The paper is devoted to the sophistic method of "two-fold arguments" (antilogic). The traditional understanding of antilogic understood as an expression of agonistic and eristic tendencies of the sophists has been in recent decades, under the influence of G.B. Kerferd, replaced by the understanding of antilogic as an independent argumentative technique, having its own sources, essence, and goals. Following the interpretation of G.B. Kerferd, according to which the foundation of the antilogic is the opposition of two logoi resulting from contradictions or opposites, necessarily associated with contradictory character of the sensual world, in the paper it is argued that the philosophical basis of antilogic should be sought in the presentation of the views attributed to Protagoras and "adherents of flux" in Plato's dialogue Theaetetus.

In the ancient epistemology, precisely stated definition of judgment (axioma) appears only in the 3rd century B.C. It was formulated by Chrysippus of Soli, the founder of the Stoic logic. However, on the other hand, the analysis of the extant utterances in which the knowledge had been objectified since the first Greek thinkers, allows us to state that the evolution of the theory of judgment was a long process. In this development, Greek epistemology had to deal with a number of problems connected with the object of the judgment –– knowledge, with the form of its objectification –– predication, and also with the predicates of the true and false judgment –– categories of “truth” (aletheia) and “falsehood” (pseudos). The first definition of the false judgement (logos pseudes) and the true judgment (logos alethes) can be found only in the late dialogue of Plato, Sophist, which delivers precisely established terminology of the theorem. Yet, such a definition could be formulated only when Greek epistemology re-defined the scope of the meaning of the key terms-concepts, aletheia and pseudos. The term-concept aletheia was identified with the term-concept being, functioning in the ontological-axiological sphere. On the other hand, pseudos did not mean false in the sense of negating the truth, but something, which is different than truth, is its imperfect copy. Thus, the pre-Platonic philosophy has not yet formulated the terminology in which predication of something inconsistent with the actual state of being, with the truth, could be verbalized. Often to express such a form of predication, a phrase “to utter things, which are not” was used. The other problem was connected with –– characteristic ofthe Greek language –– dual function of the verb to be/einai, which included both existential and truthful function. Accordingly, every utterance, in which the predicate was the verb einai or its derivates, was ex definitione a true predication –– “it spoke beings (things, which are).” In such a situation, there was noneed in epistemology to precisely define judgment as such, and to state the conditions which the true judgment hadto meet. The problem is definitely solved by Plato in his dialogue Theaetetus, in which the philosopher defines the object of the judgment, which is knowledge (however, its object is not stated yet) and introduces the project of verification of the utterances/opinion, thanks to which an opinion ––doxa can reach the status of judgment ––logos. An opinion needs to be verified with the dialectical procedures.

In this article, I pose the question of what the role of the pseudos theme is in the entire argument of the Republic, which is motivated by a challenge from Thrasymachus, who defined justice as “the advantage of the stronger/ruler.” How can the “beautiful polis” (Kallipolis), based on a “noble falshood” addressed to its rulers in particular, be a good counterargument to the realist Thrasymachus? I show that Plato, wanting to prove that Thrasymachus’s thesis is too narrow and only seemingly realistic description of political reality, explicitly uses the same tool that implicitly lies at the root of the worldview expressed in the rhetorician’s thesis: ideological falsehood. He opposes the ugly ideology (the advantage of the stronger) with a “noble falsehood” (the dogma of love), since falsehood as such is an indispensable structural element of the polis itself, resulting from the weakness of the faculty of reason proper to the human condition. The pseudos theme has a dual function in the Republic: heuristic and structural. First, Plato exposes the implicit ideological falsehood underlying Thrasymachus’s realistic thesis using a falsehood that he [Plato] himself has explicitly proposed. Second, he presents falsehood as a component of the political, which compensates for human ignorance and exploits human susceptibility to normative and cultural implementations.

In this paper, the notion of the classical theory of knowledge is analysed with reference to its primary source – the philosophy of Plato. A point of departure for this analysis is the description of the classical theory of knowledge presented by Jan Woleński in his book Epistemology (but it can be also found in the works of other researchers devoted to epistemology). His statements about Plato are examined in the context of Plato’s thought. The dialogues Apology, Gorgias, Meno, fragments of the Republic, Theaetetus, Timaeus and the testimonies about the so-called agrapha dogmata are especially taken into consideration.

The aim of this article is to analyze Plato’s epistemology of politics in the light of Book VII of the Republic, in which the Allegory of the Cave is introduced. The problem named in the title is presented within the framework of a veritative interpretation of Greek ontology (referencing Charles Kahn’s work) and against the backdrop of Plato’s polemic with sophistry (Protagoras and Gorgias), along with references to the sources of Plato’s inspiration – the Eleatics and Pythagoreans. In my analysis I propose hypotheses concerning certain aspects of the Cave Allegory (e.g. the status of the fire) and present my interpretation of Plato’s politico-philosophical project.