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From the Problems of the Occupation of Northern Bukovina by the Soviet Army – Between Reality and Propaganda (April–December 1944)

Abstract: In April 1944, Soviet forces occupied Bukovina. Partisans were sent to areas designated by the Soviet Military Command to carry out diversionary activities. As a result, the inhabitants of Bukovina experienced hunger, destruction of crops, and forced labor in the construction of trenches for the Soviet army. Soviet civil authorities were restored in every community. Newly appointed guards relayed all orders to the inhabitants and took part in requisitions, arrests, and deportations. One of the first actions of the new administration was to conduct a census, which was necessary to introduce a tax system. Taxes were then set at between 50 and 500 rubles per resident, depending on their wealth. In addition, the local population was subject to taxes in kind (grain, livestock, wool, and dairy products). The Soviets saw the annexation of northern Bukovina as the unification of the great Ukrainian nation into a single Soviet state undergoing continuous socialist development.

Key words: Bessarabia, Bukovina, NKVD, Red Army, Romanians, Soviet army's occupation, Soviet troops, systematic plundering, Transnistria, Ukrainians

Introduction

The war's trajectory was drastically altered on all fronts, not only in the east, when the German campaign came to an end in 1942 and the 6th Army surrendered.

An area of almost 500 000 km² was liberated as a result of the Soviet offensive's triumph at Stalingrad, which was followed by the battles on the Kuban and the Lower Don in the spring of 1943. The front line was also pushed down to a depth of 600–700 km. These, together with the victories of the Soviet Union allies' in the theaters of military operations in North Africa and the Pacific Ocean, signaled the start of a geopolitical and military strategy in how the Second World War was fought.

Preliminary background

The changes produced on the eastern front in the first half of 1943 resulted not only in the pushing of the German troops but also in the appearance of the danger concerning the occupation of Romania by the Soviet soldiers who were on the offensive along the entire length of the eastern front. How the civilian population and the Romanian administration in Northern Bucovina and Bessarabia reacted in the summer of 1940¹ had an impact on marshal Ion Antonescu's decision to order the elaboration of an evacuation plan for the Romanian provinces at risk – Transnistria, Bessarabia, Bucovina, and Moldova. The decision was taken in the fall of 1943. Antonescu even stated that “we have to prepare everything for the worst case” when discussing this approach. In this regard, Colonel Gheorge V. Mosiu was assigned on November 10, 1943, to organize, supervise, guide, and coordinate operations for the planning, carrying out, and positioning of the necessary evacuations from the designated provinces inside the nation. Concurrent with the job that Col. Mosiu was doing for M. St. Major, several officers of Marshal's Military Cabinet were assigned to collect the information required to prepare the state officials' administrative staff records in these provinces.

At the end of November 1943, the first documents were drafted concerning the evacuation of civilians, goods, and administrative personnel from Transnistria, Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Moldova. “Operation 1111” was used to codify the documents about these plans. These documents were titled “Operation 1111 A” for Transnistria and Bessarabia, “Operation 1111 B” for Bukovina,² and “Operation 1111 M” for Moldova.

¹ G. Buzatu, *România cu și fără Antonescu*, București 2021, p. 12.

² Serviciul Județean Suceava al Arhivelor Naționale (SJSAN), Fond Prefectura Județului Suceava (PJS), dos. 6/1944, ff. 7–12.

The Ministry of Finance made available to the Governments and local departments a fund of 7,014,966,026 lei for operation 1111 B and M, of which 505,000,000 lei for the Government of Bucovina, 860,000,000 lei for that of Bessarabia, and the remainder for the Ministry of War, civil departments, and autonomous institutions. This was in response to the request made in January 1944 by the province governors regarding the creation of a special fund for the execution of evacuation operations.

The Romanian civilian population experienced a general state of dread as the front approached Bucovina and the imminent menace of Bolshevism, but when faced with the prospect of evacuation, the province's minorities responded differently. Among the many duties the committee had to do between November 1943 and January 1944 were the allocation of the budget, the delineation of the targeted areas, the formulation of the selection criteria, and the division of the work into phases based on priority. Taking these factors into account, we can conclude that one of the main effects of the adjustments made on the front in 1942–1943 was the creation of Operation 1111 B.³

Evacuation of Institutions, Officials, and Their Families

Despite opposition from the Romanian and German armies, Soviet troops captured Cernăuți, the capital of Bukovina on March 30, 1944. The stabilization of the front on the Rădăuți – Suceava – Pașcani – Sculeni – Orhei – Dubăsari line (the Iași-Chișinău front) at the end of March and beginning of April 1944 resulted in not only the evacuation of civilians but also the Soviet soldiers' penetration into Bucovina villages and towns. Against this backdrop, on April 2, Veaceslav Molotov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, claimed that Moscow did not intend to annex any part of Romanian land to the Soviet Union or to alter the current social circumstances in Romania.⁴

Within the parameters of Operation 1111 B, the evacuation and the departure of the Romanian authorities were carried out hurriedly and very haphazardly. The people of Romania were left to their fate and the German troops retreated once

³ E. Cazacu, *Evacuarea provinciei Bucovina în primăvara lui 1944: Pregătirea Operațiunii 1111 B*, "Arhivele Totalitarismului" 2018, vol. 26, nos. 100–101, 3–4, pp. 98–107.

⁴ *România – marele sacrificat al celui de-al doilea război mondial. Documente*, vol. 1, ed. M. R. Mocanu, București 1994, p. 180.

the rulers withdrew. For instance, up until the Soviet army invaded the county seat town on April 8, 1944, Rădăuți County was plagued by robberies and the damaging operations of German forces.⁵ When the army entered the non-evacuated Bucovina villages, the residents had to live alongside them for a while. The Russians landed in southern Bucovina in April, around Easter. They inquired about the German troops, and the presence of weaponry, and began requisitioning food, agricultural products, and animals from the local populace.

They also launched intimidation campaigns against Bucovina residents who had not yet had time to escape. A strip of terrain (about 80 km long) that belonged to no one was measured along the Obcina Mare Mountain. The Soviet troops along the Eastern Carpathians' line stopped fighting at the end of March. Here were active members of Romania's first anti-communist movement. Spontaneous anti-Soviet partisan formations had emerged by May 1944. Skilled in crossing wooded and mountain terrain, they planned nighttime assaults on Soviet outposts. Colonel Gheorghe Bățătorescu formed the *Bucovina Battalion*, which waged guerilla warfare both in front of and behind the Russian lines. These regiments were disbanded on August 23, 1944, following the coup against the Antonescu regime.⁶

In the event of an evacuation, the Romanian administration was responsible for the dispersal of officials and their families within the country during the second phase of the operation. The directions for their movement throughout the country were carried out down to the smallest detail, and thus each official had to know by what means they were evacuating (through the railway and horse transportation) and the location of the destination. Officials planned the evacuation from the province.⁷ A particular issue with the evacuation of administrative personnel was the creation of a power vacuum at the time of their departure. Furthermore, the authorities argued that it was in the interest of the Romanian nation not to empty these territories of the existing population, except for elements of the army.

Receiving the evacuation order entailed the withdrawal of both institutions and their officials from Bucovina territory to the country's interior. Once they arrived, the institutions in Bucovina had to begin their operations. They were given spaces to complete their tasks from local town halls or other institutions. The authorities' first activities were to implement management for the years

⁵ Suceava County Directorate of National Archives, Fond Prefectura Județului Rădăuți, f. 8/1944, pp. 1–2.

⁶ G. Vatamaniuc, *Lupta armată împotriva comunismului în Bucovina și reprimarea ei*, "Analele Sighet" 1995, vol. 2, pp. 308–309; A. Brișcă, *Studiu introductiv*, in: *Rezistența armată în Bucovina 1944–1950*, vol. 1, Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, București 1998, pp. 50–52; C. Hrehor, *Muntele mărturisirilor*, Editura Timpul, Iași 2001, p. 308.

⁷ SJSAN, PJS, dos. 3/1944, f. 2.

1943–1944, as well as to assess the condition of commodities and evacuated officials to gain a *comprehensive picture* after the government had left Bucovina. The difficulties encountered in carrying out the evacuation plans, the inspections in the territory, the early evacuation, the vicissitudes encountered until the destination, and the Bucovina government's activity during the evacuation were all aspects that characterized the Romanian administration in 1944. Considering these factors, we can confirm that, despite the government's instructions, measures, and inspections in the Bucovina counties to establish the 1111 B operation down in detail, the people's reaction was not considered, which influenced how the evacuation was carried out.

Evacuation of Industry, Pre-military, and Military Units

The Romanian government's plans for Bucovina included not only the politicians and governmental institutions present in the region, but also valuable industrial products, military units, and pre-military groups. Marshal Antonescu set the general framework for the industry's organization during the November 16th, 1943, meeting of Council of Ministers.

Special Instruction No. 4, issued on February 15, 1944, mandated that only the industries chosen by the Ministry of the National Economy and the Ministry of the Endowment of the Army could be evacuated in the prescribed order of urgency. Finished products from factories (textiles, alcohol, tobacco, etc.) and large warehouses were evacuated first. Only what was strictly necessary for the population was left behind: grain, sugar, oil, beans, and sunflower seeds were evacuated, leaving only what was necessary until the new harvest. Potatoes were left behind, animals, processed oils and fats of all kinds, as well as "oilseeds" were released.⁸ Additionally, industries approved for evacuation were allowed to relocate throughout the nation accompanied by their experts based on displacement sheets.

On May 4th, 1944, the Minister of Finance reported to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers on the effects of the evacuation of Bessarabia, Bucovina, and Moldavia. Based on the agricultural population in 1942–1943, the agricultural economy's losses were projected to be 48.81% on average, while those of the sown lands were 49.06%, or more than 50%, for the production of potatoes, barley, rye,

⁸ SJSAN, PJS, dos. 6/1944, ff. 4, 28.

sunflower, and hemp. Large losses were anticipated in the food, wood, textile, and paper industries, which accounted for 14.08% of total industrial production in the three provinces.

The local government received instructions that classified the 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, and 1946 Bucovina and Bessarabia contingents as pre-military. The authorities judged it necessary to evacuate not only pre-military personnel but also young individuals aged 16 to 20. They were to be marched to their initial destination in groups by county. Consequently, it was necessary to send pre-military forces from the counties of Cernăuți, Hotin, Storojineț, Rădăuți,⁹ Suceava, Dorohoi, and Botoșani to the regions of Buhuși, Târgu Trotuși, and Frumoasa pe Taslău. Every young man needed to bring his finest winter attire, an additional set of clothes, “soap as much as possible,” and personal dinnerware weighing no more than 20 kg and fitting into a backpack. The pre-military also had a 12-day food carry requirement.¹⁰

The mobilization of Romanian soldiers began in June 1941 and continued in 1944 when the central government ordered the pre-military and military formations stationed in the area to evacuate. Taking these factors into account, we can confirm that while the planning of the evacuation of businesses and material goods, as well as that of military units and pre-military groups in Bucovina, was theoretically sound, there were practical inconsistencies with the reality of the region. For example, the decision to halt the supply of raw materials had an impact on and led to the military-interested factories in the area requesting to be evacuated from the country.

Evacuation of the Civilian Population

Plans developed and distributed by “Colonel Mosiu’s group” for the 1111 B operation’s planning allowed for the evacuation of civilians who could suffer during the Russian occupation because of patriotic sentiments. In response to the front’s evolving course, Marshal Antonescu declared on January 26, 1944, that the Romanian regions “should not be emptied of Romanian elements, lest in this way our ethnic situation and our political position be weakened.” As a result, the plans for

⁹ Ibidem, Fond Prefectura județului Rădăuți (PJR), dos. 25/1944, ff. 17–19.

¹⁰ Ibidem, f. 18.

Bessarabia and Bucovina only included the evacuation of military units and young or compromised individuals, not the large-scale evacuation of Romanian elements. This is further evidenced by the fact that the evacuation was included in phase III, following the withdrawal of permanent administrative institutions.

The rumor of a possible evacuation went quickly throughout the people, aided by memories of the exodus from the summer of 1940. The terror was prompted by both information received from relatives on the front lines and the sending of bags and valuables within the nation by officials. However, the government's resolve not to depopulate Bucovina was viewed as a futile sacrifice by its population, who said that they would rather be slain by Romanian soldiers than fall victim to Russian hordes and the organs of the Bolshevik N. K. V. D.¹¹

The following counties were established as the destination for the population evacuated from the south of Bucovina: a. The population of Câmpulung county is evacuated to Gorj county; b. The population of Rădăuți County is evacuated to Mehedinți County; c. The population of Suceava County is evacuated to Mehedinți County. The *route* established for the population evacuated from Suceava, known in documents as the *yellow itinerary*, was Suceava – Fălticeni – Târgu Neamț – Roznov – Târgu Trotuș – Păunești – Odobești – Cotești – Râmnicul Sărat – Vișcani – Gara Făurei – Cilibia – Pogoanele – Urziceni – Adâncata – Fierbinti – Lipia, Tâncăbesci – Periș – Bilciurești – Dobra – Titu – Corbii Mari.

As a result of the Soviet Union's victories during this time, the attack in Ukraine was launched at the beginning of March, and on March 4, the 1st Ukrainian Front began implementing the "Proskurov – Chernivtsi" operation. The "Uman-Botosani" action was conducted by the 2nd Ukrainian Front on March 5 while the "Berez-negovatoe – Snighirevka" operation was carried out by the 3rd Ukrainian Front on March 6. In this regard, the Government of Bucovina received an encrypted telegraph no. 5276 from the Ministry of the Interior on March 9, 1944, stating that "the evacuation may begin immediately."¹²

Faced with the *fait accompli*, some Romanian officials chose to remove their assets and families within the country rather than follow the government's demands. Residents of various villages and cities in the province's south were evacuated at gunpoint by Red Army soldiers. Aware of the fate of those waiting under Soviet rule, entire families decided not to carry out the withdrawal order issued by Soviet troops or, as the case may be, Romanian authorities. Rather than travel to uncharted territory, they opted to seek sanctuary in the Bucovina woodlands. Taking these factors into account, we can say that the Soviet Union's incursion into

¹¹ Ibidem, PJS, dos. 29/1944, ff. 49–53.

¹² Ibidem, PJS, dos. 29/1944, f. 54.

the region resulted in the establishment of a resistance movement among the locals against the Soviet dictatorship in addition to the local government's partial execution of the plans for the population evacuation.

The Fate of Bucovina after August 23rd, 1944

A political alliance supporting Romania's withdrawal from the war and entry into the United Nations coalition was formed between April and August 1944 as a result of the deteriorating circumstances in Romania and Marshal Antonescu's unyielding stance. In this situation, the National Peasant Party and the National Liberal Party agreed to work together with the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party of Romania to topple Ion Antonescu's regime. As a result, on June 20, 1944, the National Democratic Bloc was established. Its goals were to achieve peace in line with the interests of the Romanian people and the state, conclude an armistice with the United Nations, free Romania from the Axis, and install a democratic government.

The Soviet offensive in the Iasi-Chisinau area on August 20, combined with the internal evolution of the country, precipitated events and resulted in the implementation of a B. N. D. plan to overthrow the Antonescu government. The shift in state management regime in August had an impact on the fates of the provinces of Bessarabia and Bucovina. Consequently, the Governments of Bessarabia and Bucovina were abolished on September 6, 1944, by decree legislation no. 449. The decree no. 790 of September 4, 1941, about the organization of the territories, along with all of its amendments, was to be repealed by law, and any assets that belonged to their administrations under any name had to be assigned to the ministries or local administrative units by the Council of Ministers' Journal.

On September 12, 1944, the Romanian government and the United Nations signed the Armistice Convention, allowing the civilian population and administration to return to the evacuated districts on September 17. If the Romanian government sought to remove administrative staff who collaborated with the Soviet occupation from the administration of Bucovina province in 1941, state officials were subjected to a "purification" in the fall of 1944, this time targeting those appointed, employed, or employed between 1938 and August 1944. The lawsuit was based on Decree No. 486 dated October 8, 1944.

The directives received stated that the civilian population had to show up at the Security office close to the town hall within 24 hours of arriving in their hometowns to get their identity certificates certified. We believe that the document targeting the measure was a means of identifying those who in 1940–1941 were the residents of Northern Bucovina and Bessarabia, and were regarded as Soviet citizens upon the signing of the armistice. They were required to return “voluntarily or by force.”¹³

Upon their return, the people and the authorities had to deal with several issues, including the dissolution of the Bucovina Government on September 6, the northern region’s capitulation, and the Soviet Union’s influence over local government choices. Both the civilian populace and officials in the southern region of Bucovina experienced the financial and managerial ramifications of the 1111 B operation.

Despite the dramatic situation, which included Soviet Command abuses, a lack of basic food and clothing, the undermining of the Romanian administration, typhus epidemics, and houses looted and burned to the ground, people hoped for a return to normalcy as soon as possible under the circumstances. Taking these factors into account, we can conclude that the Romanian administration’s actions in Bucovina in 1944 had an impact not only on the province’s fate (the northern part was ceded to the USSR), but also on the lives of Bucovina residents who were familiar with war, evacuation, and the Soviet regime since the summer of 1940.

The Return of Romanian Administration in Southern Bucovina (Câmpulung, RăduŃi and Suceava Counties)

On September 17, 1944, the Romanian government and the United Nations signed the Armistice Convention, allowing the civilian population and the administration to return to the evacuated districts. If the Romanian government worked to remove administrative staff members who had aided the Soviet occupier from the province of Bucovina’s administration in 1941, state officials faced another purge in the fall of 1944, this time focusing on those who had been appointed, elected, hired, or employed between February 20, 1938, and August 23, 1944.

There were two stages to the restoration of administrative authority in the counties of Suceava, RăduŃi, and Câmpulung. Nonetheless, the Soviet Commander’s interference, mistreatment, and objections frequently made things more difficult.

¹³ Ibidem, f. 56.

A few challenges had to do with running an administration that was supported by the Soviet government. Despite directives from Bucharest's Ministry of Internal Affairs, there were instances where prefects and mayors refused to pledge to return to the services the officials had left behind. There was no legal foundation for the imposed commissions composed of political body representatives that selected them. Apart from these elements, the ongoing support provided by Soviet commanders and NKVD delegates in the administration's rehabilitation.

One instance is the Soviet commander of the city's efforts to stop the Legion of Gendarmes from returning to Rădăuți. The residents felt unsafe because of these circumstances, which was further highlighted by the fact that all inmates were released from prisons without being separated into political or common law offenders. Without making a distinction between officials, civilians, and soldiers, the Soviet officers took radios and guns through a series of interferences and abuses. The presence of Soviet forces severely undermined the authority of the Romanian state immediately following the reintroduction of the Romanian government to the three counties in southern Bucovina. As a result, the untrained administrative personnel surrounding the prefects and mayors chosen by the Soviet command lacked the education required for their positions and employed abusive or unlawful tactics. The prefecture, police, court, agricultural chamber, and town hall were restructured in Suceava County with the consent of the Soviet military commander. Despite food shortages, the situation in Câmpulung County was better because the Romanian administration there had not been evacuated despite the military activities. During the evacuation, Soviet-appointed authorities ruled over southern Bucovina, collecting local and state taxes and giving preference to those who promised larger pay.

The Romanian administration's return to these counties did not take effect immediately after the return permits were issued. This was likewise the case with the judicial bodies, whose absence allowed for the appointment of improvised magistrates. Concerning the officials in charge of upholding public order, the police and gendarmerie, a similar situation was noted. Soon after the officials' return, delegates from the Romanian government were dispatched to the region to examine and catalog the condition of the resources and tangible legacy of the local state organizations. The absence of civil status registrations, damaged roads, and bridges, missing or ruined church and school furniture, etc. were discovered during the inspections.

The delegates of the Ministry of Internal Affairs described the fall and winter of 1944 as a disastrous time for the economies of the counties in the south of Bucovina, particularly the mountainous area, with the inhabitants facing hunger. Large-scale grain collecting by Soviet commanders, combined with a deficiency in some items (corn, sugar, fats, and salt), which were deemed war prizes, allowed the famine to

slowly spread among the civilian population. To this is added the dearth of clothing, shoes, and other necessities, forcing some village residents to wear uniforms purchased from the Russians. The confiscations of grain by the German and Soviet armies resulted in the total destitution of Cămpulung county, to the point that autumn sowing was no longer feasible.

Suceava County was among the counties most impacted by the military actions in the Bucovina region. In this context, 42 communes out of 52 rural areas were fully evacuated between April and September 1944, resulting in a fall of approximately 80% in economic power. The 1944 harvest was sold to the army as a result of the military forces that were kept in place and assisted by the civilian population that was evacuated from the communes and surrounding counties. In addition, the front line was unpassable because of its closeness to the agricultural area. The Suceava County factories were dismantled and moved, and the products, particularly the sausage factory's and slaughterhouse's canned meat, were delivered to Bessarabia over the Prut and to the front. The Soviet authorities demolished the three sawmills, the glass plant in Putna commune, the mill in Dornești commune, and other installations in Rădăuți County to send them to Russia.

The items that were evacuated, together with factories, workshops, parts, furniture, equipment, agricultural implements, and lumber, were rigorously inventoried before being seized and shipped to the Soviet Union. The occupants asked the Bucharest government to return all the items from this territory, citing the armistice accord that mandated the handover of the north of Bucovina to the Soviet Union's control. The evacuation of health authorities resulted in a lack of medications, personnel, and hygiene, and the spread of illnesses, such as typhus exanthematicus. The use of civilians to rebuild roads and bridges destroyed by both the German and Soviet armies contributed to an increase in the frequency of accidents caused by mine explosions or projectiles, among other things.

After September 17, the civilian population could return to the south of the province. When they arrived at their hometowns, they were required to present themselves within 24 hours to the Security Office near the town hall to get their identity documents endorsed. This was also a technique of identifying persons who resided in northern Bucovina and Bessarabia before July 1941 but were designated Soviet citizens after the armistice was signed and had to return to the USSR voluntarily or by force. The approach to the residences was challenging since the Soviets' wider gauge lines made it impossible to go from Dorohoi to the three counties by train. In addition to walking, residents had to use freight trains and carts. Their homes and belongings had been completely or partially destroyed when they returned home. Food was meager and frequently limited to fruit or, at most, potatoes or maize.

Northern Bukovina (1944)

The Soviet Union's return in March–April 1944, having experienced all the hardships and atrocities of the war, did not signal a shift in policy concerning a more normal attitude toward the indigenous populace. The level of Sovietization reached uncharted territory, and the authorities grew even more brutal. Various armed anti-Soviet partisan groups, primarily composed of Romanians and Ukrainians, struggled with the communists during this time. Terror was unleashed in the initial months, following the reoccupation of Bucovina and Bessarabia. On August 24, 1944, 7,000 people from Chernivtsi were sent to work as forced laborers in Karelia, near Lake Onega, to clear forests and construct railroads or the Baltic Sea – Lake Onega canal. One of the people who were brought to Onega said that he also ate pork or beef skin. He worked from 12 to 15 hours a day at temperatures as low as 40 to 45 degrees below zero, eating salted fish soup only. By the end of 1945, those who had survived were granted permission to go back to Bucovina.

Following the decision of the USSR's State Defense Committee on October 29, 1944 in mid-December 1944, a second round of arrests was carried out in the Chernivtsi Region, targeting men aged 18 to 55. Thus, on December 20, approximately 150 individuals were arrested in the Voloca commune (Hliboca district) and brought to Chernivtsi prison. On January 25, 1945, thousands of Bukovinians were loaded into wagons and sent to Vorkuta, located beyond the North Polar Circle. It wasn't until January 1947 that these innocent folks were granted the freedom to return home.

About 19,000 former soldiers of the Romanian army were sentenced to six years of forced labor in the Urals, Donetsk area, and other mines. All males between the ages of 18 and 50 were being conscripted into the Red Army by the Soviets in May 1944. This time, the refusal to enlist spread like wildfire. As a result, 400 recruits in the Cernauti rural region alone failed to show up at the military commissariats, and the army and militia were called in by the government to retrieve them from their residences. The Bolshevik security forces were hunting many of the young people who were hiding in the forests of Bucovina. Therefore, in the spring of 1944, in the forest close to Buda-Mahala, some young Romanians were pursued and surprised by Soviet soldiers, who shot them on the spot without trying to arrest them. Only four of the at least 13 victims were able to escape with their lives.

The group of young people born in 1927 was mobilized in the fall of that year under the October 25, 1944, State Defense Committee of the USSR decision number 6784/a. It was decided that the recruits should be called to the district military commissariats under the reason of the repeated organization of the general military instruction in an organized manner. The regional recruitment center, where the mobilization would take place in the districts most strongly affected by the counter-revolutionary element, were those close to the Romanian border. Over 78,000 soldiers had been called up in the area as of December 17th, 1944. The majority of them were assigned to military reserve forces. Here, the counter-intelligence service identifies all dangerous social and political elements by using information from the origins and secret agents to identify individuals who were part of the Romanian administration or army, had any connection to the anti-communist resistance movements, expressed various anti-Soviet opinions, etc.

On January 1st, 1945, 567,000 people lived in the Chernivtsi Region as a result of World War II, the Soviets' oppressive policy, and the refuge of a portion of the population inside the country in front of the Red Army's advance. Previously, 35.2% of the population had been raised. All of them were deported to the southern areas of Ukraine.

Additionally, on September 7, 1946, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR issued an order changing the names of several dozen Romanian villages in order to eliminate traditional toponyms, which were proof of the autochthonousness of Romanians in the Chernivtsi Region. For instance, Crasna changed to Crasnoilsc, Tereblacea became Porubne, Oprişeni became Dubivka, Mihoreni became Petraşivka, Mogoşesti became Bairaki, Proboteşti became Djakivţi, Cerlena became Cerlenivka, Suceveni became Şiroka Poljana, and so on.

These decisions, which targeted the identity of Romanians from the Chernivtsi Region, were made in the context of the Stalinist leadership adoption of several measures in August and September 1946 to tighten and restore discipline in the war-affected economy and society. In a similar vein, the Soviet Government issued two more rulings on June 4, 1947, stating that "any damage to the property of the state or collective farms" would result in a labor camp sentence of five to twenty-five years. A sentence of two to three years in the camp was imposed on anyone who knew about the planning of a crime or the actual theft and failed to disclose it to the militia. Additionally, the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers raised the requirements for individual households to supply agricultural products by the end of the same month. These requirements included a 50% rise for wheat, sunflower, soy, potatoes, vegetables, hay, meat, and milk, as well as a 100% increase for wool.

All facilities were cancelled and the dates for turning in the production were substantially shortened for the so-called peasant households. As a result, ordinary people once again suffered. Thus, from 1946 to 1947, 51 residents of Sadagura, Chernivtsi rural area, Herța, and Storojineț were prosecuted and condemned under Article 58 of the Criminal Code, which dealt with all counter-revolutionary crimes. They earned a total of 339 years and 6 months in prison for failing to meet the state's mandated agricultural product quotas from individual families. Many of these convictions were accompanied by the confiscation of property.

It is important to acknowledge that the precise numbers about the different categories of suppressed individuals remain unclear (such as those who were shot dead in their hometowns; arrested and found guilty; arrested and later killed without receiving a sentence; deported to labor camps; deported to different regions of Siberia and Kazakhstan; picked up and transported to forced labor, etc.). Official records show that 4,298 persons were removed from the area between 1944 and 1952. Based on additional computations, 11,145 residents of the Chernivtsi Region (about 10% of the entire population) were sent to Siberia and Asia between 1940–1941 and 1944–1952.

Generally, we can conclude that numerous crimes against the population of the respective territories were committed in conjunction with the Red Army's entry, the communist regime's establishment, and the inclusion of the northern portions of Bessarabia, Bucovina, and the Herța region into the Ukrainian SSR. The Soviets destroyed the basis of a liberal society and the creative and productive energies of the Romanian people as well as the other ethnic communities in northern Romania, rather than bringing about "liberation" from the domination of the Romanian boyars and capitalists. We can estimate that between 15 and 20% of Romanians were victims of Soviet repressions, given that the largest-scale arrests and deportations occurred in the border districts with Romania. To comprehend and measure the phenomenon of the decline in the overall Romanian population, we should correlate the number of those who died on the front with the number of refugees in Romania or other European countries or the number of those brought to the land from other areas of Ukraine and Russia.¹⁴

¹⁴ Ș. Purici, *Românii din Regiunea Cernăuți și represiunile sovietice*, in: *Drama românilor din Regiunea Cernăuți. Masacre, deportări, foamete în 1940–1941, 1944–1947*, ed. A. Cernov, Mănăstirea Putna 2019, pp. 35–46.

Minorities in Bukovina

Ukrainians

The Ukrainian irredentist movement was represented by numerous organizations, including the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, created in Vienna in 1929 and directed by Evgheni Konoval, and the Movement of Integral Ukrainian Nationalism, led by D. Dontsov, among others. In Romania, the Ukrainian National Party defended the Ukrainian minority's interests, with the irredentist goal of establishing a Greater Ukraine comprised of Galicia, Subcarpathian Russia, Bucovina, and Ukraine. The press and cultural organizations backed Ukrainians' rights to the Bukovina land.¹⁵ Following Germany's invasion of Poland in September 1939, German-Ukrainian cooperation commenced, during which time Ukrainian officials secured Berlin's assurance to assist them in the establishment of an independent Ukraine.¹⁶ However, the Reich's reluctance to recognize the independent Ukrainian state, led by Stepan Bandera, resulted in an open clash between Berlin authorities and the Ukrainian Liberation Movement. As a result, the Ukrainians resolved to organize large-scale protests and resistance actions.

Romania's territorial losses in the summer of 1940, particularly in the north of Bucovina, sparked resistance among members of the Organization of Nationalist Ukrainians and the Ukrainian Revolutionary Army when Soviet troops reached the region. Following the withdrawal of Soviet soldiers in the summer of 1941, Ukrainians in northern Bukovina formed national guards and established their administration in several communes. Between August and September 1941, the Ukrainians refused to lay down their arms, committed crimes against Jews, spread nationalist propaganda, and so on. In 1942, the Ukrainian irredentist movement in Bukovina took two approaches: 1) preparing the peasant and urban masses for passive resistance and economic sabotage against the Germans and Romanians to persuade the Third Reich to make territorial concessions in favor of the Ukrainian cause; 2) organizing attacks on the German-Romanian authorities in Bucovina and Bessarabia. The appearance of Soviet propaganda agents in the two areas in 1943

¹⁵ *Minoritățile naționale din România (1931–1938). Documente*, ed. I. Scurtu, București 1994, p. 429.

¹⁶ D. Șandru, *Bucovina și nordul Basarabiei în planurile iredentei ucrainene (1940–1944)*, "Revista istorică" 1997, vol. 8, nos. 3–4, p. 203.

increased the Ukrainians' demands: the establishment of schools with Ukrainian teachers and instruction in Ukrainian; religious services in churches in the same language, and so on. The Romanian authorities in the Bucovina Government attempted to oppose the Ukrainian irredentist movement, albeit with varying degrees of success.

Germans

The exodus of ethnic Germans from Romanian territory was based on two agreements: *The Soviet-German Convention of September 5, 1940*,¹⁷ and the *agreement signed between Nazi Germany and the Romanian state, dated October 22, 1940*, regarding the departure of ethnic Germans from southern Bucovina and Dobrogea.¹⁸ The effects of territorial cessions and emigrations were evident on April 6, 1941, when 542,325 persons of German ancestry fled from Romania out of a total population of 745,421, according to the census. We are discussing 4.1% of the state of Romania's overall population.¹⁹ When they went to Germany, they gave up their Romanian citizenship in exchange for German citizenship, and their belongings became public property. However, in certain cases, those who left, wished to return to Bucovina, either officially or illegally. In any case, the Romanian government agreed to pay reparations to Germany. As a result, the country's leadership decided that permission for the return to Romania would only be issued in extraordinary circumstances.²⁰ The benefits enjoyed by the German minority in Bucovina prompted some persons from other ethnic groups (Ukrainians, Jews, and Poles) to attempt to deceive Bucovina Government officials during the May 3, 1942 census. In August of the same year, Order No. 33 was issued, which called for the imprisonment in camps of these people who falsely claimed German ethnicity.²¹

¹⁷ D. Șandru, *Mișcări de populație în România (1940–1948)*, București 2003, pp. 84–86.

¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 112.

¹⁹ Ș. Purici, *Strămutarea germanilor sud-bucovineni și impactul asupra societății românești*, "Codrul Cosminului" 2000–2001, nos. 6–7, pp. 293–302; D. Șandru, *Reforma agrară din 1945 și țărănimea germană din România*, Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, București 2000, p. 28.

²⁰ D. Șandru, *Mișcări de populație...*, pp. 78–83; D. Hrenciuc, *Între destin și istorie: germanii în Bucovina (1918–2012)*, Cluj-Napoca 2013, pp. 168–172.

²¹ P. Muraru, *Bucovina sub regimul Antonescu (1941–1944)*, vol. 1: *Administrație. Economie. Societate (Bukovina under Antonescu. Administration, Economy, Society)*, Chișinău 2004.

Poles

The condition of Poles in Romanian territory after the onset of World War II, which was initially governed by the Treaty of Guarantee signed in 1921 and amended in 1926, 1931, and 1936, changed when Romania entered the war in 1941.²² Poland's erasure from the European map in 1939 resulted in its inhabitants seeking safety in Romania under the shelter of the Chilean mission. The province of Bucovina was home to about 1,500 Polish refugees in June 1942.²³

Jews

The relationships between Jews and the local populace (1940-1944) can be classified into three analytical categories: *time*, *causation*, and *space*.

Period: June 1940 to May/June 1941 – the USSR occupied Northern Bucovina at the end of June 1940 by the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Romania's unconditional surrender of a portion of its territory necessitated the identification of a "scapegoat" who could be blamed for the Romanian state's geopolitical and military failings. Despite the terms of the ultimatum, the Soviets invaded the territories to be occupied more quickly, resulting in persecution, abuse, and brutality against civilians. NKVD operatives arrested and interrogated a huge number of troops and civilians, using terror to force them to sign statements and disclose information about the whereabouts of the Romanian armed forces. Some Romanians were jailed for allegedly denouncing Jews, while Judeo-communist groups attacked others. The "Judeo-communist" caricature gained traction after June 1940, but Jewish communities in the Kingdom of Romania officially distanced themselves from individual or collective expressions of hatred toward Romanian soldiers. Anti-Semitic activity in the south of Bucovina intensified beginning in January 1941, manifesting as violence, crimes, and robberies in both cities and villages during the Legionary Rebellion. The measures against the indigenous

²² D. Hrenciuc, *Drumul spre libertate: refugiații polonezi în Bucovina (1939-1941)*, "Analele Bucovinei" 2005, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 51-62.

²³ *Stenogramele ședințelor Consiliului de Miniștri. Guvernarea Ion Antonescu May-June 1942*, vol. 7, eds. M. Ciucă, A. Teodorescu, B. Popovici, Arhivele Naționale ale României, București 2003, p. 447.

populace in the Soviet-occupied northern part of Bukovina had an impact on the Jewish community as well. This did not benefit from any acts of kindness from the locals.²⁴

June 1941–1942 – Local violence against Jews increased again in the summer of 1941, with the arrival of Romanian-German soldiers in the north of Bucovina, as did discriminatory directives with an anti-semitic element. Since the earliest days of the reinstallation of the Romanian administration, the local community employed violence, with ethnic Romanians and, in particular, Ukrainian paramilitary groups carrying out killings among Jews.²⁵ The ghettoization, sorting, and systematic expulsion of Jews in Transnistria represented the coordinates of this period, as did their metamorphosis in the collective imagination into internal and external adversaries. Only essential professionals within the Jewish population were exempt from deportation.

Period: 1943–1944 – Starting in the second half of 1942, the official stance toward Jews grew increasingly vague and fluctuated. Unlike in German-controlled territories, where massacres were methodical and carried out by Final Solution directives, cleansing activities in Bucovina were less intense. Abusive treatment and exploitation of Jews were paired with rescue efforts by local commanders or leaders, resulting in contradicting directives. The installation of a new governor of Bucovina, General Corneliu Dragalina, in March–April 1943 resulted in a little easing of attitudes toward Jews. The Romanian-controlled territories had a higher number of Jewish survivors than the German-controlled areas. In November 1943, more than 34,000 Jews were deported to Transnistria. A few of them returned but were met with hatred by the local populace.

The province of Bucovina was defined from a spatial perspective in a north-south orientation. The terrible realities of northern Bucovina were properly compared to those of Bessarabia by numerous historians. Due to the cooperation of Ukrainian nationalists with *Einsatzgruppe Ek10b*, there were multiple acts of violence and crimes committed against Jews in the northern region of Bukovina.²⁶ According to historians, such as Simion Geissbühler and Vladimir Solonari, Jews

²⁴ Ș. Purici, H. Mareci-Sabol, *Extremes and Exceptions: Civilian Attitudes Towards Jews in Bukovina during World War II*, "Codrul Cosminului" 2020, vol. 26, no. 1, p. 98.

²⁵ V. Solonari, *The Treatment of the Jews of Bukovina by the Soviet and Romanian administration in 1940–1944*, "Holocaust and Modernity. Studies in Ukraine and the World" 2010, no. 2 (8), pp. 163–165.

²⁶ Ș. Purici, H. Mareci-Sabol, *Extremes and Exceptions...*, p. 100. *Einsatzgruppen* were operational groups of the German Security Police (Sipo) and Security Service (SD) operating during World War II, whose task was to physically eliminate and isolate the enemies of the III Reich, and to secure property behind the front lines.

could be identified by their physical characteristics, as well as by the places where they lived. Nonetheless, Jews were successfully assimilated into the indigenous community in several places. In numerous instances, the Christian neighbors mistreated and even massacred the Israelis in an attempt to seize their belongings or force them to leave the area, yet they were still required to identify and report their presence. The pogrom survivors made an effort to relocate to larger places like Chernivtsi. Nevertheless, the Jews were located and turned over to the police. There were an occasional exception, nevertheless, when residents concealed and rescued a few Jews.²⁷

The civilian population's attitudes toward Jews were motivated by economics, ideology/politics, and solidarity. During the war, many citizens saw nothing wrong with confiscating the lands, homes, and personal possessions of deported or slain Jews. Furthermore, corruption and robbery contributed to the wealth of many people. Traian Popovici, the mayor of Chernivtsi, writes in his *Memoirs* on the unacceptable behavior of many people toward Jews, particularly after the establishment of the ghetto in Bucovina's capital city.²⁸ Rice and opportunism had become symbols of the moral decline of Bucovina's non-Jewish inhabitants.

In ideological and political terms, anti-Semitic propaganda throughout the interwar period paved the way for the dehumanization of the Second World War. Jean Ancel asserted that the mass massacre of Jews in northern Bucovina was the culmination of a protracted anti-Semitic campaign.²⁹ Antisemitic attitudes and practices were exacerbated by state control, as well as by the Holocaust, which emerged in the late 1940s, following territorial losses as a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Treaty. The extermination of Jews in Europe was carried out with the assistance of local collaborators (officials, military, and civilians) from among Germans, Baltics, Poles, Ukrainians, Romanians, Hungarians, and French. Aside from the Romanian army, which committed acts of genocide against Jews beginning in June 1940 because it considered the Jewish community to be a supporter of the Bolsheviks, a large portion of the Jewish population was killed in pogroms, ghettos, deportations, and other acts of extermination. The Bucovina population's attitude and behavior mix

²⁷ S. Geissbühler, "He spoke Yiddish like a Jew": *Neighbors' Contribution to the Mass Killing of Jews in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, July 1941*, "Holocaust and Genocide Studies" 2014, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 437; V. Solonari, *Purificarea Națiunii. Dislocări forțate de populație și epurări etnice în România lui Ion Antonescu, 1940–1944*, Traducere de Cătălin Drăcșineanu, Iași 2015, pp. 181–184.

²⁸ T. Popovici, *Spovedania. Biografie. Mărturii*, D. Olaru, S. Voronțov, eds., Cernăuți 2018, p. 110.

²⁹ J. Ancel, *The History of the Holocaust in Romania*, Jerusalem 2011, p. 216.

ideological and practical components, including anti-Semitism, anti-communism, sadism, cruelty, and so on.

Psychologists, such as Samuel and Pearl Olinery identified three types of psycho-social solidarity: 1) those with a strong sense of empathy; 2) people with a greater sense of obligation to the reference group; and 3) people who are guided primarily by moral ideals. The current documents do not show a large number of saviors among non-Jewish civilians, with initiatives being more individual and isolated. Because of the severity of anti-Semitic propaganda throughout the war, compassion for Jewish suffering was viewed socially as betrayal or a lack of loyalty. People who assisted the Jews were of all ages and levels of education, and came from diverse origins and social classes. In most cases, the rescuers were motivated by their relationships with Jewish neighbors, friends, and coworkers. Ideological reasons were relatively uncommon. Sometimes evidence of chivalry was associated with a broader set of moral or civilizational norms.³⁰

After August 23rd, 1944, and the fall of the authoritarian regime of Marshal Antonescu, some of the surviving Jews returned from the camps in the Ukrainian territories and began to demand their material and financial rights from the Romanian state. The Jewish communities in the territory of Bucovina began to reorganize, trying to lead a normal life.³¹

Violence is typically a dynamic, fluctuating process, but it can also be irrational, unpredictable, or conjunctural. During WWII, Bucovina's civilians reacted differently to Jewish persecution. Some offered support and assistance, while others increased their agony by acts of needless violence. Although there are various explanations – materialism, envy, opportunism, resentment, but also empathy, moral principles, integrity, and humanitarianism – they do not cover up or legitimize the atmosphere of widespread violence against Jewish communities in Bukovina, Bessarabia, and Transnistria. A broad and interdisciplinary reevaluation of historiography is required in light of the new documents.

³⁰ Ș. Purici, H. Mareci-Sabol, *Extremes and Exceptions...*, pp. 104–105; see also *Final Report*, eds. T. Friling, R. Ioanid, M. E. Ionescu, International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, Iași 2004; M. Hausleitner, *Acțiunile de salvare a evreilor prizonieri, în special în Bucovina, 1941–1944*, in: W. Benz, B. Mihok, eds., *Holocaustul la periferie. Persecutarea și nimicirea evreilor în România și Transnistria în 1940–1944*, Chișinău 2010, pp. 173–198.

³¹ SJSAN, PJS, dos. 114/1944, ff. 13–17.

Romanian Propaganda in Bucovina

Within the Bucovina Government, Romanian authorities sought to construct a new administrative regime, promote the nationalist philosophy, and raise the population's standard of living. The Press, Propaganda, and Censorship Service of Chernivtsi controlled Romanian propaganda in the province's counties. Among the operations carried out, we mention the development of a mobile library consisting of 385 volumes, which was to circulate for five months among the communes of Suceava County,³² establishment of a weekly newspaper in each county, organizing tours of the Work and Light theater in the territory of Bucovina,³³ concerts, cinematographic screenings, as well as establishment and endowment of communal libraries. For example, the cinematographic projections made by the Council of Patronage of Social Works, donated the proceeds for the benefit of the wounded in the war and their families.³⁴

A considerable number of publications appeared in Cernăuți county under the auspices of the local propaganda service: "Bucovina," "Buletinul Industriei si ComerŃului," "VoinŃa Scolalei," "Revista Arta," "Candela," etc. According to the Censorship Service's rules, publications had to be printed by 9 p.m., censored articles or passages were not allowed for publication, sensational titles were prohibited. Marshal Antonescu's communiqués and speeches were only published on the front page, while articles about alarms and air raids, other than those officially communicated, were prohibited.³⁵

German Propaganda

In the early months of 1944, the German propaganda campaign in Romania became more intense. In February 1944, Manfred von Killinger, the Reich's ambassador in our country, congratulated Mihai Antonescu (Minister of Foreign Affairs in

³² Ibidem, dos. 94/1941, f. 1.

³³ Ibidem, PJR, dos. 1/1942, f. 22.

³⁴ Ibidem, Fondul Oraşului Rădăuţi, dos. 10/1942, f. 1.

³⁵ Ibidem, Fond Prefectura Judeţului Câmpulung, dos. 8/1943, f. 52.

the government led by Marshal Ion Antonescu) for the Romanians' calm demeanor, as well as the country's unity and tranquility. The German envoy stated that the Berlin leadership had chosen to increase anti-communist propaganda in response to erroneous rumors about the signing of a separate Soviet-German peace treaty. In March, the German ambassador expressed alarm over Barbu Știrbey's mission in Cairo, as well as Romania's preparations to depart the war. The central themes of German propaganda from the beginning of 1944 were the following: the continuation of the fight, even if it was taking place on Romanian soil; glorifying the heroism of the Romanian ally; combating Anglo-American propaganda; the soldiers' confidence in victory; the sacrifice of the German soldier for the defense of the Romanian land; the new secret weapons with great destructive potential, and so on.

According to German propaganda, the war demanded ultimate sacrifices to achieve victory. Resistance and heroism were the two pillars of German propaganda discourse. The advance of the front toward Romania and the development of the other theaters of operations showed that the German victory had become but a mirage. The major Nazi newspapers and the Berlin press agency said that the people were viewing the front's approach to Romania with confidence and calmness. While the departure from Bessarabia, Bucovina, and a portion of Moldavia was a calculated move, the Reich guaranteed the reoccupation of these provinces and areas. However, publications such as "Times" warned that no matter how strong the Romanians' anti-Russian feelings were, they could not compel Romania to openly back Nazi Germany in its efforts to prolong the war. Although German propaganda acknowledged the Eastern Campaign's failure, it continued to advocate for futile and irrational resistance.

If relations between Romanian and German authorities remained amicable, relations between Romanian civilians and Germans had deteriorated considerably. German propaganda had almost little chance of succeeding in Romania during the first half of 1944. Under the influence of anti nazi propaganda, the general public came to believe that Germany was incapable of achieving its goals. Romania needed to leave the war and stay out of Russian domination. From the army's perspective, there was little chance that this kind of propaganda would be effective. The bad command relations, as well as the behavior of German commanders and men throughout the Eastern Campaign, had sparked significant hostility. The conflict could only be sustained if it served national interests.

More and more people were claiming that the situation on the front was bad for the Romanian army since the German army avoided the front, leaving Romanian men to fight on the front lines. However, even the German soldiers had given up on their propaganda. They frequently listened to the BBC radio station and were

sure that England would not permit the USSR to win the solution to the post-war problems. Press reports also hinted at the ongoing tensions that have resulted from the development of military operations. The German services kept a careful eye on public sentiment. Romanian public opinion was reported to be cohesive, and the internal order was unwavering, despite a restless and apprehensive attitude that was understandable at the time.

Romanian society had not taken up communist concepts. However, it is necessary to consider the official nature of the German press journalists when interpreting their views.³⁶

Soviet Propaganda

The goal of the Soviet propaganda effort, which was conducted in tandem with the military operations, was to reduce or eradicate the populace's support for the Romanian-German army. Romanians were also asked to work with the new invaders in military, logistical, and economic capacities, with assurances about Romania's territorial integrity and maintaining the current political structure. Here are a few examples:

“Romanians!

Please do not believe the German lies that the Russians wanted to occupy Romania and that the Germans would have come to defend it.

The Russians do not need Romania's land! Our land is enough for us! The Germans robbed the Romanian people and occupied Romania. The Germans put all the hardships of the war on Romania. The Germans want to prolong the war on your land. The Red Army wants to end this war as quickly as possible.”³⁷

“Men and women from Romania!

The Red Army has no intention of destroying your order and imposing its own on you. Remain in your places! Continue your peaceful effort! Help the Red Army keep order and discipline!”³⁸

³⁶ M. Anton, *Propagandă și război. Campania din Est (1941–1944)*, București 2007, pp. 318–322.

³⁷ SJSAN, PJS, dos. 25/1944, f. 17.

³⁸ Ibidem, f. 15.

“Men and women from Romania!

Ensure the normal functioning of factories and institutions, trade, and transport!

Unmask the agents of the Germans, who disorganize the working process and sow panic!

Carrying out a normal life is in your interest.”³⁹

Throughout the Second World War, the Romanian provinces of Bucovina and Bessarabia felt the effects of events on the global political landscape. The approach of the war to Romania's frontiers shattered the attempts made by the Romanian government between 1941–1943 to restore as much of a regular life as possible during those years. A portion of the massive measures taken by the Romanian government in 1944 to save and relocate the institutions and businesses that would have suffered under the Russian occupation to the country's interior were accomplished. As a result, the civilian population in the area was evacuated to the front lines, either by Romanian authorities or under fear of Soviet soldiers. The population of Câmpulung, Suceava, and Rădăuți counties encountered a variety of challenges, including a lack of food, typhus epidemics, entirely burned buildings, requisitioned animals, abuses, and the Soviet command's intervention in local administration decisions. Suppose the economic and administrative consequences of World War II in Bucovina, particularly in the province's south, can be assessed. In that case, the evacuation phenomena and its influence on the civilian population can be approximated using archival documents, memoirs, and oral history.

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³⁹ Ibidem, f. 16.

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Vlad Gafița

O problemach okupacji północnej Bukowiny przez Armię Radziecką – między rzeczywistością a propagandą (kwiecień–grudzień 1944 roku)

Streszczenie

W kwietniu 1944 roku siły radzieckie zajęły Bukowinę. Partyzanci zostali wysłani do obszarów wyznaczonych przez radzieckie dowództwo wojskowe w celu przeprowadzenia działań dywersyjnych. W rezultacie mieszkańcy Bukowiny doświadczyli głodu, zniszczenia upraw i przymusowej pracy przy budowie okopów dla wojsk radzieckich. W każdej społeczności przywrócono radzieckie władze cywilne. Nowo powołani strażnicy przekazywali mieszkańcom wszystkie rozkazy i brali udział w rekwizycjach, aresztowaniach i deportacjach. Jednym z pierwszych działań nowej administracji było przeprowadzenie spisu ludności – niezbędnego do wprowadzenia systemu podatkowego. Następnie ustalono podatki w wysokości od 50 do 500 rubli na mieszkańca, w zależności od jego zamożności. Ponadto na miejscową ludność nałożono podatki rzeczowe (w zbożu, zwierzętach hodowlanych, wełnie i produktach mlecznych). Sowieci postrzegali aneksję północnej Bukowiny jako zjednoczenie wielkiego narodu ukraińskiego w jednym radzieckim państwie podlegającym nieustannemu socjalistycznemu rozwojowi.

Słowa kluczowe: Besarabia, Bukowina, NKWD, Armia Czerwona, Rumuni, okupacja przeprowadzona przez Armię Radziecką, wojska radzieckie, systematyczne grabieże, Naddniestrze, Ukraińcy