Amendments to the Polish Penal Code between 2015 and 2023 significantly increased its punitiveness by introducing a range of instruments affecting harsher sentencing. This has simultaneously reduced the transparency of sentencing principles and penal measures; numerous institutions have emerged that, although resembling judicial sentencing institutions in form, are nonetheless mandatory. This article seeks to identify the circumstances that differentiate extraordinary aggravation of a penalty from an aggravated type of offence. The substantive legal consequences of the distinction drawn between an aggravated type of offence and extraordinary aggravation of a penalty are far-reaching; they significantly impact the severity of punishment and define the scope of legal instruments available to the sentencing court in criminal proceedings.

This study aims to highlight, on the one hand, the influence of the principle of legalism on sentencing policy, and, on the other hand, the impact of the rules governing the application of penalties and other criminal law responses on the scope and conceptualisation of that principle. From a constitutional perspective, the principle of legalism requires the existence of a competence norm for any action taken by public authorities. While such norms are primarily found within the provisions of procedural criminal law, this does not diminish the role of substantive criminal law. From the procedural standpoint, it should be noted that the dominant role of the principle of legalism in Poland necessitates the rationalisation of sentencing policy through the substantive definition of a criminal offence, as established in Article 1 § 3 of the Polish Criminal Code. The criminal procedural principle of legalism, codified in Article 10 § 1 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure, reflects the constitutional principle of equality before the law and the principle of a proper criminal response, thereby implementing the model of distributive justice.

This paper examines the principle of general prevention (general deterrence) in relation to occupational crimes, that is, crimes committed by individuals in connection with the exercise of their profession. The principle acquires particular significance in this context, even more so than in the case of traditional offences. Imposing a criminal penalty on a pilot in the hope of fulfilling the directive of general prevention contradicts the principles underlying the aviation safety management system, in which incident reporting constitutes the foundation of its proper functioning. Thus, there is a conflict between traditional methods of ensuring safety, where criminal law represents an individualised approach to punishment, and aviation regulations that introduce a systemic approach based on improving the overall rules governing all aviation activities. Consequently, measures that are theoretically intended to enhance safety may, in practice, lead to its deterioration.

This article analyses the functions of compensatory measures, specifically the obligation to redress damage caused by an offence, compensation for non-pecuniary harm and a lump-sum compensatory payment, in cases concerning offences against road safety. In such cases, the functioning of the system of compulsory civil liability insurance must be taken into account, as it provides the injured parties with broad opportunities to obtain compensation from the insurer. While acknowledging the guarantee function of the compulsory insurance system, it is necessary to examine the actual role of compensatory measures in this context. In instances where
the perpetrator can expect reimbursement of the sums paid to the injured party under a criminal court order, not only the compensatory but also the justice-related function of these measures becomes problematic. It is therefore worth considering whether, and in what manner, it would be advisable to expand the scope of criminal law responses to road offences, ensuring that the perpetrator experiences the financial consequences of their actions to a greater extent.