Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego. Tom 29, pod redakcją Maksymiliana Pazdana.

The aim of the following article is to introduce characteristics of the Nordic countries’ cooperation in the field of private international law, with particular emphasis on legislative cooperation concerning matters of inheritance law. The study discusses the genesis, characteristics and methods of legislative cooperation, along with selected Nordic conventions on private international law. As an example of a legal act of such kind, the article presents the Convention of 19 November 1934 comprising private international law provisions on succession, wills and estate administration, the detailed analysis of which was based on the author’s translation of the act from Swedish to Polish. Selected detailed issues discussed in the content of the Convention were also presented, some of which were compared to the solutions adopted by Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012.

Contractual liability for damages is not limitless, which is also reflected in provisions of United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Internatiownal Sale of Goods (CISG). Limitation of liability can be introduced in several ways; in CISG Convention this was achieved by limiting the liability to foreseeable damages. In Polish scholarship this issue has received only minimal attention. The author of the contribution focuses on the interpretation of Art. 74 second sentence of the CISG. The aim of the contribution is to elaborate on key normative elements affecting the proper evaluation of the foreseeability and to propose a step-by-step method (scheme) of evaluating the foreseeability of damage that — in the author’s opinion — might ensure that such an exact and thorough evaluation according to the aforementioned provision. The author focuses primarily on the relevant time and subject of foreseeability, the perspective that ought to be taken into account, the factors affecting the foreseeability (will of the parties, binding practices and usages, knowledge of the party, as well as on the distinction between the objective foreseeability of damage (which refers to the damage that the party in breach ought to have foreseen) and the subjective foreseeability of damage (which refers to the damage that the party in breach had actually foreseen).

The present article addresses the issues relating to the agreements as to family business succession with a particular focus on the Catalan law pertaining thereto. The paper first identifies certain general difficulties that result from lack of official “family business” definition, both at the national and international levels. Then, briefly explains the specificity of the Spanish legal system, that is particularly visible from the perspective of inheritance law, the systems of which Spain has as many as seven, including Catalan, which is of particular interest in the present article. The paper then moves to the family protocol - the institution whose task is to fully and comprehensively assist family enterprises in arranging both internal and external relations with third parties. Then the special attention is devoted to the heretament and pacte successori d'atribució particular as examples of succession agreements in Catalan law. The admissibility of the succession agreements, as discussed by the author, is closely related to the continuity of family businesses. It is considered an appropriate measure to guarantee their integrity and intergenerational transfer. Therefore the author suggests that the Polish legislator should not cease searching for institutions that would support entrepreneurs in the process of inheritance planning.

The article is dedicated to the (still relatively unknown) EU Regulation 2016/1191. The Regulation disposes of some of the formalities with respect to circulation of the public documents within EU. In particular, no legalization in any form, including the apostille under the Hague Convention, will be needed with respect to documents covered by the Regulation. Unliked originally planned by the Commission, the Regulation does not, unfortunately, completes a more challenging goal of mandating recognition of the civil status throughout the Union. This issue still remains subject to national conflict-of-law rules. Moreover, the scope of Regulation is relatively narrow. It does not, again regrettably, apply to many public documents which are crucial in cross-border transactions (excerpts from commercial registers, powers of attorney for sale of immovable property).

The author analyses to what extent Regulation 2016/1191 offers progress in circulation of documents. This question is first raised in light of the long standing application of the Hague Apostille Convention. The author then attempts to discern the effective role of the Regulation given the fact that under Article 1138 of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure, no legalization in any form is in principle required for the foreign public documents to be treated as authentic and official proof in Poland (although the practice often is to ask for the apostille even if not required by law). Still, the Regulation 2016/1138 might come of assistance for the parties in some respects. First, it will facilitate acceptance of Polish public documents in those Member States, which have so far required apostille. Second, the Regulation may help to overcome an incorrect practice in Poland of requiring apostille by the officials, where Article 1138 actually dispenses of such formality. Third, the Regulation introduces an administrative cooperation based on the IMI system which allows to verify doubts as to the authenticity of the public document from another Member States. This last feature of the Regulation, it is argued, may prove of its true value to the freedom of circulation of public documents within the EU.

The article confronts the unilateral and multilateral methods in private international law. The author first identifies the basic differences between the two. She then moves to describe the instruments and concepts resulting from the unilateral method: the theories of the Statutists in the period between 12th to 19th centuries, the solutions offered by the so called new American school, the method of recognition of private situations crystallized in a foreign legal system,  the rules governing the spatial scope of the EU provisions, including the regulations and the directives, and finally the paradigm of the overriding mandatory rules.

The second part of the paper provides a comment to the Nikiforidis case. The author makes a number of critical remarks with respect to the restrictive and rigid interpretation of Article 9(3) adopted by the CJEU. The argument is made that the more flexible and functional approach proposed by the Attorney General Maciej Szpunar in his Opinion should be preferred. Finally, the author makes her own proposition regarding the Nikiforidis case. She advocates a unilateral methodology that rejects the distinction between the overriding mandatory rules of the legis fori, legis causae and these of a third country.

The Supreme Administrative Court has correctly adjudicated that without determining which inheritance law is applicable to the inheritance from the testator, the tax authority cannot categorically claim that an heir subject to inheritance and donation tax acquired the ownership of things or rights by inheritance at the time of the testator’s death. The ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court is also an opportunity to take a broader look at the provisions of the Act of the 28th of July 1983 on inheritance and donation tax which go beyond the issues covered by this jurisdiction. That act also raises other issues the resolution of which requires the application of conflict-of-law rules or, at the very least, of the methods of qualification specific to private international law.
The position adopted by the Supreme Administrative Court in this verdict should contribute to the increase of the interest of tax authorities in conflict-of-law issues. Inheritance and donation tax is a public levy with which, due to the nature of the legal events covered by it, there are cases with the so-called „foreign element”. These are also of interest to the conflict-of-law rules. When considering them, as follows from the ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court, it is necessary to refer not only to our own (Polish) provisions of civil law, but also, by applying appropriate conflict-of-law rules, to the provisions of foreign civil law.

This paper comments on a recent ruling concerning the choice of law to the individual employment contract according to the Rome I Regulation. In the judgement in the joined cases C–152/20 and C–218/20 (DG, EH v. SC Gruber Logistics SRL and Sindicatul Lucrătorilor din Transporturi, TD v. SC Samidani Trans SRL), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) provided the interpretation of Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation on two issues.

At first, the EU Court was asked about the freedom of choice of law applicable to the individual employment contract if (a) national law required the inclusion of a clause into that contract under which the contractual provisions are supplemented by national law and (b) the contractual clause concerning that choice was drafted by the employer. The second issue was connected with the concept of the employee’s protection, under which the choice of law may not have the result of depriving the employee of the protection afforded to him (her) by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement, under the law that would have been applicable to the contract in the absence of choice.

Regarding the first question, the CJEU admitted that the parties to an individual employment contract dispose of freedom to choose the law applicable to that contract, even if the contractual provisions are supplemented by national labour law under a (relevant) national provision, if “the national provision in question does not require the parties to choose national law as the law applicable to that contract”. Secondly, the Court found that the parties to an individual employment contract were “to be regarded as being, in principle, free to choose the law applicable to that contract, even if the contractual clause concerning that choice is drafted by the employer”. Therefore, the CJEU confirmed the application of the rules concerning the choice of law resulting from Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation to the individual employment contracts.

Referring to the second issue of the commented ruling, the CJEU confirmed that Article 8 (1) of the Rome I Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that, where the parties have chosen the law governing the individual employment contract, the application of the law that would apply to the contract in the absence of choice must be excluded, with the exception of “provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement”, if those provisions offer the employee concerned greater protection than those of the law chosen by the parties. The EU Court underlined that rules on the minimum wage could be treated as “provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement” and the law that, in the absence of choice, would be applicable should decide about it. Unfortunately, it is necessary to follow the commented judgment’s justification to correctly understand the concept of an employee’s protection applied in Article 8 (1) of the Rome I Regulation. The thesis of the ruling in this regard seems to be too laconic, and it can be misinterpreted. 

Tłumaczenie na podstawie szwedzkojęzycznej wersji porozumienia zmieniającego konwencję Överenskommelse med Danmark, Finland, Island och Norge om ändring av konventionen med Finland, Danmark, Island och Norge undertecknad i Köpenhamn den 19 november 1934, SÖ 1935:17, om arv, testamente och boutredning Köpenhamn den 1 juni 2012 (SÖ 2015:1) oraz norweskojęzycznej wersji tekstu jednolitego konwencji Konvensjon mellem Norge, Danmark, Finnland, Island og Sverige om arv og dødsboskifte (LOV-1934-11-19).