Apart from universal principles regulating servitude, Roman law encoded also those that referred strictly to land servitude. These were the principles that specified their execution. The present article focuses on the praedia debent esse vicina principle, which was known already in Roman law. The author, relating to the opinions of jurists, not only analyses the significance of the aforementioned principle in Roman Law, but also makes an attempt at demonstrating it in the Polish civil law.

Wincenty Skrzetuski was a renown pedagogue, historian, lawyer, and political writer of the Stanislavian age. The aim of the present article is to discuss his views upon the so-called landed estate court (sąd zadworny), which included the relational court, the assessorial court, and the referendary court. Skrzetuski formulated his thoughts on this institution in the prominent work known as Prawo polityczne narodu polskiego [Political law of the Polish nation] published in the years 1782—1784. In this publication, he discussed the history of each of the aforemen- tioned courts, as well as their structure, functioning and the scope of cases adequate for them.

In this article, we present the history of divorce law in the Kingdom of Hungary. The reader is briefly informed about the Hungarian divorce law since the 11th century; however, attention is drawn primarily to Law XXXI/1894. This law, also known as the Marriage Act, was adopted for the Hungarian territory within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where it allowed dissolubility of Hungarian marriages. We describe the historical background of the adoption of the Marriage Act and the reaction of the Catholic Church to it. Next, there is an analysis of all divorce grounds according to the Marriage Act. A special attention is paid to Section 77, which softened the strictness of divorce law. Finally, an interesting effect of the Marriage Act beyond the borders of Hungary is demonstrated.

Up to the end of the World War I, the foundation of german constitutionalism was the monarchical principle. For many 19th-century state and law theoreticians in germany this principle was indeed synonymous to constitutionalism. Constitutionalism itself, in turn, was commonly identified with the contemporary monarchical system of german countries. On the other hand, the foundation of the constitution enacted in August 1919 in Weimar was the prin- ciple of democracy, which was set out in the Art. 1 of the constitution as the principle of the sovereignty of the nation. The principle of democracy took a specific form in the Weimarian con- stitution, combining direct democracy with representative democracy. The elements of the direct democracy were people’s initiative and referendum. The representative democracy, on the other hand, was realized by means of citizen rights with regard to the election of deputies to the Reich- stag and the president of the german Reich. Due to the lack of appropriate democratic traditions and a complex social and political situation of the Weimar Republic, the democracy did not gain a foothold in germany. Neither the mechanisms of direct democracy nor the ones of representa- tive democracy passed muster with the voters. The referendum was held twice, however due to the low electoral turnout it was not valid. Also, the presidential election was conducted twice, and it was won by the opponent of parliamentary democracy, the marshal Paul von Hindenburg. In contrast, the results of parliamentary elections usually resulted in the political split of Reichstag. yet, up to the beginning of 1930s new governments managed to be set up, which were supported by the parliamentary majority. In the final years of the Weimar Republic, however, such a pos- sibility did not exist. A habit was formed of convening the so-called presidential cabinets. These were the governments convened by the President which took advantage of his support, and their activity was enabled by the President’s emergency powers specified by the Art.48, par. 2 of the constitution. It turned out that the actual demise of Weimarian democracy was the takeover of the government by Adolf Hitler in January 1933 as a consequence of the electoral success of his Nazi Party.

The article presents the works of Codification Commission in the Second Republic of Poland on the specific section of the penal code. It considers the discussion on the reports of Juliusz Makarewicz and Stefan glaser on offences against the so-called morality.

The article not only emphasizes the views of the most prominent lawyers of the interwar period on the issues of sexual freedom, but also underlines the ideological differences regarding this matter. It also points out to a universal contribution of contemporary codification works to the understanding of the degree of state interference with the sexual freedom of an individual. Most of the opinions and legislative solutions of that time has remained unchanged up to this day, which only emphasizes a universal value of the presented discussion.

The view that the press has an almost unlimited power of influencing public opinion is hard to question. For this reason, legal regulations regarding the press have frequently been dependent on the current political system. State authorities, being aware of the impact that the press may have on public opinion, have been eager to create the press law. The years 1919—1939 were a period of increased legislative activity with respect to the press law on the territory of Poland. The legal acts that were passed at that time aimed not only at eliminating particularisms stemming from the regulations practised by the invading countries, but also at shaping the limits of the freedom of press so as to enable the authorities to control the content of the published texts. Therefore, the present article analyses individual press law acts applicable in the years 1919—1939 for the legal structures that affected the degree of freedom of speech granted to the press. Also, an attempt has been made at answering the question whether the contemporary po- litical situation has affected the shape of the press law.

After gaining independence, the Second Republic of Poland had to face many chal- lenges, among which the unification of the political system was the most important one. It deter- mined the stability of life, the homogeneity of the political system, the elimination of regional particularisms, and the construction of the basis which would unite social structure. This process faced obstacles that were frequently impossible to overcome. It was vital to reconcile contradic- tions with challenges imposed by various factors based on inner conditioning and additionally reinforced with a catastrophic economic situation, with a complex social and national condition, as well as international situation.

In literature on the codification of the civil law in Poland after the WWII, the years 1950—1954 are a research gap. The preparation of the draft of the Civil Code in 1951 remains al- most an unknown fact. The aim of this article is to present the work on the last book of this draft and solutions adopted herein. It is worth paying a closer attention to them, as they formed a clear example of progressive stalinization and compulsory transplantation of the Soviet patterns. The circle of statutory heirs was significantly narrowed, the freedom of testation was heavily re- stricted. Testate succession became almost completely meaningless. Under the former name of “legitime”, a reserve system (a forced share) was introduced. Testator could dispose of only a half of his assets, the rest had to be preserved for the benefit of the forced heirs. The responsibility for debts had been limited in a way which caused a high risk for creditors. The hastily prepared draft contained many gaps and errors. However, the political climate was not conducive to taking into account the remarks made to the draft.

In the fonds of the Ministry of Justice located in the resources of the Archives of Modern Records, materials have been compiled which concern the cooperation between the Ministry of Justice in People’s Poland and the justice departments of socialist countries. Among them, we can find reports (accounts) of trips and visits of delegations, correspondence containing information about the functioning of individual institutions of the judicature, and other files. The retained documents allow for looking into some aspects of the functioning of justice departments from the internal perspective and from the point of view of some separateness of units subor- dinated to them within ideologically and politically uniform Eastern Block. After the important visit of the Soviet justice department in Poland in 1955 and the return visit of the Polish delega- tion in the USSR in 1956, the cooperation between these departments ceased. The renewal of the contacts of the Polish justice department with the USSR in 1959 gave rise to regular visits of Polish delegation both in the USSR (1962, 1965, 1966), as well as in the countries of people’s de- mocracy (Czechoslovakia, gDR, Bulgaria, and Hungary). Obviously, the intensification of these contacts was characteristic to the changing political climate and a some uncertainty caused by, among others, the evolving practice of the judicature of the USSR, which preceded formal acts.

For Czechoslovakia disappeared in terms of international law by dismembration — dividing, none of new-arisen states — neither the Czech republic nor the Slovak republic was identical to the previous subject of international law — Czechoslovakia. Therefore both successor states in most cases had to apply for membership in different international organisations, which was in the overwhelming majority of cases successful. This arose also from the fact that neighbouring states officially expressed — even before the dissolution — the willingness to acknowledge both republics immediately after getting their independence.

Regardless of the correctness of the dissolution with all its consequences, it is important that both successor states were able to join the international community successfully and nowadays they are actively cooperating and we can qualify the relations between them as above-standard.

The article is dedicated to the comparative analysis of the Islamic legal culture and the Western legal culture. The article points out to the differences of those legal cultures and tries to find their roots. The author considers this problem in several basic contexts: the sources of law, the variability of law, the obligation of submission to law, the limits of legal system, the relation of law to morality, the functions which are attributed to law and the role of religion in public space. The paper examines each of them penetratingly. With reference to the author’s viewpoint, a prime difference between the Islamic and the Western legal cultures comes down to the number of normative systems possible to single out while examining the former or the latter. Accord- ing to the text, in the Islamic legal culture there exists one universal normative system which includes legal rules as well as moral standards, unwritten laws, courtesy instructions, etc. On the other hand, the Western legal culture is characterized by strict separation between legal rules and other standards which belong to morality or customs. At the end of the article the author attempts to formulate a standpoint referring to the future of the Islamic and the Western legal cultures.