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# Ethics and Solidarity as Hope in the Philosophy of Józef Tischner

**Abstract:** In this paper, the concept of solidarity will be introduced as voluntary cohesion, mutual help and support not only within a loose group, but, above all, within the whole human race. Tischner wants to help contemporary man because he is aware that contemporary man has entered a period of profound crisis of his hope. The reflection on solidarity and hope in the philosophy of Tischner represents a neuralgic point which has its justification in Christian thought. Hope is the prospect of something better which, together with mutual support, removes both fear and isolation, and brings about the development of both the individual and the community. The deepest solidarity is solidarity of conscience. The community of solidarity differs from many other communities precisely because it is “for him” that is fundamental. It is only on this foundation that the community of “we” grows.

**Keywords:** solidarity, hope, human, dialogue, community

## Introduction

People often think of hope ambivalently in the modern world, yet philosophers and scholars point out that it is a very important element in the life of every person. Tischner wanted to be a philosopher of Polish hope at the time of the two terrible experiences of Nazism and Communism. He analyzes the evil which was contained in totalitarian regimes with the purpose to outline of the prospects for liberation. It is significant that his first book *Świat ludzkiej nadziei* [The World of Human Hope] is entirely devoted to hope. Tischner found the meth-

odological key to this philosophy in phenomenology and related currents in the philosophy of dialogue and hermeneutics. Tischner defended his doctoral dissertation under the guidance of the most eminent Polish phenomenologist, Roman Ingarden, and was deeply inspired by him in his habilitation. He believed, as did Karol Wojtyła, that the understanding of man and religion must begin with the understanding of the subject of individual experience, and not with man as an element of the cosmos.<sup>1</sup> The author of *Thinking in Values* readily admits that during the Polish crisis of hope, he referred not only to Scheler, Heidegger, and Levinas, but also to Marcel and Ricoeur.<sup>2</sup> They helped him rebuild real hope in the nation.<sup>3</sup> He saw liberation from totalitarianism above all in reminding us of who a free man is and can be, and he also saw it in religious faith, Christian faith from its deepest side.<sup>4</sup>

In this paper, I will first present hope viewed as the prospect of something better. However, the prospect of something better is based on ethics, which is closely related to solidarity. Ethics and solidarity are two complementary notions. According to Tischner, solidarity without conscience is impossible. Conscience is basically the view of the other within me, which means that I cannot directly influence my own conscience. However, the other within me is in solidarity with me, and, therefore, hope is tied to the idea of “being for the other,” of being with the other, coming out of hiding and creating community. Hope for a better coexistence lies in the solidarity that is born in dialogue.

## Hope—Offering a Better Vision

Tischner writes in the introduction to *The World of Human Hope* that hope is a more or less hidden supposition of the solutions proposed here, both those that are critical and those that claim to bring something positive. Hope is both a fundamental experience and a fundamental value that reflection on the various issues of our lives seeks to express and sustain. Our hope is the most appropriate perspective for us to discover and view the truth, the truth about Christianity, about man, about our world. In and through hope the axiological dimension of human existence is revealed.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Karol Tarnowski, *Józef Tischner – niezastąpiony filozof nadziei*, accessed July 13, 2020, <http://www.tischner.org.pl/karol-tarnowski/tischner-niezastapiony-filozof-nadziei>.

<sup>2</sup> Józef Tischner, *Myslenie według wartości* (Kraków: Znak, 2000), 7.

<sup>3</sup> Józef Tischner and Jacek Żakowski, *Tischner czyta Katechizm* (Kraków: Znak, 1997), 94.

<sup>4</sup> Tarnowski, *Józef Tischner – niezastąpiony filozof nadziei*.

<sup>5</sup> Józef Tischner, *Świat ludzkiej nadziei* (Kraków: Znak, 1994), 9–10.

Marcel writes that we are presumably capable of hope only insofar as we consider ourselves enslaved, and slavery can take many forms, such as illness or exile. Often in highly technical countries, where life is comfortable, hope disappears, and with it all religious life. Life then comes to a standstill and an insurmountable boredom spreads everywhere. Hope is therefore connected with a certain tragedy. In hope the idea is that, whatever the present situation, there is a better way out. The hopeful patient not only wishes to get better, he does not limit himself to the words: “I would like to get well,” but assures himself: “You will recover”—and it is under this condition that hope can sometimes contribute to a person’s recovery.<sup>6</sup>

Tischner claims that hope makes heroism possible, and whoever has lost hope—has lost heroism. Moreover, what human hope is—such is human heroism. Hope is fulfilled in the present: here a moral choice must be made. Man is capable of heroism only in the name of some hope, and true heroism is fulfilled in the present formed by hope. Here one must accept suffering, even death. And to these situations hope brings the consolation that it promises in the future. Hope is what enables us to reflect that everything is not lost in the face of our current situation. This hope must, likewise, be coupled with faith that we can do something through the Absolute Thou, who is at the same time the final guarantor of our liberation.<sup>7</sup> Christ is the Trustee of such a hope. Christ’s death for man means that the Son of God also places his hope in man. Through the proper binding of hope, Christianity manifests itself in man. To bind up hope means that the end of one hope becomes the beginning of another; it also means to make the voice of hope from that earth heard in earthly hope; it also means to incite hope to action. Then the voice of hope is like the voice of the pre-action conscience, which says: in the name of Hope give bread to the hungry, bear witness to this truth, keep silent and speak, pray and work, here and now cry out on the rooftops, and when today you have received a blow with a stone, tomorrow throw bread.<sup>8</sup> Hope in Christianity is special because it reaches beyond the horizon of death, it speaks of eternal life and resurrection.

In Tischner’s thoughts, the Christian virtue of hope finds a philosophical foundation, as it does in Marcel. Tischner emphasizes that hope enables heroism, that is, the individual’s elevation to the heights of humanity. Everyone needs hope in everyday life, in the daily hardships of struggling with one’s own fate. Few people can show heroism, but everyday problems must be overcome by everyone. Most of us are guided by a “modest hope for a better tomorrow,” which even many, colloquially speaking, “keep alive.” The experience of hope is largely an apophatic experience that is difficult to articulate and far from the

<sup>6</sup> Gabriel Marcel, *Tajemnica bytu*, trans. M. Frankiewicz (Kraków: Znak, 1995), 365–367.

<sup>7</sup> Józef Tischner, *Świat ludzkiej nadziei*, 294–310.

<sup>8</sup> Gabriel Marcel, “Structure of Hope,” trans. David-Louis Schindler, *Communio* 23 (1996): 611.

resources of a language describing the world that falls under sensual cognition.<sup>9</sup> Hope implies human freedom, for without freedom there would be no hope; thus, where there is hope, there is freedom, and where there is freedom, there is room for hope.<sup>10</sup>

As in Marcel, so in Tischner, hope is always preceded by some trial in life, accompanied by uncertainty, anxiety, justified fear, and even the temptation of despair. Hope is then a response to these states and human experiences. It is the power to undertake hardship; it is a promise: Man is greater than his despair.<sup>11</sup> Hoping in liberation is nothing without the essential virtue of love. This love calls us to be available to others' needs, especially in their times of trials and darkness. This bond created by loving and remaining with the other likewise creates a communion with the Absolute Thou. As a proclaimer of hope for people enslaved in totalitarian regimes, Tischner wants to offer hope for the betterment of their lives, which is why he raises the theme of ethics and solidarity. The totalitarian regime has thrown people into "shelter" so that it can use them for its inhumane purposes, in the sense of *divide et impera*. It is a topic that is intrinsic to man as a social creature.

## Solidarity—The Opportunity for People

Solidarity means voluntary cohesion, mutual help and support not only within a loose group, but, above all, within the whole human family. Mutual support builds community and develops the individual; isolation leads to social and individual deviance. It is that solidarity in greater community and the larger it is, the harder it is to maintain solidarity.<sup>12</sup>

The Latin word *solidus* (solid, whole, in the legal context in *solidum*) denotes a loose group of people who make a commitment as a whole. Solidarity in the true sense of the word is mutual, voluntary and not enforced by law. The requirement of solidarity is a moral challenge to all those who are disadvantaged in any way. Solidarity as an expression of a sense of belonging is not only helping, but also responsibility for the whole, for the community, for the

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<sup>9</sup> Marek Rembierz, "Nadzieja – transcendencja – paideia. O perspektywach nadziei i pedagogii nadziei w kontekście (przekraczania) ludzkiej niedoskonałości," *Świat i Słowo* 1 (2016): 14.

<sup>10</sup> Józef Tischner, *Świat ludzkiej nadziei*, 301–309.

<sup>11</sup> Jarosław Jagiełło, "Problematyka nadziei w współczesnej filozofii człowieka," *Kieleckie Studia Teologiczne* 3 (2004): 49–68.

<sup>12</sup> Jürgen Habermas, "Democracy, Solidarity and the European Crisis," *Pro Europa. In Defence of European Culture* (2014), accessed July 13, 2020, <https://www.pro-europa.eu/europe/jurgen-habermas-democracy-solidarity-and-the-european-crisis/>.

world, for the earth.<sup>13</sup> According to Durkheim, to behave in solidarity is to behave morally. Morality is everything that is the source of solidarity, everything that makes one reckon with others and be guided in one's actions by motives other than egoism. The more stable morality is, the more such ties there are and the stronger they are.<sup>14</sup>

Józef Tischner used metaphorical language to explain the phenomenon of solidarity. He sees the starting point for understanding the concept of solidarity in the Gospel. He considers that to be in solidarity, as well as to be responsible, means "to bear another person's burden."<sup>15</sup> Solidarity shows itself as a phenomenon in which a person realizes that he is connected to other people. Solidarity awakens consciousness, and then speech and word appear and what was hidden comes to light. Our connections become visible.

On the one hand, solidarity appears to Tischner as a virtue that appears spontaneously and expresses the good will of man. On the other hand, the source of solidarity is what every human being is really concerned about in life. People are concerned with truth and justice. What people want as a unifying factor, according to Tischner, is duty. Solidarity cannot be imposed on a person through violence. According to Tischner, solidarity is, on the one hand, the pursuit of a goal, the building of a community, which is part of the eudaimonism, the teleological current in moral reflection. On the other hand, solidarity is based on duty, which is part of the deontological current of Kantian ethics. It is about the relationship between the primary existence of the individual and the relationships between individuals (especially relationships in which individuals by their own decision participate with commitment, producing new and important qualities for them), and the possibilities and conditions for the functioning of society. In this perspective, the existence of society is secondary, because it depends on the existence of individuals, founded on the prior existence of individuals and relations (ties) between them.<sup>16</sup>

Solidarity is neither a concept nor a ready-made ethical theory, but an idea—a pattern of things rather than an expression of their actual state. The idea is like light.<sup>17</sup> This means that it cannot be easily characterized, like a concept, but remains undefined. Solidarity is something for people to map out, something that is defined as it comes to fruition, and something that still needs to be redefined. Solidarity is an indispensable imperative in our democratic times, and, at the same time, it is a calling which we cannot answer unconditionally.

<sup>13</sup> Dariusz Dobrzański, *Zasada solidarności. Studium z filozofii społecznej* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 2013), 72–74.

<sup>14</sup> Émile Durkheim, *Sociology and Philosophy*, trans. David F. Pocock (New York: Routledge, 2010), 176.

<sup>15</sup> Józef Tischner, *Etyka solidarności* (Kraków: Znak, 1981), 6.

<sup>16</sup> Marek Rembierz, "Spór o koncepcję społeczeństwa i wartość jednostki jako kontekst i wyzwanie dla polskiej myśli pedagogicznej," *Polska Myśl Pedagogiczna* 4 (2018), 64.

<sup>17</sup> Tischner, *Etyka solidarności*, 10.

This is the tragedy of our current position.<sup>18</sup> We do not find an exact definition of solidarity. Tischner's reflections are descriptions of the space of life shown in the perspective of solidarity.

Tischner draws attention to the ethical character of solidarity, by which he means the values that man encounters in his life. The key values are man's conscience and man's natural relationship with those who suffer.<sup>19</sup> He postulates that the ethics of solidarity is the ethics of conscience, and defines conscience as man's "ethical sense" that is largely independent of various ethical systems, prior to them and autonomous. According to Tischner, one cannot be in solidarity with people without conscience, and he emphasizes that authentic solidarity is the "solidarity of conscience."<sup>20</sup> Solidarity with a person is related to the ability to rely on this person. If one can rely on another person, one believes that there is something constant in him or her that does not fail. That something is conscience. Under the influence of Heidegger, Tischner claims the only condition for conscience is the will to have a conscience.<sup>21</sup>

With whom can you stand in solidarity? The solidarity community did not acknowledge anyone as an enemy, which was proved by the fact that it was open to everyone who wished to participate in it. Everyone who wanted to have a conscience, regardless of his or her background, could become its member. The time of the "First Solidarity" was a period of effective "new beginnings," a time of absolving faults and of the preeminence of mercy over justice. The past sins of ex-opportunists—and almost everyone was to be counted as such—their abuses, trespasses, and weaknesses, though surely not crimes, had no meaning in the circle of those who resolved to live truly as people of conscience.<sup>22</sup>

According to Tischner, solidarity is first and foremost towards people suffering by others—people without conscience. Solidarity, therefore, refers especially to those affected by suffering that is not culpable and can be remedied. The basis of solidarity is conscience, and the impulse for its appearance is a call for help from a person who has been hurt by another person. In conscience as the basis of solidarity, there is an order of goodness. Solidarity, like drama, is something that is created, but also something that creates unique human relationships. A person bonds with another person for the sake of a third person in need of care. Tischner argues that solidarity is always the solidarity of some dialogue.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Charles Taylor, "Several Reflections on the Theme of Solidarity," trans. Artur Rosman, *Znak* 543 (2000), 24–34.

<sup>19</sup> Tischner, *Etyka solidarności*, 11.

<sup>20</sup> Tischner, *Etyka solidarności*, 8.

<sup>21</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1962), 312–348.

<sup>22</sup> Tischner, *Etyka solidarności*, 15

<sup>23</sup> Zbigniew Stawrowski, "Solidarity Means a Bond," accessed December 16, 2022, [http://www.tischner.org.pl/Content/Images/tischner\\_12\\_stawrowski.pdf](http://www.tischner.org.pl/Content/Images/tischner_12_stawrowski.pdf).

Dialogue builds reciprocity and assumes that both parties are able to learn the truth about themselves only if they look at themselves, as it were, from the outside, from the perspective of the interlocutor. Persons in dialogue have to compare their points of view in order to know the truth about themselves. The whole truth is a result of their mutual experience. The one entering into a dialogue is thus ready to make the truth of the other part of his own truth, and to make the truth about himself part of the other's truth. The topic of dialogue in the ethics of solidarity is the suffering caused to man by another man. The purpose of dialogue is the truth about the unnecessary suffering of working people. Human suffering gives the speech of solidarity great moral weight. It is not a mere human speech, it is not even a speech of complaint, it is, above all, a speech of witness. To go through the world of suffering of the working man and bear witness is the solidarity of conscience.<sup>24</sup> In other words, a man who encounters another suffering man realizes that a certain value has been destroyed. He is joined by others who, in solidarity with the sufferer, form an open community of witnesses sharing the same value. By witnessing in solidarity with their sincere intentions, the members of the community can finally remedy unnecessary suffering.

According to Tischner, solidarity is born in dialogue, and such a dialogue can also be scientific work. The fate of science is truth and the fate of science is dialogue. Scientific dialogue is distinguished by the fact that the pursuit of truth is consistent and uncompromising in it. Science emerged when man decided to find out what really is, what is, and can be. However, it cannot be done alone. Cognition always takes place in agreement with other people. Tischner claims that one can speak of truth in at least three ways: (1) we speak of true cognition when it is consistent with the reality it concerns, (2) we speak of true or false expression of one's inner convictions in speech, and (3) finally, we speak of "existential" truth, "truth of being," of being oneself, that is, an "authentic" person.<sup>25</sup> Each of these three cases of truth reveals its deeply ethical dimension—it is a source of moral obligation for human beings. Tischner states that science is done for someone and with someone. In his opinion, the issues of science today are extremely complicated. Therefore, to the abovementioned two planes of encounters with man one should add a third one—the plane of relations with the organizer of scientific life.

According to Tischner, the idea of solidarity is closely related to the sphere of human work.<sup>26</sup> Work is the axis of solidarity. By work he means a particular form of conversation between man and man, serving to sustain and develop human life. Work is conversation in the service of life. The dialogue of work is

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<sup>24</sup> Tischner, *Etyka solidarności*, 15–18.

<sup>25</sup> Tischner, *Etyka solidarności*, 35.

<sup>26</sup> Tischner, *Etyka solidarności*, 45



thus more than mere conversation. The objects of exchange of working people are not only words but also certain products. They grow out of the agreement and serve it, hence their similarity to words. Like speech, work should also be “truthful.” True speech is speech in harmony with things, speech that grows out of understanding and develops understanding. Real work is work that truly serves life and also grows out of and continues understanding. Tischner calls exploitation the “lie of work.”<sup>27</sup> The sign of exploitation, according to him, is unnecessary suffering. Through moral exploitation of labor, the basic vertical and horizontal structures of the dialogue of labor are disturbed. The awareness of the pain and suffering of working people has its origin precisely in exploitation. The exploitation of human labor is also the exploitation of man himself. Man’s good will is despised, humiliated, and betrayed by exploitation. In such a situation, the fundamental duty of conscience as the voice which calls for fidelity is rebellion against exploitation.

## Being for Another

Man creates himself and, in response to the challenge of values, he satisfies the hope that emerged in the encounter with the other person. The quality of this response determines who a person actually is. Depending on how he responds to the challenge, we can say of him: he is a traitor, or he is a saint. Human dignity as the principle of ethics is what comes to the fore here. Ethics, on the other hand, is understood here by Tischner as a grammar of interpersonal relations. Grammar organizes statements, while ethics organizes interpersonal relations. The author of *Ethics of Solidarity* first draws general attention to the harmfulness of illusions to emphasize that if the illusions concern the reality of work, their effects are tragic and resemble the effects of labour exploitation.<sup>28</sup> An example of such situations are the illusions related to the concept of property, resulting from the ambiguity around the basic concepts, namely, private property and common property. Disputes around the concept of property arise because it has not been fully clarified what it means for something to be property, or what it means for something to be common and something to be private. According to Tischner, the source of the illusion is a metaphysical style of thinking about social life.

According to Tischner, metaphysics has other concerns<sup>29</sup> and this style of

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<sup>27</sup> Tischner, *Etyka solidarności*, 19–22.

<sup>28</sup> Tischner, *Etyka solidarności*, 30–31.

<sup>29</sup> Tischner, *Etyka solidarności*, 33.



thinking must be rejected. The proper way of thinking about social life should be sought in ethics. As an example of the common property of people, Tischner gives speech and language. They are the ones that condition the communication between man and man. If the meanings of words are common, then the language that people use is also common. The community here is above all a community of fruit. What is truly common begins at the level of fruit. The desire to speak a common language causes man to try to adapt what is his own to the requirements of the community. The common fruit, as it were, radiates backwards, permeates the personal and makes it too—without ceasing to be man’s property—serve the community. The truth about common property is a truth from the ethical sphere. What is common is what is for me, for you, for us.<sup>30</sup> The word “for” best expresses the essence of ethical community, which is moral rather than metaphysical in character. Solidarity is thus a social phenomenon, developing and manifesting itself in a particular social system, a particular space-time continuum. This entails a connection with politics. Solidarity grows out of indignation at unnecessary suffering, out of pity for people who suffer unnecessarily, and gives hope for better social conditions. Tischner is convinced that solidarity is proximity—it is brotherhood for the paralysed.<sup>31</sup> The “paralysed” are the people whose faces we meet and to whom we respond with solidarity. According to him, the purpose of politics is to organize public space in such a way that people do not inflict unnecessary suffering on each other. Politics gives hope when it deals with the evildoers, and people in solidarity with the wronged can help them without hindrance.

According to Tischner, the ethics of solidarity of working people and solidarity with working people is Christianity’s answer to the ideology of struggle.<sup>32</sup> Hope is created by solidarity when it appears in the space of human encounter with another human being. “Solidarity of conscience” is the deepest and most essential bond uniting people into one community. Thanks to it, it is possible to realize the human plan of building the common good, which finds its foundation in truth. This common good, together with the moral good, is the object of particular concern in this plan. Communities, such as the family or the homeland, take up the idea of solidarity, being the field of personal realization for individuals.<sup>33</sup> They also delimit the scope of individual action. Within the scope of a given community, the individual, with a sensitive conscience, formulates an “ethic of solidarity” through his choices and actions. Thus we have a basis for solidarity that is linked to conscience as a source of duty. Conscience plays a significant role in solidarity with values. One such value is truth. Truth is arrived at in dialogue. Truth as agreement is something that requires solidarity.

<sup>30</sup> Tischner, *Etyka solidarności*, 34–35.

<sup>31</sup> Tischner, *Etyka solidarności*, 12–13.

<sup>32</sup> Tischner, *Etyka solidarności*, 44.

<sup>33</sup> Tischner, *Etyka solidarności*, 84.

The pursuit of truth is the glue of solidarity. It builds community as a task of solidarity.

The foundation of community is thinking in the horizon of the good, thinking “for someone” that builds social bonds based on truth, respect, fidelity, trust, and solidarity.<sup>34</sup> Because solidarity is, on the one hand, the recognition of a certain duty in conscience and, on the other hand, the building of a consensus around some threatened value, such as the dignity of marginalized and suffering people, it acquires a practical and political dimension. Solidarity can be interpreted as a principle of realizing the good, a principle that is created by the hope of better living conditions.

## Conclusion

Tischner believed that in order to build a community, it is necessary to create a sense of solidarity among its members. He pointed to the teachings of the Church, according to which solidarity, and not for example justice, should be the guiding principle in the case of poverty, which almost always appears in larger communities. He very often quoted the words of St. Paul and recalled the words of St. Paul: “Bear one another’s burdens” (Galatians 6:2).<sup>35</sup>

Tischner’s interest in man and his freedom stems not only from exact scientific interests, but also from an authentic pastoral concern. Indeed, human action today has implications for the whole earth and in the context of the experience of world wars, extermination camps, terrorist actions, and in confronting the possibility of nuclear and ecological catastrophe. Man is suffering from a loss of hope.<sup>36</sup> Tischner wants to help contemporary man because he is aware that contemporary man has entered a period of profound crisis of his hope. The crisis of hope is a crisis of foundations, which Tischner reflects as the starting point of philosophical thought: Philosophy was once born out of wonder at the world around us (Aristotle). And then also out of doubt (Descartes). And now, on our earth, it is born out of pain.<sup>37</sup> Despite his awareness of the critical situation, Tischner was an optimist who believed in the meaning of human existence, and,

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<sup>34</sup> Zbigniew Stawrowski, “O pewnej fundamentalnej iluzji. Polemiczny komentarz do myślenia politycznego Józefa Tischnera,” in *Bądź wolność twoja. Józefa Tischnera refleksja nad życiem publicznym*, ed. Jarosław Jagiełło and Władysław Zuziak (Kraków: Znak, 2005), 72.

<sup>35</sup> Józef Tischner, “Solidarność sumień. Kazanie wygłoszone na Wawelu dnia 19 X 1980 r.,” *Tygodnik Powszechny* 43 (1980): 1.

<sup>36</sup> Karol Tarnowski, “Ziemia obiecana, ziemia odmówiona,” in *Pytając o człowieka*, ed. Władysław Zuziak (Kraków: Znak, 2001), 139.

<sup>37</sup> Tischner, *Myślenie według wartości*, 10.

importantly, unlike the positivists, pessimists, and minimalists, he believed that the existence of this meaning could be justified.<sup>38</sup>

According to Tischner, the community of solidarity differs from many other communities precisely because it is “for him” that is fundamental. It is only on this foundation that the community of “we” grows. I am with you, you are with me, we are together—for him. We—for him. We, but not in order to look at ourselves, but—for him.<sup>39</sup>

A person without any awareness of another person’s existence could not be certain of who this person is, would not find the whole truth of his or her existence, and would not discover the full extent of his or her responsibility for his or her existence and the existence of others. Inextricably linked to the experience of the other person through the prism of value is the experience of hope. It is always the case that either I am recommending some value for realization to somebody else and have the hope that the other will accept my proposition, or the other is recommending something similar to me, nurturing a similar hope towards me.

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<sup>38</sup> Władysław Zuziak, “W poszukiwaniu wolności – między J. Nabertem i J. Tischnerem,” *Pytając o człowieka*, ed. Władysław Zuziak (Kraków: Znak, 2001), 43.

<sup>39</sup> Tischner, *Etyka solidarności*, 13–14.

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## Éthique et Solidarité comme espérance dans la philosophie de Józef Tischner

### Résumé

Dans cette étude, le concept de solidarité sera introduit en tant que cohésion volontaire, entraide et soutien non seulement au sein d'un groupe, mais aussi et surtout au sein de l'ensemble de la race humaine. Tischner veut aider l'homme moderne, car il est conscient que l'homme moderne est entré dans une période de crise profonde de l'espérance. La réflexion sur la solidarité et l'espérance représentent un point névralgique dans la philosophie de Józef Tischner, un point qui trouve sa justification dans la pensée chrétienne. L'espérance est la perspective de quelque chose de mieux qui, associé à un soutien mutuel, supprime la peur et l'isolement pour conduire au développement de l'individu et de la communauté. La solidarité la plus profonde est la solidarité de conscience. La communauté de solidarité se distingue de beaucoup d'autres communautés précisément parce que son fondement est «pour lui». Ce n'est que sur ce fondement que se développe la communauté du «nous».

Mots-clés: solidarité, espérance, homme, dialogue, communauté

Pavol Dancák

## Etica e solidarietà come speranza nella filosofia di Józef Tischner

### Sommario

In questo studio verrà introdotto il concetto di solidarietà come coesione volontaria, aiuto reciproco e sostegno non solo all'interno di un gruppo, ma soprattutto all'interno dell'intero genere umano. Consapevole della profonda crisi della speranza in cui si trova l'uomo moderno, Tischner si sforza di aiutarlo. La riflessione del presente articolo si concentra sulla solidarietà e sulla speranza nella filosofia di Józef Tischner, concetti che costituiscono un punto spinoso, ma giustificabili grazie al pensiero cristiano. La speranza è la prospettiva di qualcosa di meglio che, insieme al sostegno reciproco, rimuove la paura e l'isolamento e conduce allo sviluppo dell'individuo e della comunità. La solidarietà più profonda è la solidarietà della coscienza. La comunità di solidarietà si distingue da tante altre comunità proprio perché il suo fondamento è "per lui". È solo su questa base che cresce la comunità di "noi".

Parole chiave: solidarietà, speranza, uomo, dialogo, comunità