O szczurach i ludziach I: Pragmatystyczne podejście do wolnej woli jako wyzwanie dla dychotomii człowiek-zwierzę
Abstrakt
The article is the first part of a triptych on agency. It critically analyses those arguments drawing from the notion of free will (FW) that most frequently resurface in discussions of non-human minds within the context of the human-animal divide. By embedding the investigation within pragmatic philosophy, backed by broadly understood cognitive sciences, the author argues that this web of assertions is unconvincing, as FW’s ontology: 1) is inconsistent with current empirical knowledge; 2) appears to be a superficial construct, failing to reflect the intricacies of human decision-making processes; and 3) is inconsequential for experience. Rather than being a unique capability of the mind, FW reveals itself as an anthropocentric and WEIRD-made artefact, which lacks explanatory power regarding human behaviour. As such, when applied to non-human species, it qualifies as anthropofabulation. Consequently, the author proposes replacing FW with an empirically informed concept of agency derived from Karl Friston’s free-energy principle, supported by insights from the processual philosophy of biology. Such a framework allows for capturing the nature of agency in its advanced form, plausibly shared with at least some other species. It thus facilitates the construction of gradable concepts of moral agency, in the likes of Mark Rowlands’s category of “the moral subject.” Subsequent articles will discuss this subject matter further.
Słowa kluczowe
pragmatism; Free Will; human-animal dichotomy; anthropofabulation; Mark Rowlands
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Uniwersytet Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie Polska
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7734-8484
Zbigniew Słuszkiewicz jest absolwentem filozofii Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego w Krakowie (2007). Ukończył również z wyróżnieniem studia podyplomowe na kierunku Pedagogika Specjalna (2012): Autyzm, Zespół Aspergera oraz inne całościowe zaburzenia rozwojowe – diagnoza i terapia (2015) w Wyższej Szkole Biznesu w Dąbrowie Górniczej (2015) oraz Psychologia Kryzysu i Interwencji Kryzysowej na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim w Krakowie (2019). Obecnie doktorant UKEN w Krakowie. Jest absolwentem Diverse Intelligences Summer Institute 2021, wspieranego przez grant Fundacji Johna Templetona i prowadzonego przez Uniwersytet Kalifornijski w Los Angeles. W 2022 roku otrzymał grant naukowy PRELUDIUM od Narodowego Centrum Nauki na dwuletni program badawczy zatytułowany „Pragmatyczny zwrot w poznaniu ucieleśnionym i kategoria »podmiotu moralnego« Marka Rowlandsa”. Na co dzień pracuje jako nauczyciel etyki i terapeuta behawioralny w Centrum Autyzmu i Całościowych Zaburzeń Rozwojowych w Krakowie.
Utwór dostępny jest na licencji Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa – Na tych samych warunkach 4.0 Miedzynarodowe.
Właściciele praw autorskich do nadesłanych tekstów udzielają Czytelnikowi prawa do korzystania z dokumentów pdf zgodnie z postanowieniami licencji Creative Commons 4.0 International License: Attribution-Share-Alike (CC BY-SA 4.0). Użytkownik może kopiować i redystrybuować materiał w dowolnym medium lub formacie oraz remiksować, przekształcać i wykorzystywać materiał w dowolnym celu.
1. Licencja
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego zapewnia natychmiastowy otwarty dostęp do treści swoich czasopism na licencji Creative Commons BY-SA 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/). Autorzy publikujący w tym czasopiśmie zachowują wszelkie prawa autorskie i zgadzają się na warunki wyżej wymienionej licencji CC BY-SA 4.0.
2. Oświadczenie Autora
Autor deklaruje, że artykuł jest oryginalny, napisany przez niego (i współautorów), nie był wcześniej publikowany, nie zawiera stwierdzeń niezgodnych z prawem, nie narusza praw innych osób, jest przedmiotem praw autorskich, które przysługują wyłącznie autorowi i jest wolny od wszelkich praw osób trzecich, a także, że autor uzyskał wszelkie niezbędne pisemne zgody na cytowanie z innych źródeł.
Jeśli artykuł zawiera materiał ilustracyjny (rysunki, zdjęcia, wykresy, mapy itp.), Autor oświadcza, że wskazane dzieła są jego dziełami autorskimi, nie naruszają niczyich praw (w tym osobistych, m.in. prawa do dysponowania wizerunkiem) i posiada do nich pełnię praw majątkowych. Powyższe dzieła udostępnia jako część artykułu na licencji „Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa-Na tych samych warunkach 4.0 Międzynarodowe”.
UWAGA! Bez określenia sytuacji prawnej materiału ilustracyjnego oraz załączenia stosownych zgód właścicieli majątkowych praw autorskich publikacja nie zostanie przyjęta do opracowania redakcyjnego. Autor/autorka oświadcza równocześnie, że bierze na siebie wszelką odpowiedzialność w przypadku podania nieprawidłowych danych (także w zakresie pokrycia kosztów poniesionych przez Wydawnictwo UŚ oraz roszczeń finansowych stron trzecich).
3. Prawa użytkownika
Zgodnie z licencją CC BY-SA 4.0 użytkownicy mogą udostępniać (kopiować, rozpowszechniać i przekazywać) oraz adaptować (remiksować, przekształcać i tworzyć na podstawie materiału) artykuł w dowolnym celu, pod warunkiem, że oznaczą go w sposób określony przez autora lub licencjodawcę.
4. Współautorstwo
Jeśli artykuł został przygotowany wspólnie z innymi autorami, osoba zgłaszająca niniejszy formularz zapewnia, że została upoważniona przez wszystkich współautorów do podpisania niniejszej umowy w ich imieniu i zobowiązuje się poinformować swoich współautorów o warunkach tej umowy.
Oświadczam, że w przypadku nieuzgodnionego z redakcją i/lub wydawcą czasopisma wycofania przeze mnie tekstu z procesu wydawniczego lub skierowania go równolegle do innego wydawcy zgadzam się pokryć wszelkie koszty poniesione przez Uniwersytet Śląski w związku z procedowaniem mojego zgłoszenia (w tym m.in. koszty recenzji wydawniczych).
