The subject of the present article is an attempt to outline the theory of transcendental recentivism. Transcendentalism is described here as a passage of the recens moment of being from the inchoative recensial to the parallel recensial which receives the name of the Supermonad. The recens moment of being is characterised by the suddenness of the explosion of the phenomena which later become situated on both sides of that recens. The suddenness of that explosion contributes to the loss, by the existential recensial, of the metaphysical sense.

Each ethical system produces its morality: either open or closed, static or dynamic, and it leaves man less and less of free space. It happens that it demands from us only that our life should become fitted into a straitjacket of rules. The present article contains reflections on the open morality a possibility of which is included in J. Banka’s independent ethics, the ethics of right-mindedness. The problem is in fact much more complex because it is based on the assumption of the openness of this kind ethics towards other systems of moral philosophy, and, particularly, towards Christian ethics. The dynamic and open morality generated by the ethics of right-mindedness is crowned by the model of homo euthyphronicus. In this way, the modem man receives an independent and autonomous ethical system which, in exceptionally unfavourable conditions (connected with Post-modernism), allows us to keep our individuality and creative outlook on life.

The author of the present article undertakes the moral and ethical problem included in the question whether the sequencing of the DNA chains provides us with an absolutely reliable foundation upon which we may pass judgements on the identity of a human being. The views and opinions of scientists on this question are divided. The author undermines the absolutist thinking in this respect, and suggests the possibility for the “genetic reality” to admit mistakes.

The author presents here MacIntyre’s views expressed in his most extensively discussed work "After Virtue". The author of the present article concentrates on the British philosopher’s views concerning the modern condition of the moral discourse, the origin of which MacIntyre identifies in the rejection of the pre-modem moral system derived from Aristotle. The philosopher, indicating those elements of the history of culture which led to the rejection of that scheme, attempts, being convinced of the social origin of ethics, to reconstruct the way of thinking that would conform with the Aristotelian categories, and to restore the notion of practice on which has founded his concept of virtues and of the narrative unity of human life. In its last part, the author points to the most controversial elements of the presented conception and expresses his criticism of some of MacIntyre’s statements.

The present article, together with the already published texts An Attempt at a Definition of the Truth in the Hebrew Bible on the Basis of its Opposites (“The Silesian Historical and Theological Studies” 2000, no. 33. pp. 104-126), and An Attempt at a Definition of the Truth in the Old Testament (“Polonia Sacra” 2001, in print since July 2000), constitutes a part of a larger whole devoted to the understanding of the truth in the Hebrew Bible (further on referred to as HB). This article, as opposed to the other ones, does not define the notion of truthfulness either by means of negating the meaning of the Hebrew terms which in HB are opposed to the truth, or in a “direct” way, i.e. by means of analysing the meaning of 38 Hebrew terms which appear in Polish translations of HB as: prawda (the truth), prawdziwy (true), prawdomówny (truthful), prawdziwie (truly), or doprawdy, naprawdę, zaprawdę (forsooth, in truth, verily). The author concentrates instead on achieving his purpose by examining the terms synonymous with the nouns ’emet, and ’emunah which carry in themselves the idea of truthfulness. The criterion on the basis of which synonymity is discovered consists in the existence of semantic links demonstrated, for example, by mutual substitution, parallelism, connecting with the
help of conjunction, or hendiadys. Thus the results of the author’s research cast some light on the meaning of the idea of “truthfulness” in HB in a third way, independent from the two former ones. Owing to the research devices used here, we are going to be able to define precisely the meaning of ’emet and ’emunah, which should be achieved on five levels (from the most detailed to the most general): 1) directly by examining the meaning of the terms semantically connected with the above mentioned ones; 2) on the basis of the meaning of the Hebrew roots from which the discussed terms are derived; 3) through the meaning of the aspects under the heading of which the said terms may be linked on the basis of the criterion of synonimity; 4) by the meaning of the terms that appeared as a result of combining synonymous aspects; and 5) by the meaning of the groups of such dimension. On each of the above levels, apart from the content of the analysed terms (roots, aspects, and dimensions), we are going to establish the sequence of their appearance and proportions, which will make it possible to compare the results of the research on truthfulness in HB obtained in all three above mentioned ways. As far as the author knows, such an analysis that would include the whole of HB has not yet been carried out, and, even though in some studies it is possible to find statements emphasising the importance of such research, in none of them will we find a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon, and all of them taken together do not offer any synthetic conclusions.

The present article shows the development of anthropological reflection in the scholarly and philosophical works by Włodzimierz Sedlak. The process of shaping the field of research proper to naturalist anthropology has been presented against the background of reflections on the bio-electronic vision of life. It is exactly against this background that the concepts of homo electronicus and of homo comicus, with the problems peculiar to them, can come into being. The naturalistic vision of man may serve as a point of departure for analyses belonging already to philosophical anthropology. The problems typical of the philosophical analysis implies questions of a metaphysical nature. Within the framework of theological anthropology, the problem of the relationship between man and God. Reflections on this subject are characteristic of Christian evolutionism and personalism.

The author treats conformism as a prerequisite for one’s adaptation to life in the world. The key notion here is the category, introduced by the author, of the “co-fonn”, for a conformist is a person who always creates his or her special “co-form” with the world in which they happen to live. The author perceives the source of conformism to reside in people’s desire for social approval. The article takes into account also the role of conformism in the wielding of power.

For the present article, the statement that the foundation, or rather legitimisation, of Popper’s philosophy (both his epistemology, which the present work is devoted to, and his other fields of research) is a defence of rationality (no matter whether we talk of the rationality of acting, thinking, science, or of something still different) is of crucial importance also because the process of cognition, according to Popper, is subject to rational principles. It is to the formulation of these principles, and to the proving of their existence that Popper devotes a large part of his work. The author thinks it is possible to treat his methodology of science, and the conception of the three worlds which provides an answer to the question of the relationship between body and mind and an evolutionary theory of science, as attempts to support his thesis that, in spite of man’s tendency to make mistakes, cognition is a rational process. The author of the present article demonstrates no. only that Popper strove to justify his faith in rationality; but also that his subsequent theories, perhaps with the exception of his social views, were produced as a result of the philosopher’s becoming aware that his achievements so far had failed to accomplish the desired purpose. Thus we should accept Popper s remark that his conception of the three worlds should not be treated too seriously. The conception in question is a peculiar declaration of the philosopher’s convictions, but it does not seem possible, without a fundamental restructuring of the conception itself, to use it, with significant results, for the task of solving the problems that so many scientists and philosophers grapple with. The statement that scientific theories exist as objectively as the objects of the physical world does not imply anything more than is implied by the acceptance of the thesis that scientific theories and science as such are products of the human consciousness the activity of which does not follow any rules. The purpose of science and the purpose of philosophy are, as a matter of fact, human purposes, and it is of little importance whether, in pursuing those purposes, we conjure, by means of special terminology, another world different from that of our daily experience, or we satisfy ourselves with the naive ontology based on common sense.

Kant’s reflection on the essence of transcendentalism was accompanied not only by his awareness of the novelty of his stance, but also by a methodological awareness that manifested itself in his preoccupation with the method and idea of philosophy. This preoccupation can be seen in his taking up such problems with great prudence, and avoiding ultimate solutions. Kant, being fully aware of the novelty of his stance, did not want to close the discussion on the idea and methods of philosophy, the discussion that has been going on since his time to the present day (in the 20th c. particularly within neo-Kantianism and Phenomenology).

The present article is an attempt to describe the cultural determinants of the categoryof tragicality, the determinants considered in relation to the very generally conceived cultural systems of the West and East (particularly the Anglo-European tradition, on the one hand, and the Japanese and Chinese ones, on the other, as the most characteristic for the discussed problem). The particular parts of the article concentrate on various differences in approaching the notions of transcendence, individualism, natural and normative law. Summing up, the author makes a list of the features conditioning, in a given culture, the development of a tragic consciousness that influences the formation of a specific vision of the universe.

The progress of knowledge and technology has damaged the original unity of the material and spiritual culture which existed in antiquity. A particular role in the split of these two subordinating branches of culture, and in their disproportionate development was played by the paradigm of scientism in the period of the Enlightenment, and, later and up till now, by the paradigm of commercialism. The material culture became more quickly a commodity than the spiritual culture which only recently was made to obey the rules of a free market economy. Consequently, the material culture developed at a much faster rate than the spiritual culture. In such circumstances, it is difficult to talk about a balanced development of culture as a whole. Nevertheless, there has appeared a chance for a balanced and harmonious development of both cultures within the framework of the ecological paradigm which, in the future, is sure to replace the paradigms of scientism and commercialism that have been hitherto considered valid.

The subject of the present article is the problem of a nation in the historical and philosophical conception of Feliks Koneczny, a Polish philosopher and historian living in the years 1862-1949. The main topic of the present study is preceded by a brief outline of the model conceptions of a nation, particularly the cultural and political models. The author’s analysis of F. Koneczny’s approach is opened by the question of treating a nation as an ethical superstructure of the society. Further on, the author tackles the problem of the factors which, in keeping with the discussed theory, are supposed to condition the formation of a nation. Taking into account the historical dimension of this phenomenon, the reflections of that philosopher of history, concerning the formation of modern nations, have been presented. Particular emphasis has been placed on the civilisational aspect of a nation, the concept of which, in F. Konieczny’s theory, was directly connected with the problem of one’s native country and native language. The article is closed with the author’s remarks on the presence of neo-Messianic motifs in the analysed concept of a nation.