and the scarcity of support from the university as well as the lack of financial aid. Despite this, students and administration see their higher education institution as a potential catalyst for the process: taking responsibility for changing curriculum and working as a hub between researchers and business to get more and more profit. The top-down and bottom-up approach are outlined as only active scholars and students can press the university to transform its mission into reality. Interestingly, our respondents' perceptions of university-business-public relations and the problems cited by our respondents are pretty similar to those mentioned by representatives of different Polish universities and research centres: the lack of favourable institutional environment, effective communication, and mutual trust, as well as the lack of financial support from the state budget (Młodzińska-Granek & Kwieciński, 2018)

Finally, we have to conclude that positions on the social sciences knowledge commercialization issue at TSU are divided. The first vision states that it can be done easily if there is enough will and support for the process. However, the op-

posite vision claims that aligning social studies with natural sciences is aimless. The essential product of commercialization are the human resources and societal ideas that create and shape everything. Indeed, the human development contribution approach can be used to characterize the social science knowledge commercialization issue. Ultimately, proponents of both views agree with the vision of DEA (2011, p. 22) that SSH can play an essential role in solving societal challenges which “demand alternative solutions and new ways [...] and this is not done by losing the Social Sciences and Humanities.”

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Factors Influencing Local Governments' COVID-19 Crisis Decision Making: Case Study of the First Wave in the Two Estonian Municipalities

Czynniki wpływające na podejmowanie przez samorządy lokalne decyzji w związku z kryzysem COVID-19: studium przypadku dotyczącego pierwszej fali w dwóch gminach estońskich

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Abstract

The present article describes the results of a case study on the factors that influenced COVID-19 first wave decision making on the local government level in the Republic of Estonia. The municipalities that were studied were the biggest municipality in Estonia, the City of Tallinn, and the worst hit local government in the first wave, the Municipality of Saaremaa. In the mapping of crisis units, 3 units were identified in Tallinn, 2 in Saaremaa – some formalized prior the crisis, others formalized *ad hoc*, and yet others not formalized at all. The subjects of the study were the members of the COVID-19 crisis units.

Abstrakt

W niniejszym artykule opisano wyniki studium przypadku dotyczącego czynników, które wpłynęły na podejmowanie decyzji związanych z pierwszą falą COVID-19 na poziomie samorządów lokalnych w Republice Estońskiej. Badane gminy to największa gmina w Estonii, miasto Tallinn, oraz najbardziej dotknięta pierwszą falą kryzysu gmina Saaremaa. W trakcie mapowania jednostek kryzysowych zidentyfikowano trzy jednostki w Tallinie i dwie w Saaremaa – niektóre sformalizowane przed kryzysem, inne sformalizowane *ad hoc*, a jeszcze inne w ogóle niesformalizowane. Podmiotami badania byli członkowie jednostek kryzysowych COVID-19.

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The study which comprised of a questionnaire and in-depth interviews focused on the influence of 8 decision-making factors which were divided into internal (stress, helplessness, group pressure, and well-being) and external (time pressure, pressure from the media and the public, availability of information, pressure from the central government or other institutions). The results indicate that external factors were the predominantly influencing (highest pressure was felt due to time pressure, stress and the pressure from media and the public). Decision makers also highlighted previous experience, risk perception and emotions, which influenced decision making.

Key words: crisis management, COVID-19, decision making, factors, local government

Badanie, które składało się z kwestionariusza i wywiadów pogłębionych, koncentrowało się na wpływie ośmiu czynników decyzyjnych, które podzielono na wewnętrzne (stres, bezradność, presja grupy i dobre samopoczucie) i zewnętrzne (presja czasu, presja mediów i opinii publicznej, dostępność informacji, presja rządu centralnego lub innych instytucji). Wyniki wskazują, że największy wpływ miały czynniki zewnętrzne (największa napięcie odczuwano z powodu presji czasu, stresu oraz presji ze strony mediów i opinii publicznej). Decydenci podkreślali, że wpływ na podejmowanie decyzji miały także wcześniejsze doświadczenia, postrzeżenie ryzyka i emocje.

Słowa kluczowe: zarządzanie kryzysowe, COVID-19, podejmowanie decyzji, czynniki, samorząd lokalny

1. Introduction

German historian Sebastian Conrad (2018, p. 183) has noted that epidemic diseases are a burdensome – and perhaps inevitable – cost of connection or globalization. The onset of COVID-19 pandemic, which started in Wuhan (Peoples Republic of China) in the beginning of 2020, has burdened health care systems, the global economy and caused serious disturbances to day-to-day governance around the globe. The public sector at all levels is responsible for managing pandemics as crises which threaten human lives. The stress that managing a crisis puts on a public institution is especially burdensome in the case of lack of information, inadequate previous experience or scarce resources, which were all present during the pandemic's first wave. No matter how dire the situation is, public sector cannot refrain from crisis management, but more specifically, from making decisions in a crisis. Therefore, crisis management via decision making may be considered a public service.

In Estonia, a public service is defined as a service rendered upon performing a public task, aimed at providing a benefit to the public, fulfilling an obligation inherent in a public role, or in order to protect fundamental rights, freedoms, and interests (Ministry of Finance, 2022, p. 26). While distinction is made between internal (services for natural and legal persons) and external (beneficiaries cannot be identified) support services, they are considered as basic services.

Of the direct services, the subdivision of event service stands out, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, being provided jointly by several institutions to enable a person to complete all the obligations and exercise all the rights that they have in relation to an event or situation (Principles for Managing Services and Governing Information, § 2 p. 4). Therefore, crisis managing via decision making may be seen more specifically as an event service.

Whilst public sector is considered to be resilient to crises (Rochet et al., 2008, p. 63), the corona crisis adds an extra nuance with its duration – it can feel like “it doesn’t matter what we do, it keeps coming back” (Tercatin, 2021). The complex conditions in which decision making takes place in the context of crisis management affect decision making as a process but also in terms of its efficiency and quality. COVID-19 has highlighted these challenges faced by public sector institutions in decision-making processes and the implementation of the resulting measures.

Decision making itself is such an integral part of crisis management that crises can be plainly interpreted as a time for decision making (Brecher, 1993; Janis, 1989). According to Lewin (1931, p. 141), “the need to make a choice is in itself a source of stress.” This stress can be managed. Although indeed there are aspects of the corona crisis that are beyond human control, there are also areas where processes and systems can be made more efficient, resilient, and flexible.

The responsibility of political decision makers in a pandemic is comparable to or even greater than the responsibility of healthcare professionals. The resilience of the healthcare system, as well as society as a whole, is directly dependent on decisions made at the public sector level, this also includes local governments. For example, the potential impact of the decisions of the largest local government in Estonia, which is the case of Tallinn, extends well over to third of the country’s total population¹ when its metropolitan area (population approx. 609,000)² is taken into account (Mürk, 2014, p. 3; Nagel, 2021, p. 7).

The COVID-19-induced crisis provides a rare opportunity to study the factors and processes by which decision making is influenced. As a practical outlet, studying decision-making processes in a crisis offers answers to public sector decision makers’ most important question: What should we know about crisis decision making and the factors influencing it?

It is worthwhile to note that adequate decision making becomes even more important in a prolonged crisis. Despite the fact that the previous waves have by now given many policymakers, organizations, and experts a number of new experiences with an ever-improving understanding of the coronavirus, the society as a whole is showing signs of corona-boredom and fatigue. This affects the

¹ As of January 1, 2021 the population of the Republic of Estonia is 1,330,068 (Statistics Estonia, 2021a).

² As of January 1, 2021 the population of Harju county is 609,515 (Statistics Estonia, 2021b).

provision of both private and public services, infringes on rights and creates social aversion (including public protests), which again highlights the importance of crisis communication as well as media and public pressure to influence crisis management. However, these are just some of the factors that have a significant impact on decision making in the on going crisis.

2. Theoretical framework

According to Conrad (2018, pp. 137–139), the historical reality on the ground level is much more confusing and fragmented than can be seen from the macro-perspective. For this reason, it is important to understand crisis management at the grassroots level of public sector, the local government. In the six-level national COVID-19 crisis management network (Ruul, 2020, pp. 62–63; Nagel, 2021, p. 173) there were three administrative levels between Estonian local governments and the central government: ministries, agencies, and regional crisis units³ (North Estonia, West Estonia, South Estonia, East Estonia, and the region of Saaremaa). This in itself describes the complexity of the multi-level decision-making environment at the time from the perspective of Estonian local governments. Although the Estonian local governments have a clear statutory role in managing a social crisis, the role of municipalities in an emerging pandemic was not clear in Estonia in the beginning of 2020.

In crisis management, Boin et al. (2016, p. 15) highlight five tasks of strategic crisis management: sense making, decision making and coordinating, meaning making, accounting, and learning. One of the pillars of crisis management is decision making. Decisions are not made in a vacuum and are influenced by various factors (Thomas, 2019, p. 28; Nagel, 2021, p. 138–139) which may differ significantly at specific levels of the public sector. Crises disrupt routines as they change the normality (Mayo, 2020), thereby posing new challenges with great uncertainty in which decision-making groups need to focus on deliberating efficiently, deciding for the common good, and persisting to implement decisions (Thürmer et al., 2020, p. 2157). Decision making during a crisis is affected by several sources of information and prior knowledge, such as factual (statistical) information, narratives of others, and real-time governmental messages (Bakker et al., 2019, p. 1419).

³ Remarks: a crisis unit is the collective term for manned systems (crisis committee, crisis team, crisis task force, etc.) of various sizes, roles, personal compositions, and time dimensions of crisis management at organizational level, which are activated and/or created at the outbreak of a crisis or during different phases thereof. Given the complexity of crises, it is normal that decision-making processes involve more than one decision-making group (Stern, 2003, p. 207) but also a new organizational form (Boin et al., 2016).

One explanation for the persuasive effect of narratives on decision making may be that affective responses (e.g. stress and anxiety) are triggered, which generally have strong effects on decision behaviour (Slovic et al., 2007). An average municipal crisis unit is made up of municipal staff and may include experts and relevant external stakeholders, led by policymakers as members of local government councils and governments. At the beginning of the corona crisis, policymakers were faced with the sudden need to take action in order to protect their population from the disease, whereas they lacked reliable information on the disease itself and its transmission mechanisms (Berger et al., 2021, p. 1). However, every crisis adds to the field the socio-economical dimension, which hinders decision making, as there is little information on the effectiveness of possible measures and their (direct and indirect) consequences (Berger et al., 2021, p. 2).

This can lead to situation interpretations that differ between decision makers within the specific organization and across the different levels of the public sector where availability of information, resources, and expertise vary greatly. According to Boin (2004, p. 171) in the initial phase of a crisis, crisis managers have to decide whether there is a real threat or whether there are signals indicating an imminent threat. Thus, the challenge reveals itself in interweaving crisis management into daily practice of politics and administration in such a way that crisis management becomes a routine form of public governance (Boin, p. 174).

The specific impact on public sector decision makers, especially on the municipality level, has so far received low attention in academic research. The impact of these factors can be both positive (e.g. the availability of information lowers perceived stress levels) and negative (e.g. time pressure as a cause of stress), which was also stated in the study (Nagel, 2021) of factors influencing decision makers in municipal crisis units. Both options need to be considered when planning decision-making units and their work organization. It must also be noted that crisis conditions can lead not only to decision making but also to non-decision making, which, according to Wolfenstein (1967), manifests itself as a decision not to decide or as a decision not to react. According to 't Hart et al. (2008, p. 237), this in turn can lead to paralysis of the organization and decision makers, where policymakers and other crisis managers are overwhelmed by the pressure of events to such an extent that they are no longer able to take action and events develop on their own.

In a decision-making situation, the inability to cope with uncertainty and constant change may also affect the decision maker's ability to process information – for example, valuable information from alternative sources may be overlooked and COVID-19 outbreak phases may be misinterpreted (Berger et al., 2020, p. 1), which can lead to decisions with possible catastrophic consequences (Chater, 2020, p. 439).

In fulfilling the role of a crisis manager as an organization, the impact of COVID-19 on local governments (OECD, 2020, p. 9) was high or very high in 63% of EU Member States' regions or municipalities. The impact was felt greatest in the municipalities with more than 250,000 inhabitants (e.g. Tallinn over 438,000).⁴ The study also mapped the factors that affected local governments the most – these were the lack of technical means and equipment, lack of human resources, legal obstacles as well as the lack of coordinated action by the central government and other state agencies (OECD, 2020, p. 10).

Rating the COVID-19 impact high or very high by most EU municipalities (OECD, 2020) raises a question on the crisis preparedness on the local level. In the case of Estonia, Saaremets (2011) and Sildnik (2018) concluded pre-COVID crisis readiness of municipalities. Saaremets (2011, p. 2) mapped the challenges of West Estonian local governments crisis units preparedness – the main problem inhibiting successful crisis management was one of resources – time, people, energy, and equipment. Sildnik (2018, p. 84) assessed the capacity of Estonian local governments to cope independently in a crisis (also with the help of service providers) and concluded it to have been rather weak. Sildnik also points out that preparedness is at best incomplete and not fully mapped (2018, p. 84). It must be considered that he studied provision of vital services such as electricity or water and, for example, readiness for evacuation whilst the challenges posed by a pandemic as a health event were different. Deciding on whether to send educational institutions to distance learning, implement curfews, or cancel large-scale events due to health hazard were pandemic-specific areas in which the Estonian municipalities had no previous and comparable experience.

The National Audit Office (2018) recommended that the Estonian public administration ought to focus on analyzing risks it did not transfer into actions, and concluded that risk mitigation measures were not systematically implemented. Furthermore, many authorities did not document nor analyze the results of crisis exercises, so there is no assurance that lessons learned are applied. What is more, several critical service providers (e.g. hospitals and ambulances) are unable to render emergency services in the event of a protracted crisis because of their dependence on electricity, heating, water, etc., which public institutions lack the resources to provide autonomously (National Audit Office, 2018, pp. 3–5). In regards to local governments, the report of 2021 (National Audit Office, 2021, pp. 7–21) concluded that the tasks of the public sector on all levels must be clear and the messages understandable to the public as lives depend on it. In addition, crisis aid for organizations (including local governments) must be delivered quickly, transparently, and take into account the actual need for assistance.

⁴ As of January 1, 2021 the population of the City of Tallinn is 438,342 (Statistics Estonia, 2021b).

One of the most in-depth study of factors influencing local level crisis units' decision makers was conducted in the context of the 2017 landscape megafires in California (USA) by Thomas (2019), whose dissertation was one of the main starting points for developing the theoretical framework of this study. In his research, Thomas (2019) determined the internal and external factors influencing decision-making processes in public sector's crisis management. Combined with the conceptual model of factors influencing decisions developed by Thompson (2014, p. 638), the two were adapted by Nagel (2021, p. 29) to study local government decision making in the initial phase of COVID-19. Looking into the local level of decision making is crucial because local governments have certain responsibilities and tasks that must be fulfilled and services which need to be provided in a crisis, foreseen by law.

The present survey (Nagel, 2021) repeated the survey conducted by Thomas (2019) in a modified form, allowing it to test the reliability of the methodology designed to study wildfire crisis management in the conditions of a megacrisis that the COVID-19 pandemic has proven to be (Boin et al., 2020, p. 189). The theoretical framework was mainly based on the combination of the works of the following researchers and their previous research results: Thomas (2019), Thompson (2014), Stern (2003), Jaques (2007, 2010, 2014), Janis (1972, 1982, 1983), Janis and Mann (1976, 1977), Holsti (1972), and Ahituv et al. (1998).

The study focused primarily on mapping factors through the study of decision-making processes of two local governments' crisis units and drawing conclusions from what had influenced the decision makers during the COVID-19 first wave.

The municipalities selected for the study differed in several parameters – for instance, size, population density, availability of manpower and financial resources, number of municipality-owned healthcare facilities, to name few (see Table 1).

Table 1.

Comparison of resources potentially affecting crisis management
in the sampled municipalities

Local government	City of Tallinn	Municipality of Saaremaa
No. of inhabitants	438 342	31 073
Density (people per sq. km)	2 745.9	11.4
Area (sq. km)	159.3	2 718
Percent of the country's population	33.4	2.3
Percent of Estonians	52.8 (2020)	97.9 (2019)
No. of municipal staff	ca. 20 000	ca. 1600
Municipal budget in 2020 (EUR)	ca. 823 700 000	ca. 55 600 000
No. of municipal hospitals	3	1

Source: own study based on regional and national statistics (Nagel, 2021, p. 49).

In addition, both Saare County and Harju County (including the Tallinn metropolitan area) stood out from other Estonian regions at the beginning and middle of the first wave with highest infection rates in the country (Nagel, 2021, p. 49). The importance of conducting research in the chosen municipalities' crisis units is also illustrated by Figure 1 and by the fact that 48.5% of first wave victims (Rüütel et al., 2020, p. 32) and 70% of patients in need of hospital treatment in Estonia came from the sample municipalities (Nagel, 2021, p. 49).




Figure 1. Active COVID-19 cases at the beginning of the emergency situation on March 12 and during the peak on April 6 in 2020

Explanation: the arrows mark the increase in the number of infected people over time at county level, comparing the two key dates of the first wave.

Source: own elaboration based on the Estonian Health Board statistics.

The decision makers of the crisis units of two Estonian local governments – the City of Tallinn and the Municipality of Saaremaa – who were involved in preventing the spread of COVID-19 viral disease during the above-mentioned period were included in the sample. The period which the study focused on started on February 26, 2020, when the threat from the coronavirus became real in Estonia – on this date the first infected person was identified in the country (Estonian Health Board, 2020) and the central government formed a coronavirus prevention team (Government of the Republic of Estonia, 2020). The survey

period ends on May 18, 2020 with an end of the emergency situation declared by the central government.

3. Methodology

The design of the study was based on a combined method, which according to Tashakkor and Creswell (2007, p. 4) gives the researcher a certain advantage in collecting and analyzing data by integrating findings and drawing conclusions using both quantitative and qualitative methods. It also allows expanding and strengthening the findings of the study (Schoonenboom & Johnson, 2017, p. 110). The combined study method (Nagel, 2021) used document analysis, a questionnaire, semi-structured interviews and correlation analysis. The decision makers of the crisis units provided important quantitative and qualitative input to the study, which complemented each other. The methodology allowed to describe what factors influenced decision makers and how, in order to assess the impact of these factors and the causality between them.

The study consisted of three consecutive stages. First, document analysis was used to map the crisis units created at the beginning of the pandemic in Tallinn and Municipality of Saaremaa. After identifying the crisis units, a list of their members during the first wave was compiled. In order to refine and verify the size of the final sample, several requests for information were made, and consultations held with representatives of the municipalities to clarify decision-making networks at the local government level. In total, 80 members of the crisis units were identified. Then, a questionnaire (see Nagel, 2021, pp. 165–168 for more details) was sent to all of the members of the mentioned crisis units with an aim to acquire quantitative data to map the decision makers' assessments based on the influencing factors previously discussed in the Thomas (2019) and Thompson (2014) studies on a 5-point scale (1 – lowest influence, 5 – highest influence). Answers of 41 (51%) members of the crisis units were received. The database with the collected quantitative data was analyzed using R-Studio (v. 1.3.1093).

Lastly, semi-structured interviews (see Nagel, 2021, p. 53 for the details) (n = 15) were conducted with decision makers to understand the real life implications of the factors which were, according to the questionnaire, the biggest influencers of crisis decision making. The interviews resulted in 11 hours (Nagel, 2021, p. 52) of audio material subsequently analyzed via narrative and discourse analysis.

As a limitation of the methodology, one must point out the fact that the beginning of the questionnaire survey was 213 days after the end of the Emergency Situation and 295 days from the beginning of the survey period. It must therefore be kept in mind that remembering the events of that time may have been difficult over the said time period for decision makers. It must also be considered that at the time when the study was underway, Estonia was in the midst of the active phase of the second wave of COVID-19 and the crisis units of both the municipalities were actively engaged with crisis management (Nagel, 2021, p. 142).

4. Main results in regard the decision-making factors and their manifestations

In the phase of mapping of the crisis units of the studied municipalities, three crisis units were identified in Tallinn, two in Saaremaa – some formalized prior to the crisis, others formalized ad hoc, and yet others not formalized at all. In these crisis units, 80 members were identified. The decision makers were divided into four categories: 1) members of local government councils and (city/rural municipality) governments, 2) heads of local government agencies, 3) local government officials, and 4) external experts (see Nagel, 2021, pp. 169–170 for more details).

In the questionnaire that was sent to them, the decision makers assessed 8 factors (stress, helplessness, media and public pressure, time pressure, group pressure, availability of information, self-care, and pressure from central government or other organizations) that influenced on decision making in the first wave, on the mentioned 5-point scale during the period. Time pressure, stress, media and public pressure were rated as the most important factors influencing the decision-making process (see Figure 2).

The decision makers of both Tallinn and Saaremaa crisis units rated time pressure, stress and media and public pressure, as the most influential unanimously, but in Saaremaa the influence of the factors was felt as more severe. This is also in line with the difference in the depth of the crisis in the first wave, the situation in Saaremaa was critical contagion-wise. For example, the average perceived impact of key factors on a 5-point scale was 2.94/5 in Tallinn and 3.25/5 in Saaremaa, which suggests that the deeper the crisis, the more important external and internal factors become in influencing decision makers (Nagel, 2021, pp. 70, 141).




Figure 2. Perceived impact of factors in the decision-making process during the first wave of COVID-19 on the averages of municipalities and decision makers

Source: own study based on online-questionnaire survey (Nagel, 2021, p. 69).

When comparing external (derived from the decision-making environment) and internal (derived from within the crisis unit) factors, the impact of external factors (time pressure, media and public pressure, availability of information, central government or other organization pressure) was considered more severe – the average influence of external factors was 3.31/5 compared to internal factors (stress, attending to one’s well-being, group pressure, and helplessness) with an average of 2.79/5 (Nagel, 2021, p. 140). Pressure from the central government or other organizations, the availability of information, attending to one’s well-being, group pressure, and helplessness were perceived as less influential.

During the first wave of the coronavirus crisis, the situation emerged differently in Tallinn and Saaremaa. The study results show that this difference was also reflected in the perception of the factors that influenced decision making by respective crisis units’ decision makers. The decision makers of both municipalities chose identical factors – time pressure, stress and media and public pressure – as the three most influential factors of the decision making. In Saaremaa, as the municipality that was affected most seriously in the first wave, the influence of the factors was felt more intensively by the decision makers.

As the question “What factors influenced decision making in the crisis units the most?” was answered, the question “How did the influence of these factors emerge?” remained. In addition to the 8 main factors provided to the decision makers for assessment, the interviews revealed three additional factors influencing decision making: the existence of previous (personal) experience, risk perception, and emotions. The manifestations of the 8 main and 3 additional factors (in total 34) that influenced the decision making are summarized in Table 2:

Table 2.

Key and additional factors influencing decision making and their forms of expression

Key factor	Output
Time pressure	1. The need to decide quickly; 2. Many tasks combined with the lack of time; 3. Periodicity of time pressure.
Stress	4. Increase in workload and long working hours; 5. Perceptions of residents' expectations as a source of stress; 6. Adrenaline-powered working.
Media and public pressure	7. Media's hunger for information; 8. Proactive communication; 9. Click-based media as an amplifier of situations and influencer of decision-making process; 10. Difficulties of reaching different target groups.
Helplessness	11. Feeling of hopelessness; that one's life has changed forever; 12. The feeling of abandonment.
Group pressure factors and manifestations	13. Existence of a strong leader, system and discipline; 14. Discussions, disputes and disagreements.
Availability of information	15. Lack of information – difficult to get information from the Estonian Health Board; 16. Request to be involved in the state-level national crisis committee.
Attending to one's well-being	17. Meeting physiological and security needs; 18. Burnout and its prevention.
Pressure from central government or other organizations	19. Weak state governance and lack of support; 20. Confusing uncoordinated guidelines from higher levels; 21. Uncertainty of the legal space; 22. The problem of the "one size fits all" approach.
Additional factor	output
Existence of previous experience	23. Positive effect of having personal experience; 24. Negative impact of lack of experience at organizational level; 25. Unrealistic and insufficient previous crisis exercises.
Risk perception	26. Difference in risk perception in Tallinn and Saaremaa; 27. Wearing a mask as an example of the danger perception during the first corona wave; 28. Public sector communication choices as an influencer of public risk perception; 29. Many other municipalities did not take the crisis seriously.
Emotions	30. Feeling fear; 31. Fiery and passionate discussions; 32. Mental coping with prospective and real deaths; 33. Public criticism at the height of the crisis; 34. Echoes of exertion.

Source: own study based on information from semi-structured interviews (Nagel, 2021, p. 138).

In the narrative analysis of the interviews (see Nagel, 2021, pp. 139–140 for more details), the following features of the factors influencing decision-making were mentioned:

A very important feature of a crisis situation was considered to be working under strong time pressure, which was characterized by decision makers as the need to decide quickly, the abundance of tasks combined with long working hours. During the onset of the crisis, the situation was somewhat interesting for decision makers, despite the perceived danger. It was considered important to provide days off to maintain mental health of the people working in the crisis units. In Saaremaa, a ban was applied on the on-site working of the crisis unit member, if their workload had turned out to be too great, rotation was used in Tallinn. According to the decision makers, there were many debates and discussions, but the matter rarely ended with serious disagreements, and there was no recording of disagreements in the official documents. Dealing with death was described as the emotionally most difficult aspect of the crisis.

At the beginning of the crisis, the ambiguity and complexity of decision making was most evident in enforcing restrictions and mitigation measures (distance learning, closing the non-essential shops in shopping malls, setting rules for public transport etc.), arranging communication (on the restrictions, easing the restrictions, precautionary measures) but also in reorganizing the work of the local government units (distance work while remaining available for the citizens).

Local government decision makers highlighted the media's hunger for information, which was generally considered understandable and inevitable, although it was sometimes interpreted as a search for "clickbait headlines". The decision makers emphasized the importance of proactive communication as a mitigation measure for media pressure – holding regular press conferences or giving regular information to the media by other means. Reaching some specific target groups via communication was not easy – in Saaremaa, for example, youngsters, in Tallinn, the Russian-speaking population.

There were quite large differences in the perception of risk – in Tallinn, as a municipality with a significantly higher population density, the risk was felt quite early, in the Municipality of Saaremaa the protection was felt greater – being on an island, away from the mainland and virus outbreaks in China and Italy seemed very far away. The decision makers emphasized the positive effects of personal past (crisis) experiences and the negative effects of the lack of organizational experience. Earlier crisis exercises were deemed insufficient in numbers and unrealistic in content. The importance of a strong leader, system, structure and discipline in the crisis was considered vital asset of a functioning crisis units.

There were difficulties in obtaining information from the Estonian Health Board⁵ observed in the crisis units of both municipalities, whose members were expecting more constructive help in organizing the work of hospitals as well as clearer messages. In both crisis units, it was claimed that in certain situations local governments were left alone by the state in a crisis situation, which created a feeling of helplessness. In the case of the relations with central government, crisis management was considered to be relatively weak as it was often not understood who (what organization, ministry etc.) was managing the crisis at the central level. This may be due to the six-level crisis management scheme previously discussed (see Nagel, 2021, p. 173 for more details). In Tallinn, it was emphasized that the government was trying too hard to implement “one size fits all” approach, due to the fact that the capital, with almost half a million inhabitants, was subject to the same restrictions as some small municipalities with a population of ca. 1,000. Both Tallinn and Saaremaa in the first wave, considered that their representatives should have been included in the national crisis committee.

The ambiguity of the legal space was evident in the decision-making processes concerning mass gathering events that would potentially lead to a crisis. In order for local governments to be able to ban a concert before the Emergency Situation was declared, for example, they would have had to start “inventing” a non-traditional solution in the legal sphere. The decision makers were also disturbed by public criticism at the height of the crisis, when they did not even have time to respond to criticism in addition to their job responsibilities.

The main hypotheses in regard of the factors that influenced decision making on the local government level in the first wave, are summarized as follows:

- *Time pressure is a significant factor influencing decision making:* during the first wave of COVID-19 it turned out to be the most important decision-making factor (3.88/5) and it was felt more acutely in Saaremaa (4.27/5) versus Tallinn (3.65/5). Time pressure had a more significant and statistically significant effect on all other factors, most notably the perception of group pressure and helplessness as well as stress. The decision makers described the need for quick decision making, the multiplicity of tasks in the face of time constraints and the reduction of time pressure in April 2020 as expressions of time pressure.
- *Stress is a significant factor influencing decision making:* it turned out to be the second largest factor influencing decision making (3.66/5) and it was evenly felt in Saaremaa (3.66/5) and in Tallinn (3.65/5). Stress was significant-

⁵ The study (Nagel, 2021, p. 88) also revealed that the Estonian Health Board did not consider important to make any substantive changes in the personnel of the agency even at the height of the COVID-19 first wave crisis despite it had great difficulties in communicating critical information to the numerous crisis units operating in across Estonia – from January 1 to May 18, 2020 the change in staff occurred only within 0.85 positions (252.3 in January and 253.15 in May, 2020; Estonian Health Board, 2021).

tly affected by other factors, including the statistically significant presence of information, time pressure and feelings of helplessness. While speaking about stress, the decision makers described the increase in workload and long working days, the perception of residents' expectations as a separate source of stress and working on adrenaline.

- *Media and public pressure is an important factor in the decision making of local governments in crisis units:* ranked third highest factor influencing decision making (3.29/5), it was felt more strongly in Saaremaa (3.73/5) versus in Tallinn (3.12/5). It also affected other factors, including statistically significant helplessness and time pressure. The decision makers described media pressure as media's hunger for information, the effects of clickbait on decision-making processes, the importance of proactive communication and reaching different target groups.
- *The availability of information is a significant factor influencing decision making:* this hypothesis was not confirmed in its original form. The availability of information was not one of the factors that local government decision makers assessed as one of the most important factors that directly affected the situation (only fifth in order), but it does have a strong indirect effect through several other factors that make it difficult to solve and decide. This finding is confirmed by Ahituv et al. (1998) who found that the availability of complete information does not always improve the results of decisions to a statistically significant extent. It appeared that the availability of information reduces perceived stress, helplessness, and time pressure. The decision makers described the lack of information and the desire to be at the national decision-making level (Nagel, 2021, p. 173), for example involved in the national crisis committee.
- *Experienced decision makers are important contributors to crisis units:* the existence of previous personal experience was an important factor in the assessments of the decision makers of local government crisis units, it was mentioned in the interviews by almost all decision makers (93.3%) and therefore the author assessed it as an additional factor. The decision makers described the positive effects of having personal experience, the negative effects of the lack of organizational experience, and unrealistic and too little crisis exercises that did not allow for sufficient crisis preparedness as expressions of the importance of past experience.
- *Local government crisis units as new and relatively small groups are more compliant in their decisions and conflict-avoiding:* the results of the decision makers' interviews showed that disagreements were never recorded and that conflicts remained at the level of discussions and were resolved through clarification. This finding confirms the observation of Stern (2003) and Stern and Sundelius (1994) that such tendencies are particularly evident in small decision-making groups set up on an ad-hoc basis.

5. Conclusions

Being influenced by time pressure, stress, emotions, and other factors characteristic to crisis management situations, reminds us that crisis managers and the decision-making process are not immune to adverse effects of crisis environment. Janis and Mann (1977, p. 15) have aptly presented decision makers as dependent individuals who are “limited by conflict, doubt, concern, longing, antipathy, and loyalty.”

The study confirmed the conclusion of Millar et al. (2018) that lack of readiness causes stress, mental exhaustion, and inhibits the ability of an organization to operate in an unstable environment. The 34 different forms of expression with 8 main factors and 3 additional factors revealed suggest that in a crisis environment local governments of different sizes (e.g. Tallinn vs Saaremaa) do not have fundamental advantages over each other (Nagel, 2021, p. 25). A similar finding has been made by the OECD (2020) study.

The results of this study only show the factors that influenced decision makers of local municipalities in a very specific context – beginning of a pandemic caused by a virus that was unknown at the time. The novel crisis combined with a serious lack of information created a distinct and specific crisis-management situation. Follow-up studies are needed to clarify the types of factors that influence decision makers in the second, third, and following waves to understand better how the decision making as a process change in a long and evolving crisis to better understand the dynamics of local-level decision making.

One of the key conclusions of the study is that the severity of the influence of decision-making factors felt in the crisis units is linked to the severity of the situation. This means that, for example, the pressure under which the health-care system of a municipality is, translates into the higher influence of decision-making factors. There remains a question whether high infection rates bring extreme decision-making environment or vice versa, the increasingly stressful crisis management situation is what leads to, in some case, inadequate decisions and therefore exacerbates crisis?

Considering the latter, mitigating the influence of factors that make decision making difficult should in theory also help to ease the consequences of the crisis. If we, for example, take pressure from media that was mentioned as one of the top three influencing factors, engaging in proactive communication and including crisis management experts should alleviate this. In the case of time pressure, hiring temporary workforce to allow crisis managers focus on managing the crisis (not as a by-product from their day-to-day tasks), might also contribute to better decisions. How exactly mitigating the effects of the factors influencing the decision-making process translates into more effective crisis

management in local administration and public administration in general, needs to be studied further.

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The European Union's Soft Economic Power Assessment: A Comparative Analysis

Ocena miękkiej siły gospodarczej Unii Europejskiej.
Analiza porównawcza

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Abstract

Soft economic power is related to subjective perceptions of attractiveness, justice, and success of an economic system and economic policy. The current state of the European Union soft power relatively to other global economic powers is analyzed with several approaches: opinion polls, objective indicators, value estimates, and infometric method. They prove either the supremacy of the EU or second best result after the US. Positive contribution to the EU soft power is provided by its development level, quality of life, national and corporate brands, business regulation, environmental protection priorities, economic freedoms, integration initiatives, development assistance, tourism, creative industries, education, science, culture, and healthcare. The main challenges for the EU image is slower economic

Abstrakt

Miękka siła gospodarcza wiąże się z subiektywnie postrzeganą atrakcyjnością podobnie jak sukces systemu gospodarczego i polityki gospodarczej. Obecny stan miękkiej siły Unii Europejskiej w stosunku do innych światowych potęg gospodarczych analizowany jest w niniejszym artykule za pomocą kilku metod: sondaży, wskaźników obiektywnych, szacunków wartości oraz metody infometrycznej. Potwierdzają one dominację UE lub jej drugą po USA pozycję. Na miękką siłę UE składają się między innymi: poziom rozwoju, jakość życia, marki krajowe i korporacyjne, regulacje biznesowe, priorytetowo traktowana ochrona środowiska, swoboda prowadzenia działalności gospodarczej, inicjatywy integracyjne, pomoc rozwojowa udzielana przez UE, turystyka, branże kreatywne, edukacja,

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growth and a domination of American and Chinese corporate brands in media, technological, and banking sectors.

Keywords: the European Union, soft power, economic power, brand, image

nauka, kultura i poziom opieki zdrowotnej. Główne wyzwania dla wizerunku UE to spadające tempo rozwoju gospodarczego oraz dominacja amerykańskich i chińskich marek korporacyjnych w sektorach medialnym, technologicznym i bankowym.

Słowa kluczowe: Unia Europejska, miękka siła, siła gospodarcza, marka, wizerunek

Introduction

The European Union is one of the main soft and economic superpowers. Unlike the US, which is also a military superpower, and China as fast-growing economy, soft component of the EU's power traditionally plays relatively more important role. This article aims at analyzing the current state of soft power of the EU relative to other global economic powers and its determinants.

The article starts with literature review on the theory of soft power and justification of the notion of soft economic power. It is followed by the literature review on the EU soft power determinants and challenges in front of it. The subsequent section provides a synthesis of alternative measures of the EU soft economic power: results of the published opinion polls, objective statistical indicators, national brand value estimates and infometric measures (the latter include both external measures and previously suggested ones by the author). Advantages and disadvantages of each method are discussed. The same four approaches are applied in the final parts to substantiate assessment of the main determinants of the EU soft power or indicators that raise concern.

Theoretical framework of the research

Soft economic power is a component of national economic power located on the intersection of pure soft and pure economic power. *Economic power* can be defined as an ability to apply economic means to influence foreign and domestic entities, to affect world economy development trends and to resist external pressure (Chugaiev, 2018, p. 416).

Meanwhile, the concept of *soft power* takes its origin in international relations research as an alternative tool to military (hard) and economic power. According to Nye (2004), soft power envisages voluntary readiness of others

to cooperate without tangible award or straightforward coercion. Julius (2005) defined soft power as an ability of a state to attract others because of attractiveness of its policy and values. Abels et al. (2020) define soft power as “the ability to project values and norms on to the global stage, without relying on force or coercion.”

Soft power is closely related to the notions of image and brand of a country which are also used within the discourse of international communications research and marketing analysis. Sasu and Băgăian's (2010) definitions, in turn, read: “Country image represents a set of beliefs and perceptions that people have about a given country” and “a nation brand or country brand is believed to be a country's identity that has been proactively distilled, interpreted, internalized and projected internationally in order to gain recognition and to construct a favorable national image.”

But the borderlines between various components of national power are rather fuzzy, which results in existence of multiple views about the relationship between the notions of soft power and economic power:

- separate notions of hard, economic, and soft power that are based on coercion, bribery, and persuasion, respectively (Treverton & Jones, 2005, p. xi);
- intersection of economic power with soft and hard power (Höhn, 2011, p. 51; Kudryavtsev, 2014), namely, they mention attractiveness of advanced economies or nonreciprocal preferential treatment for imports from other countries;
- economic power is a component of soft power (Treverton & Jones, 2005, p. 17), for example it is based on foreign aid, trade partnership, and volume of trade;
- soft power is a component of economic power (Julius, 2005; Malanciuc, 2014), for instance, of popularity and prestige;
- economic power is necessary for soft power, since the latter is based not only on heritage and language, but also on financial culture (Sajjad, 2011);
- “[...] strong nation brand and positive soft power perceptions allow a nation to promote itself as a place for people to visit, invest in, and build a reputation for their quality of goods and services” and attract talents (Thomson, 2020);
- culture-centered approach to soft power definition is too narrow because soft power both relies on economic resources and is an instrument to achieve economic benefits (Carminati, 2022).

Nye (2014) used about 20 proxy *variables to measure soft power* (also summarized in Höhn, 2011). As we may see, most of the categories are directly or indirectly related to economics: culture (published books, exports of audiovisual products, sports), education (foreign exchange students and professors, Nobel prizes, research papers), global outreach (internet hosts and sales, well-known multinational companies), health (life expectancy), foreign relations (development assistance, public diplomacy), technology (high-tech exports, financing research and development), travel and migration (air travel, immigration, tourism).

Since most of the researchers underscore the relationship between soft and economic power either explicitly or implicitly, considering a hybrid concept of *soft economic power* may be justified. On the one hand, it marks the ability of a state (or another entity, e.g. an inter-state union) to transform economic issues into the benefits of good reputation, attractiveness, and other intangible assets. On the other hand, the latter may help to foster economic development and to raise efficiency of international economic relations.

Unlike ordinary economic power based on real economic resources, soft economic power is related to attractiveness, justice, success, and popularity of economic system and economic policy of a country (or a union) among its own and foreign citizen. It is related to subjective perceptions of compliance with the interests of subjects and affects economic objectives and motivation of people. Soft economic power is a part of the soft power which relies on economic factors, such as economic values, ideology of social and economic policy, feeling of wellbeing and economic progress, business culture, quality of products and services, trust in economic entities and institutions, legitimacy of foreign economic policy, creative industries etc.

Previous studies of the EU's soft economic power determinants

Several authors described determinants of the EU soft economic power. They mostly used qualitative approach or substantiated their views by providing the relevant examples of statistical data. Some of the studies mention peculiarities of European social and economic model. For instance, despite the similar level of hourly rates in terms of salaries in the US and in Western Europe, the EU is distinguished by leaning to more free time, security, and stability (Julius, 2005); more prominent role of social security, trade unions, lower income inequality (Nye, 2004), which raises attractiveness of the EU primarily for its own citizens. But there is also an external dimension of soft economic power. Aside from the demonstration of economic success, quality, and freedoms, the EU also provides financial or technical assistance to its partners and contributes to solving global problems.

Smith (2009, p. 9) noted about the status of the EU as a “continental model of economic and social organization”, which gives strong basis for the European foreign policy. Smith (2014) wrote that the EU demonstrated efficiency of their model. What is more: “Most neighboring countries wish to join it rather than balance it or resist it, and other regional groupings around the world seek to emulate it” (Smith, 2014, p. 104). The EU consists of advanced economies with rich cultural heritage and human right protection guarantees. It is a leading

developmental aid donor and a hub for trade and association agreements with other countries. Bilal and Hoekman (2019) add that trade agreements of the EU are aimed at ensuring benefits for all the parties by mutually reducing trade barriers, improving social, labor and environmental policies in partner countries, and providing developmental assistance.

Dimitrova et al. (2016) note that soft power of the EU regarding its neighborhood is founded on economic attractiveness of “a union of prosperous states with free citizens...” (p. 8), assistance, economic norms, and reform clusters, aspirations of people in the neighboring countries for freedom of movement, better welfare, and education opportunities. Chernega (2013) mentions several sources of the soft economic power of the EU: programs of assistance, initiatives for reforms in neighboring countries, European values helping to sustain economic and political stability, successful integration experience as a benchmark for integration projects worldwide. Nielsen (2013), in turn, pays attention to the role of the EU as a “principal voice in relations with the South” (p. 726) or a bridge between the rich and the poor. The Union takes a joint responsibility for the world economy and managing international trade together with other important actors.

Several sector-specific issues are also mentioned. In the long run, cultural sector may have smoothing anticyclical effect on soft power when the image of successful economy is challenged under a crisis. At least, Lisbonne de Vergeron (2015) claims that Chinese cultural perceptions of European countries persisted (which is reflected by tourist flows) despite economic difficulties and related cuts of budget support for cultural and creative industry. Across the EU, visual arts, television channels, newspapers, and publishing were the main components of this industry. Popovska and Darcq (2019) write that the EU's main currency (euro) and European quality of goods and services are among the main elements of the EU's supranational brand. Goldthau and Sitter (2015) assumed that the EU may exercise its soft power in energy sector if non-EU states consider its regulation model to be attractive.

As for challenges for the EU image, Smith (2014) acknowledges that the crisis that started in 2008 undermined not only its soft power (especially in some countries, e.g. Greece) but also the confidence the European social model had previously enjoyed. Mihalcea and Vitelar (2015) also hold that economic crisis in the EU damaged confidence in the EU and its future by revealing its vulnerabilities. Bhardawaj (2019), in turn, claims that Brexit with its serious geopolitical ramifications has affected the EU's soft power and attractiveness.

Abels et al. (2020) note that despite the overall championship of Europe in soft power the bloc faces several challenges: managing migration, strong competition in technological advances with the US and China, the lingering economic problems in the eurozone etc. Abels et al. (2020) also suggest several measures, which include developing a “digital silk road” by setting standards and estab-

lishing the “gigabit society” in order to contain Chinese influence; extending the Erasmus+ program to improve human capital and increase cultural, teaching and research influence, and other schemes.

As we may see, in qualitative research of the EU soft economic power often only a few particular issues are considered at a time. But soft economic power is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon that is not directly observable. Therefore a synthesis of multiple approaches to measurement of the EU’s soft economic power will be used to ensure methodological triangulation.

Measuring soft economic power of the EU

Opinion polls method may provide a direct subjective measure, namely, of the EU reputation in human minds (mostly of the general public). The method facilitates the assessment of the attitude(s) distribution in various countries, but may hardly be based on a representative global sample, since it is too costly to carry out opinion polls in all the countries. The opinion polls method uses up-to-date information obtained at the moment of a survey. In practice, either the overall soft power is estimated by this method or its specific dimensions, for instance, subjective view on global economic influence of a given country regardless of its attractiveness or the internal view of economic success (which are both too narrow notions).

For example, according to the opinion poll carried out in 2019 by Pew Research Center (2020), the largest share of people who have a positive opinion about the EU was in Poland (84%), Lithuania (83%), South Korea (80%), Ukraine (79%), and Bulgaria (77%). There was a general upward trend recorded in recent years (the median for the analyzed sample of countries was 52% in 2014 and 58% in 2019). According to the study, the lowest proportion of the public with a positive views on the EU was in Turkey (34%), India (34%), and Russia (37%). The share of favorable views on the US varied from Turkey (20%) to Israel (83%) with the median of 54%; whereas on China – from Japan (14%) to Russia (71%) with the median of 40%.

At the same time the EU lags behind the US and China by the share of people who consider it to be the leading economic power in the world. In this regard, the share for the EU ranged from 2% in India to 12% in Lithuania. The share for the US – from 15% in Russia to 82% in South Korea, for China – from 10% in India to 53% in Germany. The result can possibly be explained by incomplete integration within the EU, therefore there is a differentiated view of the EU both as an actor or as a sum of individual actors in international economic relations.

According to European Commission (2021a, online), in the summer of 2021 “optimism about the future in the EU has reached its highest level since 2009 and trust in the EU remains at its highest since 2008.” As much as 60% consider that “the interests of their country are well taken into account in the EU”, ranging from 33% in Greece to 80% in Portugal.

Infometric approach provides an indirect subjective measure considering ideas expressed online primarily by influential voices (officials of various institutions, journalists, experts, researchers, analysts, bloggers, etc.). Thus, it actually weighs reputation according to the influence of various target entities and individuals. Positive information about the EU economy can be treated as its intangible asset, negative – as a liability. There is a tradeoff between low cost thanks to automatic sentiment analysis and increasing precision under more labor-intensive thorough analysis. Another risk is language bias as information in one or very few languages is analyzed.

Ranking by Bloom Consulting (2017) considers the number of searches made by people worldwide on a particular country. There were 4 EU countries among the top-10 countries: Germany (rank 4), Spain (7), France (8), Italy (10) in comparison to the US (1) and China (9). But the overall index provides information about the general soft power, while its components – about particular aspects of soft economic power.

In 2015, Chugaiev (2018, pp. 194–197, 243–248) applied a similar approach with several modifications. A webometric index was calculated as a product of positive information about a country’s economy and the ratio of positive information to total information. The index was measured as a percentage of the total value for all countries. Search queries in Google were specifically constructed to find the information and to count positive and negative information in English. The total index for the EU and its member states was 18.3–22.2% (or 15–18.8% without the UK) which was larger than the share of its GDP in the global economy. The index for the US was 12.5–28%, and for China 4.8–5.9%. Despite the language bias the index correlated with the size of economies (correlation 0.85 was significant at $p < 0.01$). About 20% of the EU index was provided by the EU supranational component. The EU itself (2nd place worldwide) and Germany (5th) led in regard to the net difference between positive and negative information, where the largest negative difference was reported in Greece due to the consequences of the financial crisis at the time.

An index based on *objective indicators* considers a comprehensive set of factors which are supposed to provide a fundamental basis for soft power (cause-oriented approach). This is also a low-cost method if secondary sources of information are used. It is suitable virtually for all the countries considering wide availability of statistical data. The drawbacks include statistical data publication lag, sensitivity to subjectivism in choosing weights for indicators, variability, and uncertainty in importance of indicators for different people (e.g. some peo-

ple more appreciate development aid while others may appreciate the access to market more). And the resulting index may only be an ordinal variable measured as ranks or artificially created score.

In particular, the Good Country Index in Anholt (2020) reflects the contribution of a country to the wellbeing of the entire humanity and the planet as a whole. Since relative indicators are considered, often high rank economies are not the largest ones. There is no opportunity to get the EU aggregate rank. But 7 out of the top-10 countries are from the EU: Sweden (rank 1), Denmark (2), Germany (3), the Netherlands (5), Finland (6), France (7), Spain (9). They are much ahead of the US (38), and China (60). The lowest ranks among the EU member states are for Romania (57), Greece (46), and Lithuania (40).

Value estimates is a method based on the estimated economic benefits of soft power (outcome-oriented approach). Thus, it is directly related to the notion of power in terms of results, while the previous methods related to the notion of power as resources or potential. But the drawback of the method is that it disregards non-economic benefits of soft economic power.

For instance, in Brand Finance (2021, online) the total national brand value for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden was estimated to be \$12.6 trillion in comparison to \$24.8 trillion in the US and \$19.9 trillion in China.

As we may see, many existing indices pay attention to specific countries only, so sometimes it is impossible to calculate the overall index for the EU, for example, if ranks are used. Also it is not enough for practical purposes to know the overall measure for the EU. Factor-oriented approach and comparative case study research design will help to determine the domains of success and challenges for the EU as a whole.

Positive factors of the EU's soft power

In this section we will consider the economic factors constituting net positive contribution to the soft power in case of the EU. They largely correspond to the determinants mentioned in the previous research review section.

Economic development. The EU consists of advanced economies with high income and wealth per capita (see Table 1) and ranks 2nd among the biggest economies by this criterion. These indicators demonstrate the overall average level of economic success as a benchmark for many other economies.

Table 1

Economic development and wealth indicators

Indicator	EU	US	China
	in thousands of dollars		
GDP per capita, PPP method, 2021	48.3	69.4	19.1
Total wealth per capita, 2018	405.0	872.0	174.0
Natural capital per capita, 2018	9.8	17.3	6.9
Produced per capita, 2018	163.0	264.0	38.0
Human capital per capita, 2018	236.0	621.0	128.0

Note: 2021 – forecast published in October 2021.

Sources: International Monetary Fund (2021) – GDP per capita; World Bank (2021a) – wealth indicators; author's own calculations – total or average values for the EU.

Quality of life provided by the economic system is a more complex criterion of opportunities for comfortable life and well-being of the general public.

According to United Nations Development Program (2020), 7 countries of the EU are ahead of the US (17th place) by Human Development Index and they all are ahead of China (85th place). The ranks for the EU member states ranged between 2nd (Ireland), 6th (Germany), 7th (Sweden), 49th (Romania), and 56th (Bulgaria).

The EU is based on a socially-oriented market economy unlike more liberal American and hyperdynamic regulated Chinese economic models. The public expenditure on social protection in 2017 constituted 28% of the EU overall GDP in comparison to 18% in the US. The share of income of 80% of the population (the lowest and 3 intermediate quintiles) was 62%, unlike 53% in the US, and 55% in China (Eurostat, 2020). Life expectancy in 2019 was on average 81.1 years in the EU, 78.8 in the US, and 76.9 in China (World Bank, 2021b). Nevertheless, in 2019 the share of the EU respondents (the median for 14 countries in the sample) who were optimistic about reducing gap between rich and poor was only 23% and about availability of well-paying jobs – 37% (Wike, 2019).

Quality of products and services, and corporate brands. The European brands at micro- and macro-level are able to support each other and promote exports of the EU member states.

According to Kunst (2019), in the country of origin ranking the top-10 economies included Germany (1), the European Union as a whole (3), Sweden (5), Italy (7), France (9) in comparison to the US (10) and China (49) out of 50 countries.

A similar ranking by Future Brands (2015) based on the opinion of consumers and experts provided top-10 positions for France (2), Germany (3), Italy (5), Sweden (8) in comparison to the US (1) and China (9). As for sector-specific reputation of the country of origin, France (ranking 1st), Italy (2nd) and Spain (3rd) are leaders in food and beverages industry, whereas Germany (1st) and Italy (4th) in automotive industry, Italy and France (2nd and 3rd respectively) in fashion and luxury goods, France (2nd) and Germany (5th) in personal care and

beauty products. In electronic goods production, from among the EU countries, only Germany (3rd) is among the top-5 countries followed by Sweden (6th), and Finland (7th).

Brand Finance (2022) also provides rankings for corporate brands by industry (see Table 2). The EU brands are especially successful in luxury goods, apparel, automotive, utilities, advertising, football, champagne and wine, chemical and cosmetic industries. At the same time there are industries with domination of the American or Chinese corporate brands in top-10 positions (airlines, banking, gambling, hotels, media, real estate, restaurants, retail trade, technological companies, tobacco). But relative weakness of corporate brands in many cases can be offset by sectoral, national or supranational brands (e.g. famous European cuisine, European quality is largely ensured also in smaller enterprises, national technological achievements).

Table 2

Global ranks of the EU corporate brands, 2021

Category	EU-based brands among the top-10 companies in particular industries (ranks)
Food and drink	Danone (4)
Dairy	Danone (2), Arla (4), Friso (6), Président (10)
Non-alcoholic drinks	Red Bull (3)
Alcoholic spirits	Hennessy (7)
Beers	Heineken (2)
Champagne and wine	Moët & Chandon (1), Henkell (3), Veuve Clicquot (4), Dom Pérignon (6), Martini (10)
Apparel	GUCCI (2), Louis Vuitton (3), Adidas (4), Chanel (5), ZARA (6), H&M (8), Cartier (9), Hermès (10)
Luxury and premium	Porsche (1), GUCCI (2), Louis Vuitton (3), Chanel (4), Cartier (5), Hermès (6), Ferrari (7), Dior (9), Guerlain (10)
Oil and gas	Shell (1), Total (6)
Mining, iron and steel	ArcelorMittal (3)
Chemicals	BASF (1), Linde (5), LyondellBasell (6), Air Liquide (8)
Tires	Michelin (1), Continental (3), Pirelli (6)
Cosmetics	L'Oréal (1), Nivea (3), Guerlain (4), Garnier (9)
Pharmaceuticals	Bayer (4), Sanofi (10)
Medical devices	Fresenius (2)
Aerospace and defense	Airbus (3), Safran (8), Thales (9)
Automotive	Mercedes-Benz (2), Volkswagen (3), BMW (4), Porsche (5), Volvo (9), Audi (10)
Auto components	Valeo (5), Faurecia (7), Schaeffler (8), Marelli (9)
Toys	Lego (1)

Engineering and Construction	Siemens Group (2), Bosch (3), Vinci (9)
Telecommunication infrastructure	Nokia (3), Ericsson (6)
Telecommunications	Deutsche Telekom (3), Orange (9)
Logistics	DHL (5)
Airports	Paris Aeroport (1), Frankfurt Airport (6), Munich Airport (9), Schiphol (10)
Car rental	Europcar (5), Sixt (8)
Leisure and Tourism	TUI (5)
Football	Real Madrid CF (1), FC Barcelona (2), FC Bayern Munich (5), Paris Saint-Germain (7)
Utilities	Enel (2), Engie (3), EDF (4), Iberdrola (6), E.ON (7), Veolia (1)
IT services	Capgemini (6)
Commercial services	KPMG (9)
Advertising	WPP (1), JC Decaux (4), Teleperformance (5), Ogilvy & Mather (7), IPSOS (9)
Insurance	Allianz (3), AXA (4)
Exchanges	Eurex (7)

Source: Brand Finance (2022).

Economic policy is an important factor when it comes to the trust of the general public, investors, and officials (either inside or outside the EU) in both the governments of the member states and the supranational institutions. The individuals may assess whether the institutions act in their interest or not.

In 2019 most of the people in the EU assessed that membership in the Union benefited their country. The ratio of positive to negative answers varied from 40%/20% in the Czech Republic (Czechia) and 48%/28% in the UK to 74%/6% in Germany and 67%/5% in Poland (Wike, 2019). The euro, the single currency for eurozone, became another European symbol and the second major international currency besides its role as a legal tender inside the eurozone. According to European Commission (2021b), 78% of respondents in the eurozone replied that the euro was good for the EU.

The EU countries are among the leaders in terms of business regulation (see Table 3) especially by the regulation environment for the intra EU-trade. This is why the EU is often treated as a benchmark for other countries, especially associated ones. As for economic relief efforts under the COVID-19 pandemic, there were mixed views in the EU: 48% respondents (median share for the 8 countries in the sample) thought that the relief measures were right, 6% that they were excessive, and 40% that they were insufficient (Devlin et al., 2021).

Table 3

Business regulation indicators, 2019

Ease of doing business indicator	Leading EU country	Leading EU country's rank	US's rank	China's rank
Overall index	Denmark	4	6	31
Starting a business	Greece	11	55	27
Dealing with construction permits	Denmark	4	24	33
Getting electricity	Germany	5	64	12
Registering property	Lithuania	4	39	28
Obtaining credit	Latvia	15	4	80
Protecting minority investors	Ireland	13	36	28
Paying taxes	Ireland	4	25	105
Trading across borders	Most Member States	1	39	56
Enforcing contracts	Lithuania	7	17	5
Resolving insolvency	Finland	1	2	51

Source: World Bank (2020).

Thanks to policy priorities, the EU is a leading large economy in the category of transition to green economy, which is also important especially for future generations. In 2017 the energy intensity of GDP in the EU was less than 0.08 toe/\$1000, which was less than almost 0.11 in the US and more than 0.12 in China (Eurostat, 2020). In 2018, the EU contributed 8.4% of CO₂ emissions, which is almost two times less than its share in the global economy. The US was responsible for 14.6%, and China – for 30.3% (World Bank, 2021b).

As for external economic policy, the EU provided preferential access to its market for several dozen countries by means of establishing free trade areas (often within association agreements) or deeper agreements or non-reciprocal preferential treatment. There is also a potential opportunity for European countries to join the EU as member states, unlike the US and China. Membership in the EU ensures balanced representation of member states in decision-making. The EU is also the largest development and humanitarian assistance donor, which aims at solving problems in neighboring and less developed countries. According to Eurostat (2020), the share of the EU in the official development assistance in 2017 was 45% (the US – 24%).

Tourism attractiveness. Another objective indicator of soft power is a number of international tourist arrivals (at least before the COVID-19 pandemic). It reflects the concept of “voting by feet” together with the indicators of migration. But using the latter for soft power assessment is complicated by restrictions for immigration and existence of non-economic factors of migration.

There were 966 million arrivals in the EU in comparison to 166 million in the US and 163 million in China, although there should be an adjustment for the large share of intra-EU tourism. According to the tourism rank by Bloom Consulting (2017/2018) 4 of top-10 countries were EU member states: Spain (3), France (6), Germany (8), Italy (10) besides with the US (1) and China (7).

Creative industries are especially important for promoting the image of countries as their products are specifically targeted at producing positive emotions. According to UNCTADStat (2022), in 2015 the share of the EU (without UK) in creative goods exports was 28.5% in comparison to China (33.1%) and the US (7.9%). The EU was the 1st exporter by audiovisuals (43.6%), publishing (43.4%), visual arts (33.9%) including antiques (50.6%) and the 2nd (after China) by performing arts (30%), design (26.9%), new media (21.6%), and art crafts (19.3%).

Other positive factors. In 2019 the share of the EU respondents (median for 14 countries in the sample) who were optimistic about culture was 68%, about education 51%, relations with other European countries 68% (Wike, 2019).

The role of several factors is also detailed in some indices. According to Ranking by Bloom Consulting (2017), Germany was the 3rd by the component Prominence (it consists of the subcomponents: Arts, Science, Culture, Gastronomy, Government, Society, Sports) and the 5th by Exports, Investments and Talent. Spain, Italy and France had the ranks 1–3 by Tourism.

In Anholt (2020) the largest EU economy (Germany) ranks high by the Good Country index thanks to such factors as patents, journal exports, Nobel prizes, freedom of movement, press freedom, UN treaties signed, financing peacekeeping, ecological footprint, open trading, charity, development assistance, humanitarian aid, food aid, donations to World Health Organization, pharmaceutical exports, international health regulations compliance etc. (see Table 4). There are very few relatively worse than average values for Germany, mainly the effect of arms exports and UN volunteers abroad.

Table 4

The Good Country Index components, ranks

Component	Germany	US	China
Science and Technology	22	48	68
Culture	12	45	131
Peace and Security	38	108	21
World order	1	25	120
Planet and Climate	8	82	64
Prosperity and Equality	19	36	65
Health and Wellbeing	1	9	32

Source: Anholt (2020).

Many other member states take even higher positions. Hungary is the 2nd country by Science and Technology component (relative to the economy size), Belgium – the 1st by Culture, Ireland – the 2nd by Peace and Security, Germany – the 1st by World Order and by Health and Wellbeing, Finland – the 2nd by Planet and Climate, Denmark – the 2nd by Prosperity and Equality.

Challenges for the EU's soft power

Economic trends. This factor is the main source of vulnerability for the EU image. The EU lags behind the US, many emerging economies, and especially behind China in terms of the pace of economic growth. Moreover, unlike China, the EU had negative economic growth in 2009 and 2020 (see Table 5). In particular, the crisis of 2008–2009 had a prolonged effect for financial stability and public sentiment. The periods of crises became a challenge for European solidarity too.

Table 5

GDP growth, %

Period	EU	US	China	World
2001–2020, average	1.2	1.7	8.7	3.4
2009	-4.2	-2.6	9.4	-0.1
2019	1.9	2.3	5.9	2.8
2020	-5.9	-3.4	2.3	-3.1
2021	5.1	6.0	8.0	5.9

Source: International Monetary Fund (2021).

According to Pew Research Center (2020), the satisfaction with the current economic situation in 2007 varied from 19% in Bulgaria to 65% in Spain, in 2010 from 13% in Spain to 53% in Poland, in 2013 from 1% in Greece to 75% in Germany. The confidence was restored upon improvement of economic and financial situation (circa 2015–2019). For instance, in 2019 the share of assessments of situation as “good” ranged from 15% in Greece, 23% in Italy, and 34% in Bulgaria to 82% in the Netherlands, 79% in Germany, and 78% in Sweden (in comparison to 32% in the US).

In early 2021 the share of the EU residents who thought that their “economy is failing to recover from the effects of the coronavirus outbreak in ways that show the weaknesses of their economic system” (online) was 58%, which was larger than 37% – the share of those who believed that recovery was enough to show strength of the economic system (Devlin et al., 2021).

In the long-run retrospective, a survey in 2018 showed that the share of people who thought that their financial situation improved relatively over the last

20 years varied from 7% in Greece and 10% in Italy to 66% in Sweden and 68% in Poland. The median was 31% for 10 countries in the sample against 50% who thought the situation became worse (Devlin, 2019).

Infometric tool for assessing vulnerability. We further test a relative webometric index by applying Google search engine. A query “good economic * * EU” query is used to find positive information about the EU, while “bad economic * * EU” query is used to find negative information about the EU. Option “at any time” is used to consider all the information, which has been created by the moment of analysis. Then, we count the number of webpages suggested by the search engine as a response to the search and calculate a ratio based on the number of positive (P) and negative information (N):

$$R_G = 100\% * (P - N)/(P + N)$$

Then we check robustness of the results by searching for recent information (by 24 January 2022) with the online service Social Mention (<http://www.socialmention.com/>). It monitors various types of media: blogs, microblogs, bookmarks, images, and videos. The mentions are classified by the service as positive, neutral or negative. Then we construct another index considering also the number of neutral information (O):

$$R_{SM} = 100\% * (P - N)/(P + O + N)$$

The results are presented below (see Table 6).

Table 6

Calculation of webometric indices for the images of the global leading economies

Key words in the search query for Google	Good / bad economic * * EU / European	Good / bad economic * * EU / European / Germany / France / Italy	Good / bad economic * * the US / America	Good / bad economic * * China /Chinese
P	31	84	83	66
N	37	98	80	69
R _G	-8.8%	-7.7%	+1.8%	-2.2%
Key words in the search query for Social Mention	EU economy / European economy / economy of the EU / EU economic	EU economy / European economy / economy of the EU / EU economic / German economy / French economy / Italian economy	US economy / American economy / economy of the US / US economic	China economy / Chinese economy / economy of China / Chinese economic
P	8	106	78	25
O	93	132	82	56
N	4	8	13	16
R _{SM}	+3.6%	+39.8%	+37.6%	+9.3%

The results calculated using Google and (partially) Social Mention may be presumably explained by the current GDP growth trends (see Table 7), so that a lower R_G and R_{SM} in the EU can be associated with lower growth in 2022. The exception is the total R_{SM} for the EU and its three largest economies (Germany, France, and Italy), which provides a better ranking for the EU.

Table 7
Forecasted GDP growth in 2022, %

Quarter	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
EU	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.5
US	3.1	2.0	1.8	2.5
China	1.5	1.5	1.2	1.1

Source: Trading economies (2022).

Promoting faster and balanced positive economic growth in all the member states may improve soft economic power of the EU. Nevertheless, relatively slower economic growth is the only major challenge for the bloc, while many other determinants of the soft economic power are well-balanced in favor of the EU.

Conclusions

Economic power can be defined as an ability to apply economic means to influence foreign and domestic entities, to affect world economy development trends and to resist external pressure. Soft component of economic power is related to subjective perceptions of attractiveness, justice, success and popularity of an economic system and economic policy. Various approaches may be used to estimate it (opinion polls, objective indicators, value estimates, and infometric approach).

The EU is one of the main economic and soft superpowers. Opinion polls show that it has a better image than the US and China, although people think that it possesses less economic power than the other two superpowers. Earlier infometric studies showed that the EU possessed much more soft economic power than China. Objective data prove that the EU is a leader by contribution to the wellbeing of humanity, which provides a moral reason to consider the EU to be the main soft superpower. The EU lags behind the US by supranational brand value estimate.

The EU outperforms China by quantitative measures of economic development (income and wealth) and often even the wealthier power (US) by quality

of life. European multinational companies and countries of origin support the EU's soft power by leadership in a number of industries (e.g. automotive, apparel, chemical, cosmetic).

Domestic and foreign economic policy in the EU is another net positive contributor to the soft power (e.g. monetary union, quality of business regulation, green economy priority, freedom of movement inside the EU, trade agreements, opportunity for accession, development and humanitarian assistance). It dominates in exports of several types of creative goods. The EU has a good reputation in education, prominent achievements in science and technology, culture, healthcare and pharmaceutical industry.

Relatively slow economic growth with two recessions in the 21st century is the main challenge for the EU's soft power, particularly among its own citizens. Confidence in the EU is associated with the phase of a business cycle and varies a lot among the member states. Another matter of concern is domination of American or Chinese corporate brands in some key sectors such as media, technological companies, banking etc., but in many cases this can be offset by the good umbrella image of European quality or powerful national brands of the member states. Also the suggested infometric tool in the paper provides mixed evidence on comparative position of the EU by the relative amount of positive and negative economic information.

Acknowledgement and disclaimer

With the support of the Erasmus+ program of the European Union. The European Commission's support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

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The Hungarian October Party against the Round Table Talks: Comparison with the Contemporary Critics of the Polish Transition

Partia Węgierskiego Października wobec Okrągłego Stołu w porównaniu z ówczesnymi krytykami polskiej transformacji ustrojowej


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Abstract

The Round Table Talks in Hungary and Poland were widely criticized by opposition forces not participating in the negotiations. One of them was the Hungarian October Party, which considered this form of transformation to have been flawed and against the interests of society. The formation, which also had Polish connections and was led by György Krassó, became known primarily through its street happenings. Its criticisms of the participants in the Round Table Talks bear a strong resemblance to the opinion of the so-called non-constructive Polish opposition forces.

Abstrakt

Rozmowy Okrągłego Stołu odbywające się pod koniec lat 80. ubiegłego wieku na Węgrzech i w Polsce były szeroko krytykowane przez siły ówczesnej opozycji nieuczestniczące w negocjacjach. Na Węgrzech do krytykujących należała Partia Węgierskiego Października, która uznała tę formę transformacji za wadliwą i sprzeczną z interesami społeczeństwa. Formacja, której przewodził György Krassó, mająca powiązania z Polską, zasłynęła przede wszystkim dzięki ulicznym happenin-gom. Krytyka Partii pod adresem uczestników obrad węgierskiego Okrągłego Stołu przypomina „niekonstruktywną” ocenę polskiego Okrągłego Stołu sformułowaną przez przedstawicieli ówczesnych polskich sił opozycyjnych.

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Keywords: Hungarian October Party, Round Table Talks, György Krassó, regime change, Polish opposition

Słowa kluczowe: Partia Węgierskiego Października, Okrągły Stół, György Krassó, transformacja ustrojawa, polska opozycja polityczna

Introduction

This article analyzes the Hungarian October Party's (Hungarian: Magyar Október Párt) theoretical critique regarding the Round Table Talks in Hungary. The rather short-lived party rose to prominence and has been remembered mainly due to its political performances. Instead of a biographical approach focusing on the charismatic leader of the organization, György Krassó, I would like to place the party on the rapidly changing map of the 1989 transformation. Applying a political history perspective, my goal is to emphasize the most important differences between the "constructive" and the "radical" opposition in the era of the regime change, using the Hungarian October Party as a model. At the same time, the positions of the political minority, which also aimed at the regime change but, at the same time, oppose the manner in which it was carried out, are also placed in context.

To broaden the perspective of my article, I follow the methodology of comparative historiography, as I compare the activity of the Hungarian October Party with those Polish organizations which were not included in the negotiations that defined the transformation. Was the idea of a consensual regime change itself criticized, or could they simply have not accepted the way in which it was conducted? Were compromise-ready forces excluded from the Round Table Talks, or did they voluntarily stayed away from them? Which points in the discussions and final agreements were the most problematic? Finally, the most important question is: Why could not they address the society by offering any alternative to the transition?

For understandable reasons, history scholars first and foremost focus on the custodians of the regime change, as opposed to entities that were ultimately unable to exert a meaningful impact on the process of transformation. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate how little these organizations have been depicted by the Hungarian researchers so far. The situation of the Hungarian October Party is a bit favourable in this respect that its leader, György Krassó, inspired some authors, if not for the impact of the party he created than due to his actions in 1956 or later opposition activities and personal fate. Back in 2006, Ádám Modor edited a volume of writings by and dealing with him (*Célkeresztben Krassó*), while most recently Gabriella Kinda devoted several studies ("A Nádor-utcai akció, or K. Gy. 1956-os pere") and a doctoral dissertation in German (*György Krassó*

und der Systemwechsel) to Krassó. Krassó's interest in the developments in Poland in the 1980s gives a particular importance to our topic. Krassó's "Polish orientation" was analyzed in Miklós Mitrovits's monograph published in 2020 (*Tiltott kapcsolat*).

In terms of the sources, the most important ones include Krassó's own writings, interviews with him (both types are published by Mónika Hafner and Zoltán Zsille in 1991 in the book *Maradj velünk!*), and contemporary press reports on his party's activities.

The Hungarian October Party and the Round Table Talks

Considering the 1956 Revolution as its theoretical starting point, the aim of the Hungarian October Party,¹ as it is described in its founding statement, was "to keep in check and criticize the authorities, in order to reveal secret and unprincipled agreements" (Bozóki, 1991, p. 377). On 9 July 1989² the party's assembly accepted its programme, in which they spoke out for worker self-government through various forms of ownership, such as workers' councils³ and producer cooperatives (Vida, 2011, p. 426).

The party worked closely with numerous smaller groups⁴ and samizdat editorials (Kinda, 2017, p. 1). One of these publishers was the Hungarian October Publishing House (Magyar Október Kiadó) led by Krassó, which was, for instance, the first to publish Wiktor Woroszyłski's *Hungarian diary* (orig. *Dziennik węgierski*) in Hungarian, translated by Grácia Kerényi (Mitrovits, 2020, p. 127). Krassó, who lived in England between 1985 and 1989 also operated the Hungarian October Information Service (Magyar Október Tájékoztató Szolgálat) between 1986 and 1989, which aimed to provide the misinformed Hungarian emigration with information on the latest events in Hungary (Bozóki, 1991, pp. 373–374). In addition, the Hungarian October Party, which was officially

¹ There was a question of functioning as a movement or alliance, but in Krassó's view, it would have been hypocrisy not to call the organization a party (Bozóki, 1991, p. 376).

² Thus, the organization was established very late compared to the fact that multi-party competition in Hungary had already developed from the one-party system (Bihari, 1992, p. 304), so the Hungarian October Party started with a serious disadvantage in terms of impact on the events of transition.

³ In 1989 in Hungary the revival of the 1956 workers' councils proved to be the most decisive of the "third way" ideas. Defined as temporary organizations performing political and advocacy tasks, they were also included in the resolution issued at the 1st National Assembly of the MDF (Marschal, 2020, p. 114).

⁴ Such as the Inconnu Art Group, which made a parody of the late Kádár era with its satirical happenings. The group elected György Krassó as an honorary member.

registered only in January 1990 (Kinda, 2017, p. 1), worked particularly closely with the liberal-minded Hungarian Radical Party, led by Mihály Rózsa. They were connected by their strong anti-communism derived from the retaliation after 1956 and by the desire for Hungary's neutrality based on the withdrawal of Soviet troops (Vida, 2011, pp. 428–429).

In Hungary, in addition to the peaceful change of regime, the negotiations of the ruling party (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party – Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSZMP) and the opposition also facilitated the redistribution of political and economic power and the mapping of positions in the new system to be established. Furthermore, the discussions set strict boundaries for the political sphere. Most of the political factions within it had a good chance to operate in the new, pluralistic system, while most of the groups that were left out of the substantive decisions seemed irreversibly disadvantaged in the upcoming political competition. However, it is also important to keep in mind that the Round Table Talks in Hungary had to create the framework for democratic transformation in a state which, in the absence of a substantive tradition of democracy, had serious historical limitations. As the change of regime itself could not have been conducted on a democratic basis for this reason, the *a posteriori* integration of the transformation into Hungarian history is also difficult, especially with regard to the Round Table Talks.

Negotiations with the state were preceded not by pressure from the society⁵ but by the work of the Opposition Round Table (Ellenzéki Kerekasztal, EKA) initiated and coordinated by the Independent Lawyers' Forum and carried out since 22 March 1989. In order to coordinate the activities of each opposition group the following organizations joined the talks: Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum, MDF),⁶ Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége, SZDSZ), Alliance of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, FIDESZ), Social Democratic Party of Hungary (Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt, MSZDP), Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party (Független Kisgazda-, Földmunkás- és Polgári Párt, FKgP), Hungarian People's Party (Magyar Néppárt, MNP), Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Society (Bajcsy Zsilinszky Társaság), and the Christian Democratic People's Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, KDNP), which joined a bit later.⁷ The condition for inviting the MSZMP was to make a commitment to bring the conventions concluded during the negotiations into force (Melia, 1994, pp. 62–63). After the ruling party gave its consent and committed to constitu-

⁵ Neither the state leadership nor the opposition has embraced any specific bottom-up initiative (Krausz, 2010, p. 15).

⁶ Although it feared for its leadership role during the Round Table Talks, and wished a constituent assembly rather than following the Polish model (Ripp, 2006, 315).

⁷ The Democratic Confederation of Free Trade Unions (Független Szakszervezetek Demokratikus Ligája, LIGA) was present as an observer.

tionalism and pluralist democracy (Ripp, 2006, p. 366), the groundwork for the National Round Table (Nemzeti Kerekasztal, NEKA) based on the broadening of the EKA was laid down in a basic agreement on 10 June 1989 (Tütő, 2019, p. 73). On the one side of it was the opposition, on the other the representatives of the MSZMP, and the “Third Side” included the organizations such as the Patriotic People’s Front (Hazafias Népfront, HNF), the National Council of Trade Unions (Szakszervezetek Országos Tanácsa, SZOT) or the Association of the Left Alternative (Baloldali Alternatíva Egyesülés, BAL) (Bozóki, 1999–2000, vol. IV, p. 605). There was also some room for observers, such as representatives of Churches (Melia, 1994, pp. 62–63).

Thus, the EKA, and later on the NEKA, involved a rather wide range of different organizations in the negotiations defining the framework for the regime change, so groups that were left out from the discussions were trapped in a peripheral situation.⁸ In addition, representation of social groups appeared in Hungary during the round table discussions: the MSZMP embraced the goals of the late communist elite, the MDF represented the Hungarian middle class, the FKgP supported the rural intelligentsia, the SZDSZ spoke up for the interests of the liberal intellectuals, and the KDNP embraced the Churches of the most dominant Christian denominations. Thus, the so-called non-constructive opposition organizations did not really have interest groups that they could exclusively address. The Hungarian October Party was also struggling with a lack of social base, moving in a political vacuum. It tried to counterbalance this by building international relations: they maintained a close cooperation with Freedom and Peace (Wolność i Pokój, WiP) in Poland, whose representative was also present at the party’s inaugural meeting in Budapest. At the same time, despite the joint work of the Hungarian October Party with other organizations on specific issues, no platform similar to the Congress of the Anti-System Opposition (Kongres Opozycji Antyustrojowej, KOA) in Poland was established in Hungary.

The Hungarian October Party expressed the willingness to negotiate only a new electoral law: it considered regime change discussions to be illegitimate because they perceived it as the “bargaining over the head of society.” In Hungary, the lack of social impetus in the process of transition is prominent⁹; however, the “constructive” opposition organizations could not gain political authority in the one-party system. At the same time, they had programmes and memberships, and their activity as a whole enjoyed the support from the Western

⁸ Nevertheless, as the negotiations progressed, the legitimacy of the EKA was increasingly questioned, as the representatives of the entire opposition were by no means seated at the table (Ripp, 2006, p. 419).

⁹ This is illustrated by Elemér Hankiss’s argument on 24 August 1989 in favour of the Round Table Talks’ regular broadcasting: “If we don’t have a mandate from the society – because we don’t have it – then at least let’s not decide in the way that they don’t even know what we’re deciding on” (Tütő, 2019, p. 72)

world.¹⁰ Thus, the criticism of the lack of social support and legitimacy of the negotiating parties cannot be completely justified.

In connection with the Round Table Talks, György Krassó spoke about the “sharing of elites” (Bozóki, 1991, p. 378), which meant the elites redistributed the leading economic and political positions among themselves. It is a fact that seeing the unreformability of planned economy and the inevitable fall of centralized state, the communist elites expected the multi-party system to ensure that they remained in power, but successful and unsuccessful examples of this did not take any shape mainly during the Round Table Talks. A real phenomenon of regime change in Central and Eastern Europe – meaning: the transformation of the party nomenclatures into capitalists – has nevertheless, out of context, turned dialogue with the government into a symbol of fraternizing with the enemy rather than an attempt at democratization. According to Krassó, “communists can lose power, but the elite cannot” (Bozóki, 1991, p. 381).

Thus, the Hungarian October Party was simultaneously opposed by the MSZ-MP, the opposition and the said Third Side, proclaiming the need for a “fourth side”. Krassó intended his party to have played the part of the conscience of the opposition, however, they were soon labelled by the “opposition of the opposition” (Bozóki, 1991, p. 379). The Hungarian October Party’s activities, due to its severely limited capabilities, were largely limited to street happenings. The most iconic of these is the renaming of Ferenc Münnich¹¹ Street (where Krassó’s flat – the seat of the party – was situated) to Nádor Street. The first change of street signage was carried out on 14 July 1989, the day of the funeral of János Kádár, but due to the official reorganization it was repeated again and again (Kinda, 2017, p. 4). Thanks to its actions, the party was able to make itself heard among samizdat readers, through the state media reporting on these performances (Kinda, 2017, p. 1), which also published the organization’s announcements sometime (Kinda, 2017, p. 14). This was due not only to the expanding possibilities of the press, but also to the fact that this way the Hungarian October Party could be well separated in the readers’ eyes from the reliable opposition negotiators at the Round Table.

Thus, the above-mentioned political and economic ideas of the Hungarian October Party, that were also included in their programme, were less notable than the party’s anti-communism. It is true that, in the space outside the negotiations between the authorities and the opposition, it was difficult to stand out by representing some form of *tertium datur*, as these also appeared at the Round Tables. For example, the MNP wanted to protect the poorer social classes from

¹⁰ In the case of Poland, the West clearly saw the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR) and personally Lech Wałęsa as legitimate negotiating partners.

¹¹ Along with János Kádár, he was a key figure in the repressions following the 1956 Revolution.

the sudden appearance of market economy by creating self-governments of production, while the BAL focused on the idea of collective worker ownership and the issue of workers' councils (Éber et al., 2014, pp. 50–51).

The Round Table Talks took place in two working committees, one dealing with political issues and the other with economic ones. The work was not facilitated by the internal conflicts of the opposition. The main fault lines were developed in three cases, firstly, between the newly formed organizations and those with roots going back to before the communist takeover, secondly, between the national-conservative MDF and the Budapest-focused, liberal, more open to foreign SZDSZ and FIDESZ, and thirdly, between the MNP, which were not considered completely independent of the MSZMP, and the other factions. Although an agreement was reached on 18 September 1989, the SZDSZ and the FIDESZ refused to ratify it,¹² claiming it would have offered too many concessions to the ruling party (Melia, 1994, pp. 64–65). The LIGA took a reluctant position, and the MSZDP refused to sign the passage for the election of the President of Hungary (Bozóki, 2012, pp. 229–230). Moreover, economic negotiations, proved to have been absolutely fruitless. Despite the fact that the six bills¹³ included in the political agreement had already been adopted by the National Assembly on 21 September 1989 (Tütő, 2019, pp. 67–69), a number of open questions remained.¹⁴ Some of these were to be answered by the referendum held on 26 November 1989, in the newly-born Republic of Hungary proclaimed on 23 October. As a result, the MSZMP had to account for the assets it owned or managed, its organizations were no longer present in the workplaces, the Workers' Militia (Munkásőrség) was disbanded, and the date of the presidential election was postponed until after the inauguration of the new parliament. This practically meant that the said election would be indirect. This was the most important issue of the referendum, as the Polish case – namely, the election of Wojciech Jaruzelski as the President of Poland – was both a cautionary and instructive example for the SZDSZ,¹⁵ which was at the forefront of its campaign for the indirect election of the first president of Hungary. They saw a greater chance that the new head of state would not have been related to the MSZMP if he or she had been elected by a freely and democratically elected parliament instead of direct citizens' vote (Melia, 1994, pp. 65–68).

¹² György Krassó assessed all this as hypocrisy and a political theatre, as the two parties did not veto the agreement, passing on its contents (Bozóki, 1991, pp. 379–380).

¹³ On the amendment of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court, the operation and management of parties, the election of members of parliament, the amendment of the Penal Code, and the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act.

¹⁴ Thus, the Round Table Talks did not end on 18 September: the commissions met until November of 1989 and the EKA until the end of April 1990, while their possibility of having a meaningful influence on the processes gradually diminished (Ripp, 2006, pp. 458–459).

¹⁵ Until that moment, however, the party has considered the Polish regime change to be exemplary (Csizmadia, 1992, p. 23).

The MDF, in turn, campaigned for the boycott of the referendum, which meant recognizing what had been recorded in the Round Table agreement. This stance by the MDF only fueled the accusations from the party's opponents of conspiring with the communists,¹⁶ which showed a remarkable resemblance to the attacks against the “constructive” Polish oppositionists (Ripp, 2006, pp. 435–436).¹⁷

Due to the mentioned scenario of the regime change, several opposition parties competed for the votes in the parliamentary elections held on 25 March and 8 April 1990; there was no umbrella organization similar to the Citizens' Committee (Komitet Obywatelski, KO) established in Poland. The election was won by the MDF, which then formed a coalition government with the FKgP and the KDNP. Meanwhile, the Hungarian October Party was gradually deprived of its political prospects by the ongoing regime change, so the organization ceased to exist in December of 1991. György Krassó did not live to see this, as he died in February 1991. His plans included relaunching a samizdat, expressing that he did not consider the new administration to be different from the old one, but only one number of *The Voice of the Street* (*Az utca hangja*) was published, during the Taxi Blockade which took place on 25–28 October 1990 (Hafner & Zsille, 1991, p. 387).

The Hungarian October Party and the contemporary critics of the Polish Round Table Talks

György Krassó was keenly interested in the events that transpired in Poland. In September of 1980, he joined a call in which the Fund for Supporting the Poor (Szegényeket Támogató Alap, SZETA) asked individuals to contribute to providing aid, in the capacity of accommodation and care, to children of the Polish workers who were then on strike (Mitrovits, 2020, p. 99).¹⁸ In the late autumn of 1980 he visited Krakow and Warsaw. As the only Hungarian traveller on the train going to Poland he asked the question in his article entitled “Let's travel to

¹⁶ György Krassó simply referred to the MDF as a coalition partner of the MSZMP (Bozóki, 1991, p. 380).

¹⁷ Interestingly, the accusation of collusion with the communists has hit the democratic opposition at least as strongly as the MDF, which was really seeking its own deal with the MSZMP.

¹⁸ After the introduction of martial law in Poland (13 December 1981) they wanted to organize a camp similar to the one that finally took place in June 1981 – one of the main instigators of this initiative was Krassó – but this was finally thwarted by the Polish and Hungarian authorities (Mitrovits, 2020, pp. 129–131).

Poland!” (“Utazzunk Lengyelországba!”) published in the samizdat newspaper/journal named *Diary* (“Napló”): “Are the people of a country with a similar structure to us – who are struggling for radical social and economic change – less interesting than the Tatra ski slopes?” (Hafner & Zsille, 1991, p. 90).

He reported on his travel experiences at a Free University lecture on 24 November. He was captivated by the extensive operation of Solidarity and the fact that “everyone is politicizing” which prompted the memories of years 1945 and 1956 in him. He saw the meeting of workers and intellectuals embodied in the birth of Solidarity, and their camaraderie became, to his mind, an example to be followed (Mitrovits, 2020, pp. 53–54). In Hungary, however, some of the many reflections of the democratic opposition regarding the events in Poland were approached directly from the point of view of the clash of interests with Hungarian workers. It was not a new phenomenon: one may say that the inability of the intelligentsia to connect with the masses as a whole was traditional in the Central and Eastern European region.¹⁹ This was already seen by many besides Krassó, but with the enthusiastic participation of the Hungarian party-state leadership, the workers were practically absent from the Hungarian regime change.²⁰

However, beyond the Polish effect on Krassó’s thoughts and on his party’s acts, it is instructive to compare the main points of their criticism with the opinion of the Polish Round Table Talks’ contemporary critics.

The discussions between Lech Wałęsa and Czesław Kiszczak, which began on 31 August 1988, polarized the opposition forces in the most spectacular way possible. Kornel Morawiecki, the leader of the Fighting Solidarity (*Solidarność Walcząca*) was the first to state that the dialogue with the government manifested in the Kiszczak-Wałęsa talks is a mistake in both a political and moral sense (Ligarski, 2019, p. 93). A similar stance, yet from a different starting point, was expressed by the Working Group of National Commission of Solidarity (*Grupa Robocza Komisji Krajowej NSZZ „Solidarność”*). As in March of 1981, their criticism was again aimed at ending the strikes, by which Wałęsa fulfilled Kiszczak’s precondition for the start of formal negotiations (Dudek, 2004, pp. 21–22).

In Poland, by the end of 1988, through the Citizens’ Committee an exclusive opposition was formed, a special elite whose attribute had become the Round Table itself. Groups outside the narrow circle of Lech Wałęsa could not become negotiating partners of the ruling group, and thus neither the shapers of regime change. However, the selection of specific participants in the negotiations raised

¹⁹ One of the most interesting examples of this was *The Social Contract* (*Társadalmi szerződés*), a key pamphlet of the democratic opposition from 1987, which, contrary to its name, was addressed directly to the authorities (Thoma, 1998, pp. 248–249).

²⁰ Since the end of the 1988 summer strikes, Solidarity itself began to count less and less on them.

questions on both sides. On the part of the state, Kiszczak²¹ and the Security Service (Służba Bezpieczeństwa, SB) were in charge of the “casting” of the opposition and the selection process was plagued by failures.²² Although they proved to be successful in continuing to divide the opposition. They also received help from Solidarity itself, whose membership was already polarized by the mere fact of negotiations (Opulski, 2019, pp. 49–50). The division of potential participants into “constructive” and “obstructive” ones – which, moreover, was carried out by Wałęsa himself and his closest confidants – only deepened the internal front lines (Tálas, 1993, pp. 50–51).

In addition to the authorities, the “constructive” opposition also emerged in the crosshairs of the organizations criticizing the negotiated regime change. Self-determination towards the Citizens’ Committee became one of the starting points for anti-system forces. At the first meeting of the Congress of the Anti-System Opposition on 25 February 1989, the participants declared that Wałęsa and his circle do not represent the whole opposition or the entire Solidarity in the negotiations (Terlecki, 2010, p. 154). A similar situation did not take place in Hungary, where such a monopolistic organization never appeared on the opposition side, and a wide spectrum of opposition organizations took part in the Round Table Talks.

Among the groups not participating in the negotiations, those who were seeking for compromise with the ruling group were criticized on the moral grounds for negotiating with the regime responsible for the bloodshed of the Poznań June of 1956, for the salvos of 1970 and 1981, and for the administrative oppression of 1968 and 1976. However, those who were negotiating with the regime were partly motivated by the view of avoiding similar incidents in the years to come,²³ which were foreseen as ramifications of a non-consensual regime change. In Hungary, the memory of the 1956 Revolution came to forefront in 1989 in different forms. In a radio interview on 27 January, Imre Pozsgay, a prominent politician of the MSZMP called the events of October–November 1956, that had been officially treated as a counter-revolution, a popular uprising. On 16 June, the executed prime minister of the revolution, Imre Nagy was reburied. Nevertheless, due to the historical character of the revolution and the resultant retaliation, the Hungarian October Party was unable to criticize the negotiating authorities in this direction. At the same time, in Poland there was a significant personal overlap between those who ordered the introduction of the martial law in 1981 and those sitting at the negotiating table in 1989.

²¹ According to Jan Olszewski, the interior minister decided as the sole authority on the persons who could sit at the negotiating table (Błażejowska, 2019, pp. 10–12).

²² For instance, Jacek Kuroń and Adam Michnik were in no way excluded from the negotiations, despite their names being blacklisted as extremists (Tischler, 1999, p. 142).

²³ As early as 1976, Adam Michnik made it clear in his essay, “A New Evolutionism”, that changing the system cannot require more human lives.

In addition, to avoid violence, Solidarity's leadership was driven by the fact that the system did not provide any legal guarantee for their operation – so they had to become indispensable for it. The radical right-wing groups in the opposition also inadvertently played into the hands of Wałęsa by constantly referring to the system as totalitarian, ignoring the anti-totalitarian process that had already begun much earlier, and ignoring the original meaning of the term. In doing so, they contributed to the legitimacy of the “constructive” opposition which were able to indulge in the role of forcing a huge, totalitarian administration to its knees instead of the reality of the late Jaruzelski regime (Walicki, 1996, p. 525).²⁴

Regarding the legitimacy of the negotiating parties, Karol Modzelewski made a remark similar to that of Krassó: “[...] the Round Table was the agreement of the elites, a compromise of the generals of non-existent armies.”²⁵ At the same time, this approach is problematic in several aspects. On the one hand, without official recognition the Solidarity could not have had legal or political legitimacy, yet it had significant social support.²⁶ On the other hand, in Modzelewski's words, it should not be forgotten that there were very real armies behind the PZPR: the Soviet, which was still stationed in the country, and the Polish People's Army. At the same time, dissatisfaction was further heightened by conspiracy theories, which were rapidly gathering momentum and were also fueled by the increasingly marginalized members of the right wing of Solidarity (Vetter, 2013, p. 285). They proclaimed that real agreements under which the Solidarity's elite would transfer the PZPR nomenclature to the new system in exchange for certain leadership positions would have been reached at the minister of interior's villa in Magdalenka (Tischler, 1999, pp. 142–143).

Unlike in Hungary, the Polish Round Table was accompanied by continuous demonstrations and strikes, the topics of which, however, were not limited to criticism of the discussions. The withdrawal of Soviet troops, the prevention of the construction of the Żarnowiec and Klempice nuclear power plants, the demand for free elections, and many other cases ranged from changing the education law to the release of Václav Havel called the protesters to the streets. Demonstrations have also been regularly covered by the state media, confirm-

²⁴ This phenomenon is by no means to be observed only in Poland, moreover, in Central and Eastern Europe only Romania can really be considered a state in which the change of regime was the success of de-Stalinization and terminating personality cult.

²⁵ However, the historian also emphasizes in the same article that he sees the negotiations as a success as a whole, as they have ensured a peaceful regime change (Modzelewski, 2014, p. 162).

²⁶ It was also important for the government to have some level of social support behind its negotiating partner, as this was what it expected to legitimize the compromise to be reached.

ing the official position already held on several fronts that the only competent opposition was sitting at the negotiating table (Pietrzyk-Dąbrowska, 2019, p. 25). The demonstration in Krakow on 17 February 1989, organized by the Independent Students' Association (Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów, NZZS) and dispersed by military police units, was particularly vividly described in the state media: "W Warszawie toczą się rozmowy, a w Krakowie toczą się kamienie", namely 'In Warsaw the arguments are flying, in Krakow – the stones' (Pietrzyk-Dąbrowska, 2019, pp. 26–27).

The attitude of the Churches to the Round Table Talks was very similar in the Polish and the Hungarian case, namely, that the representatives of the clergy had a kind of observer-moderator role in the negotiations. In Poland, however, the role of the Roman Catholic Church was far more important. In the campaign leading up to the compromise elections, the Citizens' Committee received significant help "from the pulpits", especially in rural areas where Solidarity was not strong and its candidates were barely known (Vetter, 2013, p. 309). For this reason, organizations that refused negotiations would also have been in need of support from the clergy, primarily to reach a wider audience. However, the Polish Catholic Church, which had extensive social organizations, did not extend its mediating role at the Round Table to radicals who could potentially endanger the peaceful transition. According to state security reports, at a conference on 22 March 1989, the Archbishop of Krakow, Franciszek Macharski expressed concern about the possible disruption of the Round Table Talks by the continuous protests. He said that the young people protesting in the streets of Krakow were being manipulated, and the city was pushed to have potentially repeated the role of Bydgoszcz in 1981 by forces that had found supporters especially in university circles (Łatka, 2020, p. 308).

In particular, the impact of the Round Table agreement on the compromise (semi-free) parliamentary elections provoked further anger and dissatisfaction among the opposition groups left out of the negotiations, which culminated in further street upheavals, but was overwhelmed by the Citizens' Committee's success in the elections.

Conclusions

Like Polish organizations that also criticized the Round Table Talks from the outside, the Hungarian October Party failed to have channeled social tensions that had arisen from the discrepancy between reality and state socialist promises (Zimmermann, 1998, p. 67), partly because it misjudged its extent. By 1989, neither Hungarian nor Polish society was open to radical solutions to

achieve the change (Przeperski, 2019). However, it was a very important factor in the marginalization of the Hungarian October Party's activities that they could have not communicated their alternative ideas about regime change to the wider public. As an early forerunner of anti-elite populism, the party's message was a repository of internal contradictions. It presented its ideas on worker self-management on an undifferentiated anti-communist basis, while it had no clear position on privatization or on the nature of private property in general. The lack of a clear political self-definition was also reflected in the party's almost non-existent social support.

At the same time, in Poland, although the simultaneity and inseparability of the political and economic aspects of regime change were already recognized by many (Offe, 1996), the majority of radical opposition groups²⁷ became disinterested in the second field, offering no economic alternative to society.²⁸ It is also worth mentioning that almost all of these organizations were active in particular nation states, so their opportunities for international cooperation with similar groups were severely limited (Radice, 1998, p. 213).

The Hungarian October Party could not have become the representative of a specific social group from which it might have received support, while it did not find a promoter at the institutional level either. Cooperation with similar Hungarian organizations and embracing international – especially Polish-oriented – paths could not compensate for this shortcoming. Furthermore, since the single-party systems opposite to the concepts of social self-government had been shaken, the proponents of a liberal market economy had already emerged as new, invincible rivals.²⁹ The anti-stateism of the young generation, primarily sought by the so-called non-constructive opposition organizations, was successfully channelled this time by capitalism, as it had already happened in 1968. Meanwhile, workers who later suffered the loss of social status with the change of regime became so individualized by 1989 – especially in Hungary where the private sector was extended – that addressing them at the community level proved to be a completely fruitless effort. The Hungarian case is particularly instructive in this respect, where although the third constitutional amendment of 1989 introduced the concept of “producer self-government,” one of the first measures of the National Assembly in 1990 was the deletion of this passage (Tütő, 2019, pp. 75–76).

²⁷ It was understandable in the case of the GR KK, since its members in 1980–1981 had already had a first-hand experience of the hopelessness of the Polish path of worker self-government.

²⁸ This proved to be a serious mistake, especially in the light of the fact that the most common social demand related to the change of regime was to change the economic system (Bartha, 2010, p. 28).

²⁹ Among them were party nomenclatures whose privileged positions of power would have been lost in self-governing, democratic socialist systems.

However, the doom of the Hungarian October Party was first and foremost spelled by the Round Table Talks that had previously played a key role in bringing it to life. The unstoppable regime change finally suppressed the voice of simultaneous political criticism. It was replaced by the criticisms of the effects of economic transformation, especially its social cost, although they were made by new organizations in both Hungary and Poland. Kornel Morawiecki, the leader of the Fighting Solidarity³⁰ said in a documentary³¹ about the organization that “Fighting Solidarity survived many blows, except one: the Round Table Talks.”

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³⁰ The organization ceased to exist in 1992, and was revived in the form of an association by its former members in 2007.

³¹ *Głowa mur przebijesz. Solidarność Walcząca*, a documentary filmwritten and directed by Grażyna Ogródowska and Leszek Furman, presented in 2007.

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The Catalan Artists' Involvement in the Pro-insdependence Movement

Zaangażowanie katalońskich artystów w ruch proniepodległościowy

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Abstract


This article examines the involvement of artists in the pro-independence movement in Catalonia. First, to provide context, the author discusses the history of Catalonia, focusing on the conflicts with the Spanish state and on the five instances throughout history when the region proclaimed independence. The article shows how stories from the Catalonia past are present in people's everyday lives and influence their sentiments. The author also tries to find an answer to the question of how artists became involved in the pro-independence movement by taking a closer look at both the art and political engagement of the artists representing different generations and genres during the period in question.

Keywords: Catalonia, pro-independence movement, separatism, artists, activism

Abstrakt

Artykuł analizuje kwestię zaangażowania artystów w ruch proniepodległościowy w Katalonii. Dla wprowadzenia w kontekst wydarzeń, autorka rozpoczyna od przedstawienia historii Katalonii, skupiając się na jej konflikcie z Królestwem Hiszpanii i pięciu momentach historycznych, gdy Katalonia ogłosiła niepodległość. Artykuł przedstawia, w jaki sposób przeszłość jest obecna w codziennym życiu Katalończyków i jak wpływa na ich postawy. Autorka stara się także wskazać, jaką rolę odgrywają w tych procesach artyści i jak rozpoczęło się ich zaangażowanie w ruch proniepodległościowy. Czyni to poprzez przedstawienie artystycznego i politycznego zaangażowania artystów reprezentujących różne style i pokolenia.

Słowa kluczowe: Katalonia, ruch proniepodległościowy, separatyzm, artyści, aktywizm

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Introduction

“Nation” is a term that scholars find hard to define, or at least they find it hard to agree upon the definition of. Apart from scholars, lawmakers also use the term in their own way, finding definitions that suit them best. Usually, a nation is understood as a group organised in its own state (e.g., according to the Preamble to the Polish Constitution of 1997). But there are also other similar terms in use. For example, in the Spanish Constitution, Catalans are described as a “nationality”; therefore, their cultural separateness is recognised (Myśliwiec, 2014). In Section 2 of the Spanish Constitution from 1978, we read:

The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all.

In Europe, the idea of a nation is linked to the idea of the nation state. The concept is based on the right of people to self-determination. Hence, it comes as no surprise that some groups (often those recognised as minorities) claim to be a people and, consequently, have a strong desire for self-determination.

There are many scholars concerned with nations and nationalism. For example, Déloye, drawing upon Ernest Renan, names some of the characteristics that constitute a definition of a nation: “Concern for reciprocity, interdependence, loyalty, organic solidarity, empathy, the valorisation of individual sacrifice for the benefit of the national collectivity (*pro patria mori*): these are the constitutive elements of this ‘abstract patriotism’ [...]” (Déloye, 2013, p. 3). The author goes on to describe “abstract patriotism” and Renan’s idea of the “everyday plebiscite”:

[...] abstract patriotism’ that unites and connects those who see themselves as participating in the ‘everyday plebiscite’ [...]. The approach in terms of ‘banal nationalism’ is therefore an invitation to see nationalism as more than something imposed from above upon a passive and credulous public for ideological and political reasons. (Déloye, 2013, p. 3)

Hence, we are invited to analyse nationalism as a bottom-up phenomenon and to try to understand how it evolves. In scholarly literature, attention has been paid to artists who create works in support of a particular ideology.

Nationalism is one of the most popular among them. It is the reason why it is still relevant to analyse the subject today. In the following article, I try to find an answer to the question: How do artists in Catalonia influence the pro-independence movement? In my hypothesis, I assume that they do this mainly through their art but also through their personal engagement in politics. The aim of the article is, therefore, to analyse the ways in which artists in Catalonia support independence. In the analysis, we should keep in mind that the idea of secession from Spain is nothing new in Catalonia, and its symbols are a part of everyday life, as demonstrated later. Throughout the years, the support of artists for the independence movement changed, but it remained one of the pro-independence movement's characteristic features. In the study, I focus on the period from 2009 to 2020 (the period of the Franco regime shifted the focus from independence to freedom and later, autonomy, but around 2009 the idea of independence grew stronger). As the analysis focuses on the intersections between political science and cultural studies, the study is of an interdisciplinary nature.

Artists and nationalism in Catalonia

Art and artists can be seen as facilitators of social movements and change. Antoni Martí Monterde states that “[...] if we must imagine an independent Catalonia, we must also imagine independence for the various fields: their autonomies and heteronomies, their complicated modulation in relation to the international literary field” (2013, p. 67). Following this thought, if we are to imagine an independent Catalonia, we have to imagine every part of its culture as independent. This task is not hard. Media, literature, music – these are all produced in Catalan. Moreover, various Catalan artists played, and often still play, an important role in the Catalan pro-independence movement.

But first, we need to take a look at nationalism in Spain, which assumed a different form than in the rest of Europe. Ludger Mees writes, “I have described the Spanish history of the 19th century as a ‘Spanischen Sonderweg’, a *particular Spanish way* towards the building of a modern nation-state.” This way was *particular*, since it was exactly opposite to that of other western states:

During the last decades of the century, when the western world entered a phase of extreme internal nationalism and external imperialism, Spain was degraded from being the most influential colonial power in the world into a nearly bankrupt third- or fourth-class state with tremendous internal problems of legitimacy, identity, penetra-

tion and participation, according to the terminology used by Charles Tilly in another of his already classic studies. (Mees, 2004, p. 317)

It is not only the history of Spain that makes Catalan nationalism different but also the history of Catalonia itself. In fact, each region of Spain developed on its own (Antczak, 2008). Spain itself was mostly agricultural, while Catalonia, with its port in Barcelona and proximity to other European states, was an entering point for the new European ideas. Therefore, Catalonia was always ahead of the rest of the country. Laura Desfor Edles writes about the importance of Catalonia's industrialisation:

Both Catalonia and the Basque Country have rich autonomous histories, cultures, and languages; and both resisted centralist, Castilian domination throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. In the mid-1800s, the Basque Country and Catalonia became Spain's most industrialized areas, which brought a surge of Spanish immigration. In both the Basque Country and Catalonia, ethnic nationalist movements emerged in the late nineteenth centuries [sic], in conjunction with both industrialization and immigration. (Edles, 1999, p. 315)

Resistance to centralisation does not have to be manifested through political actions and wars – it can also be shown in the preservation of one's regional culture and traditions. Thus, any non-dominant culture (including minor cultures) is always political, as it exists independently from the "national" culture, preserving the separateness of a group in relation to the dominant culture. As it has already been suggested, "[m]inor literature can describe sites of experimentation that allow readers to think outside or beyond existing identity formations organised around the nation state" (Laurieb & Khana, 2017, p. 3).

The 20th century made us well acquainted with the fact that there is more to the arts than just their decorative, aesthetic aspects. The arts shock – they make us ask questions and search for answers, even in its popular (pop-art) variety. But artists do not communicate with their audience through art alone. Media, especially social media, provide us with an easy access to the artists themselves and allow us to communicate with them, get to know them better, and learn about their opinions. This type of communication between artists and fans has never existed before and is peculiar to the 21st century. It empowers artists, who see that their voice is not only being heard but often also powerful (Nouri, 2018).

Esteladas in Palau

It is 26 December 2012, and Catalans are celebrating Saint Stephan's Day. In Palau de la Música Catalana, in Barcelona's historical city centre, Orfeó Català, a choral society, is having its traditional Sant Esteve concert, as it does every year on that day. Like the previous year, the last song performed is "El Cant De La Senyera"¹ (Song of the Flag), an informal Catalan anthem often sang after the official "Els Segadors" (The Reapers) during the events. Just like the previous year, the entire audience rise from their seats; some of them putting their hands over their hearts. But this year is special because, for the first time, *esteladas*² (Catalan independentist flags) appear all around the audience and the choir, covering the stage and the auditorium. Once the music ceases, people begin to clap their hands and shout: *In... Inde... Independencia!* This was the first but not the last time this occurred during the Sant Esteve concert in Palau.

"El Cant De La Senyera" is a very special song for Catalans. Its lyrics and music are very proud. It refers to values such as freedom, faithfulness, and sovereignty. "La Senyera" starts off with: *Au, germans, al vent desfem-la en senyal de llibertat*, which translates: 'Come, brothers, to the wind, let's unfurl her as a sign of freedom'.

What happened in Palau in 2012 had never occurred before. It was the result of years of autonomy-related debates that brought no answer from Madrid. The support for independence grew, and events just like the one described above, when people have expressed their support for secession during non-political events, have become more frequent. Over the years, more and more celebrities and artists have supported the cause.

But to understand Catalonia and its push towards self-determination, it is necessary to understand Catalonia's history. The Catalan State or the Catalan Republic was proclaimed five times under different circumstances – in 1641, 1873, 1931, 1934, and 2017. Each of those stories is engraved in Catalan towns, but aside from Catalans, not many people can read the symbols that tell us about Catalan history.

¹ The song was composed by Lluís Millet to accompany Joan Maragall's poem and was dedicated to Orfeó Català, a choir dating back to 1891 founded by Lluís Millet y Amadeo Vives and residing in Palau de la Música Catalana.

² While *senyera* is a traditional Catalan flag (four red stripes on the golden background), *estelada* is its independentist version, with a blue triangle attached to the shorter edge and a white star in it. *Estelada* was designed by Vicenç Albert Ballester, inspired by Cuban and Puerto Rican flags, in the beginning of the 20th century. *Estelada* now has two versions – *estelada blau* (with a blue triangle and a white star) is a symbol of independentism, while *estelada vermella* (with a yellow triangle and a red star) is associated with the left.

Catalan history in the City

Going back to the beginning of Catalan history, we can see that Catalonia has a long history of self-governance. It was united by a personal union (which is not considered a full unification) with Castille in 1469 through the marriage of King Ferdinand II of Aragon and Queen Isabella I of Castille, later called the Catholic Monarchs. The aim of the marriage was to join the units in the *Reconquista* (the period when Hispanic kings intended to reclaim the Peninsula from its Muslim rulers).

Catalonia has always had a substantial autonomy. Between the 13th and 18th centuries, the Catalan Court (Les Cortes Catalanes) functioned as a medieval type of parliament. Les Cortes Catalanes gave its name to many streets and squares in the region, reminding people about the history of self-governance. The Court was not only an advisory body but one that could create laws and influence politics.

Nationalism in Catalonia is also different from the nationalism of other groups. As a result of years of self-governing and autonomy, the idea of independent Catalonia became part of the public space. Nationalism in Catalonia is a part of everyday life. The phenomenon explained by Yves Déloye:

To be sure, national narratives have been represented and disseminated on a large scale by novels, operas, paintings, and engravings, historical works scholarly and popular, and in the form of school textbooks, as well as by street names, statues in public spaces, public commemorations, the construction of historical monuments, new festive calendars, et cetera. What matters in this incomplete list is the constant ‘advertising’ effort that accompanies the promotion of the ‘national habitus’, especially in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The daily affirmation of national identity, which is revealed in particular by the study of the media of mass communication, becomes *an active social co-production of a commonplace national identity* that combines not only the work of nationalization carried out by nationalist elites but also the everyday activity of identifying, receiving, and reappropriating undertaken by the populations concerned. (Déloye, 2013, p. 3)

Most tourists who visit Barcelona want to see and take a picture in front of the Arc de Triomf, situated in the very centre of Barcelona. Next to the Arc, usually bypassed by most pedestrians, stands a monument dedicated to Pau Claris i Casademunt – a famous Catalan who proclaimed the Catalan Republic in 1641 during the Catalan Revolt (against Spain) in 1640–1659, also called

the Reapers War (Guerra de los Segadores). Claris was the leader during the Reapers War, a conflict that was a result of discontent caused by the presence of Castilian troops in Catalonia during the Franco-Spanish War. The Catalan Revolt is the main topic of the Catalan anthem – “Els Segadors” – which is a call for the reapers to stand against Spain (called an enemy in the song) and “cut off the chains”. Spaniards are referred to as “so conceited and so arrogant”. *Ara és hora* was also used as a slogan during the Junts pel Sí campaign in 2015 (Pobóg-Lenartowicz, 2016, p. 28). It can be understood as a call to action – now is the time to stand against Spain (again).

The War of Succession was another important moment when Catalonia stood against the rest of Spain. After the death of the heirless king in 1700, the Habsburgs and the Bourbons claimed rights to the throne. As a result, Catalonia fought against Spain and finally lost after the Siege of Barcelona.

From the Arc de Triomf, a passage leads to the Parc de la Ciutadella, the only remains of the Ciutadella – a castle built after the thirteen-month-long Siege of Barcelona to control the city after the War of Succession.³ The Ciutadella was destroyed by the citizens of Barcelona. We can learn about this history in the nearby El Born Cultural Centre, built between 1874–1876 to serve as a market. During renovations, it was discovered that underneath lied the ruins of a neighbourhood that had existed there previously but was levelled later on, so that the Ciutadella could have been built. The story says that people were not only instructed to leave their houses but also to raze them leaving only one metre of walls to be used as foundations for a castle. The archaeological discovery was made between 1994 and 2007, so the story is still vivid for Catalans.

The Cathedral is another spot often visited in Barcelona. It is not hard to spot the hollows in its walls. They are marks left by cannonballs used by the Bourbon's (Philip V of Spain) army during the Siege. Between the Cathedral, situated in Gòtic Quarter, and the Ciutadella Parc, there is a small square next to the basilica of Santa Maria del Mar called Fossar de les Moreres. Most tourist simply walk past it, as there is nothing but a red arch with a torch near the top. Fossar de les Moreres (Hollow of the Mulberries) is where the defenders of the city were buried. The square was designed by the award-winning Catalan architect Carme Fiol i Costa. Every year on 11th September, Barcelonians come to the Fossar to pay tribute to those who died defending their city. The 11th September is a national day of Catalonia called *Diada*. Although it is a very festive day, it commemorates the fall of Barcelona in 1714. Since 2010, pro-independence protests have been organised on this day.

Carrer de la Diputació is a street name related to independence, too. It runs across the entire city, beginning close to Plaça d'Espanya and finishing near the

³ Ciutadella was not the only castle controlling the city. There is another castle on a hill nearby – Montjuïc – and its cannons were famously directed towards the city.

Torre Agbar. *Diputació*, in turn, is the institution that proclaimed the independence of Catalonia in 1873 during the First Spanish Republic.

The name of Francesc Pi i Margall, who was the president of the First Spanish Republic, also reminds people of those times. It is important to remember that Catalan nationalism is not the only movement that has strong roots in Catalonia. Republicanism is another, as monarchy has not been popular in Catalonia for a very long time now. And we have many accounts of Catalonia standing against the Spanish monarchy. Joan Cortada – a Catalan writer – campaigned for the independence of Catalonia and helped bring about the events in the 19th century (Obtułowicz, 2007, pp. 19–20).

The passage that leads us from the Arc to the Parc is named after Lluís Companys i Jover, a Catalan lawyer and politician, who has streets named after him in almost every town in the region. Companys was one of the first leaders of the Republican Left of Catalonia (*Esquerra Republicana Catalunya*), an independentist party established in 1931. In 1934, Companys became president of the *Generalitat de Catalunya* and proclaimed the Catalan State. Companys was executed in 1940 in Montjuïc castle. Three years prior, in 1931, Francesc Macià i Llussà proclaimed the independence of Catalonia (Edles, 1999, p. 320). Macià has a square named after him, crossed by the *Avinguda Diagonal*.

Briefly, the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) was a conflict between the republican left and right-wing monarchists, with both sides allying with other groups. Catalonia as a region was pro-republican and has remained so to this day:

[...] in Catalonia, three new sacred symbols were melded to Catalan nationalist mythology as a result of the Second Republic and the Civil War: (1) the notion of a modern, legitimate, autonomous government (symbolized by the 1932 Autonomy Statute and the *Generalitat*); (2) a genuine national hero (Macià, the first president of the *Generalitat*); and (3) a national martyr (president of the *Generalitat*, Lluís Companys). (Edles, 1999, p. 326)

George Orwell's *Homage to Catalonia* is probably the most famous book about the Spanish Civil War in Catalonia. The author went to Spain to fight against Franco.

Franco's regime and Lluís Llach

In Poland, most people believe that “Mury” is an original song by Jacek Kaczmarski. The truth is that Kaczmarski adapted Lluís Llach's anti-Francoist

protest song “L'estaca” and replaced the metaphor of a stake with a similarly used one of a wall. Llach supported the pro-independentist movement for years – he was one of the most important artists who backed the Junts pel Sí campaign in 2015. He even became a candidate and was elected from Girona's list. His presence brought something special to the movement. When he entered the stage during events, people would immediately start to sing “L'estaca”, and the crowd would become very emotional, remembering the times when they stood against Franco's regime. The band La Trinca also supported Junts pel Sí during the campaign (and their drummer also became a candidate). During the event opening the campaign, they performed the song “Volem pa amb oli” (We want bread with oil) – a popular Catalan song known in various versions, the most popular ending with a warning that if the singer does not get the bread, they will not be quiet. This time, at the end of the performance, when the audience was singing along, the band changed the lyrics to “We want independence”. La Trinca and Lluís Llach both represent Nova Cançó (New Song) – a movement created in the 1950s that united artists against Franco's regime.

“Junts anirem més Lluny” was the main song created for the Junts pel Sí campaign in 2015. The song was performed by various Catalan artists. The band was created by four musicians: Pemi Roviroa (Lax'n'Busto), Jimmy Piñoli, David Abarz, and Èric Vinaixa, while the song was sung by Lluís Llach, Joan Dausà, Ivette Nadal, Arneu Orriols (Okey Ok), Josep Maria Mainat (La Trinca), Pemi Fortuny, Caïm Riba, Cris Juanico, Èric Vinaixa, Èric Vergés (Els Catarres), Jan Riera (Els Catarres), Roser Cruells (Els Catarres), Natxo Tarrés, Roger Farré, Juanjo Muñoz (Gossos), Salva Racero (Lax'n'Busto), Quim Mandado (Ex-Sangtraït, Los Guardians del Pont), Bikimel, Joan Masdéu, Joan Reig (Els Pets), and a children's choir. In the music video for “Junts anirem més Lluny”, we can see that Llach plays an important role – the song begins and ends with him singing, and throughout the video, we see him greeting and hugging people.

The song is based on the second part of Llach's song “Ítaca”, first published in 1975 on the album *Viatge a Ítaca*, in which Llach also collaborated with other artists. The music video ends with Llach quoting a poet – Miguel Martí Pol – whose poems he would often use as lyrics. Llach says: “To say how I see the future I will use a short phrase from Miguel Martí Pol ‘I see it bright and possible. I see it bright and possible.’”⁴

“Possible” was an important word in the campaign. Paul Romeva⁵ said those words at the end of a spot called “Sí, tot és possible” (‘Yes, everything is pos-

⁴ Original wording: “Per parlar de com veig el futur, faré servir una petita frase d'en Miguel Martí Pol: El veig lluminós i possible. El veig lluminós i possible”. Author's translation.

⁵ Raul Romeva is one of Catalan politicians who spent two years in prison without a trial and was later sentenced to 9–12 years in prison for organising the referendum.

sible'). There are two versions of the video with the same footage and different speeches in the background (Artur Mas, leader of CiU, and Oriol Junqueras, leader of ERC). The video shows an elderly man who is listening to the speech. He stands up, takes a chair, and leaves his flat, only to put the chair outside and stand on it. In the next scene, we can see other people, including Llach and other candidates, doing this against different backgrounds. These backgrounds are not random – we can see walls of the Cathedral with holes from cannonballs and ruins in the El Born cultural centre. Mas says: “I ask you, let’s have the same attitude of combat, revolt, if you want to, but above all – self-affirmation, will, faith in the future that we had on that historical day of 9th of November 2014 [...] liberty of the country.”⁶

The pro-independence movement today

As we can see, the idea of independence is nothing new in Catalonia, but during Francoist regime it was gradually replaced by a discussion of autonomy. The shift occurred around 2009 when Partido Popular⁷ challenged the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia of 2006 in the Constitutional Court of Spain, and the matter of independence was again on the table. According to Joan Marcet:

It all seems to have started in June 2010, with the Constitutional Court sentence (STC 31/2010) that blocked the reform of the 2006 Statute of Catalonia. Though hindsight reveals clear precedents in political attitudes that surfaced a few years prior, the paradigm shift in Catalanian politics began with the November 2010 elections. It would continue for five years before culminating in the electoral and political repositioning of the established and emergent political forces in the Catalanian party system (Marcet, 2019, p. 5).

The discussion later developed into numerous protests that were organised, including the one on 11th September 2012 during the celebration of Diada de Catalunya (Catalan National Day).⁸ It was organised under the motto *Catalun-*

⁶ Original wording: “Us demano que el 27 de setembre tinguem la mateixa actitud de combat, de revolta si voleu, pero sobretot d’autoafirmacio, de voluntat, de creure en el futur que varem tenir en aquella jornada historia del 9 de novembre de l’any 2014. [...] llibertat pel pais”. Author’s translation.

⁷ Partido Popular is a right-wing party with a direct origin in Franco’s organisation. PP governed Spain between 2011 and 2016.

⁸ *Diada de Catalunya* is a Catalan national day established in commemoration of the fall of Barcelona after the Siege of Barcelona (the War of the Spanish Succession in 1714).

ya, nou estat d'Europa ('Catalonia, a new state in Europe') by the Assembla Nacional Catalana (Catalan National Assembly – ANC) in Barcelona. The estimated number of participants was between 600,000 and 1.5 million (the overall population of Catalonia amounts to 7.7 million inhabitants).⁹ It was the last of a series of protests called *Marxa cap a la Independència* ('The March towards Independence'). Marcet summarised it by saying:

The political parties, especially those that had traditionally been central in the Catalanian political system, found themselves overwhelmed by the citizenry. On several occasions (July 2010 and September of 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015), citizens filled the streets to protest ad hoc or as part of new political and civic movements. [...] At most of these events, indignation at being treated as objects overlapped with the desire to be recognized as subjects capable of expressing their own opinions. In the more multitudinous protests, the generic 'right to decide' demand acquired a specific meaning in slogans favouring Catalanian independence. Thus, in a short time, the bridge was crossed: from the possibility of perfecting autonomy to independence as the sentiment and the will of a very significant segment of the Catalan population. (Marcet, 2019, pp. 8–9)

There were pro-independence protests on 1th September over the previous years, but with far fewer participants (around 10,000). They continued to grow each year, culminating in over one million people joining the protests in the streets of Barcelona every year.

It is not possible to introduce all the artists involved (also because for ten years, during each *Diada* protest, there were various artists performing across the region, often spontaneously, and especially in Barcelona, including marching bands from different towns), but I would like to analyse some of the more interesting names.

Elections in 2015 and Els Catarres

In 2015, Artur Mas, the president of Generalitat, called for elections and asked all the participating parties to decide if they wanted independence or not. This way, the elections took on the role of a referendum. There were, in fact, several local referendums held since 2009 and a large one in 2014. Ac-

⁹ The estimation varies according to different sources.

According to Spanish law, the Catalan government does not have the power to call a referendum. Thus, after several petitions to Spanish authorities, the Catalan government decided not to organise a referendum itself but to give all the possible tools to the people, so they could organise it themselves. The referendum of 2014 saw over 80% of people voting for independence and a turnout of 40%. This referendum led Artur Mas to call for elections. Those took place on 27 September 2015. There were seven lists presented, two of them were pro-independence – a far-left CUP and Junts pel Sí, a centre-left coalition created by the Democrats of Catalonia (DC, *Demòcrates de Catalunya*), the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC, *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*), and some other smaller organisations. After the votes were counted, Junts pel Sí announced its victory in front of the El Born Cultural Centre. The victory was only partial. The independentists gained 72 out of 135 seats (62 Junts pel Sí and 10 CUP) but only 48% of votes.

A coalition with CUP was the only chance Junts pel Sí had for a majority, but it was not sure if the two sides could agree upon it. CUP is a radical left-wing party, while at the time, a significant part of Junts pel Sí were liberals from the former *Convergència* party. It was possible that new elections would have been held in 2016. The compromise was reached, and as a result, Artur Mas did not get re-elected as president of *Generalitat*. Charles Puigdemont, candidate number three on a list in Girona province, who until that point was a president of Girona, took his place. Meanwhile, eight CUP politicians were instructed to vote with Junts pel Sí on topics related to secession. Mas has left his mandate as an MP and decided to focus on taking the CDC out of crisis.

During the campaign, Junts pel Sí was designed to look like a vivid, spontaneous social movement. It used bright, pastel colours, and its posters and campaign spots were full of everyday people, nature, and sun reflections. A part of it was *M'hi apunto* campaign where people could “appoint themselves” as candidates. The goal was to reach 100,000 people registered as candidates. On the real list, among the candidates there were many famous people who supported the campaign and presented themselves in elections, like the musician Lluís Llach, football coach Pep Guardiola, writer Josep Maria Ballarín i Monset, Els Pets’ drummer Joan Reig i Solé, Èric Vergés i Pascual from a band Els Catarres, popular chef and book author Ada Parellada i Garrell, actors Sílvia Bel i Busquet and Montserrat Carulla i Ventura, journalist and writer Jaume Cabré i Fabrè, a musician from the popular band La Trinca Josep Maria Mainat i Castells, and Salvador Cardús i Ros, a sociologist, journalist, and writer.

Els Catarres is a pop-folk band formed in 2010 by Èric Vergés, Jan Riera Prats, and Roser Cruells. Their first big hit, “Jennifer”, came out in summer 2011 and is a love story about a Catalan boy, who describes how Catalan he is in every possible way, yet has fallen in love with Jennifer – a girl from Castell-

defels.¹⁰ The story refers to various places, traditions, famous people, and even political parties – the protagonist lists all the typically Catalan things he does, including listening to Lluís Llach in his car, having a Catalan flag on his balcony, voting for *Convergència*, and even having erotic dreams about Jordi Pujol, a CDC politician and former president of *Generalitat*, who was in office between 1980 and 2003.

The band does not only sing in Catalan about being a Catalan, but they also collaborate with the *Institut Ramon Llull* – “a public body founded with the purpose of promoting Catalan language studies at universities abroad, the translation of literature and thought written in Catalan, and Catalan cultural production in other areas like theatre, film, circus, dance, music, the visual arts, design and architecture” (*Institut Ramon Llull*, n.d.).

The band has often expressed their support for the independence of Catalonia, and fans often bring *esteladas* to their concerts and chant *In... Inde... Independència!* The band also supported the *Junts pel Sí* campaign in 2015 (Èric Vergés was even a candidate on the list in Barcelona). Their song from 2013, “*Invencibles*” (*Invincible*), was used on various occasions during the campaign, including during events. The band would also post on their social media channels about their political views. Pictures from their concerts with *esteladas* were shown on their website.

On election day in 2015, each member of the band posted pictures of themselves voting. Each photo’s description had a hashtag *#ViscaCatalunya* (‘long live Catalonia’). The descriptions read:

We vote. We vote with joy. We vote for creating. We vote with courage, without fear, without threats we open eyes to a better future. *#ViscaCatalunya*. (Els Catarres, 2015a)

Always with a big smile! Because with joy and love that brought us here we will build a new future among us. Let’s go [for] it! *#ViscaCatalunya*. (Els Catarres. 2015b)

From abroad. I voted by e-mail. It looks like the world was waiting for this historical moment. For those who fought before us and for those who will come after us and won’t have to! Today we make history! *#ViscaCatalunya*.¹¹ (Els Catarres, 2015c)

¹⁰ *Castelldefels*, referred to in the song as “*Castefa*”, is a part of a “red ring” – towns surrounding Barcelona that were a destination for thousands of migrants from southern Spain in the 1950s and 60s.

¹¹ Author’s translation.

The trial and Pol Peiró i Navarro

Born in 1994, Pol Peiró i Navarro is a young artist from Premià de Mar. Although he is mostly known for his abstract art, in 2015 he started drawing the pro-independence protests and their protagonists – regular people, activists, and politicians. His art became popular when he started publishing his works on social media and tagging politicians. He would often give the portraits he drew to the people the art represented. In 2006, he held an exhibition in Premià de Mar.

Peiró has also designed the covers of several books, including Artur Mas's (former president of Generalitat) *Cap fred, cor calent*, Màrius Carol's (*La Vanguardia's* director) *El Camarote del Capitán*, and Gemma Aguilera and Jordi Turull's *Persistim* (Turull is one of Catalan politicians sentenced to 12 years in jail for organising the referendum on the independence of Catalonia in 2017).

Dibuixos per la República is Peiró's project, which he started in March 2018 (*Dibuixos per la República*, n.d.). The artist replaced the light yellow and blue sketching technique he had previously used when drawing the protest with dark watercolours on a bright yellow background. Peiró publishes his art on his Instagram account. The *Dibuixos per la República* project also has its own account under the same name.

The aftermath and Pablo Hasél (Pablo Rivadulla Duró)

Pablo Hasél is a rapper known for his activism. Politically, he represents the far left. Hasél is not pro-independence per se, but he believes it helps the communist cause. As he explained in a comment on Instagram in 2015: "I am communist, not nationalist, and as a communist I always search for what benefits the working class. The independence benefits it because it weakens the Spanish State and that favours the revolutionary movement and therefore the working class" (pablohaseloficial, 2015).¹² It is worth mentioning, especially for a reader from eastern and central Europe, that communism in the Peninsula is often seen differently than in the countries that have experienced it in the past. It is associated strongly with an anti-Francoist force. Hasél has attended pro-independence

¹² Original wording: "Yo soy comunista, no nacionalista, y como comunista siempre busco lo que beneficia a la clase obrera. La independencia la beneficia porque debilita al Estado español y eso favorece al movimiento revolucionario y por lo tanto a la clase obrera." Author's translation.

protests and commented: “Today at a rally for the right to decide. A fascist tribunal cannot stop people’s will” (pablohaseloficial, 2014).¹³

In 2014, Hasél was sentenced to two years in jail for glorifying terrorism, in particular for publishing materials on the organisation called GRAPO.¹⁴ That did not stop him, and in December 2015, he wrote on his Instagram account:

Spanish legality has no legitimacy. Firstly, because it is antidemocratic and does not defend people’s interest. Secondly, because it was born out of fascism and has never broke away from it. The Catalans, we decide with a majority that we want to break away from a fascist state and if that state does not respect it, the disobedience is not only legitimate but essential.¹⁵ (pablohaseloficial, 2015)

In 2020, he was sentenced to another 6 months in jail for assaulting a TV3 journalist and spraying him with cleaning fluid, which resulted in the said journalist being injured, and another two and a half years for assaulting a witness in a trial against an officer of the municipal police.

On 16 February 2021, the rapper was arrested after barricading himself with his supporters at the University of Lleida (BBC, 2021). His arrest was followed by protests all around Catalonia. Over 200 artists, including Javier Bardem and Pedro Almodóvar, signed a petition asking for Hasél’s release.

This was not the first time a rapper in Spain has been imprisoned because of their song lyrics. It is believed that the first time since the restoration of democracy in 1977 that a musician was imprisoned for their lyrics was in Valtònyc’s case. In 2012, José Miguel Arenas Beltrán Valtònyc, who was 18 at the time, was arrested. Valtònyc is a Mallorcan and Catalan Independentist and referred to communist, anti-capitalist republican, and anti-fascist ideology in his lyrics. He was not well-known until the arrest. According to the court, the lyrics praised terrorist organisations like ETA and GRAPO. In 2018, the rapper fled the country to avoid serving the three-and-a-half-year prison sentence. After

¹³ Original wording: “Hoy en la concentración por el derecho a decidir. Un tribunal fascista no puede frenar la voluntad de un pueblo.” Author’s translation.

¹⁴ GRAPO was an anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism organisation with origins in the Organisation of Marxist-Leninists of Spain (OMLE). Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre (The First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups) took its name from the events of 1 October 1975, when four Spanish policemen were killed. In the 1970s, the group organised several terrorist attacks and kidnappings. GRAPO shares a flag with Partido Comunista de España (Reconstituido).

¹⁵ Original wording: “La legalidad española no tiene legitimidad alguna. Primero porque es antidemocrática y no defiende los intereses del pueblo. Segundo porque nace del fascismo y no rompió con este. Los catalanes decidimos por mayoría que queríamos romper con el Estado fascista y si el Estado no lo respeta, la desobediencia no sólo es legítima sino que es imprescindible.” Author’s translation.

Spain issued an EU-wide arrest warrant, a judge in Belgium, where the rapper resided for the time, decided against the extradition (BBC, 2018).

Conclusions

The Catalan history of self-determination and rebellion against Spain lives within Catalan cities. Their residents are reminded of that history every day when walking down the streets. It is not surprising that the sentiments those stories inspire are used by politicians, and people are reminded of them during the pro-independence campaigns.

But those stories of rebellion also live in art and are given voice by artists. In a region as small as Catalonia, artists have no choice but to live close to their audience. There is no artificial “bubble” created by the industry. Living a rather normal life among regular people, the artists have a chance to hear their voices and make them stronger by introducing these voices in their art and getting directly involved in politics. And because of that, artists representing different generations and genres are all united for the same cause – the independence of Catalonia.

Having witnessed the events of 2017, the lack of dialogue between Barcelona and Madrid, and the cruelty of Spanish police, we can predict that myths will arise from those events and fuel generations to come, just like the Siege and the story of Ciutadella invigorates people living today.

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Działania administracji państwowej w Polsce wobec uchodźców z Ukrainy w pierwszych tygodniach wojny w Ukrainie 2022 roku Aspekty prawne i securitologiczne

The Actions of State Administration in Poland towards Refugees from Ukraine in the First Weeks of the War in Ukraine in 2022
Legal and Securitological Aspects

Piotr Zalewski*

Abstrakt

Agresja wojsk Federacji Rosyjskiej na terytorium Ukrainy, do jakiej doszło 24 lutego 2022 r., doprowadziła do wybuchu wojny, która zmusiła ludzi do ucieczki z domów i opuszczenia swojego kraju w poszukiwaniu bezpieczeństwa, ochrony i pomocy. W pierwszym tygodniu wojny ponad milion uchodźców z Ukrainy, głównie kobiet z dziećmi i osób starszych, przekroczyło granice swojego kraju, chroniąc się w krajach sąsiednich. Znaczna część uciekających przybyła do Polski. Celem artykułu jest przegląd głównych działań legislacyjnych i organizacyjnych podejm-

Abstract

The attack of the Russian Federation's troops on Ukraine, which took place on February 24, 2022, led to the outbreak of a war, which caused civilians to flee their homes and leave their country in search of safety, protection and humanitarian aid. In the first week of the war, over a million refugees from Ukraine, mainly women with children and the elderly, crossed Ukraine's border with its neighbor countries; a large group of the refugees arrived in Poland. Piotr Zalewski's aim in this article is to review the main legislative and organizational activities undertaken by the Polish government and the local government



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wanych przez polską administrację rządową i samorządową w zakresie zapewnienia uchodźcom instytucjonalnej pomocy i ochrony, a także działań służb mundurowych na rzecz identyfikacji ryzyka i zagrożeń oraz zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa osobistego przybywającym z Ukrainy.

Słowa kluczowe: kryzys uchodźczy, administracja państwowa, wojna, bezpieczeństwo

administration in terms of providing institutional assistance and protection for the refugees. Zalewski also discusses the activities of the uniformed services, which has consisted in identifying risks and threats and ensuring the personal safety of Ukrainian refugees.

Keywords: refugee crisis, state administration, war, security

Procesy nowej masowej migracji, jakich Europa Zachodnia doświadczała od roku 2011, a której szczyt zaowocował kryzysem migracyjnym 2015 r., ujawniły poważne deficyty wspólnej polityki migracyjnej i azylowej Unii Europejskiej (dalej: UE) (Dahl i Dziudziuka, 2017), a także zasadnicze różnice wśród rządów państw członkowskich w poszukiwaniu możliwości rozwiązania tego problemu. Kraje UE położone na południu Europy, do których bezpośrednio masowo docierali nielegalni migranci, prezentowały zupełnie inne podejście do działań podejmowanych na rzecz rozwiązania tego problemu niż państwa Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, co uwidoczniło brak solidarności i jedności wśród państw członkowskich w tej sprawie¹.

Kryzys migracyjny 2015 r.² stał się ważnym wyzwaniem w sferze bezpieczeństwa wszystkich państw członkowskich UE, czego wyrazem były choćby opinie respondentów badanych przez Eurobarometr w 2015 r., w którym migracja wskazana została jako drugi, po bezrobociu, problem, z którym musi zmierzyć się UE (*Główne wyzwania dla UE...*, 2016). Jak podaje Adam Starzyk (2016):

W badaniu widać różnicę w odbiorze kryzysu w Europie Zachodniej i Wschodniej. Ze stwierdzeniem, że decyzje dotyczące kryzysu

¹ Państwa członkowskie UE z Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej nie chciały zgodzić się np. na system kwot, w którym liczba imigrantów zostałaby przemieszczona dla każdego państwa UE. Ostatecznie Polska jako jedyna z państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej, mimo wcześniejszych ustaleń z przedstawicielami Czech, Słowacji i Węgier, zagłosowała za propozycją ministrów spraw wewnętrznych państw członkowskich UE z 22 września 2015 r., dotyczącą kwotowego podziału 120 tys. imigrantów (zob. też: Pacek, 2020, s. 85).

² Kryzys imigracyjny 2015 r. jako poważny problem zauważony został przez szeroką opinię publiczną w związku z zatonięciami w kwietniu 2015 r. statków przewożących imigrantów przez Morze Śródziemne. Jednakże trzeba zaznaczyć, że problem ten nie narodził się w tym czasie, lecz eskalował m.in. w związku z wybuchem wojny w Syrii, a oprócz wojen i represji wpływ na kolejne fale migracji, głównie z kierunku Afryki Północnej, Azji Wschodniej oraz Bałkanów, miały również kwestie ekonomiczne.

powinny zapadać w większej mierze w ramach UE zgodziło się 66% ankietowanych, z czego na przykład 80% Niemców, ale już w państwach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej (dalej V4) rozkład był zgoła inny – jedynie 40% Polaków i Słowaków oraz 41% Czechów zgodziło się z tym stwierdzeniem [...]. (s. 109).

Jednocześnie problemy imigracyjne na stałe weszły do agendy wewnętrznej debaty politycznej poszczególnych państw członkowskich UE, stanowiąc ważny element budowania tożsamości partii politycznych oraz ich możliwego wpływu na poziom poparcia w przyszłych wyborach parlamentarnych (Starzyk, 2016).

Stanowisko władz Polski w sprawie polityki imigracyjnej związanej z kryzysem, którego apogeum przypadło na rok 2015, ewoluowało w czasie i było uzależnione w głównej mierze od układu sił politycznych sprawujących władzę w kraju oraz kalendarza wyborczego, ponieważ w Polsce w latach 2014–2016 miały miejsce cztery elekcje – w maju i listopadzie 2014 r. odbyły się wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego i wybory samorządowe, a w 2015 r. wybrano prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i parlament. W Polskim dyskursie politycznym tamtych czasów kwestie migracyjne należały do wiodących tematów dyskursu politycznego, co w konsekwencji publicznej narracji sprawiało, że społeczne postrzeganie kryzysu migracyjnego z neutralnego przekształciło się w wyraźnie negatywne, a ryzyko związane z napływem imigrantów traktować zaczęto jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa narodowego³.

Dodatковым predykatorem kształtującym negatywnie społeczne postrzeganie kwestii migracyjnych w Polsce stał się kryzys na granicy polsko-białoruskiej w 2021 r., kiedy to wskutek politycznego wykorzystania przez Białoruś nielegalnej migracji ekonomicznej na zachodniej granicy Białorusi z Unią Europejską nastąpił nagły napływ imigrantów ekonomicznych przybyłych z Azji i Afryki, którzy w ten sposób przez terytorium Polski, Litwy i Łotwy chcieli przeniknąć do strefy Schengen⁴. Grupy nielegalnych migrantów, bardzo często inspirowane i wspomagane przez służby specjalne Białorusi, podejmowa-

³ Stanowisko Platformy Obywatelskiej (PO) i Prawa i Sprawiedliwości (PiS) wobec np. systemu kwotowego było jedną z głównych różnic między tymi partiami. PO zgodziła się przyjąć liczbę 2000 osób ubiegających się o azyl. Po zmianie władzy w wyniku wyborów parlamentarnych w październiku 2015 r. Polska nie zaakceptowała schematu relokacji migrantów, ponieważ partia PiS była zdecydowanie przeciwko przyjmowaniu do Polski osób ubiegających się o status uchodźcy, relokowanych w ramach tego mechanizmu (zob. Podgórska, 2019, s. 67).

⁴ Kryzys rozpoczął się latem 2021 r. i był elementem operacji hybrydowej prowadzonej przez białoruskie służby specjalne z nieoficjalnym udziałem służb rosyjskich. Władze Białorusi i przedsiębiorstwa kontrolowane przez państwo białoruskie zaczęły organizować „wycieczki” z Bliskiego Wschodu do Białorusi. „Turystom” wydano białoruskie wize i organizowano przeloty samolotami do Mińska. Celem większości „turystów” było dotarcie do Niemiec i innych państw Europy Zachodniej i ubieganie się o azyl (zob. Wicha, 2021, s. 87).

ły próby siłowego przekraczania granicy z sąsiadującymi z Białorusią Polska, Litwą i Łotwą, a także nielegalnego wyjazdu do Niemiec lub innych państw UE (Wicha, 2021). Sytuacja ta doprowadziła do powstania poważnego kryzysu granicznego⁵, który został zakwalifikowany jako element wojny hybrydowej prowadzonej przez Białoruś, a inspirowanej przez Rosję, ukierunkowanej na destabilizację UE. W konsekwencji, w proces zabezpieczenia wschodniej granicy UE na terenie Polski włączono służby mundurowe podległe szefowi Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji oraz Wojsko Polskie, a Prezydent RP 2 września 2021 r. wprowadził stan wyjątkowy na części terytorium Polski, tj. na części obszaru województw podlaskiego i lubelskiego, przez których teren przebiega granica Polski z Białorusią (Wicha, 2021). Skutkiem kryzysu granicznego i odpowiedzią na pojawiające się w związku z tym zagrożenia było uchwalenie przez Sejm RP ustawy z dnia 29 października 2021 r. o budowie zabezpieczenia granicy państwowej.

Od początku kryzysu granicznego, w wyniku działań podejmowanych przez białoruskie służby, dochodziło do eskalacji napięcia w rejonach przygranicznych i prób nielegalnego przekraczania granicy przez migrantów. Wyraźne wzmoczenie presji migracyjnej nastąpiło od 8 listopada 2021 r., kiedy to w okolicach przejścia granicznego w Kuźnicy zebrały się setki cudzoziemców, którzy inspirowani, wspomagani, a nawet naciskani przez białoruskie służby siłą próbowali przedrzeć się na terytorium Polski, w czego wyniku polskie służby zmuszone były podejmować interwencje, w czasie których działały zwarte formacje policyjne i wojskowe wspierane przez techniczne środki przymusu bezpośredniego. Od tego czasu Straż Graniczna (dalej: SG) odnotowywała każdej doby próby nielegalnego przekraczania granicy oraz organizowania przemytu uchodźców przez teren Polski do innych państw UE (Fraszka, 2021).

Hybrydowy charakter działań podejmowanych przez reżim Białorusi wobec Polski w związku z kryzysem granicznym znalazł swoje odzwierciedlenie w negatywnej kampanii informacyjnej, jaka we wszystkich dostępnych mediach prowadzona była przeciw władzom RP, a także administracji publicznej i służbom zaangażowanym w stabilizowanie sytuacji na granicy. Celem tych działań było przede wszystkim szerzenie dezinformacji dotyczącej przyczyn, charakteru i skali problemu, przedstawianie w negatywnym świetle działań polskiej administracji i podległych jej służb, a także polaryzacja społeczeństwa względem samego zjawiska.

W tak złożonej i wieloprotblemowej sytuacji politycznej i społecznej, wzmacnianej planowanymi działaniami dezinformacji, realizowanymi w ramach wojny informacyjnej zarówno w Polsce, jak i w całej Europie, wyraźnej zmianie uległo

⁵ Elisabeth Braw z Politico, twierdzi, że sytuacji na granicy polsko-białoruskiej nie należy nazywać „kryzysem migracyjnym”, ponieważ jest to kryzys graniczny (Braw, 2021), który stanowi element białorusko-rosyjskiej operacji „Śluza”, realizowanej w celu pokazania, że UE nie jest zdolna do ochrony własnych granic zewnętrznych (Fraszka, 2021).

nastawienie społeczne mieszkańców do kwestii migracyjnych. Coraz mocniej okazywana była niechęć do udzielania pomocy uciekinierom, w dużej mierze będąca skutkiem powszechnego utożsamiania uchodźstwa z migracją ekonomiczną i polityką „grania ludźmi” przez białoruski reżim.

Agresja wojsk Federacji Rosyjskiej (dalej: FR) na terytorium Ukrainy, do jakiej doszło 24 lutego 2022 r., doprowadziła do ataków na cele cywilne skutkujących ofiarami wśród ludności cywilnej oraz znacznymi zniszczeniami infrastruktury, co zmusiło tych ludzi, którzy przetrwali, do ucieczki z domów w poszukiwaniu bezpieczeństwa, ochrony i pomocy. W pierwszym tygodniu wojny ponad milion uchodźców z Ukrainy – głównie kobiet z dziećmi i osób starszych – przekroczyło granice Ukrainy, chroniąc się w sąsiednich krajach. Znaczna część przybyła do Polski, gdzie szukała stałej pomocy i schronienia. Część przez Polskę podróżowała do innych krajów UE. Napływ fali uchodźców z Ukrainy spotkał się w naszym kraju z bardzo pozytywnym odzewem społecznym, który przede wszystkim w początkowym okresie polegał na spontanicznym wsparciu materialnym, społecznym i logistycznym, wyrażającym się nawet w zapewnieniu przez mieszkańców darmowego schronienia w domach czy też pomocy w znalezieniu pracy. Jak wynika z raportu Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (dalej: CBOS), w sondażu przeprowadzonym w połowie marca 2022 r. 94% respondentów było przekonanych, że Polska powinna przyjąć uchodźców i udzielić im pomocy na swoim terytorium (Komunikat z badania CBOS nr 38/2022, s. 8). Masowy napływ uchodźców do Polski spotkał się również z reakcją administracji państwowej, której organy i instytucje podejmowały działania organizacyjne i logistyczne uwzględniające zmieniające się z dnia na dzień potrzeby, a także przygotowywały stosowne rozwiązania systemowe w obszarach swoich kompetencji.

Za cel badawczy prezentowanego tekstu przyjęto próbę przybliżenia głównych działań podejmowanych przez krajową administrację rządową i samorządową w zakresie zapewnienia instytucjonalnych ram pomocy uchodźcom i ochrony ich, a także postępowania służb mundurowych na rzecz identyfikacji ryzyka i zagrożeń oraz zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa osobistego uchodźcom z Ukrainy w pierwszych tygodniach masowej fali uchodźczej wywołanej wojną w ich ojczyźnie. Tak zogniskowana perspektywa badawcza wynika z przyjęcia założenia, że w organizację i świadczenie pomocy dla uchodźców zaangażowani są interesariusze, wśród których zasadniczą rolę odgrywają instytucje rządowe i samorządowe – wyposażone w kompetencje polityczne, prawotwórcze, finansowe, decyzyjne (również w zakresie współpracy międzynarodowej) i w odpowiedni zasób organizacyjno-kadrowy – a także organizacje pozarządowe oraz inicjatywy społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, które z kolei realizują cele statutowe, udzielając specjalistycznego albo spontanicznego krótkoterminowego wsparcia uciekającym przed wojną. Głównym zadaniem administracji rządowej i samorządowej będzie zatem stworzenie podstaw do recepcji uchodźców

w pierwszym etapie kryzysu, a także podejmowanie inkluzyjnych działań systemowych na rzecz ich uczestnictwa w głównych obszarach funkcjonowania państwa przyjmującego, takich jak np. bezpieczeństwo, edukacja szkolna, rynek pracy, system ochrony zdrowia, mieszkalnictwo, działalność gospodarcza, czy budowania właściwych relacji społecznych i zapewnienia możliwości samorealizacji w kraju udzielającym schronienia.

By uściślić nieostre określenie „w pierwszych tygodniach”, przyjęto cezurę czasową: od 24 lutego 2022 r., czyli od dnia rozpoczęcia działań wojennych przez wojska FR na terytorium Ukrainy, do dnia 24 marca 2022 r., czyli okres czterech tygodni, kiedy to liczba uchodźców przekraczających granicę ukraińsko-polską osiągnęła poziom ponad 30 tys. osób. Jak informowała Straż Graniczna, 24 lutego 2022 r. z Ukrainy do Polski przybyło 31,2 tys. osób. Kolejno: 25 lutego – 47,5 tys. osób, 26 lutego – 77,3 tys. osób, 27 lutego – 97,3 tys. 28 lutego funkcjonariusze SG odprawili na wszystkich przejściach granicznych na granicy Polski z Ukrainą już ponad 100 tys. osób. Dzielne liczby przekroczeń granicy zwiększały się do drugiego tygodnia wojny, osiągając najwyższe wartości 6 i 7 marca, kiedy zarejestrowano w naszym kraju każdej doby ponad 140 tys. uciekinierów z Ukrainy. Następnie notowano systematyczny spadek liczby uchodźców napływających do Polski. Liczba ta 24 marca 2022 r. osiągnęła wartość 32,5 tys. osób, wraz z jednoczesnym wzrostem liczby obywateli Ukrainy wybierających kierunek z Polski do Ukrainy⁶. Pierwsze cztery tygodnie trwania wojny w Ukrainie i wywołanej nią fali uchodźców charakteryzowały się zmasowanym napływem uchodźców do Polski, co stawiało przed samymi uchodźcami, ale też przed administracją państwową, samorządową, organizacjami pomocowymi i społeczeństwem nieznanne dotąd na taką skalę wyzwania, ryzyko i zagrożenia.


Podstawą rozważań była analiza, przez przedstawicieli administracji rządowej, samorządowej i organizacji pozarządowych, dostępnych w przestrzeni publicznej informacji, komunikatów i sprawozdań składanych w pierwszych tygodniach kryzysu uchodźczego dotyczących działań pomocowych dla uchodźców z Ukrainy, a także procedowanych i uchwalanych aktów prawnych i zasad regulujących kwestie pobytu oraz procedur pomocy dla uchodźców przybywających na terytorium Polski.

⁶ Straż Graniczna (b.d.). Dane ilustrujące dzienne przekroczenia granicy państwowej z Ukrainy do Polski przedstawione zostaną szczegółowo w dalszej części artykułu.

Kryzys uchodźczy 2022 r.

Dnia 24 lutego 2022 r. w godzinach porannych siły zbrojne FR zaatakowały Ukrainę, rozpoczynając działania wojenne, nazwane eufemistycznie „specjalną operacją wojskową”. Atak na terytorium Ukrainy wyprowadzono z kierunku północnego, wschodniego i południowego, za cel obierając początkowo ważne aglomeracje miejskie, tj., Kijów i jego północne otoczenie, Charków na północnym wschodzie oraz Chersoń, Melitopol i Mariupol na południu. Intensywne walki toczyły się również na wschodzie, w rejonie Doniecka i Ługańska, a siły zbrojne FR prowadziły ostrzały raketowe i bombardowanie innych celów na terenie Ukrainy, w tym Łucka i Iwano-Frankiwska na zachodzie kraju.

Według danych Operational Data Portal, od 24 lutego 2022 r. do 24 marca 2022 r. liczba uciekających z Ukrainy do państw sąsiadujących wyniosła prawie 3 mln 726 tys. (Operational Data Portal, b.d.), z czego do Polski ok. 2 mln 206 tys. osób. Liczbę osób, które w tym czasie przybyły na teren Polski, z podziałem na intensywność fali uchodźczej, przedstawiono na rys. 1.



Rysunek 1. Rozkład liczby uchodźców przybyłych do Polski w pierwszych czterech tygodniach wojny w Ukrainie

Źródło: Operational Data Portal (b.d.). Pobrano 17.06.2022 z: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>

Uchodźcy z terenów objętych działaniami wojennymi do granicy z Polską przybywali swoimi samochodami, komunikacją zbiorową autobusową lub koleją, a także podwożeni byli przez znajomych, po czym część z nich granicę państwa przekraczała pieszo. Ruch uchodźczy odbywał się przez polsko-ukraińskie przejścia graniczne znajdujące się na terenie województw podkarpackiego: Budomierz–Hruszów, Korczowa–Krakowiec, Krościenko–Smolnica, Medyka–

Szeginie; dodatkowo funkcjonowało kolejowe przejście graniczne Przemysł–Mościska na dworcu kolejowym w Przemyśle, gdzie uchodźcy przyjeżdżali pociągami rejsowymi lub specjalnymi (szerokie tory), a następnie na terenie dworca kolejowego SG dokonywała odprawy granicznej, oraz lubelskiego: Dołhobyczów–Uhrynów, Dorohusk–Jagodzin, Hrebenne–Rawa Ruska, Zosin–Uściług.

Według danych SG, od początku wojny w Ukrainie każdego dnia polsko-ukraińskie przejścia graniczne przekraczało kilkadziesiąt tysięcy osób. Szczegółowe dane dotyczące dziennej liczby uchodźców przybywających do Polski z Ukrainy przedstawiono w tabeli 1.

Tabela 1

Dobowa liczba uchodźców z Ukrainy przybywająca do Polski od 24 lutego do 24 marca 2022 r.

Data	Liczba	Data	Liczba	Data	Liczba	Data	Liczba	Data	Liczba
24.02.	31,2	3.03.	99,2	10.03	87,0	17.03	52,4	24.03	32,5
25.02.	47,5	4.03.	106,3	11.03.	76,2	18.03.	42,7	–	–
26.02.	77,2	5.03.	129,0	12.03.	79,8	19.03.	40,1	–	–
27.02.	99,0	6.03.	142,3	13.03.	82,1	20.03.	33,8	–	–
28.02.	100,0	7.03.	141,5	14.03.	71,6	21.03.	30,0	–	–
1.03.	98,3	8.03.	127,3	15.03.	66,6	22.03.	31,0	–	–
2.03.	98,5	9.03.	117,6	16.03.	60,0	23.03.	30,0	–	–

Źródło: Zestawienie na podstawie danych SG (Twitter Straż Graniczna, b.d. a), za: Firlit-Fesnak, G., Jaroszevska, E., Łoćocki, Ł., Łukaszewska-Bezulska, J., Ołdak, M., Zawadzki, P., Żołędowski, C., Żukowski, T. (oprac.). (2022). *Inwazja Rosji na Ukrainę. Społeczeństwo i polityka wobec kryzysu uchodźczego w pierwszym miesiącu wojny, Raport roboczy – Working Paper Katedry Polityki Społecznej*. Uniwersytet Warszawski, s. 6.

Jak wynika z danych SG, od rozpoczęcia działań wojennych 24 lutego 2022 r. do 24 marca 2022 r. do Polski z Ukrainy przybyło blisko 2 mln 231 tys. uchodźców z Ukrainy (Twitter Straż Graniczna (b.d. b), którzy granicę państwa przekroczyli przez cztery przejścia graniczne na terenie województwa podkarpackiego i przez cztery przejścia graniczne na terenie województwa lubelskiego⁷. Żeby zobrazować skalę wyzwania, jakie stanęły przed państwem polskim, warto uzmysłowić sobie, że tylko w ciągu pierwszych dwóch tygodni granice Polski przekroczyło ponad milion uchodźców i uchodźczyń z Ukrainy⁸, którzy pieszo,

⁷ Od 24 lutego do 18 czerwca 2022 r. funkcjonariusze SG odprawili w przejściach granicznych na kierunku z Ukrainy do Polski 4 mln 166 tys. osób. Dane SG wskazują, że w czerwcu 2022 r. na podobnym poziomie kształtowała się liczba osób wjeżdżających do Polski i opuszczających ją, np. 18 czerwca z Polski do Ukrainy wyjechało 26 tys. osób, a przyjechało ponad 27 tys. osób (Twitter Straż Graniczna, b.d. b).

⁸ Od 24 lutego 2022 r. mężczyźni w wieku od 18. do 60. roku życia, będący obywatelami Ukrainy, poza nielicznymi wyjątkami, nie mogli wyjeżdżać z Ukrainy w związku z wprowadzeniem stanu wojennego.

komunikacją autobusową, koleją i samochodami osobowymi, bardzo często po wyczerpującej podróży i znacznym czasie oczekiwania na granicy, znaleźli się na terytorium Polski, a następnie po krótkim odpoczynku, otrzymaniu niezbędnej pomocy medycznej i humanitarnej w punktach recepcyjnych i wytechnieniowych przemieszczali się dalej do wybranych miast w kraju lub poza jego granice.

Napływ uchodźców z Ukrainy, którzy przekroczyli granicę RP na terenie województw podkarpackiego i lubelskiego, i przybyli do Polski w pierwszych dniach wojny, stał się poważnym wyzwaniem organizacyjnym i logistycznym dla wszystkich podmiotów i osób zaangażowanych w udzielanie pomocy i zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa. Przede wszystkim wyzwaniem było sprawne przyjęcie osób przekraczających granicę pieszo i skierowanie ich do punktów recepcyjnych, zapewnienie możliwości uzyskania potrzebnych informacji, posiłku, pomocy medycznej i humanitarnej, skierowanie do przygotowanych autobusów lub pociągów specjalnych i rejsowych oraz zorganizowanie przejazdu do innych punktów recepcyjnych albo do wybranych miejsc pobytu w kraju. Ze względu na liczną mniejszość ukraińską w Polsce i Europie, w rejon przejść granicznych przybyli krewni, znajomi lub wolontariusze, którzy przyjechali swoimi samochodami i oczekiwali nawet po kilkadziesiąt godzin na krewnych lub lub tych, którzy potrzebowali przewiezienia w wybrane miejsca. Sytuacja taka sprawiała, że często same przejścia graniczne i infrastruktura drogowa w ich rejonie i na trasach dojazdowych była blokowana przez oczekujących i tworzyły się zatory. Problemy występowały również w punktach recepcyjnych i na dworcach kolejowych, gdzie docierały autobusy i kolejne pociągi z uchodźcami z Ukrainy, co sprawiało, że miejsca te okresowo były zatłoczone i przepełnione, szwankował system obiegu informacji, zawodziła koordynacja działań pomocowych, brakowało (lub był nadmiar) dostarczanych uchodźcom przez różnych darczyńców niezbędnych produktów i rzeczy, brakowało też systemu weryfikacji i kontroli osób oferujących uchodźcom przewóz lub miejsce do zamieszkania. Zdarzały się przypadki zgłaszania zaginięcia osób, z którymi podróżowano, kradzieży lub zagubienia dokumentów i rzeczy osobistych, istniało także ryzyko potencjalnego lub realnego zagrożenia stania się ofiarą wyzysku lub handlu ludźmi (Human Right Watch, 2022).

Sytuację, z jaką mamy do czynienia w Polsce po 24 lutego 2022 r., w związku z napływem fali uchodźców z Ukrainy, zdefiniować należy jako sytuację kryzysową, mimo że ze względu na swoje źródło, jakim jest wojna, charakteryzuje się ona wyjątkowością i szczególną intensywnością (*Ustawa z dnia 26 kwietnia 2007 r., o zarządzaniu kryzysowym...*, art. 3). Podstawą formalnego zarządzania publicznego kryzysem uchodźczym w Polsce, w zakresie recepcji uchodźców, wypracowania i wdrożenia procedur związanych z legalizacją pobytu na terenie Polski, koordynacją i świadczeniem przyznanych ustawowo uprawnień, są przepisy określające kompetencje poszczególnych organów administracji publicznej.

Zgodnie z kodeksem postępowania administracyjnego (dalej: KPA) organami administracji publicznej są ministrowie, centralne organy administracji rządowej, wojewoda, terenowe organy administracji rządowej (zespolonej i niezespólonej), organy jednostek samorządu terytorialnego oraz inne organy państwowe, a także inne podmioty, gdy są one powołane z mocy prawa lub na podstawie porozumień do załatwiania spraw przed organami administracji publicznej w należących do właściwości tych organów sprawach indywidualnych rozstrzyganych w drodze decyzji administracyjnych (KPA, art. 5 §3)⁹.

Bezpośrednio za realizację i koordynację działań wynikających z kryzysu uchodźczego w Polsce, na terenie całego kraju, zgodnie ze swoimi kompetencjami odpowiedzialni byli poszczególni wojewodowie, którzy zgodnie z art. 22 p. 2 i p. 4 *Ustawy z dn. 23 stycznia 2009 roku o wojewodzie i administracji rządowej w województwie* odpowiadają za wykonywanie celów i zadań polityki Rady Ministrów, w tym m.in. zapewniają:

współdziałanie wszystkich organów administracji rządowej i samorządowej działających w województwie i kieruje ich działalnością w zakresie zapobiegania zagrożeniu życia, zdrowia lub mienia oraz zagrożeniom środowiska, bezpieczeństwa państwa i utrzymania porządku publicznego, ochrony praw obywatelskich, a także zapobiegania klęskom żywiołowym i innym nadzwyczajnym zagrożeniom oraz zwalczania i usuwania ich skutków [...], wykonuje i koordynuje zadania w zakresie obronności i bezpieczeństwa państwa oraz zarządzania kryzysowego, wynikające z odrębnych ustaw (Firlit-Fesnak, 2022, s. 14).

Działania administracji publicznej¹⁰

Analizując działania podejmowane przez administrację państwową na rzecz organizowania warunków pomocy uchodźcom z Ukrainy w Polsce w pierw-

⁹ *Ustawa z dnia 14 czerwca 1960 r. Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego*. Dz.U., 2021, poz. 735, tj.

¹⁰ Przedmiotem tej części artykułu jest próba przybliżenia głównych działań podejmowanych przez administrację publiczną w zakresie zapewnienia instytucjonalnych ram pomocy uchodźcom z Ukrainy po 24 lutego 2022 r., i ochrony ich, dlatego też autor ma świadomość, że jedynie wzmiankowany jest bezprecedensowy udział społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, organizacji pozarządowych i przedsiębiorców w logistyce i organizacji pomocy dla uchodźców, bez których udziału żaden z podmiotów administracji publicznej nie poradziłaby sobie z nasilającą się falą uchodźców.

szych dniach wojny i ochrony ich, zauważyć trzeba spójność działania i komunikacji zarówno na poziomie politycznym deklarowanym publicznie przez polityków, jak i na każdym poziomie wykonawczym w zakresie ustawodawczym i decyzyjnym oraz w kwestii reakcji na pojawiające się na bieżąco problemy.

W publicznych wypowiedziach przedstawicieli polskiego rządu i polityków już 13 lutego 2022 r. znaleźć było można wpis zamieszczony na Twitterze przez ministra spraw wewnętrznych i administracji Mariusza Kamińskiego, który napisał: „To oczywiste, że w związku z sytuacją na Ukrainie przygotowujemy się na różne scenariusze. Jednym z nich są działania wojewodów związane z ewentualnym napływem uchodźców z Ukrainy, którzy z powodu możliwego konfliktu, mogą szukać w naszym kraju bezpiecznego schronienia” (Twitter Mariusz Kamiński, b.d.). Z kolei 24 lutego 2022 r. w czasie konferencji prasowej szef MSWiA wraz z wiceministrami przedstawił plany przyjęcia uchodźców z Ukrainy w Polsce. Jak powiedział Kamiński: „Każdy, kto będzie uciekał przed bombami, przed karabinami rosyjskimi, będzie mógł liczyć na wsparcie państwa polskiego [...]. Wszystkim naszym ukraińskim braciom okazemy solidarność i wsparcie” (Twitter Mariusz Kamiński, b.d.). Wiceminister Paweł Szefernaker przedstawił podczas tejże konferencji prasowej stan przygotowań punktów recepcyjnych przy granicy polsko-ukraińskiej:

Dziś, we wczesnych godzinach porannych, rozpoczęliśmy pracę nad pierwszym etapem planów przyjęcia uchodźców z Ukrainy. W ramach tego etapu wojewodowie lubelski i podkarpacki rozpoczęli przygotowanie tzw. punktów recepcyjnych przy granicy z Ukrainą [...]. Jesteśmy przygotowani również na to, aby z punktów recepcyjnych transportem przygotowanym przez Państwową Straż Pożarną dyslokować potrzebujących do innych województw. Wszyscy wojewodowie w Polsce zgłosili stosowną gotowość (Twitter Mariusz Kamiński, b.d.).

Wiceminister Błażej Poboży przekazał, jakie działania będzie podejmowała SG wobec uchodźców z Ukrainy:

Każdy z przekraczających naszą granicę uchodźców otrzyma ulotkę, która będzie wydawana bezpośrednio na przejściu granicznym. Zawiera ona podstawową informację dla uchodźców w 4 językach: ukraińskim, polskim, rosyjskim i angielskim [...]. Jeśli dana osoba ucieka z Ukrainy przed konfliktem zbrojnym, zostanie wpuszczona do Polski. Może udać się do punktu recepcyjnego, gdzie otrzyma podstawową pomoc (Serwis Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, gov.pl, 24.02.2022).

Szef Urzędu do Spraw Cudzoziemców, minister Jarosław Szajner, uczestnicząc w konferencji prasowej wojewody lubelskiego dnia 24 lutego 2022 r., poinformował, że:

Każdy obywatel Ukrainy, który będzie chciał przekroczyć polską granicę zostanie wpuszczony, niezależnie od tego, czy okres pobytu będzie upływał na terenie strefy Schengen, czy Rzeczypospolitej, osoba będzie mogła pozostać [...]. Część osób – zdajemy sobie z tego sprawę – nie będzie miała dokumentów, wówczas będą wpuszczani zgodnie z art. 32 ustawy o cudzoziemcach na te 15 dni na legalny wjazd i będą mogli pozostać [...]. Nie ma żadnych ograniczeń dla tych osób, nie będziemy patrzeć na to, czy się kończy możliwość przyjazdu na podstawie wizy, czy też nie. Jeżeli wjadą będą mogli pozostać na terenie Polski i będziemy ich wspierać. Ci, co zechcą będą mogli złożyć wniosek o udzielenie ochrony międzynarodowej, a ci, którzy zechcą po prostu wjechać do Polski i tu z nami przebywać, będą mile przyjęci. Te osoby są skanowane, jeśli posiadają paszport, sprawdzane są wizy, osoba, która nie ma żadnych dokumentów jest dokładnie sprawdzana (*Punkty recepcyjne...*, 24.02.2022).

Deklaracje polityków wzmocnił premier Mateusz Morawiecki, który 19 marca 2022 r. powiedział, że

Polska jest ewenementem w skali świata, ponieważ nie przyjmuje uchodźców do wielkich obozów [...]. Przygotowaliśmy całą infrastrukturę. Owszem są remizy, hale sportowe czy wystawiennicze, które służą do tymczasowego zakwaterowania, ale generalnie ponad 2 miliony 200 tys. uchodźców zostało rozlokowanych dzięki gigantycznemu wysiłkowi Polaków, organizacji pozarządowych, Kościoła, samorządów i państwa (Firlit-Fesnak, 2022, s. 14).

W praktyce, w pierwszej fazie kryzysu uchodźczego zapowiedzi przedstawicieli rządu realizowane były przez wojewodów podkarpackiego i lubelskiego, którzy już 24 lutego 2022 r. w rejonach przejść granicznych z Ukrainą otworzyli 8 punktów recepcyjnych dla uchodźców, a następnie w kolejnych dniach dodatkowe punkty recepcyjne. W województwie podkarpackim punkty recepcyjne zlokalizowano: (a) w rejonie przejścia granicznego Budomierz, w miejscowości Krowica Sama, w świetlicy przy szkole podstawowej, gdzie przygotowano 50 miejsc; (b) w rejonie przejścia granicznego Korczowa, w miejscowości Korczowa, w świetlicy wiejskiej, gdzie przygotowano 250 miejsc, oraz w budynku odprawy autokarowej, dysponującym 50 miejscami dla uchodźców; (c) w rejonie przejścia granicznego Korczowa, w miejscowości Piaski, w świetlicy wiejskiej,

gdzie przygotowano 90 miejsc; (d) rejonie przejścia granicznego Korczowa, w miejscowości Młyny, w Hali Kijowskiej, gdzie przygotowano 2000 miejsc; (e) w rejonie przejścia granicznego drogowego Medyka, w miejscowości Medyka, w hali sportowej, gdzie przygotowano 150 miejsc; (f) w rejonie przejścia granicznego Krościenko, w miejscowości Łodynia, w budynku byłej szkoły podstawowej, gdzie przygotowano 160 miejsc; (g) w rejonie przejścia granicznego Krościenko, w miejscowości Równia, w świetlicy wiejskiej, gdzie przygotowano 50 miejsc; (h) w rejonie przejścia granicznego Korczowa, w miejscowości Chotyńiec, w świetlicy wiejskiej, gdzie przygotowano 90 miejsc; (i) w rejonie przejścia kolejowego Medyka–Przemyśl, na terenie hali dworca kolejowego Przemyśl Główny, gdzie przygotowano 330 miejsc; (j) na terenie miasta Przemyśl, w hali marketu Tesco, tzw. hala Tesco punkt „wytchnieniowo-koordynacyjny”, gdzie przygotowano 1500 miejsc; (k) punkt recepcyjny – centrum tymczasowego przyjęcia dzieci ewakuowanych z domów dziecka i rodzin zastępczych z Ukrainy (Echo Dnia, 4.03.2022).

Głównym zadaniem funkcjonujących punktów recepcyjnych była konieczność zorganizowania bezpiecznych i spełniających odpowiednie standardy miejsc, gdzie przekraczającym granicę uchodźcom bezpośrednio już na terytorium RP mogła być udzielona pierwsza pomoc w zakresie wsparcia prawnego, zalegalizowania pobytu, udzielenia pomocy medycznej oraz zabezpieczenia pod względem żywnościowym, sanitarnym i humanitarnym (Serwis Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, gov.pl., 25.02.2022). Do końca lutego 2022 r. powstało kolejnych 20 takich punktów w największych polskich miastach i we wszystkich województwach.

W celu zapewnienia możliwości sprawnego przyjmowania przybywających masowo uchodźców, osoby już objęte opieką w punktach recepcyjnych, zgodnie z dobrowolnie podejmowanymi decyzjami, przewożone były pociągami kursowymi lub specjalnymi, a także autobusami Państwowej Straży Pożarnej (dalej: PSP), Policji i innych przewoźników (wynajmowanych przez wojewodów, samorządy lub wolontariuszy) do miejsc czasowego pobytu na terenie kraju bądź wyjeżdżały docelowo poza granice RP. Już w trakcie planowania przyjmowania uchodźców w Polsce zdecydowano, że aby zapobiec chaosowi i dodatkowemu zamieszaniu, w pierwszych dniach osoby przekraczające granicę na terenie województwa podkarpackiego kierowane będą do punktów recepcyjnych utworzonych na terenie województw: małopolskiego, śląskiego, opolskiego, dolnośląskiego, lubuskiego, świętokrzyskiego i łódzkiego. Uchodźcy przybywający do Polski przez przejścia graniczne na terenie województwa lubelskiego kierowani byli do punktów recepcyjnych utworzonych dla nich w miastach na terenie województw północno-wschodniej Polski.

Punkty recepcyjne tworzone były przez jednostki samorządowe na wniosek właściwego wojewody. Portal internetowy www.prawo.pl 11 maja 2022 r., informował, że zgodnie z danymi przekazanymi przez rzecznika prasowego

województwa podkarpackiego na funkcjonowanie 6 punktów recepcyjnych w województwie podkarpackim przekazano samorządom, które je prowadzą, 5 mln 268 tys. zł.; Gminny Ośrodek Kultury w Krowicy Samej – 835 tys. zł., gmina Lubaczów; hala sportowa w Medyce – 583 tys. zł., gmina Medyka; świetlica wiejska w Korczowej – 250 tys. zł., gmina Radymno; była szkoła podstawowa w Łodyni – 500 tys. zł., miasto Ustrzyki Dolne; dworzec PKP w Przemyślu – 1 mln 100 tys. zł., miasto Przemyśl; Hala Kijowska w Korczowej – 2 mln zł., powiat jarosławski. W województwie lubelskim funkcjonowanie punktów recepcyjnych, do dnia 11.05.2022 r., kosztowało 11 mln 756 tys. zł (brak szczegółowych danych). (Prawo.pl, 11.05.2022).

Poza tworzeniem punktów recepcyjnych wojewodowie w porozumieniu z jednostkami samorządu terytorialnego, powiatami ziemskimi i grodzkimi oraz z samorządem województwa (realizującymi zadania administracji rządowej), tworzyły i prowadziły miejsca stałego zakwaterowania, a także punkty medyczne przy punktach recepcyjnych. W pierwszym okresie organizowania pomocy uchodźcom, tzn. do 12 marca 2022 r., czyli do momentu uchwalenia specustawy¹¹, źródłem finansowania tych zadań była rezerwa ogólna budżetu państwa w dyspozycji prezesa Rady Ministrów. Drugim źródłem finansowania, po wejściu w życie specustawy stał się Fundusz Pomocy.

Przełomowym wydarzeniem w zakresie pomocy uchodźcom było uchwalenie przez Sejm RP 12 marca 2022 r. (po 11 dniach kryzysu uchodźczego) ustawy o pomocy obywatelom Ukrainy w związku z konfliktem zbrojnym na terytorium tego państwa określającej szczególne zasady legalizowania pobytu obywateli Ukrainy oraz publicznych form pomocy dla wszystkich uchodźców, którzy przybyli na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z terytorium Ukrainy (*Ustawa z 12 marca 2022 r., o pomocy...*). Ustawa została uchwalona w wyjątkowo krótkim czasie, ze znacznym poparciem większości sejmowej, a następnie 12 marca ustawę podpisał Prezydent RP. W trakcie prac parlamentarnych nad ustawą zaproponowano wykreślenie z niej słowa „bepośrednio”, które wykluczało z uprawnień uchodźców przybywających do Polski tranzytem z innych krajów. Poprawka została przyjęta przez Sejm RP 24 marca 2022 r.

Specustawa w zakresie pomocy uchodźcom wprowadzała następujące mechanizmy:

1. Legalizacja pobytu – możliwość nadania numeru PESEL i automatyczna zgoda na pobyt czasowy w Polsce do 18 miesięcy.
2. Podjęcie pracy – prawo do podejmowania pracy bez zezwolenia, w tym szczególne regulacje zatrudnienia lekarzy, pielęgniarek, położnych, pedagogów, opiekunów dziecięcych, psychologów, nauczycieli, pomocy nauczyciela,

¹¹ *Ustawa z dnia 12 marca 2022 r. o pomocy obywatelom Ukrainy w związku z konfliktem zbrojnym na terytorium tego państwa*. Dz.U., 2022, poz. 583.

- ustalenie (w drodze rozporządzenia) proporcji zatrudniania w danym podmiocie obywateli z Ukrainy i z Polski, możliwość zatrudnienia socjalnego, prawo do rejestrowania się jako osoba bezrobotna i poszukująca pracy.
3. Otrzymywanie świadczeń pieniężnych i niepieniężnych – jednorazowe świadczenie pieniężne w wysokości 300 zł, świadczenia rodzinne, świadczenia na zasadach i w trybie ustawy o pomocy społecznej bez przeprowadzenia wywiadu środowiskowego, świadczenia pomocy materialnej na zasadach określonych w ustawie o systemie oświaty, pomoc psychologiczna, całodzienne wyżywienie, środki czystości i higieny osobistej, lekarstwa, schronienie, transport do miejsc zakwaterowania lub miejsc świadczenia opieki medycznej, bezpłatne środki transportu publicznego oraz transportu osób niepełnosprawnych.
 4. W zakresie edukacji, wychowania, opieki dzieci i uczniów: prawo do korzystania z placówek opiekuńczo-wychowawczych i edukacyjnych, ustanowienie opiekuna tymczasowego dla małoletnich obywateli Ukrainy pozostających bez opieki osoby dorosłej, prawo do pełnienia funkcji rodziny zastępczej lub rodzinnego domu dziecka dla obywateli z Ukrainy.
 5. W zakresie pomocy obywatelom Polski przyjmujących uchodźców: możliwość przyznania kwoty 40 zł na osobę przez okres 60 dni obywatelom Polski przyjmującym uchodźców we własnym domu.
 6. Uprawnienia obywateli Ukrainy będących studentami, pracownikami naukowymi, nauczycielami akademickimi: zwolnienie z opłat za usługi edukacyjne na studiach niestacjonarnych albo studiach w języku obcym dla studentów, którzy opłacili II semestr studiów na Ukrainie, uregulowanie zasad ubiegania się o stypendia socjalne dla studentów z Ukrainy, określenie zasad zatrudniania pracowników naukowych z Ukrainy w polskich uczelniach i placówkach naukowych.
 7. W zakresie podejmowania i wykonywania działalności gospodarczej przez obywateli Ukrainy, przebywających legalnie na terytorium RP: uchodźcy z Ukrainy posiadający PESEL mogą podejmować i wykonywać działalność gospodarczą na terytorium RP na takich samych zasadach, jak obywatele polscy.
 8. W zakresie opieki medycznej: uprawnienie do opieki medycznej udzielanej na terytorium RP obejmującej świadczenia opieki zdrowotnej na zasadach i w zakresie, w jakim osobom objętym obowiązkowym lub dobrowolnym ubezpieczeniem zdrowotnym przysługuje prawo do świadczeń na podstawie *Ustawy z dnia 27 sierpnia 2004 r. o świadczeniach opieki zdrowotnej finansowanych ze środków publicznych* (Dz.U. z 2021 r., poz. 1285, z późn. zm.), z wyłączeniem leczenia uzdrowiskowego i rehabilitacji uzdrowiskowej, a także podania produktów leczniczych wydawanych świadczeniobiorcom w ramach programów polityki zdrowotnej ministra właściwego do spraw zdrowia.

9. W zakresie finansowania, dotacji celowych, rekompensaty za pracę ponadwymiarową w związku z kryzysem uchodźczym: utworzenie Funduszu Pomocy, określenie obszarów finansowania wydatków samorządów na pomoc uchodźcom z dotacji celowych z budżetu państwa, zasad korzystania przez uchodźców z PFRON-u, Funduszu Solidarnościowego, Europejskiego Funduszu Pomocy Najbardziej Potrzebującym, rekompensaty za godziny ponadwymiarowe dla pracowników SG, PSP, Służb Celno-Skarbowych, Służby Ochrony Państwa, Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego. Nieodpłatne wykonanie fotografii do dokumentu legalizującego pobyt uchodźcy w Polsce (Firlit-Fesnak, 2022, s. 17–18).

Wejście w życie *Ustawy z 12 marca 2022 r. o pomocy...* (poz. 583) uregulowało wiele kwestii związanych z systemowym udzielaniem pomocy uchodźcom z Ukrainy, którzy po uzyskaniu pierwszej niezbędnej pomocy w miejscach przekraczania granicy RP pojechali do różnych województw na terenie kraju, gdzie zdecydowali się pozostać. Specustawa uregulowała kwestie pomocy medycznej i świadczeń medycznych dla uchodźców. W pierwszych dniach kryzysu uchodźczego podstawowa pomoc medyczna świadczona była bezpłatnie przede wszystkim w punktach recepcyjnych utworzonych przy przejściach granicznych. Następnie 26 lutego 2022 r. na stronie internetowej Narodowego Funduszu Zdrowia (dalej: NFZ) zamieszczona została informacja o zasadach udzielania pomocy medycznej obywatelom Ukrainy – zasady udzielania i rozliczania świadczeń. Z treści komunikatu wynika, że każdemu obywatelowi Ukrainy, który od 24 lutego 2022 r. przybył do Polski w związku z agresją militarną Rosji na teren Ukrainy, i który zgłosi się z problemem zdrowotnym do lekarza rodzinnego, poradni specjalistycznej czy szpitala, należy udzielić adekwatnej pomocy medycznej, a świadczenie takie rozliczone zostanie przez NFZ ze środków budżetu państwa. Do czasu wprowadzenia stosownych przepisów świadczenia medyczne miały być udzielane bezpłatnie, a podmioty medyczne miały móc rozliczyć się z NFZ na podstawie prowadzonej ewidencji świadczeń medycznych na rzecz uchodźców (Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia, nfz.gov.pl, 26.02.2022). Po uchwaleniu i wejściu w życie *Ustawy z dnia 12 marca 2022 r. o pomocy obywatelom Ukrainy w związku z konfliktem zbrojnym na terytorium tego państwa*, prawnie uregulowane zostały kwestie związane z opieką medyczną świadczoną na rzecz uchodźców. Osobom uciekającym z Ukrainy zagwarantowano powszechny dostęp do podstawowej opieki zdrowotnej na zasadach analogicznych, jak w przypadku wszystkich osób objętych ubezpieczeniem zdrowotnym w Polsce.

Bezpieczeństwo

Od pierwszych godzin wojny na Ukrainie i nasilającej się fali uchodźców w rejonie przejść granicznych z Ukrainy do Polski ważnym aspektem udzielania niezbędnej pomocy stała się kwestia zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa osobistego przybywającym ludziom. Wprowadzenie przez władze Ukrainy przepisów mobilizacyjnych związanych ze stanem wojennym sprawiło, że do Polski przybywały głównie kobiety i dzieci (mężczyźni w wieku od 18. do 60. roku życia nie mogli opuszczać kraju) oraz osoby powyżej 60. roku życia. Zdecydowaną większość uchodźców stanowili obywatele Ukrainy pochodzący ze wschodnich obwodów, którzy niejednokrotnie pierwszy raz w życiu opuścili swój kraj i nie mieli żadnych znajomych w Polsce, do których mogliby pojechać i u których mogliby się zatrzymać (Żołądowski, 2022)¹². Ruch uchodźczy z województw podkarpackiego i lubelskiego kierowany był do innych części kraju, skąd uchodźcy podróżowali do innych państw lub szukali możliwości zakwaterowania się i prowadzenia normalnego życia. Szacuje się, że w pierwszym miesiącu kryzysu uchodźczego do Polski przybyło ok. 2 mln 237 tys. uchodźców z Ukrainy, co spowodowało wzrost populacji osób w naszym kraju, zwiększających liczebność ludności Polski o prawie 6% (Firlit-Fesnak, 2022, s. 11). Według danych Unii Metropolii Polskich na 1 kwietnia 2022 r. populacja mieszkańców Polski przekroczyła 40 mln osób i liczyła 41 mln 45 tys. osób. Spośród obywateli Ukrainy, którzy przyjechali do Polski w celach zarobkowych przed 24 lutego 2022 r. oraz przybyłych po wybuchu wojny na Ukrainie, w Warszawie na 1 kwietnia mieszkało 266,9 tys. Ukraińców, we Wrocławiu – 187,3 tys., w Krakowie – 177,6 tys., w Gdańsku – 157,6 tys., w Rzeszowie – 104,8 tys., w Katowicach – 96,5 tys., w Łodzi – 85,7 tys., w Poznaniu – 84,6 tys., w Lublinie – 68,4 tys., w Szczecinie – 59,6 tys., w Bydgoszczy – 43,4 tys. i w Białymstoku – 36,6 tys. Oznacza to skokowy wzrost populacji największych polskich miast, np. populacja Rzeszowa wzrosła o 53%, Gdańska – o 34%, Katowic – o 33%, a Warszawy – o 15% (Wojdat, Cywiński, 2022, s. 11).

Znaczny napływ uchodźców w pierwszych tygodniach wojny w Ukrainie, a także przyjęty model pomocy, jakiej udzielano im w Polsce, spowodował tworzenie punktów recepcyjnych i miejsc udzielania pomocy, a także węzłów i szlaków komunikacyjnych, gdzie naturalnie wraz ze znaczną liczbą uchodźców pojawili się wolontariusze, przedstawiciele administracji państwowej, funkcjonariusze formacji mundurowych i służb specjalnych, żołnierze, przed-

¹² W przestrzeni medialnej pojawiały się informacje, że wśród uchodźców znajdowali się również obywatele państw innych niż Ukraina. Informacje te potwierdził w wystąpieniu na sesji ONZ dnia 28 lutego 2022 r. ambasador Krzysztof Szczerski, podając dane o obywatelach 125 państw zarejestrowanych na polskiej granicy (m.in. Uzbekistan, Nigerię, Indie i Maroko) (Wprost, wprost.pl, 28.02.2022).

stawiciele organizacji pozarządowych oraz udzielający doraźnego wsparcia i pomocy mieszkańcy różnych części Polski, a także innych państw. Sytuacja ta, w połączeniu z niepewnością co do możliwego rozwoju działań dezinformacyjnych, a nawet dywersyjnych i terrorystycznych ze strony FR, sprawiała, że służby porządku publicznego w Polsce musiały być przygotowane na nieznane dotąd zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa ludzi i możliwe próby zakłócenia porządku publicznego.

Analizując ryzyko i zagrożenia związane z zaistniałą sytuacją za najpoważniejsze uznawano: (a) niekontrolowane, siłowe przemieszczanie się osób próbujących przekroczyć granicę RP, w tym również poza wyznaczonymi przejściami granicznymi; (b) możliwość nielegalnego przekroczenia granicy przez uzbrojone, bliżej niezidentyfikowane formacje zbrojne, grupy dywersyjne czy terrorystyczne lub pojedyncze osoby; (c) aktywizację środowisk przestępczych, zagranicznych i krajowych, oraz uwarunkowany tym faktem wzrost przestępczości transgranicznej, w szczególności związanej z przemytem środków odurzających, broni palnej, materiałów wybuchowych i generujących zagrożenia chemiczne, biologiczne, radiacyjne i nuklearne, kradzieżami, rozbojami, przestępstwami seksualnymi, a także nielegalnym przemytem osób i handlem ludźmi; (d) przestępstwa motywowane uprzedzeniami w stosunku do obywateli Ukrainy, obywateli państw trzecich uciekających z Ukrainy, a także w stosunku do obywateli Rosji przebywających na terenie Polski; (e) ryzyko związane z przeprowadzeniem na terenie RP zamachu terrorystycznego w celu wywołania destabilizacji w kraju, które polegać może m.in. na podłożeniu materiałów wybuchowych w miejscach tworzenia się dużych skupisk ludzkich lub w obiektach ważnych dla bezpieczeństwa bądź obronności kraju, a także infrastruktury krytycznej; (f) zakłócenia związane z prawidłowym funkcjonowaniem państwa, w tym dezorganizacja normalnego działania organów administracji rządowej i samorządowej, szpitali, sądów, służb bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego np. przez jednoczesne przekazanie informacji e-mail o podłożeniu ładunków wybuchowych w tych instytucjach z wykorzystaniem sieci transmisji zapewniającej pełną anonimowość nadawcy.

Ponadto liczono się z możliwością celowego niszczenia obiektów użyteczności publicznej mającego wywołać w społeczeństwie poczucie lęku, niepewności i zagrożenia itp., a także z istnieniem zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa i porządku publicznego w postaci wrogiego oddziaływania w sferze informacyjnej. Kampanie dezinformacyjne ukierunkowane są na niszczenie wizerunku Polski i Ukrainy na arenie międzynarodowej poprzez m.in. (a) wzbudzenie poczucia zagrożenia wśród określonych grup społecznych; (b) incydenty podrabiania i przerabiania dokumentów umożliwiających obcokrajowcom legalizację pobytu na terytorium RP; (c) nagłaśnianie utrudnień w ruchu drogowym w rejonach przyległych do granicy z Ukrainą oraz na drogach, którymi prawdopodobnie będą przemieszczać się uchodźcy; (d) nagłaśnianie wzrostu liczby zda-

rzeń drogowych spowodowanych zwiększonym ruchem kołowym i osobowym (Raczyński, 2015).

Poza wymienionymi zagrożeniami wynikającymi *stricte* z masowego ruchu uchodźczego wywołanego wojną prowadzoną w sąsiednim kraju i towarzyszącym jej lękom i emocjom, warto zauważyć, że wszelkie masowe ruchy migracyjne i uchodźcze niosą z sobą również zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa o charakterze kryminalnym, społecznym i kulturowym w kraju przyjmującym (Lubiewski, 2016). Pojawienie się w krótkim czasie znacznej liczby migrantów staje się wyzwaniem dla możliwości budżetu państwa, który ponosi dodatkowe niezaplanowane wydatki oraz dla systemów opieki zdrowotnej, zabezpieczenia społecznego, edukacji i szkolnictwa oraz rynku pracy. Istnieje także ryzyko, że politycznie (wewnętrznie) lub poprzez celowe zastosowanie narzędzi dezinformacji (zewnętrznie) negatywnie wzmocniona narracja o „Obcych” doprowadzić może do polaryzacji nastrojów społecznych w stosunku do uchodźców, co często powoduje odwoływanie się do stereotypów lub fałszywego obrazu rzeczywistości kreowanego przez media (Studzińska, 2006).

Zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa osobistego uchodźcom przybywającym z Ukrainy do Polski, a także bezpieczeństwa obywateli RP i porządku publicznego w kraju w zmieniającej się po 24 lutego 2022 r. rzeczywistości stało się priorytetem służb i formacji mundurowych do tego powołanych. Działania podejmowane przez administrację publiczną i podległe jej służby, straże i inspekcje były realizowane przede wszystkim w strefie przygranicznej, w punktach recepcyjnych oraz w miastach i miejscowościach, gdzie odnotowywano zwiększoną obecność uchodźców, a także na trasach przemieszczania się i w miejscach docelowego pobytu na terenie kraju.

Funkcjonariusze SG prowadzili odprawy graniczne podróżnych, sprawdzali i potwierdzali tożsamość osób wjeżdżających do Polski, pilnowali bezpieczeństwa tzw. zielonej granicy oraz udzielali niezbędnych informacji osobom uciekającym z Ukrainy. Uchodźcy byli następnie bezpłatnie, przez strażaków PSP, dowożeni do punktów recepcyjnych, a następnie do bezpłatnych miejsc zakwaterowania. W punktach recepcyjnych, na dworcach oraz w miejscach publicznych byli obecni policjanci. Realizowali tam zadania o charakterze prewencyjnym, patrolowo-interwencyjnym, zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa ruchu drogowego, zabezpieczenia kontrterrorystycznego, rozpoznania i zabezpieczenia operacyjnego, zabezpieczenia pirotechnicznego, rozpoznawania i weryfikowania tożsamości osób, które „odbierają” uchodźców z punktów recepcyjnych, oraz stosowali wyprzedzającą reakcję, która umożliwi zapobieganie popełnianiu przestępstw związanych z handlem ludźmi. Na bieżąco, prowadząc monitoring Sieci Internetowej, zbierano, analizowano i przetwarzano informacje ze źródeł otwartych i niejawnych, związanych z masowym napływem cudzoziemców na teren Polski oraz z pojawiającymi się zagrożeniami. Ważnym elementem realizowanych czynności było rozpoznanie zagrożeń, a także zabezpieczanie konwojów huma-

nitarnych, przejazdów i pobytu na terenie województw podkarpackiego i lubelskiego osób podlegających ustawowej ochronie, w tym m.in. Prezydentów RP i USA, wizyt i przejazdów przedstawicieli różnych państw i organizacji międzynarodowych.

Wśród pojawiających się zagrożeń na terenie województw podkarpackiego i lubelskiego odnotowano incydenty i przestępstwa dotyczące mowy nienawiści wobec uchodźców, rozpowszechniania fake newsów o zagrożeniu uprowadzeniami i gwałtami na szkodę kobiet z Ukrainy oraz o ryzykownych zachowaniach i przestępstwach popełnianych na szkodę obywateli RP przez uchodźców, którzy są obywatelami innych państw, oszustw dokonywanych na szkodę uchodźców, np. podczas wynajmu mieszkań czy załatwiania formalności urzędowych. Szczególne zagrożenie pojawiło się wraz z nasileniem się w mediach społecznościowych kampanii nienawiści do uchodźców „studentów” z państw Afryki Południowej, którzy mieli zagrażać mieszkańcom Podkarpacia, co spowodowało znaczny odzew w środowiskach pseudokibicowskich i przyjazd na teren powiatów przemyskiego i jarosławskiego grup pseudokibiców klubów piłkarskich z całej Polski, którzy organizowali „patrole obywatelskie” chroniące przed uchodźcami. Informacje o takiej treści masowo pojawiały się w Internecie, wywołując dodatkowe niepokoje i napięcia społeczne.

Podsumowanie

Celem prezentowanego artykułu była próba przybliżenia głównych działań podejmowanych przez administrację rządową i samorządową w Polsce od 24 lutego 2022 r. do 24 marca 2022 r. w zakresie zapewnienia pomocy i ochrony oraz bezpieczeństwa osobistego uchodźcom, którzy masowo opuszczali Ukrainę dotkniętą wojną wywołaną przez agresję FR. Sytuacja, z jaką społeczność międzynarodowa miała do czynienia na skutek działań FR, była bezprecedensowa i budziła powszechny niepokój, przywołując w pamięci tragiczne doświadczenia i skojarzenia z obrazami znanymi z XX w.

Atak wojsk FR na Ukrainę oraz konsekwencje, jakie wywołał, wyzwoliły niespotykany w XX w. ruch uchodźczy, którego skutki trudne są obecnie do jednoznacznej oceny zarówno ze strony wspólnoty międzynarodowej, jak i państw przyjmujących uchodźców, w tym Polski, która stała się punktem tranzytowym lub miejscem docelowym dla znacznej części uchodźców. Trudność ta, w kontekście skutków politycznych, gospodarczych oraz społecznych, dotyczy i perspektywy krótkoterminowej, i dalekosiężnych konsekwencji dla bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego Polski oraz całej UE. W doktrynie dosyć dobrze opisane są pozytywne dla państwa przyjmującego skutki migracji ludności

z państw bliskich etnicznie, kulturowo i geograficznie oraz o silnych sieciach krewniaczych z państwem przyjmującym i licznej, ustabilizowanej ekonomicznie mniejszości narodowej (por. np. Paliś, 2018).

Nie ulega wątpliwości, że napływ uchodźców z Ukrainy spowodował bardzo pozytywną reakcję społeczeństwa i instytucji państwa polskiego. W krótkim czasie i w warunkach niepewności, a nawet zagrożenia obywatele, instytucje publiczne i podmioty niepubliczne podejmowały spontaniczne działania organizacyjne i logistyczne, które miały na celu udzielenie ochrony i pomocy potrzebującym sąsiadom. Spójność i konsekwencja w działaniu widoczna była zarówno w deklaracjach, jak i działaniach legislacyjno-organizacyjnych władz publicznych, a także pozostałych interesariuszy biorących udział we wspieraniu uchodźców i organizowaniu pomocy dla nich. Cechą charakterystyczną tego działania, odmiennego od dominującego w przestrzeni międzynarodowej, było stworzenie inkluzywnego modelu pomocy uchodźcom, który charakteryzował się otwartością na uciekających przed wojną z Ukrainy. Wszystkie podmioty publiczne i niepubliczne państwa oraz społeczeństwo solidarnie współdziałały w zakresie organizowania pomocy i wsparcia dla uchodźców. Na poziomie politycznym, legislacyjnym i organizacyjnym podjęto działania mające na celu powszechne włączanie uchodźców do życia w polskim społeczeństwie poprzez ułatwienia i zachęty do podejmowania nowych lub przerwanych przez wojnę ról społecznych i ekonomicznych, zaniechanie relokacji czy tworzenia obozów dla uchodźców w pobliżu przejść granicznych. Prowadzono też koordynowaną przez UE albo organizacje międzynarodowe pomoc w docelowej destynacji uchodźców (Firlit-Fesnak, 2022).

Napływ uciekinierów z Ukrainy, do jakiego doszło po 24 lutego 2022 r., pokazał, że Polska stała się państwem odgrywającym najważniejszą rolę w przyjmowaniu uchodźców szukających schronienia przed wojną i udzielaniu im opieki i pomocy. Doświadczenia te potwierdzają istnienie ogromnego kapitału solidarności społecznej i pomimo licznych trudności czy problemów – sprawność działania systemu zarządzania kryzysowego. Stanowią też swoistą praktyczną formę weryfikacji obowiązujących procedur działania na przyszłość, ponieważ współczesne środowisko bezpieczeństwa ulega ciągłym przeobrażeniom, a pojawiające się ryzyko i zagrożenia multiplikują się i stawiają coraz to nowe i trudniejsze wyzwania.

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Redakcja i korekta tekstów w języku polskim / Polish texts copy editing
Barbara Konopka

Korekta tekstów w języku angielskim / English texts proofreading
Krystian Wojcieszuk

Projekt okładki i przygotowanie do druku / Cover design and preparation for printing
Beata Klyta

Łamanie / Typesetting
Marek Zagniński

ISSN 2353-9747

(wersja elektroniczna) / (electronic version)

Wersją referencyjną czasopisma, począwszy od 2018 roku, jest wersja elektroniczna, ukazująca się na platformach: / The reference version of the journal is the electronic version, which appears on the platforms:

Central and Eastern European Online Library www.ceeol.com

University of Silesia Press – Open Journal System www.journals.us.edu.pl

Czasopismo wcześniej ukazywało się w formie drukowanej z ISSN 1895-3492

This journal was formerly published in print with the following identifier ISSN 1895-3492

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Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego

ul. Bankowa 12B, 40-007 Katowice

www.wydawnictwo.us.edu.pl

e-mail: wydawnictwo@us.edu.pl

Ark. druk. 8,0. Ark. wyd. 10,0.

Egzemplarz bezpłatny

ISSN 2353-9747

22



9 772353 974208

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