The article deals with phenomenon of art which uses so-called wet or biological media. Eduardo Kac - the author of the article as well as of presented works - tries to introduce totally new form of art: bio art and some of its variants (transgenic art, telerobotic art, protein art or biotelematic art). At the same time he underlines philosophical, ethical and social implications of such artistic creation. Since his work explores the boundaries between humans, animals and robots, and moreover - it manipulates or even creates life, it must be pursued with great care, with acknowledgment of the complex issues it raises and, above all, with a commitment to respect, nurture and love the life created.

The paper deals with the problems of the ideas of individuals in Plotinus’ system. The author claims that the concept as described in Enneads should not be seen as separate from the principles of Plotinus’ ontology. It may be proofed by pointing out the psychological context in which Plotinus puts this issue and the kind of understanding of noetic sphere in terms of multitude, which entails the individualization of souls, typical for Plotinus. He takes the ideas of individuals as connected with the concept of alethēs anthropos - the essential way of being of a man in the hypostasis of the Intellect (nous).

The paper is focused on interpretative analysis of the problematic construction of an absolute (absolutes) in Kamieński’s system, which is uncertain and controversial. Absolute as seen by Kamieński is not an absolute of all things (God) but a human being - „the absolute of all human things”. This makes the concept of Polish philosopher significantly different not only from other Polish thinkers but also from Hegel. According to Kamieński, man gets a knowledge concerning the existence of absolute form the absolute’s „results”. It cannot be recognized rationally. The recognition of the absolute in Hegelian sense could be possible only if the man would turn himself in God. Hence, an absolute a priori knowledge is possible in terms of human world only.

The Paper deals with the relation between Hartmann’s and Wittgenstein’s understanding of the notion of „metaphysics”. The main thesis is as follows: despite Kantian sources of both points of view, Hartmann’s and Wittgenstein’s concepts should be conceived as independent.

The paper presents Husserl’s conception of the transcendental reduction taken as a mode of revealing those constitutive achievements of consciousness which were covered in the natural attitude. This aspect of Husserl’s writings was pointed out by Ludwig Landgrebe, Paul Janssen and Shigeru Taguchi. Taking their works into account, the author focuses on reduction in terms of excluding the thesis of natural attitude. To exclude this thesis it is first of all necessary to reveal it and recognize as a thesis, for in natural attitude it is fulfilled anonymously and remains covered. Reduction of the thesis of natural attitude leads to its reflective revealing, that is refraining from its anonymous, mindless fulfilment. It is through revealing the thesis, taken as an experience of consciousness, that we recognize that the reality needs to be understood as a correlate of the thesis, and ultimately: correlate of subjectivity which works as fulfilling the thesis. Hence, anonymously fulfilled in natural attitude, the thesis on the world’s existence is recognized, thanks to the reduction, as a constitutive achievement of consciousness.

The paper deals with the concept of „unconsciousness” in the history of post-Cartesian philosophy. Focusing on B. Spinoza’s concept, the author analyses the possibility of a certain understanding of Spinoza’s hypothesis of the unconsciousness and his idea of psychology as speculative version of Freudianism (the practical part of Spinoza’s philosophy may be conceived as a version of Freudian analysis).

The aim of the paper is to discuss two kinds of simple-minded ethics taken as intention of justified understanding of the world. This intention, which is not rooted even in science, is intuitively unfailing. Both kinds of ethics include specific keywords: a recentiori (derived from „now”) expresses the opinion according to which everything we recognize is recognized for the first time, whereas a satori (Sanskrit - „from awakening”) refers to mystical transformation of personality. The comparison between them is made on the ground provided by recentivism according to which description of certain phenomenon may be taken as justified in a real-time only. In both cases the migrating element (recens), which is aimed at self-perfection and nirvana, stands out. At the same time it is a common element for both kind of ethics.

Working out the experience of a man as both starting point and research method of philosophical anthropology, Karol Wojtyła conjoined two seemingly separated and contradicting philosophical stances: metaphysics and phenomenology. This new method was expressed in a theory of the experience of man (person) taken as phenomenological experience, rooted in a conscious experience of knowing subject which, as a person, is faced with themselves as both subject and object. This insight - itself a kind of self-recognition of particular man, based on their personal experience understood along such lines - appears as ultimate moment of the experience of man. Simultaneously, this kind of personal experience allows an overall experience gathering in itself three kinds of experience and different cognitive attitudes. Taking this idea as granted, the experience of the „other” shows up as the experience of „non-I”, which makes it necessary to justify one’s own presence in the area of the experience of man and explaining its methodological uniqueness.

My aim in this paper is to try to encapsulate a selection of issues typical for philosophical anthropology from the standpoint of Alfred North Withehead’s metaphysics. Whitehead himself has not presented any developed anthropological theory. Yet, if his metaphysical theory is supposed to give possibility of interpretation of every element of possible experience, it might be also useful to provide a new research perspective for anthropology. For this reason I start with a brief discussion of Whitehead’s metaphysics: the actual entity (one of Whitehead’s key categories), descriptions of the process of unifying of actual entity and the dynamic structure of living organism (including man). Finally, I attempt to analyse certain issues of philosophical anthropology from this perspective: personal immortality, identity, freedom and man’s openness to the world.

The idea of „resembling unification” as developed by John of the Cross is broadly discussed by scholars of his work. The key queries here are not only those of how this kind of unification, the highest moment of mystical unification possible in earthly life, is possible in the mystic’s soul, but also what role is played by two fundamental powers of soul: mind and will. In John’s view their tasks are clear: while unifying with God they turn towards their supernatural objects, which are the virtues of, respectively, faith and love. Yet, the problem of what is the nature of the unification thus understood remains unsolved. Is it a kind of intellectual insight or an experience of emotion and will? How should be understood the „substantial touches” in the very heart of the soul which John mentions in the descriptions of states of the highest unification? Finally, what is the difference between unification in the substance of the soul and transformation of its powers and is this unification identical with participation in the life of God itself as John describes it? The aim of the paper is to answer those questions.

Pascal’s Wager is still one of the most original arguments concerning the fundamental issues of philosophy of religion. What is especially interesting here is its multi-faceted character, as philosophical and theological analysis is combined with elements of probability calculus and game theory. The aim of the paper is to present its critique by Alan Hájek, contemporary Australian philosopher. Hájek argues that Pascal’s idea of „profitability” of the faith in God is based on a fallacious argument. On the ground of contemporary knowledge in probability Hájek declines all three Pascal’s key premises:
1. It is rational to ascribe positive value to the probability of God’s existence.
2. Man has to choose to believe or not to believe and it is possible to predict the consequences of this choice depending on whether God exists or not.
3. Rationality demands to choose the act which leads to the biggest expected value.

Review of Aleksander R. Bańka's book Désiré Merciera ogólna teoria pewności (Désiré Mercier's General Theory of Certainty), Katowice: University of Silesia Press, 2008.

Review of Krzysztof J. Pawłowski's book Dyskurs i asceza. Kształtowanie człowieczeństwa w kontekście mistyki filozoficznej [Discourse and Asceticism: Shaping Humanity in the Context of Philosophical Mysticism], Kraków: TYNIEC Wydawnictwo Benedyktynów, 2007.

Review of Janina Gajda-Krynicka's book Filozofia przedplatońska (Pre-Platonic Philosophy), Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2007.

Review of Milovan Ješič's book "Descartes' Metamorphoses in the Philosophical Reception of Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger," Prešov: Rokus Publishing House, 2006.

Review of Józef Tischner's book “Ethics and History: Lectures,” Krakow: Józef Tischner Institute of Thought, 2008.

Report from the international conference “Corporeality as a subject of reflection in contemporary philosophy,” which took place from May 12 to 14, 2009, in Ustroń. The conference was organized by the Department of Philosophical Anthropology and Philosophy of Civilization and the Polish Philosophical Society, Katowice Branch.

Report from the conference “Argumentation and Rational Change of Beliefs,” which took place from April 1 to 3, 2009, in Ustroń. The conference was organized by the Institute of Philosophy of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Silesia in Katowice.

Report from the conference “What is ‘prima philosophia’ in the 21st century?”, which took place on May 5-6, 2009, in Katowice. The conference was organized by the Philosophers' Scientific Circle at the Institute of Philosophy of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Silesia in Katowice.