For the present article, the statement that the foundation, or rather legitimisation, of Popper’s philosophy (both his epistemology, which the present work is devoted to, and his other fields of research) is a defence of rationality (no matter whether we talk of the rationality of acting, thinking, science, or of something still different) is of crucial importance also because the process of cognition, according to Popper, is subject to rational principles. It is to the formulation of these principles, and to the proving of their existence that Popper devotes a large part of his work. The author thinks it is possible to treat his methodology of science, and the conception of the three worlds which provides an answer to the question of the relationship between body and mind and an evolutionary theory of science, as attempts to support his thesis that, in spite of man’s tendency to make mistakes, cognition is a rational process. The author of the present article demonstrates no. only that Popper strove to justify his faith in rationality; but also that his subsequent theories, perhaps with the exception of his social views, were produced as a result of the philosopher’s becoming aware that his achievements so far had failed to accomplish the desired purpose. Thus we should accept Popper s remark that his conception of the three worlds should not be treated too seriously. The conception in question is a peculiar declaration of the philosopher’s convictions, but it does not seem possible, without a fundamental restructuring of the conception itself, to use it, with significant results, for the task of solving the problems that so many scientists and philosophers grapple with. The statement that scientific theories exist as objectively as the objects of the physical world does not imply anything more than is implied by the acceptance of the thesis that scientific theories and science as such are products of the human consciousness the activity of which does not follow any rules. The purpose of science and the purpose of philosophy are, as a matter of fact, human purposes, and it is of little importance whether, in pursuing those purposes, we conjure, by means of special terminology, another world different from that of our daily experience, or we satisfy ourselves with the naive ontology based on common sense.
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