The aim of this article is to draw attention to an issue that has a long history: the problem of hate crimes in the United States of America. There is no doubt that hate crimes are the type of crime that attack the very principle of individuality that is an entitlement under the equal protection of the law (in the U.S.). Bearing the foregoing in mind the above, and that the number of such crime has increased at an alarming rate, this article describes and discusses types of hate crimes such as: Racist and Religious Hate Crimes, Sexual Orientation-Based Hate Crimes and Disability Hate Crimes as an extended projection of the analysis, several solutions have been proposed to mitigate tensions and combat the prevalence and severity of hate crime in all its forms.

This article concerns the possibility of conducting proceedings in the absence of the accused or his or her defence counsel even though they have duly justified their absence. The study discusses grounds for applying Article 378a of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure, alongside some issues connected with submission of a motion for the supplementary taking of evidence. The paper assesses the ratio legis of Article 378a of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure in the context of the principle of a fair criminal trial, the right to court and the right to defence. The author analyses this legal norm de lege lata and formulates de lege ferenda postulates.

The aim of this work is to analyse Article 524, § 3 of Polish Code of Criminal Procedure and, on the basis of the systemic and functional ways of judicial interpretation, to provide the answer to the question about the possibility of refusing to accept (by the president of the court to which the cassation was submitted) or leaving unexamined (by the Supreme Court) the cassation filed against the accused after more than one year of the date on which the judgment has become final, if, at the same time, it is not even theoretically possible, in that particular case, to change the appealed judgment in favour of the accused. The view was expressed that the adoption of the proposed interpretation of this provision would contribute to a significant relief to the Supreme Court, while maintaining all procedural guarantees for the parties, which, according to the author, may be of particular importance, especially during the period of combating the effects of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.

The analysis of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure shows a clear asymmetry in the rights of the accused and the victim as regards the right to interpreting. Despite the implementation of subsequent amendments, the legislators consistently ignored the rights of the victim with regard to the right to interpreting; when they actually dealt with that issue, it was done in a fragmented and selective manner.
Moreover, the exegesis of the provisions on the right to interpreting leads to the conclusion that the analyzed right is not fully regulated by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and some extremely important normative parts of it must be decoded from the Law on the System of Common Courts. Both these spheres interpenetrate each other, which is undeniably undesirable from the point of view of the standard of legal certainty and transparency.
This study aims at identifying legislative shortcomings, as well as at proposing de lege ferenda solutions in relation to the analyzed right of the victim to interpreting.

In the presented gloss, the author, on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court, analyzes the relation of Article 54 § 1 to Articles 53 § 1 and 3 of the criminal code. The author’s aim is to establish the significance of the educational goal of punishment in light of the directives of punishment. The phrase “first of all” is an essential thing for the interpretation of the provision of Article 54 § 1 of the criminal code and the establishment of the aforementioned relation. Ultimately, albeit the author uses a different argumentation, she agrees with the Supreme Court’s resolution.

The institution of attempt is used relatively frequently in the practice of justice system.
Importantly, it always separates the punishable stage of attempt from punishable preparatory activities, and therefore constitutes the limit of criminalization. Despite its practical importance, using of the indicated legal structure, raises a number of doubts that are related to the proper interpretation of the normative concepts comprising it. A consequence is moving the limit of punishability of the crime by adjudicating authorities. It can raise some objections – from fundamental principle of criminal law in
the form of nullum crimen sine lege point of view. The article discusses the problems of that appear in jurisdiction in connection with the application of the attempt institution; these problems raise interest among doctrine. The author confronts irreconcilable judgments. The Author searches interpretative solutions that seem the most appropriate from theoretical and dogmatic structure of the successful attempt and inept attempt point of view.

In the presented article, the author analyzes practical issues related to the service of process of the public prosecutor’s decisions related to the search and seizure during the course of the preparatory proceedings. The first part of the paper discusses the search and seizure regulations in urgent cases. In the course of further deliberations, the focus is on search and seizure regulations, obligation on the service of public prosecutor’s decisions and opportunity of its appealing. The author points out that this practice is wrong and suggest what the optimal solution should look like, even without legislative changes, but with the right interpretation of the current regulations. All the considerations lead him to present his own final conclusions and de lege ferenda postulates.

In this paper the author considers the connotations between the presidential pardon applied under the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the judgments of foreign courts sensu largo. This article deals with issues that are on the borderline between constitutional law, criminal law (substantive and procedural) and international law, both public and criminal. The analysis of literature and jurisprudence in this respect allows the author to conclude that the right of grace is significantly limited by international law, due to the international agreements and art. 9 of the Polish Constitution. The author argues that the acceptance of a punishment to be enforced (ordered by a foreign court) excludes the possibility of applying presidential law of clemency to the perpetrator, unless an international agreement (or custom) provides otherwise.