The core of the author’s considerations refers to the theory of recentivism developed by him. However, in the version of this philosophical direction presented here he introduces the new category of "abruptness" (Latin: subitum entis). Recentivism ascribes to nature the ontological tendency (the author uses the word “inclination”) to disrupt the continuity of phenomena and hide the essence of things in an emergency case. On this background recentivism proposes a new method of philosophising, a new type of reflection on man - the so called “rarity anthropology”. The author call abruptness a Rarity, or a world "created for one time”. Abruptness is the ability of reality to come to being only in the present and only for one moment. In this understanding events do not last, they do not produce conti­ nuity. The author analyses the consequences of accepting such a point of departure for the development of the theory of recentivism.

In the present paper the author attempts to analyse the main avowals and ideas contained within the anthropic principle on the basis of the theory of events elaborated by Józef Bańka. The task of such a "testing” of the anthropic principle with the theory of events is to gam its new elucidation. The result of the analyses is the principal conclusion that the main theses of the anthropic principle correspond to the conception of the theory of events.

The article presents the most important ideas of the anthropic principle on the background of the Józef Banka’s philosophy of recentivism. The anthropic principle evokes numerous discussions and controversies both in sciences and in philosophy. It is a manifestation of “anthropologisation” of the contemporary science, though of “anthropologisation” perceived differently than it is understood by philosophers. Instead of the notion of “cognising sub­ ject” the anthropic principle makes use of the notion of “observer” who or which can be a man an extraterritorial reasonable creature, or a quantum computer.

The article presents J. Bańka’s conception of ethics in the light of the recent publication titled „The Metaphysical Rap; or a Plea of a Lunatic from Opatów to Other Madmen” („Rap metafizyczny, czyli odezwa wariata z Opatowa do reszty szaleńców”). It also takes into consideration N. Postman’s thesis concerning the triumph of technology over culture (technopol) as well as the postmodernist meanders of normative ethics. The norm of straight­ forwardness, derived from human nature, is the evidence of trust to the individual who is conscious, mature, “awakened”. The author argues that this norm constitutes the actual alternative to the civilisation structures which deprive the individual of dignity and the possibility of self-realisation. This proposition can be situated on the principle of the coun­ terpoint to H. Jonas’s ethics of responsibility. On the one hand this proposition accentuates the necessity of the prognostic knowledge about the possible threats and a kind of education sentimantale as the preliminary conditions of ethics while on the other hand - an appeal to conscience and to the simplest feelings constitutive of the straightforward attitude of an individual to values.

The paper is an attempt at comparing the ideas of Parmenides of Elea and Wittgenstein from the time of Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Numerous scholars (Popper, Mourelatos. Wolniewicz, Gawroński, Blandzi) point to an affinity of Parmenides’s certain findings with L. Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. The problems approached by them (the relationship of thought to the world, the problem of the limits and the nature of thinking) seem to confirm the assumption of the existence of some parallels between those philosophers. It should be remembered, however, that their views on the subject of philosophy and its status were different. What cannot be questioned is the fact that they both were the “philosophers of problems” who asked fundamental questions and with a comparable eagerness were trying to answer them.

The author departs from a reminder that despite the excellent theoretical tradition in expressing the truth it still evades our expression. In order to restore the notion of truth the author suggests to abandon the Aristotelian metaphysics of substance and shift toward Plato's metaphysics of subsistence. The basis of this operation should be the analysis of Plato's dialogue titled Sophist. Instead of the absolute expression the author proposes the so called respective expression - i.e. an expression through reference “to another”. The author thinks that the dialectic procedure presented in Sophist reveals the respective structure of cognition within which the reciprocal, reflexive references and connections of ideas make possible both thinking and speech. From that moment being is no longer considered “for itself" but “in relation to another”. Translating the essence of such a capturing of the problem into the language of contemporary metaphysics the author arrives at the conclusion that the nature of the eidetic ontological structure has a respective character.

The considerations presented in the paper concentrate on two notions from the ancient Greek philosophy: thymos and paideia which, even at present, turn out to be very influential. We live in an overtechnicised society which, for human sake, has developed the most complicated of technologies. It cannot be thus surprising that those achievements have exerted a deep influence on the lives of people. Man has "really” become, or is becoming, the master of nature. In the attitude to benefits there disappears the usefulness of the theoretical knowledge resulting from self-evaluation, from reflection on oneself and on the spiritual reasons for action. Such a way of thinking does not belong to the usefully needed sphere. What is forgotten are such important matters as the mutual “enrichment” of one culture through another. We do not remember about the distinguished personages of this or that culture or a historical period. This problem has been in the philosophical-politological work of Francis Fukayama in the essays "The End of History?" and the "Last Man" in which, among others, he introduces the notion of "recognition” derived from Plato’s thymos in which he grasped its ethical dimension and which he accepted in its primary meaning, i.e. "valor”, “vitality” or in J. J. Rousseau’s sense of the term amour-propre. In the evaluating and interpretive sense this notion frequently co-occurs with the notions of the sense of personal dignity, dignity and respect. The importance of “recognition” is connected with the development of economics Fukayama answers the question of aim and values in accordance with Plato saying that when a people becomes richer, more cosmopolitan and better educated it demands not only a greater richness but also the recognition of its position. The second part of the paper contains reflections on problems discussed during the meeting of the 2O'h World Congress of Philosophy held in Boston. It can be said that they concentrated on: appreciation of minority philosophy as a part of cultural pluralism; broadening of intercultural dialogue, acceptance of diversity and pluralism of truth, freedom of discussion, openness on different world views. An important issue was the guidance towards the education of people, especially the young ones, as it is helpful in solving intellectual conflicts and in shaping the intellectual integrity. The notion of paideia was referred to in this case. The task is to teach how to live a morally and intellectually independent lives. The basis is also to be the ethical education without authorities which will enable man to investigate the sense of existence and to find orientation in the world by himself or herself. This means that already from childhood it is necessary to teach generally human ethics or philosophical ethics, which will prevent an inflation of human rights.

The article is devoted to the presentation of the position of Henry of Ghent in the controversy concerning the real difference between essence and existence. Henry was the first to strongly oppose Gilles of Rome's thesis that essence and existence really differ by way of things - inter rem et rem. Henry's position was based on assuming a different solution. He claimed that in the case of essence and existence we do not deal with the real difference or with mental difference, but with a specific type of difference as a relation to something third. For if we state that something exists we indicate that is has a cause, that it is causal. Hence existence is intentionally different from essence, i.e. it points to the cause of a given being which is the cause of its such and not other essence. Henry's idea of difference played an important role in the subsequent development of the controversy.

Francisco Suarez’s (1548-1617) philosophy remains as it were in the background among various philosophical systems which have emerged in history. It seems to be deeply rooted in scholasticism and it was for this reason suspected of being anachronic. On the other hand it was also suspected of departure from St. Thomas Aquinas ideas of a distortion of his thought. In its essence, however, this thought is a synthesis of different currents in
scholasticism (Tomism, Scottism, nominalism) and though it principally does not go beyond the limits of this kind of practicing philosophy, within those limits it is new and different enough as to significantly influence the emergence of 17lh-century thought. This thought owes its originality first of all to its synthetic character. Themes taken from different Medieval philosophical traditions constitute a new quality. Suarez unexpectedly puts together genetically different elements so that it seems on the one hand to reject them all without accepting any of the solutions proposed by them in their pure form, while on the other he preserves them though creating a qualitatively new thought. He takes such a position in the traditional disputes taken within the oppositions:  monism/dualism/pluralism, nominalism/realism or in the controversy concerning the nature of matter. In fact, despite the declared faithfulness to tradition (especially the Tomist tradition) he does not accept any of the traditional solutions bringing in new proposal which are neutral in the face of the existing ones. The synthetic character of this philosophy universal enough to be also expressible in the language of the basic traditions of the antique philosophy so that what can be perceived in his conception is an attempt at reconciling Parmenideism, Platonism, Arstotelism and Stoicism as well.

The article is devoted to a presentation of the persona and the ideas of Bernard Mandeville. This author is frequently omitted in the history of ethics, and if his ideas are remembered, then only in a fragmentary way. Mandeville's output deserves a higher evaluation - his analyses of man, morality, and society were innovative in the 17lh century, they are achievement of the English Enlightenment, and the significance of his anthropology goes beyond the epoch in which he lived.

Like many philosophers today, Sir Karl R. Popper asserts: “Ethics is not a science.” Three arguments are described with which Popper supports his claim: (1) the dualism between facts and standards; (2) the idea of truth is not applicable to standards; (3) the so-called scientific ethics kills the personal responsibility of humans. Against these suggestions, the author argues that the dualism between facts and standards can be overcome with simple „bridging principles”; parallel to the idea of truth in the sciences there is the regulative idea of life, protection and fulfillment of life - albeit with one decisive difference: whereas the scientist can reach only an approximation to truth which makes him criticize and revise scientific findings, the value of life can be reached and can be realized. Life as both the foundation and goal of ethics makes it more than a mere science, it makes ethics a part of wisdom. Ethics is science as well, because the critical method, learning and testing by trial and error, is applicable in ethics as it is in science, and is, when properly used, strengthening personal responsibility.

The article is an attempt at having a closer look - both content-related and historical - at an interesting thought orientation which in 1880s and 1890s in Poland was represented by neo-criticism. One of the representatives of the second stage of the Polish positivism was Marian Massonius - the thinker best “armed with theory” active at that time. For this reason the article contains a proposal of a new, deepened insight into that stage of the shaping of the Polish thought through the prism of the work of Massonius seen not only as the philosopher who was an active participant of the philosophical movement of 1880s and 1890s in Poland, but firs of all one of its creators. In can be maintained that this philosopher was on the one hand a representative of criticism related to Kant though taking independent position, and on the other hand a representative persona of the Polish positivist philosophy. For this reason it seems that the analysis of his output allows for a better and fuller understanding of the epoch of positivism in Poland and especially of its last phase - neocriticism.

The paper deals with the situation in the Czech philosophy at the break of 19th and 20th centuries considered on the background of the social-national and political life of the Czech nation, considerations over that situation have been carried out in three aspects: 1) the relation of Czech philosophy to European philosophy; 2) the crisis of philosophy and, generally, the social crisis and the crisis in which man has found himself; 3) practical-utilitarian character of the Czech philosophy. In the first case, despite some unfavourable opinions about Czech philosophical thinking, the activity of Czech philosophers at that time was significant - the periodical „Česka mysl” begins to appear as well as works relating to main European philosophical currents. In the second aspect - the crisis concerns the historical conditioning of the reflection on the situation which is connected with a kind of impatience. The totality of culture was submerged in the atmosphere of the end of the century, revaluation of values, the beginning of Modernism. The consciousness of the crisis determined the individual expressions of the authors, it became their basic point of reference. In the third case the Czech philosophy, though with exceptions, looms as the so called marginal philosophy, as applied philosophy connected with some historical situation, interpreting that situation and reacting to the practical problems and their solving, as a philosophy which deals with questions considered to be socially current. In the works of the philosophers there showed itself one of the permanent features of the Czech philosophical thinking which is connected with the life activities, with everyday life. It was acknowledged because it proved the ability to solve practical problems and to answer the vital questions of our national and individual lives.

The author of the paper discusses Popper’s theory which he himself called “the theory of three worlds”. He tries to establish whether this conception can be treated as a tool of explanation of the essence of human cognition. In order to realise the task undertaken, the author assumes that this theory should not be treated either too strictly or too literally. He points out the difficulties resulting from a too consequent and too rigorous treatment of Popper’s theory. He simultaneously defines reasons for which Popper himself treated the conception of three worlds as a comfortable and useful metaphor rather than as a scientific theory. In his further considerations the author attempts to show the similarities and differences between Poppers theory of objective knowledge and I. Kant’s theory of perception as well as between Popper’s conception and A. Tarski’s theory of metalanguage. The author ends his article with showing some similarities between Popper’s theory and Freud's psychoanalysis.