In the Constitution of Uganda, there are two circumstances in which a person may be granted a pardon. A pardon may be granted to a person before he/she has been prosecuted for an offence. Thus, Article 28(10) of the Constitution provides that ‘[n]o person shall be tried for a criminal offence if the person shows that he or she has been pardoned in respect of that offence.’ A pardon can also be granted to a person after he/she has been convicted of an offence. This is under Article 121(1)(a) which provides that the President, on the advice of the Advisory Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy, may ‘grant to any person convicted of an offence, a pardon either free or subject to lawful conditions.’ On the basis of Article 121, the President has pardoned hundreds of prisoners without imposing any condition(s). As a result, they are often released from prison immediately. These could be classified as free or unconditional pardons. However, Ugandan legislation is silent on the grounds on which a free pardon may be granted and whether a free pardon expunges a conviction. Relying on case law and legislation from countries such as South Africa, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, the author argues that since Ugandan legislation does not provide that a free pardon should only be granted to a person who was wrongfully convicted of an offence, a free pardon does not expunge a conviction. Under Article 121(6), the President’s pardon powers do not extend to those convicted by a Field Court Martial. However, in Uganda Law Society and Another v Attorney General, the Constitutional Court held that Article 121 is applicable to cases where the offenders were convicted by a Field Court Martial. It is argued that this reasoning is contrary to the drafting history of Article 121(6). It is also argued that Article 121(6) is only applicable in cases where the Field Court Martial was operating during an
armed conflict. The Constitutional Court held that a prisoner has a right to petition the President to exercise the prerogative of mercy. It is argued that this view is neither supported by Article 121 nor any legislation. It is also argued that section 102 of the Trial on Indictments Act which provides for the role of the Minister in the prerogative of mercy process is contrary to Article 121(5) of the Constitution and should be interpreted to
bring it in conformity with the Constitution or be declared unconstitutional. Parliament may have to amend or enact legislation to expressly stipulate whether a free pardon expunges a conviction.

Determining the legally relevant location of digital evidence requires an analysis of the technical and legal aspects of obtaining such evidence by law enforcement. The problem relates to the complexity of determining the location of digital evidence, especially in the case of cloud storage, where data is often stored in various locations worldwide. The associated uncertainty regarding the location of digital evidence poses a significant legal challenge in cross-border evidence collection. This article acknowledges that the technical location of digital evidence is tied to the physical location of the storage unit. However, it also explores alternative ways to define the location of digital evidence based on existing regulations for cross-border collection of digital evidence. The problem of the location of digital evidence is analysed from the perspective of the concept of territorial jurisdiction in the digital age.

Przedmiotem artykułu jest analiza czynności sądu na tle modelu postępowania przygotowawczego w polskim prawie karnym. Rozważania rozpoczyna wstęp dotyczący etapowości i zagadnienia modelu procesu karnego. Segmentem, który jest szeroko analizowany w artykule jest postępowanie przygotowawcze. Po nakreśleniu kwestii wprowadzających, analizowane są kwestie historyczno-prawne tj. wybrane aspekty modelu sądowej kontroli postępowania przygotowawczego w okresie od 1918 r. do 1997 r. Autor wykorzystuje niniejsze rozważania w dalszej części pracy w celu wskazania wpływu modeli, które już nie obowiązują, na aktualne uregulowania. Następnie omawiana jest rola czynności sądu w postępowaniu przygotowawczym wynikającą z aktualnego brzemienia Kodeksu Postępowania Karnego z 1997 r. Tłem rozważań jest zastany model postępowania przygotowawczego. W końcowej części artykułu autor przechodzi do wniosków de lege lata i de lege ferenda w zakresie optymalnego modelu procedury karnej. Jego zdaniem polskie postępowanie karne gruntownego przemodelowania poprzez wprowadzenie nowego organu do postępowania przygotowawczego – niezawisłego sędziego ds. postępowania przygotowawczego oraz określenia katalogu czynności tego sędziego w duchu praworządności, obiektywizmu i sądowej ochrony praw człowieka.

The study deals with the illegal abuse of cryptocurrency-mining, the phenomenon of the so-called ‘cryptojacking’, which is such an unknown crime that it has not even had a Hungarian name so far. The aim of the study is to examine the illegal mining of cryptocurrencies – as an abstract act – giving a detailed description about their characteristics and their place in the present Hungarian criminal law system. A further aim of the study is to make suggestions to the legislature and law enforcement bodies for the criminal assessment of the illegal mining of cryptocurrencies, based on the review of the relevant legal acts and the related cases.

The article is of a theoretical and empirical nature, presenting the main problems of child pornography and the assumptions of the amendment to the Penal Code of July 7, 2022 in the scope of Art. 202 of the Penal Code, hereinafter referred to as “Zmkk2022”. In addition, the study presents the results of a public opinion survey regarding the penalties for the crime of child pornography and their comparison with legally applicable regulations, as well as the statistics of penalties imposed by courts. The survey was carried out in March 2024 based on an original survey questiononnaire of a group of 236 respondents – students.

The article analyses “legal highs” in the context of recognising this substance as a substance harmful to health, covered by the crime of causing a threat to the life or health of many people (Article 165 § 1 item 2 of the Penal Code). Legal highs fall within the definition of both a substitute (Article 4 item 27 of the Act of 29 July 2005 on Counteracting Drug Addiction) and a new psychoactive substance (Article 4 item 11a of the Act on Drug Addiction). Nevertheless, the greatest axiological justification is to recognise them as a substitute. This already determines from the normative point of view their harmfulness to health. Not every legal high contains, by its nature, substances so harmful to humans that its use always results in a threat to the life or health of many people.