Even though Husserl himself did not write on the history of philosophy in true sense, his work is in fact a peculiar dialogue with philosophical tradition - from rejection to almost complete acceptance. What distinguishes Husserl’s research in this area is its full subordination to phenomenological reflection. His views are revised by Eugen Fink, who (with reference to Heidegger) claims that man, while living within the history, is unconditionally subordinated to it. Hence, Fink bases his philosophy in a claim that man exists historically on account of worldly rule of separation and division in both labour and fight. Jan Patočka’s work in turn, offers an unusual synthesis of historico-philosophical reflection and asubjective phenomenology. This is one of the reasons for which it has prominent place in history of phenomenological movement. Patočka is maybe the first philosopher in 20th century who, in confrontation with Hegel’s profound model, engaged openly in analysis of philosophy of the history of philosophy.

The paper presents characteristics of the monad and dyad which might be found in aritmological treatise attributed to Iamblichus Chalcidensis. The treatise deals with the nature of and relation between principles of numbers - the monad and dyad. It contains mathematical analyses linked with traditional Greek theology, and ontological characteristics of the principles are derived even from etymological arguments. The treatise presents many problems, final solutions of which, for historical reasons, needs to remain guesswork. It is probable that Iamblichus, because of his attention for Pythagoreism, addressing the claism of Nicomachus, Antonius and “the ancients”, was in fact presenting also fragment of his own teaching concerning numbers and principles which organise the universe.

John Duns Scotus may be treated as a forerunner of a new way of thinking in metaphysics, which according to him is a transcendental science. In fact, he put his entire effort into developing a project of such a metaphysics. It should be taken as an alternative to Thomas Aquinas’ proposal, yet, what needs to be emphasised, the difference between them is not as strong as both Aquinas’ closest students and partisans of Thomism up to today may think. The innovation of Duns was to extend the subjective structure of cognition which enabled in-depth analyses of cognitive abilities of human mind. Thus, Scotus raised a distinctive question concerning the limits of any cognition possible and looked for the answer not in real subjectivity but in formally taken conditions of cognition which, on the one hand, are beyond real sphere, on the other, are not limited simply to the sphere of thinking, that is constituted by human mind. Metaphysics seen along such lines acquires a formal dimension, which, according to Scotus, makes it meet Aristotle’s demands of the most theoretical science concerning being qua being.

Re-establishing of the Cracow University in 1400 led to forming the Cracow School of philosophy being unique in its practicalism, tolerance, probabilism, concordism, eclecticism, Buridanism in philosophy of nature, ethics and anthropology, and focus on natural sciences, as well as in highlighting the methodological distinction of the orders of faith and knowledge, philosophy and theology. All of these characteristics might be found in the work of Benedykt Hesse, one of the main representants of Cracow academic community of the first half of 15th century.

The paper addresses Benedykt Hesse’s attempt to determine the category of relation through definitions and a list of its characteristics. I emphasise that the definitions were insufficient tool for philosophers of the Middle Ages and for this reason they used lists of their characteristics as well. In revived, 15th-century Cracow University Jean Buridan’s terministic concept was critically accepted and used for development of a new scientific formation - via communis - which tried to make an agreement between opposite philosophical standpoints, namely those of nominalism and realism, and hence invoking some historical background in the paper was necessary. Quotations from Benedykt Hesse were taken from his commentary on Categories from manuscripts of signatures BJ 2037, BJ 2043 and BJ 2455, as well as from anonymous commentary by one of Hesse’s students preserved in BJ 1900 manuscript.

The paper presents remaining manuscripts of Quaestiones in duodecim libros „Metaphysicorum” Aristotelis by Jean Buridan and the way in which they were divided into different redactions. Although Buridan’s commentaries were enormously popular at all European universities of late the Middle Ages and early Renaissance, they have not yet been adequately studied. Both their chronology and relations between different manuscripts in which the commentary was handed down remain unclear.
Nine manuscripts containing Buridan’s commentary to Metaphysics are known. The most important research on them were done by B. Michael and L.M. de Rijk. Their results show that there are probably three different redactions of this text. Redaction A seems to be the oldest one and it is dated from the earliest years of Buridan’s lectures at University of Paris (1340s). Redaction B is surely the newest one. There is also the third redaction, “the lecture from Erfurt” (lectura Erfordiensis), yet, its relation with other manuscripts has not been defined so far.
In my paper I focus on presenting the most important doctrinal, methodological and stylistic differences which make singling out of three redactions possible.

In the paper I present the Husserl’s idea of philosophy as a strict science (Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft) which he understood as universal and ultimately justified knowledge, free from any prejudices (Vorurteile) coming from naturalistic attitude. The prejudice of such an attitude is a thesis of the existence of the world (Thesis vom Sein der Welt). By complying with this thesis unreflectively, one becomes immersed in the world, which means that in the natural attitude the transcendental character of subjectivity remains unconscious and anonymous. This anonymity might be razed by transcendental reduction (transzendentale Reduktion), which aims at getting the transcendental ego rid of self-forgetting (Selbstvergessenheit). The subjectivity revealed this way is still, in its deepest aspects, anonymous as ultimately functioning ego (das letztfungierende Ich), for being an epistemological absolute, it is a source of reflection and through reflection it cannot become acknowledged. I discuss some difficulties related to the second type of anonymity in relation to Husserl’s demand of phenomenology realising the idea of philosophy as strict a science.

The paper discusses phenomenological reduction as the transformation of ego. Possibility of overcoming natural-objective attitudes leading to revealing of what is the first from which everything that is immediately given takes its sense, is what Husserl calls phenomenological reduction (epoché). This overcoming, which causes a movement from natural attitude to more primal orientation in the genetic sense (meaning transcendental attitude), reveals the transcendental aspect of ego. Acknowledging the primacy of ego over other spheres of being, Husserl rehabilitates the value of subjectivity as transcendental sphere. For it shows that from transcendental point of view it is something more than the change of attitude. Exclusion from the world with reduction leads to revealing its transcendental reverse seen from the perspective of the transformed ego, the ego which acknowledges its constitutive life. With the change in the attitude the peculiar transformation change of ego follows, so that ego in the transcendental-phenomenological attitude becomes unprejudiced spectator of their own intentional (consciousness’) life.

The paper deals with Gerold Prauss’s critique of cognition taken as reflection of the surrounding reality in the consciousness of the agent (Abbildtheorie). The results of his critique are similar to the standpoint presented earlier by Neo-Kantians (Rickert, Cassirer). Prauss’s original contribution to the debate on theory of reflection consists in distinction between materialistic and non-materialistic theories of reflection, as well as in his argumentation basing on the notion of clarity (Deutlichkeit).

The author of the paper starts with reminding that recentivism (Latin: recens - actual) might be summarised in a claim that the depiction of certain event, although possible at all times, is true only at the present time. At the same time, the author explains that each act of existence is always a discovery of that existence. Seen along such lines, recentivism is a limitative idea taking some of the characteristics (such as being true or existence) as not reserved to some forms of time such as past and future. The author refers to Jan Łukasiewicz, who claimed that to understand future as “not ready yet” it is necessary to ascribe third value to propositions concerning future. Łukasiewicz also claimed that choice will be made between two-valued and infinitely-valued logic. With reference to this remark the author claims that Łukasiewicz’s infinitely-valued logic may be fulfilled in the horizon set by the recentivist ontology, which addresses every moment of “now” into “never ready” future. Hence, according to recentivism, to grasp the future as “never ready” n-value needs to be ascribed to propositions concerning future, that is, choice needs to be done in favour of infinitely-valued logic.

The aim of the paper is to compare the role played by logical analysis in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus and Russell’s On Denoting. Whereas in Russell’s work it is an important element of his argument in support of description theory, in his pupil’s it does not function this way. Russell, while analysing various propositions, including descriptions translates them into formal language, indicating that those propositions, despite the appearances, in fact do not denote. Logical analysis shall be a tool decisive in favour of Russell’s thesis. Wittgenstein similarly analyses some troublesome propositions (i.e. philosophical theses) and claims that they are meaningless. The difference is that Russell’s final conclusion is derived from logical analysis, whereas Wittgenstein’s from pure speculation. In Tractatus logico-philosophicus logical analysis is not a method thanks to which the author gets certain result, just as it was the case with his teacher and his On Denoting. In Wittgenstein’s early philosophy logical analysis concerns just a few technical problems connected only to some ideas from Principia mathematica, and not to the main subject of his work, which is the analysis of philosophical theses.

The paper addresses so-called slippery slope arguments, which are usually used as warnings against accepting a certain view or undertaking some action for the reason of their negative consequences. Two types of this kind of arguments might be recognised, which differ significantly: logical and empirical one. Logical slippery slopes are rarely well supported. Most common flaw they contain is so-called fallacy of assimilation. Empirical slippery slopes, on the other hand, are definitely much more powerful kind of argument. Their soundness depends on the truth of premise according to which decision A1 will finally lead to unwanted outcome An. Yet, the assessment of this premise, and in consequence of the entire argument, often demands specialist knowledge in the field.

The paper deals with so-called conspiracy theories, that is a kind of explanation of spectacular events, such as catastrophes and terrorist attacks, which is alternative to the mainstream explanations. What conditions should theory meet in order to become recognised as false or unjustified, that is “conspiracy”? Is it possible to draw up a standard test which could differentiate imaginary theories from the legitimate ones? Those questions are addressed in reference to the debate between Brian Kelley and Lee Basham.

The paper addresses history of German journal „Logos. Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur”. I discuss its genesis and principles (internationalism, criticism, pluralism). Establishing „Logos” was a decisive attack on the entire positivist, materialistic and mechanicist way of thinking of 19th century. The most important task of the journal was realisation of the postulate of building a scientific philosophy of culture. I refer also to the „Logos” later drift towards Nazism, which led to journal’s collapse.

F. W. J. Schelling worked on mythological issues through his entire lifetime and it had great influence on his philosophy. Unfortunately, there are very few who make a reference to Schelling while dealing with this matter, and even if they do, they mention only philosophy of revelation, which was developed in the last period of Schelling’s work. Mythological issues appear in Schelling’s works in reference to philosophy of nature, philosophy of identity, as well as to his historiosophy, theory of art, and theological issues. The paper aims at showing that in all those areas myth was not just a minor addition to the Schelling’s theory, but it played an important, often crucial role.

Review of Matuš Porubjak's book: Vôl’a (k) celku. Man and Community in the Words of Homer and Theognis. Pusté Úlany: Schola Pholosophica, 2010.

Review of Grzegorz W. Salamon's book: The Concept of Intuitive Cognition in John Duns Scotus. Niepokalanów 2007.

Review of Manfred Lurker's book: The Message of Symbols in Myths, Cultures, and Religions. Translated by Ryszard Wojnakowski. Warsaw: Aletheia Publishing House, 2011.

Review of Ireneusz Ziemiński's book: Metaphysics of Death. Krakow: WAM Publishing House, 2010.

Review of Anna Borowicz's book: Transcendentalism in Józef Tischner's Philosophy. Gdańsk: Gdańsk University Press, 2010.

Review of William James' book: Life and Ideals. Translated by P. Kostyło and S. Stańczak. Bydgoszcz: Kazimierz Wielki University Press, 2011.