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# Philosophical Reflection on Ideology against the Backdrop of Józef Tischner's Thinking

**Abstract:** Since its beginnings, philosophy has been associated with a critical quest for answers and has rejected biased and uncritical a priori interpretations. Methodic doubt has thus become not only the ever-present method of philosophy, but also a symbol of defiance against every kind of closed-minded and ideological thinking that has a tendency to simplify explanations and adapt reality to its own projections about the said reality. This type of thinking has always been linked to truth claims made by individual power entities. In the past, we have witnessed twists and abuses of ideology with far-reaching political consequences and yet the problem still persists. Each and every situation affected by crisis is a breeding ground for quick, clear and black and white explanations which attract attention and gain support, since they are generally easy to comprehend. This paper introduces a philosophical context of ideological thinking, in which the “will to power” is typical, as reflected upon by many thinkers, among them Józef Tischner who draws from his personal experience with the Communist regime in Poland.

**Keywords:** philosophy, ideology, power, Józef Tischner, ethics

## Critical Role of Philosophy

The notion of ideological thinking has always been present in the philosophical discourse. The philosophical criticism of ideological thinking stems from the very nature of philosophy. Although there is no one rigid definition of philosophy as such, we can say that there is a certain consensus that sees philosophy

as a systematic thinking effort that is open to a permanent search for truth as well as to admitting possible errors. Methodic doubt is a philosophical method critically scrutinising all knowledge claims. Without this methodological scepticism, demanded firmly by René Descartes, there is no true philosophy. Decisive is, however, how and where one would be able to get on that proverbial “safe ground” through doubt itself.

Philosophy can teach us how to think and, at the same time, it teaches us to understand why we think the way we do. In this respect, Karl R. Popper regards critical examination as a necessary instrument of philosophy:

All men and all women are philosophers. If they are not conscious of having philosophical problems, they have, at any rate, philosophical prejudices. Most of these are theories which they take for granted: they have absorbed them from their intellectual environment or from tradition. Since few of these theories are consciously held, they are prejudices in the sense that they are held without critical examination, even though they may be of great importance for the practical actions of people, and for their whole life. It is an apology for the existence of professional philosophy that men are needed to examine critically these widespread and influential theories.<sup>1</sup>

Today, we are facing a question whether the critical role of philosophy has not become its greatest challenge that eventually leads to its fragmentation into different philosophical schools of thought and perspectives that are often in opposition to one another. Current postmodern pluralism throws us into many ethical, epistemological, and cultural discourses. Can we still talk about philosophy? Or is it only subjectivism and arbitrariness of thinking wrapped in the philosophical concepts?

With that in mind, Wolfgang Iser speaks about two problems endangering the postmodernism: *superficiality* and *arbitrariness*. Superficiality requires plurality only as some comfort zone. “What I have in mind,” maintains Iser, “are scientific discourses and behaviour of those who start every of their sentences with ‘I suppose,’ ‘from my point of view,’ or ‘I believe,’ and so they think that they rid themselves of obligation to engage in more detailed argumentation oriented mostly at assumptions.”<sup>2</sup> Arbitrariness is an expression of *dissolution* and not of serious acceptance of plurality. It is then indifferentism, which is grounded in *thoughtlessness*. For Iser, the solution is in the practice in which clear articulation is typical. Therefore, postmodernism needs to master the strictness, since it is a challenging concept rather than a scenario for relaxa-

<sup>1</sup> Karl Popper, *In Search of a Better World. Lectures and Essays from Thirty Years* (London, New York: Routledge, 2000), 179.

<sup>2</sup> Wolfgang Iser, *Naše postmoderní moderna*, trans. Miroslav Petříček and Ivan Ozarčuk (Praha: Zvon, 1994), 164.

tion. It does not mean that every discourse will always lead to a statement that everybody agrees with. Postmodernism aims to expose plurality of codes that make up our forms of rationality. The practice of transition is introduced while taking the existence of such codes under consideration.

It does not put these codes on the same level, neither does it synthesize them; it allows them to enter into relationships that are full of tension. Superficiality and arbitrariness are manifestations of wrongly interpreted postmodernism. The strictness of postmodernism lies in the clarity of arguments and pluralistic discourse. Welsch maintains that “this can provoke too, but productively.”<sup>3</sup>

The foundation for contemporary philosophy is the need to derive its validity from factuality and not from the a priori basis. In this context, philosophy can contribute to protection against totalitarian demands that elevate particular opinions to the alleged absolute. Postmodernism emphasises the need for freedom in plurality, but, at the same time, it contributes to us being more sensitive to different problems. Postmodernism does not ignore the real differences, nor does it lower its demands for communication. It shows the limits of various forms of rationality and allows transitions between them.<sup>4</sup>

In a similar vein, Józef Tischner (1931–2000) asks about the foundation of philosophy and about the type of philosophy. His philosophical reflection is closely linked with the suffering of the nation caused by the Communist ideological regime. For Tischner, the starting point of any philosophical reflection is the face of the human anxious for his or her destiny.<sup>5</sup> We can say that Tischner’s thinking is, in its essence, a part of the phenomenological and personalistic philosophic tradition.<sup>6</sup> Primarily, human person is a free being. Yet, freedom is not to be taken for granted. One must interiorize his or her freedom. Otherwise, one may succumb to temptation of power that substitutes philosophical questioning for ideological possession of the truth.

## Perpetual Return of Ideology

In philosophy, the concept of ideology is often mentioned in association with the reflection on the conditions in society in which ideological thinking and struc-

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. Welsch, *Naše postmoderní moderna*, 164–165.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Welsch, *Naše postmoderní moderna*, 13–16.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Pavol Dancák, “Concreteness of Life as the Context of Thinking in the Philosophy of Jozef Tischner,” *European Journal of Science and Theology* 12 (2): 213–221.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Józef Tischner, *Medzi slobodou a porobou*, trans. Jozef Marušiak (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2001), 11.

tures have manifested themselves. Francis Bacon criticized false knowledge determined by social prejudices in his teaching about idols.<sup>7</sup> These prejudices are the opinions, notions, and concepts that are expressed in various forms of social consciousness that is oftentimes thought to be superior to other opinions. In ideological thinking, there is always certain theoretical foundation and uncritical or even idolatrous attitude towards it, which results in many different forms of totalitarianism. François Rouleau speaks about the ideological ideas being regarded as scientifically justifiable but, in reality, all we can do is believe in them. It is a “science” which demands blind “faith” and a “quasi-religion” which claims to be “science.”<sup>8</sup> This fusion of “science” and “religion” is at the centre of ideology.

Fundamentally, the ideological certainty comes from the certainty, which is often compared to the scientific certainty. In reality, this certainty comes from the “religious” character of ideology—ideology is always presented as a teaching about “salvation.”<sup>9</sup> Theory and objective research is frequently replaced with emotional approach, which searches for scientific justifications only retrospectively. The impact of a certain idea does not depend on content and rational arguments. It is rather dependent on the way in which it is presented and accepted at the level of imagination and affectivity. In such a way, the philosophical background of ideology that similarly to a myth claims uncritical acceptance is created. People do not question the value of such a myth, so it is very difficult to hold a dialogue with a person who was ideologically manipulated. It is even worse when such a person assumes power and uses it to enforce the “correct” worldview that he or she holds.

Ideology claims to determine the direction of thinking processes and life of a person and presents itself as the only alternative. The “religious” character of ideology seems credible and salvific and presents the possibility of building “a new world”—the realization of the ideal world here on Earth. The very essence of such approach to life and thinking is uncritical and creates space for totalitarianism and tyranny of both spirit and body. Many concentration and labour camps in the former Eastern Bloc countries are evidence of it. Rouleau says: “Those who hesitate to accept such offer or even reject it disqualify themselves. And this is the moment when they must be either forced to accept it or destroyed for the common good of the future generations.”<sup>10</sup> It is evident that ideology cares not only about the truth, but also about power that is used to enforce this truth.

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<sup>7</sup> Cf. Walter Bruggen, *Filosofický slovník*, trans. Ladislav Benyovszky et al. (Praha: Naše vojsko, 1994), 176.

<sup>8</sup> François Rouleau, “Ideológia – choroba ducha,” in *Antológia štúdií k sociálnej morálke* (Trnava: Dobrá kniha, 1995), 85.

<sup>9</sup> Rouleau, “Ideológia – choroba ducha,” 85.

<sup>10</sup> Rouleau, “Ideológia – choroba ducha,” 87.

Ideology exploits the fact that people tend to assign to systems built within the society their own existence and authority that goes beyond the scope of human ability. In certain situations, the limits of free judgement vanish in favour of passive obedience, symbolic thoughts or ideas. This illusion is then materialised and assumes the form of individuals and structures.<sup>11</sup> As a result, people give preference to what is emotionally more appealing in comparison to what is more rational, moral, or fairer. People tend to be easily influenced through what they like or believe in. This then affects the patterns of behaviour and action of those in power who, when seeking people's support, justify and hide their claims behind the common good. When they assume power, however, they learn that they can hold their posts even after the promised services are no longer provided.<sup>12</sup>

This type of people Tischner likens to the character of the inquisitor from Dostoevsky's acclaimed work *The Brothers Karamazov*. The inquisitor does not make any effort to seek the truth. He observes the other person from a position of power to decide what is and what is not the truth.<sup>13</sup>

Today, in the complicated world, such a clear way of thinking about the present and future may be very appealing. It especially appeals to people who feel that they are on the periphery of society and those who are socially excluded or endangered. People living in insecurity caused by the constant flow of information about risks and problems will want to change their reality. They will have a tendency to fight against this negativity, face it and it is only natural for them to seek hope in this uncertain situation. It is understandable, but also tricky. Psychological studies show that in the environment full of uncertainty in which it is very difficult to find one's bearings and where one chronically lacks the feeling of his or her personal control over the situation, people search for authorities<sup>14</sup> whom they want to trust. One's willingness to accept authority increases with the feelings that one can no longer protect himself or herself. Paradoxically, the lack of information and knowledge about a particular social and political problem does not motivate a person to seek information more in-

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<sup>11</sup> Cf. Jean-Marie Abgrall, *Mechanismus sekt*, trans. Tomáš Suchomel and Martin Palouš (Praha: Karolinum, 1999), 110.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Marian Balázs, *Sloboda a pamät'* (Dunajská streda: Valeur, 2010), 132, 185.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Józef Tischner, *Filozofia ľudskej drámy*, trans. Ján Matyáš (Bratislava: Serafin, 2007), 84, 193.

<sup>14</sup> Hannah Arendt differentiates authority from violence and power. She says that "since authority always demands obedience, it is commonly mistaken for some form of power or violence. Yet authority precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force is used, authority itself has failed." Hannah Arendtová, *Mezi minulostí a budoucností*, trans. Tomáš Suchomel and Martin Palouš (Brno: CDK, 2002), 88. She distinguishes between the formal and institutionalized authority, which is open to freedom. "Its hallmark is unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey: neither coercion nor persuasion is needed." Hannah Arendtová, *O násilí*, trans. Jiří Příbáň and Petr Fantys (Praha: Oikoymenth, 2004), 35.

tensively, but it reinforces the sense of dependence and trust in legitimacy of particular political party, politician, or authority. Thus, the politician's *lifespan* is not determined by the quality of his or her service, but by the illusion of authority and competency, that he or she manages to maintain.

In this context, Tischner speaks about the charm of the “political reason” that accepts only its own truth. A question “Who is with me and who is against me?” comes to the foreground here. Then comes withdrawal, distrust, and fear. Asking about the essence of being and the meaning of existence is subordinate to the power of the political truth that is enforced by (1) promises—if you accept this truth you can participate in the exercise of power and demand obedience from others, or (2) threats—if you do not give in, you are wasting your life.<sup>15</sup>

The effectiveness of an ideological doctrine does not come from its meaning, but from its certitude. Therefore, no doctrine can be effective unless it is presented as an embodiment of the only truth.<sup>16</sup> To develop critical thinking one must adhere to one principle: what is presented as the only, unambiguous, and general solution, which is easy to understand and is often charged with emotions and special vocabulary tolerating no other alternative is, to say the least, suspicious. More often, it is a manifestation of ideology and not that of healthy critical rationality that is conscious of the fact that complexity of life often transcends our explanations.<sup>17</sup> Many dictators started at this point and many times successfully.

## Black and White Way of Thinking

By Milan Nakonečný ideology can be described as a closed way of thinking. In the field of social psychology, Milton Rokeach conducted a research into dogmatism and developed a theory of open and closed mind. Rokeach defines dogmatism as a relatively closed cognitive organization of conforming and contrary thinking about reality. Regarding beliefs, dogmatism is centred on authority and it creates a framework for intolerant and partially tolerant behavioural patterns towards others. Typical for dogmatism is a limited space for freedom and emphasis on value uniformity. On the other side of the spectrum, there is the acceptance of freedom and openness to pluralism. Rokeach hence defines dogmatism as the generalized authoritarianism.<sup>18</sup> For the “closed mind” typical

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Tischner, *Filozofia ľudskej drámy*, 148–149.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Eric Hoffer, *Pravoverný. Úvahy o podstate masových hnutí*, trans. Ivana Chudíková (Bratislava: Európa, 2009), 62.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Rouleau, “Ideológia – choroba ducha,” 86, 92.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Milan Nakonečný, *Sociální psychologie* (Praha: Academia, 1999), 264–266.

is the “black and white” thinking which ignores the fact that an object can be looked at from many different angles. The closed mind assumes the right to decide about others. The person for whom the closed mind thinking is typical feels entitled to determine the truths and norms. They are convinced that they “know” better what is “good” for others. When such persons lose the critical perspective on themselves and their status, they can, while exercising their power, inflict suffering on others without even realizing it. The power approach does not enable us to know the truth. From a position of power we assume that we have the right to decide what is good and what is evil. Karl Jaspers says, “For the most devastating threat to truth in the world is the overweening claim to absolutely true. In the certainty of the moment the humility of the enduring question is indispensable.”<sup>19</sup>

Ideological way of thinking leaves no room for otherness, which is perceived by the person, hungry for power, as a threat. That person does not accept other people in their uniqueness and originality but tries to reduce them to mechanisms whose movements he can easily control and manage as he pleases.<sup>20</sup>

Such a person can sink into illusion about his or her irreplaceability and infallibility. Vladimir Solovyov described it aptly as the temptation of reason, which prompts thinking: “You alone are the chosen one who has the right to this exclusive status. If the truth becomes your own dignity and virtue, your thoughts and opinions are also true; and others must accept that. If you govern by the truth, you cannot err—you are infallible.”<sup>21</sup> Gabriel Marcel described similar intellectual craziness when he referred to a narrow-minded perception of “the truth” from the position of a person whose relation to others was defined by his attitude of superiority. Such a person declares that “your good is not the true good [...], but as far as I am concerned I claim to be able to see the lights which are now concealed from you and can illuminate the darkness in which you are writhing. You who do not even realize that you are in the darkness, so perfect is your blindness.”<sup>22</sup> We can apply Trotsky’s principle here: “One cannot be right against ‘the party’. It is only possible to be right with ‘the party.’” And by the party he means its leader acting in accordance with the known truth to which he solely has the monopoly.<sup>23</sup> According to Arendt, “infallibility” of those in power is the chief qualification of a leader. “Leaders must never admit

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<sup>19</sup> Karl Jaspers, *Way to Wisdom. An Introduction to Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), 70.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Gabriel Marcel, *K filosofii naděje*, trans. Věra Dvořáková and Miloslav Žilina (Praha: Vyšehrad, 1971), 71.

<sup>21</sup> Vladimír Solovjov, *Duchovní základy života* (Velehrad: Refugium, 1996), 45.

<sup>22</sup> Gabriel Marcel, “Nebezpečná situace etických hodnot,” in Peluška Bendlová, *Hodnoty v existenciální filosofii Gabriela Marcela* (Praha: Academia, 2003), 142.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Tomáš Zalešák, *Diablova práca – úvahy o totalitarizme* (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2005), 62.



to an error.”<sup>24</sup> They identify their own power with their own truth treating those subordinate to them arrogantly. Paradoxically, they view their arrogance as fair strictness. If somebody points out their inappropriate behaviour, they become suspects of a hostile attitude.

This brings us to yet another attribute of people with ideological thinking and that is their inability and reluctance to be confronted with criticism. They mostly see faults in others, never their own. They often generalise their own experience and make themselves role models for others. This implies that any objection or different opinion is a priori interpreted as a hostile attitude or a destructive criticism, which needs to be, in the name of the truth of the person in power, eliminated. It might not always mean a liquidation of others because their existence is a prerequisite for domination and control. “They are given the status which does not allow dialogue; it allows only the acceptance of the will, feelings, and thoughts of the person in power.”<sup>25</sup>

In addition, the person who succumbs to the ideological thinking is always suspicious and hostile towards others. Solovyov warns us not to yearn for power because we never know how we might behave once we have it.

There is no way of knowing whether it will be good for me and for others when I assume the power now. Even though I became a participant in God’s truth, and the spiritual life was revealed in me, it still does not seem to me that I am able to lead people. Perhaps if I assume power, I will show myself incapable not only in directing others in God’s spirit, but I will also lose my own spiritual dignity, and if I seek power, then I have already lost it.<sup>26</sup>

Whenever a person seeks power for oneself, eventually, one will seek refuge in the totalitarian ways because the whole project is based solely on one’s own ideas. Then every effort for justice, if done with power and without love, turns into tyranny.

Neither pleasure, nor the high opinion about oneself has such a devastating effect on the person as giving in to temptation of power does. Desire for power is the greatest temptation for people. It tempts everybody, even those who are against it. Józef Tischner says, “Pleasure from power is the greatest power there is for man. There is no price man would pay to have it.”<sup>27</sup>

Ideological thinking and power are two “communicating vessels.” Surrendering to power is not conditioned by inclination towards lower values. It is not only power over the Earth, but also the power over the truth and lie. This

<sup>24</sup> Hannah Arendtová, *Původ totalitarizmu*, trans. Jana Fraňková et al. (Praha: Oikoymenh, 1996), 482.

<sup>25</sup> Jolana Poláková, *Smysl dialógu* (Praha: Vyšehrad, 2008), 14.

<sup>26</sup> Solovyov, *Duchovní základy života*, 47–48.

<sup>27</sup> Tischner, *Medzi slobodou a porobou*, 173.



power brings people pleasure that comes with an opportunity to control and be in charge of the world.<sup>28</sup> Tischner pointed out that religious people too can succumb to the temptation of ideology and power. In a belief that sin has corrupted people, such persons can convince themselves that all problems must be solved using power.

Being conscious of their own limitations, they seek the guarantee for their power in God. Fear of themselves and others sends them to unreserved service to God and, at the same time, they carry in their soul a belief that if all power comes from God, they themselves “do God a service.” The essential meaning of totalitarian temptation in religion is: fear of themselves and others directs them to the slavery of power and makes them believe that God wanted it so.<sup>29</sup>

Solovjov aptly described that temptation:

You are the representative of this higher principle, not according to your own dignity and your strengths, but by the power of God’s grace, which has given you participation in the real truth. Not for yourself, but for the glory of God and for the well-being of the world, for the love of God and the neighbour, you are obliged to make all the effort to surrender the world to the higher truth and bring people to God’s kingdom. To do this, however, you must have the necessary means to influence the world successfully; in particular, you must assume the power and authority over other people, subjugate them in order to lead them to the one and only true salvific truth.<sup>30</sup>

Tischner also says that the basic desire for the absolute power can also be the desire to build a new, better, and ideal world.<sup>31</sup>

## Power and Fear

Power is always linked with fear. Therefore, the power in state, revolutions, religions, family, and other institutions has often been accompanied by violence, which was always excused and justified with the goal. The means has always been ignored when defence of “the truth” was at stake. Every action that has achievement of the goal in mind seems to be permitted and even necessary. Oftentimes, those who suffer the consequences are the innocent ones. Those in power are gripped by fear and have tendencies to generalize. Therefore, they

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Tischner, *Filozofia ľudskej drámy*, 150.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Tischner, *Medzi slobodou a porobou*, 173.

<sup>30</sup> Solovjov, *Duchovní základy života*, 47.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Tischner, *Filozofia ľudskej drámy*, 148.

are overcome with the constant temptation to assume that what concerns an individual person, can concern others too. It is some sort of “preventive totalitarianism.” Elias Canetti wrote that “the fact that in his speed he may crush the innocent does not trouble him [...] What does disturb him profoundly is to let an enemy escape by failing to move fast enough.”<sup>32</sup>

Why is it so? Patočka maintains that a person’s fear has its roots in one’s awareness of one’s own impermanence. One is always bound to the future, which haunts by introducing the perspective of perdition. One fears losing oneself and becoming nothingness. In fear, we fear something and worry about something. We are afraid of losing something. The feeling of fear is the feeling of loss and disorientation. We are worried about ourselves and that exposes us in how we are existentially situated.<sup>33</sup> Power must be constantly amplified and expanded otherwise, it is doomed to weaken.

Tischner called this phenomenon a “hideout.”

People in the hideout believe that they carry some treasure in them. They try to hide their treasure somewhere deep. They themselves stand next to the hideout and guard. They surround the place where they stand with the wall of fear. They are suspicious of all people who approach their hideout and believe that are coming to rob and destroy them. [...] Typical feature of people from the hideout is that they suffer and inflict suffering on others. And what is worst is that their own suffering is intense and worthless.<sup>34</sup>

Fear then leads people to a fight for their own space and their own security. When two fear-enslaved people meet, their communication lingers on the surface. Not only do they ignore what the other person feels and experiences, but they also fear to come out of their defensive shell because they are afraid of getting hurt, of not being accepted and understood, and they fear losing their security. Openness and honesty fade away from relationships. What infiltrates into them instead is a phenomenon of putting on a mask. By putting on a mask, one creates an illusion that is an opposite of what he or she really is. The reason for doing that, according to Tischner, is fear that “moves a person into coexistence whose dominant structure is a structure of the opposite: the other is a priori my enemy. In order to protect myself I must retreat to the prepared hideout. Mask is a person’s view through the window of the hideout.”<sup>35</sup>

People from hideouts “struggle with a disease of hope; their hope is guided by fleeing from people.”<sup>36</sup> Control becomes an essential form of manipulation

<sup>32</sup> Elias Canetti, *Crowds and Power* (New York: Continuum, 1978), 284.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Jan Patočka, *Tělo, společenství, jazyk, svět* (Praha: Oikoymenh, 1995), 93.

<sup>34</sup> Tischner, *Medzi slobodou a porobou*, 51.

<sup>35</sup> Tischner, *Filozofia ľudskej drámy*, 70.

<sup>36</sup> Tischner, *Medzi slobodou a porobou*, 52.

of other people and the world. The hideout becomes a place of shy freedom overwhelmed by worries over someone's own salvation. The key driving force here is Nietzsche's concept of the "will to power"—the will to rule, seize the power, take over the world and thus secure one's survival. Tischner maintains that the only cure for this fear is to discover the space of hope that shifts the strategy of "protecting oneself" to "creation."<sup>37</sup> It is not an easy task since creation is necessarily linked to being open to mystery and meaning that cannot be pressed into firm structures and schemes. Therefore, one must rid oneself of an illusion of own securities and discover what is at the very essence of human identity. What Heidegger called "Sein," Tischner relates to God. Nevertheless, the temptation to focus on "worrying" about things that somehow compensates for worrying about finality will always be strong.

## Conclusion

Every manifestation of ideology and the closed way of thinking have a common basis and that is fear. A feeling of endangering oneself or one's own ideas leads to the totalitarian thinking and action. By gaining power, tension is not relieved. As Tischner points out "the power is always in danger. We can never be quite sure of our own ideas."<sup>38</sup> This raises suspicion, distrust, and prevents creativity. Any creative and unique expressions of the other person are perceived as suspicious. Therefore, the stronger the conviction of owning the ultimate knowledge and understanding of the contexts is often associated with an increase of aggression towards others who do not share the beliefs of a person with ideological thinking. Especially in crises, which are ample today, the ultimate and cheap interpretations of problem solving can be very appealing and can even seem easier and simpler. However, any such action has its consequences. History repeats itself, as we say. It is because we forget our past. As historians often remind us—if we forget about the past mistakes, we will keep repeating them.

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<sup>37</sup> Cf. Tischner, *Medzi slobodou a porobou*, 65.

<sup>38</sup> Tischner, *Filozofia ľudskej drámy*, 152.

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## Réflexion philosophique sur l'idéologie dans le contexte de la pensée de Józef Tischner

### Résumé

La philosophie a toujours été associée à une quête critique de réponses et a rejeté les interprétations a priori qui étaient biaisées et non critiques. Le doute méthodique est ainsi devenu non seulement une méthode de philosophie constamment présente, mais aussi un symbole de méfiance contre toute forme de pensée étroite et idéologique qui a tendance à simplifier les explications et à adapter la réalité à ses propres projections sur ladite réalité. Ce type de pensée a toujours été lié aux affirmations de vérité formulées par des entités de pouvoir individuelles. Dans le passé, nous avons été témoins de rebondissements et d'abus d'idéologie avec des conséquences politiques profondes, et pourtant le problème persiste. Chaque situation touchée par une crise devient un terrain fertile pour des explications rapides, claires et en noires et blanc qui attirent l'attention et gagnent du soutien, car elles sont généralement faciles à comprendre. Cet article présente un contexte philosophique de pensée idéologique, pour lequel la "volonté de puissance" est typique, comme en témoignent de nombreux penseurs, parmi lesquels Józef Tischner qui s'inspire de sa propre expérience en rapport avec le régime communiste en Pologne.

Mots-clés : philosophie, idéologie, pouvoir, Józef Tischner, éthique

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## Riflessione filosofica sull'ideologia nel contesto del pensiero di Józef Tischner

### Sommario

La filosofia è sempre stata associata a una ricerca critica di risposte e ha rifiutato interpretazioni diffamanti a priori e acritiche. Il dubbio costante è diventato così non solo un metodo onnipresente della filosofia, ma anche un simbolo di sfida contro ogni forma di pensiero chiuso e ideologico che tende a semplificare le spiegazioni e ad adattare la realtà alle proprie proiezioni su di essa. Questo tipo di pensiero è sempre stato legato ad affermazioni di verità fatte da singole entità di potere. In passato abbiamo assistito a colpi di scena e abusi dell'ideologia con profonde conseguenze politiche, eppure il problema persiste. Ogni situazione di crisi diventa terreno fertile per spiegazioni rapide, chiare, nero su bianco che attirano l'attenzione e ottengono consensi, perché di solito sono facili da capire. Questo articolo presenta uno sfondo filosofico del pensiero ideologico, per il quale la "volontà di potenza" è tipica, come evidenziato da molti pensatori, tra cui Józef Tischner che attinge alla propria esperienza in relazione al regime comunista in Polonia.

Parole chiave: filosofia, ideologia, potere, Józef Tischner, etica