The article focuses on the question of the law applicable to the sale or lease of the entirety of the assets of the enterprise in private international law. The author adopts the understanding of an enterprise in terms of its subject matter — a collection of assets tradable on a contractual or statutory basis (e.g., inheritance). The paper focuses on acts concerning an enterprise, which are effectuated between the living (inter vivos). The issue of acquiring an enterprise mortis causa is not covered. The main thesis defended in the article is the interpretation about the uniform law applicable to the right to an enterprise in the conflict of laws (as an opposite view to the concept of the severance of the law applicable to the enterprise). The text consists of the following parts: 1) comparative remarks, 2) transfer of an enterprise in the norms of uniform law, 3) determination of the law applicable to an enterprise, 4) scope of the law applicable to the enterprise in conflicts law, 5) the law applicable to contracts involving an enterprise, 6) the law applicable to the liability of the purchaser for the debts of an enterprise, 7) conclusion.

The article is a polemic against the views encountered in doctrine and case-law that a court is absolutely bound by an A1 certificate confirming the social security legislation to which a worker is subject - if it is proven that the certificate was obtained fraudulently. The thesis that there is no such obligation of the Court to respect the fraudulently obtained certificate, is derived from the existing prohibition in the EU order against the abuse of rights and the benefit of fraud and the obligations of the forum to determine and apply the applicable law of its own motion – on the grounds of dogmatic and critical method. The article proposes, following the position put forward by CJEU Advocate General Henrik Saugmandsgaard Øe, to assume that the court is not bound by the outcome of a dialogue and conciliation procedure aimed at removing a defective A1 certificate from circulation.

The text draws attention to the reasons underlying the solutions adopted in the current regulation of the Rome I Regulation with respect to the law applicable to (direct) insurance contracts. These reasons include the need to reconcile the diverse traditions of insurance market regulation and the necessity to deal with the complexities of the solutions adopted in EU law. The research objective of the study is to assess — taking into account the analysis and interpretation of the concept of risk location in an EU Member State under the Rome I Regulation — whether the current legal situation requires changes for the benefit of the service recipient (the policyholder, but also the insured). The basic thesis is that the current complexity, which is mainly the result of the evolution of the acquis communautaire, causes perturbations in the practice of applying European private international law. The importance of the three generations of insurance directives is also emphasized, which has historically resulted in discrepancies in the interpretation of the concept of the location of insurance risk as a connecting
factor. The Solvency II Directive and the conclusions drawn from CJEU case law (including the relevant opinions of the Advocates General) are of significant importance. In addition, it was assumed that the concept of risk location is not only relevant to conflict of laws, but also functions in public law, e.g. in solutions relating to the taxation of insurers. In summary, it was confirmed that such uniformity and linking this connecting factor solely to the policyholder as a party to the contract, may not necessarily be beneficial in practice, both in relation to private and public insurance law. The text also emphasizes that the key issue, albeit one that goes beyond the scope of the article, is the conceptual nature of risk itself, both in conflict of laws and substantive law.

The article discusses the impact of uncertainties about the legal nature of Article 15 of the Polish Commercial Companies Code on the outcome of the conflict-of-laws qualification of the requirement (resulting from this provision) to obtain the consent of the ownership body of the company to execute financing agreements with an officer of that company. This requirement can be viewed as concerning corporate, representation, or contractual matters. Depending on the presumed legal nature of this requirement, it is possible to categorize it under different laws — applicable to corporate, representation, or contractual aspects. In practice, this can cause significant doubt as to the effect of failing to obtain the consent of the ownership body. The article attempts to resolve these doubts and classify the consent requirement to the most appropriate law, taking into account its purpose, function, and nature. The article dwells also upon the functional links between the norms regulating this requirement and the purpose of the given conflict norm. The outcome of these considerations is that there are convincing arguments for classifying Article 15 of the Commercial Companies Code to the legis societatis within its scope, to the category of restrictions on representation.