The article pertains to the matter of jurisdiction and the law applicable to relations between parents and children in Polish-Ukrainian relations. In recent years, in particular since the beginning of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, large waves of Ukrainian immigrants have come to Poland. The structure of the migration, with the domination of women and children, oblige Polish courts and other authorities to deal with the issues of parental responsibility, contacts with children, custody and maintenance in the cross-border context. In this situation, the bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Poland and Ukraine on legal assistance and legal relations in civil and criminal matters, signed in Kiev on 24 May 1993, acquires a new significance. It contains both the procedural rules (on jurisdiction, international legal aid, service
of documents, as well as the recognition and enforcement of judgments) and confl ict of law provisions in the field of broadly understood civil matters, including relations between parents and children. The author undertakes a critical analysis of the provisions of Polish-Ukrainian Agreement as with respect to filiation (children’s origin), parental responsibility and child maintenance. The anachronism of its solutions and the need for its termination is emphasized.

The subject of the study is the analysis of the conflict of law rules contained in Article 30 of the Agreement between the Republic of Poland and Ukraine on legal assistance and legal relations in civil and criminal matters, made in Kiev on May 24, 1993 (Journal of Laws of 1994, No. 96, item 465) determining the jurisdiction and applicable law for establishing, amending, terminating and canceling the adoption. Before proceeding with this analysis, some differences in the substantive and procedural/technical rules relating to adoption in Polish and Ukrainian law are pointed out. Furthermore, it is emphasized that under Article 30 of the Agreement the institution of renvoi plays no part. In the event of multiple Polish and Ukrainian citizenship, the decisive factor becomes the “effective” citizenship. Article 30, on the other hand, offers no solution for stateless persons. Next, the jurisdiction designated by Article 30 sec. 5 sentence 1 of the Agreement (dealing with matters of adoption, as well as the amendment, termination or annulment of the adoption) is analyzed. Subsequently, the author takes up the questions relating to determination of the law applicable to adoption by one person and the joint adoption by spouses. The author contends that the law applicable to the adoption is fixed and so it is not subject to changes. The article assumes that the effects of a full adoption “transform” — on the confl ict-of-laws level — into relations between parents and children, and the effects of a partial adoption are governed by the law applicable to the establishment of adoption.
The article shows that the law applicable to its establishment of the adoption is applicable also to the amendment, termination and annulment of adoption. The author further submits that in theory the public policy clause may be used under the Polish-Ukrainian Agreement, but in practice this should not occur too often because there are no provisions of the Ukrainian adoption law, the application of which would result in consequences contrary to the fundamental principles of the Polish legal order.

The Act of March 12, 2022 on Assistance to Citizens of Ukraine in Connection with Armed Conflict on the Territory of Ukraine introduced the possibility of establishing temporary custody for minor citizens of Ukraine who — following the war in their home country — found themselves on the territory of the Republic of Poland without the protection of adults (Article 25 of the Law). The author seeks to determine what are the grounds for the application of the above-mentioned provisions of Polish law to Ukrainian citizens while examining the grounds for asserting the domestic jurisdiction of Polish courts in temporary custody cases.
Despite the existence of a 1993 bilateral agreement in Polish-Ukrainian relations, which contains conflict-of-law rules on applicable law and jurisdiction, the 1996 Hague Convention on Parental Responsibility, to which both Poland and Ukraine are parties, takes precedence in guardianship cases. Article 6 of this convention stipulates that for the children who, due to disturbances occurring in their country, are internationally displaced, the authorities of the country on the territory of which these children are present as a result of their displacement have jurisdiction. Article 15 of the Hague Convention, on the other hand, stipulates that the authority that has jurisdiction applies its own law.
The author notes, however, that the Polish legislator has not referred to the abovementioned conflict rules justifying the jurisdiction of Polish courts and the jurisdiction of Polish law, but seems to treat the provisions on temporary custody as the international mandatory rules (lois l’application immédiate). It is also unfortunate that Article 25 of the Act refers to Polish law with regard to the premise of a minor present in Poland unaccompanied by “responsible adults.” However, the author contends that the point of reference here must be Polish conflict of laws (and not family law), which leads to the conclusion that the determination of who is responsible for the child should be determined on the basis of Ukrainian law.

The article presents an analysis of the provisions of substantive law and private international law in force in Ukraine regarding the maintenance obligation, as well as their application in judicial practice.
When presenting the issues regarding determination of the law applicable to maintenance obligations, the author fi rst refers to the possibility for the parties to choose the law applicable to maintenance obligations. Further attention is devoted to the determination of the applicable law on the basis of objective connecting factors to be considered by default when parties have not chosen the law applicable. General issues of private international law, such as circumvention of law and public policy clause, are also addressed in this context.
It has been underlined that in addition to the domestic law on private international law, the conflict-of-law rules are contained in bilateral international agreements on legal assistance and legal relations in civil matters binding on Ukraine, and in the 1993 multilateral Minsk Convention, which has a regional scope of application.

The article is dedicated to the matters of succession in the Agreement of 1993 on Legal Aid concluded between Poland and Ukraine. The author touches upon a number of issues. First, he discusses the role of the “general compatibility clause” provided for in Article 97 of the 1993 Agreement. He concludes that the clause does not produce effects with regard to the Regulation (EU) No 650/2012. Under the “general compatibility clause”, in all situations where the 1993 Agreement does not provide for a rule being the equivalent of the rules laid down in the Hague Convention of 1961 determining the law applicable to the form of a testamentary disposition, in Poland, in relations between Poland and Ukraine, the law applicable to the form of a testament is to be determined pursuant to the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1961.
Second, the author discusses the conflict-of-laws rules set out in the Agreement which designate, as the applicable law, either Polish or Ukrainian law. He contends that where the deceased is a Polish and Ukrainian national, in order to determine which of those nationalities have to be taken into account for the purposes of Article 37 (1) of the 1993 Agreement, the criterion of the most effective (more closely connected) nationality should be relied on. However, the situations that involve a deceased of Polish or Ukrainian nationality, who is also a third-State national, do not fall within the scope of the 1993 Agreement. The application of the 1993 Agreement is, on the other hand, not barred by the fact that an immovable property in a third State forms part of the estate. Jurisdiction and the law applicable to the succession of such immovable property must be determined, both in Poland and in Ukraine, pursuant to their general conflict-of-laws regulations on matters of succession. The author explains also that the drafters of the 1993 Agreement (in Articles 37 (1) and (2)) ruled out the principle of unity of succession in favour of the principle of scission, employing the connecting factors of nationality and of location of the immovable property. This results in numerous complications in the determination of the applicable law and in its application. However, the law applicable to succession determined on the basis of Article 37 (1) and (2) of the 1993 Agreement of 1993 governs the succession as a whole, with the exception of issues covered by other rules provided for in that agreement (for example, Article 39) and of the issues that do not fall within its scope of the 1993 Agreement. Although Article 39 (1) of the 1993 Agreement expressly mentions only consequences of defective consent, there is no doubt that the said rule also covers the legal requirements for effective declaration of consent.
Third, the author addresses the function of Article 38 of the 1993 Agreement, which is a substantive law provision on the estate without a claimant. This provision enjoys priority over Article 33 of the Regulation No 650/2012. Article 38 solely determines the State (Poland or Ukraine) acquiring the estate without a claimant. The concerned State enjoys the competence to designate the entity that will become the subject of rights and obligations forming part of the estate without a claimant.
Finally, the author comments on the pending case resulting from the preliminary question posed by the Opole District Court (Sąd Okręgowy, case no II Czz. 438/21). The Opole Court requested from the European Court a ruling on whether a Ukrainian national residing in Poland may, under Article 22 of the Regulation No 650/2012, choose Ukrainian law. The author suggests, that — although not without a doubt — it is tempting to answer this question in the affirmative. The argument here is that the freedom to choose the applicable law in matters of succession falls entirely outside the ambit of the 1993 Agreement and so the Agreement does not preclude the choice.

In this article the authors analyse the consequences of displacement of natural persons during war, in the field of private international law. That displacement may affect the determination of applicable law if the factors to be taken into account include domicile, habitual residence, permanent residence, residence or sojourn of natural person. Apart from discussing the general understanding of these factors, we present the situations where a person has lost links with the country of his or her nationality because of the war but has not acquired strong links with any other country. All of the issues are discusses in the light of legal assistance agreements, EU law, and national laws.