In my paper I discuss Husserl’s standpoint on the existence of world. Addressing this issue the philosopher thinks of the kind of being, outer of consciousness, which is realized in the general thesis of natural attitude. The aim of phenomenological research is to reveal correlation of consciousness and the world, which according to Husserl, becomes transcendental constitution. In the course of explaining this correlation Husserl reveals that the existence of world might be recognized as a correlate of the general thesis of natural attitude, which after phenomenological reduction becomes recognised as the constitutive achievement of consciousness. Transcendental idealism is interpreted in the paper as transcendental monism. Husserl not only questions the possibility of non-cognizable things-in-themselves, but also he uses some broad concept of transcendental subjectivity. The transcendental subjectivity is not opposed to the world, but it includes the world as the subjectivity’s correlate. Strictly speaking, the world is conceived as structure transcendental subjectivity, and the natural attitude might be taken as anonymous modus of transcendental life.

The paper depicts phenomenological threads of philosophy of drama. My aim here is to analyse the dramatic creature in its phenomenological aspect rooted in the thought of Józef Tischner. In analysis of axiological-agatological character of the egotic sphere, Tischner shows ego as a creature of internal rift. In the paper I focus on three threads of Tischner’s philosophy of drama and his concept of dramatic creature. First, the issue of the source experience as a starting point of philosophy. Second, the egotic thread; and thirdly, the dramatic-one, that is axiological interpretation of egology. Taking into account some selected issues which are core of Tischner’s philosophy of drama, makes it able to show his thought in his phenomenological provenance.

In this paper I sketch the problem of hospitality as developed by Jacques Derrida in his late work. I pinpoint the dependence between hospitality and deconstruction arguing that the hospitality is not an unexpected turn in relation to Derrida’s earlier work in deconstruction of metaphysics, but its further development on ethical and political level. Derrida keeps taking hospitality as an alternative name or an example of deconstruction, showing in this peculiar metaphor quasi-ontological structure of trace haunted by what precedes and what follows it, sabotaging its homogeneity and integrity.

The paper presents Leszek Kołakowski’s attitude to Christian philosophy. Very often it is seen as informed by scepticism in the sense of some negative vigilance against dogmas and non-scientific contents. An important element of Kołakowski’s biography is his initial fascination with post-war socialism and subsequent “Hegelian bite”, which manifested in harsh criticism of Polish Catholicism. After the change of his views and compulsory emigration he kept researching religious attitude and religion itself. The paper concerns his views in this matter with exclusion of his “ideological” analyses. It consists of, first of all, Kołakowski’s attitude to transcendence-existence relation of medieval and modern order including the question of evil manifesting itself in the world as conceived in Christian philosophy. It also aims to give answer to the question of what form should Christianity take in the face of scientific concepts of world and man’s place within it. It deals also with Kołakowski’s attempt to define religion in the context of epistemological separation of the act of faith from intellectual cognition. According to him, religion should not pretend to attain a scientific level, which however does not negate its meaning for man.

In this paper I analyse the notion of critique, its subject and scope of validity in the context of critical metaphysics of Otto Liebmann. The main argument is preceded by introductory remarks in which historical context and intellectual background of this notion are discussed. The main focus of the paper is on the standpoint of Otto Liebmann, author of curricular for neo-Kantianism "Kant und die Epigonen" (1865), and who — however usually conceived to be forerunner of neo-Kantianism — quite paradoxically takes somehow different position on metaphysics. It is different from so-called late neo-Kantianism which declared itself as opposite to metaphysics. Contrary to this, Liebmann accepted the possibility of metaphysics as a kind of crowning achievement and climax of scientific theories.

The paper deals with the issue of the studies on mystical experience led in first half of 20th century by Joseph Maréchal, Belgian philosopher and the creator of transcendental Thomism. His most important work in this area is "Studies in psychology of mystics" ("Études sur la Psychologie des Mystiques"), first volume of which was published in 1924. Maréchal’s research, apart from the attempt made to specify the nature of mystical experience on the basis of the concept of the dynamic purpose of intellect and on the problem of so-called sense of presence, concerned also some methodological issues. Making use of his background in biology and psychology, Maréchal focused on the question of the possibility of applying the methods of empirical sciences in psychology of mystical experience. This was first of all aimed at application of those methods to analysing both special phenomenon related to mystical experience and its essential hidden depth. This paper aims at showing how Maréchal, using the tools of philosophers, evaluates the possibility of using scientific methods to study phenomenological and criticises some deterministic presuppositions underlying those methods.

The paper concerns Immanuel Kant’s view on ontological argument for the existence of God by Anselm of Canterbury. Arguing from his critical philosophy, Kant remains sceptical about the possibility of proving the very existence of God, which he takes as only the idea (ideal) of pure reason. Seen along such lines the concept of God cannot be verified in the matter of experience. Kant’s critique was based on refutation of speculative character of theological speculation related to the tradition of natural (rational) theology. From this point of view he takes it as impossible to derive a priori the real existence of subject merely on the basis of taking it as the greatest thing that can be conceived, that is the best thing that might exist. The idea of the highest being has in Kant merely intellectual status, that is, it has it source in (pure) reason only and in this sense its real existence cannot be subject of analysis (scrutiny). Interestingly, what Kant has in mind in his critique of ontological argument (besides other arguments) is Descartes’ argument which is to an important degree different from the one by Anselm. In this paper similarities and differences between Kant’s refutation and Anselm’s support of the ontological argument are discussed.

The article presents a little-known figure of Wiktor Potempa (1887—1942) and his Platonic studies. His works proceeded from his doctoral thesis on Phaedrus which was defended in 1912. Later on he studied relation between Platonism and Christianity, and finally published a handbook for the history of ancient philosophy that was addressed to the Catholic seminarians. Some views of Potempa are compared to those of Stefan Pawlicki, the most important Plato scholar in the neo-Scholastic milieu. In comparison with Pawlicki, Potempa’s attitude to Plato is much less enthusiastic, but rather cautious; he warns the Christian reader not to worship Plato’s philosophy uncritically.

The paper aims at presenting Paul Natorp’s views on consciousness discussed on historical and systematic plane. In the former case understanding of consciousness and self-consciousness is discussed in the context of Cohen’s views. In the latter the problem is conceived in the light of evolution of both  concepts in Natorp.

The paper presents epistemological project of philosophy by Paul Natorp in the context of Marburg School of neo-Kantianism. I take into account not only intellectual atmosphere of the department of philosophy at the University of Marburg, but also its influence on the character of Natorp’s works, changing characteristics of his presuppositions-hypotheses and the way of argumentation for them. Paying attention to strong influence of Immanuel Kant, and especially his transcendental logic, I disclose the differences emerging between Natorp’s programme of philosophy and the rules of neo-Kantianism set originally by Hermann Cohen.

The paper concerns the psychoanalysis of objective cognition — a philosophical project by Gaston Bachelard, developed and implemented in epistemology and philosophy of science since 1938. The paper consists of two parts. Firstly, relation between Bachelard’s philosophy and psychoanalysis is addressed with the special attention given to sources of Bachelard’s inspiration — S. Freud, C.G. Jung, M. Bonaparte and R. Allendy. Secondly, Bachelard’s concept of psychoanalysis of objective cognition is discussed. In the course of its development, Bachelard transformed the assumptions and ideas of Freud and Jung and used them in theory of knowledge and philosophy of science. This original project was straightforwardly practical — it was aimed at providing an analysis of the scientific mind, revealing any epistemological obstacles it contains (such as false beliefs and habits of thinking) and its overcoming so that valuable cognition might be obtained.

Jean Buridan was one of initiators of a new interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories. According to this interpretation, the subject matter of Aristotle’s work are significative terms in the function of subject and predicate and not the things meant or substitutive by these terms. In this way Buridan rejected some traditional belief that modi praedicanti are directly related to modi essendi. In consequence, he questioned the realist explanation of both number and variety of categories (ex parte rerum). At the same time, rejecting the idea of reduction of the differences between categories to the verbal level only, he finally stated that the source of the difference are various forms of predication of the first substance which are derived from various connotations of the terms. Buridan has set a canon for the way of commenting Categories for many years, and although the next generation of commentators shorten his list of questions, few basic ones were always included, namely those concerning the scope of each category, relation between them, their independence and some of their characteristics.

There is a broadly shared belief among historians according to which the ideas of Xenophanes of Colophon (and especially fragment B 18 in Diels Kranz) should be understood as the earliest expression of the idea of progress, a belief in possibility of discovering possibilities of betterment. On the other hand, Hesiod’s story of five generations is usually recognized as a model example of quite the opposite thesis, stressing regress, the fall of humanity. This contradiction is highlighted by the fact that Xenophanes criticises the views on gods from Homer’s and Hesiod’s writings. In this paper I analyse Works and Days by Hesiod as well as remaining fragments of Xenophon’s writings. It seems that Hesiod is first of all interested in diagnosis of the sources of human misery and suffering, and not in describing some historical process of degradation of man. Contrary to this, Xenophanes develops a philosophical framework mostly consisting of epistemological reflection that calls for rejection of the hubris of reason which coincides with hasty and dogmatic judgement of both gods and the world itself. The two thinkers agree that the human fortune, however dependent on gods-established necessity, lays to a degree in man’s own hands thanks to humbleness, piety and wisdom. Thus, their standpoints are not contradictory in historical philosophical perspective, quite the opposite, they agree in belief in progress, in betterment.

The paper aims at comparing the two thinkers, the lives and works of which took place in troubled by totalitarianisms 20th century. Apart from the historical kinship of the biographies there is also a group of issues in which they share some interest. Part of it is related to their affiliation to phenomenological movement. Jan Patočka, former student of Husserl and Heidegger, has developed an original concept of phenomenology, firstly as a science concerning human life taken as a existential movement, including then also some questions concerning first philosophy as a project of a subjective phenomenology. In turn, Józef Tischner, a student of R. Ingarden, in his rich output starting with his dissertation concerning transcendental ego in Husserl, through analyses of axiological consciousness, the problem of values and some issues concerning existence gets to some fundamental problems of ethics and philosophical anthropology. Just as Patočka, Tischner also was active in political life taking part in some important public debates. Central to the paper is the issue of philosophy of man. In the case of Patočka I reveal the relation between man, freedom and history which is best expressed in his late works, the ones from 1970s. They show the way of conceiving man as historical creature and rise of history is accompanied by discovery of philosophy, politics and freedom. Becoming a historical creature, man enters the realm of “controversiality.” In Tischner, on the other hand, the movement of autonomous reflection on man, including its temporal and historical aspects, goes from reflection on axiology to the late period of his intellectual activity when it is placed in the context of his philosophy of drama. Here, the key to grasp who is man is the I—you relation and agatology. Both thinkers see the fragility, even drama of human existence, which they face, and they defend human freedom in the era of ideologies and technology.

The paper aims at grasping Henryk Elzenberg’s thought on human condition on both social and universal level. By showing an individual in the world doomed to relations Elzenberg tries to analyse distortion and over-interpretations of impulses coming both from human psyche and from civilization. By stigmatization of the shallowness of life and omnipresent utilitarianism he wants to find an alternative to raise the man to higher level, to salvation. For this he proposes focusing on perfect values, independent from man. Noticing the difference between the nature of human and other creatures he highlights the role discovering one’s personal capacities and the necessity of gathering them in what is called culture. Setting as the demand the turn first in mind, related to deepening of self-consciousness, and then also spiritual, he sets alternative roads of experiencing the world, both that given in senses and alternative-one. All of his ideas are ways of building humanity to be more essential and rewarding.