The article reconceptualizes truth not as a direct property of statements but as a metatheoretical construct for interpreting diverse theoretical frameworks. The author examines the main truth theories—coherence, correspondence, and pragmatic—demonstrating how each relies on distinct criteria tied to interpretive schemas. Problematic cases such as semantic paradoxes and self-referential statements are discussed to reveal the limitations of classical truth theories. Special emphasis is placed on how the metatheoretical perspective enables flexible reconfiguration of the notion of truth depending on research objectives, for instance in empirical sciences or philosophical text analysis. In conclusion, the author highlights the constructivist nature of truth and recommends treating it as an interpretive tool rather than an objective and immutable entity.

Noël builds on Désiré Mercier’s criteria of truth by presenting it as a complex act of the mind—compositio (uniting) and divisio (separating) predicate and subject—through which the intellect attains adequation of judgment. He argues that the intellect can directly operate on singular data about external objects without focusing on the phantasm itself, aligning with our practical cognitive experience. Noël emphasizes the inseparable link between the first abstract judgment and the intuition of existence: certainty arises from this judgment, which upholds reality through simultaneous “synthesis” and “affirmation”. In polemic with Gabriel Zamboni, the author examines the notion of psychic reality of the “self” versus the “non-self,” highlighting the direct character of existential cognition. He concludes with a pedagogical appeal for an early, provisional introduction of students to the whole Thomistic doctrine, treating metaphysical concepts initially as temporary scaffolding before the definitive account of knowledge’s nature.

The article sets the temporal and theoretical framework of early phenomenology, focusing on Brentano and Husserl, and outlines its shift from psychology to ontology as a pivotal stage leading to the emergence of analytic philosophy. The author emphasizes that both early phenomenology and analytic philosophy were characterized by a pronounced anti-psychologism, with the naturalistic form of anti-psychologism tracing directly back to Brentano’s and Husserl’s phenomenology, distinct from the later transcendental variant. The nineteenth-century debate on the relationship between philosophy and psychology is examined, from Kant’s critique of empirical psychology to Brentano’s descriptive psychology and the development of early phenomenology. In conclusion, Soldati argues that the naturalistic yet philosophical account of consciousness offered by early phenomenologists provided the foundational premises for the birth of analytic philosophy.

The subject of comparison of Husserl’s category of “now” with the category of “now” functioning in recentivism constitutes the notion of “living reality” in the sense of embroiling “now” into the activity of the stream of consciousness. In Husserl’s conception, this „living reality” falls apart into retention and protention. Hence, we deal with the passage of subsequent “nows”, taking nunc stans, which creates all other time- and logic-delayed objects for granted. This lack of an ontological foundation of the category of “now” in Husserl’s conception removes recentivism. In recentivism, though, the category of “now” constitutes punctum saliens (that is fluidity) on the one hand, and characterises being as newly formed each time, that is an event which in its new “now” is continually taking on the new otherness on the other hand. It is enough for an event to “be”, but “the way” it is is no longer dependent on the event, but a phenomenon which phenomenology would like to ignore. At best, it would like to eliminate it as insignificant.

The article presents two conceptions of a priori cognition, i.e. that of Kant and Husserl. Kant’s and Husserl’s positions differ as to the basis of importance of a priori. Kant conducts subjectivisation of a priori because, in his opinion, a priori criteria, such as generalization and necessity, have their basis in the recognising object, and, at the same time, express a subjective inability to present them in other way. Husserl, on the other hand, ontologises a priori, saying that aprioriness is grounded in the essence, and, as such, expresses an objective deriving from the essence’s inability to be in a different way. However, a consequence of a phenomenological ontologization of a priori is a discovery of a material a priori. The aritcle shows that it is possible to see an analogy between Kant’s and Husserl’s standpoints in terms of the scope of aprioriness. Kant’s subjectivisation of a priori, though, does not imply a total formalization of what is a priori because Kant is a creator of an idea of an un-clear synthetic a priori, where one can find similarities to Husserl’s material a priori.

In this article, I raise the issue of revisiting Immanuel Kant’s transcendental consciousness from the perspective of its hermeneutic application. Referring to the issue of a priori historicisation, I address the problem of the history of understanding, which I consider the main motive of a hermeneutic thinking. Thus, I analyse the structure of historical experience, as important to Wilhelm Dilthey and George Misch as to Hans-George Gadamer. Claiming, at the same time, that the main problem connected with it concerns the application of the category of understanding and interpretation in a wide range of historical inquiries, I show the consequences of the adaptation of transcendentalism to cultural studies. Therefore, contrasting historical consciousness to both a formal axiology by Heinrich Rickert, methodology of humanistic science by Dilthey, as well as a speculative historiosophy by Hegel, I prove that a perspectivitc thinking by Friedrich Nietzsche, contaminated by the maniersm of historicism, and used later on, among others, by Martin Heidegger, Gadamer and Gianni Vattimo, in his case to present the conception of “weak onthology”, constitutes a specific type of the opening of transcendentalism to the history. Just this opening, in a long chain of posttranscendental thinking I treat as an expression of the historicisation of Kant’s critical consciousness.

In this article, the author analyses the category of “learned ignorance” present in Socrates’ and Bodhidharma’s translations, contrasting it with a recentivistic theory of cognition. The article aims to show that Bodhidharma’s “learned ignorance” is expressed by means of the maxim of “I don’t know if I know anything”, and is recentivistic in character.

In this paper I tried to give a metaphilosophical characteristic of a philosophical method. I define a philosophical method, indicate its components, describe its relation to the subject matter and aim of investigation, and list difficulties connected with it. I assume that a philosophical method differs from the scientific one. Each philosophical method is based on philosophical theses. This connection between philosophical theses and an assumed philosophical method is shown on the example of the method of the philosophy of God. At the end of my paper I formulated an algorithm which can be used in examining a philosophical method.

The aim of this article is to present one of the most important motives of William James’ late philosophy referred to as pluralisic panpsychism. James considered the alternative, such as monism-pluralism, as the most important philosophical theme. In the article, his version of pluralism in relation to the categories of novelty and indeterminism is presented. Next, it is shown that James’ panpsychism can be interpreted as the result of the presence of non-dualistic tendencies in his philosophy. In conclusion, it is indicated that the category of panpsychism has not been developed.

The article is devoted to the presentation of the understanding of matter in the philosophy by Plotinus. It also constitutes an attempt to show a surface character of aporia of a hylemorphic structure of the noetic sphere. It points to the difference between a system function of aoristos dyas and noete hyle function from the perspective of dualism of existential principles. A characteristic of noetic matter presented in Enneads remains in an opposition to aoristos dyas constituting the principle of multiplicity and indefiniteness. A noetic matter determines the unity of a nous hyposthasis, and, as such, does not constitute the model of the matter of a sensual sphere. An understanding of the matter alone in the work by Plotinus is, basically, identified with an understanding of an aoristos dyas principle.

The article shows tension which exists at the contact of two models devoted to an interpretation of the world, i.e. a religious and naturalistic one. The author discusses: J. Hick, R. Braithwaite, A. MacIntyre, defends a religious understanding of reality, basing on the achievements of contemporary philosophy and methodological tools worked out by it. The philosophy of religion based on pluralistic assumptions does not consist in the undermining of this naturalism at all, but criticism of reductionistic tendencies connected with it. A naturalistic view on the world, which was developed at the end of the 19th century, led to the undermining of the legitimacy of religious convictions. Their defence from anthropological positions is connected with a postulate of an adequate and dialogic way of understanding man. In a multicultural dialogue, which is an intellectual call of our times, one should not escape the aspect of religion. Philosophy can help in developing the language to enable this dialogue.

The aim of the article is to present the sources of Alasdair MacIntyre’s political conception. Considering his criticism of contemporary culture as known, the issue of man’s subjectivity, its intellectual character, and perception of community as a place of thereby understood realization of the human nature follow. At the same time, an emphasis of the importance of philosophical reflection for self-knowledge of an average member of such a community somehow forces a conclusion on a political nature of an intellectual activity.

In this article, I present Höffe’s analyses, the most important consequence of which is his claim that the best form of a just state at the present civilisational stage is a democratic state of law. Before Höffe makes a claim like that, he places his considerations in a historical-philosophical context of a discussion on the theory of a just state (Plato’s, Aristotles’, Hobbes’ and Kant’s conceptions, and ideas of a political-legal positivism are quoted), as well as contemporary controversies evoked by the necessity of the existence of state as such (anarchism is cited at this point). It is necessary to present this context because it makes it easier to understand the way leading Höffe to the acceptance of a democratic state of law as a just system. The first part of the article is devoted to this issue. In the second part, I explain the most important anthropological-ethical fundaments on which Höffe bases his theory of a just state. Among them, the most significant seems to be an indication that man is a rational and combative creature by nature, and it is only the theory of a just exchange that helps to justify an obligatory character of basic human rights (Höffe calls them “basic human interests”). The third part shows the way Höffe authorizes the necessity of the existence of the state as such, as well as search for a certain form of a just state, which ends with the perception of a democratic state of law as a just system.

A critical-historical method proposed by Léon Brunschvicg is based on the assumption, according to which the subject of analysis should constitute recorded in history acts of human thought. Thus, the history of science is, according to the thinker, the only source of the knowledge in our cognition, whereas an identification of the conditions of capacity and cognition limits constitutes, in accordance with the assumptions of Brunschvicg’s critical idealism, a fundamental task of philosophy. An interpretation of the history of thoughts as an appropriate subject of a philosophical reflection is connected with numerous difficulties deriving from the incongruence of the rational and historical. The attempts the philosophers made to combine these two orders lead inevitably to a reduction of one them. Brunschvicg’s conception is also connected with numerous difficulties, which is reflected in numerous polemic opinions on this philosophical conception, as well as the method worked out on its basis.

The author of the article reconstructs the historiosophy of Witkacy, and makes an attempt to verify its main theses. A historical-philosophical reflection shown in The New Forms of Painting and Unwashed Souls concerns a disappearance of “metaphysical feeling” accompanied by the fall of “spiritual culture” (religion, philosophy, art) and development of “socialisation” supportive to a collective culture (science, common good, justice). A vision of the history of Witkacy is, according to the author, deterministic in character. Also, it is pointed out that the fall of “high culture”, foreseen by the philosopher as early as at the beginning of the 20th century, has not occurred out of the thin air, and the basic theses of his historiosophy can be positively verified.