The purpose of this article is to analyze the main assumptions and exegetical strategies used by representatives of the so-called invective interpretations of Xenophanes’ philosophy. In addition to the models of imputing scepticism or empiricism to the poet’s position, they constitute a third group of possible ways of reading the passage B 34 of the Colophonian. The article points where to look for weaknesses in the arguments proposed by the representatives of the understanding of B 34 as invective, and in what sense these interpretations can contribute to a deeper understanding of Xenophanes’ novel conception of philosophy, especially in the context of the development of individualistic archaic poetry. The need for further research that takes into account the key question of the positive component of the poet’s philosophy in invective interpretations will also be indicated.

The article opens by outlining the aporias present in contemporary theoretical approaches to art, including the stereotypical view of Plato’s alleged hostility towards art. What follows is a synthetic overview of the state of artistic culture, taking into account controversial theoretical perspectives and laying the groundwork for demonstrating the relevance of examining Plato’s insights. Further, the article discusses the concept of “basanistic pedagogy” (W.H.F. Altman), characterized by intellectual provocations designed to enhance critical thinking skills. Building on this foundation, the article analyzes the argumentation from The Republic and Philebus, focusing on cognitive competencies and the potential for formulating reliable evaluations of artworks. Further examination of Laws addresses the notion of “true judges” of art, emphasizing the substantive and moral qualifications of art critics. The analysis then shifts to the treatment of aesthetic pleasures in Laws and the formal approach to beauty in Hippias Major. Based on the collected arguments, the article elucidates the reasons for the ambiguity in Plato’s statements on art. The conclusion reflects on the academic tradition of educating artists, highlighting the potential for a constructive interpretation of Platonic reflections on art.

The problem of identity has only recently become the subject of research interest. There are many reasons why identity has become a much-debated issue; however, they all focus on the transformation of collective life in contemporary civilization, in which the bond between the individual and the community has changed significantly. The identity of the individual in traditional societies was not problematic. However, the change in self-identification is a hallmark of modernity as well as a harbinger of an individual’s identity crisis. It is possible to observe a decline in the authority of traditional cultural institutions and an expansion of consumer identity patterns. When analyzing changes in the cultural context of identity, one should be aware of the relevance of this dilemma. In modern societies, which have been subject to globalization processes, the previously preferred value hierarchies have fallen apart, and it is becoming increasingly difficult for individuals to choose their own identity.

In this article, I explore how the category of repetition, as developed in the philosophical writings of Søren Kierkegaard, is applied in the psychoanalytic teachings of Jacques Lacan, particularly as presented in the transcriptions of his seminars and the collection of his writings, Écrits. First, I examine how Lacan accounts for the functioning of the neurotic symptom drawing on Kierkegaard’s opposition of recollection and repetition. I then show how references to Kierkegaard’s Repetition inform Lacan’s conceptualisation of the three orders: the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary (RSI). Finally, I summarise the evolution of Lacan’s theoretical positions on the phenomenon of repetition within the context of the psychoanalytic clinic, and consider their relationship to the concept of repetition in Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophy.

The Polish translation titled Philosophy is part of the philosophical notebooks of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713). Alongside other passages that explore nature, goodness, and beauty, it summarizes the reflections developed during Shaftesbury’s time in the Netherlands. His opposition to religious fanaticism, emphasis on interpersonal bonds, and engagement with social and political issues position him as a thinker associated with Enlightenment thought. However, this article argues that the author of Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times was more closely aligned with ancient philosophical ideals. For Shaftesbury, philosophy was not primarily a theoretical inquiry into nature or human beings; rather, he regarded it as a practical guide to life – one that shapes fundamental human choices and cultivates a sound understanding of values.