Reception of the British empirical-sensualistic tradition as a unique form of philosophizing has its irreplaceable place in the history of philosophy. Jan Patočka takes this fact into consideration, but his reception and interpretation of British empiricism is not purely historical. Patočka was trained by Husserl’s phenomenology and formed by Heidegger’s intellectual heritage, and this makes for his specific philosophical thinking. Furthermore, his thinking is highly influenced by a thematic element initially formed on the grounds of Husserl’s phenomenology as the problem of Lebenswelt, now present in Patočka’s work as the problem of natural world. Patočka perceives entire philosophical tradition via the context of this leitmotif, which we find present in his thinking. His critical reception of British empiricism was an inseparable component in the rethinking of the problem of natural world. Patočka did not offer any attempt at summarization of his attitude towards British sensualism in form of a stand-alone paper or study. Nevertheless, reception of British philosophical heritage of the 17^th century in Patočka’s optics definitely is of primary importance – firstly, in context of phenomenological tradition (especially its founder E. Husserl), which Patočka joins, and secondly for the purpose of articulating his own philosophical position. Commentaries to British sensualistic tradition can be found in various writings from his early, as well as late period. His notion of empiricism is always fundamentally interrelated with his other philosophical works – within his interpretation of Husserl, Heidegger and later still more intensively within Patočka’s own notion of natural world and his project of asubjective phenomenology. 

Socrates as a philosopher is present in Patočka’s thinking in irreplaceable manner, and in all periods of his philosophical life. Patočka mainly accepts the Socratic idea of knowing the unknown. He is developing this idea step by step throughout the various periods of his philosophical work. Socratic knowing of the unknown, transformed through the problematisation and the moment of negativity successively into the principle of historicity, means for Patočka the essential resort for his own conception of philosophy of history in its top form. Within this conception he is attempting for a new, historical understanding of the sense of human life, and also of the sense of history. For Patočka, the history is understood on the basis of constant problematisation, it’s infinite, unresolved and opened – but it must remain this way, if we don’t want to think about the end of history.

Patočka´s and Rorty´s philosophy offer a foundation for the reconstruction of liberalism and a possibility of fulfilling individual´s freedom. Patočka intends to assess the value of transcendence and its relevance to life. He tries to save the metaphysics for it does not need to become necessarily dogmatic. Contemporary people may find Patočka´s reflections on freedom beneficial. Patočka invites people to connect their spirituality with skepticism and modesty, and according to Socratic knowing of unknowing, along with humility which makes man non-dogmatically open to transcendence. In the reflections on man, Rorty holds to moral responsibility and tries to bring man to self-awareness and taking responsibility for his acting, because it is only man who disposes of unique possibilities and abilities to shape his own authentic way of life. Rorty´s concept of freedom as an accidental phenomenon is based on the concept of history of Western philosophy and is closely linked with the problem of metaphysics and truth. Despite timeless reflections of both philosophers, any timeless ideal of human freedom is determined by the context in which we are thinking.

Hegel’s history of philosophy has irreplaceable place within the whole of his philosophizing and this fact grounds its philosophical importance. It has become the organ of the self-knowing mind in time as an integral component of philosophy of objective mind. Patočka was very precise with defining four main dimensions of Hegel’s philosophy of the history of philosophy: 1. The development of philosophy is organic. Different philosophies are different stages of the same organism development. 2. The role of individuality is subordinate; it does not belong to philosophical contents. 3. Time is but a mere external milieu, a mirror of inner development in the organism of mind. Philosophy and other aspects of mind in different periods are certain manifestations of the very same stage in the development of spiritual substance. Each historical period can be expressed rationally. Time thus doesn´t have positive, content meaning. 4. Advance of philosophical systems corresponds with the logical development of thought. The crucial core of Hegel’s philosophy of the history of philosophy as Patočka identified it couldn´t be even put forward in a better way. According to Patočka, Hegel is right that history of philosophy lives a life of systematic philosophy; it reflects our systematic nature, our tendency to system. History of philosophy and philosophy itself for Patočka, as well as for Hegel, create unity – a kind of organic totality. 

Patočka’s philosophical work is very extensive; therefore, it is necessary to pay special attention to each area of his interest. It seems that the most important thing in his philosophical heritage is his effort to bridge political and philosophical thought. The aim of this article is to describe the influence of the philosophy of Jan Patočka on the Charter 77 programme. His role was revealed mainly in providing Charter 77 with the moral and existential context.

In framing a question about meaning of man, respectively human history, Patočka uses a historical-philosophical aspect as well as a phenomenological aspect. By tracking the genesis of the concept of eternity from Kant to the 20th century he concludes, that human meaning cannot be derived from moral postulates which exceed finitness of man. By deleting the concept of eternity Patočka concludes, that the question of meaning cannot be bound by human targets, because filled purpose is already objectified, existing, without the horizon of your being and in this its takes the form of a relative meaning. The meaning, according to Patočka is phenomenologically bound to being, which is non-objective, implying that the meaning is problematic, unreal, yet constantly perpetuated. This attitude has served Patočka to the criticism of nihilism and in it especially to the unacceptability of active nihilism, the concept which Nietzsche introduced into the philosophy. Patočka transferred a critique of Nietzsche´s understanding of realized meaning in terms of superman by rejection of his idea of will to power (he understood it in the definition of gross and ruthless animal life, namely in the form of the highest being) and the doubtful idea of eternal return. Patočka with his attitude to Nietzsche only echoed the opinion presented by Heidegger, which called Nietzsche the consummator of modern subjectivity.In terms of the present (Kouba) it shows, that phenomenology will profit more if it converts both Nietzsche´s thoughts to its own area and use them in the analysis of situational meaning that is constantly (by contradiction) bound to the horizon of possibility of the situation without a sense – that is in meaningful situation suppressed, not realized, but its validity and consistency with the horizon of meaning does not lose. In this view, it appears that Nietzsche´s understanding of the meaning is also problematic, but this problematic natureis not bound to absolute meaning.