Fish are unique animals: due to their distinct habitat and modes of communication, our contact with them is very limited. Consequently, they evoke less sympathy from us than mammals or birds. At times, even their capacity to experience pain and suffering is questioned. This issue is crucial because sentience is essentially the sole basis for attributing moral status to fish. As such, they are primarily protected by the principle against cruelty. Fish are neither subjects of life nor non-human persons. They are protected under the principle of equal consideration of interests, yet they are simultaneously regarded as replaceable beings. Legal protections concerning, for example, transport and slaughter conditions are far weaker or altogether absent. Public opinion rarely advocates for fish, largely because few people are aware of fish farming practices and the conditions therein. Therefore, it is important to draw attention to the suffering of these animals and the need to extend protective measures to them as well.

Fish can be considered from two perspectives: instrumental and ethical. The instrumental approach views fish as economic resources to be exploited in fisheries and aquaculture, as well as vital elements of ecosystems that play a key role in maintaining biological balance. From this standpoint, fish possess instrumental value. The ethical perspective, by contrast, emphasizes the ability of fish to feel pain, recognizing them as sentient beings with moral status. The article examines neurobiological and behavioral evidence suggesting that fish have pain receptors (nociceptors), display protective responses to harmful stimuli, and learn to avoid painful situations – indicating a basic form of consciousness and the capacity for subjective experiences of pleasure and pain. The article also considers the arguments of skeptics, who contend that fish lack sufficiently developed brain structures, such as the neocortex, which are thought to be necessary for the conscious experience of pain. From this viewpoint, the behaviors exhibited by fish may be attributed to nociceptive reflexes rather than to a conscious experience of suffering.

This paper examines the production of meat, including fish, through in vitro techniques, commonly referred to as cultured meat, as a potential solution to reducing animal suffering while addressing the growing global demand for food, including aquatic products. The first poultry products developed using this method have already received regulatory approval in Singapore and the United States. Further expansion of cultured meat production is expected in the coming years, including in the European market, subject to a positive assessment by the European Food Safety Authority. This paper also discusses the potential environmental and public health benefits of cultured meat production, alongside the key challenges and barriers to its commercialization.

The study aims to analyze the differences in the commodification of bluefin tuna by examining examples of how it has been valued by people in both ancient and modern times. The first aspect addresses the process of anthropomorphism. In ancient art, the attribution of human characteristics and behaviors to tuna influenced how they were perceived and valued. The second aspect of commodification examined in the article is the modern mass consumption of tuna, which diminishes its worth compared to the appreciation of its culinary qualities in the ancient world.

In 1847, the world’s first Vegetarian Society was established in England. Its founding principles declared that members were not allowed to consume meat, poultry or fish. While the eating of non-flesh animal-based products was left to the choice of individual Society members, the principle of not eating the “Three Fs” (flesh, fowl, fish) was mandatory – a necessary condition to be considered a “vegetarian.” So those who wanted to be vegetarians had to also give up fish. This restriction provoked much debate and
controversy, and the level of opposition went beyond that of red and white meat. This was due to the special status of fish in religion and the wider culture. Why should a Christian not eat fish as Christ did? Vegetarians, in turn, defended their position by invoking theological, ethical, aesthetic and health and hygiene-based arguments. This article presents all these arguments and discusses the detailed reasons that nineteenth-century vegetarians formulated to justify their refusal to eat these beautiful and sensitive creatures.

Water disasters pose significant risks to wildlife, livestock, and companion animals. While training programs are available for zootechnicians and veterinarians in the Global South and the Anti­podes, Europe currently lacks such initiatives and is facing events unknown to previous generations due to climate change and anthropogenic factors. This study analyzed traditional and social media platforms in Greece (September 2023), Poland, and Germany (August 2022 and early 2024), focusing on mentions of flooding, water quality, and dead fish. Tools such as Brand24, Google Trends, and observations by epizootiologists were employed for the analysis. The results highlighted the importance of social media in identifying the biological causes of the Oder disaster while also emphasizing the spread of misinformation. In Greece, the economic impact of the floods was the dominant topic, with little attention paid to ecological concerns. Mitigating ecological disasters requires effective media monitoring and crisis communication, early warnings, and collaboration with civic groups (e.g., anglers).

The main purpose of the article is to present contemporary fishing as a form of cultural archaism. Angling constitutes an act of cruelty to animals under the guise of sport, recreation, and relaxation. It involves catching, tormenting and killing fish, which, according to scientific knowledge, are sensitive, intelligent, conscious, and capable of suffering. The article provides an overview of fishing practices and offers an ethical assessment of them.

The article is a sketch of the current state of knowledge about the aspect of the sentience and internal life of fish, which is still too rarely taken into account – about the construction of pain experiences, affective states and possible emotional experiences. In order to draw conclusions about the possibility of fish feeling emotions, firstly it is necessary to answer questions about simpler content that characterize the fish cognitive system: whether fish are able to create a special type of affective-physiological feeling, such as pain with distress, and whether fish have simple affective states – fear or anxiety – which are correlated with the experience of pain. The rudimentary nature of these issues results from the assumption that the simplest behavioral reactions and cognitive-affective sensations are considered a necessary condition for the ability to construct more complex cognitive structures, such as sensorimotor experiences, mental representations and emotional states. The ability to feel pain and the correlated ability to feel negative affects, such as fear or anxiety, can be considered indicators of a species' possession not only of physiological needs, but also of mental preferences. Thus, the ability to experience pain with fear and anxiety can be treated as a predictor of cognitive-behavioral flexibility and a certain degree of cognitive control in fish.

A positive answer to the questions about feeling pain, fear or anxiety is a starting point for further analyzes of the cognitive system and neurobehavior of fish. In the first part of the text, I consider the physiological ability of fish to feel pain. In the second part of the text, I analyze the phenomenon of constructing negative affective states based on the neurophysiological and cognitive components of the experience of fear. I propose a compromise position between defenders of basic emotions in animals and supporters of the theory of constructed emotions. I present how the affective experience differs from typically cognitive percepts and what are the basic functions of the experience of fear in vertebrates and invertebrates. The whole text is summarized with final remarks that encourage discussion about the social, ethical and legal consequences that result from the fish sentience and richness of the mental landscape of fish.

This article proposes a new criterion for assessing an animal’s capacity for suffering, focusing on psychological criteria, particularly avoidance learning. This criterion may allow for a more comprehensive assessment of suffering in various species and situations. The theory of integrative levels explains the development of avoidance behavior and presents the probable cognitive threshold for animal suffering. Animals capable of avoidance learning are more likely to suffer, as this behavior requires the ability to form associations between stimuli and actions and make predictions about future events, which may lead to aversive emotional states. The proposed criterion offers an objective way to assess suffering without relying on ambiguous terms like “consciousness” or “sentience,” providing a broader, more accurate evaluation method.

In this paper, the author analyzes a criminal case concerning the humane protection of carp, which lasted over a decade (2010–2023) and can be considered groundbreaking for the protection of fish and, indirectly, other animals in Poland. The case involved nine decisions by prosecutors and courts, including two rulings by the Supreme Court. The author examines why it took so long to reach “justice for fish,” what made the carp case so difficult to adjudicate, and why it provoked radically different evaluations among legal authorities. Drawing on the theory of hard cases, the author introduces the concept of a “hidden hard case” – a situation in which the judiciary, due to its entanglement in a particular socio-cultural context, struggles to correctly apply legal provisions, even though their proper interpretation is attainable using standard legal interpretative methods. One of the factors contributing to the emergence of hidden hard cases is the adjudication of cases involving animals perceived as distant or unfamiliar to humans. The author argues that identifying and addressing hidden hard cases in animal protection cases is a necessary step toward the proper application of animal protection law. At the same time, it requires incorporating hermeneutic insights on the influence of pre-understanding on legal interpretation. Finally, the article formulates interpretive directives for legal actors handling cases involving the protection of sentient animals.