Apart from universal principles regulating servitude, Roman law encoded also those that referred strictly to land servitude. These were the principles that specified their execution. The present article focuses on the praedia debent esse vicina principle, which was known already in Roman law. The author, relating to the opinions of jurists, not only analyses the significance of the aforementioned principle in Roman Law, but also makes an attempt at demonstrating it in the Polish civil law.

Wincenty Skrzetuski was a renown pedagogue, historian, lawyer, and political writer of the Stanislavian age. The aim of the present article is to discuss his views upon the so-called landed estate court (sąd zadworny), which included the relational court, the assessorial court, and the referendary court. Skrzetuski formulated his thoughts on this institution in the prominent work known as Prawo polityczne narodu polskiego [Political law of the Polish nation] published in the years 1782—1784. In this publication, he discussed the history of each of the aforemen- tioned courts, as well as their structure, functioning and the scope of cases adequate for them.

In this article, we present the history of divorce law in the Kingdom of Hungary. The reader is briefly informed about the Hungarian divorce law since the 11th century; however, attention is drawn primarily to Law XXXI/1894. This law, also known as the Marriage Act, was adopted for the Hungarian territory within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where it allowed dissolubility of Hungarian marriages. We describe the historical background of the adoption of the Marriage Act and the reaction of the Catholic Church to it. Next, there is an analysis of all divorce grounds according to the Marriage Act. A special attention is paid to Section 77, which softened the strictness of divorce law. Finally, an interesting effect of the Marriage Act beyond the borders of Hungary is demonstrated.

Up to the end of the World War I, the foundation of german constitutionalism was the monarchical principle. For many 19th-century state and law theoreticians in germany this principle was indeed synonymous to constitutionalism. Constitutionalism itself, in turn, was commonly identified with the contemporary monarchical system of german countries. On the other hand, the foundation of the constitution enacted in August 1919 in Weimar was the prin- ciple of democracy, which was set out in the Art. 1 of the constitution as the principle of the sovereignty of the nation. The principle of democracy took a specific form in the Weimarian con- stitution, combining direct democracy with representative democracy. The elements of the direct democracy were people’s initiative and referendum. The representative democracy, on the other hand, was realized by means of citizen rights with regard to the election of deputies to the Reich- stag and the president of the german Reich. Due to the lack of appropriate democratic traditions and a complex social and political situation of the Weimar Republic, the democracy did not gain a foothold in germany. Neither the mechanisms of direct democracy nor the ones of representa- tive democracy passed muster with the voters. The referendum was held twice, however due to the low electoral turnout it was not valid. Also, the presidential election was conducted twice, and it was won by the opponent of parliamentary democracy, the marshal Paul von Hindenburg. In contrast, the results of parliamentary elections usually resulted in the political split of Reichstag. yet, up to the beginning of 1930s new governments managed to be set up, which were supported by the parliamentary majority. In the final years of the Weimar Republic, however, such a pos- sibility did not exist. A habit was formed of convening the so-called presidential cabinets. These were the governments convened by the President which took advantage of his support, and their activity was enabled by the President’s emergency powers specified by the Art.48, par. 2 of the constitution. It turned out that the actual demise of Weimarian democracy was the takeover of the government by Adolf Hitler in January 1933 as a consequence of the electoral success of his Nazi Party.

The article presents the works of Codification Commission in the Second Republic of Poland on the specific section of the penal code. It considers the discussion on the reports of Juliusz Makarewicz and Stefan glaser on offences against the so-called morality.

The article not only emphasizes the views of the most prominent lawyers of the interwar period on the issues of sexual freedom, but also underlines the ideological differences regarding this matter. It also points out to a universal contribution of contemporary codification works to the understanding of the degree of state interference with the sexual freedom of an individual. Most of the opinions and legislative solutions of that time has remained unchanged up to this day, which only emphasizes a universal value of the presented discussion.

The newly-established Silesian voivodeship was one of those regions where most of the aforementioned problems were especially pronounced. It was connected with a vast decentraliza- tion which took the form of the autonomy that was granted to this voivodeship.

The present article discusses only a handful of examples that depict the conflicts which in practical terms manifested the differences concerning the extent of autonomous rights that had been attributed to the Silesian voivodeship. At that time, the conflicts were not accompanied by the doctrinal debate nor by any other legal discussion on the matter in question that would specify mutual relations between the central government units and the autonomous authorities, mainly the Silesian Sejm.

The problem of the autonomy of the Silesian Voivodeship and the constitutionality of the or- ganic statute became the subject of a serious doctrinal discussion after the adoption of the April constitution in 1935. The changes that had been introduced had a considerable influence on some political solutions of the Silesian voivodeship. This direction seemed to confirm the thesis about the inevitability of serious changes in the political structure of this voivodeship. The adoption of one of the two solutions, namely either the abolishment of the political system that guaranteed autonomy or its deep reconstruction, was just a matter of time.

In literature on the codification of the civil law in Poland after the WWII, the years 1950—1954 are a research gap. The preparation of the draft of the Civil Code in 1951 remains al- most an unknown fact. The aim of this article is to present the work on the last book of this draft and solutions adopted herein. It is worth paying a closer attention to them, as they formed a clear example of progressive stalinization and compulsory transplantation of the Soviet patterns. The circle of statutory heirs was significantly narrowed, the freedom of testation was heavily re- stricted. Testate succession became almost completely meaningless. Under the former name of “legitime”, a reserve system (a forced share) was introduced. Testator could dispose of only a half of his assets, the rest had to be preserved for the benefit of the forced heirs. The responsibility for debts had been limited in a way which caused a high risk for creditors. The hastily prepared draft contained many gaps and errors. However, the political climate was not conducive to taking into account the remarks made to the draft.

On 31st December 1992 Czechoslovakia disappeared from the map of the world. Of course, it is controversial if the dissolution was necessary, or it was possible to prevent it by some form of a Czechoslovak compromise.

The article is dedicated to the comparative analysis of the Islamic legal culture and the Western legal culture. The article points out to the differences of those legal cultures and tries to find their roots. The author considers this problem in several basic contexts: the sources of law, the variability of law, the obligation of submission to law, the limits of legal system, the relation of law to morality, the functions which are attributed to law and the role of religion in public space. The paper examines each of them penetratingly. With reference to the author’s viewpoint, a prime difference between the Islamic and the Western legal cultures comes down to the number of normative systems possible to single out while examining the former or the latter. Accord- ing to the text, in the Islamic legal culture there exists one universal normative system which includes legal rules as well as moral standards, unwritten laws, courtesy instructions, etc. On the other hand, the Western legal culture is characterized by strict separation between legal rules and other standards which belong to morality or customs. At the end of the article the author attempts to formulate a standpoint referring to the future of the Islamic and the Western legal cultures.