Sztuczna inteligencja w ujęciu odpowiedzialności karnej – luka w odpowiedzialności czy możliwość jej przypisania?

Oliwia Królikiewicz

doi:10.31261/PPK.2025.09.02.04

Published: 2025-10-22

Vol. 9 No. 2 (2025)

Artificial intelligence in terms of criminal liability – a gap in liability or the possibility of assigning it?

Oliwia Królikiewicz

Section: Articles

https://doi.org/10.31261/PPK.2025.09.02.04

Abstract

The article provides an examination of the rationale for adopting criminal responsibility for artificial intelligence systems. It identifies the basic concepts associated with artificial intelligence and goes on to explore its relationship to morality and ethics. The different approaches to adopting a framework of criminal responsibility for artificial intelligence are discussed in this article, and this is achieved by means of an analysis of the theoretical foundations of criminal responsibility in the continental and common law systems. The article examines the application of familiar criminal science concepts, such as guilt, consciousness and the act, to artificial intelligence systems, and it answers the question of mitigating the liability gap by presenting alternative approaches to the problem for researchers within the Continental and Anglo-Saxon systems. In the concluding section, the article comments on the interpenetration of civil law (and its institutions) with criminal law.

Keywords:

artificial intelligence (AI) , responsibility , ethics , morality , criminal responsibility , accountability gap , fault

Download files

PDF (Język Polski)

Citation rules

Królikiewicz, O. (2025). Artificial intelligence in terms of criminal liability – a gap in liability or the possibility of assigning it?. Problemy Prawa Karnego, 9(2), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.31261/PPK.2025.09.02.04

Cited by / Share

Licence

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

The Copyright Owners of the submitted texts grant the Reader the right to use the pdf documents under the provisions of the Creative Commons 4.0 International License: Attribution-Share-Alike (CC BY-SA). The user can copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose.

1. License

The University of Silesia Press provides immediate open access to journal’s content under the Creative Commons BY-SA 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/). Authors who publish with this journal retain all copyrights and agree to the terms of the above-mentioned CC BY-SA 4.0 license.

2. Author’s Warranties

The author warrants that the article is original, written by stated author/s, has not been published before, contains no unlawful statements, does not infringe the rights of others, is subject to copyright that is vested exclusively in the author and free of any third party rights, and that any necessary written permissions to quote from other sources have been obtained by the author/s.

If the article contains illustrative material (drawings, photos, graphs, maps), the author declares that the said works are of his authorship, they do not infringe the rights of the third party (including personal rights, i.a. the authorization to reproduce physical likeness) and the author holds exclusive proprietary copyrights. The author publishes the above works as part of the article under the licence "Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International".

ATTENTION! When the legal situation of the illustrative material has not been determined and the necessary consent has not been granted by the proprietary copyrights holders, the submitted material will not be accepted for editorial process. At the same time the author takes full responsibility for providing false data (this also regards covering the costs incurred by the University of Silesia Press and financial claims of the third party).

3. User Rights

Under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license, the users are free to share (copy, distribute and transmit the contribution) and adapt (remix, transform, and build upon the material) the article for any purpose, provided they attribute the contribution in the manner specified by the author or licensor.

4. Co-Authorship

If the article was prepared jointly with other authors, the signatory of this form warrants that he/she has been authorized by all co-authors to sign this agreement on their behalf, and agrees to inform his/her co-authors of the terms of this agreement.

I hereby declare that in the event of withdrawal of the text from the publishing process or submitting it to another publisher without agreement from the editorial office, I agree to cover all costs incurred by the University of Silesia in connection with my application.

References

Literatura
Google Scholar

Abbott R., Sarch A.: Punishing Artificial Intelligence: Legal Fiction or Science Fiction. “UC Davis Law Review” 2019, vol. 53, s. 323–383. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3327485
Google Scholar

AI in eHealth. Human Autonomy, Data Governance and Privacy in Healthcare. Eds. M.C. Compagnucci, M.L. Wilson, M. Fenwick, M. Forgó, T. Bärnighausen. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2022.
Google Scholar

Andrejew I.: Ustawowe znamiona czynu. Typizacja i kwalifikacja przestępstw. Wydawnictwo Prawnicze, Warszawa 1978.
Google Scholar

Avila Negri S.M.C.: Robot as Legal Person: Electronic Personhood in Robotics and Artificial Intelligence. “Frontiers in Robotics and AI” 2021, vol. 8, s. 1–10. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2021.789327
Google Scholar

Bafia J., Mioduski K., Siewierski M.: Kodeks karny. Komentarz. Wydawnictwo Prawnicze, Warszawa 1977.
Google Scholar

Baker D.J., Robinson P.H.: Artificial Intelligence and the Law: Cybercrime and Criminal Liability. Routledge, New York 2021. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429344015
Google Scholar

Barczak-Oplustil A.: Sporne zagadnienia istoty winy w prawie karnym. Zarys problemu. „Czasopismo Prawa Karnego i Nauk Penalnych” 2005, z. 2, s. 79–96.
Google Scholar

Beckers A., Teubner G.: Three Liability Regimes for Artificial Intelligence. Hart Publishing, Oxford 2021. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509949366
Google Scholar

Brożek B., Jakubiec M.: On the Legal Responsibility of Autonomous Machines. “Artif Intell Law” 2017, vol. 25, s. 293–304. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-017-9207-8
Google Scholar

Buchała K.: Prawo karne materialne. Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1980.
Google Scholar

Buchała K., Ćwiąkalski Z., Szewczyk M., Zoll A.: Komentarz do kodeksu karnego. Część ogólna. Wydawnictwo Prawnicze, Warszawa 1994.
Google Scholar

Buchała K., Waltoś S.: Zasady prawa i procesu karnego. PWN, Warszawa 1975.
Google Scholar

The Cambridge Handbook of Responsible Artificial Intelligence. Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Eds. S. Voeneky, Ph. Kellmeyer, O. Mueller, W. Burgard. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2022.
Google Scholar

Chopra S., White L.F.: A Legal Theory for Autonomous Artificial Agents. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbour 2011. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.356801
Google Scholar

Cieślak M.: Pojęcie czynu na tle przesłanek odpowiedzialności karnej w obowiązującym prawie polskim. „Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego” 1987, nr 15, s. 33–44.
Google Scholar

Coeckelbergh M.: Virtual Moral Agency, Virtual Moral Responsibility: On the Moral Significance of the Appearance, Perception, and Performance of Artificial Agents. “AI and Society” 2009, vol. 24, s. 181–189. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-009-0208-3. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-009-0208-3
Google Scholar

Czochra M., Bar D.: Śmierć pacjenta wywołana zastosowaniem sztucznej inteligencji w technologiach medycznych – analiza prawnokarna. „Studia Prawnicze. Rozprawy i Materiały” 2019, nr 2 (25), s. 67–79.
Google Scholar

Dąbrowa J.: Wina jako przesłanka odpowiedzialności cywilnej. Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 1968.
Google Scholar

Dignum V.: Responsible Artificial Intelligence: How to Develop and Use AI in a Responsible Way. Springer, Cham 2019. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30371-6
Google Scholar

Duraes D., Miguel Freitas P., Novais P.: The Relevance of Deepfakes in the Administration of Criminal Justice. W: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Artificial Intelligence and the Law. Eds. H.S. Antunes, P.M. Freitas, A.L. Oliveira, C.M. Pereira, E. Vaz de Sequeira, L.B. Xavier. Springer, Cham 2024, s. 351–369. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41264-6_19
Google Scholar

Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction. Eds. I. van de Poel, L. Frank, J. Hermann, J. Hopster, D. Lenzi, S. Nyholm, B. Taebi, E. Ziliotti. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2023.
Google Scholar

Gardocki L.: Pojęcie przestępstwa i podziały przestępstw w polskim prawie karnym. „Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska Lublin-Polonia” 2013, vol. LX, 2, Sectio G, s. 29–40.
Google Scholar

Gogoshin D.L.: A Way Forward for Responsibility in the Age of AI. Inquiry, London 2024. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2024.2312455
Google Scholar

Gunkel D.: How to Survive a Robot Invasion. Rights, Responsibility, and AI. Routledge, New York 2020. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429427862
Google Scholar

Gunkel D.: Robot Rights. The MIT Press, Cambridge 2018. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/11444.001.0001
Google Scholar

Gunkel D.J.: Mind the Gap: Responsible Robotics and the Problem of Responsibility. “Ethics and Information Technology” 2020, vol. 6 (4), s. 279–290.
Google Scholar

Hallevy G.: The Basic Models of Criminal Liability of AI Systems and Outer Circles. Springer, Berlin 2019. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3402527
Google Scholar

Hallevy G.: Liability for Crimes Involving Artificial Intelligence Systems. Springer, Cham 2015. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10124-8
Google Scholar

Hallevy G.: When Robots Kill: Artificial Intelligence under Criminal Law. Northeastern University Press, Boston 2013.
Google Scholar

Hanausek T.: Wyłączenie czynu jako podstawowego elementu przestępstwa. „Wojskowy Przegląd Prawniczy” 1967, nr 4, s. 430–459.
Google Scholar

Hart H.L.A.: Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law. 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008.
Google Scholar

Hawking S.: Transcendence Looks at the Implication of Artificial Intelligence – But Are We Taking AI Seriously Enough?. “The Independent”, 01.05.2014. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/stephen-hawking-transcendence-looks-at-the-implications-of-artificial-intelligence-but-are-we-taking-ai-seriously-enough-9313474.html [dostęp: 09.07.2024].
Google Scholar

Jankowska M.: Podmiotowość́ prawna sztucznej inteligencji?. W: O czym mówią prawnicy, mówiąc o podmiotowości. Red. A. Bielska-Brodziak. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2021, s. 171–196.
Google Scholar

Jędrzejewski Z.: Bezprawność jako element przestępności czynu. Studium na temat struktury przestępstwa. Wolters Kluwer, Warszawa 2009.
Google Scholar

Kolfschooten H. van: EU Regulation of Artificial Intelligence, Challenges for Patients’ Rights. “Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper, Kluwer Law International” 2021, vol. 59, s. 81–112. DOI: https://doi.org/10.54648/COLA2022005
Google Scholar

Kurek Ł.: Problem wolnej woli z perspektywy nauk empirycznych. „Logos i Ethos” 2011, z. 30, s. 99–138.
Google Scholar

Lahti R.: The Rule of Law and Finnish Criminal Law Reform. „Acta Juridica Hungarica. Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies” 1996, vol. 37, s. 251–258.
Google Scholar

Lernell L.: Wykład prawa karnego. Część ogólna. T. 1. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 1969.
Google Scholar

Loucaides L.: Essays on the Developing Law of Human Rights. Brill-Nijhoff, Norwell 1995. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004482258
Google Scholar

Mahler T.: Regulating Artificial General Intelligence (AGI): W: Law and Artificial Intelligence: Regulating AI and Applying AI in Legal Practice. Eds. B. Custers, E. Fosch-Villaronga. Springer, Berlin 2022, s. 521–540. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-523-2_26
Google Scholar

Mamak K.: AGI Crimes? The Role of Criminal Law in Mitigating Existential Risks Posed by Artificial General Intelligence. “AI & Society” 2025, vol. 40, s. 2691–2701. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-024-02036-5
Google Scholar

Mamak K.: Robotics, AI and Criminal Law: Crimes Against Robots. Routledge, New York 2024. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003331100
Google Scholar

Marek A.: Prawo karne. C.H.Beck, Warszawa 2004.
Google Scholar

Matthias A.: The Responsibility Gap: Ascribing Responsibility for the Actions of Learning Automata. “Ethics and Information Technology” 2004, no. 6 (3), s. 175–183. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-004-3422-1
Google Scholar

Müslüm F.: Artificial Intelligence and Legal Issues: A Review of AI-based Legal Impasses in Terms of Criminal Law. Duncker & Humblot Gmbh, Berlin 2022.
Google Scholar

Nyholm S.: Humans and Robots, Ethics, Agency, and Anthropomorphism. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, London 2020. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5771/9781786612281
Google Scholar

Nyholm S.: This is Technology Ethics. Wiley, Hoboken 2023.
Google Scholar

Pagallo U.: The Laws of Robots: Crimes, Contracts, and Torts. Springer, Berlin 2013. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6564-1
Google Scholar

Picard R.: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong. “The Economist”, 05.07.2017. https://www.economist.com/1843/2017/07/05/teaching-robots-right-from-wrong [dostęp: 09.07.2024].
Google Scholar

Prawo karne w zarysie. Nauka o ustawie karnej i przestępstwie. Red. J. Waszczyński. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 1992.
Google Scholar

Prifti K., Stamhuis E., Heine K.: Digging into the Accountability Gap: Operator’s Civil Liability in Healthcare AI-systems. W: Law and Artificial Intelligence: Regulating AI and Applying AI in Legal Practice. Eds. B. Custers, E. Fosch-Villaronga. Springer, Berlin 2022, s. 279–295. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-523-2_15
Google Scholar

Quattrocolo S.: Artificial Intelligence, Computational Modelling and Criminal Proceedings: A Framework for A European Legal Discussion. Springer, Cham 2020. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52470-8
Google Scholar

Regulating Artificial Intelligence in Industry. Ed. D.M. Bielicki. Routledge, New York 2021.
Google Scholar

Rejman G.: Teorie i formy winy w prawie karnym. Wydawnictwo Prawnicze, Warszawa 1980.
Google Scholar

Rejmaniak R.: Autonomiczność systemów sztucznej inteligencji jako wyzwanie dla prawa karnego. „Roczniki Nauk Prawnych” 2021, t. 31, nr 3, s. 95–113. DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rnp21313.6
Google Scholar

Rejmaniak R.: Odpowiedzialność karna za skutki spowodowane przez autonomiczne roboty bojowe – zarys problemu. W: Wykorzystanie dronów i robotów w systemach bezpieczeństwa. Wybrane aspekty. Red. R. Kamprowski, M. Skarżyński. Wydawnictwo Naukowe WNPiD UAM, Poznań 2019, s. 95–113.
Google Scholar

Santoni de Sio F., Mecacci G.: Four Responsibility Gaps with Artificial Intelligence: Why they Matter and How to Address them. “Philosophy & Technology” 2021, vol. 34, s. 1057–1084. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-021-00450-x. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-021-00450-x
Google Scholar

Scherer M.U.: Of Wild Beasts and Digital Analogues: The Legal Status of Autonomous Systems. “Nevada Law Journal” 2019, no. 1, s. 259–290.
Google Scholar

Solaiman S.M.: Legal Personality of Robots, Corporations, Idols and Chimpanzees: A Quest for Legitimacy. “Artifical Intelligence and Law” 2017, no. 25 (2), s. 155–179. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-016-9192-3. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-016-9192-3
Google Scholar

Sośniak M.: Bezprawność zachowania jako przesłanka odpowiedzialności cywilnej za czyny niedozwolone. Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Kraków 1959.
Google Scholar

Świda W.: Prawo karne. PWN, Warszawa 1978.
Google Scholar

Świerczyński M., Więckowski Z.: Sztuczna inteligencja w prawie międzynarodowym. Rekomendacje wybranych rozwiązań. Difin, Warszawa 2021.
Google Scholar

Wąsek A.: Ewolucja pojęcia winy w prawie karnym. „Problemy Prawa Karnego” 1990, z. 4, s. 5–15.
Google Scholar

Wina w prawie karnym. Red. W. Wolter. Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Kraków 1954.
Google Scholar

Zelek M.: Wina w prawie karnym i prawie deliktów – przyczynek do dyskusji na temat tożsamości pojęcia winy w prawie polskim. „Acta Iuris Stetinensis” 2019, nr 2 (26), s. 109–126. DOI: https://doi.org/10.18276/ais.2019.26-08
Google Scholar

Zoll A.: O wartościowaniu czynu w prawie karnym (Uwagi na marginesie artykułu prof. I. Andrejewa o pojęciu winy). „Państwo i Prawo” 1983, z. 4, s. 109–120.
Google Scholar

Akty prawne
Google Scholar

Rozporządzenie Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) 2024/1689 z dnia 13 czerwca 2024 r. w sprawie ustanowienia zharmonizowanych przepisów dotyczą cych sztucznej inteligencji oraz zmiany rozporządzeń (WE) nr 300/2008, (UE) nr 167/2013, (UE) nr 168/2013, (UE) 2018/858, (UE) 2018/1139 i (UE) 2019/2144 oraz dyrektyw 2014/90/UE, (UE) 2016/797 i (UE) 2020/1828 (akt w sprawie sztucznej inteligencji).
Google Scholar

Ustawa z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r. – Kodeks karny. T.j. Dz.U. 1997, nr 88, poz. 553.
Google Scholar

Ustawa z dnia 30 czerwca 2000 r. – Prawo własności przemysłowej. T.j. Dz.U. 2001, nr 49, poz. 1170.
Google Scholar

Vol. 9 No. 2 (2025)
Published: 2025-12-10

ISSN: 0208-5577

eISSN: 2353-9712

10.31261/PPK

Publisher

Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego | University of Silesia Press

Licence CC

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

Submit