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GOD WHO CAUSES PEACE AND CREATES EVIL: THE CASE OF ANSELM OF CANTERBURY

BÓG, KTÓRY OBDARZA POKOJEM I STWARZA ZŁO:
ARGUMENT ANZELMA Z CANTERBURY

ABSTRACT

Anselm states “God, as it is said, ‘causes peace and creates evil’ ” in *Concordia*. The expression ‘God creates evil’ contradicts itself and it cannot be said that the omniscient and omnipotent God creates evil. This paper considers why Anselm made such an expression, i.e. why Anselm believed that God created evil, what it means in his ethics, and what this point of view tells us about how to live in peace with each other. The expression ‘causes peace and creates evil’ is believed to have been taken from the book of *Isaiah*. Evil created by God is in order to try and purify just people and to punish unjust people. God creates evil to correct the evil of humans, which in turns brings about peace. Evil committed by humans (i.e. sin) is opposed to the ‘rule of charity (*regula caritatis*)’ which Anselm writes of. God creates evil so that our behaviour comes to accord with that rule. True love, i.e. charity, is required for peace, and justice is required to carry out deeds of charity. Recovering distorted love to the bond of charity is the path to peace. In Anselm’s way of thinking, peace is brought about by following the rule of charity, and peace is broken when we live without and outside this rule of charity.

Anselm stwierdza w *De Concordia*: “Mówi się, że Bóg, ‘obdarza pokojem i stwarza zło’”. Wyrażenie ‘Bóg stwarza zło’ samo w sobie jest sprzeczne i nie można powiedzieć, że wszechwiedzący i wszechmogący Bóg stwarza zło. W tym artykule została podjęta kwestia, dlaczego Anselm użył takiego wyrażenia, dlaczego wierzył, że Bóg stworzył zło oraz co to oznacza w jego etyce i co ten punkt widzenia mówi nam o tym, w jaki sposób mamy żyć we wzajemnym pokoju. Przyjmuje się, że wyrażenie ‘obdarza pokojem i stwarza zło’ zostało zaczerpnięte z Księgi Izajasza. Zło zostało stworzone przez Boga, aby wypróbować i oczyścić sprawiedliwych i ukarać niesprawiedliwych. Bóg stwarza zło, aby naprawić ludzkie zło, co z kolei przynosi pokój. Zło popełnione przez ludzi jest przeciwstawione ‘regule miłości’ (*regula caritatis*), o której pisze Anselm. Bóg stwarza zło, aby nasze postępowanie było zgodne z tą regułą. Prawdziwa miłość tj. miłosierdzie, jest koniecznym warunkiem istnienia pokoju, a sprawiedliwość jest potrzebna by spełniać czyny miłości. Przemienianie zniekształconej miłości w więź miłości prawdziwej jest drogą do pokoju. Według Anzelma wypełnianie reguły miłości przynosi pokój, a jest on niszczony gdy żyjemy bez reguły miłości lub poza nią.

From a Christian perspective, peace and love (charity) are inseparable. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) can be mentioned as one of the people who have such

a viewpoint. He states, “God, as it is said, ‘causes peace and creates evil (*faciens pacem et creans malum*)’” in *De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae dei cum libero arbitrio* (hereinafter abbreviated as *De concordia*).¹ In this text he considered God’s creation of evil.

The question of why evil exists in spite of the fact that God is almighty has been considered in much older literature as well. The dilemma of Epicurus exemplifies this problem. Lactantius said in his book *De ira Dei* :

God either wishes to take away evils and he cannot, or he can and does not wish to, or he neither wishes to nor is able, or he both wishes to and is able. If he wishes to and is not able, he is feeble, which does not fall in with the notion of god. If he is able to and does not wish to, he is envious, which is equally foreign to god. If he neither wishes to nor is able, he is both envious and feeble and therefore not god. If he both wishes to and is able, which alone is fitting to god, whence, therefore, are there evils, and why does he not remove them?²

Lactantius attributed this statement to Epicurus, although it is not found in writings of Epicurus.

Acceptance of evil by God is found in Augustine’s *De ordine* where it is argued that God accepts the existence of minor evil in order to prevent greater evil.³ It should be noted that the essential point here is that God does accept evil, which does not mean that God performs evil acts. God, being almighty, is incompatible with the existence of evil, which implies that the creation of evil by God would be self-contradictory.

Firstly, this paper considers why Anselm believed that God created evil. An interpretation of *aliquid* and evil by analyzing *De Concordia* and the *Philosophical Fragments* is presented.

Secondly, the paper studies what significance this point of view has in his thought, and what it tells us about how to live in peace with each other. Therefore the consideration to *caritas* and evil is given.

The expression “God creates evil” contradicts itself and it cannot be said that the omniscient and omnipotent God creates evil.⁴ By considering why St. Anselm

¹ Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae dei cum libero arbitrio*, Quaestio I, 7: *Sancti Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia I (ii)*, ed. F. S. Schmitt (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann, 1984), 258, 25-26.

² Lactantius, *De ira Dei*, cap. 13. Lactance, *Le colère de Dieu*, texte critique, traduction et commentaire, Christiane Ingremeau, (Source chrétienne 289), (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1982), 158, 104-160, 111. “Deus, inquit, aut uult tollere mala et non potest, aut potest et non uult, aut neque uult neque potest, aut et uult et potest. Si uult et non potest, inbecillus est, quod in deum non cadit; si potest et non uult, inuidus, quod aequè alienum est a deo; si neque uult neque potest, et inuidus et inbecillus est ideoque nec deus; si et uult et potest, quod solum deo conuenit, unde ergo sunt mala aut cur illa non tollit?” Lactantius, *The Minor Works*, trans. Sr. Mary Francis McDonald, (The Fathers of the Church, A new translation 54), (Washington, D. C., The Catholic University of America Press, 1965), *The Wrath of God*, 92-93.

³ Augustinus, *De ordine*, II, 4, 12. *Corpus Christianorum: Series Latina XXIX* (Turnholt: Brepols, 1970), 114.

⁴ About “the evil God creates” the author presented the paper entitled “God who Creates Evil: *Aliquid* and Evil in Anselm” at the Saint Anselm of Canterbury and His Legacy Conference held in Canterbury (22-25 April 2009).

writes “God creates evil” and “God causes peace”, we may understand the actual significance of his thought about evil, peace and charity.

1. Isaiah 45

When Anselm states that “God, as it is said, ‘causes peace and creates evil,’” the expression “causes peace and creates evil” is believed to have been taken from the book of Isaiah (45: 7).⁵ For this reason first we will examine how this sentence is used by Isaiah.

Isaiah 45: 6-7

*The New Jerusalem Bible*⁶

- 6 so that it may be known from east to west
that there is no one except me.
I am Yahweh, and there is no other.
- 7 I form the light and I create the darkness.
I make well-being, and I create disaster,
I, Yahweh, do all these things.

In Blenkinsopp’s translation⁷

- 6 so that all may acknowledge,
from the rising of the sun to its setting,
there is none apart from me.
I am Yahveh; there is no other.
- 7 I form light and create darkness,
I bring about well-being and create woe;
It is I, Yahveh, who do all these things.

The verse 7 is found in the second half of the passage Isaiah 44: 24 to 45: 7. The first half (44: 24-28) is addressed internally to the Judean audience and the second half (45: 1-7) is directed to the Persian king Cyrus. According to Blenkinsopp, the statement “I am Yahveh, who made all things” (Isa. 44: 24) clearly correlates with the declaration “It is I, Yahveh, who do all these things” (Isa. 45: 7).⁸ It was believed traditionally that Yahveh is the source of everything that happens, whether good or ill, and that this is unproblematic.⁹ Consequently, God as “the one who creates woe” is believed to have planned all woes that have occurred since the creation.¹⁰

⁵ F. S. Schmitt mentions it in his edition. Cf. F. S. Schmitt, *op. cit. I (ii)*, 258, footnote for ll. 25-26.

⁶ *The New Jerusalem Bible* (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 1259.

⁷ Joseph Blenkinsopp, *Isaiah 40-55* (Anchor Bible 19A), (New York: Doubleday, 2002), 244.

⁸ Joseph Blenkinsopp, *op. cit.*, 245.

⁹ Joseph Blenkinsopp, *op. cit.*, 250.

¹⁰ There is an interpretation that the Hebrew word *ro'* should be translated as “misfortune”, not as “disaster” or “woe” because if we regard it as “disaster” or “woe”, it means that God causes

2. Evil created by God: *aliquid* and evil

“Disaster” or “woe” in Isaiah are replaced by “evil” in Anselm’s *De concordia*. Anselm maintains that evil is created in order to try and purify just people and to punish unjust people. He explains that “God creates disadvantages (*incommoda*), by means of which to try and purify just people and punish unjust people.”¹¹


In *De concordia* Anselm states that “justice is something” and “injustice is nothing”. On the other hand, in the *Philosophical Fragments* he writes of injustice and evil as something. In *De concordia* injustice is regarded as nothing, but in the *Philosophical Fragments* it is considered as something. How is it that he holds these seemingly inconsistent positions? In order to understand this point, Anselm’s way of thinking about *aliquid* and evil will be presented here.

2-1. The structure of “good and evil”

Anselm distinguishes two kinds of good: goodness which is justice (*iustitia*) and goodness which is called benefit (*commodum*). The opposite of the former is evil, which is injustice (*iniustitia*). The opposite of the latter is evil, which is called disadvantage (*incommodum*).¹²

This can be illustrated as follows:

Figure 1



people to make morally wrong decisions and it is not a correct translation of *ro'*. Cf. John N. Oswalt, *The Book of Isaiah. Chapters 40-66* (The new international commentary on Old Testament), (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1998), 204. It is the question of whether the agent of light and the agent of darkness can be the same being. P. D. Hanson says that Isaiah (45:7) far from denying the contradiction of life, relates to them a defiant *nevertheless*. (Hanson’s italics) Cf. Paul D. Hanson, *Isaiah 40-66* (Interpretation, a Bible commentary for teaching and preaching), (Louisville, Kentucky: John Knox Press, 1995), 102ff.

¹¹ Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De concordia*, I, 7: ed. F. S. Schmitt, *op. cit. I (ii)*, 258, 26-27. “Ipse (sc. Deus) namque creat incommoda, quibus exercet et purgat iustos et punit iniustos.”

¹² Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De concordia*, I, 7: ed. F. S. Schmitt, *op. cit. I (ii)*, 258, 5-7. “Haec autem quaestio facile solvi potest, si prius cognoscitur bonum, quod est iustitia, vere aliquid esse: malum vero, quod est iniustitia, omni carere existentia.” Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De concordia*, I, 7: ed. F. S. Schmitt, *op. cit. I (ii)*, 258, 22-23. “Est autem aliud bonum, quod dicitur ‘commodum’, cuius contrarium est malum, quod est ‘incommodum’.” Anselm refers to the same in the following: Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De casu diaboli*, 12: ed. F. S. Schmitt, *op. cit. I (i)*, 255, 6-8.

Anselm further writes, “Now, for anything to be just or good is for it to be something; but it is not the case that for a thing to be unjust or evil is for it to be something.”¹³ According to this fragment, justice is something and that injustice is nothing.

2-2. The meanings of *aliquid*

In the *Philosophical Fragments* Anselm thinks about *aliquid* in four modes. Here, the first and the third one are mainly referred to.

The first mode is *aliquid* in its proper sense “which has a name, is a concept in a mind, and exists in reality.”¹⁴ Anselm gives a stone and a piece of wood as examples. In Figure 2 we call it **aliquid 1** above the left box. “Injustice is nothing” has the same meaning as “injustice is not *aliquid*.” *Aliquid* in the case of “injustice is not *aliquid*” signifies the same as *aliquid* in the case of “justice is *aliquid*”. It is **aliquid 1** above the right box and *aliquid* in the proper sense. This is how Anselm uses *aliquid* in *De concordia*.

The third mode is *aliquid* “which has only a name, even though there is no concept of this name in our minds and no real existence of the thing which is named”.¹⁵ We will call it **aliquid 2**. Anselm provides injustice and nothing as examples.

When we say “he was punished for injustice”, we speak of injustice as *aliquid*.¹⁶ Actually, Anselm regards injustice as nothing. In other words, injustice is not *aliquid* in the proper sense. Then, how can injustice be regarded also as something? The key to solve this question can be found in the *Philosophical Fragments*, where Anselm says “We also ordinarily say that [...] (*Solemus quoque dicere* [...]).”¹⁷

¹³ Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De concordia*, I, 7: ed. F. S. Schmitt, *op. cit. I (ii)*, 258, 16-18. “Nam omni rei esse iustam vel bonam est aliquid esse; nulli vero rei est esse aliquid iniustam vel malam esse.” *Anselm of Canterbury*, Vol. 2, ed. and trans. J. Hopkins and H. Richardson, (Toronto and New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1976), 194. All English quotations from Anselm’s works except for the *Philosophical Fragments*, hereinafter, are from these texts if not specified. Some changes of the word translations have been made by the author.


¹⁴ Anselmus Cantuariensis, *The Philosophical Fragments*, R. W. Southern and F. S. Schmitt, eds., *Memorials of Saint Anselm* (London: The British Academy, 1969), 336, 12-14. “Dicimus enim ‘aliquid’ proprie, quod suo nomine profertur et mente concipitur et est in re, sicuti est lapis vel lignum. Suis namque vocabulis haec nominantur et mente concipiuntur, et sunt in re.” Jasper Hopkins, *A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972), 239.

¹⁵ Anselmus Cantuariensis, *The Philosophical Fragments*, R. W. Southern and F. S. Schmitt, eds., *op. cit.*, 336, 19-21. “Solemus quoque dicere ‘aliquid’ quod solum nomen habet sine ulla eiusdem nominis in mente conceptione et est absque omni essentia, ut est iniustitia et nihil.” Jasper Hopkins, *op. cit.*, 239.

¹⁶ Anselmus Cantuariensis, *The Philosophical Fragments*, R. W. Southern and F. S. Schmitt, eds., *op. cit.*, 336, 21-24. “Dicimus enim iniustitiam aliquid, cum asserimus eum puniri propter aliquid qui punitur propter iniustitiam. Et nihil dicimus aliquid, si sic dicimus: ‘Aliquid est nihil’ aut ‘aliquid non est nihil’ [...]”

¹⁷ Anselmus Cantuariensis, *The Philosophical Fragments*, R. W. Southern and F. S. Schmitt, eds., *op. cit.*, 336, 19. Jasper Hopkins, *op. cit.*, 239.

Figure 2



Anselm considers injustice and nothing as infinite nouns (*infinita nomina*) and gives “not-man” (*non-homo*) as an example to explain his idea. When we hear the word “not-man”, we understand that “not-man” does not include the meaning of “man”, but removes it. This is how the term “not-man” is certainly understood. But what is meant by the word “not-man” is not indicated. It differs from the comprehensive word “man”.

When we say that injustice is not *aliquid*, we give our minds to an idea that “injustice is the privation of required goodness.” *Aliquid* in this case has *aliquid* in the proper sense. On the other hand, when we say that injustice is *aliquid*, it is not used in the strict sense, namely it means “something which has only a name, even though there is no concept for this name in our minds and no real existence of the thing which is named.” The reason why injustice is sometimes regarded as *aliquid* and sometimes it is not regarded as *aliquid* is because the latter is considered from the viewpoint of the proper sense of *aliquid* and the former is not considered from the viewpoint of a strict sense of *aliquid*.

The first of the four modes of *aliquid* which Anselm considered is used in its proper sense and the third one is called *aliquid* not in the strict sense. Consequently, the third mode is not *aliquid* but *quasi aliquid* (as if something).

In the case of evil called disadvantage (*incommodum*) one can distinguish between nothing and something. Blindness (*caecitas*) corresponds to the former and

pain (*dolor*) corresponds to the latter.¹⁸ In what sense is the evil called disadvantage regarded as something? Anselm says “When this evil is something, we do not deny that God causes it.”¹⁹ If God causes the disadvantage, it has a positive meaning, even though it is evil. **Aliquid 3** in Figure 2 sometimes means the evil created by God because God creates evil to try and purify just people and punish unjust people.²⁰ It is God’s intention and *aliquid* in the proper sense.

In the chapter 26 of *De casu diaboli* Anselm explains why we dread when we hear the word ‘evil.’ According to Anselm, “when we hear the name ‘evil,’ we fear not an evil which is nothing but an evil which is something that follows the absence of good.”²¹ Evil which is nothing means evil which is the absence of good. On the other hand, evil which is something and follows the absence of good is in some cases evil caused by God to correct sins committed by humans. Consequently, *aliquid* sometimes exists with God’s intention and it is included in **aliquid 3**.

2-3. *Aliquid* and evil

When Anselm relates evil, he thinks of *aliquid* both in the proper sense and the not-strict sense. It is characteristic of Anselm’s thought on *aliquid* and evil that evil created by God refers to *aliquid* in the proper sense.

Uprightness exists in God, but injustice, i.e. something unjust, does not originate from God. Injustice is generated by human behaviour and God creates evil in order to punish unjust people and to put them to right road. Evil created by God is not unjust but disadvantageous. God uses it to punish and corrects unjust people. From this it can be concluded that Anselm put the positive meaning into the conception that God creates evil and recognized the significance thereof. For Anselm, the fact that God creates evil means neither that God is evil nor that evil is a necessary consequence of God’s creation. Rather, it is for correcting sins.

3. Peace caused by God: *caritas* and evil

Evil committed by humans (i.e. sin), not by God, is opposed to the “rule of charity” (*regula caritatis*), which is one of the topics considered by Anselm. God

¹⁸ Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De concordia*, I, 7: ed. F. S. Schmitt, *op. cit.* I (ii), 258, 22-24. In another book Anselm gives not only blindness but also deafness (*surditas*) as examples of nothing, and gives not only pain but also sadness (*tristitia*) as examples of something. Cf. Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De conceptu virginali et originali peccato*, 5: ed. F. S. Schmitt, *op. cit.* I (ii), 146, 30-147, 1. In *De casu diaboli* he gives the former three except deafness as examples. *De casu diaboli*, 26 : ed. F. S. Schmitt, *op. cit.* I (i), 274, 8-10.

¹⁹ Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De concordia*, I, 7: ed. F. S. Schmitt, *op. cit.* I (ii), 258, 24-25. “Sed hoc malum cum aliquid est deum facere non negamus, [...]”

²⁰ Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De concordia*, I, 7: ed. F. S. Schmitt, *op. cit.* I (ii), 258, 26-27. “Ipse (sc. Deus) namque creat incommoda, quibus exercet et purgat iustos et punit iniustos.”

²¹ Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De casu diaboli*, 26: ed. F. S. Schmitt, *op. cit.* I (i), 274, 11-14. “Cum igitur audimus nomen mali, non malum quod nihil est timemus, sed malum quod aliquid est, quod absentiam boni sequitur.” Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson, *op. cit.*, 174.

creates evil so that our behaviour accords with that rule. Anselm's conception of the rule of charity is characteristic because it takes into consideration both the doer and the recipient of a certain behavior, not only the doer. With this understanding, the notion of evil correcting sins becomes meaningful.

3-1. "Rule of charity" (*regula caritatis*)

When Anselm relates sin and evil, he uses the expression "be outside the rule of charity" instead of expressions like "commit sins" or "do evil." Note that the expression "be outside the rule of charity" does not involve the idea of distinguishing between sin and evil. When considering sins and evil resulting from human behaviour, we normally regard doing something bad knowingly as a sin and doing something bad unknowingly not as a sin, but evil. From this point of view, even if the same behaviour causes the same result, the judgement about whether the behaviour is seen as a sin or evil depends on whether the doer consciously intended the behaviour or not. According to this understanding, the focus is on the agent.

From the recipient's (i.e. the victim's) side, however, the harm that was done is the same regardless of whether the behaviour is seen as evil or a sin. If a person is mistaken for a bear and shot, the person will not come back to life even though the shooter did not intend to kill the victim. A person hurt by bullying requires time to heal the wounds of the person's soul. A smoker may believe that it is only himself who runs the risk of developing lung cancer, but in fact, other people in the vicinity who are forced to inhale the smoke produced by the smoker run a similar risk of developing lung cancer as the smoker. If neighbours suffer due to evil perpetrated by others, this behaviour cannot comply with the rule of charity; it is outside the rule of charity.

In *Cur deus homo* we can find a good example to explore this idea.

"Ipsa namque *perversitas* spontanea satisfactio vel a non satisfaciente poenae exactio ... in eadem universitate suum tenent locum et ordinis pulchritudinem."²² (italics added)

"... the ready satisfaction for *perverted action* and the exaction of a penalty from him who does not give satisfaction ... hold their own place in this universe and maintain the beauty of its order."²³

(italics added)

The word '*perversitas*' is sometimes translated as "wicked act".²⁴ If we understand '*perversitas*' as wicked act, it means only the agent's *perversitas* and

²² Anselmus Cantuariensis, *Cur deus homo*, I, 15: ed. F. S. Schmitt, *op. cit.* I (ii), 73, 19-22.

²³ *A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockam*, ed. and trans. Eugene R. Fairweather, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956), 124. The author has altered the translation "wrongdoing" into "perverted action."

²⁴ The following are examples of modern translations.

Eugene R. Fairweather: "wrongdoing". *A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956), 116.


it does not mean the recipient’s *perversitas*.²⁵ The translation “wrongdoing” fails to recognize the perspective of the passive recipient, though it does not include the meaning of wickedness.

Anselm took into consideration not only the intention of the agent, but also the recipient of the behaviour. What is important here is not the fact that Anselm considered both people committing evil and people suffering from it, but rather the point that he took both parties into consideration and focused his attention on the relationship between them.

3-2. “Rule of charity” and evil

The discussion in 2-2 and 3-1 can be analyzed from the following alternative viewpoint, and illustrated in a combined diagram (Figure 3).

Figure 3



René Roques: “des comportements pervers”. *Pourquoi Dieu s’est fait homme* (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1963), 281.

Joseph M. Colleran: “wickedness”. *Why God Became Man and The Virgin Conception and Original Sin* (New York: Magi Books, 1969), 91.

F. S. Schmitt: “die Verkehrtheit”. *CUR DEUS HOMO, Lateinisch-deutsch*, (München: Kösel Verlag, 1970), 51.

Michel Corbin: “la perversité”. *L’œuvre de S. Anselme de Cantorbéry 3* (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1988), 353.

Janet Fairweather: “wrongdoing”. *Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works*, eds. Brian Davis and G. R. Evans (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1998), 289.

²⁵ As to recipient’s *perversitas* (*perversitas* as result) the author has discussed it in the following: Hiroko Yamazaki, “*Ordinis Pulchritudo* and evil in St. Anselm’s *Cur Deus homo*”, *Studia Anselmiana* 128, a cura di P. Gilbert, H. Kohlnerberger ed E. Salmann, (Roma: Pontificio Ateneo S. Anselmo, 1999), 709-715.

According to the conventional way of considering evil, the focus is on the will (intention) of the actor, whether it is good or bad, and thus judgment revolves mainly around point 3 in Figure 3. Point 2 is seldom considered. However, the only difference between point 2 and 3 is whether the agent intended to perform evil consciously or not, i.e. whether the act was unjust or not. The impact of the evil (harm) that the receiver suffers as a result of the given act is the same regardless of whether the behaviour was carried out with conscious malicious intent or not. Point 2 can be divided into evil created by God (*malum quod Deus creat*) and evil performed by humans (*malum quod homo facit*). Evil correcting sins committed by humans falls under the former and evil done without noticing or knowing falls under the latter category, as the cases when actions performed for the benefit of others turned out to do them more harm than good. Point 3 is called sin in the original sense. In the case of point 4, since the intention of the given act is bad although its result is good, it is difficult to claim that it fits in charity. Thus, point 2 is the point where Anselm's opinion differs from the common point of view.

According to Anselm's understanding of evil, only point 1 is in the accordance with the rule of charity, while the other points (2 to 4 in the bold square) are outside the rule of charity. Anselm considers love and evil as being dependent upon the relationship between the agent and recipient, and thus charity is considered not to be fulfilled even if one of the human parties is touched by evil.

3-3. "Rule of charity" and justice

Instead of the expression "performing evil" (performing evil deeds), Anselm uses the expression "to be outside the rule of charity". However, does not "performing evil deeds" mean fundamentally "going against the rule of charity"? Why did Anselm use the expression "to be outside the rule of charity" instead of "to go against the rule of charity"?

Actually, "uprightness" and justice, the central concepts in Anselm's thought, are related to this issue. The Latin word *rectitudo*, which is translated as uprightness, has the meaning of "being straight". That is why, being outside the straight path means abandoning justice.

On the other hand, justice is defined as "uprightness-of-will kept for its own sake"²⁶ and includes the meaning of *rectitudo*. In Figure 3, only point 1 of all the cases includes justice. This means that only the relationship presented in point 1 maintains uprightness; the others do not maintain uprightness, so they go against the rule of charity and are outside the rule of charity except for the evil created by God (*malum quod Deus creat*). Justice cannot immediately be achieved by having uprightness of will; justice is achieved by maintaining justice.²⁷ If a certain action

²⁶ Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De veritate* 12: ed. F. S. Schmitt, *op. cit. I (i)*, 194, 26. "Iustitia igitur est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata." Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson, *op. cit.*, 96.

²⁷ Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De veritate* 12: ed. F. S. Schmitt, *op. cit. I (i)*, 195, 2-4. "[...]: non mox ut habetur est iustitia, nec accipimus iustitiam cum illam accipimus, sed nos servando facimus eam esse iustitiam."

is accompanied by justice, the action itself is set as the main purpose and point 4 in Figure 3 (where the result of the given deed accidentally turns out to be good although the intention is bad) cannot occur. Going against the rule of charity means being outside the right path and, therefore, is outside the rule of charity.

4. Bond of charity and peace

Anselm wrote that “God, as it is said, ‘causes peace and creates evil.’” In other words, Anselm believed that God creates evil in order to correct the evil of humans, which in turns brings about peace. If evil is understood as privation, conditions where nothing is lacking can be understood as peace. If love is damaged where it is supposed to be present, it cannot be said that peace is maintained. Peace is not simply a time when there is no war. Peace is required not only between states, but also among people and between people and God.

When one is outside the rule of charity, love appears in a distorted form and becomes evil. The distortion of love is caused by loving in a wrong way. If a robber kills somebody to get money, the person considers money superior to human life. Furthermore, one sometimes does not have a sense of sin even if the person commits a sin, just as one does not feel exhausted even though the person accumulates fatigue. We know from experience that after doing the same action some people are conscious of their sins, while the others are not. It is loving in a wrong way even when we act without consciousness that it is evil.

There is an agent and a recipient when evil is discussed. For the recipient of evil it is not important whether the agent acts consciously or unconsciously because the evil caused as a result of the given act is the same. We cannot say that the rule of charity is fulfilled when our neighbour suffers evil due to another person’s act.

If desirable human relationships are damaged and charity is distorted, how can we eliminate the distortion and return to the bond of charity? Anselm believed that once people lose uprightness, they cannot get it back without the grace of God.²⁸ However, God will give people His grace because He desires to bring peace. That God brings people the evil to correct sins, which is evil as *aliquid* created by God, can be viewed as the grace of God. God who creates evil is the same God who brings back the bond of charity and makes peace.

5. Conclusion

When Anselm referred to “God who causes peace and creates evil,” he mentioned that within the framework of his ethics. True love, i.e. charity, is required for

²⁸ Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De concordia*, III, 13: ed. F. S. Schmitt, *op. cit.* I (ii), 287, 14-17. “Perdito igitur instrumento volendi iustitiam, id est rectitudine, nullo modo – nisi per gratiam reddatur – potest voluntas instrumentum velle iustitiam. Quapropter quoniam nihil debet velle nisi iuste: quidquid vult sine rectitudine, vult iniuste.” Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De concordia*, III, 14: ed. F. S. Schmitt, *op. cit.* I (ii), 287, 24-25. “[...], quia nullo modo potest illam (sc. iustitiam) per se adipisci vel recuperare.”

peace, and justice is required to perform deeds of charity. Anselm argues that God creates evil in order to make our acts accord with the rule of charity. This law covers not only the agent but also the recipient. Consequently, if the recipient suffers from evil due to another person's act, it is against the rule of charity. The transformation of distorted love into the bond of charity is the path to peace. In Anselm's way of thinking, peace is brought about by following the rule of charity, and peace is broken when we live without and outside this rule of charity.

Słowa kluczowe: Anzelm z Canterbury, Bóg i zło, grzech, aliquid, reguła miłości (regula caritatis), więź miłości, pokój, sprawiedliwość

Keywords: Anselm of Canterbury, God and evil, sin, aliquid, rule of charity (regula caritatis), bond of charity, peace, justice