The normative system originating at the beginnings of the Roman monarchy bound the sacral realm and the realm of law together in ways that made it impossible to distinguish between those two orders. It was not until the 5th century BCE, when the rising autonomy of law prompted the question of the impact of Roman beliefs on the formation of legal institutions, espe- cially the law of succession, highly reflective of religious convictions of the Romans in the early Republic. The law at that time, being formed by the college of pontiffs, or priests (pontifical ju- risprudence), remained under a strong influence of faith professed by society, at the core of which was domestic worship (sacra privata) practiced in order to provide families and gentes with prosperity. The regulations regarding succession were aimed to maintain its continuity by intro- ducing a universal successor (heres), linking an obligation to continue domestic worship with the patrimony (patrimonium), controlling a universal succession by way of pontiffs on the strength of the calatis comitiis will, and also by enabling the acquisition of an inheritance through usucapion (usucapio pro herede), and, finally, by broadening the scope of people responsible for religious rites to co-heirs (coheredes) and members of the gens (gentiles).

Marceli Chlamtacz was one of the representatives of the Lviv school of Roman law. One subject of his interests was the issue of fruits. He devoted an extensive monograph to the acquisition of fruits by a holder in good faith, entitled O nabyciu owoców przez posiadacza w do- brej wierze w klasycznem prawie rzymskiem z uwzględnieniem prawa cywilnego austriackiego i niemieckiego [On the Acquisition of Fruits by a Holder in Good Faith in Classical Roman Law, with a Consideration of Austrian and German Civil Law], where he attempted to demonstrate the interpolation of the rule of bonae fidei possessor fructus <consumptos> suos facit. The aim of this article is to present the Lviv scholar’s views regarding this issue. The author also includes the polemics of other Romanists with Marceli Chlamtacz’s views.

Researchers of the Roman-Catholic Church’s liturgy usually consider its histori- cal, cultural, and theological dimension, whereas its legal dimension is barely noticed. It can be observed when applying the Roman law methodology. Specific institutions, legal constructions and formulae become apparent in the specific gestures, words, and order of the liturgy. All this indicates that the latter carry specific legal meaning, and hence, specific commitments, which are legally binding. The research problem pursued by the author: Does the rite of ordination in the Roman-Catholic Church contain receptions of Roman law and are they noticeable? has been concluded positively. In her analysis of ordination, the author points out the undoubtedly Ro- man legal acts, such as mancipacio, nexum, and stipulacio. Moreover, using a legal-comparative methodology, she shows the hierarchy of the status of the bishop and the presbyter in the Church based on the model of a Roman family structure (pater familias) and indicates the change in the status of the presbyter in relation to the bishop after the latter’s laying on of hands (mancipacio). All of the above enables an analysis of other Church rites to examine the receptions of Roman law, shows the liturgy rituals as acts that are legal in essence and as such are legally binding, creates premises to put forward a hypothesis about the existence of a doctrine of liturgical law, and allows resolving cases using the method of Roman law.

Franciszek Ksawery Bohusz (1746—1820), Jesuit and diocese priest after the dissolu- tion of the monastery, was a man educated in philosophy, theology, and law. Between 1777—1778 and 1781—1782, he made long journeys abroad, during which he got to know Czechia, Germany, France, England, Austria, Italy, and Switzerland. These were the journeys of an intellectual, typical of the period of Enlightenment. Not only did he admire edifices worthy of interest, visit museums and libraries, but he also tried to gain knowledge of the political regimes, social and economic relations in the visited countries. His observations were diligently noted down in travel journals and finally edited upon his return to the country. A lot of comments concern court law: civil and criminal, particularly procedural law. The traveler was also interested in the administra- tion of punishments.

The references to law vary from extensive, comprehensive discussions of whole branches of law to prevailing brief mentions of particularly interesting legal institutions. The author attempts to offer a possible objective view of legal solutions he became familiar with, yet, does not always fully succeed. It is worth noting his commentaries on English law, which are not only exception- ally extensive, but also filled with not always well-justified praise. On the other hand, his evalua- tions of other legal systems, for instance Swiss, seem to be rather harsh and stereotypical.

Nevertheless, Franciszek Ksawery Bohusz’s observations on court law in the visited coun- tries deserve a thorough analysis since they let us assess their accuracy and the degree to which some foreign legal solutions found appreciation in his eyes.

The subject of the following article is the views of German jurist Bernhard Windsc- heid on law and its interpretation. Bernhard Windscheid is traditionally regarded as a prominent representative of pandectists, conceptual jurisprudence, and legal positivism. In legal historiogra- phy an opinion about an excessive formalism and detachment from reality in his studies was held for a long time and is still partially maintained. In most recent studies, however, that assessment has been revised, and a more diversified picture of Windscheid has emerged of a scholar who is hard to define by means of simple formulas. The analysis of his views on law and its interpretation conducted in this article leads to the conclusion that the traditional picture of Windscheid as a representative of „bloodless conceptual jurisprudence” is incorrect. According to Windscheid, the aim of the interpretation of law is to find out the legislator’s intention and realize it accordingly, which however, does not exclude taking into consideration under some circumstances the requirements of legal relations and transactions with values such as righteousness. In Windsc- heid’s concept, limits of the interpretation of law are drawn quite broadly, although he simulta- neously attempts to specify them clearly enough to prevent freedom of interpretation and not to jeopardize the certainty of law.

Regardless of which of these terms we are going to use, they will contain in essence, in their semantic layer a broad form of decentralization, perceived as a scope of competences ascribed to a given community and giving a local community vast freedom to realize their most required goals.

In federal systems, the accumulation, division, distribution, and administration of public finances can be covered by a collective notion of fiscal federalism. These financial relations are particularly interesting not only because by enabling funding of public tasks they are in fact a pillar of the state, but also because they are a kind of litmus test for changing social, economic, and political conditions. What is more, they perfectly reflect the model of federalism adopted in a country. Based on this, the author conducts an analysis of the development of financial relations in Germany and of its causes. She shows the „maturing” process of the German federation and adjusting its federal financial system to the new needs and goals of the state. A starting point for reflections is the establishment of a confederation of German states — German Confederacy at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. This article examines the most formative stages of federal fiscal relations starting from the strong federalism of the Second Reich and large dependence of central authority through the financial centralization of the Weimar Republic and complete liquidation of the federation during the Third Reich and continuing to the model of cooperative fiscal federal- ism introduced after World War II until the reunification of Germany in 1990.

The subject of this article is an analysis of Szymon Rundstein’s theory of a legal norm. In the first part of his study, the author discusses primary trends in the theory of law in inter-war Poland. Indicating that normative concepts had few supporters, the author simultane- ously notes that they attracted law practitioners dealing with legal theory. The second part is an attempt at reconstructing Szymon Rundstein’s views on legal theory. Having proposed his meth- odology, the author analyzes Szymon Rundstein’s statements regarding both a legal norm, a cen- tral category in his considerations, and a normative system. In conclusion, it has been pointed out that although Szymon Rundstein takes a very rigorous approach to the normative assump- tion about the “purity” of the theory of law, he appears to be fascinated with phenomenology and frequently alludes to psychological theories. Specifically, many references alluding to Leon Petrażycki’s tradition can be traced in his writings. Thus, Szymon Rundstein’s theory of a legal norm modifies the normative assumptions of Hans Kelsen and is an original concept that was developed under the influence of many theoretical-legal views. It undoubtedly has a lot to offer and requires “re-reading”.

Developing a system of appeals in court proceedings, both in criminal and civil cases, is a matter of particular interest for legal reformers, especially in times of political break- throughs. Admission of a full appeal, its limitation, or lack stems from the structure of the judi- ciary. Among priority tasks of the Codification Commission of the Second Republic of Poland was designing a system of appeals that would serve best the re-established Polish state. This article highlights the commission’s deliberations during work on the first Polish code of penal proceedings and during its far-reaching amendments. It discusses the standpoints of opponents and supporters of maintaining appeals from district court rulings decided by a judicial panel. Those problems have not lost their relevance. Until this day changes in a criminal lawsuit pri- marily attempt to streamline and accelerate penal proceedings. Under changing conditions, the search continues for the correct and adequate proportions between the protection of the defend- ant’s rights and the value of discovering the truth, the need for protecting public safety, fighting increasing crime, and protecting the victim’s interests.

This article is devoted to research into the origins of the idea of community property in Soviet law and its development in the Soviet study of family law, legislation, and judicature. The paper deals with regulations concerning property relations of spouses in the Soviet empire. The author examines conditions and circumstances of the adoption of the first Soviet codes of family law and indicates their characteristics. He also analyzes the impact of spouses’ work on Soviet marital property system.

In the first of Czechoslovak republic, mainly under the influence of the normative theory, started many legal researchers to pay attention to public law branches. Administrative law and self-government were not the exceptions. The discussion about self-government was focused mainly on the issue of its function in society. On the one hand, we are confronted with a political concept of self-government, and on the other hand, with a legal concept of self-gov- ernment. The political concept of self-government was based on the historic originality of local authorities and on the idea that self-government is a collective version individual that has natural rights. The theory of legal concept of self-government was based on the fact that, despite the historic originality of the municipalities, the State is the only sovereign on its territory. The mu- nicipality is therefore only subject of its power and its competence is being delegated by the state. Self-government is therefore a collective organization created by state.

This paper deals with an issue of legal representation throughout the history of Po- land, with special regard to the first decade after World War II. The Office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Poland created after the restoration of Poland’s sovereignty in 1918, providing a high quality of legal representation of the State Treasury, was reinstated by the communist authority after World War II in order to secure financial interests of the newly built people’s state. Nationalization of industry, an introduction of centrally-controlled economy, and expansion of the state administrative-economic apparatus to colossal proportions, however, led to a situation in which the centralized model of legal handling of the State Treasury ceased to be efficient. After the abolishment of the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Poland in 1951, the authorities attempted to implement a mixed model of legal representation. However, it only lasted for three years, and eventually, the Soviet model was copied — full decentraliza- tion of legal handling of the apparatus of authority, administration, and state-owned enterprises.

The decentralized model of legal management of the State Treasury’s interests remained in place unusually long, for over half a century. It outlasted the regime transformation by 16 years. Attempts to reinstate the centralized system of legal representation of the State Treasury were undertaken repeatedly (in 1990, 1992, and 1998). However, it was not until 2005, when the politi- cal climate was ready for this reform and the appointment of the Office of the Prosecutor General of the State Treasury, which resumed its activity in March 2006.

This article addresses the impact of politics and ideology on the development of law in the Polish People’s Republic during the Stalinist period. The entire legal system was influ- enced, and it was mostly visible within constitutional law and criminal law.

Bolesław Bierut’s persona demonstrates that statements made by the then highest ranks of the state apparatus were not without significance for the development and practical application of law. Abundant with ideology, Bierut’s addresses were a foundation for the continuing transforma- tions and justification for increasing repressive measures against actual and imagined enemies of the new authority. A tool for the revolutionary changes was the law.

In every state that has decided to introduce to its legal system the oversight of public administration by an administrative judiciary, one of the most crucial points appears to be the question of regulating the scope of such control. The creation of administrative courts itself does not guarantee proper and full protection of citizens against the actions of the authority. As is shown by the history of statutes of control, the legislator can de facto freely influence the judges in this matter by introducing either the so-called enumeration clause or a general clause.

Both aforementioned ways of determining the scope of contesting are derived from German legislation, in which Rudolf von Gneist’s and Otto Bähr’s concepts were „competing” over the years. The first saw the administrative judiciary mainly as an institution to protect the objective law order. For the latter, who put the individual’s rights first, it was pivotal that the administra- tive judiciary should provide full protection of citizens against the actions of the executive power. And it was the second of the two theories that led to a gradual disappearance of determining the object of protection in statutes regarding administrative court procedures by listing the categories of affairs liable to control (enumeration) with general clauses allowing submission of conceivably all activity of public administration to the cognizance of the courts.

The document discussed in this paper was prepared in 1950 by the Scientific-Advisory Committee, which was then operating at the Office of Minister of Justice. It was not released for publication, probably because of its highly controversial content. The Committee was established with an aim to promote Marxist-Leninist ideology in the Department of Justice and the study of law. The document contains the evaluation of fundamental legal textbooks which were the core of teaching law at universities at that time. In fact, it was a form of critique of their authors, the majority of whom did not apply Marxist ideology in their works. It was a most vicious attack and an outright threat against the professors meaning that no other approach would be tolerated. Some of the professors began to comply, but these were in the minority. Others applied the ideol- ogy on a very superficial level. Also, the textbooks of the deceased professors were criticized.